POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY QUARTERLY, Vol. 6, No. 2, April 1987,145-150

French geopolitical thought in the interwar years and

the emergence of the European idea

GEOFFREY PARKER

Department of Extramural Studies, University of Birmingham, Birmingham Bl5 2TT, England

ABSTRACT. The reactions of French geographers to German GeopoIitik were accompanied by attempts to examine France’s role as a great power after World War I. There were two major approaches to this question. One saw France’s future as being principally a colonial power while the other saw her as a central part of a united Europe. The idea of closer European unity in place of strife became an important theme in French geopolitical writing during the 1930s. French geo- political thought of this period can be seen as moving along lines similar to those which led to the establishment of the European Communities after World War II.

‘It will be necessary to give attention in Annales de Ge’ographie to the study of states and the political organisations which these arrangements are going to create.’ So wrote Lucien Gallois after the Treaty of Versailles (Gallois, 1919: 248). Subsequent French attitudes to the rise of Geopolitik in Germany were conditioned both by their opinion of what constituted the proper study of geography and by a growing apprehension concerning the intentions of their powerful eastern neighbour. It was this above all which made a number of French geographers forsake their cherished regional monographs and, albeit reluctantly, endeavour to apply the study of geography to international issues.

French geographers of the period demonstrate in their writings that they were uneasy both about Germany and about central Europe-Mitteleuropa-as a whole. In L‘Europe centrale, de Martonne (1931: 3) viewed the whole region as a meeting-place of diverse elements, but one lacking the harmony of oceanic Europe. Zimmermann saw it as a sort of cauldron in which the constituents had not fused properly and which consequently remained in ‘a dangerous state of instability’ (Zimmermann, 1933: 633). The Germans were seen as bearing the principal responsibility for this situation. They constituted, as Ancel put it, ‘a mass which weighs on central Europe’ (1938: 195). Just before the outbreak of World War II Demangeon wrote that of all the states ‘grown recently on the soil of old Europe, there exists none more original, nor more disquieting, than Germany’ (Demangeon, 1939: 114). These geographers were also aware of the most disquieting feature of all which was that, despite temporary appearances to the contrary, the balance of

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146 French geopolitical thought and the European idea

power had by then swung decisively from France to Germany. Taking Bismarck’s indices of ‘iron and blood’, Germany’s ~pulation and her capacity for producing iron and steel made her, even in defeat, potentially a far more formidable power than was France.

The writings of the German Geopolitiker were well known to the principal French geographers, and works by Haushofer and others were given lengthy reviews in Annales de Gdographie. A number of articles on Geopolitik also appeared from time to time, and Demangeon and others acquainted the French geographical community with the German view of their country which it expressed. Demangeon quoted Dix’s view that ‘France as a world power is finished’, and Haushofer’s that ‘France will be the first country to be inherited by the powers of the future’ (Demangeon, 1932a: 29). They regarded France, said Demangeon, as having been bastardized by the colonial races and forced to employ ‘les methodes carthaginoises’ to hold on to her empire.

For their own part, French geographers had very unfavourable views both on Geo~o~itik and on its practitioners. ‘Mystical theories of territory become a driving force in German political mythology’, said Goblet (1936: 16). He dismissed it contemptuously as a ‘pseudo

science’ relying on geographical ‘spagyrics’. It was abstract and metaphysical and had been developed ‘with grim fanaticism’ to justify German expansionism. ‘It deliberately renounces all scientific spirit’, said Demangeon, who saw it as in reality forming part of the German war machine. It was deterministic, and postulated ‘a bronze law of geopolitical influences’ which left the human spirit passive and crushed (Demangeon, 1932a: 24). Ancel also denounced this ‘pseudo-geographic’ as being ‘la science propagandiste allemande’ (Ancel, 1938: 186). It substituted for Ratzel’s Ramn (espace) the vaguer Volk (people) and in this way sought to legitimate ‘une expansion infinie’. Siegfried summed up French attitudes when he wrote that Geopobtik, despite its scientific clothing, ‘donne la nausee’ (preface to Ancel, 1938).

Whilst French geographers were thus united in virtually universal condemnation of the ideas emanating from across the Rhine, French geopolitical thinking itself had two quite distinct strands. In the first of these France was an autonomous great power acting in pursuance of her national interests as she saw them; in the second she was also engaged in furthering her national interests, but aimed to do so through the wider European dimension. The great power thinking took place against the background of the boost to national pride afforded by the victory of 1918, the Treaty of Versailles and the return of Alsace-Lorraine. Thanks to French geographical education, there was by then a widespread perception of I ‘hexagone as being the final and eternal shape of France. It was once again complete thanks to the replacement of the final piece of the territorial jigsaw, ripped out half a century earlier. The same enemy was seen as being still the principal danger to the m~ntenance of France’s integrity, and despite defeat and loss of territory, the spatial factors underlying Germany’s power appeared to remain largely intact. In order to counteract this, having failed, as a result of the opposition of her British and American allies, to secure any further weakening of German economic power, France then endeavoured to enter into alliances with the new states of eastern Europe. The object of this policy was to establish a cordon smituire which would prevent further German expansion to the east. The enthusiasm of many French political leaders for this course of action found surprisingly little echo among geographers. Whilst the dangers of a resumption of the Rang nach Osten were well understood in the context of the inherent instability of Mitteleuropa (Ancel, 1938: 185), the construction of a French-dominated East European bloc did not constitute a significant element in their geo- political thinking.

IVIore attention was paid to the importance of the colonial empire as an alternative basis for national power. During the 1920s colonial geography became an important study, and

GEOFFFEY PARKER 147

the books and articles of the period show a growing belief that the development of La Pius Grande France (Betts, 1978: 52) was regarded as an important supplement to the nation’s waning power in Europe. Hardy (1933), Ferenczi (1938), Demangeon and others saw the future of France as being closely bound up with her success as an imperial power after the manner of Great Britain. While Haushofer in his Teutonic bastion derided France as a ‘half- African power’ forced to employ Carthaginian methods, the African dimension was something which large numbers of French geographers took to with an enthusiasm which was noticeably lacking for their country’s posture as a great power in Europe. Colonization was welcomed for its economic, strategic and political value to the metropolis. France must ‘extend sea commerce and associate the colonies in the national effort’, said Gallois (1920: 213). Colonies were also seen as possessing an important value as breeding grounds for a new generation which would in time revitalize la vied/e France. Demangeon was of the opinion that the possession of a front de colonisation was the greatest boon a nation could possess, since it injected the a&&e pap with its vitality (Demangeon, 1932b: 632). ‘Colonies’, he asserted, ‘imposed the necessity for a struggle against the rigours of nature’. He called for a more vigorous policy in North Africa and lamented the fact that France was a far less successful colonial power than was Great Britain. Clemenceau had seen a contra- diction between ‘la rke coloniale’ and ‘la politique du pot au feu’, since he considered that the more the nation’s resources were devoted to the colonies, the more would the mother country itself be weakened (Holt, 1976: 51). However, most geographers who concerned themselves with colonialism, far from agreeing with The Tiger, took the line of Jules Ferry that ‘we could have one eye on Tunis and the other on the Vosges’ (Holt, 1976: 48).

The other strand of French geopolitical thinking was very different in spirit, but never- theless some geographers succeeded in embracing both. Its underlying thesis was that it was in their own best interests for the nations of Europe to end their historic conflicts and to come together for the common good. An early protagonist of this view was Demangeon in his book LR dklin de I’Europe (1920). He maintained that the world had been made one by the Europeans and had been organized in their interests. Now the non-European world was itself beginning to take a hand in its own destiny. In particular he singled out Japan and the United States, both in the course of building up their own systems which would inevitably come into conflict with the Eurocentric world order. As a consequence, Europe was now beginning to experience ‘a crisis of hegemony and expansion’ and could no longer maintain its ‘privileged fortunes’. It was thus imperative that Europe should establish a new system to act in the interests of the continent as a whole and to arrest its otherwise inevitable decline.

The same theme was subsequently taken up by Ancel, Decugis and Goblet. Like Demangeon, Decugis emphasized the need for Europe to unite in the face of the new constellations of power and the end of European world hegemony. ‘The equilibrium of world forces is destroying itself to the detriment of Europe’, he said. ‘The emancipation of America, the emancipation of Asia, the emancipation even of Africa’ were in the throes of bringing this about (Decugis, 1936; quoted in Demangeon, 1938: 59). Ancel regretted that, since World War I, Europe had been artificially divided by ‘watertight bulkheads’ which were impeding the natural development of regional interrelationships (Ancel, 1938: 185). The frontiers of states were merely lines drawn on maps-‘zig-zags bigarres’- and despite claims to ‘solutions ‘ ‘evidentes’ ’ cartesiennes’ , in reality no permanent answers to Europe’s problems were offered. The true human realities lay hidden beneath this artificially created political surface. ‘The walls of these Jerichos will fall at the sound of the trumpets which will awaken the bound and sleeping nations’ (Ancel, 1938: 188). The ‘ Jerichos’ were imperial states and those with hegemonial aspirations, and geography, he said, would eventually and inevitably take its revenge upon them. He saw this most strongly

148 French geopolitical thought and the European idea

in the Rhinelands where ‘la civilisation rhCnane’ was something far more enduring than the

enforced Prussianization which had taken place there in recent times. Such consciousness of underlying realities arose naturally from that Vidalien tradition which saw pays as the enduring building blocks of the human landscape, and the true frontiers as transition zones to other genres de vie (Parker, 1985: 94).

Demangeon returned in 1928 to his theme of European unity. In an article in Annales

(Demangeon, 1928: 268) he proposed a ‘bloc europeen’ to face the other continents. ‘One must hope for a United States of Europe . . . When this union has been accomplished, it will not be necessary again to speak of the decline of the West.’ He urged Great Britain to join such a grouping, maintaining prophetically that Britain had to choose between her Empire and Europe. ‘If she chooses Europe, she will have given to the West her eminent role in humanity.’

By the late 1920s French foreign policy, under the direction of Aristide Briand, had become increasingly committed to a European solution. Briand had come to see that his country could not rely indefinitely for her security on the maintenance of military pre- dominance over her old enemy, and that more realistic arrangements needed to be examined. As French Foreign Minister from 1926 to 1932, Briand refined his ideas on European cooperation and brought them together in 1930 as the Briand Plan for European Union. The term ‘United States of Europe’ was first used by him in a speech to the League of Nations in 1929, just after its use by Demangeon in his article in Annales de Gdographie. In

this and subsequent speeches on this subject, he urged the forging of closer international links. ‘Between nations geographically grouped like those of Europe a federal link must be

created . . . [and] h t w a must be built is a permanent organisation to handle European problems’ (Thompson, 1932: 321-325). Again,

Europe is geographically a unit [so] there are problems which exist for all. The economic question should be the first one to be considered, but even in political and social problems, it would often be to the advantage of various countries to meet and solve questions in common.

Despite Briand’s federalist umbrella, his approach was essentially a functionalist one and close in substance to that advocated by Demangeon.

At this time many European political leaders were well disposed towards such ideas, and during the ministries of Briand and his counterpart in Germany, Gustav Stresemann, much progress was made. Its failure by 1932 was brought about in part by the disappearance from the scene of the two principal actors, but, more fundamentally, it was caused by the world economic crisis and its effects on the political situation in Germany. The refusal of the British government to take part was also crucial. In his 1928 article Demangeon had stated the choice facing Britain, and in 1932 Britain made clear that she had chosen the imperial option. From that time on Europe turned rapidly to what Goblet termed ‘the barbarous theory of economic nationalism’ in a belated and ultimately doomed attempt to solve its economic problems. Following the departure of Briand, French administrations placed greater emphasis on strengthening the colonies and on the alliance with Great Britain.

The European idea had become central to French foreign policy during the Briand years, and accompanied the dawning realization that new solutions had to be sought to the problem of chronic French weakness in the face of German strength. The breakthrough to the European dimension arose from this, and thus the well-being of France was sublimated into that of Europe as a whole, and the process of fusing France and Europe into a new geo- political unit was envisaged. French weakness in the face of Germany was in this way widened to that of Europe in the face of developments in the rest of the world. Both France

GEOFFFEY PARKER 149

and Europe had lost their former hegemony and so needed to take action to protect their interests. For a time the French and the European problem seemed almost as one and, not for the first time, the interests of France and those of Europe as a whole were equated.

While Demangeon was the most effective and influential French geographer involved in the formulation of a European policy, Ancel expressed the geographical philosophy lying behind it. To the watertight bulkhead of Raum he opposed the flexible idea of groupement, implying openness, permeability and the development of natural relationships throughout the continent (Ancel, 1938: Ch XII). Mucht he countered with civilimtion and determinism with the primacy of the human spirit. This was an appropriate enough response at the best of times for a great and civilized nation, but one particularly opportune when that nation was also conscious of its own fundamental weakness.

It was to take nearly twenty years, and another world war, before the European idea was resurrected. The prime mover this time was Jean Monnet who had been Deputy Secretary- General of the League of Nations during the period when Briand was one of the great champions of internationalism. His carefully thought-out proposal for the creation of a grouping of European nations was given the enthusiastic support of Robert Schuman, a French Foreign Minister in the Briand mould. The close working relationship between the two men was to produce the Schuman Declaration of May 1950, and the Treaty of Paris, a year later, which set up the European Coal and Steel Community. The essentially functionalist and transnational approach of this organization echoed the proposals of the Briand Plan. Both were realistic methods which sought to address the urgent problems facing the continent through an understanding of the realities which lay beneath the arti- ficially created political surface. Such an approach had been inherent in both Demangeon’s bloc and Ancel’sgroupement. It was also in line with Goblet’s proposal in 1935 that ‘living and evolving agreements’ should replace ‘dusty parchments in archives’, and that ‘an experimental order’ should be created founded upon geopolitical realities (Goblet, 1936: 256-257). It was exactly an ‘experimental order’ of this sort that Jean Monnet was now proposing in the wake of World War II and the eclipse of the old Realpolitik (Parker, 1983: 6-7), and it came to fruition in the first of the Communities. While Monnet is rightly regarded as the principal architect of the European Community, the intellectual foundations of the Community method can thus be traced back to French geopolitical thinking in the interwar years. Gallois’ call of 1919 ultimately met with a response so powerful that it was to be instrumental in rolling up the old political map of Western Europe and beginning to draw a new one, founded upon firm geopolitical realities.

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