Freight Movement in Emergency Situations

8/18/2019 Freight Movement in Emergency Situations

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Research Report

AP-R512-16

Freight Movement in Emergency Situations


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Prepared by

John Dudgeon

Publisher

Austroads Ltd.Level 9, 287 Elizabeth StreetSydney NSW 2000 AustraliaPhone: +61 2 8265 3300

[email protected]

Project Managers

Simon Grieve and Greg McFarlane

Abstract

This study researches how essential and general freight movementassists the economic resilience of industry and communitiesimpacted by emergencies. The literature review confirmed thispremise, as did six public and private sector workshops.

Essential freight is defined as goods or services without whichsignificant further or compounding economic loss would be suffered.General freight includes important and normally repetitive freightflows.

For the relatively sparse networks of Australasia, keeping essentialand general freight moving offers high economic benefits for disasteraffected communities. Potentially, an increased focus by governmenton this matter could make a worthwhile contribution to the economic,employment and social resilience of disaster affected communities.

With the new understanding of the importance of economic resilienceduring and after emergencies, and the contribution made to this byessential and general freight movement, change is needed. It issuggested that the economic resilient objective needs to change froma helpful reaction to being part of a systematic approach based onthis policy imperative. Many suggestions are made in Chapter Fourfor jurisdictional consideration. One is that incidents on key freightroutes likely to disrupt flow for four hours could or should bemanaged under emergency processes.

At the workshops it was evident that good working relations existed

between the jurisdictional agencies responsible for emergencymanagement. This provides a sound basis for the suggestions toprogress essential and general freight movement. Care is needed inmaintaining relationships and focus during governmentrestructurings.

It was also evident that, with exceptions, relationships between the jurisdictional agencies and the road freight industry stakeholder/s andoperators were not as well maintained. There is much to be gainedby both parties through increased engagement.

Abo ut Austro ads

Austroads is the peak organisation of Australasian roadtransport and traffic agencies.

Austroads’ purpose is to support our member organisations to

deliver an improved Australasian road transport network. Tosucceed in this task, we undertake leading-edge road andtransport research which underpins our input to policydevelopment and published guidance on the design,construction and management of the road network and itsassociated infrastructure.

Austroads provides a collective approach that delivers valuefor money, encourages shared knowledge and drivesconsistency for road users.

Austroads is governed by a Board consisting of seniorexecutive representatives from each of its eleven memberorganisations:

Roads and Maritime Services New South Wales

Roads Corporation Victoria

Department of Transport and Main Roads Queensland

Main Roads Western Australia

Department of Planning, Transport and InfrastructureSouth Australia

Department of State Growth Tasmania

Department of Transport Northern Territory Territory and Municipal Services Directorate, Australian

Capital Territory

Australian Government Department of Infrastructure andRegional

Australian Local Government Association

New Zealand Transport Agency.

Keywords

Economic resilience in emergencies; Freight movement inemergencies; Essential and general freight movement; Heavyvehicles and emergency management; Heavy vehicle detours in

emergencies; Emergency management and State Road Agencies.

© Austroads 2016

This work is copyright. Apart from any use as permitted underthe Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by anyprocess without the prior written permission of Austroads.

ISBN 978-1-925451-04-7

Austroads Projec t No. FS1808

Austroads Publ ication No. AP-R512-16

Publication date April 2016

Pages 49

This report has been prepared for Austroads as part of its work to promote improved Australian and New Zealand transport outcomes byproviding expert technical input on road and road transport issues.

Individual road agencies will determine their response to this report following consideration of their legislative or administrativearrangements, available funding, as well as local circumstances and priorities.

Austroads believes this publication to be correct at the time of printing and does not accept responsibility for any consequences arising fromthe use of information herein. Readers should rely on their own skill and judgement to apply information to particular issues.


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Austroads 2016 | page i

Summary

The Freight Movement in Emergency Situations study ‘seeks to identify the methods utilised by jurisdictionsto move essential freight and keep general freight moving in emergent situations’. Essential freight is definedas goods or services without which significant further or compounding economic loss is suffered; generalfreight includes important and normally repetitive freight flows.

Austroads desired to document member experiences in keeping freight moving and lessons learned from themultiple cyclone, flood, fire and earthquake emergencies early in the decade. The Austroads brief intimatedany lessons would potentially benefit other road users, as well as improving the social, employment andeconomic performance of emergency stressed communities.

The literature review highlighted a key factor in minimising community social, employment and economicdistress during and after emergencies, is ensuring essential and general freight movement, as well as

response heavy vehicle movements. This focus requires a high priority by road agencies working with otherGovernment agencies during the planning, preparation, response and recovery phases of emergencies.

Six multi-agency public and private sector workshops were held in Queensland, Western Australia, SouthAustralia, New South Wales and New Zealand during mid-2013, outside the period of most emergencies.Victoria was affected by an emergency so its workshop was held in June 2014.

The project’s continual challenge was to maintain a freight movement focus. Many workshop attendees,

understandably, focussed on their agency roles during the emergency. However, a freight movement focus isof great importance in ensuring emergency economic resilient outcomes for communities. During anemergency, governments and the media are focussed on saving lives and preserving property with theassistance of emergency response freight movements.

The literature review, workshops and project analysis determined that another key focus of road agenciesshould be facilitating essential and general freight movement to better maintain economic resilience.Economic resilience should be incorporated into the highest level of emergency management objectives, asit is in some jurisdictions already. The Road Freight Risk Conceptual Model, adapted from a ProductivityCommission report, may assist in this.

Workshop attendees generally exhibited an increasing awareness of the community importance of essentialand general freight movement, and the workshops enhanced this. Importantly, the multi-agency and roadfreight sectoral workshop approach allowed two-way feedback. Road freight operators discussed agencyperformance, including communication, during emergencies and road agencies gave information to the roadfreight sector on government obligations, objectives and priorities, resources, issues and improvementprograms. This experience suggests that road freight industry feedback at workshops should be sought

periodically. Such would enable emergency and road agencies to obtain road freight operator feedback ontheir performance, communication efforts and issues arising, and address selected matters. Road agenciescould benefit as the road freight industry can assist or harm agencies in its separate meetings withgovernment.

Australia is a big country with big differences in weather related emergencies and in the density and locationof resilient road freight routes. The need for timely, appropriate information increases significantly in

jurisdictions and areas with sparse road networks, where road freight operators use restricted accessvehicles (RAVs) or in emergencies affecting cross border networks.


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Austroads 2016 | page ii

Workplace Health and Safety legislation obliges road freight operators to have Continuity Plans (CPs) foremployee/driver security and safety. CPs force road freight operators to defer freight movements if ‘Single

Point of Truth’ (SPoT) information is not provided within about four hours from an incident occurring. Thisseemed not to be appreciated by many government attendees. To alleviate incident economic costs, it issuggested that the appropriate State agencies consider triggering emergency processes for all incidentssuch as crashes, likely to exceed a certain timeframe. The four hour suggestion should be confirmed

following agency and industry dialogue.

Cancellation of freight services is costly. It also mitigates against the emergency economic and communityresilience sought by governments. Road freight operators interrogate many sources of information beforecancelling services. Stranding of vehicles due to road closures causes a higher cost than trip deferrals, soemergency road closure timings is an important issue for monitoring.

A SPoT jurisdictional communication source is needed by the road freight sector where this is not alreadyprovided. The SPoT source could provide the likely duration of impacts, the available road freight routedetours and forecast the expected re-opening of weather affected road assets. It is acknowledged that thesecan all change during an emergency.

In almost all jurisdictions, the road agency has non-emergency communication responsibility for freight (and

passenger) safe movement across road and transport assets, and the related content and systems. Roadusers are familiar with their road agency communication role. Road agencies should continue being theSPoT during emergencies, but with increased focus. The jurisdictional payback for timely SPoT informationfor road freight operators should be a reduction in emergency personnel distracted from their primary task byrepeated information requests.

Importantly, emergency and Police agencies are responsible for community safety and emergencymanagement. Their role need not displace nor detract from road agency responsibilities for essential andgeneral freight movement (and road user) performance and communication outcomes over impaired assets.However, it is crucial the relevant agencies focus on their respective accountabilities and work well together,as seems to be generally occurring.

Every emergency is different and has diverse impacts. Multi-agency planning and preparation, before, duringand after emergencies, are processes that alleviate confusion and mitigate impacts. New Zealand found that‘a focussed program of planning and preparation for foreseeable disaster impacts can result in more resilientroad network surviving to perform a role following disasters’.

Funding repair clarity for roads damaged during emergencies is another factor affecting their closure andreopening. Regular workshops would assist in clarifying and refining processes.

During emergencies, clarity in agency accountabilities and their delivery and relevant timely communicationgreatly assists the freight transport industry. This is most effectively achieved through modern, commonmulti-agency platform IT systems, where prepared traffic management plans (TMPs) for the emergency areacan be deployed and communicated, including for RAVs. It is crucial that government agencies all havesecure access to these platforms.

Jurisdictional road and transport agencies vary in their emergency road related performance,communication, and use of common IT platforms with other emergency and Police agencies. Considerationof the project documentation may assist these agencies in considering future actions. Suggestions forimprovement are contained primarily in Section 4.2 of this report.

Report suggestions may assist in a greater awareness and visibility of freight movement, and itsinterdependence on the public sector infrastructure and road freight industry performances in collectivelycontributing to industry and community economic resilience when disasters and emergencies areexperienced.


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Austroads 2016 | page iii

Contents

1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 1

1.1 Background ...................................................................................................................................... 1

1.1.1

Learning from Disasters ...................................................................................................... 1

1.1.2

Overview of Road Freight Movement in Australia ............................................................... 1

1.1.3 Damaged Transport Networks and Emergency Response Priorities .................................. 2

1.1.4 Freight Movement for Economic and Social Recovery ....................................................... 2

1.2

Project Purpose, Scope and Outline ................................................................................................ 3

1.2.1 Project Purpose ................................................................................................................... 3

1.2.2 Project Definitions................................................................................................................ 3

1.2.3 Project Scope ...................................................................................................................... 4

1.2.4 Project Administration and Methodology ............................................................................. 4

2.

Literature Review ................................................................................................................................... 5

2.1

Literature Review Process ............................................................................................................... 5

2.1.1 Literature Review Approach ................................................................................................ 5

2.1.2 Literature Review Methodology ........................................................................................... 5

2.1.3

Out of Scope Literature ....................................................................................................... 6

2.1.4 In-Scope Freight Movement ................................................................................................ 6

2.2 United States of America Literature ................................................................................................. 6

2.2.1

Department of Homeland Security ...................................................................................... 7

2.2.2 Transportation Research Board .......................................................................................... 7

2.2.3 Federal Highways Association .......................................................................................... 10

2.2.4

Washington State Department of Transportation .............................................................. 10

2.3 Japan and New Zealand ................................................................................................................ 13

2.3.1 Japan ................................................................................................................................. 13

2.3.2

New Zealand ..................................................................................................................... 14

2.3.3 Christchurch Earthquake and Focus on Economic Recovery ........................................... 15

2.3.4 Disaster Preparation and Response ................................................................................. 16

2.4

Australian Literature ....................................................................................................................... 18

2.5 Disasters and Mitigation Productivity Commission Report ............................................................ 18

2.5.1 Productivity Commission Report and this Project ............................................................. 20

2.5.2

A Framework for Effective Risk Management ................................................................... 20

2.6

Lessons from the Literature Review ............................................................................................... 21

2.6.1 USA Observations for this Project ..................................................................................... 21

2.6.2

USA Lessons for this Project ............................................................................................. 22

2.6.3 Lessons from Japan and New Zealand ............................................................................. 23

2.6.4 Key Lessons ...................................................................................................................... 23

2.6.5

Next Steps ......................................................................................................................... 24


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Austroads 2016 | page iv

3.

Workshops Approach and Conduct................................................................................................... 25

3.1 Intent and Workshop Structure ...................................................................................................... 25

3.2 Preparation ..................................................................................................................................... 25

3.2.1

Project Manager Attendance ............................................................................................. 25

3.2.2 Roles ................................................................................................................................. 26

3.2.3

Invitations and Materials .................................................................................................... 26

3.3

Conduct .......................................................................................................................................... 26

3.3.1 Pilot Workshops ................................................................................................................. 26

3.3.2 Typical Workshop Structure .............................................................................................. 27

3.3.3

Workshop Challenges ....................................................................................................... 28

3.4 Workshops ..................................................................................................................................... 28

3.5 Workshop Documentation .............................................................................................................. 28

3.6 Awareness of the Other Party Obligations ..................................................................................... 29

4. Emergencies and Freight Movement ................................................................................................. 30

4.1 Context ........................................................................................................................................... 30

4.1.1

Jurisdictional Geography Variations .................................................................................. 30

4.1.2 Emergency Economic Resilience and Road Freight Risk ................................................. 30

4.1.3 Leveraging Knowledge ...................................................................................................... 33

4.2

Key Lessons ................................................................................................................................... 33

4.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities ................................................................................................ 33

4.2.2 Policy and Legislation ........................................................................................................ 35

4.2.3

Planning ............................................................................................................................. 36

4.2.4

Preparation ........................................................................................................................ 37

4.2.5 Partnering .......................................................................................................................... 39

4.2.6

Technology Platforms and Communication ...................................................................... 40

4.2.7 Funding for Emergency Management and Road Infrastructure ........................................ 41

4.2.8 Liaising and Reviewing ...................................................................................................... 41

4.2.9

Urban Networks and Emergency Freight Movements ...................................................... 42

5.

Discussion and Suggestions .............................................................................................................. 44

5.1 Scope ............................................................................................................................................. 44

5.2 Literature Review Matters .............................................................................................................. 44

5.3

Emergency Economic Resilience ................................................................................................... 44

5.3.1 Emergency Management Progress in Jurisdictions .......................................................... 45

5.3.2 Relationships among the Parties ....................................................................................... 45

5.4

Suggestions .................................................................................................................................... 45

Glossary and List of Acronyms ................................................................................................................. 46

References ................................................................................................................................................... 48


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Austroads 2016 | page v

Tables

Table 2.1: Out of Service Duration by Proportion for Transport Systems followingChristchurch Earthquake ........................................................................................................ 17

Table 2.2: Insurances Losses by Disaster and State or Territory ........................................................... 19

Figures

Figure 1.1: Share of Australian Domestic Freight Tonnes ......................................................................... 1 Figure 2.1: DHS NPG Recovery Mission

Area Targets for Economic Recovery ....................................... 7

Figure 2.2: Indicative Map of Australia’s Key Freight Routes .................................................................... 8 Figure 2.3: USA National Highway Network for Conventional Trucks ....................................................... 9 Figure 2.4: Urban Road Freight Route in Washington State .................................................................... 12 Figure 2.5: Widespread Inundation One Month after the GEJE............................................................... 14 Figure 2.6: Flooding in Rockhampton, Queensland, 3 January 2011 ...................................................... 14

Figure 2.7:

Christchurch Quake Landslide Damage on Port Lyttleton Christchurch EvansPass Road, 2011 .................................................................................................................... 15

Figure 2.8:

Canterbury Bridge with Structural Retrofits to increase Resilience to Earthquakes .............. 17

Figure 2.9:

Factors Reducing the Three Disaster Risks .......................................................................... 21

Figure 4.1: Victorian PBS 2A Road Network Density ............................................................................... 31 Figure 4.2: The Road Freight Emergency Risk Conceptual Model .......................................................... 32


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Austroads 2016 | page 1

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

1.1.1 Learning from Disasters

Many Australian jurisdictions and New Zealand have over recent years experienced catastrophic naturalevents that have required primacy to be given to response and recovery operations on a damaged transportsystem. Rapid and innovative responses were required in order to keep freight moving on damaged or non-typical transport networks.

In the three years prior to 2013, Australasia experienced a severe earthquake decimating the City ofChristchurch, Victoria’s most tragic bushfires, Category 4/5 cyclones in Queensland and Western Australia

and major general flooding in Queensland, New South Wales and Victoria.

Austroads desired to have their experiences documented, and any lessons from them researched. Thiswould allow jurisdictions to refine processes to respond more effectively to future emergencies.

1.1.2 Overview of Road Freight Movement in Australia

The Centre for Transport, Energy and the Environment (CTEE) synthesises data from the transport, energyand emission domains to establish the national transport task in Australia.1 Of the five modes reported, theroad mode is most relevant for this commission.

The amount of freight transported within Australia grew by 4.6% in 2012/13 to 4.08 billion tonnes. The share

transported by road was 71.5%, with a further 24.9% by rail. Pipelines catered for the next largest share(2.3%), followed by sea (1.2%). The Australian domestic freight modal share is depicted in Figure 1.1.

Figure 1.1: Share of Australian Domestic Freight Tonnes

Source: Australian Transport Facts (ATF) 2015 by the CTEE

1 The CTEE is owned by Adam Pekol Consulting Pty Ltd, trading as Pekol Traffic and Transport

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

Air

Sea

Pipeline

Rail

Road

Tonnes (million)


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On a jurisdictional basis, New South Wales accounted for 26% of the national road freight task (in terms oftonnes), followed by Victoria with 23%, Queensland with 22% and Western Australia with 18%. The otherStates and Territories contribute the remaining 11% of the national total.

Much of the freight task performed by rigid trucks occurs in urban areas. A much smaller proportion of thefreight task carried by articulated or multi-combination vehicles occurs in urban areas.

Rigid trucks travelled 9841 million kilometres in Australia in 2012/13. Of this, 68.2% occurred in urban areasand nearly a third (31.8%) elsewhere. Even in rural or regional areas, most rigid truck trips are relativelyshort distance, with many being operated to service the agricultural sector.

In contrast, the longer distance road freight task in Australia is borne mainly by articulated vehicles. Of the7267 million kilometres travelled by articulated vehicles in Australia in 2012/13, over two thirds (70.6%) tookplace in rural, regional or remote areas. For many of these trips, their exposure to flooding, landslips,avalanche and fires, is a matter for planning and operational response.

Urban areas in Australasia occupy a small proportion of the landmass, so they may be less likely toexperience disasters than regional and remote areas. Due to the concentration of population and economicactivity in urban areas, they are greatly impacted by disasters when these do occur.

1.1.3 Damaged Transport Networks and Emergency Response Priorit ies

Transport systems may be vulnerable alongside coastlines (from cyclones and tsunamis), along rivers andflood plains (from general flooding caused by cyclones and rain depressions), along mountainous terrain andtheir nearby creeks and rivers (from landslides, avalanches and flash-flooding) and in earthquake or fire-prone areas.

The consequences of these weather or geological risks are that transport networks in many areas ofAustralasia are vulnerable to damage and potential closure.

When transport networks are compromised by disasters, the primary need is to find resilient elements thatcan be used for emergency response and recovery operations.

During a flood, fire or earthquake, road network requirements can change dramatically. Not only are parts ofthe network suddenly and completely unavailable, but the types of freight requiring movement can shiftsuddenly from regular, prearranged freight movements to urgent, ad-hoc and difficult ones, to supportcommunities that are often in sudden need of basic supplies.

The logistics of moving essential goods and equipment freight on a fragmented network to support damagedor isolated communities requires immediate action. In particular, emergency and road agencies mayimplement processes and undertake actions that would not otherwise have been done in normal situations.

1.1.4 Freight Movement for Economic and Social Recovery

Depending on the scale of the disaster, disaster response and recovery traffic movements and preservingsecurity for damaged towns and dwellings, can overwhelm or constrain the availability of the remainingtransport elements for their normal social and economic use. This can impede the ability to maintain crucialfreight movements required by businesses and for employment.

However, recent research shows that general freight movement is essential for maintaining the economy andemployment of disaster impacted communities, and their social wellbeing.

Jurisdictions have had to develop rapid and innovative responses to keep non-emergency related freightmoving on damaged or non-typical transport networks.


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In some cases, these have proven to be successful and are being implemented as standard practice. Anexample in Queensland includes stocking stores before the emergency with essential goods that will berequired immediately afterwards, to reduce the subsequent heavy vehicle demand on a damaged system.But many general freight movements in the agricultural, transport, manufacturing, mining and retailingsectors are generated continuously irrespective of disasters.

Non-essential freight movements on a fragmented, already damaged network have the potential to causesignificant further damage to newly vulnerable assets. On the other hand, restrictions on general freightmovement have the potential to harm businesses and employment not initially affected by the emergency.This can also increase the longer run social and economic costs to the emergency affected community.

Emergencies have also highlighted the need to support freight routes that connect communities. While theseroutes generally carry lower traffic, and as such often receive less funding allocations, it is in emergencysituations when their function often changes from lower-level freight route to that of a vital link for localcommunities when the primary freight route has been damaged or cut.

1.2 Project Purpose, Scope and Outline

1.2.1 Project Purpose

Austroads Project FS1808 seeks to identify the methods utilised by jurisdictions to move essential freight,and keep general freight moving, in emergency situations such as floods, fires and earthquakes.

1.2.2 Project Defin itions

Disaster Types

In this report, an emergency or natural disaster is defined as a naturally occurring, rapid onset event that

causes a serious disruption to a community or region. This could include a flood or flash-flood, bushfire,earthquake, storm, cyclone, storm surge, tornado, landslide or tsunami.

With respect to essential or general freight movements, emergencies during this project were broadened toinclude the impacts of high temperatures and droughts.

Emergency Duration

During the course of the workshops, road freight operators also reported that any event that closed roads forlonger than four hours, for example crashes, initiated similar emergency processes on their businesses, asdid emergencies or natural disasters. While the scale of the impact may be smaller, the impact on thebusiness was similar.

Freight Types

Essential freight is defined as goods or services without which significant further or compounding economicloss would be suffered. Examples include movement of:

Grain and additives to poultry farms and cattle feedlots, without which the livestock perishes;

Perishable annual agricultural commodities, such as transporting grapes to wineries;

Fuel, without which road freight cannot move; and

Coal for power generation for refineries, without which the ore will solidify leading to months of lostproduction and rectifying effort.


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General freight includes important and normally repetitive freight flows. Examples include food, fuel andwater for people, and inputs and production in the agriculture, manufacturing and mining sectors, some ofwhich may be able to be stored for a period.

It is noted that there is potential overlap of the project scope with emergency management. An example isthe transport of bottled water during emergency response if the local water supply operation has suffered

damage. Although bottled water is routinely supplied in stores, the demand in an emergency situation isgreatly increased. In this eventuality, the supply of bottled and other water for the local population would be amatter for emergency response.

1.2.3 Project Scope

The scope of this project does not include emergency response and recovery transport. This includes thesignificant freight or special purpose heavy vehicle flows generated in the immediate response toemergencies. These are needed to preserve lives, limit public and private property damage and provideemergency goods and services to communities. Examples of heavy vehicle responses are the movement offire trucks and water carriers to respond to fires, and movement of trucks carrying maintenance equipmentand emergency generated supplies.

Not including emergency response vehicles in the scope is due to these being given priority access generallyby an emergency controller using the powers of jurisdictional emergency legislation. This could occur undera road authority permit or exemption for RAV access.

The scope of this project includes identifying and documenting the measures jurisdictional road agenciestake to support or reinstate the essential and general freight flows, as defined in sub-section 1.2.2, into andout of communities. Inbound freight flows may include food, fuel and water; outbound freight flows mayinclude agriculture, mining and manufactured products.

1.2.4 Project Admin ist ration and Methodology

Pekol Traffic and Transport (PTT) was commissioned by Austroads to undertake the FS1808 FreightMovement in Emergency Situations project. To facilitate its delivery, PTT has worked with the ProjectReference Group (PRG) members of State Road Agencies (SRAs). The guidance and advice of theAustroads Project Manager, Simon Grieve, who also chaired many of the workshops is gratefullyacknowledged, along with the assistance of Greg McFarlane, the subsequent project manager.

A literature review was conducted to inform the project research. It is noted there are many papers writtenand conferences held about emergency response matters, including the excellent Chartered Institute ofLogistics and Transport, New Zealand (CILTNZ) 2012 The Logistics of Natural Disaster Recovery conference. The literature review was described in Working Paper 1 (WP1) and is reported in Chapter 2.

Workshops were held in many jurisdictions. Multi-agency public and private sector workshops were held in

Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia, New South Wales and New Zealand during mid-2013,outside the period of most emergencies. Victoria remained affected by an emergency so its workshop washeld in mid-2014. While unavoidable, it delayed the project by a year. The workshops were organised by the

jurisdictional PRG members, who also provided advice on organisational involvement. Their assistance wassignificant and is appreciated.

The workshops were reported in Working Paper 2 (WP2), which described the various jurisdictionalstructures and approaches that may provide lessons for each other. Key points from Chapter 3.

The literature review and workshops provided a basis for analysis of the lessons learned and for suggestionsdeveloped. This analysis is also the subject of this report.

A List of Acronyms and Glossary is provided in this report prior to the References.


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2. Literature Review

The aim of this Chapter is to document the literature review process and findings for the project. Theliterature review was conducted in mid-2013. It is augmented with selected recent research.

2.1 Literature Review Process

2.1.1 Literature Review Approach

The literature review for this project identified both public and unpublished information.

The first step was to identify and summarise documentation from selected sources, nationally andinternationally, that described actions taken to support the movement of freight in emergency situations.Additionally, PRG members have identified and provided access to a range of unpublished jurisdictionalmaterial. Such is incorporated judiciously into this Chapter.

A traditional literature search focussed on identifying published disaster/emergency documentationcongruent with the project scope. This involved a process of identifying actions taken to facilitate generalfreight movements before and following emergency situations, and/or the lessons learned.

The results of this search are reported in Section 2.2 for the USA, 2.3 for Japan and New Zealand, whichwere grouped as the literature revealed their responses to their tragic earthquake disasters, and 2.4 for theAustralian approach. Chapter 2 concludes with the recent Disaster and Mitigation Productivity CommissionReport and discusses the lessons learnt.

2.1.2 Literature Review Methodology

The literature review was conducted by searching a range of websites for English language, non-commercialdocumentation relating to the in-project scope movement of freight.

The countries targeted were the USA, Japan and New Zealand, as well as Australia. The USA and Japanwere a focus due to known recent experiences with disasters, including flooding, cyclones (hurricanes) andearthquakes. As well, research in the USA provides a clearing-house for transport focussed research,worldwide.

Websites were searched for literature about:

government sector (USA, Japan, New Zealand) planning and management of non-emergency freightmovements during disasters in affected areas

road freight carrier companies of Japan company reports containing information of freight performanceand movements

lessons learnt by these countries, which may be able to be applied to the Before and Recovery stages for Australia’s freight movements.

Where documentation was found, associated references were investigated.


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2.1.3 Out of Scope Literature

The literature review did not include disaster response considerations, including:

infrastructure assessment and access

evacuation of people and animals

delivery of emergency response personnel

equipment and services – food/drink, fuel, sanitary items, waste removal, fuel delivery.

The literature review also discounted the following:

economic data in general, except where this related to in-scope matters

industry data, for example, freight tonne growth

passenger transport

light freight delivery services on the basis that these are more likely to be in urban areas and to be flexibleenough to be quickly re-established

mode freight competitiveness and/or share.

2.1.4 In-Scope Freight Movement

In seeking literature, it was recognised that the four general phases of disaster/emergency managementwere important for describing in-scope freight movement, being:

Usual/Before: In-scope freight movement, even at heightened or restricted levels

During: Discounted in-scope freight movement during this period

Response: In-scope freight movement, not or minimally associated with response

Recovery: In-scope freight movement, not or minimally associated with recovery

In particular, literature associated with the movement of heavy or special purpose vehicles preparing for, inresponse to and during recovery from disasters, was not included as it is out of scope. This type of excludedmovement included, for example, equipment to remove earth or fallen trees or buildings, assist human rescue, aswell as rebuilding and reconstruction activities, and the resupply of food, water, medical stores and equipment.

In essence, literature describing how the remaining essential and general road freight transport fared duringthe disaster phases was sought during this literature review. Supply chain and logistics aspects of roadfreight transport were also of interest where these provided context.

2.2 United States of America Literature

The websites of the following were accessed for information:

Center for Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance

American Trucking Associations

Department of Homeland Security

Transportation Research Board, and its National Cooperative Freight Research Program

Federal Highway Administration Washington State Department of Transportation.


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Only the last four are described below; the full literature review is reported in WP1.

2.2.1 Department of Homeland Security

In its September 2011 National Preparedness Goals (NPG), the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)states a number of factors that are important in its five mission areas. The DHS mission areas arePrevention, Protection, Mitigation, Response and Recovery.

Within the Recovery DHS Mission Area, the DHS NPG Goal is:

Recovering through a focus on the timely restoration, strengthening and revitalisation of infrastructure,

housing, and a sustainable economy, as well as the health, social, cultural, historic and

environmental fabric of communities affected by a catastrophic incident.2

To give effect to this goal, the DHS NPG has developed Capabilities and Preliminary Targets for theRecovery Mission Area. There are eight Capabilities and Economic Recovery is one of these. Its Capabilityand Preliminary Targets are illustrated in Figure 2.1.

Figure 2.1: DHS NPG Recovery Miss ion

Area Targets for Economic Recovery

The focus of this project would fall within actions to implement Preliminary Targets 1 and 2 of the DHS NPG.

The next sub-section documents literature illustrating approaches the USA is taking towards these.

2.2.2 Transportation Research Board

A review of the nearly fifty National Cooperative Freight Research Program (NCFRP) reports revealed littleresearch directly related to this project.

However, one report provided a good level of information about the quantum of freight movement in the USAand also the density of its road (and rail and maritime) freight network.

The NCFRP Report 16 of the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies entitled Preservingand Protecting Freight Infrastructure and Routes was published in 2012. It states on page 1:

According to the Commodity Flow Survey, on average, 42 tons of freight worth $39,000 was delivered

to every person in the United States in 2007. When considering the distance involved in transporting

this freight, an average of 11,000 ton-miles (nearly 18,000 tonne-kilometres) was delivered to every

person in the country.

Freight volumes and the transportation of those volumes are driven by consumption. Moreover, a key

determinant of consumption growth is population growth, which makes growth in freight volumes and

the need to transport these increasing volumes a virtual certainty.

2 This DHS NPG Goal was restated on page 166 of the (Disaster Resilience, 2012) report; and Author’s emphasis.


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The 2015 Australian Transport Facts3 report states that in June 2013, Australia’s population was 23.1 millionpeople. In the 2012/13 financial year, the national domestic road freight task totalled 2923 million tonnes and221 billion tonne-kilometres. This equates to 127 tonnes per person (or 72% of the national figure) and 9570tonne-kilometres per person (or 35% of the national figure).

(When rail, sea and aviation are included, the freight task becomes 4085 million tonnes or 639 billion tonne-

kilometres. This equates to 177 tonnes and 27 660 tonne-kilometres per person. Much of this increase is dueto rail haulage of iron ore and coal, and the sea transport of bauxite. These three high tonnage, long distanceexports influence or skew the national freight statistics.)

The above figures assume that the total road freight task in Australia is domestic and that all the rail andmaritime freight tasks are international; neither assumption being correct. There will be some balancinginfluences from these assumptions, but these are unlikely to be entirely congruent. But even this simplisticapproach indicates that Australia and the USA have similar freight tasks.

A key difference is the density of the Australian and USA National Freight Networks. Australia’s Key RoadFreight Routes were approved by the Transport and Infrastructure Council of Ministers on 7 November 2014,which is shown in Figure 2.2.

Figure 2.2: Indicative Map of Australia’s Key Freight Routes

Source: Transport and Infrastructure Council website

The comparative USA National Freight Network is shown on page 3 (NCFRP Report 16, 2012) and formsFigure 2.3.

3 Australian Transport Facts, CTEE, 2015.


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Visual inspection reveals significantly more opportunities for different road freight trip paths in the USA thanin Australia, should any road link or links be closed by a disaster.

Perhaps in the USA, there is less need to secure general road freight movement across disaster damagedroad links, as other roads can provide this function without too much deviation and cost. This may explain theUSA focus on the economics and community impacts of freight movement disruptions (DHS NPG, 2011).

This report’s emphasis is on identifying economic issues and inhibitors and specifying economic recoveryperformance in recovery plans.

Figure 2.3: USA National Highway Network for Conventional Trucks

A second relevant report was found on the Transportation Research Board website. The 2012 report wasentitled Disaster Resilience: A National Imperative. It was produced by a consortium of consultants andacademia for the National Academy of Sciences. This report focussed principally on the health impacts and

organisational collaboration and processes that could result in better resilience, with transportation viewedprincipally as contributing to resilient outcomes. The report contains some interesting discussion aboutsecondary economic impacts on business. In a sub-section entitled Geographic Variation in EconomicLosses (p 75), there is discussion that the data gathering processes in the USA ‘under-estimates the totalvalue of losses because indirect losses and business interruption are not included, for example. Suchindirect losses can be substantial. ’ The report further noted that ‘Indirect flow losses refer to the disruption inthe supply chain for other businesses as a result of the shutdown (a ripple effect caused by theinterconnectedness of many supply chains regionally and globally).’

On page 166, it notes that one of the USA DHS’s National Preparedness Goals is as stated in sub-section2.2.1 above.

In summary, the focus of this report (as with most others perused) is on the planning and response todisasters to ensure greater resilience, with the re-establishment of road freight flows being a mention ratherthan even a secondary item or focus.


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It is clear that re-establishing the affected economy during the recovery stages is becoming a moreprominent issue. For example, it was accorded secondary consideration, along with other matters in the DHSNPG.

2.2.3 Federal Highways Association

The Federal Highways Association (FHWA) has a web page specifically for Freight Disruptions: Impacts onFreight Movement from Natural and Man-Made Events, containing more than fifty reports and articles. Two,including the Statewide Freight System Resiliency Plan report (SFSRP described below) and one linked tothe Transportation Research Board (of the National Academies) website described in sub-section 2.2.2, areassociated with the concept of freight and economic resilience after disaster/ emergencies.

In 2008, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Transportation and Logistics, produced aFinal Research Report, Development of a Statewide Freight System Resiliency Plan, for the WashingtonState Department of Transportation (WSDOT). It states (pages 4 and 6):

Most work, however, has focussed on how an organisation should successfully respond to these

disasters during and in the immediate aftermath in order to save lives. On the other hand, very little

research has been conducted on how organisations or regions should plan to recover economically

from these disasters, and few States have any meaningful recovery plans outlined for their freight

systems.4

Emergency response plans, for example, focus on minimising the immediate loss of life and damage,

are generally “incident specific”, and are usually considered the responsibility of the public sector.

Longer-term recovery plans, on the other hand, focus on business resumption and stability, are

industry or company specific, and are usually considered the responsibility of each individual company

in the private sector. Collectively, however, this suggests that there is little awareness or visibility of the

interdependence of the public sector infrastructure and the private sector business community. This is

most evident in the general lack of defined plans and priorities for allocation and use of limited public

sector transportation resources post-incident by private sector entities through recovery.

While many companies have embraced these insights [referring to resilience and business continuityplans/planning (BCP)], the public sector has appeared to lag in the development of resilience and

BCPs. We believe this body of knowledge has fertile application in the freight transportation system

and that many of the lessons can be applied to the freight system of an entire region, State, or country.

On page 8 the report:

Calls for each State to develop a State-specific SFSRP that addresses the recovery of freight systems

in order to preserve the economic viability of the State and region. A standard SFSRP would not be

adequate because each State has a different risk profile where the leading disaster might range from

earthquake, to hurricane, to mudslide, to forest fire. But ... the specific cause of the disaster is less

important than the effect it has on the State’s transportation network. Viewed from a ‘consequences’

rather than a ‘causal’ perspective then, the multitudes of potential disasters can be classified based on

their impacts on the network and therefore more easily addressed and prioritized.

2.2.4 Washington State Department of Transportation

The SFSRP report develops a framework under which SFSRPs can be developed. But how these conceptswere developed and applied in WSDOT is not entirely clear. Eight reports on the WSDOT website wereperused. Two are discussed with respect to freight system resilience, and a third described, which mayprovide a means for prioritisation of freight resilience treatments for the five WSDOT categories of key freightroutes.

4 In an Appendix from page 100, only four of the 50 States had an economic recovery plan or section in 2008.


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Freight Mobility

Following the SFSRP for the WSDOT, that jurisdiction announced incorporation of the concept into its nextiteration of the Highway System Plan. Its FREIGHT MOBILITY: Joint Report5 on Washington State FreightHighway and Rail Projects, September 2008, stated on page 3 that:

The [next] Highway System Plan update will highlight recommendations for freight system

improvements across the State, and feature new statewide freight corridor classification criteria and afreight data program to support project prioritisation. It will include a list of high-priority freight highway

system projects and operational improvements. The Department also leads the State’s freight data and

analytic program, and initiatives to improve freight system operational efficiencies, build a data

framework to monitor system performance, and develop resilient freight systems.6

Page 5 outlined initiatives for establishing Strategic Freight Corridors for road, rail and maritime, which arediscussed further below. The remaining 11 pages of the report are associated with proposed highway andrail projects, as its title suggests.

Statewide Freight Data Flow Network

The Development and Analysis of a GIS-based Statewide Freight Data Flow Network7 (SFDFN, 2009) bytwo universities for the WSDOT was released in November 2009. This research report was the secondphase of the SFSRP report outlined in sub-section 2.2.3.

It restated the concepts of freight resilience and provided performance indicators of the SFSRP as:

the restoration or recovery of the State’s economy as it is affected, enabled, or disabled by theperformance of the freight system (SFSRP 2008, 10)

how quickly and efficiently the freight transport system can recover from a disruption (SFSRP 2008, 10)

The purpose of the SFDFN research was to:

Understand how disruptions of the State’s freight corridors change the way trucking companies andvarious freight-dependent industries route goods

Plan to protect freight-dependent sectors that are at high risk from these disruptive events

Prioritise future transportation investments based on the risk of economic loss to the State.

The research developed a statewide multimodal freight model for Washington State. It is a GIS-basedportrayal of the State’s freight highway, arterial, rail, waterway and intermodal network.

Two case studies, potato growing and processing and diesel fuel distribution, were chosen to represent theagriculture and all industry sectors. These showed that the potato growing and processing sector was heavilydependent on one Interstate road corridor, while the diesel delivery system is highly resilient and is notdependent on any one corridor.

Freight and Goods Transportation System

The Washington State Freight and Goods Transportation System (FGTS) 2011 Update was released inMarch 2012. It is an excellent technical report supported by 16 Appendices. This is the seventh update of theFGTS since the first report in 1995. The report is used to establish project eligibility for Freight MobilityStrategic Investment Board (FMSIB) grants and fulfil other federal reporting requirements, and supportsplanning for mobility improvement. It states variously in the Executive Summary:

5 This was a joint report between WSDOT and the Freight Mobility Strategic Investment Board.6 Author emphasis.7 QTMR has a Road Freight Map that was first produced in 2003, its third iteration is dated 2010.


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The FGTS classifies roadways using five truck gross tonnage8 classifications, T-1 through T-5, as

follows:

T-1 more than 10 million tons per year

T-2 4 million to 10 million tons per year

T-3 300,000 to 4 million tons per year

T-4 100,000 to 300,000 tons per year

T-5 at least 20,000 tons in 60 days and less than 100,000 tons per year

WSDOT is aware that gross tonnage data (for roads, rail and freight) is not sufficient to present a

comprehensive view of the State’s freight system. It does not provide information on the users of the

system, their economic importance, performance requirements, system needs and future trends.

The road freight classification categories were used for investment decision-making, as outlined in theBusiness Directions document. No information was discovered on the WSDOT site that these categories

were used to prioritise system resilience or for local government land use planning. Clearly, there is scopefor them to be used also for that purpose.

Figure 2.4: Urban Road Freight Route in Washington State

Source: WSDOT FGTS (2011)

8 The tonnage estimates for road links were derived for three classes of vehicles using permanent and temporary count sites, inferringtruck proportions where not available and using derived tonnages for three truck classes. The result seems robust and comparable,sufficient for the purpose of the road freight classification system.


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2.3 Japan and New Zealand

The literature relating to these two countries is reported in a single section. This is because most of the NewZealand literature used by this project corresponds to the Christchurch earthquakes mega-disaster as doesthe single source from Japan.

Japan and New Zealand’s mountainous terr ain are subject to landslides, which may be caused byearthquakes or heavy rain, and to avalanches following snowfalls. Landslides can close or partially closefreight roads, or lead to river flash flooding, when a temporary landslide dam is breached.

Mega Disasters

The two Christchurch earthquakes and especially the second, like the Great East Japan Earthquake, can beconsidered to be a mega-disaster from at least two aspects. Firstly, their combined economic impact wasabout NZ$8.86 billion (Poulter 2012 p4), nearly 100 times greater than any of the 10 other New Zealanddisasters in the same two years. Secondly, in the second earthquake half of all roads in Christchurch weredamaged, with 54 km of roads significantly damaged, 980 km needing repair along with 600 retaining wallsand 30 bridges and 50 000 road defects (Ladbroke 2012). When there is such damage, the focus of

agencies is towards disaster response and recovery rather than economic resilience, as was found in Japan(Ochi 2012).

Stephen Sellwood, Chief Executive of the New Zealand Council for Infrastructure Development, provided aninsightful presentation incorporating economic recovery into the suite of planning by government and theCanterbury Council, but raising issues about organisational roles, financing and debt repayment obligationsover many years. While the scale of the damage is unusual and tragic, the lessons about preparedness andfreight movement facilitation could be applied in all Australian jurisdictions.

This matter is discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters.

2.3.1 Japan

On 7 February 2012, the Great East Japan Earthquake (GEJE) struck, causing its corresponding tsunami,and subsequent nuclear power generator disasters. 15 846 lives were lost and another 3317 people aremissing. Such a disaster can be considered to be a mega-disaster.

Just over a year later, Shigeo Ochi, Director for Earthquake, Volcanic and Large-scale Flood DisasterManagement, Disaster Management Bureau, Cabinet Office gave a presentation (Ochi 2012). While thescale of such a disaster is virtually unimaginable in Australia (but not in New Zealand), some aspects areworth reporting to inform jurisdictions, including:

The area of inundation far exceeded that indicated in municipal hazard planning maps:

– The effects of inundation are far more significant, but not dissimilar to the effects of flooding in

Australia as shown in Figure 2.5 and Figure 2.6; and

– Loss of the telecommunications network restricted emergency operational incoming information andoutgoing instructions, as it did in the Bundaberg flood of 2013.

The total cost of the GEJE was $220 billion (using an exchange rate of $1=\77.07Y) of which $25 billionwas due to agriculture, forestry and fisheries impacts.

Nearly 10 months afterwards, 99% of Nationally controlled roads, 97% of railways but only 68% of portshad been reinstated:

– All Tokyo trains were stopped for six weeks; and

– One of the nine overall lessons learned is that in order to prevent economic stagnation due to damageto key industries, BCPs for disaster response should be formulated and encompass the freighttransport network.


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2.3.2 New Zealand

Because New Zealand straddles a plate boundary, it is tectonically active with volcanoes and earthquakes.The Pacific Plate is colliding with the Australian/Indo Plate at a rate of about 38 mm/year (Thornton, 2009).

New Zealand is subject to more frequent and intense earthquakes than Australia, epitomised by the

Christchurch earthquakes in September 2010 and the more destructive one in February 2011.

Figure 2.5: Widespread Inundation One Month after the GEJE

Source: Ochi (2012)

Figure 2.6: Floodi ng in Rockhampton, Queensland, 3 January 2011

Source: Stratton (2012)


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2.3.3 Christchurch Earthquake and Focus on Economic Recovery

As with the USA literature review, few papers recognised the importance of economic recovery followingdisasters. However, a number focussed on disaster preparation and the benefits of this.

The Johnson 2012 presentation at the CILTNZ that stated the Ministry for Transport in New Zealand has an

important focus on economic continuity in its disaster response. He said the role of transport in anemergency is ‘fundamental’ to response, but also ‘necessary for the long-term recovery of people affectedand wider economic continuity.’

Port of Lyttelton, Christchurch

Stratton 2012 discussed reinstatement of fuel supplies from the Port of Lyttelton.

During the Christchurch earthquake, the Evans Pass Road between Christchurch and its Port of Lytteltonwas damaged, as shown in Figure 2.7. It was closed for over 12 months. This road was used by hazardousvehicles in order not to have them pass through the alternate tunnel.

Figure 2.7: Christchurch Quake Landslide Damage on Port Lyttleton Christchurch Evans Pass Road, 2011


Thankfully, the tunnel was found to be structurally sound, so that restricted travel was allowed in thefollowing seven days. In order to provide fuel supplies to Christchurch and surrounding regions, dangerousgoods and heavy vehicles were approved to use the tunnel at night between 1900 and 0630 during fulltunnel closure for other traffic.


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The consequences of the closure of Evans Pass are remarkably similar to the landslip disruption andclosures of the seven Great Dividing Range crossings, including two NLTN highways in Queensland inJanuary 2011. However, the cause was different with the Australian road ranges being closed due todamage from a rain depression. In Queensland, the two NLTN highway range crossings were reopened on aone lane basis quickly, but reconstruction of these and the other passes took between many months to wellover a year.

So as with the USA, New Zealand has a focus on the importance of economic recovery following disasters.The remainder of this section discusses its planning, preparation and response, with particular emphasis onthe Christchurch Earthquakes of September 2010 and February 2011.

2.3.4 Disaster Preparation and Response

Disaster Preparation

New Zealand has well established processes for geological hazards monitoring. This was presented at theCILTNZ by the departmental head (Gledhill 2012). The work focuses on the:

Long term planning for reduction and readiness: – based on historical data and using scenarios

– risk awareness

– defences and operational strategies

– residual risk

Short term forecasts for response and recovery

Wellington Lifelines Group/ Wellington Region Emergency Management Office (WeLG/ WREMO 2013) hasprepared a Transport Access report on the effects of a major earthquake on Wellington, the capital of NewZealand. (It followed a related report on lifeline utilities restoration times.)

This report states that access by sea may take 4-5 or 5-7 days following a major earthquake, whereas roadreconnection takes far longer and varies significantly. Depending on the area, intra-city access may be re-established for some areas within 5-7 days, while other areas may take up to 10 weeks. Reconnection to theNew Zealand’s national road system may take 120 days.

This report takes an explicit disaster response focus. There is no economic recovery consideration; however,this was not the focus of the report. For example, there is no analysis of the essential and general freightrequirements that would be generated or required were different proportions of the remaining workforce ableto resume their normal work over different timescales.

The clear lesson is that earthquakes, particularly mega-earthquakes, are at such a catastrophic level that

their economic effects last for months or years, and the financial repercussions may be even longer(Selwood 2012 refers).

Ochi 2012 has already cautioned that countries and regions need to consider and focus on achieving bettereconomic recovery from disasters.

Road Asset Preparation and Response

The NZ Transport Agency is responsible for land transport, including the State Highways Network. As part ofits network management role, it conducted a study of the resilience of its bridges in the Canterbury regionusing geological sciences input data. Seventeen bridges were retrofitted with structural components at a costof $2 million per bridge (or 7% of their replacement value) to increase their seismic resilience. Examples ofthe work are shown in Figure 2.8.


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Stratton 2012 stated that the seismic retrofit works undertaken prevented more critical damage, and repairsto these bridges would only cost $6.3 million. This indicates that a focussed program of planning andpreparation for foreseeable disaster impacts can result in more resilient road network surviving to perform arole following disasters, even those of a Christchurch earthquake scale.

Figure 2.8: Canterbury Bridge with Structural Retrof its to increase Resilience to Earthquakes


The Ladbroke 2012 presentation reported the duration until the elements of the road and transport system

were able to be brought back into service. This data is presented in Table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Out of Service Duration by Proportion for Transport Systems following Christchurch Earthquake

Source: Ladbroke (2012)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 2 3 4 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 2 3 4 5

Years

Infrastructure NetworkDays Weeks Months

Service to 50% of Network




Traffic Management Operations

Airport Operations at 50%



Rail Network at 50%

Rail Network at 90%

Rail Network at 99%

Port Operations at 50%



Roads

Transportation System

Basic Cellular Access NEEDS VALIDATION

Cellular Service to 50% of Network

Cellular Service to 99% of Network

Basic Local Telephone Access

Service to 50% of Local NetworkService to 99% of Local Network

Telecommunications


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For the Christchurch mega-disaster, traffic management was most quickly reinstated followed by airportswith 50% capability within seven days and 100% within four weeks. Roads were next with 50% reinstatementwithin three weeks. While rail was slower to this level, it had 99% reinstatement within six months, whileroads took between one and two years to reach this level. Ports were slowest with 50% reinstatement takingtwo months and 99% between one and two years, the same repair performance as for roads.

The experience from Japan (Ochi 2012) following the GEJE mega-disaster was different, but followed similartrends. Nearly ten months afterwards, 99% of nationally controlled roads, 97% of railways, 68% of ports and99% of the telecommunications network had been reinstated.

Partnering for Recovery

Of all the documentation found during the literature review, the joint Solid Energy and Kiwi Rail presentation(Russell 2012) contained key lessons in recovering the economic function of freight transport. The aim wasto re-establish the rail link and Port of Lyttelton for international coal export contracts after it was severelydamaged by the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes.

The key lessons are information and communication with customers, and working together using wellpractised and rehearsed preparatory plans for emergencies.

It was noteworthy that these companies also provided practical support (structural checks of employees’homes) and soft support through an employee assistance program.

2.4 Australian Literature

Until 2014, very little comparable information was found in the Australian literature.

For example, the Standing Council on Transport and Infrastructure 2013, National Land Freight Strategy: Aplace for freight, states that ‘transport and logistics share of GDP (Australia’s gross domestic product) couldbe as much as 14%’ and ‘the transport sector directly employed over half a million people.’ So the economicimportance of freight and logistics is acknowledged.

However, in spite of the multiple disasters affecting most states between 2010 and 2012, nowhere in thereport is the issue of economic resilience preparation, and economic recovery and the movement of roadfreight after disasters, mentioned as one of Australia’s six key issues.

2.5 Disasters and Mitigation Productivity Commission Report

On 28 April 2014 (after all but one workshop had been conducted), the then Treasurer of the AustralianGovernment requested the Productivity Commission to examine natural disaster funding arrangements. Itproduced a two volume draft report in September 2014.

As a context for this project, this section quotes extensively from the Volume 1, Draft Report, NaturalDisaster Funding Arrangements, Productivity Commission, September 2014.

Natural disasters are an inherent part of the Australasian landscape. Since 2009 in Australia, naturaldisasters have claimed more than 200 lives, destroyed 2670 houses and damaged a further 7680, andaffected the lives and livelihoods of hundreds of thousands of Australians.9

Over the past 40 years, storms have been the most frequent disasters causing insured property losses.Floods have also been frequent and, when they occur, are typically the most expensive events. Bushfires areless frequent, but account for most fatalities. Across the country, accumulated insurance losses have beengreatest in New South Wales (mostly hail and storms), followed by Queensland (mostly floods and cyclones).

9 Volume 1, Draft Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements, Productivity Commission, September 2014.


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Table 2.2: Insurances Losses by Disaster and State or Territ ory

Source: Table 1, Volume 1, Draft Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements, Productivity Commission, September 2014

In approximate per capita terms, the Northern Territory and Queensland suffered the highest losses, followedby Western Australia, New South Wales and Victoria.

The highest property losses occurred from hail and storm, and it is likely that the insurance loss size is highlycorrelated with urban areas. Storms and hail generally do not affect large areas or have the same level ofimpacts on the transport system or businesses as do cyclones, floods, some bushfires or major earthquakes.

Insurance losses from natural disasters exceeded $29 billion over the period 1970 to 2013 (in 2011 dollars),or an average of $670 million each year. However, the bulk of these losses arose from a relatively smallnumber of events - indeed, only 10 per cent of natural disasters accounted for 80 per cent of recorded

insurance losses.

However, the costs of natural disasters go beyond insured losses. Disasters impose a range of economic,social and environmental costs on governments, businesses, households and communities. These include:

direct market costs caused by the physical event, such as damage to private properties and publicinfrastructure;

indirect market costs, such as disruptions to economic activity; and

non-market costs, such as deaths and injuries as well as impacts on social wellbeing and the naturalenvironment.

The Productivity Commission states that the economic costs of natural disasters are difficult to measure.There is some data on the direct market costs of natural disasters, but only limited data on the indirect andnon-market costs. Further, the economic impacts of natural disasters are likely to be nonlinear - that is, asthe size of a natural disaster increases, its disruptive effect is amplified.

These natural disasters have also had a significant financial impact on the Australian, State, Territory andLocal Governments. For the financial years ending 2010 to 2016, the Productivity Commission estimated thatthe Australian, State and territory governments have or will have spent nearly $20 billion on funding theimpacts of natural disasters.

It stated Government investment in mitigation tends to be outweighed by post-disaster expenditure. Forexample, Australian Government mitigation spending was only three per cent of what it spent post-disaster inrecent years.

The Productivity Commission reported a longstanding concern that governments under-invest in mitigationand spend too much on recovery, leading to higher overall costs for the community.


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2.5.1 Productivity Commission Report and this Project

Selected Draft Product ivity Commission Recommendations

Australia is exposed to natural disasters on a recurring basis. Effective planning and mitigation of risks isan essential task for governments, businesses and households.

Governments generally overinvest in post-disaster reconstruction, and under-invest in mitigation thatwould limit the impact of natural disasters in the first place.

Governments can also do better in terms of policies that allow people to understand natural disaster risksand have incentives to manage them effectively.

– Information is critical to understanding and managing natural disaster risk. Information on hazards andrisk exposure has improved significantly in recent years, but there are opportunities to improve itsconsistency, sharing and communication.

Project Context

The scope of this project places it within two of the Productivity Commission concepts, being:

indirect market costs, such as disruptions to economic activity; and

disaster mitigation, rather than post-disaster expenditure.

This project is not concerned with the direct market cost category of property and infrastructure damage thatgenerates the need for emergency response and recovery actions. Nor is it directly concerned with non-market costs. An indirect consequence to the latter may be that as jurisdictions improve their essential andgeneral freight emergency management, it will result in an improvement on social and economic wellbeingand reduce non-market costs after emergencies.

The project uses post-disaster information gained through a literature review and private and public sectorworkshops to develop suggestions on how jurisdictions are and could improve essential and general freight

management processes in order to mitigate the impacts of future emergencies.

2.5.2 A Framework for Effective Risk Management

The Productivity Commission 2014 describes an effective risk management process. This is adapted by thisproject as described in Figure 4.2 and related discussion. It states:

Natural disasters pose risks to community living standards - potential damage that could occur in the

future (Box 1.2). As such, natural disaster funding is not a traditional service delivery activity, but

essentially a risk management activity. Risk management is a process that can reduce the impact of

risks, including by managing the consequences when they occur. Even when little can be done to

reduce the probability of natural hazards, it is possible to reduce the exposure and vulnerability of the

community, and hence natural disaster risk.

The report’s Box 1.2 is reproduced as Figure 2.9.


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Figure 2.9: Factors Reducing the Three Disaster Risks

Source: Box 1.2, Volume 1, Draft Natural Disaster Funding Arrangements, Productivity Commission, September 2014

In terms of jurisdictional road assets, exposure can be mitigated by the location of those assets to be, where

possible, away from areas affected by storm surges, flooding and landslips. Where altering the location is notpossible and ranges and rivers have to be crossed, the vulnerability of the road assets can be reduced byappropriate planning, design, construction and maintenance.

Box 1.2 is directly applicable for terminals and warehouses associated with road freight operations foressential and general freight movement.

In terms of road freight operations, timely information about likely impacts on the road assets during ahazard, can reduce significantly, or eliminate, heavy vehicle and driver exposure.

2.6 Lessons from the Literature Review

2.6.1 USA Observations for this Project

A number of observations are derived from the USA literature review, being:

Disaster Management literature did not have a focus on economic recovery 20 years ago, merely noting itas a consequence in an Appendix (Auf der Heide, 1989);

Communities are unable to survive for extensive periods without road transport services. Some importantlocal supplies can be exhausted in as little as a day or two, and can become critical within a week to amonth (Hu, 2008);

The USA freight task is growing along with its population (NCFRP Report 16, 2012). It is not dissimilar to

Australia’s (ATF, 2015), but the density of its freight road network far exceeds that of Australia’s (NCFRPReport 16, 2012 and NLFS, 2013);


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The economic function of freight movement has long been understood, but not always appreciated(FGTS, 2011 and NCFRP Report 16, 2012). It appears to be under-reported (Disaster Resilience 2012),with States having to specify a freight route hierarchy:

– WSDOT has a five level road freight hierarchy (also rail and maritime) and this information is used forplanning and investment (FGTS, 2011 and Business Directions, 2008); and

Recently, disaster resilience has become a national focus, and national preparedness goals includeeconomic recovery as a secondary item (DHS NPG, 2011) (albeit with an economic (Disaster Resilience,2012), planning and performance measurement focus):

– The FHWA has a web page specifically for Freight Disruptions: Impacts on Freight Movement fromNatural and Man-Made Events;

– There does not appear to be the same focus at State level with only four of 50 States having recoveryplans in 2008 (SFSRP, 2008);

– WSDOT has a strong freight movement/economic focus, but even it appears to not have integrated asyet the resilience, economic recovery and freight movement emphases into its transportation businessand highway planning (all documents in section 3.4 refer), even though this is a focus of its freightplanning;

– The (SFSRP, 2008) report recommended the State and public sector should adopt BCPs in the sameway that the private sector has;

– In the second stage of this research, WSDOT developed (SFDFN, 2009) a statewide GIS multi-modalfreight model and used it to assess the resilience of an agricultural and industry sector supply chain;and

– It planned to release its Freight Mobility Plan and updated Highway System Plan by end 2013.

This USA literature provides a framework within which this project can potentially make a compellingcontribution.

2.6.2 USA Lessons for this Project

In the USA, there is a growing national focus on disaster resilience, including economic resilience andrecovery, and the importance of freight transport to that. Australia does not appear to have the sameeconomic resilience and recovery focus in its national planning for freight (NLFS, 2013).

Freight movement is recognised as being critical for the USA’s economic sustainability. From this aspect it is

increasingly being recognised as a core issue for disaster management, with State disaster andtransportation planning being updated to encompass this aspect.

Although USA freight movement planning is integrated into investment decisions and highway planning, theimportant focus of reinstating freight movement in the recovery phase of disasters remains an emerging

trend.

Even with the USA’s far greater network density, some agricultural and manufacturing industries, with cottonbeing an example, rely on the resilience of one Interstate highway (SFDFN, 2009).

Australia’s national freight network is much less dense than that of the USA. It has only one national freightlevel, irrespective of the volume and value of freight being moved. By comparison in the USA, WashingtonState alone has a six level road freight and five level rail freight hierarchies, all based on freight volumes.

Given Australia’s sparse freight network compared with that of the USA, it is likely to be comparatively lesseconomically resilient. This will have flow-on effects on Australia’s export and domestic industries.

It would seem axiomatic that a framework for this project should consider freight corridors with high volumesor values of freight and with a greater propensity for disaster impacts.


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Perhaps Australia

Documents

Freight Movement in Emergency Situations