frees v mcmillan

8/14/2019 frees v mcmillan

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The Motion for Partial Summary Judgment also seeks a ruling from the Court that1

Frees is barred, as a matter of law, from recovering statutory damages under the CopyrightAct. See Record Document 82-3 at 8-9. This issue is moot because Frees conceded inits opposition that it was not seeking an award of statutory damages under the Copyright

Act, but rather was seeking actual damages. See Record Document 89-1 at 18.Accordingly, the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to statutory damages under theCopyright Act is DENIED AS MOOT.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTWESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

SHREVEPORT DIVISION

FREES, INC. CIVIL ACTION NO. 05-1979

VERSUS JUDGE S. MAURICE HICKS, JR.

PHIL MCMILLIAN, ET AL. MAGISTRATE JUDGE HAYES

MEMORANDUM RULING

Before the Court is Phil McMillians and Tony Piercealls (Defendants) joint Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment (Record Document 82), which seeks to have Frees, Inc.s

(Frees) Computer Fraud and Abuse Act claims dismissed, or in the alternative, to have

the lost profits allegedly suffered by Frees excluded from the amount of recoverable

damages. Frees opposes the motion. For the reasons that follow, Defendants motion is

DENIED.1

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Frees provides ventilation and dust control systems to manufacturers in the

fiberglass reinforced product industry. See Record Document 1-1, 6. Frees has spent

considerable time, money and effort to research and develop methods which are unique

in the industry. See Record Document 1-1, 7-8. In order to protect its trade secrets,

Case 5:05-cv-01979-SMH-KLH Document 119-1 Filed 08/06/2007 Page 1 of 11


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Frees requires employees, potential employees, customers, potential customers, and

vendors to sign confidentiality agreements. See id., 8.

Defendants are former employees of Frees. See Record Document 95 at 1.

McMillian was employed as a senior manager and vice-president in charge of sales and

day-to-day management of the business. Pierceall was responsible for designing

ventilation systems. See id. During their employment, Frees provided McMillian and

Pierceall with computers which, according to Frees, contained trade secrets, proprietary

information and other data (hereinafter collectively referred to as data) belonging to

Frees. See Record Document 1-1, 16,18.

In mid-2002, Southeast expanded its business by providing industrial ventilation and

dust control systems. See Record Document 95 at 2. At different times, Southeast hired

two former Frees employees, defendants McMillian and Pierceall. See id. McMillian and

Pierceall, in turn, are alleged to have loaded Frees proprietary data onto Southeasts

computers, which they apparently used as Southeasts employees to design, construct,

implement, and/or market industrial fiberglass ventilation and dust control systems in

competition with Frees. See id. McMillian is also alleged to have deleted data from the

Frees computers before he left Frees employment, which resulted in Frees expending

$2,000 to INS-Triad for a forensic investigation of the computers, $11,000 to

CyberControls, LLC, for consultation and forensics work, and $3,500 to MMCC for a

forensic investigation of the current home and work computers of McMillian. See Record

Document 89-1 at 2. Frees did not suffer an interruption of service as a result of the

misconduct. See Record Document 82-2 at 1.

Frees filed the above-captioned suit alleging copyright infringement and violations



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F.3d 624, 626 (5th Cir. 2001). However, the Court will not assume that the nonmoving

party could or would prove the necessary facts. See Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d at 1075.

The nonmoving partys burden will not be satisfied by some metaphysical doubt as to the

material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a

scintilla of evidence. Id. Therefore, summary judgment is appropriate in any case where

critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a

judgment in favor of the nonmovant. Armstrong v. City of Dallas, 997 F.2d 62 (5th Cir.

1993); see generally Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,

586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986).

With these principles in mind, we now turn to a review of the claims at issue in the

instant motion.

B. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act.

The CFAA provides:

Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a

violation of this section may maintain a civil action against theviolator to obtain compensatory damages and injunctiverelief or other equitable relief.

18 U.S.C. 1030(g) (emphasis added). As the plain language of statute makes clear, only

a person who has suffered damageor loss can maintain a cause of action. The CFAA

defines damage as any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a

system, or information. 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(8). Loss is defined as any reasonable cost

to any victim, including the cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage

assessment, and restoring the data, program, system, or information to its condition prior

to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages



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incurred because of interruption of service. 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(11). If the plaintiff has

suffered only loss, the statute requires the plaintiff to establish a jurisdictional threshold,

or loss aggregating at least $5,000 in value, to maintain a cause of action. 18 U.S.C.

1030(a)(B)(i).

1. Loss

Frees alleges the following expenditures constitute loss:

Payment of $2,000 to INS-Triad for a forensicinvestigation of the prior work computer of McMillian;

Payment of more than $11,000 to CyberControls, LLC,

for consultation and forensics work relating to thecomputer problems alleged to have been caused byMcMillian and Pierceall; and

Payment of $3,500 to MMCC for forensic investigationof the current home and work computers of McMillian.

See Record Document 89-1 at 2.

McMillian and Pierceall contend that Frees has not met the jurisdictional threshold

because the expenses allegedly incurred by Frees do not constitute loss as defined by

the CFAA. However, this argument fails. Loss is not limited to actual repairs. Nexans

Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); S. Rep. 4702-02

(1986). Courts have consistently interpreted loss, both before and after the term was

defined in the 2001 amendment, to mean a cost of investigating or remedying damage to

a computer, or a cost incurred because the computers service was interrupted. See

Nexans, 319 F. Supp. 2d at 475.

During oral argument, defense counsel argued that expert fees of this type do not

constitute loss. This argument is without merit. In fact, the case repeatedly cited by



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defendants supports a finding of loss. In Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Assn, Inc., 2005

WL 1924743, *4 (M.D. Fla. 2005), the court stated:

The CFAA defines loss in terms of any reasonable

cost. (Internal citation omitted). Cost ordinarilymeans an amount paid or charged for something; priceor expenditure. Blacks Law Dictionary 371 (8th ed.2004).

The cost of hiring an expert to investigate the computer damage is clearly a reasonable

cost sufficient to constitute loss under the CFAA. 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(11); Dudick, ex

rel. Susquehanna Precision, Inc. v. Vaccaro, 2007 WL 1847435, *5 (M.D. Pa. 2007)

(holding that the time and resources spent and the cost of hiring an expert to research and

assess the unauthorized information and assets are costs explicitly identified in the CFAAs

definition of loss); Kaufman v. Nest Seekers, LLC, 2006 WL 2807177, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)

(the cost involved in investigating hacking and unauthorized access, investigating the

damage, and revealing the infringing activity constitutes loss as defined by the CFAA);

Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 468, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding

that loss includes the costs associated with investigating the damage to the computer),

affd, 166 Fed. Appx. 559 (2nd Cir. 2006); E.F. Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274

F.3d 577, 585 (1st Cir. 2001) (finding that the loss suffered by plaintiffs, in having to

expend substantial sums to assess whether there was any physical damage to their

website, is not lessened simply because no damage occurred).

Accordingly, the expenditures allegedly incurred by Frees, which, when aggregated,

exceed the $5,000 threshold requirement, are sufficient to constitute loss under the

CFAA. The Court will now proceed to Defendants alternative argument, that Frees cannot

recover lost profits absent an interruption of service.



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2. Recoverable Damages Under the CFAA.

Defendants contend that lost revenues are not compensable damages in this case

because there has not been an interruption of computer service. See Record Document

82-3 at 1. They argue the phrase any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other consequential

damages incurred because of interruption of service is not only a jurisdictional threshold,

but also a limitation on the types of recoverable damages. 18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(11). Frees

rejects this contention, arguing that a plaintiff is entitled to recover ordinary compensatory

damages once the jurisdictional threshold has been met.

The Fifth Circuit has not addressed this issue and the circuits addressing the issue

are split. See Nexans Wires S.A. v. Sark-USA, Inc., 166 Fed. Appx. 559 (2nd Cir. 2006);

Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930 (9th Cir. 2004). The Ninth

Circuit held that loss of business and business goodwill constitutes recoverable damages

under the CFAA, but the Court failed to provide any discussion or give any reason for its

holding. See Creative Computing, 386 F.3d at 936. Conversely, the Second Circuit

excluded lost profits from the recoverable damages, stating:

As the district court correctly recognized, the plain language ofthe statute treats lost revenue as a different concept fromincurred costs, and permits recovery of the former only whereconnected to an interruption of service.

Nexans, 166 Fed. Appx. at 562. However, the district court in Nexans simply found that

the plaintiff did not allege loss sufficient to establish the jurisdictional threshold; the court

did not discuss whether lost profits would be recoverable as damages, nor did the court

address the issue.

Both the plaintiff and defendants cite district court cases in support of their



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contention. Yet, most of the cases cited by the plaintiff are interpreting the pre-2001

version of the CFAA, and nearly all of the cases cited by defendant rely on Nexans in

support of their proposition. The Court finds none of those cited cases, including the two

Circuit Court decisions, persuasive or controlling. Rather than relying on dicta or pre-2001

decisions, the Court will instead look to the basic principles of statutory construction to

resolve the conflict.

Statutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute itself. There is a

presumption that Congress says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what

it says. See Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146

(1992). In fact, the first rule in statutory construction is to determine whether the language

at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning. See Lamie v. U.S. Trustee, 540 U.S. 526,

124 S.Ct. 1023 (2004). If the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, the courts

should not consider extrinsic materials and should not derive from such materials an

interpretation that is inconsistent with the statutes plain meaning. See Guilzan v. C.I.R.,

985 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1993). Most importantly, the court cannot assume Congress

intended to say something other than what is plainly stated.

Generally, a statutory definition of a term excludes any other meaning, even if it

varies from the ordinary meaning of the term. If a word is not specifically defined, it is

presumed to have its ordinary, contemporary, common meaning. Perrin v. United States,

444 U.S. 37, 42, 100 S.Ct. 311 (1979). However, if a term has an accumulated, settled

meaning under common law, the courts must infer that Congress intended to incorporate

that established meaning. See McDermott Intern., Inc. v. Wilander, 498 U.S. 337, 111

S.Ct. 807 (1991).



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Section 1030(a)(5)(B)(i) provides that whoever by conduct described in clause (i),2

(ii), or (iii) of subparagraph (A), caused (or, in the case of an attempted offense, would, ifcompleted, have caused) . . . loss to 1 or more persons during any 1-year period (and, forpurposes of an investigation, prosecution, or other proceeding brought by the United Statesonly, loss resulting from a related course of conduct affecting 1 or more other protectedcomputers) aggregating at least $5,000 in value.

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It is also an elementary rule of statutory construction that every word and phrase

has a purpose. Thus, in determining the meaning of a statute, the court must be careful

not to construe the statute in way that renders one part ineffective or inoperative. See

United States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 112 S.Ct. 1011 (1992).

The CFAA provision at issue is 18 U.S.C. 1030(g), specifically the term

compensatory damages. This term is not defined by the statute, but because

compensatory damages is a legal term of art, it is presumed that Congress intended to

incorporate its established meaning into the statute. Hence, it is presumed that

compensatory damages means damages sufficient in amount to indemnify the injured

person for the loss suffered. See Blacks Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). The term

includes all damages other than punitive or exemplary damages. 22 Am. Jur. 2d

Damages 24 (emphasis added). Moreover, it is presumed that Congress legislates with

the basic knowledge of statutory construction. Had Congress intended a different

meaning, they could have easily added a statutory definition of compensatory damages,

just as they added the definition of loss in the 2001 amendment.

Congress did specifically express an intent to limit damages for conduct solely

violating Section (a)(5)(B)(i). Damages recoverable for such a violation are limited to2

economic damages. 18 U.S.C. 1030(g). The term economic damages was not

statutorily defined, but courts have consistently held that this term has its ordinary



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meaning, i.e., simply prohibiting damages for pain and suffering, emotional distress, and

other like damages. See Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930 (9th

Cir. 2004); P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC, 428

F.3d 504 (3rd Cir. 2005); In re Doubleclick Privacy Litig., 154 F. Supp. 2d 497 (S.D.N.Y.

2001). Similarly, without an express indication to the contrary, compensatory damages

must be interpreted to have its ordinary, established meaning, thereby allowing lost

profits as recoverable damages.

Further, interpreting the statute to limit the recovery of lost revenue would lead to

absurd results. The CFAA defines damage in terms of non-economic harm and loss

in terms of economic harm. 1030(e)(8), (11). If the Court were to find that these terms

were limitations on damages, a plaintiff would be unable to recover any monetary relief

where he suffered only damage, but no loss. When a defendant copies unauthorized

data to gain a competitive edge, it makes no sense to limit the plaintiffs recovery when the

lost revenue is a direct result of defendants misconduct.

The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous and it is unnecessary for the

Court to consider extrinsic materials. But even if the statutory language was ambiguous,

the Court finds that the numerous references to the jurisdictional threshold in the CFAAs

legislative history effectively expresses Congress intent. Congress explained that the

required monetary threshold was established to define conduct punishable as a

misdemeanor or as a felony. S. Rep. 104-357 (1996); S. Rep. 4072-02 (1986). As

Congress stated, [i]n instances where the requisite dollar amount cannot be shown,

misdemeanor-level penalties will remain available against the offender under the trespass

statute... [T]he valuation will... help determine whether the act constituting the offense is



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punishable as a felony or a misdemeanor. S. Rep. 4072-02 (1986). The legislative history

does not contain any indication of Congress intention to limit the scope of recoverable

damages in a civil action.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the terms damage and loss are terms of art used

to define a jurisdictional threshold; they do not control or limit what damages are available

in a civil action if the substantive and threshold standards are not met. Rather, Congress

used the terms compensatory damages and economic damages to define the scope of

recovery, and those terms will be given their ordinary meaning in interpreting the CFAA.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Frees has established the CFAAs

jurisdictional threshold and that the CFAA does not limit the recovery of lost profits as an

element of compensatory damages solely to instances where there was an interruption of

service. Further, Frees has conceded that it is pursuing actual damages, not statutory

damages, under the Copyright Act.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that McMillians and Piercealls Motion for Partial Summary

Judgment (Record Document 82) be and is hereby DENIED.

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in Shreveport, Louisiana, this the 6th day of August,

2007.


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frees v mcmillan