Freedom Through Philosophy - isistatic.org · Freedom Through Philosophy 175 ... Loeb Classical Library. 1920. ... as are all of Seneca’s moral letters, to Lucilius, his

Freedom Through Philosophy 175

Freedom Through Philosophy

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales , TomusI, Libri I-XIII. Edited by L. D. Reynolds. Oxford ClassicalTexts. New York: Oxford University Press, 1965. 323 pp.

Seneca, Lucius Annaeus. Epistles, 66-92 . Vol. 2. Translated byRichard M.Gummere. Loeb Classical Library. 1920. Reprint,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. 480 pp.

General Background to the Project

What exactly are the liberal arts and what specifically is theirpurpose? Further, what is the relationship of the liberal

arts to philosophy, or should philosophy itself be considered to bea liberal art? These are perennial questions that have been posedand answered in various fashions since the very inception of thenotion of the liberal arts, and such uncertainties continue to beraised by members of the contemporary academic community—both students and educators alike. Indeed, the development of theconcept of the liberal arts has a most curious and somewhatconvoluted history. What is now properly considered to be thecanonical division of the three arts of the trivium ( viz., logic,grammar, and rhetoric) and the four arts of the quadrivium ( viz.,arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy) was not the achieve-ment of any single individual, as it took literally centuries ofphilosophic discussion to arrive at the existence of, and thedistinctions between, these seven liberal arts. 1

In the broadest sense, the root notion of the liberal artstradition can be traced back to the Pythagoreans in the sixthcentury B.C., who emphasized, in a quasi-mystical fashion, the

176 THE POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEWER

importance of harmonizing one’s soul through a contemplativeunderstanding of the mathematical structure of the cosmos. 2

Indeed, Pythagorean influences are distinctly evident in Book VIIof the Republic, wherein Plato (c. 428–348 B.C.) emphasizes theneed for the studies of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, andmusic in the proper education of the philosopher-kings. 3 Al-though indisputably Hellenic in their ultimate origins, the Greeksthemselves did not call such non-vocational studies “liberal arts,”however.4 The actual phrase artes liberales was used for the firsttime centuries later in the first century B.C. by the Roman authorsMarcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 B.C.) and Marcus TerentiusVarro (116–27 B.C.). 5 For both of these writers, however, thenature and number of these arts were matters of uncertainty. 6 Itwas not until the fifth century A.D. that the first written record ofthe seven liberal arts appeared, in a work by Martianus Cappella. 7

Even after these general formulations were made, however,incessant discussion continued throughout the Middle Ages, andindeed continues today, as to the precise nature and goals of theseptem artes liberales.8

Historically speaking, arguably one of the more seminalfigures in this ongoing discussion of the nature of the liberal artsis Lucius Annaeus Seneca (ca. 4 B.C.–A.D. 65), the Roman Stoicphilosopher who lived contemporaneously with Jesus Christduring the advent of Christianity. 9 Writing during this formativetime of discussion of the liberal arts in late antiquity, Seneca thePhilosopher offered provocative and continuously relevant in-sights as to the nature, unity, and purpose of the liberal arts.

Notable for the fact that he is the earliest Stoic philosopherwhose writings have remained throughout history extant in theirentirety, Seneca wielded enormous influence not only in classicalantiquity but throughout the Middle Ages and into modern times. 10

One of the many avenues of Senecan philosophic influence has beenEpistle LXXXVIII of his 124 Moral Letters, which is devoted to thetopic of the nature and purpose of the liberal arts. During theMiddle Ages, this letter later became a separate treatise that wasdisseminated independently of his other letters under the specific


title Lucii Annaei Senecae liber de septem artibus liberalibus .11

Purpose and Methodology of the StudyThe thesis of this paper maintains that Seneca the Philosopher’shistorically innovative perspective on the liberal arts—whichreflects the Hellenistic tradition in general and Stoicism inparticular—seemingly paradoxically both depreciates and exaltsthe intrinsic value of knowledge. Recognizing a need for a teleo-logical unification of the various liberal arts in the specific studyof philosophy, Seneca understands the perfection of humannature in the virtuous activity of contemplation through which thesoul is free to rationally roam within the realm of divine nature (orLogos). However, Seneca’s understanding of the unification of theliberal arts comes at the cost of potential dogmatism. Insofar aseach discipline must be understood as being oriented primarilytoward wisdom alone, the Senecan perspective apparently ne-glects the inherent integrity of each field of study. Philosophy thusbecomes a type of architectonic and rather a priori discipline,rather than an a posteriori method of investigation, and therelationships of the other branches of knowledge to each otherand to wisdom itself is thereby obfuscated.

The focus is of this essay is centered on Seneca’s view of theliberal arts as expressed specifically in his Epistle LXXXVIII, withsupplementary references being made periodically to other per-tinent works of the Senecan corpus as required for furtherillumination; explicit attention is given throughout to the mannersin which Seneca elaborates upon, as well as differs with, generalnotions of Hellenistic thought. The first section presents anexamination of the philosopher’s specific view of the liberal artsand investigates his general classification scheme, his reasons forhis deprecating them, and his view of their propaedeutic value.The second section considers Seneca’s exalted conception of thenature of philosophy and the virtue and freedom that wisdomsecures. At the close of the paper, summarizing conclusions arerendered concerning both the weaknesses and the strengths of theSenecan perspective.


SENECA’S DEPRECIATORY CONCEPTIONOF THE LIBERAL ARTS

Seneca’s Distinctive View of the Liberal ArtsThroughout essentially all of his numerous writings, Senecaemphasizes the role of proper philosophical education in theformation of virtuous character. However, within the entireSenecan corpus, Epistle LXXXVIII stands as the locus classicusfor Seneca’s unique and influential view of the status of the liberalarts.12 Seneca emphatically proclaims in this letter his novelinterpretation of the subject, requesting, “In this discussion youmust bear with me if I do not follow the regular course,” 13

asserting that his view of the characteristics of the liberal arts—which was a subject of discussion at his time—will not followprecisely in the footsteps of previous thinkers.

Written, as are all of Seneca’s moral letters, to Lucilius, hisEpicurean friend who was at the time the procurator of Sicily,Epistle LXXXVIII begins: “You have been wishing to know myviews with regard to liberal studies. My answer is this: I respectno study, and deem no study good, which results in money-making. Such studies are profit-bringing occupations, useful onlyin so far as they give the mind a preparation and do not engage itpermanently. One should linger upon them only so long as themind can occupy itself with nothing greater; they are our appren-ticeship, not our real work.” 14 Like many modern educators,Seneca opens the question of the nature of liberal arts inducingthe specific criterion of utility: What is the use of the liberal arts?The striking difference is what Seneca understands to be “useful.”Unlike many contemporary thinkers, Seneca professes that theliberal arts cannot be oriented toward the goal of making moneyor material profit, which is not the true good or proper functionof human beings.

In fact, he continues to enumerate several types of studies,including sculpture, marble-working, wrestling, and cooking, thatothers might deem to be included among the liberal studies, but


which he affirms should rather be regarded as non-liberal pur-suits, since they are conducive to luxurious living. 15 In listing thevarious teachable skills which people have considered arts, Sen-eca discerns that certain studies (or fields of human endeavor)have as their telos a type of servile orientation; intrinsically, suchstudies serve the goal not of human perfection but of wastefulnessand luxury. Leisure time, which is a necessary requirement ofpursuing the liberal arts, also is a prerequisite for luxurious living,and for this reason, as well as their association with pleasure, theliberal arts in the proper sense and those arts that are orientedtoward luxury may be confused with each other.

Seneca then proceeds to classify the various types of artswhich are found in the world, following closely the four-folddivision recommended by the Stoic master Posidonius (c. 135–c.50 B.C.)16; Seneca affirms that there exist four basic types of arts,viz., firstly, the common (literally “vulgar”) arts, which are thosemade for the fundamental needs of life, such as cooking andmetal-working; secondly, the arts of amusement, such as thosewhich might be considered today to include many of the “finearts”; thirdly, the arts of general instruction, the so-called “puer-ile” arts which the Greeks termed enkuklios paideia (literally, “thecycle of studies”), such as grammar and arithmetic; and, fourthly,those arts that are properly called “liberal.” 17 In this quadripartiteclassification of the arts, Seneca is suggesting that the liberal artsnot only are to be distinguished from those arts that are orienteddirectly toward utility and those arts that are oriented directlytoward pleasure but also should be differentiated from othereducational arts.

What is the distinction between what Seneca is calling theproperly “liberal arts” and those arts that he states pertain to theeducation of youth? In this answer reside Seneca’s novel insightsregarding the status of the liberal arts.

Seneca’s innovative definition of the liberal arts is the follow-ing: “Hence you see why ‘liberal studies’ are so called; it is becausethey are studies worthy of a free-born gentleman. But there is onlyone really liberal study,—that which gives a man his liberty. It is


the study of wisdom, and that is lofty, brave, and great-souled. Allother studies are puny and puerile.” 18 Thus for Seneca the liberalarts are not only those that are practiced by people with free time,as are the traditional studies for youth in the general curriculum.This view of the liberal arts reflects the traditional, etymologicallyderived definition of the liberal arts, viz., arts studied by thosewho, because of time and material resources, are free to pursuethem. Most importantly, in his novel definition of the artesliberales, Seneca declares that the liberal arts should be orientedto man’s very liberation and have the explicit goal of making aperson in some sense free. Seneca thus views these arts liberal notwith regard to their origins but to their ends. Although this viewof the liberal arts as inherently freeing to an individual is mani-festly latent in the thought of earlier philosophers (such as Platoand Aristotle), 19 Seneca historically appears as the first author toconnect the concept of the liberal arts explicitly with the goal ofhuman freedom—in what now has become an almost common-place understanding of the concept (often, however, with wildlymisguided notions of freedom). 20 As will be discussed furtherhereafter, for Seneca the freedom to which the liberal arts areoriented is not primarily or even necessarily a political freedom,and much less is it a freedom for the mind to think whatever itfinds pleasing. Indeed, for the Stoic philosopher, freedom con-sists in the ability of the virtuous mind to comprehend, and thusmirror, the truths of the universe and to commune with Nature(identifiable with Reason and God) through the action of contem-plation.

Aside from his emphasis on the teleological orientation of theliberal arts toward freedom, the other striking aspect of Seneca’sview of the liberal arts is precisely that they are not, strictlyspeaking, many, but one! Only the art of wisdom, which isidentified with philosophy, adequately can be considered “liberal”in the Senecan view. Seneca had a general disdain for any pursuit,including academic studies, that was undertaken for anythingother than the perfection of human nature culminating in a stateof virtue. 21 Not only were the vulgar or pleasure-oriented arts


such as painting and sculpture viewed with a certain degree ofdisdain with regard to the ultimate goal of humanity, but Senecadiscerned that even the intellectual pursuits that were tradition-ally considered to be “liberal arts” could actually impede theactualization of virtue. 22 During the course of Epistle LXXXVIII,Seneca specifically mentions the inherent deficiencies (and po-tential moral difficulties) that pertain to the oft-considered“liberal” studies of grammar, music, geometry, arithmetic, andastronomy.23 Logic and rhetoric are the disciplines that laterwould become canonical liberal arts which Seneca does notmention specifically in this letter, although he does speak of poets(particularly Homer) and litteratura throughout, both of whichwould reflect the rhetorical discipline (of which Seneca’s fatherwas a renown practitioner). 24 The study of logic was considered bythe Stoics to be a part of philosophy itself; however, elsewhere inhis works, Seneca avows that the study of logic cannot be an endin itself. 25

What are the essential deficiencies of these so-called “liberalarts” that Seneca deems as “puerile”? Seneca recognizes at leastthree manners in which the liberal arts cannot be deemed as ends-in-themselves, namely: (1) epistemologically (lacking first-orderprinciples of knowledge), (2) teleologically (lacking direct orien-tation toward moral goodness), and (3) temporally (lacking timein which to pursue them). The first two deficiencies may beconsidered intrinsic, while the third is extrinsic, but nonethelessof great import for Seneca.

Epistemological DeficienciesThe first (or “epistemological”) deficiency in the liberal arts is dueto their very nature as second-order disciplines. According toSeneca in another one of his letters, each of the various academicdisciplines possesses its own definitive principles ( decreta) whichdistinguish it from each of the other liberal arts. 26 Seneca does notexplicate further what are the specific principles that define eachof these arts; this would seem to be essential to complete acoherent and comprehensive theory. Seneca does, however,


emphatically maintain what these doctrines are not—they are notthe most rudimentary, or first, principles of knowledge. Thecommonly called “liberal” arts do not relate directly to the causesof things but only to the categorization and assessment of phe-nomena. Philosophy alone, according to Seneca, directly investi-gates the causes of things, especially regarding the principles ofgood and evil, and it serves as the foundational principle of theother intellectual disciplines. 27 Thus Seneca conceives of knowl-edge to have a hierarchical structure, with some studies beingsubordinated to others and philosophy being the discipline thatpertains to the most basic aspects of existence and action. 28

Teleological DeficienciesArising directly out of their lack of first principles, the liberal artshave another inherent shortcoming, namely a teleological insuf-ficiency (or deficiency of ultimate purpose). By themselves, withregard to their intrinsic principles, each liberal art fails to have anotion of the true human good. Seneca questions the centralprinciple that all subjects of learning are of equal value and insiststhat many who profess to be educators lack the core concept ofthe purpose of education; with seemingly Platonic inspiration inhis insistence on the essential notion of a universal good thatunderlies all knowledge, 29 in Epistle LXXXVIII Seneca avers:

Certain persons have made up their minds that the point at issuewith regard to the liberal studies is whether they make men good;but they do not even profess or aim at a knowledge of thisparticular subject. The scholar busies himself with investigationsinto language, and if it be his desire to go farther afield, he workson history, or, if he would extend his range to the farthest limits,on poetry. But which of these paves the way to virtue? Pronounc-ing syllables, investigating words, memorizing plays, or makingrules for the scansion of poetry, what is there in all this that ridsone of fear, roots out desire, or bridles the passions? 30

Thus Seneca recognizes that there exist many varieties of


“knowledge” that have little or nothing to do directly with humanperfection. As if in answer to the Socratic question whether virtuecan be taught, 31 Seneca affirms the traditional Stoic perspectivethat virtue can in fact be instilled through education, and thatphilosophy alone is the discipline which is potentially capable ofunderstanding the notion of the good that underlies both truthand virtue. Seneca speaks of the instructors of the liberal arts inthis manner:

The question is: do such men teach virtue, or not? If they do notteach it, then neither do they transmit it. If they do teach it, theyare philosophers. Would you like to know how it happens thatthey have not taken the chair for the purpose of teaching virtue?See how unlike their subjects are; and yet their subjects wouldresemble each other if they taught the same thing. It may be,perhaps, that they make you believe that Homer was a philoso-pher, although they disprove this by the very arguments throughwhich they seek to prove it. 32

Seneca’s comments about the disparately wide range ofsubject matter taught by different instructors in the same disci-pline unfortunately has a modern resonance. For Seneca, it is notthe specific facts comprising the curriculum of any of theseparticular studies that is at issue. It is a question of the integrationof information with a view toward human fulfillment. Moreover,Seneca’s specific mention of the poet Homer in opposition to thephilosopher is evocative of the continuous debate concerning thenature of the liberal arts which has been a perpetual struggle ininterpretation between poets and philosophers as to what consti-tutes the core of the tradition: effective communication andadvancement in society or the pursuit of truth itself? 33 This is astruggle in which, following ultimately Plato and more immedi-ately Posidonius, 34 Seneca avers the definitive hegemony ofphilosophy.35 In fact, the potential abuse of pursuing an academicdiscipline without reference to the true good, Seneca acknowl-edges to be a possibility within the study of philosophy itself, 36 yet


he maintains that in principle, philosophy is the only disciplinethat is inherently ordered toward such a broad and encompassinginvestigation.

Temporal DeficienciesIn addition to these intrinsic epistemological and teleologicallimitations of the liberal arts, there exists a third, extrinsicdeficiency, namely that regarding time. For Seneca, there is thedistinct implication that the reason why these various studiesshould not be pursued exclusively, or aside from the guidance ofphilosophy, is due to our extremely circumscribed temporalexistence as mortal beings. Man can only understand so muchwithin the parameters of a limited lifetime. If human beings wereto have an unlimited lifespan, perhaps in principle such studiescould be pursued ad infinitum in an ever-increasing understand-ing of the minute features of the universe. As human nature isintrinsically confined by time, however, people do not have themeans to achieve knowledge of everything, but merely of what ismost important. Reflecting upon this time-limited aspect oflearning, Seneca proclaims in Epistle LXXXVIII that one shouldbe prudent with the use of time and asserts that as pleasant aspursuing many different studies may be one should be acquaintedonly with as many arts as are useful to life; he warns thatoverindulgence in the liberal arts can make people pretentiousbores who fail to understand the essential truths of existencebecause of intemperately involving themselves in trivial mentalpursuits.37

The Propaedeutic Value of the Liberal ArtsBecause of the inherent deficiencies of the liberal arts regardingtheir derivative and secondary starting principles, their indirectorientation toward goodness, and their temporal constraints, arepeople to categorically avoid these traditional avenues of intellec-tual investigation and cultivation? On the contrary, Seneca doesnot consider these studies to be intrinsically pernicious, and infact he understands that they are capable of being preparatory for


virtuous living. He insists that they do in fact contribute to humanwelfare by preparing the soul for the reception of virtue, althoughthey are incapable of leading the soul all the way toward itsultimate goal. 38 Indeed, the worth of the liberal arts as being astage toward leading the soul toward virtue is elsewhere echoedin a Senecan dialogue written to console his mother during histime of exile; he reminds his mother of her earlier acquaintancewith the liberal arts and suggests that they may serve as afoundation for a properly philosophical understanding of herlonely circumstances. 39 Thus for Seneca the liberal arts poten-tially possess an important, though not necessarily essential,propaedeutic value. 40 Seneca suggests that the mind can becomestrengthened in its powers of understanding through the moreelementary arts. The study of grammar or music can aid inenhancing the mind’s ability to comprehend more profoundsubject matter with greater facility. It would seem obvious that aperson would be incapable of studying the deepest truths ofnature without first being equipped with the mental tools to do so.It is for this reason that Seneca wishes to designate such arts asboyish and puerile—as preparations for the manly and virileliberal art oriented toward virtus itself, i.e., philosophy.

SENECA’S EXALTED CONCEPTIONOF PHILOSOPHY AND FREEDOM

The Divisions of PhilosophyThe reduction of all the liberal arts into the single art of philoso-phy calls for a clarification as to what precisely for Senecaconstitutes philosophia. Understanding philosophy in the classi-cal sense as the “love or pursuit of wisdom,” 41 in accordance withthe doctrines of the Stoic school, Seneca separates the field ofphilosophy into three distinct parts, namely: (1) logic, whichinvolves questions of epistemology and includes both dialecticand rhetoric, (2) physics, which investigates nature with regard toits ultimate principles, and (3) ethics, which involves the prin-ciples of the human good and virtuous action. 42 Essentially, in the


perspective of the Hellenistic thinkers, the discipline of philoso-phy was considered to be an all-encompassing field. This is truenot only for the Stoics, who arguably were among the first thinkersto systematize philosophy in a definitive fashion, 43 but also for theEpicureans, who regarded philosophy alone as the only subjectworthy of pursuit—to the exclusion of all other liberal studies. 44

Since Seneca was a Stoic who had a strong appreciation for theteachings of Epicureanism, it is perhaps not surprising that hemaintained such a truncated view of the liberal arts in a reduction-istic subordination to philosophy. With his Stoic background,what would later become known as the trivium (logic, grammar,and rhetoric) would be subsumed completely by the Stoic divisionof logic and the quadrivium arts (arithmetic, music, geometry,and astronomy) would fall under the province of physics. Therewould seem to be no need for further partitioning or articulationof the artes liberales from the Stoical perspective. And, with theadded Epicurean injunction that philosophy alone should bepursued, it is possible to view Seneca’s self-avowedly uniqueposition as being fundamentally conformable to the customaryHellenistic notions of his time.

In his work Naturales Quaestiones , Seneca clarifies the dis-tinction between philosophy and the other arts by making acomparison between moral philosophy, which deals specificallywith human action, and natural philosophy, which concerns eventhe nature of God:

[T]he great difference between philosophy and other arts ismatched, I think, by the equally great difference in philosophyitself, between that part which pertains to man and that whichpertains to the gods. The latter is loftier and more intellectual,and so has permitted a great deal of freedom for itself. It has notbeen restricted to what can be seen; it has presumed that thereis something greater and more beautiful which nature has placedbeyond our sight. In short, between the two branches ofphilosophy there is as much difference as there is between manand god. One teaches us what ought to be done on earth: the


other what is to be done in heaven. One dispels our errors andfurnishes a light for us to see through the uncertainties of life; theother rises far above this fog in which we wallow, and rescuingus from darkness, leads us to the place whence the light shines.45

The imagery in this particular passage resonates with Platonicthought. Seneca asserts that there is a realm beyond the visible inwhich philosophy can operate in order to grasp the greatest andmost sublime truths of existence. 46

For Seneca, philosophy concerns the human mind’s under-standing of the basic principles of the universe and the practicalmoral response to such understanding. Ordered to the essentialcauses of truth and goodness, philosophy is the subject of utmostimportance; the supreme form of intellectual pursuit, it should bethe main priority in one’s life. He even exhorts: “One musttherefore take refuge in philosophy.” 47

The Nexus between Philosophy and VirtueKeeping with the tradition of his Greek and Roman philosophicalpredecessors, Seneca gives immense prominence to the pursuit ofwisdom throughout his writings and identifies wisdom with theentirety of virtue itself. 48 The goal of philosophy as being orientedtoward virtue and the mutual dependence between the two isproclaimed when he states in Epistle LXXXIX: “For philosophycannot exist without virtue, nor virtue without philosophy.” 49 Theintimate connection between virtue and philosophy was groundedin the Stoic’s view of the human soul as being equivalent to reasonitself. Indeed, though obviously indebted to Platonic and Aristo-telian thought, the Stoic Seneca is the first ancient author toexplicitly define man as the “rational animal.” 50 For Seneca,philosophy as the pursuit of wisdom stands as the architectonicart. He even goes so far as to call wisdom the “art of life” (inEpistles XXIX and CXVII). 51 Seneca perceives wisdom both as aninstrumental art for attaining the highest good and as the telos ofthe perfected mind itself. 52


Contemplative Dimensions of Wisdom and FreedomQuite often Hellenistic thought in general, and Senecanism inparticular, are characterized as being interested primarily in thepractical dimensions of philosophy rather than in its theoreticalaspects.53 It has been maintained that the schools were concernedwith dogmatism more than pursuit of truth and the ultimateexplanations of things were viewed for the sake of action, ratherthan being sought for their own sakes. Although there is a degreeof truth in this assertion, it fails to take into account the theoreti-cal dimensions of philosophy that were emphasized by Senecathroughout his works. 54

According to Seneca, the cosmos is governed by rationalityand human beings participate in the pervasive providence ofnature. For Seneca, the nature of the universe was a subject ofimmense importance and a source of great intellectual satisfac-tion.55 Indeed, philosophical meditation itself has intrinsic worth,and it becomes an end in itself when one realizes that thecontemplation of the universal reason that constitutes and per-meates Nature is itself the highest function of the human mindand soul. 56

In conformance with the tradition of the ancient Stoics whopreceded him, 57 since Seneca viewed nature as the manifestationof the divine, an investigation into the reality of nature, especiallyon the most theoretical level, was in fact an inquiry into theessence of God. For him, natural science and theology tend toconverge within the highest levels of intellectual examination, andphilosophy is concerned with discovering the causes of thingsfrom the most profound perspective. 58 He maintains that thetheological sciences reign supreme and that the studies of humanconduct should be subordinated to this investigation of thehighest questions concerning the nature of the universe. Extollingthe investigation into the highest principles of being, he perceivessevere difficulties in a reductionistic account of nature.

It is precisely in the act of contemplation of Nature and Godthat Seneca identifies the true meaning of freedom. In EpistleXCII, he makes the assertion that the contemplation of nature is


a goal of humanity that should not be impeded, when he declares:“For the mind is free from disturbance when it is free tocontemplate the universe, and nothing distracts it from thecontemplation of nature.” 59 Philosophy itself, in its aspiration forattaining wisdom, is recognized by him as being a fundamentalgoal for humankind; to be sure, he emphatically insists in EpistleVIII that “the very service of Philosophy is freedom.” 60 Unlike theEpicureans, who deemed that the contemplation of nature wasnecessary to free the soul of its anxiety, 61 the Stoical Seneca insiststhat the freedom of the soul from pain is itself instrumental to thehigher human function of investigating the universe. As expresslyenumerated in Epistle LXXXVIII, the examination of the natureof the universe involves questions about its first cause, theessence of time, and the potential immortality of the soul. 62

According to the Stoic view, only the virtuous soul is capable ofsuch immortality and is free in an even stronger respect—free toaspire to the starry heavens themselves after mortal existence onearth.

In fact, in this unceasing theoretical pursuit of knowledge ofthe universe, Seneca emphatically recommends the study of thegreat minds in history, most notably Socrates, who have gonebefore and investigated the universe:

Of all men they alone are at leisure who take time for philosophy,they alone really live; for they are not content to be goodguardians of their own lifetime only. They annex every age totheir own; all the years that have gone before them are anaddition to their store. Unless we are most ungrateful, all thosemen, glorious fashioners of holy thoughts, were born for us; forus they have prepared a way of life. By other men’s labours weare led to the sight of things most beautiful that have beenwrested from darkness and brought into light; from no age are weshut out, we have access to all ages, and if it is our wish, bygreatness of mind, to pass beyond the narrow limits of humanweakness, there is a great stretch of time through which we mayroam. We may argue with Socrates, we may doubt with Carneades,


find peace with Epicurus, overcome human nature with theStoics, exceed it with the Cynics. Since Nature allows us to enterinto fellowship with every age, why should we not turn from thispaltry and fleeting span of time and surrender ourselves with allour soul to the past, which is boundless, which is eternal, whichwe share with our betters? 63

It is through the study of works of the greatest thinkers ofhistory that the soul can achieve its ultimate freedom, accordingto Seneca, and one is capable of communing with these sagesmerely through the contemplative reading of their texts; this trulytimeless freedom is afforded to each person regardless of one’speriod in history, whether it be the first century or the twenty-firstcentury A.D.

CONCLUDING CONSPECTUS

RecapitulationEmbedded within the traditions of Stoic thought, Seneca thePhilosopher maintains a unique perspective on the liberal arts, ashe both devalues such arts in the traditional sense yet emphati-cally extols the intrinsic value of knowledge. Not surprisingly,then, Seneca’s provocative suggestions concerning the nature ofthe liberal arts have both weaknesses and strengths.

Limitations of the Senecan View of the Liberal ArtsWhen assessing Seneca’s perspective regarding the liberal arts,there exist manifest weaknesses. In the debate as to the numberof the liberal arts, Seneca provides no clarification, as his reduc-tion of all liberal arts to one does not take into consideration anypossible intrinsic value of the various areas of knowledge. Poten-tial metaphysical unity between truth and goodness is not ad-dressed specifically by him. Although Seneca states that thereexist distinct first principles ( decreta) that serve to differentiatethe various arts, he offers no insights as to what the nature of theseprinciples may be. In theory, Seneca’s position with regard to the


distinction of the arts by way of principles is both tenable andpromising, but since his suggestions are so elusive, they offer nopositive elucidation on the matter.

Furthermore, despite his insistence that the traditionallytermed “liberal arts” can serve as preparations for the philosophi-cal pursuit and the virtuous life, he does not specify the mannerin which this may occur. In fact, his formal position is that sucharts are not essential to virtue, yet philosophy is deemed anecessary component of the virtuous life. As Newman suggests inThe Idea of a University , it is questionable whether the study ofphilosophy is in fact sufficient for the virtuous life, as Seneca andother Stoics profess; however, this issue pertains to the broadermatter of the Stoic view of human nature as being essentiallypurely rational. 64 Also, there arises the further difficult questionof whether it is even possible to have a holistic understanding offirst principles, as philosophy is asserted to possess, withouthaving prior comprehension of particular facts derived throughother branches of human learning. Philosophy for Seneca appearsas a seemingly a priori discipline that proceeds before the othersciences both in the order of being ( ordo essendi) and in the orderof knowing ( ordo cognoscendi). This view of the absolute priorityof philosophy seems to anticipate an almost modern (even Carte-sian) approach. It is surely distinct from more inductive method-ologies envisioned for philosophy by Socrates, Plato, or Aristotle.Certainly for both Plato and Aristotle, philosophy (particularly“first philosophy” or “metaphysics”) deals with questions aboutthe most fundamental principles in the order of being, yetphilosophy does not originate with these in the order of knowing.Seneca appears to suggest a collapsing of these distinctions; forSeneca, philosophia both derives from, and remains primarilyfocused upon, the first-order principles of the cosmos.

Strengths of the Senecan View of the Liberal ArtsDespite the difficulties implicit in Seneca’s view of the liberal arts,however, it is arguable that on the whole his view is rather sound.According to the Senecan perspective, the educational process


requires more than merely simple inculcation of rudimentarytruths in young people. As important as it is for youth to beinstructed in fundamental areas of learning, it is the study ofphilosophy that is required to synthesize their education in sucha way as to be conducive to a truly virtuous life.

Indeed, especially when considering the circumstances of thedebate concerning the essence of the liberal arts, Seneca demon-strates clarity of thought when attempting to understand themwith regard to their end and not their origins. By realizing thateducation has a purpose, Seneca offers a beacon of light even tomodern times, which are clouded by the specters of relativism,pragmatism, and progressivism—which hold that there are nosuch definitive ends. That this end corresponds with the actualiza-tion of human nature as rational animals further gives power toSeneca’s educational philosophy, as this view is entirely consis-tent with two of the essential characteristics of a proper under-standing of education according to Jacques Maritain. 65 By under-standing the various arts as being unified in a common end,Seneca is correct in perceiving philosophy to have a key role.Indeed, in the centuries following Seneca in the Middle Ages,philosophy would have such a function as a master of all of theliberal arts. His understanding of the sapiential aspect of knowl-edge is also extremely provocative. Following the general prin-ciples of Stoicism, Seneca understands human nature to befulfilled in contemplation of Nature. For the pantheistic Stoics,such a study was identified with theology. The distinction betweenthe pagan and Christian view of theology is thus illuminatedthrough examining Seneca’s perspective; because there is notranscendent God who discloses Himself through divinely re-vealed faith, there is no basis in the pagan view for a differentia-tion between philosophy and theology. 66 As a system, this paganperspective is perhaps at least consistent, although undoubtedlydefective.

The Senecan view of freedom as being intimately related tocontemplation is also extremely promising, as it underscores thetruest manner in which human nature is able to be free. 67 His view


of the contemplative end of man fits well within the classicaltradition, as he both understands and illuminates how the noeticpowers of the soul are able to transcend time and place.

In conclusion, when considering the Senecan view in itsentirety, one can begin to comprehend how the seminal thoughtsof this philosopher exercised immense influence to posterity inthis continuous discussion as to the nature and value of the liberalarts. Indeed, Seneca’s essential insights can continue to provideguidance as to the proper ends, if not means, of the education offuture generations of humanity.

Douglas C. FortnerPontifical College Josephinum

NOTES1. It is interesting to note that the seemingly reciprocally

related terms trivium and quadrivium were not originally con-ceived by one thinker to describe the division of the liberal arts.The term quadrivium was first applied by the Christian philoso-pher Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (A.D. c. 480–524)during the fifth century A.D. to designate the four higher,mathematically based arts. Moreover, it was not until severalmore centuries thereafter that followers of Alcuin (A.D. c. 755–804), Charlemagne’s scholarly advisor and theologian, used theterm trivium to apply to the three “lower” arts of logic, grammar,and rhetoric. According to Bruce Kimball, who has researchedextensively the development of the concept of the liberal arts:“Acknowledging the leadership of Pythagoras, Boethius cites thefour mathematical disciplines—‘like a place where four roadsmeet’ ( quasi quadrivio )—as the sole path to philosophy. In thisway, while relying on an antecedent root, he coined the termquadrivium for future masters of the liberal arts.” [Cf.] Boethius,De institutione arithmetica, libri duo , De institutione musica , libriquinque. Accedit geometria quae fertur Boetii, G. Friedlein (Leipzig:B. G. Teubner, 1867) 1:1.” Bruce A. Kimball, Orators andPhilosophers: A History of the Idea of Liberal Education (New


York: College Board Publications, 1995), 47. “The term triviumfor the three language arts came into use among Alcuin’s circle ofscholars in the Carolingian era. . . . [A]n earlier associationbetween these words and the artes can be found in the fact thatRoman teachers would stand at a streetcorner— trivio orquadrivio—to gather and teach their students.” Ibid., 51.

2. The Pythagorean inspiration for the liberal arts tradition isrecounted by David Knowles as follows: “The Hellenistic educa-tion . . . was a more schematized version of that of Isocrates. . . . Thiscurriculum was a descendant of the original Pythagorean‘quadrivium’ or fourfold exercise of arithmetic, geometry, as-tronomy, and acoustic.” David Knowles, The Evolution of MedievalThought, ed. D. E. Luscombe and C. N. L. Brooke (London:Longman Group Limited, 1988), 56. That the Pythagoreans are atthe foundation of the tradition of the liberal arts is accentuated bythe fact that they also were the first thinkers to emphasize system-atically the philosophical notion of yevrÛa. “Life, he [Pythagoras]said, is like a festival; just as some come to the festival to compete,some to ply their trade, but the best people come as spectator, soin life the slavish men go hunting for fame or gain, the philosophersfor the truth. (Diogenes Laertius VIII.8) . . . Pythagoras turnedgeometrical philosophy into a form of liberal education by seekingits first principles in a higher realm of reality. (Proclus, in Eucl . 65Friedl.).” Reginald E. Allen, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle(New York: The Free Press, 1991), 36.

3. Plato, The Republic, Vol. 2, Books VI–X, trans. Paul Shorey(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1946), 146–208.(521C–534E). In addition to the four aforementioned disci-plines, Plato also states the need for the study of stereometry (thescience of three-dimensional solids), and he stresses that thesevarious disciplines be unified through the study of dialectics,which he calls the “coping stone” of the other studies.

4. The development of the concept of the liberal arts has beenresearched in great depth by Bruce Kimball, who concludes: “Itis probably true to say that all seven arts—the three language andthe four mathematical—were known to and developed by the


Greeks. . . . This is not to say that these disciplines had been fullyelaborated” (Orators and Philosophers, 23). According to Kimball:“[There] is the effort to find an etymological bridge betweenliberalis and the Greeks. Here three possibilities are commonlyadvanced. One is skholê, the Greek word denoting ‘leisure, rest,ease,’ which came to mean ‘that in which leisure is employed . . .especially learned discussion, disputation, lecture.’ . . . Skholêpassed into Latin as schola and eventually into English as ‘school,’and some take it to be a significant link to Greek education forleisure or ‘liberal education.’ Another oft-cited etymologicalbridge is eleutherios, which can be literally translated as ‘fit for afree man, liberal’; and this is precisely the rendering made in thestandard translations of Aristotle’s discussions on educationrelied upon by many modern commentars on ‘liberal education.’Eleutherios—especially when applied to tekhnai, the Greek wordfor artes—has thus been considered the most direct link toAthenian ‘liberal education.’ Lastly, artes liberales has sometimesbeen regarded as a translation of the Greek term enkukliospaideia, meaning general education, prior to professional studies.. . . The curious thing, however, about the last etymologicalapproach is that enkuklios paideia can in no way be literallytranslated as artes liberales.” Ibid., 15.

5. Dr. Kimball professes: “The Roman Republic providesunambiguous etymological evidence, at least from the first cen-tury B.C. By that time, Cicero and others were employing theterm artes liberales and the like, all clear antecedents for ‘liberalarts’ and ‘liberal education’ in English.” Ibid., 29.

6. “Varro and Cicero do not themselves list seven arts. Varro,whose encyclopedic treatise was widely read, listed nine arts:medicine, architecture, philosophy, plus six of the later seven. Inworks of Cicero, one must conflate scattered listings in order toarrive at a list of seven, a fact reflecting the variability in programsof Roman education. Masters still roamed around teaching theirsubjects individually, and Cicero himself wrote that Romaneducation was neither ‘fixed by law, publicly supported, norstandardized.’ ( De Republica 4.3)” Ibid., 30.


In this following passage of Cicero ( De Oratore, III.xxxii.127),which is one of the first instances of the literal use of the phraseartes liberales , the disciplines delineated are not precisely thosewhich would later constitue the canonical tradition: “Hippias ofElis, visiting Olympia on the occasion of the quadrennial celebra-tion of the famous games, boasted before an audience containingvirtually the whole of Greece that there was not a single factincluded in any system of encyclopaedic knowledge with which hewas not acquainted; and that he had not only acquired theaccomplishments that form the basis of the liberal education ofa gentleman, mathematics, music, knowledge of literature andpoetry, and the doctrines of natural science, ethics and politicalscience, but had made with his own hand the ring he had on, thecloak he was dressed in and the boots he was wearing.” The Latinreads: “Eleus Hippias cum Olmpiam venisset maxima illaquinquennali celebritate ludoru, gloriatus est cuncta paeneaudiente Graecia nihil esse ullla in arte rerum omnium quod ipsenesciret, nec solum has artes quibus liberales doctrinae atqueingenuae continerentur, geometriam, musicam, litterarumcognitionem et poetarum, atque illa quae de naturis rerum, quaede hominum moribus, quae de rebus publicis dicerentur setenere, sed anulum quem haberet, pallium quo amictus, soccosquibus indutus esset, se sua manu confecisse .” Marcus TulliusCicero, De Oratore, Book III, together with De Fato, ParadoxaStoicorum, De Partitione Oratoria , trans. H. Rackham (Cam-bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), 98–101. Cf. Ox-ford Latin Dictionary ., ed. P. G. W. Glare (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1982), 1024.

7. Although it is a matter of scholarly debate as to whether theseven arts were specified categorically before this time, Martianus’swork De Nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii (On the Marriage ofPhilology and Mercury ) exercised a tremendous influence on thesubsequent thinkers from late antiquity onwards. “ De nuptiisrelates the story, told by an old man to his son, of how the godMercury woos and wins Philology, an erudite young woman. Atthe wedding banquet in the heavens, Mercury presents his bride


with seven handmaidens, each personifying one of the sevenliberal disciplines, which are described in separate discoursesduring the banquet. Relying heavily on Varro and extolling Cicero,Martianus warns against a too intense or lengthy study of dialec-tic, which precedes that of rhetoric. . . . Fundamentally, theallegory teaches that the seven liberal arts are the means to bringeloquence (Mercury) and learning (Philology) together, an aimsanctioned by the gods. [Cf.] Martianus Capella, De nuptiisPhilologie et Mercurii, ed. Adolfus Dick (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner,1925, 1-2, 423, 588–704.” Kimball, Orators and Philosophers , 31.

8. The definite account of the liberal arts was articulated in thethirteenth century by St. Thomas Aquinas. Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas’Commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitatae, Question V, Article 1,ad. 3; Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Lect. 3, n.59; andSumma Theologiae I-II, Question 57, Article 3, reply ob. 3.,wherein he states: “Hence whatever habits are ordained to suchworks of the speculative reason are, by a kind of comparison,called arts indeed, but liberal arts, in order to distinguish themfrom those arts that are ordained to works done by the body; forthese are are, in a fashion, servile, inasmuch as the body is inservile subjection to the soul, and man, as regards his soul, is free[liber]. On the other hand, those sciences which are not ordainedto any such work are called sciences absolutely, and not arts. Nor,if the liberal arts be more excellent, does it follow that the notionof art is more applicable to them.” Introduction to St. ThomasAquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis (New York: Random House, Inc.,1948), 572.

A contemporary, yet classical formulation of the distinctionamongst the seven liberal arts has been rendered succinctly bySister Miriam Joseph, C.S.C. as follows: “The trivium includesthose aspects of the liberal arts that pertain to the mind, and thequadrivium, those aspects of the liberal arts which pertain tomatter. Logic, grammar, and rhetoric constitue the trivium; andarithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy constitute thequadrivium. Logic is the art of thinking; grammar, the art ofinventing symbols and combining them to express thought; and


rhetoric, the art of communicating thought from one mind toanother, the adaptation of language to circumstance. Arithmetic,the theory of number, and mucic, and application of the theory ofnumber (the measurement of discrete quantities in motion), arethe arts of discrete quantity or number. Geometry, the theory ofspace, and astronomy, an application of the theory of space, arethe arts of continuous quantity or extension.” The Trivium: TheLiberal Arts of Logic, Grammar, and Rhetoric , ed. MargueriteMcGlinn (Philadelphia: Paul Dry Books, 2002), 3.

9. Seneca was well acquainted with the Roman educationalsystem and studied extensively both the arts of rhetoric andphilosophy. Born under the dominion of the Roman Empire inCorduba, Spain, to parents of an equestrian family, Seneca wasbrought to Rome as a youth, where, along with his two brothers,he studied the liberal art of rhetoric under the tutelage of hisfather—who is referred to in history as Seneca the Elder orSeneca the Rhetor. In addition to his rhetorical education, Senecafervently studied philosophy as a youth (against the expressedwishes of his father), and, through various influential teachers andself-instruction, delved into Pythagorean and Stoic thought, aswell as the classical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle. Senecabecame an eclectic Hellenistic philosopher steeped not only in theteachings of the Stoa as represented by its original adherents butalso in the continuing Platonic and Peripatetic traditions. How-ever, his early philosophical training would have to wait manyyears before coming to full fruition, as he became involved withthe political machinations of the early Roman Empire, where inwhich he would pursue the cursus honorum first as a quaestor andultimately as the tutor and personal advisor to Emperor Nero.Before his death (at direct the command of Nero), Senecaproduced numerous philosophical works, including twelve Diologi(on topics ranging from the nature of Providence to the role ofleisure and the shortness of life), a seven-book treatise concerningthe nature of reciprocal social relationships ( De Beneficiis ), aseven-book work on physics titled the Naturales Quaestiones, and,arguably his most famous philosophical work, the 124 Epistulae


Morales. Moreover, in addition to his philosophical works, Senecaalso is notable for writing ten Roman tragedies (based on theGreek models of Aeschylus, Euripides, and Sophocles).

10. The significance of Seneca’s influence on the medievalmind has been expressed by José Antonio Fránquiz: “It was duringthis period of optimistic horizons and broadening new perspec-tives, cosmopolitanism, wealth, social enlightenment, nationalexpansion, and joie de vivre, that a need for a spiritual coordinatorand critical assessor or interpreter of the times arose and wasfulfilled in the life and thought of Lucius Annaeus Seneca. . . . Afairer and clearer understanding of . . . [the] content [of theLiberal Arts] could easily be discerned from an objective analysisof the thought of Cato, Plautus, Cicero, Tacitus, Ennius, Virgil,Pliny the Elder, and the Younger, Juvenal, Marcus Aurelius, butespecially Lucius Annaeus Seneca. It was the thought of thesemen, and of Seneca in particular, that formed the educationalsubject matter of the curriculum during the Middle Ages.” “ThePlace of Seneca in the Curriculum of the Middle Ages,” in Actesdu quatrième congrès international de philosophie médiévale: Artslibéraux et philosophie au moyen âge (Montreal: Institut d’ÉtudesMédiévales, 1969), 1065–066.

It has been further remarked by Richard Mott Gummere that“Seneca was a Stoic, and Stoicism was the porch to Christianity.Then, as now, it was the thought-force that lay nearest to ourinspirational religion. It was Stoicism which made the Christianfathers claim Seneca as one of their own.” Seneca the Philosopherand His Modern Message (New York: Cooper Square Publishers,Inc., 1963), 54.

11. Étienne Gilson discusses the historical import of Senecathe Philosopher with regard to Christian tradition of the liberalarts (specifically in relation to Epistle LXXXVIII) in the followingmanner: “Pour m’en tenir à un exemple remarquable, je rappelariale nom de Sénèque le Philosophe. Dans ses Lettres à Lucilius, ilavertit son correspondent de ne pas faire de l’étude des artrslibéraux la fin ni l’essentiel de ses etudes. . . . Nous passerionsfacilement une heure en compagnie de cette letter [ Ad. Luc., 88],


que les Anciens transcrivaient souvent à part sous le titre de LuciiAnnaei Senecae liber de septem artibus liberalibus. . . . La méfiancede Sénèque le Philosophe envers les arts libéraux aura son échodans l’ Imitatiion de Jésus Christ .” “La Philosophie et Les ArtsLibéraux,” in Actes du quatrième congrès international de philosophiemédiévale: Arts libéraux et philosophie au moyen âge (Montreal:Institut d’Études Médiévales, 1969), 269–70.

Moreover, it is interesting to note in passing that the EpistleLXXXVIII was the last letter contained in the first volume of thetwo-volume medieval transmission of the Epistulae Morales;Senecan scholar L. D. Reynolds, the modern authority on the textof Seneca’s letters, has professed that: “The fundamental factwhich we must bear in mind when studying the text of the Lettersis that we are dealing, not with one manuscript tradition, but withtwo, and that these two traditions must be treated as separateproblems. For the extant corpus of letters was divided at an earlydate into two volumes, one containing letters 1–88, the otherletters 89–124, and the fact that both volumes are found in onetenth-century manuscript and commonly in later manuscriptsshould not be allowed to obscure this division.” The MedievalTradition of Seneca’s Letters (Oxford: Oxford University Press,1965), 17.

12. Martha C. Nussbaum summarizes the importance andessence of this letter in the following manner: “The fullestexpression of Seneca’s complex position on books and reverenceis in Letter 88, the famous letter on liberal education. Here heattacks traditional Roman methods of education for young gentle-men, which focused on the close and reverential study of certaincanonical texts. Seneca expresses grave doubts about the tradi-tional notion of studia liberalia, if interpreted in its conventionmeaning of ‘studies suited to a freeborn gentleman’ (88.1–2). Ifsuch studies serve only to augment one’s income, they are no goodat all. And even where they do have some use, they are useful onlyas a basis, not as the noble activity of the mind itself. The onlystudy truly worthy of the name liberalis is philosophy: for thatliberates the mind. It is good to have had the basic education


embodied in conventional liberal studies, but philosophy is theonly study whose activity is itself an exercise of human freedom.”The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics ,(Princeton University Press, 1994), 346–47.

13. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, trans.Richard M. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library (1920; reprint,Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 359; (Ep.LXXXVIII.18). “In illo feras me necesse est non per praescriptumeuntem.” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I , 316.

The most notable proclamation of Seneca’s self-professedphilosophic originality is in Epistle LXXX: “Do I then follow nopredecessors? Yes, but I allow myself to discover something new,to alter, to reject. I am not a slave to them, although I give themmy approval.” Epistles , 66–92, vol. 2, 213 (Ep. LXXX.1). “Nonergo sequor priores? facio, sed permitto mihi et invenire aliquidet mutare et relinquere; non servio illis, sed assentior.” AdLucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I, 260.

14. Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 349 (Ep . LXXXVIII.1–2).“De liberalibus studiis quid sentiam scire desideras: nullumsuspicio, nullum in bonis numero quod ad aes exit. Meritoriaartificia sunt, hactenus utilia si praeparant ingenium, non detinent.Tamdiu enim istis inmorandum est quamdiu nihil animus ageremaius potest; rudimenta sunt nostra, non opera.” Lucius AnnaeusSeneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I, Libri I–XIII , ed.L. D. Reynolds, Oxford Classical Texts (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1965), 312.

Seneca thus begins the letter addressing Lucilius’ question ofthe nature of the liberal arts, perhaps in response to Seneca’semphatic position in the previous epistle that the arts of medicineand navigation contribute nothing to virtue. Cf. Seneca’s EpistleLXXXVII.15–17.

Throughout this study, the original Latin quotations of Sen-eca from the definitive Oxford Classical Texts are provided infootnotes, and the corresponding English translations of Seneca’swritings are rendered in the text from the Loeb Classical Libraryeditions.


15. “For I do not consent to admit painting into the list ofliberal arts, any more than sculpture, marble-working, and otherhelps toward luxury. I also debar from the liberal studies wrestlingand all knowledge that is compounded of oil and mud; otherwise,I should be compelled to admit perfumers also, and cooks, and allothers who lend their wits to the service of our pleasures. Forwhat “liberal” element is there in these ravenous takers of emetics,whose bodies are fed to fatness while their minds are thin anddull?” Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 359; 361 (Ep. LXXXVIII.18–19). “[Non] magis quam statuarios aut marmorarios aut ceterosluxuriae ministros. Aeque luctatores et totam oleo ac lutoconstantem scientiam expello ex his studiis liberalibus; aut etunguentarios recipiam et cocos et ceteros voluptatibus nostrisingenia accommodantes sua. Quid enim, oro te, liberale habentisti ieiuni vomitores, quorum corpora in sagina, animi in macie etveterno sunt?” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I , 316–17.

16. According to two renown scholars on Hellenistic philoso-phy, Drs. Long and Sedley: “Seneca in our extract is answering ananonymous objection that the liberales artes, because they assistphilosophy, should be included as one of its parts. Posidonius hasalready been named in section 21 of the same letter, and [I. G.Kidd in “Philosophy and Science in Posidonius,” Antike undAbendland 24 (1978), 8–10] gives strong reasons for taking himto be Seneca’s source.” A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, TheHellenistic Philosophers, vol. 2, Greek and Latin Texts with Notesand Bibliography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987),165.

17. “Posidonius divides the arts into four classes: first we havethose which are common and low, then those which serve foramusement, then those which refer to the education of boys, and,finally, the liberal arts. The common sort belong to workmen andare mere hand-work; they are concerned with equipping life; thereis in them no pretence to beauty or honour. The arts of amuse-ment are those which aim to please the eye and the ear. To thisclass you may assign the stage-machinists, who invent scaffoldingthat goes aloft of its own accord, or floors that rise silently into the


air, and many other surprising devices, as when objects that fittogether then fall apart, or objects which are separate then jointogether automatically, or objects which stand erect then gradu-ally collapse. The eye of the inexperienced is struck with amaze-ment by these things; for such persons marvel at everything thattakes place without warning, because they do not know the causes.The arts which belong to the education of boys, and are somewhatsimilar to the liberal arts, are those which the Greeks call the ‘cycleof studies,’ but which we Romans call the ‘liberal.’ However, thosealone are really liberal—or rather, to give them a truer name,‘free’—whose concern is virtue.” Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2,362; 363 (Ep. LXXXVIII.21–23).

Concerning the originality of this division, W. Tatarkiewiczhas discerned: “The division of arts into the vulgar and liberal (orencyclic) arts had several variants in ancient times, and there weresome additions which enriched it. One of them has come to usthrough the works of Seneca. Its origin goes back to the philoso-phy of Poseidonius. To vulgar and liberal arts Seneca added thosethose which instruct ( pueriles) and those which amuse ( ludicrae).Thus he fused two different classifications: that of Galen and thatof the Sophists. The new division was fourfold; it was morecomplete, but it lacked unity.” “Classification of Arts in Antiq-uity,” Journal of the History of Ideas 24 (April–June 1963), 234.

18. Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, p. 349 (Ep. LXXXVIII.2). “Quareliberalia studia dicta sint vides: quia homine libero digna sunt.Ceterum unum studium vere liberale est quod liberum facit, hocest sapientiae, sublime, forte, magnanimum: cetera pusilla etpuerilia sunt.” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I , 312.

19. Cf. Plato’s Meno (82B–85E) and Republic, Book VII(514A–518C); cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Book I, Chapter 2(982b11–27).

20. The view of the liberal arts as having the goal, rather thanmerely having its origins, in freedom, has a modern resonance, asmany contemporary thinkers view the liberal arts in this fashion.Kimball remarks: “With the rise of experimental science and thedawning of the Enlightenment, the catalysis for renewing philo-


sophical activity and precipitating a different ideal that wouldwould come to be linked with the words ‘liberal education’commenced as well. . . . [There was an] individualistic, open-ended sense of freedom popularized in the Enlightenment.”Orators and Philosophers , 115.

21. The authoritative scholar of Roman Stoicism, EdwardVernon Arnold, has discerned that for the Stoics in general theliberal arts were thought to have a subordinate, though helpful,role in realizing the human goal of virtue: “But the Stoicsgenerally held that all wisdom must justify itself by practicalresults. The study of the so-called ‘liberal arts’ has a value forchildren, for it prepares the way for virtuous training. Logic isneeded to protect us against fallacious reasoning, and physicsthat we may rightly understand the universe and its providentialgovernment, upon which the conception of duty depends; in thissense we may speak of logic and physics as virtues, that is, assubdivisions of the virtue of wisdom. The study of physics is alsoadmirable because it elevates the soul. Geometry, law, andastrology are useful in the several professions. But study whencarried to excess, as by antiquarians, bookworms, and otherlearned time-wasters, is nothing but folly.” Roman Stoicism:Being Lectures on the History of the Stoic Philosophy with SpecialReference to Its Development within the Roman Empire (NewYork: Books for Libraries Press, 1911), 306–7.

22. Michael Frede contextualizes Seneca’s interest in thequestion of the value of the liberal arts as follows: “Later Stoics,of course, could not fail to realize that there were grammarianspursuing a particular discipline. And since there is no doubt thatsome Stoics had considerable interest in grammatical questions,one might think that they simply joined the grammarians in theirown pursuits, either for ulterior philosophical reasons or merelyout of interest in the subject itself. So we would have Stoicgrammar in the sense that there were Stoics who also happenedto be engaged in grammatical studies. This is, in fact, a view onemight obtain from a superficial reading of Seneca’s letters. InEpistle 88 Seneca considers the liberal studies or arts, among


which he includes grammar (88.3). But he wonders whether theyare genuinely liberal, that is, whether they really help make usvirtuous and hence truly free, as philosophy supposedly does(88.2).” “Principles of Stoic Grammar,” in Essays in AncientPhilosophy (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press,1987), 303.

23. “And even in the letter to Lucilius on the artes liberales,there is one notable omission. Literature, music, geometry,arithmetic, astronomy, painting, sculpture, athletics: all these areexamined in turn, and rejected. Not a word is said about rhethoric.Elsewhere Seneca definitely ranks eloquence beneath philoso-phy, [in Ep. 40.12] but here rhetoric, the most conspicuous of allthe arts, is passed by in silence.” Gwynn, Roman Education, 178–79.

24. George G. Strem comments specifically upon Seneca’sperspective of rhetoric: “Seneca does not condemn the study ofthe humanities per se, only the mercenary purpose for which theywere taught. The selfless study of the humanities will fosterSeneca’s supreme aim, the improvement of human nature, thecreation of better men and a better society. . . . [S]uch studiesshould constitute the basis of further learning. As a philosopherexamining whether such and such a study is useful for theformation of the character, Seneca had to come to grips with asubject that was vital to him and to so many Romans: the study ofeloquence. Public speaking, the debating of a given question fromboth the affirmative and the negative side, or from the point ofview of both the accuser and of the defendant, was regarded as themost desirable skill to be acquired for the career of a nobleRoman. Lucius and his brother[s] . . . had received intensivepreparation in this art of eloquence, which was highly praised bytheir father, Seneca the Elder. Yet, little by little, the youngerSeneca came to condemn oratory for its own sake, the skill ofjuggling words, as a waste of man’s intellectual potential, thoughhe never could completely rid himself of his father’s influence.”The Life and Teaching of Lucius Annaeus Seneca (New York:Vantage Press, Inc., 1981), 126–27.


25. Sophistical word-play and syllogistic bantering, which is aperversion of the field of philosophy in every age, was condemnedby Seneca as being inimical to the pursuit of virtue and anathemato the very practice of philosophy. Cf. Epistles CXI and CXVII.

26. Seneca clarifies in Epistle XCV that: “Furthermore, manyarts, aye and the most liberal of them all, have their specialdoctrines, and not mere precepts of advice—the medical profes-sion, for example. There are the different schools of Hippocrates,of Asclepiades, of Themison. And besides, no art that concernsitself with theories can exist without its own doctrines; the Greekscall them dogmas, while we Romans may use the term ‘doctrines,’or ‘tenets,’ or ‘adopted principles,’—such as you will find ingeometry or astronomy. . . . Philosophy, therefore, being theo-retic, must have her doctrines. . . . There is the same differencebetween philosophical doctrines and precepts as there is betweenelements and members; the latter depend upon the former, whilethe former are the source both of the latter and of all things.”Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, vol. 3,trans. Richard M. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library (1925;reprint, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), 63; 65(Ep. XCV.9–10; 12) “Adice nunc quod artes quoque pleraeque—immo ex omnibus liberalissimae—habent decreta sua, non tantumpraecepta, sicut medicina; itaque alia est Hippocratis secta, aliaAsclepiadis, alia Themisonis. Praeterea nulla ars contemplativasine decretis suis est, quae Graeci vocant dogmata, nobis veldecreta licet appellare vel scita vel placita; quae et in geometria etin astronomia invenies. . . . Sequitur ergo ut, cum contemplativasit, habeat decreta sua. . . . Hoc interest inter decreta philosophiaeet praecepta quod inter elementa et membra: haec ex illis depen-dent, illa et horum causae sunt et omnium.” Lucius AnnaeusSeneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus II, Libri XIV–XX ,ed. L. D. Reynolds, Oxford Classical Texts (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1965), 384–85.

27. “No art, however, is sufficient unto itself, if the foundationupon which it rests depends upon mere favour. Now philosophyasks no favours from any other source; it builds everything on its


own soil; but the science of numbers is, so to speak, a structurebuilt on another man’s land—it builds on everything on alien soil.It accepts first principles, and by their favour arrives at furtherconclusions. If it could march unassisted to the truth, if it wereable to understand the nature of the universe, I should say that itwould offer much assistance to our minds; for the mind grows bycontact with things heavenly and draws into itself something fromon high. There is but one thing that brings the soul to perfection—the unalterable knowledge of good and evil. But there is no otherart which investigates good and evil.

28. Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 365; 367. ( Ep.LXXXVIII.27–28) “[N]on est autem ars sui iuris cui precariumfundamentum est. Philosophia nil ab alio petit, totum opus a soloexcitat: mathematice, ut ita dicam, superficiaria est, in alienoaedificat; accipit prima, quorum beneficio ad ulteriora perveniat.Si per se iret ad verum, si totius mundi naturam posset conprendere,dicerem multum conlaturam mentibus nostris, quae tractatucaelestium crescunt trahuntque aliquid ex alto. Una reconsummatur animus, scientia bonorum ac malorum inmutabili;nihil autem ulla ars alia de bonis ac malis quaerit.” Ad LuciliumEpistulae Morales, Tomus I , 318–19.

29. The question of whether on the metaphysical level thereis any direct relation between truth and goodness is apparentlyignored by Seneca.

30. Cf. Plato, Republic, Book VI (488A–489A; 507A–508C).31. Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 359; 361 (Ep. LXXXVIII.2–

3). “Quidam illud de liberalibus studiis quaerendum iudicaverunt,an virum bonum facerent: ne promittunt quidem nec huius reiscientiam adfectant. Grammatice circa curam sermonis versaturet, si latius evagari vult, circa historias, iam ut longissime finessuos proferat, circa carmina. Quid horum ad virtutem viamsternit? Syllabarum enarratio et verborum diligentia et fabularummemoria et versuum lex ac modification—quid ex his metumdemit, cupiditatem eximit, libidinem frenat?” Ad Lucilium EpistulaeMorales, Tomus I , pp. 313.

32. “Ever since Plato’s Meno the question of how virtue is


acquired was central to ethics—and it was recognized that itmight be unteachable and yet still humanly attainable ( Meno 91a–100b, esp. 96c–d, 98d–99c; Aristotle, Nic. Eth. 2 1, 1103a14–b25).” R. J. Hankinson, The Sceptics (New York: Routledge,1995), 253.

33. Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, pp. 359; 361 (Ep.LXXXVIII.4–5). “[Quaeritur] utrum doceant isti virtutem an non:si non docent, ne tradunt quidem; si docent, philosophi sunt. Visscire quam non ad docendam virtutem consederint? aspice quamdissimilia inter se omnium studia sint: atqui similitudo esset idemdocentium. Nisi forte tibi Homerum philosophum fuissepersuadent, cum his ipsis quibus colligunt negent.” Ad LuciliumEpistulae Morales, Tomus I , 313.

34. Brad Inwood and Pierluigi Donini state that the essentialaims of education from the Stoical perspective, would be opposedto all emotional expression (such as that recommended by thepoets): “The aim of moral education would therefore, accordingto the Stoics, have been attained when there is established in themind a complex of correct opinions, perfectly mutually coherentand coinciding with the propositions of right reason and accord-ing to the will of Zeus. But there is a threat to any such conceptionof education, dominated by emphasis on cognitive processes:passion, interpreted as incorrect opinion.” Brad Inwood andPierluigi Donini, “Stoic Ethics,” The Cambridge History of Helle-nistic Philosophy , ed. Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, JaapMansfeld, and Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 1999), 711.

35. Long and Sedley note that: “Posidonius is probably theimmediate authority for Seneca’s distinction between the parts ofphilosophy and the purely instrumental status of special sciences.The latter are not a part of the Stoic’s philosophical curriculum,but he will make use of their findings. Underlying this distinctionis the Platonic difference ( Republic 6.510) between themathematician’s total dependence upon hypotheses, and thephilosopher’s quest for unhypothetical first principles. A Stoicsage, like the Platonic dialectian, is concerned with general


principles of explanation rather than the accumulation of data oranswers to specific questions of fact. Posidonius, who had par-ticular interest in Plato, may be responsible for adding ‘causes’ tothe definition of wisdom as ‘knowledge of the divine and thehuman.’ But there is no reason to think that the addition alteredthe substance of what was meant by ‘scientific knowledge of thedivine and human’, or that Chrysippus would have dissented fromthe doctrine. Instead of distinguishing different kinds of philoso-phy, as Aristotle had done (theoretical, practical, productive), theStoics stressed the practical utility of the subject in all its parts.Virtue pertains to each of these, with physics, which gives ‘knowl-edge of the divine’, a cardinal requirement for ‘wisdom’, and logicno less so. As to what the three parts are practically useful for, andconstitutive of, the Stoic answer must be, ‘living a well reasonedlife’. For all three parts of a particular kind of logos—philosophi-cal discourse, where discourse includes the mind’s dialogue withitself, or its rational character.” A. A. Long and D. N. Sedley, eds.,The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, Translations of the PrincipalSources, with Philosophical Commentary (Cambridge UniversityPress, 1987), 161.

36. Cf. Plato’s Republic, Books III and X, in which respec-tively Homer’s hero, Achilles, and Homer himself are the subjectsof philosophic dispute with regard to the proper understanding(and communication) of truth. According to Bruce Kimball: “Thehistory of liberal education is the story of a debate betweenorators and philosophers. . . . The story is, first of all, very old. . . because it begins with Isocrates and Plato.” Orators andPhilosophers, 2.

37. Seneca warns against the abuses of philosophy in thismanner: “I have been speaking so far of liberal studies; but thinkhow much superfluous and unpractical matter the philosopherscontain! Of their own accord they also have descended to estab-lishing nice divisions of syllables, to determining the true meaningof conjunctions and prepositions; they have been envious of thescholars, envious of the mathematicians. They have taken overinto their own art all the superfluities of these other arts; the result


is that they know more about careful speaking than about carefulliving. Let me tell you what evils are due to over-nice exactness,and what an enemy it is of truth!” Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 375 (Ep.LXXXVIII.42–43). “De liberalibus studiis loquor: philosophiquantum habent supervacui, quantum ab usu recedentis! Ipsiquoque ad syllabarum distinctiones et coniunctionum acpraepositionum proprietates descenderunt et invideregrammaticis, invidere geometris; quidquid in illorum artibussupervacuum erat transtulere in suam. Sic effectum est utdiligentius loqui scirent quam vivere. Audi quantum mali faciatnimia subtilitas et quam infesta veritati sit.” Ad Lucilium EpistulaeMorales, Tomus I , 322.

38. According to Seneca: “‘[I]t is a pleasure to be acquaintedwith many arts.’ Therefore let us keep only as much of them as isessential. Do you regard that man as blameworthy who putssuperfluous things on the same footing with useful things, and inhis house makes a lavish display of costly objects, but do not deemhim blameworthy who has allowed himself to become engrossedwith the useless furniture of learning? This desire to know morethan is sufficient is a sort of intemperance. Why? Because thisunseemly pursuit of the liberal arts makes men troublesome,wordy, tactless, self-satisfied bores, who fail to learn the essen-tials just because they have learned the non-essentials.” Epistles,66–92, vol. 2, 369; 371 (Ep. LXXXVIII.35). “‘At enim delectatartium notitia multarum.’ Tantum itaque ex illis retineamusquantum necessarium est. An tu existimas reprendendum quisupervacua usibus comparat et pretiosarum rerum pompam indomo explicat, non putas eum qui occupatus est in supervacualitterarum supellectile? Plus scire velle quam sit satisintemperantiae genus est. Quid quod ista liberalium artiumconsectatio molestos, verbosos, intempestivos, sibi placentesfacit et ideo non discentes necessaria quia supervacua didicerunt?”Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I , 321.

Indeed, the correct use of one’s time, particularly one’sleisure time, is a theme throughout Seneca’s works, particularlyhis treatises De Brevitate Vitae and De Otio . Seneca both recom-


mends that time be spent in study and recognizes the vice ofcuriositas as being a type of concupiscence of the mind to desireto be acquainted with all possible knowledge.

39. Seneca speaks of the foundational function of the liberalarts in the following manner: “‘What then,’ you say, ‘do the liberalstudies contribute nothing to our welfare?’ Very much in otherrespects, but nothing at all as regards virtue. For even these artsof which I have spoken, though admittedly of a low grade—depending as they do upon handiwork—contribute greatly to-ward the equipment of life, but nevertheless have nothing to dowith virtue. And if you inquire, ‘Why, then, do we educate ourchildren in the liberal studies?’ it is not because they can bestowvirtue, but because they prepare the soul for the reception ofvirtue. Just as that ‘primary course,’ as the ancients called it, ingrammar, which gave boys their elementary training, does notteach them the liberal arts, but prepares the ground for their earlyacquisition of these arts, so the liberal arts do not conduct the soulall the way to virtue, but merely set it going in that direction.”Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 349 (Ep. LXXXVIII.20). “‘Quid ergo? nihilnobis liberalia conferunt studia?’ Ad alia multum, ad virtutemnihil; nam et hae viles ex professo artes quae manu constant adinstrumenta vitae plurimum conferunt, tamen ad virtutem nonpertinent. ‘Quare ergo liberalibus studiis filios erudimus?’ Nonquia virtutem dare possunt, sed quia animum ad accipiendamvirtutem praeparant. Quemadmodum prima illa, ut antiquivocabant, litteratura, per quam pueris elementa traduntur, nondocet liberales artes sed mox percipiendis locum parat, sicliberales artes non perducunt animum ad virtutem sed expediunt.”Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I , 317.

40. Writing to his mother, Helvia, Seneca advises: “And so Iguide you to that in which all who fly from Fortune must takerefuge to philosopohic [liberal] studies. They will heal yourwound, they will uproot all your sadness. Even if you had not beenacquainted with them before, you would need to use them now;but, so far as the old-fashioned strictness of my father permittedyou, though you have not indeed fully grasped all the liberal arts,


still you have had some dealings with them. Would that my father,truly the best of men, had surrendered less to the practice of hisforefathers, and had been willing to have you acquire a thoroughknowledge of the teachings of philosophy instead of a meresmattering! In that case you would now have, not to devise, butmerely to display, your protection against Fortune. But he did notsuffer you to pursue your studies because of those women who donot employ learning as a means to wisdom, but equip themselveswith it for the purpose of display. Yet, thanks to your acquiringmind, you imbibed more than might have been expected in thetime you had; the foundations of all systematic knowledge havebeen laid. Do you return now to these studies; they will render yousafe. They will comfort you, they will cheer you; if in earnest theygain entrance to your mind, nevermore will sorrow enter there,nevermore anxiety, nevermore the useless distress of futile suffer-ing. To none of these will your heart be open; for to all otherweaknesses it has long been closed. Philosophy is your mostunfailing safeguard, and she alone can rescue you from the powerof Fortune.” Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Moral Essays , vol. 2, trans.John W. Basore, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press, 1990), 447; 449 ( Ad Helviam Matrem DeConsolatione, XVII.3–5). “Itaque illo te duco quo omnibus quifortunam fugiunt confugiendum est, ad liberalia studia: illasanabunt uulnus tuum, illa omnem tristitiam tibi euellent. Hisetiam si numquam adsuesses, nunc utendum erat; sed quantumtibi patris mei antiquus rigor permisit, omnes bonas artes nonquidem comprendisti, attigisti tamen. 4. Vtinam quidem uirorumoptimus, pater meus, minus maiorum consuetudini deditusuoluisset te praeceptis sapientiae erudiri potius quam inbui! nonparandum tibi nunc esset auxilium contra fortunam sedproferendum. Propter istas quae litteris non ad sapientiam utuntursed ad luxuriam instruuntur minus te indulgere studiis passus est.Beneficio tamen rapacis ingenii plus quam pro tempore hausisti;iacta sunt disciplinarum omnium fundamenta: nunc ad illasreuertere; tutam te praestabunt. 5. Illae consolabuntur, illaedelectabunt, illae si bona fide in animum tuum intrauerint,


numquam amplius intrabit dolor, numquam sollicitudo, numquamadflictationis inritae superuacua uexatio. Nulli horum patebitpectus tuum; nam ceteris uitiis iam pridem clusum est. Haecquidem certissima praesidia sunt et quae sola te fortunae eriperepossint.” Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Dialogorum Libri Duodecim ,ed. L. D. Reynolds, Oxford Classical Texts (New York: OxfordUniversity Press, 1977), 312–13.

41. Later in the letter, Seneca seems to further denigrate theliberal studies as being incidental to virtue: “‘But,’ one says, ‘sinceyou declare that virtue cannot be attained without the ‘liberalstudies,’ how is it that you deny that they offer any assistance tovirtue?’ Because you cannot attain virtue without food, either;and yet food has nothing to do with virtue. Wood does not offerassistance to a ship, although a ship cannot be built except ofwood. There is no reason, I say, why you should think thatanything is made by the assistance of that without which it cannotbe made. We might even make the statement that it is possible toattain wisdom without the ‘liberal studies’; for although virtue isa thing that must be learned, yet it is not learned by means of thesestudies.” Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 369 (Ep. LXXXVIII.31–32). “‘Cum dicatis’ inquit ‘sine liberalibus studiis ad virtutem nonperveniri, quemadmodum negatis illa nihil conferre virtuti?’ Quianec sine cibo ad virtutem pervenitur, cibus tamen ad virtutem nonpertinet; ligna navi nihil conferunt, quamvis non fiat navis nisi exlignis: non est, inquam, cur aliquid putes eius adiutorio fieri sinequo non potest fieri. Potest quidem etiam illud dici, sine liberalibusstudiis veniri ad sapientiam posse; quamvis enim virtus discendasit, tamen non per haec discitur.” Ad Lucilium epistulae morales,Tomus I , 319–20.

42. The most definitive passage of Seneca with regard to hisview of philosophy occurs in Epistle LXXXIX: “In the first place,therefore, if you approve, I shall draw the distinction betweenwisdom and philosophy. Wisdom is the perfect good of the humanmind; philosophy is the love of wisdom, and the endeavour toattain it. The latter strives toward the goal which the former hasalready reached. And it is clear why philosophy was so called. For


it acknowledges by its very name the object of its love. Certainpersons have defined wisdom as the knowledge of things divineand things human. Still others say: ‘Wisdom is knowing thingsdivine and things human, and their causes also.’ This addedphrase seems to me to be superfluous, since the causes of thingsdivine and things human are a part of the divine system. Philoso-phy also has been defined in various ways; some have called it ‘thestudy of virtue,’ others have referred to it as ‘a study of the wayto amend the mind,’ and some have named it ‘the search for rightreason.’ One thing is practically settled, that there is somedifference between philosophy and wisdom. Nor indeed is itpossible that that which is sought and that which seeks areidentical. As there is a great difference between avarice andwealth, the one being the subject of the craving and the other itsobject, so between philosophy and wisdom. For the one is a resultand a reward of the other. Philosophy does the going, and wisdomis the goal. . . . The Romans also were wont to use this word in thesense in which they now use ‘philosophy’ also.” Epistles, 66–92,vol. 2, p. 381 (Ep . LXXXIX.4–7). “Primum itaque, si [ut] videturtibi, dicam inter sapientiam et philosophiam quid intersit. Sapientiaperfectum bonum est mentis humanae; philosophia sapientiaeamor est et adfectatio: haec eo tendit quo illa pervenit. Philosophiaunde dicta sit apparet; ipso enim nomine fatetur quid amet.Sapientiam quidam ita finierunt ut dicerent divinorum ethumanorum scientiam; quidam ita: sapientia est nosse divina ethumana et horum causas. Supervacua mihi haec videtur adiectio,quia causae divinorum humanorumque pars divinorum sunt.Philosophiam quoque fuerunt qui aliter atque aliter finirent: aliistudium illam virtutis esse dixerunt, alii studium corrigendaementis; a quibusdam dicta est adpetitio rectae rationis. Illudquasi constitit, aliquid inter philosophiam et sapientiam inter-esse; neque enim fieri potest ut idem sit quod adfectatur et quodadfectat. Quomodo multum inter avaritiam et pecuniam interest,cum illa cupiat, haec concupiscatur, sic inter philosophiam etsapientiam. Haec enim illius effectus ac praemium est; illa venit,ad hanc itur. Sapientia est quam Graeci sofÛan [?] vocant. Hoc


verbo Romani quoque utebantur, sicut philosophia nunc quoqueutuntur.” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus II, 325–26.

In a manner which evokes Plato’s view of the philosophicalendeavor in his Symposium, this text illuminates the fact thatSeneca too perceives philosophy to be concerned with thingswhich transcend the merely human level. He views philosophy asbeing focused primarily upon the level of the divine, in whichhuman activities are subsumed. His differentiation between theobject of love (namely wisdom) and the activity of the lover(philosophy) is also highly suggestive of Platonic imagery.

43. “The greatest authors, and the greatest number of au-thors, have maintained that there are three divisions of philoso-phy—moral, natural, and rational. The first keeps the soul inorder; the second investigates the universe; the third works outthe essential meanings of words, their combinations, and theproofs which keep falsehood from creeping in and displacingtruth.” Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 383 (Ep. LXXXIX.9). “Philosophiaetres partes esse dixerunt et maximi et plurimi auctores: moralem,naturalem, rationalem. Prima componit animum; secunda rerumnaturam scrutatur; tertia proprietates verborum exigit etstructuram et argumentationes, ne pro vero falsa subrepant.” AdLucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus II, 327.

44. According to Long and Sedley: “Of all ancient philoso-phies, Stoicism makes the greatest claim to being utterly system-atic. Arguably, the Stoics invented the notion of philosophy as‘system’, though they may have been precede in this by the post-Platonic Academy of Xenocrates, who probably first authorizedthe division of the subject into the three parts—logic, physics, andethics.” Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1, 160.

45. “Epicurus views true philosophy as the antithesis of‘culture’ ( paideia). This term represents the educational curricu-lum much prized in ancient Greece, including rhetoric, literaryand musical theory, and mathematics. He apparently sees thesethings as bogus sciences, more a matter of ostentation than of trueenlightenment, and hence as positive obstacles to the pursuit oftrue philosophical values.” Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic


Philosophers, vol. 1, 156–157. The primary evidence for this is:“In his letter to Pythocles Epicurus writes: ‘My fortunate friend,hoist your sail and steer clear of all culture [ paideia].’” (DiogenesLaertius 10.6) Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers , vol.1,156.

46. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Naturales Quaestiones , vol. 1,trans. Thomas H. Corcoran (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-sity Press, 1971), pp. 2–3 ( N.Q. I.Pref.1–2). “Quantum interphilosophiam interest . . . et certeras artes, tantum interesseexistimo in ipsa philosophia inter illam partem quae ad homineset hanc quae ad deos pertinet. Altior est haec et animosior;multum permisit sibi; non fuit oculis contenta; maius esse quiddamsuspicata est ac pulchrius quod extra conspectum natura posuisset.Denique inter duas interest quantum inter deum et hominem.Altera docet quid in terris agendum sit, altera quid agatur in caelo.Altera errores nostros discutit et lumen admovet quo discernanturambigua vitae; altera multum supra hanc in qua volutamurcaliginem excedit et e tenebris ereptos perducit illo unde lucet.”

47. In regard to the practical and theoretical aspects of theSenecan view of philosophy, A. Robert Caponigri states that:“Philosophy is not for discourse, but for action, Seneca tells us;and the action he has in mind is not the paltry action of daily life,in the first instance, but the supreme act of life by which theindividual human existent unites himself to the life and soul of theworld. This union is the work of speculative philosophy, the pathto wisdom.” “Reason and Death: The Idea of Wisdom in Seneca,”Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Associa-tion 42 (1968): 149.

48. Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, vol. 1, 91 (Ep.XIV.11). “Ad philosophiam ergo confugiendum est.” Ad LuciliumEpistulae Morales, Tomus I, 36.

49. According to Seneca, “Virtue is nothing else than rightreason.” Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 23 (Ep. LXVI.32). “[N]ihil enimaliud est virtus quam recta ratio.” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales,Tomus I, 188. Seneca clearly identifies the interconnection oftruth and virtue in the philosophical tradition with Socrates; in


Epistle LXXI, Seneca recalls that: “Socrates used to say that verityand virtue were the same.” Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 83 (Ep.LXXI.16). “Idem esse dicebat Socrates veritatem et virtutem.” AdLucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I, 213.

50. Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 383 (Ep. LXXXIX.8).“[N]am nec philosophia sine virtute est nec sine philosophiavirtus.” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus II, 326. TheSenecan view of the relationship between virtue and philosophyhas been described by George G. Strem as follows: “Virtue, wehave said, is the effort to attain wisdom. One can say the sameabout philosophy. A lover of philosophy will by definition alsolove virtue. Wisdom is the ultimate goal of both. Philosophy,however, is not equivalent to virtue. Philosophy is the study ofvalues one should adopt to reach that state. Philosophy is thehighest of studies because it deals with the most importantquestions that affect man’s life and helps him understand himselfand the world.” The Life and Teaching of Lucius Annaeus Seneca(New York: Vantage Press, Inc., 1981), 146–47.

The close identification of wisdom with both virtue in generaland with the highest good is expressed in Epistle XCVIII, whereinhe states: “For the real Good does not perish; it is certain andlasting, and it consists of wisdom and virtue.” M.L. III, L.C.L.,123 (Ep. XCVIII.9). “[N]am illud verum bonum non moritur,certum est sempiternumque, sapientia et virtus.” Ad LuciliumEpistulae Morales, Tomus II, 408.

51. The Senecan definition of human being is found in EpistleXLI, wherein he declares: “Rationale enim animal est homo.” AdLucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I, 110 (Ep. XLI.8). Cf. LuciusAnnaeus Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales , vol. 1, trans.Richard M. Gummere (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UniversityPress, 1989), 277. More precisely, Seneca is the earliest authorfrom antiquity whose writings have been preserved wherein thisdefinition may be found. For the Peripatetic inspiration behindthe Stoic definition, cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I.7 (1098a5–9).

52. “That which takes effect by chance is not an art. Now


wisdom is an art; it should have a definite aim.” Seneca, AdLucilium Epistulae Morales, vol. 1, 205 (Ep. XXIX.3). “Non estars, quae ad effectum casu venit. Sapientia ars est; certum petat.”Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I, 81–82. “Now wisdom isMind perfected and developed to the highest and best degree. Forit is the art of life.” M.L. III, L.C.L., 345 (Ep. CXVII.12).“Sapientia est mens perfecta vel ad summum optimumqueperducta; ars enim vitae est.” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales,Tomus II, 497. The former passage of Seneca is reminiscent ofAristotle’s distinction between works of art and virtuous action inBook II of his Nicomachean Ethics . Aristotle agrees that bothworks of art and deeds of virtue must proceed from knowledge,but he states that works of art do not need to be done for their ownsake (as do virtuous actions) nor do they have to arise from a fixeddisposition of character. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics2.4.1105a26–b9.

53. Seneca explains that this virtue should be the first andmost important thing to be sought in one’s life, as when hepronounces in Epistle LXXXVIII that: “Thus, whatever phase ofthings human and divine you have apprehended, you will bewearied by the vast number of things to be answered and thingsto be learned. And in order that these manifold and mightysubjects may have free entertainment in your soul, you mustremove therefrom all superfluous things. Virtue will not surren-der herself to these narrow bounds of ours; a great subject needswide space in which to move. Let all other things be driven out,and let the breast be emptied to receive virtue.” Seneca, Epistles,66–92, vol. 2, 369; 371 (Ep. LXXXVIII.35). “Quamcumquepartem rerum humanarum divinarumque conprenderis, ingenticopia quaerendorum ac discendorum fatigaberis. Haec tam multa,tam magna ut habere possint liberum hospitium, supervacua exanimo tollenda sunt. Non dabit se in has angustias virtus; laxumspatium res magna desiderat. Expellantur omnia, totum pectus illivacet.” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I , 320–21. Senecaexpresses here the converse of the deficiencies of too much timebeing devoted to the traditional liberal arts; such studies and


pursuits must be cleared in order to make way for the pursuit ofphilosophy.

54. This perception that Seneca and other Hellenistic philoso-phers of the Roman period were interested wholly in the practicalaspects of knowledge is reflected in these statements by ClarenceW. Mendell: “‘Philosophic’ to the Roman had a different meaningfrom that which it held for the Greek. The Roman was never muchof an abstract philosopher. . . . At best, only a few Romans wereever interested in abstract philosophy; it was only the practical,concrete branch of ethics that was generally tolerated and, in thefirst century, a philosophic tone means rather a moralizing tone,the atmosphere of wise maxims.” Our Seneca (New Haven, CT:Yale University Press, 1941), 154. It is because of this orientationtoward practical action, in part, that the Hellenistic philosophicalschools were thought to possess religious overtones.

Even the renowned historian of philosophy FrederickCopleston clearly perceives Seneca as being interested almostentirely in practical philosophy and claims: “[Seneca] does notseek intellectual knowledge for its own sake, but pursues philoso-phy as a means to the acquirement of virtue. Philosophy isnecessary, but it is to be pursued with a practical end in view.” AHistory of Philosophy. vol. 1, Greece and Rome (1946. Reprint,New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc.,1993), 428.

Brad Inwood discusses the Stoic perspective of the theoreti-cal and practical dimensions of wisdom in relation to the views ofPlato and Aristotle as follows: “‘Surely the most important facetof rationality for any Greek would be its role in the acquisition andcontemplation of theoretical knowledge.’ This is certainly true ofPlato and arguably true of Aristotle (at least some of the time).Antiochus of Ascalon, an Academic philosopher of Cicero’s daywho argued for the essential unity of Platonic, Aristotelian, andStoic philosophy, claimed Aristotle as his inspiration for a view ofhuman nature which gave equal weight to the practical andtheoretical side of our nature. Later Peripatetics gave more orless weight to the active and contemplative sides of human nature,


but these were arguments about which should predominate withina framework which gave an important role to both. Is it reasonableto look exclusively at the practical side of rationality in the Stoicdiscussion of human nature? It is impossible to deny that contem-plation was a part of the good life according to the Stoics, and that,correspondingly, an important part of rationality is the ability toseek out and achieve a grasp of theoretical truths. . . . It should atleast be uncontroversial to claim that the Stoics were frequentlyinclined to de-emphasize the value of purely theoretical knowl-edge in a way that Plato and Aristotle were not.” Ethics andHuman Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1985), 2–3.

55. The high regard which Seneca held for theoretical inves-tigations into nature is characterized by Joshiah B. Gould asfollows: “Seneca is eloquent in his affirmation of the beauty ofdisinterested scientific research: to the question, what advantageis to be derived from his labor, he replies: the greatest of all—toknow Nature. Investigations such as these can render many usefulservices; but what they give us of more value is that of retainingthe attention of man by reason of the marvels they unfold ratherthan that for the profit that one might derive from their disclo-sure. . . . Another of Seneca’s characteristic views about knowl-edge of the nature of things is that there is in science an indefiniteprogress.” “Reason in Seneca,” Journal of the History of Philoso-phy 3 (1965): 16–17.

56. For example, in Epistle LXV, he affirms the importance oftheoretical investigations into the first cause of the cosmos whenhe asks: “Do you forbid me to contemplate the universe? Do youcompel me to withdraw from the whole and restrict me to a part?May I not ask what are the beginnings of all things, who mouldedthe universe, who took the confused and conglomerate mass ofsluggish matter, and separated it into its parts? May I not inquirewho is the Master-Builder of this universe, how the mighty bulkwas brought under the control of law and order, who gatheredtogether the scattered atoms, who separated the disorderedelements and assigned an outward form to the elements that lay


in one vast shapelessness?” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, vol. 1,455 (Ep. LXV.19). “Interdicis mihi inspectione rerum naturae, atoto abductum redigis in partem? Ego non quaeram quae sintinitia universorum? quis rerum formator? quis omnia in unomersa et materia inerti convoluta discreverit? Non quaeram quissit istius artifex mundi? qua ratione tanta magnitudo in legem etordinem venerit? quis sparsa collegerit, confusa distinxerit, in unadeformitate iacentibus faciem diviserit?” Ad Lucilium EpistulaeMorales, Tomus I, 179.

57. The meditative aspect of philosophy in the model of theHellenistic world is illuminated especially well by the twentieth-century French philosopher Pierre Hadot. Hadot has describedeloquently the manner in which Seneca considered the theoreticaldiscovery of the universe to be a form of meditative prayer in hisstatements that: “Seneca was equally stupefied by the spectacle ofthe world (which he contemplated tamquam spectator novus), andby the spectacle of wisdom. By ‘wisdom,’ he meant the figure ofthe sage, as he saw it personified in the personality of thephilosopher Sextius. This is a very instructive parallel. There is infact a strict analogy between the movement by which we accedeto the vision of the world, and that by which we postulate thefigure of the sage. In the first place, ever since Plato’s Symposium,ancient philosophers considered the figure of the sage as aninaccessible role model, whom the philo-sopher (he who loveswisdom) strives to imitate, by means of an ever-renewed effort,practiced at each instant. To contemplate wisdom as personifiedwithin a specific personality was thus to carry out a movement ofthe spirit in which, via the life of this personality, one was ledtoward the representation of absolute perfection, above andbeyond all of its possible realizations. Similarly, in considering apartial aspect of the world, contemplation discovers the totalityof the world, going beyond the landscape glimpsed at a givenmoment, and transcending it on the way to a representation oftotality which surpasses every visible object. The contemplationmentioned by Seneca is, moreover, a kind of unitive contempla-tion. In order to perceive the world, we must, as it were, perceive


our unity with the world, by means of an exercise of concentra-tion on the present moment. Similarly, in order to recognizewisdom, we must so to speak, go into training for wisdom. We canknow a thing only by becoming similar to our object. Thus, by atotal conversion, we can render ourselves open to the world andto wisdom. This is why Seneca was just as stupefied and filled withecstasy by the spectacle of wisdom as he was by the spectacle ofthe world. For him, in both instances, it was a case of a discoveryobtained by dint of an interior transformation and completechange in his way of seeing and living. In the final analysis, boththe world as perceived in the consciousness of the sage, and thesage’s consciousness itself, plunged in the totality of the world,are revealed to the lover of wisdom in a single, unique moment.”Philosophy as a Way of Life: Spiritual Exercises from Socrates toFoucault, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, translated by Michael Chase(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, Ltd., 1998), 261.

58. Due to the fact in the pantheistic perspective of the Stoicsthe subject of physics investigated Nature which was perceived tobe divine, it was essentially equivalent to theology, and even to becalled such at times by Chrysippus himself: (Chrysippus from hisOn Lives book 4) “‘First of all, in my opinion, which correspondsto the correct statements by the ancients, there are three kinds ofphilosopher’s theorems, logical, ethical, and physical. Secondlywhat should be ranked first of these are the logical, next theethical, and third the physical; and what should come last in thephysical theorems is theology. Hence the transmission of theol-ogy has been called ‘fulfillment’.” Plutarch, On Stoic Self-Contra-dictions 1035A (SVF 2.42, part). Long and Sedley, The HellenisticPhilosophers, vol. 1, p. 159.

59. Emphasizing the atemporal aspect of knowledge which isderived through the investigation of the basic causes in nature,A.R. Caponigri discerns the contemplative dimensions of theSenecan view of wisdom as follows: “Man contemplates from thevantage point of the present both past and future, and themediation of the present both unites past and future into oneliving whole and imparts the quality of present to this whole in


turn. Man’s past belongs to his present, his future forms anessential part of his present and his present is both one andmanifold because it meditates past and future to create a presentwhich is not a void, like that of an animal, but a plenum, a plenumwhich eventually becomes the seat of eternity itself. Through thisform of the perfect time of the full and authentic present, mancreates within his own life a microcosm of the eternal presentwhich is the perfect time of the whole of nature.” “Reason andDeath,” 149.

60. Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2, 451 (Ep. XCII.6). “[V]acatenim animus molestia liber ad inspectum universi, nihilque illumavocat a contemplatione naturae.” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Mo-rales, Tomus II, 352.

61. Seneca, Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, vol. 1, 41 (Ep.VIII.7). “Hoc [enim] ipsum philosophiae servire libertas est.” AdLucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I, 16.

This freedom which philosophy affords, he views as boththeoretical and practical. On the theoretical level, philosophyprovides the opportunity for the mind to commune with thesupreme rationality in nature, which is equivalent to god. On thepractical level, philosophy allows a person to apply the principlesof natural law to specific circumstances so that irrational fearscan be disarmed and unfounded desires eliminated. Philosophyprovides freedom in the dimension of justice both in a corporealsense of condemning slavery (on the basis of the rationally baseddignity of all human beings) and on the intellectual level of viewingoneself as a citizen of the universe, transcending, although notnecessarily disregarding, the legal statutes of any particular civilsociety.

Analogous to the manner in which Senecan perspectiveupholds that freedom is accomplished through the practice ofphilosophy, true freedom in the Christian sense is to obey the willof God. Indeed, John K. Ryan has noted concerning this particu-lar passage of Seneca: “Various prayers in the Latin liturgy referto God with the words ‘cui servire regnare est’: whom to serve isto reign. This derives from Seneca’s words on philosophy.”


Francis De Sales, Introduction to the Devout Life , trans. John K.Ryan (1950; reprint, New York: Doubleday, 1989), 309, n. 4 toPart III, Chap. 40.

Seneca was indubitably inspired by Epicurus for this concep-tion of philosophy, as he quotes him in the same letter (Frag. 199,Usener): “‘If you would enjoy real freedom, you must be the slaveof Philosophy.’” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, vol. 1, 41 (Ep.VIII.7). “‘Philosophiae servias oportet, ut tibi contingat veralibertas.’” Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales, Tomus I, 16.

62. Cf. Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1,63–65.

63. The freedom of which philosophy affords in contempla-tion is resounded in Epistle LXXXVIII in the following fashion:“Wisdom is a large and spacious thing. It needs plenty of freeroom. One must learn about things divine and human, the past andthe future, the ephemeral and the eternal; and one must learnabout Time. See how many questions arise concerning time alone:in the first place, whether it is anything in and by itself; in thesecond place, whether anything exists prior to time and withouttime; and again, did time begin along with the universe, or,because there was something even before the universe began, didtime also exist then? There are countless questions concerning thesoul alone: whence it comes, what is its nature, when it begins toexist, and how long it exists; whether it passes from one place toanother and changes its habitation, being transferred successivelyfrom one animal shape to another, or whether it is a slave butonce, roaming the universe after it is set free; whether it iscorporeal or not; what will become of it when it ceases to use usas its medium; how it will employ its freedom when it has escapedfrom this present prison; whether it will forget all its past, and atthat moment begin to know itself when, released from the body,it has withdrawn to the skies.” Seneca, Epistles, 66–92, vol. 2,369; 371 (Ep. LXXXVIII.33–34). “Magna et spatiosa res estsapientia; vacuo illi loco opus est; de divinis humanisque discendumest, de praeteritis de futuris, de caducis de aeternis, de tempore.De quo uno vide quam multa quaerantur: primum an per se sit


aliquid; deinde an aliquid ante tempus sit sine tempore; cummundo coeperit an etiam ante mundum quia fuerit aliquid, fueritet tempus. Innumerabiles quaestiones sunt de animo tantum:unde sit, qualis sit, quando esse incipiat, quamdiu sit, aliunde aliotranseat et domicilia mutet in alias animalium formas aliasqueconiectus, an non amplius quam semel serviat et emissus vageturin toto; utrum corpus sit an non sit; quid sit facturus cum per nosaliquid facere desierit, quomodo libertate sua usurus cum ex haceffugerit cavea; an obliviscatur priorum et illinc nosse se incipiatunde corpori abductus in sublime secessit.” Ad Lucilium EpistulaeMorales, Tomus I , 320.

Furthermore, in the passage Seneca alludes to the DelphicOracle’s injunction to “know thyself.” Seneca himself directlyquotes the Delphic Oracle’s statement in Latin, “Te nosce,” inEpistle XCIV.28. In order to truly know oneself, one mustunderstand one’s own nature, which participates in the nature ofthe very universe; as typified by Socrates, the pursuit of this questfor self-knowledge is itself a type of freedom.

64. Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Moral Essays , vol. 2, trans. JohnW. Basore, Loeb Classical Library (1932; reprint, Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 333, 335 ( De BrevitateVitae, XIV.1–2). “Soli omnium otiosi sunt qui sapientiae uacant,soli uiuunt; nec enim suam tantum aetatem bene tuentur: omneaeuum suo adiciunt; quicquid annorum ante illos actum est, illisadquisitum est. Nisi ingratissimi sumus, illi clarissimi sacrarumopinionum conditores nobis nati sunt, nobis uitam praeparauerunt.Ad res pulcherrimas ex tenebris ad lucem erutas alieno laborededucimur; nullo nobis saeculo interdictum est, in omniaadmittimur et, si magnitudine animi egredi humanae imbecillitatisangustias libet, multum per quod spatiemur temporis est.Disputare cum Socrate licet, dubitare cum Carneade, cum Epicuroquiescere, hominis naturam cum Stoicis uincere, cum Cynicisexcedere. Cum rerum natura in consortium omnis aeui patiaturincedere, quidni ab hoc exiguo et caduco temporis transitu in illatoto nos demus animo quae immensa, quae aeterna sunt, quaecum melioribus communia?” Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Dialogorum


Libri Duodecim, ed. L. D. Reynolds, Oxford Classical Texts (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1977), 257.

65. Indeed, in his remarks concerning the problematic posi-tion of proclaiming that philosophy is necessary for the virtouslife, John Henry Newman mentions Seneca by name: “And thenI may be reminded that the professors of this Liberal or Philo-sophical Knowledge have themselves, in every age, recognizedthis exposition of the matter, and have submitted to the issue inwhich it terminates; for they have ever been attempting to makemen virtuous; or, if not, at least have assumed that refinement ofthe mind was virtue, and that they themselves were the portion ofmankind. This they have professed on the one hand; and on theother, they have utterly failed in their professions, so as ever tomake themselves a proverb among men, and a laughing-stockboth to the grave and the dissipated portion of mankind, inconsequence of them. . . . In a word, from the time that Athenswas the University of the world,what has Philosophy taught men,but to promise without practicing, and to aspire without attain-ing? . . . Did Philosophy support Cicero under the disfavour of thefickle populace, or nerve Seneca to oppose and imperial tyrant?”The Idea of a University (Notre Dame, IN: University of NotreDame Press, 1982), 87.

66. Jacques Maritain understands the essential characteris-tics of education in a manner with is in great general conformancewith what could be considered Senecan principles: “Thus thechief tasks of education is above all to shape man, or to guide theevolving dynamism through which man forms himself as man. . . .Education is an art, and an especially difficult one. Yet it belongsby its nature to the sphere of ethics and practical wisdom.Education is an ethical art (or rather a practical wisdom in whicha determinate art is embodied). Now every art is a dynamic trendtoward an object to be achieved, which is the aim of this art. Thereis no art without ends, art’s very vitality is the energy with whichit tends toward its end, without stopping at any intermediate step.Here we see from the outset the two most general misconceptionsagainst which education must guard itself. The first misconcep-


tion is a lack or disregard for ends. If means are liked andcultivated for the sake of their own perfection, and not as meansalone, to that very extent they cease to lead to the end, and artloses its practicality; its vital efficiency is replaced by a process ofinifinite multiplication, each means developing and spreading forits own sake. This supremacy of means over end and the conse-quent collapse of all sure purpose and real efficiency seem to bethe main reproach to contemporary education. . . . Thus the factremains that the complete and integral idea of man which is theprerequisite of education can only be a philosophical and reli-gious idea of man. I say philosophical, because this idea pertainsto the nature or essence of man; I say religious, because of theexistential status of this human nature in relation to God and thespecial gifts and trials and vocation involved. . . . In answer to ourquestion, then, ‘What is man?’ we may give the Greek, Jewish, andChristian idea of man: man as an animal endowed with reason,whose supreme dignity is in the intellect; and man as a freeindividual in personal relation to God, whose supreme righteous-ness consists in voluntarily obeying the law of God; and man as asinful and wounded creature called to the divine life and to thefreedom of grace, whose supreme perfection consists of love.”Education at the Crossroads (New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 1943), 1–3; 6–7.

67. Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book VI (1026a5–33).68. Cf. John 8:32: “[Y]ou will know the truth, and the truth will

set you free.” The New American Bible (Nashville, TN: CatholicBible Press, 1987), 1202.

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Freedom Through Philosophy - isistatic.org · Freedom Through Philosophy 175 ... Loeb Classical Library. 1920. ... as are all of Seneca’s moral letters, to Lucilius, his