Freedom and Determinism in Spinoza

8/18/2019 Freedom and Determinism in Spinoza

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F r e e d o m a n d D e t e r m i n i s m i n S p i n o z a

JOHN N. R USS ELL

Indiana Cent ral Un iver sity

Spi noza 's unrel entin g emphasis on dete rmin ism and

necessity seems, at first glance, incompatible with his

espous al of hum an freedom. In what follo ws, I exp li

cate Spin oza' s meani ng of the term freedom and argue

that h i 8 use of the term is compatible with his these s

of dete rmin ism and necessity . I conclude by noti ng

some pro ble ms that Spinoza's determi nism pos es for his

moral theory.

Spino za's Denial of Freedom

Spinoz a d oes reject some meanin gs of th e term

freedom. He repud iate s the idea of free ch oic e. (By

free cho ice I mean the possib ility that a man could

have chos en to act other than he actuall y di d. ) He

further dismi sse s any account of will or d esir e

that wou ld su pport a cred ible account of free ch oi ce .

For Spinoz a, nature admits of no conti ngenc y, ca

price , or indet ermin atene ss. In fact, man 's ver y idea

of free cho ice is the illusory resul t of ina deq uat e

know ledg e. (M]en belie ve themse lves to be fre e, he

writes,

simply beca use they are cons ciou s of their ac

tions, and unco nsci ous of the causes where by those ac

tions are determined.

1 1 1

Man is limited by the con fus ed

perce ptio n that charac terize s inadequate knowl edge and,

hen ce, de lus iv ely ascr ibes the adje ctiv e fr ee .to an

alleged phe nom eno n of choice. Accord ing to Spino za,

hu ma ns fail to reco gniz e that acts of cho ice are c aus ed

and subseq uentl y imagine themselves free inasm uch as

they are cons ciou s of [their] vol itio ns and de si re s,

but they never eve n dream, in their igno ran ce, of the

caus es whi ch have disposed them to wish and de si re .

2

Spinoz a disa gree s with those who assert that human

action s depen d on the wi ll, since this is a mer e

phras e witho ut any idea to correspo nd th er et o.

1

Much

like the intellect, the will is mere ly a par tic ula r

mode of think ing. Whether the will is conce ived as

fini te or infi nit e, it too requir es a cau se by wh ic h

it shoul d be cond iti oned to exist and act. * Mor eov er ,

the wil l is rela ted to God bec aus e it must be co nd i

tioned by God

I

Pro p, xxi x] to exist and act in a par

ticular manner. * Explaini ng human action in terms of

378

tistogimg V o l . X I . N o . 1

I S S N :

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the will illustr ates our ignorance; suffi cient acco unts

of huma n action deri ve only from our hav ing clea r and

adequa te ideas of what causes beha vior .

Analog ously , Spinoza rejectes the not ion of dec i

sion as representin g an adequate expl ana tion of free

cho ice . Clearly, a mental deci sion and a bod ily ap

pet ite , or determ ined state, are sim ulta neou s, or

rather, are one and the same thing . . . . ' A deci

sion is not free (i.e., a dec isi on cann ot be the cau se

of itself). External causes, then, const rain decisio ns

as well.

Spinoza flatly af firms that everyt hing pro cee ds

from a sort of necessity, and with the utmo st pe rf ec

t i o n :

7

Noth ing in the unive rse is conti ngent , bu t all

things are conditi oned to exist and oper ate in a

part icul ar ma nner b y the nec essi ty of divi ne

nature.•

Me n are not free in the fic tit iou s sens e tha t the y

imagine; ignor ance—i nadequ ate kn ow le dg e— is the source

of this false mean ing of freedom that Spino za rej ect s.

Noth ing in nature is indeterm inate or uncaus ed, as

Spi noz a rema rked in a letter to Bo xe l: the wo rl d (is)

a nece ssar y effect of divin e nat ure , thu s he utterly

(denies that ) the world has bee n made by cha nce . •

Wit h respect to n ecessi ty and hu man choi ce, Stuart

Hamps hire aptly conclu des that

Any stateme nt of the kind an alt ern ati ve act ion

was possibl e or he could have done other wise,

is necess arily the sign of the inco mple tene ss of

our scientific knowle dge or an exp res sio n of our

pr es en t st ate of ign ora nce . . . .*'

In conclu sion, then, huma n choice s are neit her unc aus ed

nor arbitrary; that choic es are c apr ici ous is, for

Spinoza, ch im er ic al —a n idea born out of ignorance.

Nece ssit y applies to will and decis ion. Will

is not a free caus e, only a nec ess ary or con str ain ed

c a u s e .

1 1

Will is ext ern ally cause d and in no way ca n

it adeq uate ly support the idea of free cho ic e ; the

wil l is dete rmin ed to exist and act only by God . Th us ,

Spino za clearly opposes any concep tion of freedom as

tanta mount to being uncause d or inde term inat e. Rath er,

cau ses deter mine the will and, hence , hum an beh avi or

can be considered neith er capr iciou s nor acc ide nta l.

Corre spond ingly , since decision is simu ltan eous wit h

a det erm ine d state, it is not a free ca us e. So de ci

sion also fails to sufficiently account for the idea of

free choice.

In conc lusi on, then, Spin oza all ows for no free

choi ce ; the scope of necessit y is uni ver sal . Nec es si

ty prec lude s the possibi lity of free cho ice , whe the r

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conceiv ed under the rubric of will or deci sion.

Thing s could not hav e been brou ght into bei ng by God

in any man ner or in an order diff eren t from that wh ic h

in fact has obtained.

1 1

Henc e, man coul d not ha ve

acted oth er than he did; no alte rnat ive choic e and ac

tion were even possible:

Eac h so called act of cho ice in the mat ter is

in reality a necessari ly determined ass ertio n or

d en ia l . . . . T he vo li ti o, o r m en ti s d e c re -

tum,

1 1

is t h u s — l i k e any ideal or extended event-¬

absolutely determined and nec es sa ry .

1 1

God, Spinoza's all-inclu sive substance (Deus save Natu-

ra),

compris es the univer se, and each ment al or phy

sical event of experie nce follows nece ssar ily from

this one subs tance .

Spinoza and Cause

Spi noza rej ect s the notion of final cau ses in

nat ure ; eve ryth ing in nature pre ced es from a sort of

necess ity and wit h the utmost per fe cti on .

1

* The

not ion of final cau se does away with the per fe cti on of

God : for if God acts for an object , he ne ce ssa ril y

desires something which he lacks.

1

* But th is idea is

absurd, for it cont rad icts the ver y nat ure of God .

Acc ord ing ly, Spino za states that nat ure ha s no goal in

view, and that final causes are mere huma n fi g m e n t s.

When men strive to illustrate that natur e do es nothin g

in vai n . . ., they seem to have dem on str ate d that

nature , the god s, and men are all mad to g e t h e r .

1 7

But

what does Spinoza affirm about types of causes?

Spinoza accepts the idea of effic ient causa lity,

and he att rib ute s it to the deity . God is the sole

free ca u se . God, absolutely the first c a u s e ,

enco mpa sses all that is. Ever ythi ng that is, is in

God, and wit hou t God nothin g can be, or be

c o n c e i v e d .

1 0

From the necessi ty of di vi ne nat ure

must follo w an infin ite number of thi ngs in inf ini te

wa ys . . . .

M 1 1

He is the effi cient caus e of all that

can follow wit hin the sphere of infinite in te ll ec t.

1 1

Th is eff ici ent cau sali ty appli es not only to the ex

istence of things, but also of their es se nc e.

1 1

Thin gs depe nd on God for their coming into exi ste nce

and their continuing in existe nce or be in g.

1

*

Do es Spino za regard the not ion s of formal and

materia l causa lity as equally crucial to the des crip

tion of God ? Hi s answer to this que sti on is ne ga tiv e.

Efficient caus ality best charact erizes God 's activity .

Spinoza rejected Arist otle' s disti nctio n of mat ter and

form, modi fyin g them with the substantival attr ibut es

of thought and extens ion. Accordi ngly, as Wolf son

notes, the Aristo telean designation of cau ses as

mate rial and formal likewise dis app ear s ; Spino za sub-

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sumes formal causality under efficien t causality, henc e

the effici ent cause most aptly des cri bes Go d's

n a t u r e .

2 8

Effic ient causality applies to bot h the phys ical

and menta l modes of experie nce. God, the effi cien t

cause of that whi ch occurs withi n the sphere of inf i

nit e intel lect , can surely be regar ded as a thi nki ng

thin g. Th us it is apparent that the actu al be in g of

ideas ow ns God as its cau se, and the ide as of bo th

the attri butes of God and partic ular th in gs hav e, as

thei r eff icie nt caus e, God hims elf , inso far as he is a

thinking thing.

3

' Perhaps an example wil l he lp to

clarify this applicability.

Consi der the activity of buildi ng a hou se. Spino za

sta tes that a caus e referred to as final is noth ing

else but hum an des ire . . . . For ins tan ce, when we

say that to be inhab ited is the final cause of this or

that hou se, we mea n noth ing mor e than that 'a ma n . . .

had a desire to build a h o u s e .

1 , 2 7

The specific desi re,

that of the bei ng inhabited , is real ly the eff ic ien t

c a u s e .

2

'

An amplification of the term desi re will

illumi ne how efficien t causali ty relat es to the men tal

mode.

An appe tite is an ende avor when refe rred to mi nd

and body in con junc tio n.

1

' Desi re is def ined as

appetite with consciousness th ere of.

2

' Des ire, then,

is an effici ent cause and is an appetite wi th co nsi ous -

ness appended. Consc iousn ess clearly conc erns the me n

tal mode of experi ence; thus efficien t causal ity ap

pli es to the mental mode of exper ience . Spino za's ex

ample,

the activity of building a hous e, illu stra tes

that effici ent causalit y pertain s to bot h the phy sic al

and mental aspects of experie nce.

Man's Conatus

Spin oza states that everyth ing insofar as it is in

itself, endeavors to persist in its own b e i n g .

2 1

Conatus, then, is the self-preservi ng effo rt of par tic

ula r thi ngs . In this endeavor, a thing resist s that

which could take away its ex is te nc e.

1 2

In shor t,

con atu s is the actual ess ence of the thing in

q u e s t i o n .

1 , 1 1

The tendency toward self- prese rvati on is

pres ent in and comprises the very defi niti on of par tic

ular things, for Spinoza.

Gener ally speaking, conatus is also a theor y that

conce rns the interaction of thin gs. Mot e that a pa r

ticula r thing is, for Spinoza, that whi ch has a con di

tioned, finite existe nce. Under this endea vor, each

part icul ar thing withi n the univ erse, by the eternal

ne ces sit y of the natu re of the uni ver se as a wh ol e of

wha t it is a part, striv es to mai nta in its

existence.

1

* Nat ure , then, is compr ised of indi vid ual

mod es that constantly endeavor to mai nta in thems elve s

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and, in so doing, interact with diffe rent par tic ula r

mo de s that affect them.

Con atu s applies to the attribu tes of both exten sion

and thought . An obviou s parallel can here be obs erved :

conti nuanc e or resistance in movement is the ex pres sion

of the body 's cona tus. Continu ance in thought rep re

sents the min d's cona tus. Finally, the mind strive s to

affirm the exis ten ce of the body, s ince any idea ne gat

ing the bo dy' s exis tenc e cannot be po stu al ted in our

mind, but is contrary t he re to .

When con atus refe rs to the mind alon e, the ende avor

is call ed will.' * When referre d to the min d and

body in conjunction, it [conatus) is called appe

tite.

1 7

Spin oza's point is that desi re and appet ite

are equiv alent term s. A subtle diff eren ce remain s,

though. Whe n we are cognizant of our appet ites, d esi re

pre vai ls. Man, howev er, is aware of his appe tites and

ur ges (though not of their caus es) and so, p arti cula rly

wh en we hav e this self-awa renes s in mind , we may s peak

of d e s i r e .

Ma n's Con atu s and God

Ma n is an indivi dual thing and indi vid ual thi ngs

are nothin g but the modifi cations of attrib utes of God,

or mod es by wh ic h the attr ibute s of God are fixed and

expressed in a determinate ma nn e r. Spinoza further

reas ons that the esse nce of bo th the hum an bod y and

min d must be conc eive d throug h the ver y ess enc e of

God. *

8

Inasmu ch as individua l thi ngs dep end on and

par tic ipa te in Div ine substance , they are, in a re

stricted sense, infinite and etern al. God 's caus alit y

unfol ds throu gh eternal infinite mode s and its eff ects

are like wise eter nal and infin ite. The idea of . . .

every part icu lar thing actually existin g, nec ess aril y

involves the eternal and infinite essen ce of God . *

1

Hence a part icu lar being, like man, part icip ates to a

degree , in eternity: Now in a sense part icul ar thing s

are e t e r n a l — i . e . , *vi causa cui inhaerent.' ** To the

extent that individual things part icip ate in the one

Divine substance, they are eternal.*

1

Ma n' s con atu s ha s as its source of pow er, the po we r

of Go d. Go d is the cau se of the bei ng of th ing s or of

their con tin uin g in existence. ** Thu s, the force by

whic h each part icul ar thing perse vers in exist ing fol

lows from the eterna l nece ssit y of Go d' s nat ure . *' In

conclu sion, then, ea ch ind ividual's ende avor toward

self-p reser vation or conatus origin ates from the ne ce s

sity and eterni ty of God 's natu re.

Interrelation of Cause and Con atu s;

Asser tion of Human Freedom

Spin oza 's typolog y of cause inclu des those that are

inade quate and adequate. Cona tus should be placed

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wit hin the context of this dist inct ion. Once this ob

ject ive has been accomplished, an affi rmati on of hum an

freedom can be explained.

An inadequate

1 1

or part ial cau se is a cause

throug h which , by itself, its effect cannot be und er

stood. *' Men are passive whe n someth ing tak es

pla ce withi n us , or follows from our natu re exter nally ,

we being only the partial ca us e. *

7

An adequate caus e is a cause throug h whi ch its

effe ct can cle arly and dis tinc tly be conceive d. ** It

exis ts when through our nature somethi ng tak es pla ce

wit hin us or externall y to us , which can thro ugh our

natu re alone be clearly and disti nctly underst ood. *'

Me n can be said to act or be acti ve when any thi ng

takes place . . . whereof we are the adequate c a u s e .

Each individual thing strives to mai nta in itself

and thi s foll ows from the natu re of God, acco rdi ng to

Spin oza: (T]he force by whic h each par tic ula r thing

per sev ere s in existing follows from the nece ssit y of

God's nature. '

1

Clearly the force of cona tus is ne

ces sar y by virtu e of the esse nce of God; con atu s is not

extern ally constra ined or caused. Thi s fact is basi c

to our und ersta nding Spinoza 's c once ption of hum an

freedom.

Man in Bondage or Co nstr aint

Tha t which follows from external caus es, whe re ma n

is pass ive, is constrained rather than free . Spino za

state s that constrai nt occurs when somethi ng is det er

mi ne d by some thing exte rnal to itsel f to a fixed and

def ini te meth od of existence or act ion . *

1

On e can be

bound, then, whe n constrain ed by the action of anothe r

indi vidua l. Man is but a parti al caus e, conc erni ng

that whic h follows from his nature exte rnal ly. Hen ce

bond age is, for Spinoza, equivale nt to i nade quate

causa lity and represent s the absence of fr eedom.

Ma n as Acti ve and Fre e

Tho se acts which follow from adequat e caus es are

neit her compelled nor constrained from with out. Whe n

ma n is the adequ ate causal agent of hi s act ion s, the n

he is free. Individuals are activ e accor ding to

Spinoz a, when they are the authors (causes ) of thei r

own act io ns. To the extent t hat an in div idu al is

ac ti ve —t he adequate cause of his own ac ti on s— th at in

div idu al is free . Her e we see that freedom, acti vity ,

and caus al agency are compat ible t erm s.

How can we free ours elve s from the con str ain t of

pass ion and bonda ge? The determ inatio n that cha rac

teri zes reason or adequate knowl edge can release us

from the yoke of pas sio n. More narr owly , we can mod if y

and tran sfor m confus ed ideas and pas si ons (like a pa r

ticular emotion) through self-conscious reflection.

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Spi noz a stat es that an emotio n, wh ic h is a pas sio n,

cea ses to be a pass ion, a s soon as we form a cl ea r and

distinc t idea thereof. *' Now any emot ion that Spino za

cal ls a pa ss io n is also a confu sed idea . Whe n we form

a clea r and dis tinc t idea of a give n emo tio n . . . the

emotion will cease [in effect] to be a p a ss io n .

1 4

Acc ordi ngly , we attain freedom by form ing cl ea r and

distinc t ideas (adequate know ledg e) about pa ss io ns .

Note that these clear and distinct ideas are c a u s e s —

instances of cognitive or mental determin ation. Gen er

ally, then, we determine solely by the kno wle dge of

the mind, the remedies against confuse d ideas or em o

tions.**

Man 's Conat us, God and Freedom

We recal l that, for Spinoza , God alon e is the sol e

free caus e. Moreo ver, man 's cona tus der ive s from the

etern al nec ess ity of Go d's nat ure ; in short, roan's

conat us is really God' s cona tus. Any huma n act that

follows from conatus is not const rained or compe lled

from wi tho ut. Rathe r, it is the pro duc t of ade qua te

causalit y. To the degree that man' s acts deriv e from

cona tus, he can be said to be fre e.

Exposition of Freedom

Man 's freedom, in marke d contrast to God 's, is not

perfect (complete). Man 's freedom is limite d. Ma n is

free wh en he is seen in hi s pro per rel ati on to God .

Hu man freedo m cann ot exist whe n ma n is con cei ved as

separ ate from God and the infin ity of the who le mo da l

system. Human freedom is an e x t e n s i o n — a mani fest a

t i o n — o f the power of God. In this context, man' s

freedom is neither absolute nor const ant. Rathe r, an

indivi dual' s being active or free var ies in de gre e.

Striving to main tain one' s self (conatus ) can be hi n

dere d or limited by oppo sing the co nat us of ot he r

indiv idual s. In other wor ds, individual thin gs in

teract and each thing 's conatus resis ts that of anoth er

in the pro ces s of interaction. Howe ver, the oppo sing

conat us of each particu lar thing doe s not cons titu te

exte rnal con str ain t per se, as seen in pr op er rel ati on

to God.

The Compat ibilit y of Freedom and De term inis m

In wha t sense doe s Spinoz a employ the term free ?

Clearly Spinoza rejects an idea of free as mea ning

uncau sed or indete rmina te. The matt er of a free act,

wheth er caused or uncaused, is irrele vant. Freedom

is con sis ten tly employe d by him wit hin the conte xt of a

thoro ugh- going determinis m. Bu t determi nism must be

contrast ed wit h compulsion or constrain t; these term s,

in Spin oza, are not s ynon ymou s.

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Freedom and determinism are comparable terms, but

freedom contrasts with bondage. The free agent acts in

a determinate manner, but without being constrained or

compelled. All acts, both those which are free and

those which are bound, are caused, determined. But the

crucial difference lies in the type of determination

proper to each. Free actions represent adequate types

of determination; bound acts represent passive in

stances of determination.

If freedom is seen as a determined act that is

devoid of compulsion or external constraint, then

freedom and determinism are indeed compatible terms.

Acts can thus be free, yet determined. But freedom as

Spinoza intended the term, is not compatible with bon

dage,

passivity, or compulsion.

Critique

What type of determinism characterizes Spinoza's

use of freedom? A free person is self-determining in

that he actively causes his behavior by forming ade

quate knowledge of passions. Adequate knowledge—

having clear and distinct ideas--represents self-

directing, rational determination that frees one from

bondage or servitude. In his view of freedom, Spinoza

also denies that an individual could have chosen to act

in any way other than he did. This denial creates

some difficulties for Spinoza's moral theory.

Spinoza's unrelenting determinism obviates a norma

tive ethic. A person's behavior derives from two types

of determination: either behavior is self-caused

through adequate knowledge or behavior is externally

caused (constrained) by passion. As William Frankena

points out, a central goal of normative ethics is to

guide us in our capacity as agents trying to decide

what we should do in this case and in that. *

7

Spinoza's metaphysical determinism, however, eliminates

the prescribing of moral shoulds or oughts, since,

whether behavior is self-caused or externally caused,

the person could not have acted other than he did.

Self-causation and external causation are not determi

nants of choice.

The matter does not end here though. What type of

moral theory are we left with, if a moral agent can

perform only that action that he ipso facto performed?

A prescriptive ethic, wherein moral agents are exhorted

to realize ethical ideals, seems irreconciliable with

Spinoza'8 determinism. At best, then, Spinoza is left

with a descriptive ethic, wherein we observe, analyze,

and describe the moral conduct of agents. Hence

Spinoza's determinism truncates a traditionally impor

tant objective of moral theory. In a letter to Spinoza

(Epistle LXXVII) Oldenburg warns Spinoza about this

very implication of universal necessity : (God's) in

flexible fate, and . . . irresistible power compel us

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to act in a give n manne r, nor can we pos si bl y act

otherwise. *'

Consi der another problem that e merg es from

Spino za's determin ism. The idea of moral res pon sib il

ity bec ome s rather untenable, if antecen dnt cau ses

nece ssar ily deter mine subsequent eve nts . Again,

Olden burg broug ht this problem to Spinoz a's atten tion :

the doctri ne of fatalistic necessi ty render s [mora l]

r ew a rd s a nd p u ni s h me n ts . . . i ne f fe ct u al . . . . F o r

if we men are, in all of actio ns, moral as wel l a s na t

ural,

und er the pow er of God, like clay in the ha nd s o f

the pott er, with what face can any of us be accus ed of

doi ng th is or that, seeing that it wa s imp oss ibl e

[emphasis adde d] to do otherwise. ** Old enb urg con

clude s hi s argument by saying that Everyone ma y plead,

'Thy po wer cann ot be escap ed from, 0 God; the re for e,

since I could not act o ther wise , I ma y just ly be

excused.' '

0

Spinozistic determinism pre clu des mor al

blame and praise.

Finally, Spin oza's problem int ensi fies wh en he

spe aks of ide als that mora l agent s ought to see k:

. . . [EJvery man should (emphasis ad de d) love

him sel f, should see that whi ch is use fu l to him

. . . and should, each for him sel f, en dea vo r as

far as he can to prese rve his own be ing .'

1

Spinoz a's advocacy of metaphysi cal deter minis m con

flicts wit h his prescribing moral s shoulds; cons ider

the prob lema tic al ternatives this pos es :

I. 1. Spinoza cannot both advocate met aph ysic al

determin ism and presc ribe moral shou lds.

2. Spinoza advocates metaphysical dete rmin

ism.

3. Thus Spinoza cannot pres cri be mor al

shoulds.

II. 1. Spinoza cannot bot h advocate meta phy sic al

determin ism and presc ribe moral sho uld s.

2 . Spinoza presc ribe s moral sh ould s.

3. Thu s Spinoza cannot advocate metap hys ica l

determinism.

Spinoz a can not have it bot h wa ys . But he do es a dvo cat e

metap hysic al determinism, and he pre scr ibe s mor al

shoulds. Accord ingly, Spinoza 's denyi ng that an ind i

vid ual coul d hav e chose n to act other than he in fact

acted, rende rs his moral theory prob lema tic.

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NOTES

'Spinoza, Benedict de. The Ethics, trans. R. H.

M. Elwes (Washington: M. Walter Dunne, Publisher,

1901), Eth. Ill: 2 Note.

Ibid.,

Eth. I App.

Ibid., Eth. II: 35 Note

Ibid., Eth. I : 32 Proof

Spinoza, Eth. I: 32 Cor. 2.

Ibid.,

Eth. Ill: 2 Note.

Ibid., Eth. I App.

Ibid., Eth. I: 29.

Spinoza, Epistle Lviii (Spinoza to Hugo

Boxel).

'Hampshire, Stuart, Spinoza (London: Farber and

Farber,

m c m l i ) ,

p. 113.

'Spinoza, Eth., I: 33 Proof.

*Ibid., Eth. I: 32 Proof.

Joachim, Harold H., A Study of the Ethics of

Spinoza, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1901), p. 197.

*Spinoza,

Eth. I App.

'Ibid.

'Ibid.

'Ibid.

'Ibid., Eth. I

'Ibid., Eth. I

'Ibid., Eth. I

'Ibid., Eth. I

Ibid., Eth. I

'Ibid., Eth., It

17 Cor. 2.

16 Cor. 3.

15.

16.

16 Cor. 1.

25.

*Ibid., Eth., It 24.

387


11/12

C f .

H. A. Wolfson

1

8 The Philosophy of Spinoza,

v o l . 1, pp. 302-3; 422.

Ibid.,

Eth. XI: 5.

J

'Ibid., Eth. IV Preface.

Ibid.

*Mbid., Eth. Ill: 9 Note.

Ibid.

Ibid.,

Eth. Ill: 6.

Ibid., Eth. Ill: 6 Note.

Ibid., Eth. Ill: 7.

H a m p s h i r e , Spinoza, pp. 92-93.

Ibid., Eth. Ill: 10.

Ibid., Eth. Ill: 9 Note.

Ibid.

H a r r i s ,

Errol E., Salvation From Despair: A

Reappraisal of Spinoza

1

s Philosophy (The Hague: Marti-

nus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 113.

S p i n o z a ,

Eth. I: 25 Cor.

Ibid., Cf. Eth. V: 22 Proof and 23 Proof.

S p i n o z a , Eth. II: 45.

Joachim, A Study, p. 76.

4 1

S p i n o z a , Eth. II: 45 Note.

S p i n o z a , Eth. I: 24 Cor.

Ibid., Eth. II: 45 Note.

Ibid., Eth. Ill Def. 1.


••ibid., Eth. Ill Def. 1.


Ibid.

388


12/12

Ib id ., Eth. II: 45 Note.

Ib i d. , Eth. I Def. 7.

Ib id ., Eth. V: III.

Ib id ., Eth. V: III Proof.

Ib id ., Eth. V: Preface .

C f .

Spinoz a, Eth . I: 29 and 32 Pro of;

Ham pshi re, og. cit., p. 113, and G. H. R. Par kin son ,

On the Pow er and Freedom of Man , in Es sa ys in Inter

pretat ion, eds . Mauric e Mandelbaum and Euge ne Free man

(La Sal le, IL: Op en Court,

1975),

p . 22 .

Fr an ke na , William E., Ethics 2nd ed.

(Englewood Clif fs, NJ: Prentice Hal l, Inc.,

1973),

p .

12.

Ol de nb urg , Epistle LXXVII.

I b i d .

I b i d .

Sp in oz a, Eth. IV: 18 Not e.

389

Documents

Freedom and Determinism in Spinoza