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FREE ACCESS TO COURTS

1. ACAR VS. ROSAL

All over the world, Constitutions share one purpose: to protect and enhance the people'sinterest, as a nation collectively and as persons individually. The Philippine Constitution is no

exception. Interpretation of its provisions, therefore, should be done with a view to realizing

this fundamental objective. Among the provisions in our Constitution is one both, timely and

far-reaching, as it affects the people at large and relates to social justice problems of the day. It

is Subsec. 21, Sec. I of Art. III: "Free access to the courts shall not be denied to any person by

reason of poverty." It is the one involved in this case.

A suit was filed in the Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental on February 21, 1963 by ten

persons for their own behalf and that of 9,000 other farm laborers working off and on in sugar

cane plantations at the Bais milling district, Negros Oriental, against Compaia General deTabacos de Filipinas, Central Azucarera de Bais, Compaia Celulosa de Filipinas, Ramon Barata,

Aurelio Montinola, Sr., and Miguel Franco. Plaintiffs sought to recover their alleged

participations or shares amounting to the aggregate sum of P14,031,836.74, in the sugar,

molasses, bagasse and other derivatives based on the provisions ofRepublic Act 809 (The

Sugar Act of 1952), particularly Sections 1 and 9 thereof:

SECTION 1. In the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and

the millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced

in that district from the milling by any sugar central of the sugar-cane of any sugar-cane planter

or plantation owner, as well as all by-products and derivatives thereof, shall be divided between

them as follows:

Sixty per centum for the planter, and forty per centum for the central in any milling district the

maximum actual production of which is not more than four hundred thousand piculs: Provided,

That the provisions of this section shall not apply to sugar centrals with an actual production of

less than one hundred fifty thousand piculs;

Sixty-two and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-seven and one-half per centum for

the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds four hundred

thousand piculs but does not exceed six hundred thousand piculs;

Sixty-five per centum for the planter, and thirty-five per centum for the central in any milling

district the maximum actual production of which exceeds six hundred thousand piculs but does

not exceed nine hundred thousand piculs;

Sixty-seven and one-half per centum for the planter, and thirty-two and one-half per centum for

the central in any milling district the maximum actual production of which exceeds nine hundred

thousand piculs but does not exceed one million two hundred thousand piculs;
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Seventy per centum for the planter, and thirty per centum for the central in any milling district

the maximum actual production of which exceeds one million two hundred thousand piculs.

By actual production is meant the total production of the mill for the crop year immediately

preceding.

x x x x x x x x x

SEC. 9. In addition to the benefits granted by the Minimum Wage Law, the proceeds of any

increase in the participation granted the planters under this Act and above their present share

shall be divided between the planter and his laborers in the plantation in the following

proportion:

Sixty per centum of the increased participation for the laborers and forty per centum for the

planters. The distribution of the share corresponding to the laborers shall be made under the

supervision of the Department of Labor.

The benefits granted to laborers in sugar plantations under this Act and in the Minimum Wage

Law shall not in any way be diminished by such labor contracts known as "by the piece," "by

the volume," "by the area," or by any other system of "pakyaw," the Secretary of Labor being

hereby authorized to issue the necessary orders for the enforcement of this provision."

Furthermore, plaintiffs asked thereunder as well as by separate motion, that the

aforementioned court authorize them to sue as pauper litigants, under Sec. 22, Rule 3 of the

Rules of Court:

SEC. 22. Pauper litigant.Any court may authorize a litigant to prosecute his action or defense

as a pauper upon a proper showing that he has no means to that effect by affidavits, certificateof the corresponding provincial, city or municipal treasurer, or otherwise. Such authority once

given shall include an exemption from payment of legal fees and from filing appeal bond,

printed record and printed brief. The legal fees shall be a lien to any judgment rendered in the

case favorably to the pauper, unless the court otherwise provides.

invoking Sec. 1, subsec. (21) of Art. III of the Constitution of the Philippines. They alleged that

they had no means, to pay the docket fee of P14,500.00, being laborers dependent solely on

their daily wages for livehood and possessed of no properties. And in support of the foregoing,

the ten named plaintiffs submitted certificates of the municipal treasurers of their places of

residence stating that they have no real property declared in their names in said municipalities.

Acting on the petition to litigate in forma pauperis, the Court of First Instance issued an order

on May 27, 1963, denying the same upon the ground that the plaintiffs have regular

employment and sources of income and, thus, can not be classified as poor or paupers.

Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of said order but reconsideration was denied in an order dated

June 11, 1963. Assailing said two CFI orders and asserting their alleged right not to be denied

free access to the courts by reason of poverty, plaintiffs in said case filed herein, on August 1,


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1963, the present special civil action or certiorariand mandamus. Petition to litigate as pauper in

the instant case before Us was also filed. And on August 16, 1963, We allowed petitioners

herein to litigate in this Court as paupers and required respondent to answer. Respondent's

answer was filed on November 2, 1963. After hearing on February 10, 1964 this case was

submitted for decision.

The sole issue herein is whether petitioners were deprived, by the orders in question, of free

access to the courts by reason of poverty. In denying petitioners' motion to litigate as paupers,

respondent Judge adopted the definition at "pauper" in Black's Law Dictionary (at p. 1284) as

"a person so poor that he must be supported at public expense". And, as afore-stated, he ruled

that petitioners are notthat poor.

Such interpretation, to our mind, does not fit with the purpose of the rules on suitsin forma

pauperisand the provision of the Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, that: "Free access to the

courts shall not be denied to any person by reason of poverty." As applied to statutes or

provisions on the right to sue in forma pauperis, the term has a broader meaning. It has thus

been recognized that: "An applicant for leave to sue in forma pauperis need not be a pauper;

the fact that he is able-bodied and may earn the necessary money is no answer to his

statement that he has not sufficient means to prosecute the action or to secure the costs" (14

Am. Jur. 31). It suffices that plaintiff is indigent (Ibid.), the not a public charge. And the

difference between "paupers" and "indigent" persons is that the latter are "persons who have

no property or source of income sufficient for their support aside from their own labor, though

self-supporting when able to work and in employment" (Black's Law Dictionary, p. 913,

"Indigent", citing People vs. Schoharie County, 121 NY 345, 24 NE 830). It is therefore in this

sense of being indigent that "pauper" is taken when referring to suits in forma pauperis. Black's

Law Dictionary in fact defines pauper, thus: "A person so poor that he must be supported at

public expense; also a suitor who, on account of poverty, is allowed to sue or defend without

being chargeable with costs" (p. 1284, emphasis supplied).

It is further argued that the docket fee of P14,500 would very well be shouldered by petitioners

since there are around 9,000 of them. It must be remembered, however that the action in

question was filed by way of a class suit. And the Rules of Court allowing such procedure state

under Sec. 12, Rule 3:

SEC. 12. Class suit.When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general

interest to many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them

all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all. But in such case thecourt shall make sure that the parties actually before it are sufficiently numerous and

representative so that all interest concerned are fully protected. Any party in interest shall have

a right to intervene in protection of his individual interest.

So that in the suit before respondent Judge the ten named petitioners herein are the ones

suing, albeit for the benefit of all the others. It follows that the payment of docket fee would be

directly charged upon them, not upon the unnamed "9,000 other laborers." And even if the


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9,000 other laborers should later bear the payment of said docket fee of P14,500, the same

would be spread among them at about P1.60 each. Said cost of pressing their respective

average demand of P1.60 each is, to Our mind, a substantial imposition on a seasonal farm

laborer earning barely subsistent wages. And as pointed out, this is only the initial fee;

subsequent fees and charges would have to be paid. The philosophy underlying the

constitutional mandate of free access to the courts notwithstanding poverty, therefore, calls forexemption of herein petitioners from payment of the aforesaid legal fees in their assertion and

claim of substantial rights under the Sugar Act of 1952.

Returning to the purpose of all Constitutions, as mentioned earlier, We find this course the most

sensible, logical and practical construction demanded by the free access clause of the

Constitution. For a contrary interpretation could not make said provision the living reality that it

is designed to be.

As regards the fact that the supporting certifications of indigence refer only to the ten named

plaintiffs, suffice it to reiterate that this involves a class suit, where it is not practicable to bring

all the other 9,000 laborers before the court. This Court finds the supporting evidence of

indigence adequate, showing in petitioners' favor, as plaintiffs in the suit before respondent

Judge, the right not to be denied free access to the courts by reason of poverty. Since they

were excluded from the use and enjoyment of said right, mandamus lies to enforce it. Appeal

was unavailing, since they were not even accorded the status of litigants, for non-payment of

docket fee; and perfecting an appeal would have presented the same question of exemption

from legal fees, appeal bond and similar requisites.

Wherefore, petitioners are declared entitled to litigate as paupers in their class suit before

respondent Judge and the latter is hereby ordered to grant their petition to litigate in forma

pauperis. No costs. So ordered.


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2. MARTINEZ VS. PEOPLE

This is a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65, erroneously filed as a petition for reviewon certiorariunder Rule 45. But this procedural infirmity notwithstanding, we have decided togive it due course to resolve the question whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its

discretion in denying petitioner's motion to appeal as a pauper litigant.

[1]

The antecedents: Petitioner was accused of homicide in Crim. Case No. 5753 before theRegional Trial Court of Butuan City.[2]During the hearing on 23 June 1994 petitionerrepresented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez of the Public Attorney's Office of Butuan City objected topetitioner's motion to be allowed to litigate as pauper and moved instead to strike out the entiretestimony of the first witness for the prosecution on the ground that it was inadmissible forbeing violative of the testimonial privilege afforded to children in cases involving their parents.The Presiding Judge[3]deferred his ruling on the objection and allowed the testimony to becontinued.[4]On 21 July 1994 the trial court issued an order overruling the objection. On 8August 1994 the court denied the motion for reconsideration.[5]This prompted petitioner to goto the Court of Appeals by way of a petition for certiorarialleging that the trial court acted with

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed orders.[6]

On 23 August 1994 petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a Motion to Litigate asPauperattaching thereto supporting affidavits executed by petitioner himself and by two (2)ostensibly disinterested persons attesting to petitioner's eligibility to avail himself of thisprivilege.[7]The appellate court subsequently issued its resolution dated 21 March 1997 denyingthe motion and directing petitioner to remit the docketing fees in the total amount of P420.00within five (5) days from notice.[8]On 7 April 1997 petitioner filed a Motion forReconsiderationof the order denying his motion to litigate as a pauper, but this was similarlydenied in the resolution of 8 October 1997.[9]Petitioner then filed a Manifestationon 28 October1997 wherein he stated through counsel that he was transmitting the docket fees required of

his client "under protest" and that the money remitted was advanced by his counsel, Atty. JesusG. Chavez himself.[10]The transmittal of the amount was evidenced by two (2) postal moneyorders attached to the Motion to Litigate as Pauper.[11]

In the assailed Resolution of 10 November 1997 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition,citing petitioners failure to pay the required docket fee.[12]Petitioner moved for reconsiderationciting his compliance with the docket fee requirement as alleged in his Manifestation advertedto above.[13]However, the Court of Appeals in the second assailed Resolution of 21 January1998 denied this latest motion on the ground that, per verification by the Judicial RecordsDivision, the amount remitted by petitioner as docket fee was short of 150.00.[14]Msesm

The only issue expressly raised by petitioner is whether a motion to litigate as pauper can beentertained by an appellate court. When petitioner filed on 23 August 1994 his original motionto appeal as pauper before the appellate court the applicable rule was the second paragraph ofSec. 16, rule 41, of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, which provides-

Sec. 16.Appeal by pauperWhere a party desiring to appeal shall establish tothe satisfaction of the trial court that he is a pauper and unable to pay theexpenses of prosecuting the appeal, and that the case is of such importance, byreason of the amount involved, or the nature of the question raised, that it ought
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to be reviewed by the appellate court, the trial judge may enter an orderentitling the party to appeal as pauper. The clerk shall transmit to the appellatecourt the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and therecord on appeal, and the case shall be heard in the appellate court upon theoriginal record so transmitted without printing the same. Esmso

A petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by theappellate court.

Even prior to the adoption of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, the Court had uniformly frownedupon appellate courts entertaining petitions to litigate as pauper, holding that the question ofwhether a party-litigant is so poor as to qualify him to litigate as pauper is a question of factwhich is best determined by the trial court. The trial court is the court which may properlydecide or pass upon the question of fact which may require presentation of evidence whetherthe appellant is an indigent and may appeal as such, and whether the case is of suchimportance that, by reason not only of the amount involved but of the nature of the questionraised in the court below, it ought to be reviewed by the appellate court.[15]

When the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedurecame into effect on 1 July 1997 the provisionabovequoted was not reenacted. Section 21 of Rule 3, as now worded, outlines the procedurefor, as well as the effects of, the grant of a motion to litigate as pauper -

Sec. 21. Indigent party. - A party may be authorized to litigate his action, claimor defense as an indigent if the court, upon an ex parteapplication and hearing,is satisfied that the party is one who has no money or property sufficient andavailable for food, shelter and basic necessities for himself and his family.

Such authority shall include an exemption from payment of docket and other

lawful fees, and of transcripts of stenographic notes which the court may orderto be furnished him. The amount of the docket and other lawful fees which theindigent was exempted from paying shall be a lien on any judgment rendered inthe case favorable to the indigent, unless the court otherwise provides.Esmmis

Any adverse party may contest the grant of such authority at any time beforejudgment is rendered by the trial court. If the court should determine afterhearing that the party declared as an indigent is in fact a person with sufficientincome or property, the proper docket and other lawful fees shall be assessedand collected by the clerk of court. If payment is not made within the time fixedby the court, execution shall issue or the payment thereof, without prejudice tosuch other sanctions as the court may impose.

On the other hand, Sec. 18 of Rule 141 prescribes the evidentiary requirements for theexemption of pauper litigants from payment of legal fees -

Sec. 18. Pauper-litigants exempt from payment of legal fees. - Pauper-litigants(a) whose gross income and that of their immediate family do not exceed fourthousand (P4,000.00) pesos a month if residing in Metro Manila, and threethousand (P3,000.00) pesos a month if residing outside Metro Manila, and (b)
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Helen Maur, both residents of Butuan City, who generally attested to the same allegationscontained in petitioner's own affidavit.[20]Based on this evidence, the Court finds that petitioneris qualified to litigate as an indigent. Chief

WHEREFORE, the questioned Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 10 November 1997dismissing the petition for certiorariof petitioner Teofilo Martinez and its Resolution dated 21January 1998 denying reconsideration are SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuseof discretion. Accordingly, this case is REMANDED for appropriate action to the Court of Appealswhich is further ordered to allow petitioner to litigate as pauper and to return to him theamount of P420.00 representing the docket fees he paid.

SO ORDERED.
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