Frederic M. Schroeder Form and Transformation a Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus McGill-Queens Studies in the History of Ideas 1992

7/30/2019 Frederic M. Schroeder Form and Transformation a Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus McGill-Queens Studies in the History of Ideas 1992

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A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus

Plotinus,the fatherof Neoplatonism, livedin Rome duringthe thirdcenturyA . D .As the last great philosopher in the ancient Greek tra-dition,he is a figure ofcommanding importance. Despitea markedincreasein Plotinus scholarship sincethe 1970'$,the need has beenfelt for a book to make Plotinus more generally accessible.

The role of theFormas anintrinsically valuable objectofintellective

and spiritual visionis often marginalizedby theconcernin contem-porary Plato scholarshipfor itsfunctionas cause in ontology, epis-temology,and ethics. Schroeder argues thatthe intrinsic valueofForm is centralto Plotinus'thought.It isindeedan objectof ecstaticcontemplation.Yet Plotinus buildsits intrinsic value intothe verystructureof his understandingof creation in such a waythat itsphilosophical uses neednot beconsideredin abstraction fromourenjoymentof it.

The author initiatesus into Plotinus'thoughtby adeft explorationof the themesof form, light, silence, language,and love,and thevocabularythat weaves these togetherin such a waythat the readeris enabled to begin reading Plotinuswith understanding. Schroederdisplays,as well as dem onstrates discursively, w ha t Plotinus und er-stood by his doctrine of the sovereignty of Form.

F R E D E R I CM .S C H R O E D E Ris an associate professorin the Department

of Classics,Queen's University.

FORMAND TRANSFORMATION


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M c G i L L - Q u E E N ' sSTUDIESIN THEHISTORYO FI D E A S

i Problemsof CartesianismE dited by Thomas M . L ennon,John M. Nicholas, and

JohnW . Davis

2 The Deve lopment of the Idea of H istory in A ntiquityGerald A. Press

3 ClaudeBuffierand Thomas Reid:Two Common-Sense Philosophers

Louise Marcil-Lacoste

4 Schiller, H egel,and Marx :State, Society,and theAesthetic Idealof Ancient Greece

PhilipJ. Kain

5 John Case and Aristotelianismin Renaissance EnglandCharlesB .Schmitt

6 Beyond Libertyand Property:The Processof Self-Recognitionin Eighteenth-CenturyPoliticalThought

J.A.W. Gunn

7 John Toland: H isM ethods, M anners,and MindStephenH .Daniel

8Coleridge

and theInspired WordAnthonyJohn Harding


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9 The Jena System,18045:Logic and MetaphysicsG.W.F. Hegel

Translation editedby John W. Burbidgeand George di GiovanniIntroductionand notes by H.S. Harris

10 Consent, Coercion, andLimit:The M edieval O riginsof Parliamentary Democracy

ArthurP. Monahan

11 Scottish Common Sensein Germany,17681800:A Contributionto the H istoryof Critical Philosophy

ManfredKuehn

12 Paineand Cobbett:The Transatlantic Connection

David A.Wilson

13 Descartes and the EnlightenmentPeter A. Schouls

14 Greek ScepticismAnti-RealistTrends in AncientThought

Leo Groarke

15 The Irony of Theologyand the Natureof Religious ThoughtDonald Wiebe

16 Form and TransformationA Studyin the Philosophyof Plotinus

Frederic M. Schroeder


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FORMAND TRANSFORMATIONA Study in the Philosophyof Plotinus

FredericM . Schroeder

McGill-Queen's University PressMontreal& Kingston London Buffalo


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McGill-Queen'sUniversity Press 1992I S B N0-7735-1016-8Legal deposit second quarter 1992Bibliothequenationaledu Quebec

Printed in Canadaon acid-freepaper

This book has been publishedwith the help of a grant fromtheCa nadian Federation for the H um anities, using fund s provided bythe Social Sciencesand H um anities Research Councilof Canada.

Fundinghas also been providedby the Facultyof Artsand Scienceand the Schoolof Graduate Studiesand Research,

Queen's University.

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Schroeder, FredericM., 1937-Form and t ransformation

(McGill-Queen's studies in the history of ideas; 16)

Includes bibliographical referencesand index.I S B N0-7735-1016-8

i. Plotinus-Contributionsin metaphysics.2 . Form (Philosophy).I. Title. II. Series

6693^7537 1992 i86'-4 092-090094-1

This book was typeset by Typo Litho composition inc.in 10/12 B askervi lle.


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For Carol


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Contents

Preface xi

Acknowledgments xiii

I Form 3

II Light 24

III Silence 40

IV Word 66

V Love 91

Bibliography 115

Index locorum 12 1

General index 12 3


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Preface

TH EPRESENTW O R Kis offered as a reflective studyof the philosophyof Plotinus. Plotinus now here clearly sets fo rtha metaphysical system.This is not a failureon his part, but rather a mark of his salutaryopennessto fresh enquiryand experience.It is thereforeno purposeof this monographto "reconstruct" sucha system.It is hoped insteadthat the thread of discussion, departing froma basic insight intoPlotinus' understandingof the Platonic Form,will lead the readerexponentially into Plotinus' mannerof philosophizing.

This study prescindsfrom questionsof source research, historicallocation, and the exam ination of philological cruces for their ow n sakin presenting its interpretation of the Plotinian text. Words and con-cepts have been analysedto showhow they function synergisticallyinthe semanticfields of Plotinus' enquiry.I hope thatthe philosopher,the theologian, the studentof religion, and the general classicistwillfind my approacha good introductionto this autho rand that scholarsmay find Plotinus to be of intrinsic interest, quiteapart from thequestion of his undoubted influence on the subsequent course ofphilosophyand theology.

Tw o recent bibliographies, on e by H enry B lum enthal, the other bKevin Corrigan and Padraig O'Cleirigh (both listedin my bibliog-raphy),should exonerateme from providing bibliographyfor worksother than those thatI mentionin my text and notes. Citationsin thenotes will be by author and date. Unless otherwise indicated, thetranslations are from A . H . A rmstrong.

The referencesto the text of Plotinusare of the stylenow standardamong Plotinian scholars. H owever,a note of explanation mightbehelpfulfor those who are notfamiliarwith it. Plotinus'discipleFor-


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xii Preface

phyryedited hisworks intosixcollections entitled Enneads(from theGreek wordenneas,meaning "body of nine"). Each Ennead contains

nine tractates, further divided into chapters. Porphyry also informsus of the chronologicalorder of the tractates, w hich is dif feren t fromthe order in whichhe published them.A sample reference wouldbe:1.6[i]. 1.1-10. The first num ber refersto the first Ennead,the secondto the sixth tractate in that Ennead, the third (in square brackets) tthe numberof the tractatein thechronologicalorder, the fourth tothe chapterwithinthe tractate,and thelast twonumbersto the rel-evantline numbers in the chapter.

The Armstrong translationof Plotinus(A. H .Armstrong,Plotinus.

7 vols.H einem ann: London and Cambridge, M ass.,1966-88) willbereferred to in the notesas "Armstrong."The H arder-B eutler-Theilertranslation and commentary on Plotinus (R.Harder, continued byR. Beutlerand W.Theiler, Plotins Schriften. 5 vols. H am burg : FelixMeiner 195660) willbe referred to in the notes as "HBT." TheMacKennatranslationof Plotinus (Stephen M acK enn a,Plotinus,TheEnneads,third edition revised by B . S. Page. L ondon: Faber and Faber

1962)will be referred to in thenotes as "MacKenna."The Sleemanand Pollet lexicon to Plotinus (J. H . Sleeman, and G. Pollet,LexiconPlotinianum.Leidenand Louvain:E . J. Brill,Leidenand L euven Uni-versityPress, 1980)will be referred to in the notes as "Sleeman andPollet."H. F. A. vonArnim(ed.),StoicorumVeterumFragmenta.4 vols.Leipzig:Teubner, 1903 1924, willbe referredto in thenotesas"SVF."The He nr y and Schwyzereditio minor of Plotinus (P. He nr y andH.-R.Schwyzer,PlotiniOpera.3 vols. O xford: O xford Un iversity Press,

1964-82), the text of which is the subject of all Plotinus references,will be cited as "H-S."


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xiv Acknowledgments

Ram6nLemos of that university for permitting me toparticipate inhis fine seminar on phenomenology, and to theUniversity of Miami

whoentertained

me asVisiting Scholar during that year.

I also wish to express mydeep thanks to mydear wifeCarol Robertsfor her unfailing love, support, and patience.


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F O R M A N DTRANSFORM ATI ON


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I

Form

W EAREU S E DTO TH EA N A L O G Yor metaphorof light in metaphysicaland religious discourse.We are perhaps ready to accept thatthePlatonic Good shouldbe the sun of theintelligible unive rseor thatChrist shouldbe thelightof theworld.In Plotinus, however,we find

a thinkerwhoasks us to understand sensible lightand the phenom-enon of earthly illuminationin terms of the seemingly less palpableprocessionof soul from soul,as if theeventsof thespirit were some-how more familiar thanour quotidian experience.

Lightis, forPlotinus,an effectof thelum inous source.Its existencehas no dependence upon the object to be illumined, althoughit ismanifestedin such an object.Similarly,reflection, itselfan instanceof illumination,requires no mirror, no reflective surfacefor its ex-

istence, but only for itsappearance.1

In explaining this theoryofillumination, Plotinus offers whatis meant to be aninstructive anal-ogy: "So it is in thecase of soul, consideredas the activityof a priorsoul, that as long as the prior soul abides,so does the subsequentactivity"(4.5[2g].7.4g51).Plotinus, in a discussion of the light whichwe behold withour eyes, offersas illustrationthe processionof lowerfrom higher soul,with the higher soul actingas unique sourceof thatprocession.This is meant to clarify how light is an effect its source

alone.Of fire,Plotinus says thatit "shinesand glittersas if it was aForm"(1.6 [i].3.25-26). Here the luminosityof sensiblefire isillustratedbyreferenceto Form. Again,we might be prepared for a Platonicuseof fire todescribe the luminous characterof Form.YetPlotinushere

i . Plotinus 4.5 [29].7-33-49.


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4 Form a nd Transformation

also shows that for him the world of Form, the realm of the spirit, isthe primary object of experience with reference to which we mayunderstand the sensible world. Rather than using the world of ourordinary waking consciousness as a fund of anagogical metaphor oranalogy that may point to and illumine the uncharted territories ofthe spirit, Plotinus seems cast, shipwrecked and blinking, into theworld addressed by sense, a world that can be comprehended onlythrough an orientation toward that other country from which his soulhas so precipitously and unpardonably descended.

The contemporary student of Plato will tell us that (if we entertain

the Platonic theory of Forms at all) the Platonic Form is posited ascause or explanation. Ontologicaily it is the cause of being, episte-mologically it is the cause of knowledge, and ethically it is the guar-antee of right action. The same scholar will find somewhat embar-rassing the Platonic description of Form as an object of ecstaticexperience, cast in the language of erotic passion and intoxication.B y contrast, for Plotinus as a student of Plato the Platonic Form is,first and foremost, an intrinsically valuable object of intellective and

spiritual vision. Form is indeed cause. Yet to understand how it iscause, it is crucial first to comprehend it as an intrinsically valuableobject of vision, apart from its uses in explanation. The disjunctionthat we would introduce between rational enquiry and ecstasy is notvalid for an understanding of the Plotinian Plato.

The existence of Form is not postulated merely as a means of ex-planation. Rather Form is in some sense actually experienced by thesoul of man. For the purposes of the present discussion, we may

interpret the word "experience" broadly, reserving consideration ofthe nature of this experience for later. That Form is an object ofexperience may explain why, in the examples we have discussed, Plo-tinus is prepared to illustrate the phenomena of physics by means ofmetaphysical examples.

Where Plato will describe the ecstatic experience of Form in thethird person, Plotinus is prepared to use the first person: 2

Manytimesit hashappened:lifted out of the bodyinto myself;becomingexternal to allother things and self-encentered;beholdinga marvellousbeauty;then,morethan ever, assuredof communitywith the loftiestorder;

2 . Trans. MacKenna .


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Form 5

enactingthe noblest life, acquiringidentitywith the divine;stationingwithinIt byhavingattained that activity;poised abovewhatsoeverwithin the In-

tellectual is less than the Supreme: yet there comes the moment of descentfrom intellection to reasoning, and after that sojournin the divine,I askmyselfhow ithappens that I can now bedescending, and how did theSoulever enter into my body, the Soul which,even withinthe body, is the highthingit hasshown itselfto be(4.8 [6].i.i-i i).

In Plato's Symposium*the wise woman of Mantineia says of the visionof Beautv, "something marvellous is beheld, by nature beautiful"

Plotinus echoesher words 4 in his claim, "beholding a beauty wonderfully great

This is also the only place in which Plotinus makes use of the firstperson to describe the human experience of Form. Yet the use of thefirst person in this passage surely allows us to see that he does notmerely entertain the possibility of such experience: for him it is areality. His appeal to tradition, in the reference to Plato's Symposium,

intends a catholic validation of his experience.5 Furthermore, thispassage invites us to interpret other passages where Plotinus discussessuch awareness in the third person as a serious address to the reachof human experience. 6

Armstrong's translation, with its use of the indicative mood ("OftenI have woken up out of the body and have entered into myself..."),yields the sense that the experience is an interruption of everydaylife. As O'Meara suggests, the MacKenna translation (which I have

used here) preserves Plotinus' participlesand gives the sense that Plotinus is describing the continuous andtimeless experience of the higher soul which is interrupted by thecommerce of the soul with the body. This reading of the text would

3. 21064-5

4- 4- 8 [6].i-3-5. Cf. Armstrong, "Tradition, Reason and Experience," for a fine discussion of this

matter.6. Porphyry, the disciple and biographer of Plotinus, affirms that his master

achieved union with the One four times whilein his presence. We may not place greatfaith in Porphyry's account, Vita Plotini 23.15-18: see Schroeder, "Ammonius Saccas,"on the credibility of Porphyry's biography. Porphyry, a late-comer to the Plotiniancircle, is attempting to establish his place as the successor of Plotinus. The language ofPorphyry'sdescription reflects4.8 [6].i.


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6 Form and Transformation

support the view that Plotinus' primary orientation is toward the in-telligible world. 7

In Plato's Phaedo Simmias is exhorted not to employ sight, or anyother sense, but only intellect in the address to Form. 8 In the analogyof the sun and the Good in the Republicthe Good is said to have thesame relationship to the objects of knowledge which the sun bearstoward things visible. 9 The Good rules over the realm of what isknown,even as the sun is lord of the visible.I0 In the passage con-cerning the Divided Line, the fundamental division is between whatis visibleand what is intelligible.11 We maythink the Forms, but cannot

see them.12

On the other hand, in the Symposium1^ and in the Phaedrus ,14 theForms are addressed by vision. We may ask whether these statementsdo not contradict Plato's insistence elsewhere that the Forms are tobe known only by intellection to the exclusion of vision. Or is Platohere using the language of sight metaphorically?

Note that this language of vision in the Symposiumand Phaedrus isaccompanied by expressions of ecstasy. Thus the famous pages 210

and 2 11of the Symposiumdescribe Beauty as the crowning object oferos. In the Phaedrus the vision of the Plain of Truth belongs both toeros and madness. 15

It would be easy to multiply instances in which Plotinus joins ecstaticimagery, borrowed from Plato, of erotic passion, intoxication, andmadness with the vision of Form as intrinsically valuable object ofvision.Plotinus contrasts Intellect's power of self-contemplation withits capacity of beholding the One: "And that first one is the contem-

plation of Intellect in its right mind, and the other is Intellect in love,when itgoes out of itsmind 'drunk with nectar'; then it falls in love,simplifiedinto happiness by having its fill" (6.7 [38].35.24-26). Thedrunkenness here is that of Plenty in the myth of Poverty and Plenty

7. Cf. O'Meara, "A propos un temoignage,"for this interpretation. O'Meara com-pares6.9 [g].9.55 - 10.3.

8. 6se6-66a8.

9- 59b

2-io-10. Republic5090"1-3.11. RepublicsogdS.12 . Republic5070910.13. 210013-4;21064;2 i i b 6 ;2iid2-3-14. 24707-8, ds, 5-6; 24803; 24965; 25004.15. 249d4-25oc6.


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Form 7

in the Symposium.l6 Also present, of course, are the themes of eroticpassion and madness familiar from the Symposiumand Phaedrus.

In thePhaedrusthe place above the heavens may bebeheld only byreason, charioteer of the soul. 17 This statement would suggest thatthe language of vision here is used metaphorically. Elsewhere in thePhaedrus,however, it isstated that Beauty is unique among the Formsin that it can bebeheld by sight. 18 For Plotinus Beauty is greatlyevident to the sense of vision but also manifests itself to those whomount upward from the world of sense. 19

Plotinusseems to seize upon the Platonic language of ecstatic vision

to reverse the proportions of the Divided Line. He declares the an-agogical power of love:

But if someone who sees beauty excellently represented in a face is carriedto that higher world, will anyone be sosluggish in mind and soimmovablethat, when he sees all the beauties in the world of sense, all its good proportionand themighty excellence of itsorder, and thesplendour of form whichismanifested in thestars, for alltheir remoteness, he willnot thereupon think,

seized with reverence, "What wonders, and from what a source?" If he didnot, he would neither have understood (KCtTev6r|aev)this world here nor seen(ei&ev)that higher world. (2.9 [331.16.48 56)

Notice the inversion of sense and intellection in the last sentence.Here, as in Plato, the vision of Form is joined with erotic ecstasy. 20

In thenext chapter, we shall be examining the dynamic continuitythat exists between the sensible and intelligible worlds. We may here

examine a text which asserts this continuity:

The greatest beauty in the world of sense, therefore, is a manifestation ofthe noblest among the intelligibles, of their power and of their goodness, and

16. 2 O 3 b 5 _17. 24707-8.18 . 25od3-ei.19. 1.6 [i].i.20. Cf. Schwyzer, "Plotinus," cols. 526-27 and 1.4 [46].10.14; 6.9 [9].5.12 on how

Intellectmay bebeheld as if itwere an object of sensation; Brhier,La PhilosophicdePlotin,xi-xii, observes: "C'est trop peu dedire que Plotin a le sentiment du mondeintelligible:C'est plutotchezlu isensualit^;"cf. 6.7[38].6.1-9; ibid. \2.23-30and Hadot,"Structureet Themes," 647-48.


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all things are held together forever, those whichexist intelligiblyand thosewhichexistperceptibly

the intelligibles existingof themselvesand thethingsperceived by thesenses receiving their existence for ever by participation in them, imitatingthe intelligiblenature as far asthey can. (4.8 [6].6.23-28)

This continuity between the worlds is further suggested by the state-ment: "Sensations here are dim intellections;intellections there arevivid sensations" (6.7 [38].7.30-31). If there is no radical disjunctionbetween sensation and intellection, then surely the use of words im-

plyingvision is not really out of place in describing the experience ofForm. Indeed, if sensation and intellection are at two ends of a con-t inuum,the one an intensificationof the other, the use of the languageof vision may belong to something more than metaphor.

In the middle dialogues, Plato uses the language of participationto explain how the Form functions as cause. 21 Plato himself subjectsthis incautious language to aporetic scrutiny in the "day and sail"argument of the Parmenides .22 If the Form is whollypresent in the

many particulars, which are separate from it, Parmenides argues thatit will be separated from itself and lose its identity. Socrates answersthat day may be whollypresent to different places and yet not loseits identity in this manner. Parmenides rejoins that if the Form ofLargeness is present to the large particulars as a sail isstretched out over the heads of sailors, then a part and notthe whole Form will be present to each particular. The Form will bedivided among the many particulars and will thus lose

its unity. It will also sacrifice its integrity and hence identity. TheLarge will become small.The youthful Socrates may be seen as naive in allowing the older

and more experienced Parmenides to substitute the "sail" analogy forthe imagery of "day" that Socrates had advanced earlier. 23 If the Formis present to the many particulars as day is present to Athens andSparta, it need not be divided. Indeed, whether we view "day" as aunit of time or as daylight it willbe immaterial and hence indivisible.

2 1. Phaedo loic; loab; Symposium2l ib ; Republic4760!.2 2 . 13065-13167.23. Parmenides133-6.


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Form 9

Thus Plotinus (who construes "day" as "daylight") interprets the "dayand sail" argument. 24

WhilePlotinus believes that the force of the "day and sail" argumentof the Platonic Parmenidesmay beovercome, he does not think thatthe acceptance of that argument rests on a simple human error.Rather,when we accept Parmenides'reasoning and divide the Formwe participate in a grander scheme of misapprehension. The hypos-tasisof Intellect cannot maintain itsvisionof the O ne inprimal unity,but "being unable to preserve the power which it wasprocuring, itbroke it up and made the one [power] into many that it might bear

it part by part (6.7 [38]. 15.20-22). In sodoing, Intellectconstitutes itself as an imitation of the Good, as a many-hued andvariegatedGood 6.7 [38]. 15.24). Here the languageof division reflects the "day and sail" argument. Yet Intellect does notsucceed in dividing the One. Rather, in itsvery failure to divide th eindivisible One, it constitutes itself as the One in division. We maycompare 5.1 [10].7.17-18: "But Intellect sees, by means of itself,likesomething divided proceeding from the undivided

" In this passage aswell,Intellect constitutes itselfin theattemptto divide the unity and identity of the One. 25

2 4. Cf. Plotinus 6.4 [221.78,3.8 [30]. 10, and Schroeder, "The Platonic Parmenides,"51-54. It appears that Plotinus interprets "day" here as "daylight", cf. Plotinus 6.9[g].4.io 11and Schroeder "The Platonic Parmenides" 53 note 4. The soul and theintelligibleworld with which it is inunion together constitute true light, which is notmeasured by largeness and isgreater than all quantity, 1.6 [ i ] .9 .1522 .Thislatter passage is especially interesting. Platonic scholars who can accept the notion ofa Form of Beauty willfind itdifficultto cope with th e notion of theForm of somethingapparently relative, such as Largeness. Here the Largeness (perhaps we should renderit "greatness") of the intelligible world, being itself the foundation of any judgment ofsize,extent, or degree in the sensible world, is not subject to the relativistic measurementwhichbelongs to the latter realm. Light is a suitable construal here as it isincorporeal:see Chapter 2, pp. 24, 26-28, 32, 35, 37 below (thus we need not with Fielder, "Ploti-nus' Reply," insist that it be aunit of time).

2 5 . Cf. Schroeder, "Conversion and Consciousness," on the interpretation of this

important chapter. Plotinusappears to read the

"dayand

sail" argumentin

termsof

the Timaeus353 where, in the account of creation, the distinction is drawn between anindivisible intelligible reality and a divisible corporeal reality. A reading of the intro-ductory arguments of theParmenidesin terms of the Timaeusallows Plotinus to situatetheir aporetic character in the more positive context of creation, cf. Schroeder, "ThePlatonicParmenides" 72 note 46.


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io Form and Transformation

Similarly,the Soul constitutes itself by dividing the unity and iden-tity of Intellect (which, while it in itsrelation to the O ne ismany, is, in

its relationto the

Soul,one and

identical).As

participantsin

Soul,we

share in this division, constituting ourselves as wedivide the unity andidentityof Intellect. Plotinus asks, "What then are the things in theone Intellect which we divide in our thinking?" (5.9[5J-9-1-2).Reflecting that the universe isderived finallyfrom Intellect,he says:"That which is formed into the universe has itsform divided

man in one place and the sun in another; butthe forming nature has allthings in one" (14-16). Individual souls

participate then in this division:"The Soul of the All looks towardIntellect as a whole, but the individual souls rather to their own partialintellects (4.3 [27].6.15-17).

L et usreflect upon the significance of this way ofinterpreting Plato.Contemporary scholarship may, unlike Plotinus, take the followingview. The doctrine that Form is cause is the heart of the Platonicenterprise. We may regard the introductory arguments of the Par-menidesas refuting the Platonic theory of Forms and thus paving the

way for its rejection by Aristotle. We may then dismiss the ecstaticvisionof Form in the Symposiumand Phaedrus as empty poetic orna-ment. If we further dismiss the God of Aristotle as needless Platonicbaggage, we may seeourselves as set firmlyupon the way toestab-lishing philosophy as the handmaiden to science and technology. ForPlotinus, however, the vision of Form is precious. When we dividethe Form, we constitute ourselves and the world around so as toexclude that vision and that ecstasy. From this viewpoint then the

argument of Plato's Parmenidesis not descriptive, but performative.In engaging in the mental processes that would divide the unity ofForm, we constitute ourselves and the world around us as that dividedunity. The "day and sail" argument describes the Form as materialand hence divisible.The cosmic moment of addressing the Form asif it were material and hence divisible does not merely attempt todescribe its nature, but performs to create another nature, the divisionof the sensible and material world.

In the copy-likeness argument of Plato's Parmenides,Socrates ad-vances the argument that the particular is a copy the Formthe pattern it imitates.2 6 Parmenides plays upon the

2 6 . 1 3 2 0 1 2 1 3 3 37 .


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Form 11

ambiguityof the Greek wordthis word may describe either the symmetrical relation of similarity

or the asymmetrical relation of imitation. Parmenides takes it to referunambiguously to the symmetrical relation of similarity.Thus he asks:if the particular is like the Form, is not the Form also like the partic-ular? Now the Form as pattern was posited in the first instance toexplain the similarityamong particulars. If the same relationship ex-ists between the particular and the Form, then surely we must posityet a further Form to account for the similarity between the Formand the particular. Of course, this process may be extended to infinite

regress.For Plotinus, the crucial point of difference between similarity andimitation is epistemological. In the Phaedo,Plato analyses the relationbetween similarityand association, as he argues that all of our learningis really recollection. 27 The beloved comes to mind when the loversees his lyre or cloak. If we see Simmias, we recall Cebes. Here rec-ollection depends upon a mental act of association which is inde-pendent of any intrinsic similarity between the associated items. By

contrast, when we see a picture of Simmias, we may recall Simmiashimself.In this example, we have not only association, as in the caseof the lyre or cloak and the beloved, but also similarity. According toPlato, the recollection of Form requires both association and similarity.We associate the imperfect equality of sticksand stones with the per-fect equality of the Form of Equality to which they are similar.

In the Phaedo knowledge of Form is ante-natal and experience ofparticulars only begins at birth. 28 Yet Cebes could see Simmias and

the cloak or lyre at the same time and make the same association hewould in Simmias' absence. We could also see Simmiasand his portraittogether and form the same association as when they were apart.Thus, association in general does not require temporal separation andin the specificcase of anamnesissuch separation may be regarded asincidental.

A s the association need not now depend upon separation in time,Plotinus demythologizes the ante-natal character of Form in the

Phaedo. The association need not be between something that we seenow and something that we have seen before birth. Recollection de-

27. 726-736.2 8. 75a-b.

As with out English word "like,"


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scribes access to a plane of consciousness which is perpetually ad-dressed to the Forms, but does not always impinge upon our normalwakingconsciousness.^ Thus two people may look at the same paint-ing and one willinterpret it after the intelligible model and know truelove, while the other will see it merely as a likeness of a sensiblemodel. 3

Imitation, of course, involves the relation of similarity. Yet it differsfrom other cases of similarity in also requiring association and inter-pretation. This association demands a pattern of cognitive priorityand posteriority. It isbecause we know the pattern first that we maylater know the image (as we have seen, the priority need not be tem-poral). To maintain the cognitive priority of pattern to copy is to avoidthe infiniteregress of the copy-likeness argument whichreduces pat-tern and copy to the same explanatory level.

Plotinus distinguishes tw o senses of "likeness" , sym-metrical and asymmetrical,31 arising from the relationship betweenarchetype and imitation , 32 Two imitations ofthe same Form exhibit symmetrical likeness, and the Form and par-ticular, asymmetrical likeness. Thus he can

say:"It is they [sc. the

gods], not men, who are the objects of our imitationlikenessamong men is the resemblance of one image to another whenboth images are drawn from the same source, but the other kind oflikenessis imitation directed toward yet another object beyond themboth as to a pattern" (1.2 [igj.y.ay-so). 33 This passageis an exegesis of the imitation of God inPlato Theaetetus \^&b.

Let us examine the senses of likeness more closely. We may distin-guish between "attributes of similarity" and "attributes of imitation."The subjectof a painting has, let us say, blonde curly hair, blue eyes,and an aquiline nose. The painting has a certain shade of yellow paintthat corresponds to the colour of the hair, another shade of blue thatcorresponds to the colour of the eyes, wavy lines to represent the

2 9. Cf. 4.3 [27] .25 ;4.4 [28].5.1-11; 5.9 [51.5.29-34 and Schroeder, "The PlatonicParmenides," 55-56. Plotinus does (3.7 [45].1.23; 4.7

[2] .12.9)use anamnesis in the

traditional sense as well, but as O'Daly, "Memory in Plotinus," 467 note 3 observes,"that does not lessen the perceptive critique of IV.3 .25 ."

30. 2.9 [33].16.43-48 and Schroeder, "The Platonic Parmenides,"56.31. 1. 2 [19].2.7.

32. 1.2 [19].2.3.

33. My translation.


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Form i3

shapeof thehair, straight linesto depictthe angleof thenose.In theoriginalthere are shades of yellow and blue,wavyand straight lines.These

attributesare to be

found independently bothin the

originaland in theimageand hencemay betermed "attributesof similarity."Yetif I lookat thepainting,I do notmerelyseesuch linesand colours.I understand them in terms of their role as imitating their subject'attributes,as "curly," "blonde", etc.In their aggregate such charac-teristics- "attributesof imitation"- makeus recollectthe model.

Now in the original the attributes of imitation inhere in a un ity, thesubjectherself.To make th e image,the artist analysesand divides,

as an aquiline nose is resolved into straight lines, blonde hair into ashade of yellow,etc. The image has,in comparisonwith the model,only a quasi-unity. Plotinus sees here avital connexion between thedivisionin the "day and sail" arg um en t, which we discussed above, andthe reduction of attributes of imitation to attributes of similarity inthe copy-likeness argum en tof the Parmenides.

In the"dayand sail" argum ent,the failureto seeFormasimmaterialresults in its division,in the corruptionof its unity. In the "copy-

likeness"argum ent, the confusion between likeness as merely the sym-metrical relationof similarityand themore pertinent asymmetricalrelation of imitation introducesinfinite regress. The "day and sail"argumentand the"copy-likeness" argumentmayappear to be sepa-rate and distinct,the firstaddressingthe questionof unityand thesecond the question of likeness. Yet Plotinus sees the question of un iin the "copy-likeness" argumentas well as in the"day and sail" ar-gument.

If we behold the Form or model in itself, without referencetoanythingoutsideitself,or in itsintrinsic character, thenit is experi-enced as a unity in which eachpart is joined to the wholeby theinteriorityof its ownrelations. When(as in strictly representationalart)weanalysethe Formor modelsothatwe see itratheras a disparatecollectionof discrete parts,we sunder its unity. As the individualcharacteristicsare separatedout from the unityof the original,theoriginal is, in a sense, divided . O f course, the original is not itse

divided.Yet itbecomes dividedin thesense thatits imageis a dividedversion of itself analysed as a multiplicity of attributes the unity owhichmay only properly be understoodwith reference to the model.

The "dayand sail" argument seemsto beontologicalin character,the "copy-likeness" argum entto beepistemological.Yet inseeing thelatter argumentto be anexplicationof the former, Plotinus marries


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ontology and epistemology. For example, when Soul divides the unityof Intellect into discrete attributes that belie the unity of the original,

it constitutes itself and the world as such a spurious and divided unity.It substitutes, as it were, the sail for the day, the material for theimmaterial, the discrete and multiple attributes of its analysis for theprimal unity that they represent.

Thus the image is a reduction to multiplicity of the unity of theoriginal: "Everything in the intelligible world is substance. Why thenis everything in the sensible world not substance too? In the intelligibleall is substance because all things are one, but here, because the images

are separated, one thing is one thing and another is another" (2.6[17]. 1.710).Plotinus argues further:

Realitythere, when it possesses an individualcharacteristic of substance, isnot qualitative,but when the process of rational thinkingseparates the dis-tinctiveindividualityin these realities, nottaking it awayfrom the intelligibleworldbut rather grasping it and producing something else, it produces thequalitativeas akindof part of substance,grasping whatappears on thesurface

of the reality. (2.6 [17].3.10-20)

The mind analyses intelligible substance into discrete qualities andthus divides it and creates the sensible world as its quasi-unitary image.

In 6.3 [44]. 15 Plotinus argues that the sensible world as a wholebears an adjectival relationship to the intelligible world which standsas substance to the sensible world as quality. Thus Man in the intel-ligibleworld is described by man in thesensible world. This is illus-

trated by the relation of Socrates and his portrait. The portrait sharesattributes of similarity with Socrates. Although everything in the por-trait describes Socrates, it is not him. The One is said (5.3 [49]. 15.31-32 ) to have the attributes of Intellect, but in such a way that they arenot discrete; these are, however, discrete in Intellect. 34

The hypostasis of Intellect, as we have seen, constitutes itself in theact of attempting to divide the One. We may now understand thatthisdivision is ineluctably connected with an act of representation and

reduction. Intellect resolves attributes which inhere in unity in theOne into a plurality of characteristics that in their aggregate presentan image of the One. In the act of analysing the One into attributes

34. Cf. Schroeder, "The Platonic Parmenides,"67-68.


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Form i5

of similarity, Intellect does not divide the One itself. Rather Intellectconstitutes itself as an image in manyness of the One, an image made

up of many parts.35

The One, of course, remains undivided and itscharacter as pattern remains intact and it is notconfused with itsimage. Thus the "day and sail" and the "copy-likeness" arguments aremet. These arguments are curiously successful. Intellect, in dividingthe One and reducing it to the status of its image, whichis Intellectitself,executes the steps of these arguments performatively in an actof self-constitution. In so far as we areco-participants with Intellectand then Soul in the creation of the universe, we also participate in

the cosmic rehearsal of these arguments. Our acceptance of thesearguments as philosophers reflects the fall of the Soul and with it ofour ownsouls.

An analogous relationship holds between Intellect and the Soul. 36

Soul creates a series of images as it descends "deceived by likeness" 37

to theworld of sense. We mayrecall that the copy-likeness argumentof the Parmenidesleads to infiniteregress, an endless multiplicationof Forms. The Soul, in its restless analysis and division of Form,

produces ever new Forms, but Forms which are inferior, not superiorto the analysandum. Man in thesensible world is the last product ofSoul'ssequential analysisof theForm of M a n :"Man in theintelligibleworld is manbeforeall men. H e shines forth uponthe secondmanand the second man shines forth upon the third" (6.7 [38].6.11-13). 3

Both the "day and sail" argument, with its account of participation,and the"copy-likeness" arg um ent,with itsconcernwith likeness,pro-ceed from a myopic interest in theForm only as cause and hence are

unsuccessful.For Plotinus the Platonic understanding of the Form asintrinsicallyvaluable object of ecstatic vision is not a poetic ornamentto be setaside from Form ascause or explanation. W emay, in Plotinus'reception of the Platonic theory of Forms, distinguish between the

35. In 5.3 [491.13.30 31,Intellect is said to have manyness as an image in relationto an archetype.

36.Soul,

animage

ofIntellect, looks toward Intellect

andthus

becomes animageof Intellect, just as Intellect looks toward the One that it may be Intellect, 5.1 [101.6.46-

48.37. 4.6 [411.3.9.38. My translation. Perhaps this is a trace of the "Third Man" argument of Plato's

Parmenides 13168-132^ which Fielder, "A Plotinian View," 339, claims is not foundin Plotinus; cf. Schroeder, "The Platonic Parmenides,"71.


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tw o moments of use and enjoyment. When we speak of the Form ascause or explanation, we are thinking of it in terms of use. When we

address it as anintrinsically valuable object of intellective or spiritualvision,we areconsidering it in respect of enjoyment. In this scheme,enjoymenthas priority over use. Indeed use may be seen as the cor-ruption of enjoyment. 39So to argue about Form only in terms of useis to engage in a self-defeating project, as the above has shown.

We have seen that Plotinus, by contrast, does not allow the Formto become sundered in its relationship to particulars. He is equallycarefulthat it should not lose its unity and identity through its relations

with other Forms. Thus Justice is beautiful, and Beauty is just, butnot in such a way that a part of justice is assigned to beauty or viceversa. Each Form contains all the other Forms in the interiority of itsown relations, i.e., all relations in Intellect are internal. 40 Thus "Eachthere has everything in itselfand sees all things in every other, so thatall are everywhere and each and every one is all and theglory isunbounded; for each of them is great, because even the small is great;the sunthere is all thestars, and each star is the sun and all theothers"

(5.8 [31].4.610).We can see that here too the Form of Largenessdoes not become divided, as in the "day and sail" argument of thePlato's Parmenides.Thus even the small is great and does not dividethe greatness of the intelligible world.

W e use the Form as a means of explaining the character of theparticulars that either participate in it or imitate it. Yet after we haveused the Form as an instrument of explanation, we are left withotherquestions when we consider the Form, not just as a pattern or model

posited for the sake of explanation, but in its intrinsic character. Inhis interpretation of Plato's Timaeus,Plotinus pursues such a line ofenquiry.Plotinus, in an interpretation of Plato's Timaeus45d-e, wherethe mortal body is equipped with vision,argues that men and othercreatures are provided with the senses that they might be saved from

39. On the Plotinian response to the aporedc arguments addressed to the PlatonicTheory of Forms in the Platonic Parmenides,cf. further Fielder, "Plotinus' CopyTheory," "Plotinus' Reply," "A Plotinian view."Where my position is epistemological,or rather, hermeneutical, Fielder is narrowly ontological, but see Fielder, "Plotinus'Copy Theory," 6: "In his treatment of the likeness of eikon to Form Plotinus is stronglyinfluencedby his personal experience of the intelligible world."

40. Cf. 5.5 [321.1.28-43; 5.8 [311.3.30-4.11; 5-9 [51-8-3-7 and Trouillard, "TheLogic of Attribution," for an excellent discussion of this doctrine.


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Form i7

destruction (6.7[s8].i.i-5). 41 However,if the senses arerequired here for safety,do they then belong to Form which wou ld

scarcely require such immunity?In the sensible world, thingsareseparatedout insucha waythatwedissociatefact and cause. Aristotleargues thatwemust knowthe factof athing's existence beforewe may knowits reason ,42 H ow ever, despite this cognitivepriority,argues Aristotle, it can happen that we infact know boththat something existsand why itexistsin thesame mom entof enquiry.For example, an eclipse is the obstruction of the moon by the earthH ere definitionof whatan eclipseis and anexplanationof why it is

coincide.43

For P lotinus there is no p lann ing of theorder of the sensible worldon the part of the Demiurge or hischildren, 44 as if the intelligibleworldwerea blueprintfor creation draftedby theoperationsof dis-cursivethought.Thus: "How couldthe alone, the one, the simplecontainin explicationthe 'this, so that we may nothave that' and 'itwas intending this, if that could notbe' and 'the usefulappeared andbecamesalvific " (6.7 [38].!.39-42). 45 In the intelligible

world, "that"and "why" coalesce.In thesensible world, whenwe askthe question "Whydoes man have sight?",we separate "man" and"sight." In the intelligible world,fact and reasonnecessarilycoincide.Thus by reference to the latter we see, in thecaseboth of man and his sight, that these exist not for some externareason (suchas safety)but forcompleteness (6.7[38].2.111).

Plotinusoffers Aristotle's exampleof an eclipseto show thatthecoalescenceof factand reasonmay beobservedin thesensibleworld. 46

Plotinusasks fu rth er: "W hy should therebe eyes there?That theremight be all. A nd why eyebrows?That there migh t be all. For indeedif you wouldsay 'for the sakeof safety ' you would meanthat it is anindw elling protectionof essence; this [cause] wouldbe

41. For further aspects of the dependence of this passage on the Timaeus see HBT3 b 481-2.

42 .Posterior Analytics

11.8.9331721.43. Posterior Analytics11.8.9332968.44. Plotinus refersto "God or some god" (6.7 [38].!.!) because, in Plato Timaeus

4265 ff. the Demiurge leaves the creation of the mortal bodies to his children.45. My translation.46. 6.7 [38].2.11-12; on Plotinus' use of these passages from AristotlePosteriorAn-

alytics here see Mat te r,Einfluss des "Timaeus,"115-16.


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i8 Form and Transformation

something contributing [to essence]. Thus essence is prior to causeand cause is a part of essence" (6.7 [38].3.14-18). 47 Thus the causeor reason inherent in Form is the reason for its being simply what itis . Indeed, the possibility that fact and reason could be disjoinedresults from the divisive descent from the world of Form. Plotinusinvests ott>Tr)piano t only with the meaning o f "safety" but with themore positive sense of "salvation."

Plot inus asks: "What would horns be there [i.e., in the intelligibleworld] fordefense? Indeed they serve toward the self-sufficiencyaso f an animal and perfection" (6.7 [38]. 10. i a ) .4 8 If we were to ask a

child drawing a picture of an ox, "Why does the ox have horns?" , thechild would doubtless reply, "Because it is an ox," not "For defense."Plotinus would be on the side of the child. 49

The absorption of cause into essence, of "why" into "that," againdemonstrates that Form is o f intrinsic value and as such is the object,rather than the instrument, of our quest. Let us return for the momentto the example of the ox. We say that the ox in the sensible worldhas horns for defense. In the intelligible world, it has horns for the

sake of completeness. In the second chapter we shall see that Formand particular are ends of a continuum. We may expect that if I

47 . My translation. In the Timaeus45d7~8, Plato argues that the eyelid w as createdas the safeguard (o(OTT]pia)of sight. While the reference is to eyelids rather thaneyes and eyebrows, it is difficult to deny that Plotinus has this passage in mind.H B T 3 b 485 compares Aristotle's De partibus animalium ii.658^4 15: at 6 f yp \ ) $Kodcu

48. Mytranslation.49. Cf. Hadot, "Structure et Themes," especially 646-50. Hadot prefaces (625) his

excel lentstudy of 6.7 [38] with th e fo l lowingquotat ions from Angelus Silesius:

Die Rose, welche hier dein aussres Auge siehtDie hat von Ewigkeit in Gott also gebliiht.

(CherubinischerWandersmann,SamtlichePoetischeWerke, vol. i, poem 108; I quote theseverses here as they are produced in Helm's edition).

Die Ros' ist ohn warum; sie bliihet, weil sie bliihet,Sie acht nicht ihrer selbst, fragt nicht ob man siesiehet.

(ibid. vol. i, poem 289).It is diff icult to imagine that Hadot has not Heidegger's Satz vomGrund in mind here

(see Heidegger, Satz vom Grund, 63-75 on tr i e meaning of these verses).


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Form i g

co ntemplate an o x in thesensible world in terms o f enjoyment ,ratherthan merely o f use, I shall no t only better appreciate the animal but

shall begin m yjourney toward the vision o f Form.Plotinus is careful to protect Form against the loss o f unity andidentity. It is not to be divided among the particulars. It is also notto be divided o r parcelled o ut among the other Forms. As we haveseen, each Form in Intellect contains all the other Forms in the in-feriori ty of its ownrelations, so that, if Justice is beautiful, it is notthe case that a part of Beauty is attached to Justice.

This way of looking at things m ay also be applied to the world o f

particulars. T he particular may, in its uses o r relationships, be plun-dered of its unity and identity. If the ox hashorns only to defenditself against other animals, o r vision only to keep it from bumpinginto things, then the attributes of horns and vision are divided ordistributed among these external purposes. If we look at the oxwiththe eyes of an artist whose goal transcends mere representation, butis some imitation no t based o n analytical division, we may seethat ithas these attributes in order to be itself.This is precisely what Plotinus

says of the Form.If we look at the particular in its relation to the Form, restrictingthe role of the Form to causation, we mayalso rob the particular o funity and identity. Thus we m ay saythat the ox is ox by itspartici-pation in Oxness. For the purpose o f this claim,my ox is now one oxamong other oxen. The ground of this line of questioning is com-parison with other oxen, rather than investigation of the universe o fpossible discourse about this ox. The same limitation would followon

use o f the language o f likeness. T he ascent to the enjoyment o f Formwould no t arise f rom this act of discursive comparison. It belongsrather to my openness to the self-manifestationof the particular inits unity, identity, and uniqueness.

Plo tinus, in histreatise On Destiny,argues that the human soul, freeo f the body, is cut loose f rom the cosmic web ofdestiny and causation( K O O | i i K f j gaitiag e^co,3.1 [3].8.9-11). Even as the oxbecomes free tobe that very ox for uswhen w e consider it in its intrinsic value, so are

we first free when w e in soconsidering it stand outside that order o fthings which would strip us of our independent worth. We may de-duce from this argument that "body" (ocb^ia) refers not just to theindividualtenement o f clay but also to our servile entrapment in thetoils of fate and providence which would scatter us among their var-ious uses and purposes consequent upon embodiment. The assertion


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2 o Form and Transformation

of the soul's freedom from body would then be a liberation from suchheteronomous cosmic deployment of our gifts and resources. Thatfreedom in turn allows us to become co-determinants in the order ofthe cosmos (lines 17-20). We are invited to think that the freedomof the human soul may be developed by an appropriate way of lookingat the particular in its intrinsic value.

Plotinus argues 50 against the Stoic position that beauty arises fromproportion. 51 If that were so, he maintains, then simple things, suchas lightning in the night sky, or stars, or gold, would not be beautiful.Where is there proportion or composition in these things? Moreover,

incomposite things, beauty does not arise from proportion alone.

Thus in a musical composition each separate sound may in itself bebeautiful. "Sometimes," says Plotinus, "art gives beauty to a wholehouse with its parts, and sometimes nature gives beauty to a singlestone." 52

It is not so much that the Form of Beauty is offered as a genericexplanation for the many instances of beauty. Rather Plotinus stressesthe actual participation in Beauty by any beautiful object. Any man-

ifestationof beauty, whether it occurs in musical or architectural com-

position or in the simplicity of a sound or a stone, invites us, on eachoccasion, to seek its ground in the Form of Beauty.

Beautyis grounded only in Beauty itself. Thus "When, though thesame good proportion is there all the time, the same face appearsbeautifuland sometimes does not, surely we must say that being beau-tiful is something else over and above good proportion, and goodproportion is beautiful because of something else" (1.6 [i]-i-37-

40).5

3 Beauty may at one time manifest itself in something of constantarrangement or proportions, at another time not. This fact demon-strates that we are not merely positing the Form of Beauty to explainthe occurrence of things which (on the basis of some criterion otherthan the Form, viz. proportion) have already been agreed to be beau-tiful. It is rather the case that the mystery of any manifestation of

50. 1.6 [ i ] . i .51. Cf.SV FIII 278 (= Stobaeus Ed. i i .62.i5),especially lines 31-44 in SVF; S V F

01.279 ( =Cicero TusculanDisputationsiv.13.30-31), especially4.13.31; cf. St A ugu stineD e CivitateD eixxii . ig;cf. H B TIb 369; Armstrong trans, i. 6 [i].i, p. 234note i.

52 . 1.6 [i].2.25-27.53. Cf. 6.7 [38].22.22-24; 27-28.


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Form 2i

Beautycan only be understood by an appeal to the Form of Beauty.We shall later see that this appeal is existential. 54

If wethink

of abeautiful face

as onethat

fulfillscertain established

aesthetic norms such as proportion, we may risk ignoring the contri-bution of facial expression the beauty of which may not be soana-lysable.Plotinus may, on the argument we have been examining,provide us with the first theory of facial expression. It is relevant tonote that he, unlike Plato, regards the faceas aunity.In theProtagorasof Plato, it is asked whether virtue is one, like gold, or many, as aface? 55 As we think of a face primarily in terms of expression, i.e.,

not merely as ajumble of parts, eyes, nose, mouth, etc., this compar-ison strikes us as strange. Discussing whether the object of perceptionis one or many, Plotinus asks us to assume that it is one, like a face. 56

Thus, unlike Plato, he appeals to theface as united by asingle expres-sion at a time. The example of the face that is sometimes beautiful,at other times not, despite its proportions, also invokes the Plotiniantheory of expression. Beauty, as elusive as a smile, evades genericclassification.It may yet summon us to the ground of all beauty.

Plotinus' view of perspective affords valuable insight into his de-fense of the intrinsic value of the particular as an object of contem-plation. Plotinus asks 57 why it is that distant objects appear to besmaller?What the eye perceives is colour primarily and size onlyincidentally. 58 In the case of distant objects, blurring in colour isaccompanied by diminution in size. When we see anobject up close,we can, in the presence of all of its details and its distinct colours,

54. Anton,"Plotinus'Refutationof Beautyas Symmetry,"maintainsthat Plotinus'argumentsagainst symmetryas the ground of beautyare notaltogether convincing.The statement(1.6 [ i ] ,1 .28-29)tnat tne partsmust themselvesbe beautifulfor thereto be beauty in thewholemay be toodogmatic. Plotinushimselfrejects thisargumentin 3.2 [47].17.64-74. B utas Armstrong, "Beauty and theDiscovery of Divinity,"157,remarks, "if the implicitcontrast is not simplybetween 'proportion' and 'form' butbetweenproportion and colour considered abstractly as the conformity of a lifelessthingto certain aesthetic rules," then the argument maymake good sense. The thrustof the argument is not tooffer an "atomic" (Anton)as opposed to a "symmetrical"theoryof beauty,but toargue aporeticallythat there is noaesthetic theory whichwilloffer an exhaustiveexplanationof beauty.

55- 32Qd5-56. Cf. 4.7[2].6.19-20 and Schaerer ap. Henry, "Unecomparaison,"445.57. 2.8 [ 35 ].i.58. Cf.Armstrong translation, introductory note, 209.


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2 2 Form and Transformation

judge its true size. When it is faroff, we know that it iscoloured, butnot how large a space is coloured. An example of how to measure

sizeis provided by a landscape of many and varied objects. The extent

of the whole may be measured from the individual parts. This wayof looking at size and distance implies a rejection of geometrical per-spective.

This viewof perspective rests upon a fundamental tenet of Plotinianoptics. Plotinus denies that the organ of vision receives an impressionof the object seen. The image is rather located in the object seen. 59Sight is not a passive affectionproceeding from the object to the eye,that is thereby affected, but an act on our part directed towards theobject. 60

The eye, itself luminous, directs its light to meet with the light andcolours (themselves lights)of its object of perception and declares thatwhat is below light is dark and material. 61 We may deduce that, forPlotinus, the eye would abolish darkness and, with it, differences inluminous emphasis which would describe spatial differentiation andcreate perspective. The object is rendered transparent by a visionthat

isitself transparent.W emay recall that, in Intellect, each Form contains the other Forms

in the inferiorityof its own relations. Each of these Forms is itself alsoan intellect. Thus:

They see all things,not those to whichcoming to be, but those to whichrealbeingbelongs, and they see themselvesin other things; for allthingsthereare transparent, andthere is nothingdark or opaque;everythingand all

thingsare clear to theinmostpart

to everything;for light is transparenttolight. Eachthere has everythingin itself and sees all things in every other,so that all are everywhereand each and every one is all and theglory isunbounded.(5.8 [3i].4-38)

This passage offers a model from the intelligible world of how (inattenuation and distance) vision takes place in the world of sense.Those who seek beauty must not pose it as an external object of vision,

but merge their identitywith it.62

What kind of vision could this be?

59- 4-6I411-1-S7-41-60. 4.6 [41].2.l-g.

61. 2.4 [i2].5.6-i3-62 . 5.8 [311.10.35-44.


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Form 2 3

Plotinus answers: "If he sees it as something different, he is not yetin beauty, but he is in it most perfectly when he becomes it. If thereforesight is of something external we must not have sight, or only thatwhichis identical with its object. This is a sort of intimate understand-ing and perception of a self which is careful not to depart from itselfby wanting to perceive too much" (5.8 [31]. 11.20-24). Again, theobjectis regarded from the perspective not of the percipient but ofthe thing seen.

The art historian Andre Grabar finds in these passages a deepaffinitywiththe plastic art of late antiquity. 63 There is in that traditiona tendency to resist perspective. Everything is reduced to one planesurfacein which each object may be seen (on Plotinus' theory) in itstrue size and detail. There is even sometimes a deliberate reversal ofperspective, as if to emphasize the point. Often the objects are de-picted as if irradiated from one in the centre, so that they are seennot in relation to the percipient but in relation to the central object.The object's luminosity is thereby emphasized as if to stress its self-manifestation.

Plotinian optics makes each particular object of vision somethingof intrinsic value. It does not derive its worth simply as a function ofmy perspective on the universe. Nor is it ever absorbed into or plun-dered of its unity and identity by other things. Its relationship is to awhole of which the percipient himself is a sentient part rather thanan objective or alien observer. We have said that Form is for Plotinusan intrinsically valuable object of spiritual or intellective vision. Wemay now also see that it is a subject of such experience. Indeed, inIntellect, our distinction between subject and object breaks down. ForPlotinus all things contemplate. 64 Thus Plotinus does not pursue thechimera of objectivityin the sensible world either. The particular, likethe Form of which it is an icon, is, both as seer and as seen, of intrinsicvalue.

63. Grabar, "Plotin et les origines," 15-29.64. 3.8 [301.5.30.


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I I

Light

P L O T I N U SB O R R O W Smany figuresfrom sensible experience to describethe intelligible world, most of which need considerable qualificationto avoid suggesting the conflation of intelligible with sensible reality.For example, Plotinus compares the presence of intelligible reality to

the sensible world to theforce exerted by ahand upon a plank.*

Thehand exerts this power without being divided among the various partsof the plank. In this way the"day and sail" argument of Plato's Par-menidesis to beovercome.2 Form is not, by itspresence, divided amongthe particulars. It is to theforce exerted by thehand, not to thehanditself,that comparison is made. The hand itself, as it is corporeal andhence divisible, must be figurativelyqualifiedas "incorporeal" if it isto beusefulas an image of presence. Plotinus proceeds to qualifythis

imageryby juxtaposing imagery of the presence of light. The sourceof light has light not qua body, but qua luminous body, for light isincorporeal. 3

The most adequate of all thesensible figuresemployed byPlotinusto describe intelligible reality is light. Plotinus believes that sensiblelight is incorporeal. For this reason, unlike the hand, it needs nofurtherqualificationto reveal its incorporeality. It already shares in-corporealitywithForm. Light mayalso be whollypresent to aplurality

of objects without being divided among them.Light isalso in animmediate, dynamic, and continuous relationship

1 . 6 . 4 [ 2 2 ] . 7 .2. 13064-13167.

3. For an examination of this passage in the light of the "day and sail" argumentof the Parmenides,see Schroeder, "The Platonic Parmenides,"52-53.


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Light 2 5

with its source. The source has only to be and to remain what it is forlight to proceed from it. In theprevious chapter, we sawthat Form

is for Plotinus an intrinsically valuable object of intellective and spir-itual vision and enjoyment, apart from its uses fo r causation andexplanation. However, Plotinus is notcontent with a disjunction be-tweenForm as an intrinsically valuable object of intellective and spir-itualvision and enjoyment, and as acause or explanation. H ewishesto build the intrinsic value of the Form, apart from use and expla-nation, into the structure of creation itself. The sensible world shouldbe utterly dependent upon the intelligible world for its existence, with

no need for mediation between them. Thus the Form does not deriveits value from its being a pattern on thebasis of which other thingsare made or understood. The reverse is true. It is by being what it isin its intrinsic nature, without mediation, that it both creates andexplains all that proceeds from it as its image. The questions of itsbeing and of itsrelationship to theworld willnot ultimately admit ofseparation.

The image of light allowsPlotinus to accomplish this purpose, since

for him light is an effect of the source alone, while, and indeed be-cause, the source remains what it is in undiminished giving. Reflectionfulfillsthe conditions of illumination. A luminous object may, as sourceof light and reflection, appear in a mirror. The image in the mirroris the effect only of the source. When the subject of thereflectionretires, the mirror image must vanish, for itdepends for itsexistenceon the source alone. On the other hand, the withdrawal of the re-flectivesurface does not diminish the luminosity of the source; it

continuesto project the image, whether or not there is a surface onwhichit may appear.Reflection,as a special case of illumination, makes a vital contri-

bution to its figurativeuses. If the luminous source is pure light, itprojects an image of itself - light - that is, like itself, luminous (al-though in lesser degree or intensity). Reflection of light, colour, andshape yields a more complex image. That rich image differsfrom thekind that we find inartistic representation, for the artistic image is

not onticallydependent upon its subject in the same way as is thereflected image. Moreover, the characteristics of the luminous originalare, in reflection, not merely represented in the mirror (as the char-acteristics of the original are on the canvas), but truly present.

When an author makes significant use ofsomething in figurativelanguage, it issurely worthwhile to examine what he understands by


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that thing as it is in itself, apart from its illustrative uses. It must thenbe legitimate to explore the Plotinian physics of light. The text below

deals with this and also yields abundant insight into the Plotinianphysics of reflection, since Plotinus sees reflection as an instance ofillumination. Reflection (as in a mirror) is, like illumination, usedfiguratively by Plotinus. Let us now return to the text which we con-sidered at the beginning of the first chapter, 4.5 [29]. 7. 4

Plotinus says of light:

The light from luminous bodies, therefore,is theexternalactivity

of a luminous body; but the light in bodies of this kind, bodies, that is, thaare p rimarily and originally of this kind, is altogether substance, corresponing to the form of theprimarily luminous body. Whena body of this kindtogetherwith its matter enters intoa mixture,it gives colour;but theactivityby itselfdoes not givecolour, but only,so tospeak, tintsthe surface, sinceitbelongs to something else and is, one might say,dependenton it, and whatseparates itself from this something else separates itself from itsactivity.B utone m us t consider light as altogether incorporeal, even if it belongs to a bod

Therefore"it hasgone away" or "it is present" arenotusedof it intheirproper sense,but in adifferent way,and itsreal existenceis an activity.For the image in a mirror must also be called anactivity:thatwhichis reflectedin itactson whatiscapableof beingaffected withoutflowingintoit; but if the object reflected isthere the reflection too appearsin the mirror and itexistsas an image of a coloured surface shapedin aparticular way; and if the object goesaway the mirror-surface nolonger has whatit had before, whenthe object seenin it offered itselfto it

for its activity.(4.5 [29J.7.33-49)5

We may first observe that light is, for Plotinus, incorporeal, even ifit proceeds from a bodily source. In accepting the incorporeality oflight, Plotinus agrees with Aristotle who says of light in the De Animathat it is "neither fire nor corporeal at all, nor an emanation from anybody (for it would in that case be a kind of body), but the presence

of fire or something of that nature in the transparent." 6

It is unclear what Aristotle understands here by "presence." TheA *

4. p. 3.5. My translation.6. ii.7.4i8bg-io.


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Light 27

istotelian Alexander of Aphrodisias, who was read in Plotinus' sem-inar, 7 seeks to clarify this.

Colourcomes about in the illumined and in light,just as light in thetrans-parent, not like some emanation, nor because matter or the transparent re-ceive the light or the colour of light. If the sources of these are removed,immediatelycolour is gone from the transparent (if thesources whichcolourlightdepart and light is also gone from the transparent (if thatwhich illuminesit is notpresent Rather there is change from both[bothsources of colour and light and coloured or illuminedobjects] in those

things [i.e., light in the case of colour and the transparent in the case of light]that receive them [i.e., colour and light] in accordance withpresence and thecharacter of their relation as is thecase ofobjects that are seen in mirrors. As I have said, the illumined aretransparentin actuality.When there is something in them whichis capableof being transparent and this is in actuality,then they are eminendy and inact transparent, when they receive their perfection and their native form quatransparent from the light. For light is the act and perfection of the trans-

parent qua transparent. This light comes about in the transparent by thepresence of fire or thedivine body. For light comes about in accordance withthe relation of that whichis able to illumineto those objects whichare capableof being illumined. Forlight is not abody. (D eAnima42.1943.)8

Clearly Alexander is faithful to Aristotle in his insistence that lightis not corporeal. Plotinus certainly agrees on this point but correctsAlexander in his account of the genesis of illumination. For Alex-

ander, illumination is an artifact of the spatial relation or juxtapositionof the source of light and the illuminated object. When the ingredientsof illumination depart or are no longer present

the illumination ceases. He offers the example of reflectionin a mirror. When the subject of the reflection and the mirror arejuxtaposed, then reflection takes place. When they are removed fromeach other, reflection ceases.

Where Alexander (following Aristotle) sees light as the actualization

of the diaphanous medium,9

Plotinus sees it as the activity of the

7. Porphyry Vita Plotini 14.13.8. Ed. IBruns, AlexandriAphrodisiensispraeter commentariascripta minora: deAnima

liber cumMantissa. (SupplementumAristotelicumii.i [Berlin 1887]). M ytranslation.9. D e Anima i i .7-4i8bg10.


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source of illumination directed externally. Plotinus regards the lan-guage of spatiotemporal presence and departure as, strictlyspeaking,

inappropriate to the discussion of light, whichis incorporeal. He thusconfinesthe use of the verb "be present" and "depart"to the source. 10

Plotinus and Alexander also differ over the role played by thesource of illumination. For Alexander, the source of light is a causethat can produce illumination only in concert with the object to beilluminated. For Plotinus, the source of light is the unique cause ofillumination. This difference recurs in their accounts of reflection. 11

We saw, at the beginning of the first chapter, that Plotinus uses themetaphysical example of the procession of soul from soul to illustratethe physics of light. Let us re-examine this comparison. Plotinus hasjust argued that the source of light is on its own the cause of illumi-nation. If the luminous subject is withdrawn from the mirror, itsreflection will not appear. Now Plotinus appeals to his model: "Butwith soul also, in so far as it is an activity of another prior soul, aslong as the higher soul abides so does the dependent

activity"(4.5 [29] .7 .4951).la

The word "abide" is obviouslyappropriate to illumination. 13 As long as the source of light abides,the light will proceed from that source in undiminished giving.

"Abiding" is employed to describe how the One, in its productionof Intellect, remains unchanged:

When,therefore,the Intelligible"abides in its own way oflife,"that whichcomes intobeingdoes come intobeing from it, but from it as it

abides unchanged.Since,therefore,it abidesas Intelligible,whatcomes intobeingdoes so asthinking:and sinceit isthinkingand thinksthat from whichit came- for it has nothingelse- it becomes Intellect,likeanother intelligibleand like that Principle,a representation and imageof it. B uthow, whenthatabidesunchanged,does Intellectcome into being?In each and everything

10. 4.5 [291.7.42.

11. O n illuminationand reflectionAlexanderand Plotinus,seeSchroeder, "Analogyof the ActiveIntellect to Light" and "Light and theActiveIntellect inAlexanderandPlotinus;"furtherdiscussionof illumination inAlexanderand Plotinuswillbe foundin Schroeder and Todd, TwoGreek AristotelianCommentators,1419.

12 . Trans. Armstrong (slightly modifiedto render jiveiv"abide," rather than "re-main").

13. Cf. 4.3 [271.17.18.


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Light 2 9

there is anactivitywhichbelongs to substance and onewhichgoes out fromsubstance andthat

whichbelongs

tosubstance

is theactive

actuality whichiseach particular

thing, and theother activityderives from that firstone, andmustineverythingbe a consequence of it,different from the thing itself:as in firethere is aheatwhichis thecontent of itssubstance, and another whichcomes into beingfrom that primary heat whenfire exercises the activity whichis native to itssubstancein abiding unchanged as fire. So it isalso in thehigher world; andmuch more so there, while the Principle"abides in its ownproper way oflife,"the activitygenerated from the perfectionin it and itscoexistentactivity

acquiressubstantialexperience, sinceit comes from a great power ,the greatest indeed of all, and arrivesat being and substance. (5.4 [7] .2 .22-37)

As the flame, just by being what it is, issues in heat, so does theOne, simply by being what it is, give rise to Intellect and all of itssequents. Indeed this pattern is extended universally as Plotinus ar-gues that in each and every thing that is there is one activity that

inheres in its substance and another that proceeds from its substance.Obviously, the source of light and light would provide the paradigm.The verb "abide" which is used of the One in this passage,may also be used of the source of light in illumination, as we haveseen. This verb well illustrates the intransitive activity of the sourcethat, while remaining or abiding what it is, gives rise to a transitiveactivitythat proceeds from it.

"Abiding" may then appropriately describe the intransitive activity

of the source of light. The use of the term in this passage owes aliterary debt to Plato's Timaeus.Plotinus says that the One "abides" aswhat it is in its act of creation, even as the flame abides or remainswhat it is and, simply by being what it is, produces heat. In the TimaeusPlato says that the Demiurge "abided in his own way of life"

after his creation of soul and beforehe left the creation of mortal bodies to his children. 14 Plato proceedsto saythat, while the Demiurge was"abiding" , his children

thought to obey their father. Plotinus resumes this use of the participleas he describes the abiding of the One (lines 21-22):("when- the Intelligible [the One as intelligible

14. 4265-6.


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object]'abides in its own proper way of life'").The phrase is resumedat lines 3334:"While the Principle 'abides in its own proper way oflife.'"The significance of this appeal to the authority of Plato will bediscussed later.

The procession of heat from a flame is offered as a specific exampleof a general principle that in everything that is there is both an in-transitiveactivityand a transitive activitythat proceeds from it and isdependent upon it. It is apparent that the procession of light from aluminous source, heat from flame, and Intellect from the One allexemplifythis principle. To understand this principle more clearly,it is helpful to review an aspect of Plotinus' doctrine of potency andact. Among the meanings of potency (dunamis)Aristotle includes boththe power to act and the capacity to be acted upon/s Plotinus doesuse this term in the latter sense. 16 It is, however, the sense of powerto act that is relevant to the present discussion. 17

Plotinus argues that a dunamis in the sense of power to act willproduce from itself an activity(energeia).Thus the dunamisof courage

produces the activity(energeia) of courageous behaviour18 It is in this active sense of dunamisthat the One is said

to be the might or power that creates all things. Plotinus explains:"The One is potency of all things But in whatway is it the potency? Not in the way in which matter is said to be inpotency, because it receives: for matter is passive; but this [material]way of being a potency is at the opposite extreme to making" (5.3[49]. 15.32-35). The creation is the activity produced from thatpower. 19

Enneads6.4 [22] and 6.5 [23], entitled "The Presence of Being Every-where," are addressed to the problem of how intelligible reality maybe present to the sensible world without corruption of its unity andidentity. In these writings, Plotinus confronts the kinds of objectionsraised by Parmenides in the introduction to Plato's Parmenides.Plo-tinus considers that intelligible reality might be present to the sensible

15. Metaphysicsix.i.io46a.16. Cf. 2.5 [25].1.17-20 and Buchner, PlotinsMoglichkeitslehre,17-20.17. On the Plotinian uses of the Aristotelian doctrine of act and potency, see further

De Gandillac, "Plotin et la 'Mtaphysique' d'Aristote."18. 2.5 [25].2.33-36. Plotinus may be influenced in this by the Stoic use of dunamis

and by Zeno's argument that a quality is the cause of a predicate: See Schroeder,"Representation and Reflection,"44.

19- 5-3 UQl^S-S*-


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Light 31

world without sacrifice of itsunity and identity if it were present bymeans of its powers (dunameis),and speaks of inferior powers pro-

ceeding from higher powersgrounded in the

substanceof the

intel-ligible world. 20

We may see in this procession the same kind of reasoning that weexaminedin 5.4[7].2.There we sawthat there is an activity(energeia)that inheres in substance and another activity that proceeds fromsubstance.W ehave also heard Plotinus speak of how anactivity(ener-geia) may proceed from a potency or power (dunamis). It isobviousthat, where dunamisis understood in itsactive sense, the words dunamis

and energeia are interchangeable.The powers that proceed from the intelligible to the sensible worldmustthen be grounded in the substance of the intelligible world andthat substance must not be diminished by their procession. Plotinusenunciatesthe principle: "Just as it is notpossible to have substancewithoutpower, so it is notpossible to have power without substance"(6.4 [22].9.2324).So, as thepowers proceed from the intelligibleworld,even though they may, as "light from light" (6.4 [22] .9 .2627),

bediminished or weakened in comparison withthe powers fromwhichtheyproceed, they are yet yoked to substance in the intelligible world.Plotinus entertains the objection 21 that an image may continue to

exist in the absence of its original. Thus, when the model departs,the portrait remains. In this way the powers which have proceededfrom the intelligible world could be cut offfrom the substance of thatworld,yet the images of the intelligible world in the world of sensecontinue.

To disarm this argument, Plotinus distinguishes between tw okindsof imitation. In the case of the model and the portrait, the portraitmay continue in existence upon th e withdrawal of themodel. How-ever, in the case of the mirror image, the subject as original createsits image. If the original is withdrawn, the image willvanish. Plotinusappeals to the paradigm not of representation but of reflection in hisaccount of the procession of powers from the intelligible world. 22

Plotinusconcludes the chapter bycomparing the procession ofpowers

2 0. 6.4 [22].9and 10.2 1. 6.4 [22].10.2 2 . Plotinus rejects (lines 5-11) the argument that, in the case of a self-portrait, the

modelcreates its ownimage, on thegrounds that it is notqua model, but qua artistthat heperforms th e act.


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from the intelligible world to the undiminished giving of light on thepart of the sun. 23 We have already seen from 4.5 [29].7 that reflection

fulfills the conditions of illumination.There is then a doctrine in Plotinus that, in the case of everythingthat is, there is one intransitive activity or power that is at one withits essence and another transitive activityor power that proceeds fromthe first and yet continues in dynamic continuity with it. 24 This prin-ciple is instantiated, as we have seen, in the case of phenomena in thesensible world: source of light and light, reflection, flame and heat.It is also exemplified in metaphysical instances: the procession of soul

from soul, of Intellect from the One, and the procession of powersfrom the intelligible to the sensible world.We may compare the example of the source of light and light with

other examples drawn from the world of sensible objects. Processionof an inferior from a superior entity is illustrated as well by the ex-amples of cold and snow, scent and flower, 25 the stream and spring,or plant and root. 26 As we have observed from 4.5 [291.7, light isincorporeal for Plotinus. The incorporeality of light constitutes a cru-

cial difference from the other figures borrowed from the sensibleworld. As light is incorporeal, it need not be divided among the objectsto which it is present, for, like the "day" in the "day and sail" argumentsof the Platonic Parmenides,it has no size. 27 Even if the source of lightis corporeal, it is not qua body that it is luminous, but qua luminousbody. 28 Basicallythen we have light from light, a weaker or inferiorlight,from a stronger or superior light. Indeed, in 6.4 [221.9 .2627,the powers descend from the intelligible world as "light from light"

The procession of sensible light from its source istherefore a more adequate illustration of the procession of onemetaphysical entity from another, or of the procession of sensiblerealityfrom an incorporeal and intelligible source, than are the otherfigures of speech borrowed from the world of sense experience.

Light exists in a relation of dynamic continuity with its source. Inthis way too, it is an adequate image of such procession. In so far as

23. 6.4 [22].10.26-30.24. Cf. Schroeder, "Conversion and Consciousness," 191-92.25. 5.1 [io].6-35-7.26. 3.8 [30

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