Franco's Request to the Third Reich for Military Assistance

Franco's Request to the Third Reich for Military AssistanceAuthor(s): Angel Viñas and Carlos Collado SeidelSource: Contemporary European History, Vol. 11, No. 2 (May, 2002), pp. 191-210Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20081828 .

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Franco's Request to the Third

Reich for Military Assistance

ANGEL VI?AS AND CARLOS COLLADO SEIDEL

On the evening of 25 July 1936 Adolf Hitler received in Bayreuth, where he was

attending the Wagner festival, two German citizens who were residents of Spanish Morocco. They were accompanied by a member of the Auslandsorganisation (AO:

foreign organization) of the Nazi party. The two Germans had arrived in Berlin the

previous day in one of the Lufthansa planes (D-APOK) which plied the postal routes of the south Atlantic. The plane had been sequestered by rebellious Spanish

military in the Canary Islands and was pressed into service to fly to Tetuan. One of

the passengers was Adolf P. Langenheim, a 64-year-old mining engineer, who had

spent most of his lifetime in Morocco. The second was Johannes E. F. Bernhardt, a

39-year-old former Army officer in the Great War, and manager of a small trading

company whose activities included the supply of goods to the Spanish military. Within the then minuscule Nazi party in Spanish Morocco (around thirty-five

members) Langenheim was, as the Tetuan local chief, the highest authority. Bernhardt dealt with commercial questions and press relations, but there was more

to him than met the eye. Langenheim and Bernhardt brought a message from

General Francisco Franco to Hitler. Their escort, Wolfgang Kraneck, was the head

of the AO legal department. Franco had begun a military rebellion in the Canary Islands a week earlier and

taken command of the rising in Spanish Morocco, where the Spanish army's crack

troops were deployed. However, many of the Spanish naval ships had remained

loyal to the government. The powerful African army could not easily be transported to southern Spain, where the rebels were

making headway against a weak and

disorganised opposition. Franco's request was predicated upon a long history of contacts between

Germany and some of the military conspirators. The rebel general trod new ground

although he had no reason to believe in the success of Bernhardt and Langenheim, two utterly insignificant members of the Nazi party in forgotten Morocco.

Surprisingly, the F?hrer met Franco's wishes and in so doing contributed to

transforming a failed military coup into a bloody civil war. Franco's stature rose to

unexpected heights.

Contemporary European History, II, 2 (2002), pp. 191-210 ? 2002 Cambridge University Press

DOI:10.1017/S0960777302002011 Printed in the United Kingdom



192 Contemporary European History

General Sanjurjo's old contacts in Germany

The Spanish conspirators aimed at a co-ordinated, rapid and extremely violent

rebellion against the left-liberal Republican government. An improvised uprising under General Jos? Sanjurjo had been easily defeated in August 1932. Subsequently, the Republic had steered, under a succession of conservative governments, a less

intense reformist course. This had lessened military temptations to intervene actively in politics not least because Sanjurjo was exiled to Portugal.

Nonetheless, anti-republican and anti-reformist hardliners had not disarmed

completely. With the electoral success of the Popular Front in February 1936, and

the possibility of a new government resuming long overdue social and economic

reforms, the anti-republican conspiracy found a new ?lan.

The government, aware of the prevailing spirit amongst army hardliners,

immediately took preventive measures. A number of the more dangerous officers

were reassigned to posts where they were thought to have fewer opportunities for

making mischief. Several of those decisions turned out to be the right ones; in July

1936 many of those officers would not succeed in their rising against the

government. The outcome of other decisions proved less satisfactory.

Two cases stand out: General Emilio Mola was put in charge of the garrison in

Navarra, while Franco, who had been chief of staff until February, was sent to the

distant Canary Islands. On 8 March 1936, before departing for their new postings, both participated in a meeting which gave the green light for a definitive round of

conspiratorial activities. Mola was to co-ordinate them under the nominal leadership

of Sanjurjo, still living in exile. Franco, a cautious man, remained non-committal.

By then Sanjurjo had tried to acquire material support from abroad. On 12

March 1936, Pravda reported his visit to Berlin and his intentions to buy weapons for a future uprising.1 Sanjurjo's visit has usually been dismissed in the serious

historical literature, while its significance has been exaggerated by all those who

wished to play up the Third Reich's role in the rebellion against the Republic. The

authors of the current article do not share this latter view, but neither do we believe

that Sanjurjo's journey was innocuous. He was accompanied by Beigbeder, who

had been the Spanish military attach? in Berlin from 1926 to early 193 5.2

Beigbeder and Franco were acquainted with K?hlenthal who had visited Madrid,

Barcelona and Spanish Morocco in October and November 1928.3 Beigbeder had

accompanied him during another of K?hlenthal's visits to Spanish Morocco in

1 The visit was not a cast iron secret. In the small Spanish community living in Berlin the

correspondent of the liberal Madrid newspaper El Sol, Jos? Ram?n Garc?a Diez, was aware of it. 2 A lady acquaintance of Sanjurjo's from Portugal, Rosalinda Powell Fox, The Grass and the Asphalt,

(Puerto Sotogrande, Cadiz: Harter and Associates, 1997), 37-39, 45-47, met both accidentally at the

Hotel Adlon. We are indebted to Professor Paul Preston for this reference. Mrs Fox was to become

Beigbeder's intimate companion the following year. 3 Von VietinghofF, Madrid, to Berlin, 7 Nov. 1928, in Berlin, Politisches Archiv, Ausw?rtiges Amt,

Pol. Abt. II, Milit?r und Marine, Kommandierungen nach Spanien und umgekehrt: August 1928-April

1936. Thereafter AA, PA.



Franco's Request to the Third Reich for Military Assistance 193

October 193 5.4 By then K?hlenthal had become the German military attach? to

France, Spain and Portugal, with residence in Paris. As such he had official contacts

with Franco. A photograph exists in which both are seen, along with other generals and officers, watching military manoeuvres in Spain in September 1934.5

Sanjurjo also had contacts of his own in Berlin. They were founded on the

bilateral military co-operation which had taken place between 1921 and the early

1930s. General Erhard Milch, Hermann Goring's secretary of state for aviation and

one of the early builders of the Luftwaffe, had had a connection with Spain since the

late 1920s. Lufthansa, and Milch as chairman of its board, had been behind the

creation of Aero Lloyd Espa?ol (ALE) in October 1926, at the time when Spain was

opening its air space to foreign interests. ALE was, however, in competition with

Union Aerea Espa?ola (UAE), supported by Junkers. The UAE was to be one of

the major sources of contact for Sanjurjo. Two of its personnel stand out: its

manager, a former naval commander named Erich Killinger, and one of the

members of its board, the Marquis of Quintanar.6 Lufthansa's interests were also behind the creation of Iberia in March 1927.7

Subsequently, in order to eliminate intra-German competition, a new company was

established: the Concesionaria de Lineas Aereas Subvencionadas (CLASSA), whose

chairman of the board was none other than Sanjurjo himself.8

It has not yet been proved to what extent Sanjurjo was personally acquainted with Milch. In any case, while in exile he had also made contact with Willy

Grote, the representative of the German Federation of Aviation Industries in

Portugal. Grote had visited Madrid in September 1935 to explore the possibilities of Germany exporting aeroplanes to Spain. The reason was that Spain, under a

conservative government, was interested in acquiring war mat?riel from abroad to

modernise the armed forces. The negotiations covered many issues and were

ultimately unfruitful.9

The problem with Sanjurjo's visit to Berlin is that no trace of contacts with any German authority has ever been found. The legation in Lisbon was not aware of his

journey.10 The Ausw?rtiges Amt seems to have had no information. A thorough

4 Wegener, Tetuan, to Berlin, 2. Oct. 1935, in PA, AA, Deutsche Botschaft in Madrid. Deutsche

Milit?r-, Marine- und Luftattaches, Februar 193 3-Mai 1936. 5

Photograph reproduced in Ricardo de la Cierva, Francisco Franco. Un siglo de Espa?a (Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1973), 378.

6 K?pke, Berlin, to Madrid, 12 Oct. 1926; Brandenburg, Berlin, to AA, Nov. 1926, in PA, AA,

Pol. Abt. II F-Luft, Luftverkehr Europa-S?damerika: M?rz 1924-Juni 1927, vol. 1; von Vietinghoff,

Madrid, to AA, 4 Dec. 1926, in Luftverkehr Spanien: April 1925-Juli 1928, vol. 2; Killinger, Madrid, to

Forster, 3 Sept. 1927, in Abschlu? eines deutsch-spanischen Luftverkehrsabkommens: Juli 1927

Dezember 1930, vol. 1. 7 Von Welczeck to Berlin, 31 Mar. 1927, in PA, AA, Ibid., Luftverkehr Spanien: April 1925-Juli

1928, vol. 2. 8

Brandenburg, Berlin, to AA, 23 Nov. 1927, in PA, AA, Ibid., Luftverkehr Europa-S?damerika: M?rz 1924-Juni 1927, vol. 1; von Welczeck to Berlin, 16 Mar. 1929, in Luftverkehr Spanien: Juli

1928-Dezember 1932, vol. 3. 9 Evidence in PA, AA, Geheimakten 1920-1936, II FK 119. Ein- und Ausfuhr von Kriegsger?t

nach europ?ischen L?ndern (au?er Balkanl?ndern): April 1935-Juni 1936. 10 Information provided by the then charg? d'affaires Count Karl-Max Du Moulin-Eckart.




analysis of all its incoming communications produced nothing. Yet perhaps this

lacuna is not so surprising after all. It does not seem very likely that the German

authorities would have taken much interest in the wishes of an unknown Spanish

general in exile in the period of the Rhineland remilitarisation.

The most probable targets in Berlin for Sanjurjo were three: the Abwehr

(German intelligence), arms

companies and arms dealers. A considerable number of

authors have hypothesised a link between Sanjurjo, in fact between the military

conspirators, and the Abwehr. However, none has produced the slightest proof. On

the contrary, existing evidence points in the opposite direction. It is less easy to

dismiss the remaining alternatives. Sanjurjo, who had served in Morocco, must have

been aware of the very important German contribution to Spanish chemical warfare

in the early 1920s.11 This hypothesis also applies to another of the military

conspirators, General Manuel Goded. Goded had been among the planners of the

Alhucemas landing operation, at which mustard gas was massively used.12 Further

more, General Joaqu?n Fanjul, another leading conspirator, had been engaged in

some of the co-operation between Germany and Spain in the late 1920s. As an

under-secretary for war in 1935, he must have been aware of the fruitless

negotiations to acquire

war mat?riel from Germany.

This kind of export was a highly regulated activity. The secret statistics of the

Ausfuhrgemeinschaft fur Kriegsger?t (AFK: Federation of war mat?riel exporters) show the direct or indirect supplies to Spain in the period up to July 1936.13 Only

150 submachine-guns have been connected with the preparations for the uprising.

Sanjurjo may also have taken advantage of his journey to meet with one of the

leading German arms dealers of the time, the Great War air ace Lieutenant Josef

Veltjens, who was acquainted with Goring.

At the end of June 1936, some contacts were made between the conspirators and

Herr Veltjens. Rumours of them reached the Ausw?rtiges Amt.14 Since in the AFK

statistics the submachine guns are listed as having been exported in April and May, it

is possible that such contacts were a consequence of previous ones. In any case they

led nowhere.

The thesis that Sanjurjo's journey had no serious consequences in terms of

German commitments with regard to the conspiracy is reinforced by circumstantial

11 For the first time in the literature this was analysed by Rudibert Kunz and Rolf-Dieter M?ller,

Giftgas gegen Abd el-Krim. Deutschland, Spanien und der Gaskrieg in Spanisch-Marokko, I?22-I?27 (Freiburg:

Rombach, 1990). It has been expanded by Vi?as with new archival material to cover the Spanish and

French angles. Dr Sebastian Balfour, London School of Economics, will describe it in considerable

detail in his forthcoming book on Spain's African Army. 12 Susana Sueiro Seoane, Espa?a en el Mediterr?neo. Primo de Rivera y la 'cuesti?n marroqu?' (Madrid:

UNED, 1992), 218, and Juan Pando, 'Alhucemas, ultima pesadilla del Pdf, La Aventura de la Historia

(September 2000), 29. 13 Evidence and statistics in AA, PA, Geheimakten 1920-1936, Kriegsger?t. Allgemeines. Geheim

sachen: Januar 1935-Mai 1936. 14

DGFP, C, V, doc. 433, 738-739. Gerald Howson, Arms for Spain. The Untold Story of the Spanish Civil War (John Murray: London, 1998), has tracked Veltjens' activities during the war itself when he

sold weapons to both sides (although those delivered to the Republic turned out to be useless).




evidence: neither the Abwehr, nor the Gestapo, the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) or the

Nazi party were involved in the preparations of the military coup.

Myths about Abwehr Involvement

Long-lasting myths about the Abwehr's role in the Spanish coup rest squarely on

the manifold contacts with Spain of the Abwehr chief, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris.

Such contacts go back to the Great War when he was involved in intelligence activities. He was busy in Spain in the 1920s and early thirties when he met some of

the people who would later rise against the Republic. Canaris's involvement was critical in four areas: he was the leading

man in

circumventing, through Spain, the constraints on the German navy that had been

introduced by the Versailles treaty;15 he expanded the network of German

intelligence operating in Spain; he was instrumental in other high-level contacts of a

confidential nature; and as a result, the range of his acquaintances in Spain was

extensive and reached into the uppermost levels of both government and society.16

Among Canaris's unilateral activities his efforts to enlarge the network of German

intelligence in Spain were paramount. In his first documented journey, between 15

June and 1 July 1922, he placed one of his later agents, a former naval officer named

Mayrhofer, with Telefunken. In his second documented visit, in January-February 1925, Canaris expanded German intelligence in Spain. He recruited four agents

with previous military or naval experience who would be active in Barcelona and

Valencia and in the vicinity of two major naval bases in Cartagena and Cadiz. He

also charged a former army officer, Conrad Meyer, in Lugo with assisting in the

dispatching of other German intelligence officers into France. It is worth remem

bering that these activities went against the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles.

Canaris also helped to ensure that two officers, Captain Ulrich Grauert and

Lieutenant Hans Jeschonnek, be accepted as military observers in the Morocco

campaign. In May 1925, Canaris raised this matter with Admiral Antonio Magaz,

acting president of the military Junta then in power under the dictator General

Miguel Primo de Rivera. The two officers reported on the Spanish methods of

chemical warfare. None was expert in gas warfare, but Lieutenant Jeschonnek at

least had intelligence connections. He was to rise to the position of chief of staff in

the Luftwaffe, while one of his Spanish contacts, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfredo

Kindel?n, would become chief of Franco's air force.

An area of co-operation where Canaris deployed his talents, this time in response to a Spanish request, was domestic security. At the beginning of 1928 General

Severiano Mart?nez Anido, vice-president of the government and Minister of the

Interior, asked Canaris to use his good offices to draft an agreement on the exchange of information regarding subversive left-wing activities. Canaris happily obliged.

15 For a recent overview of the beginnings see Bernd Remmele, 'Die maritime Geheimr?stung unter Kapit?n z.S. Lohmann', Milit?rgeschichtliche Mitteilungen, 2 (1997).

16 Canaris's reports about some of his visits to Spain in Freiburg, Bundesarchiv-Milit?rarchiv: OKM

Box 29, PG 48903. Thereafter BA-MA.




General Mart?nez Anido,17 a brutal law-and-order man, also had first-hand knowl

edge of German co-operation in chemical warfare. He was to become Franco's first

public order minister in 1938, when he made use of the Gestapo's undoubted

expertise to enhance the efficiency of the Spanish security services.

Canaris's last documented journey took place in March 1931, a few weeks before

the proclamation of the Spanish Republic.18 This visit may have been connected

with some of the periodic difficulties encountered by the two most important German projects of the day: the manufacturing of torpedoes and the construction of

the E-i U-boat. Until the end of 1934 Canaris pursued his naval career. Suddenly, on 1 January 1935, he became the Abwehr top man.

No one has so far found documentary evidence that Canaris visited Spain between the proclamation of the Republic and the 1936 military uprising.

However, we have been told by one of the chiefs of the Nazi party in Spain that this

was the case. Nothing is known about the reasons for such visits. There is a record

of a meeting between Hitler and the long-serving ambassador to Madrid, Count

Johannes von Welczeck, in summer 1933. The diplomat drew the Fiihrer's attention

to the danger of communism in Spain and requested that Abwehr agents be sent

under the guise of business people to observe such activities.19 Hitler seems to have

agreed, but it is a matter for speculation whether this was followed up or not.

There is no reason to believe that the Abwehr paid Spain more than cursory attention between January 1935 and July 1936. This can be inferred from the

subordinate position which Spain occupied in some major Abwehr documents on

tactical and strategic requirements. On 18 May 1935 the Abwehr wrote to the

Foreign Ministry on the Wilhelmstrasse in Berlin regarding the countries for which

German intelligence needed additional information on military matters: they were

Albania, Greece, and Turkey. It would appear that, at that time, the existing

arrangements with Spain were enough for the Abwehr. Similiarly, in February

1936, Canaris himself initialled the minute describing a previous exchange of views

with the Wilhelmstrasse. He had drawn attention to the need in several German

diplomatic and consular representations for a diplomat to be entrusted with Abwehr

matters. In a number of representations, Madrid included, this was already the case.

In others (Moscow, Stockholm, Prague, Sofia, Ankara, Rome, Copenhagen, Zurich and Heerlen) it was not so. In Madrid, the diplomat in charge was Albrecht

von Koss.

Finally, the 'Abwehr directives for 1936' addressed five requirements: increased

information on countries with parliamentary and free press systems, in particular

France; increased operational activities in France, Italy, Greece, Turkey, Romania,

Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Scandinavia and South America

17 Canaris's report on 3-21 Feb. 1928 journey; von Welczeck to K?pke, Berlin, 7 Mar. 1928, in

AA, PA, Geheimakten 1920-1936, Spanien Po. 19, Sozialismus, Bolschewismus, Kommunismus: M?rz

1928-M?rz 1935. 18

Berlin, Deutsche Dienststelle (Wast), Canaris' personal file. 19 Robert H. Whealey, Hitler and Spain. The Nazi Role in the Spanish Civil War, I?36-IQ3Q

(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1989), 33, 181.




(a special mechanism would be designed around a commercial front company to be

set up in Berlin); Abwehr activities were to be reorganised or enlarged in Greece,

Turkey, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Scandinavia and Spain; exchanges of in

formation would be stepped up with Hungary, Finland and Japan and instituted

with Italy and Sweden (Mussolini's assistance to Franco would considerably ease the

intended exchange with Italy); and trips to a number of capitals and joint conferences with the Gestapo would be carried out.20

The uprising in Spain in July 1936 took the German embassy (and therefore the

Abwehr chief, Franz von Goss, and his diplomatic colleague, Albrecht von Koss) by

surprise. An Abwehr agent, Richard Classen, posted in Cadiz, was on holiday in

Germany. His colleague, Gustav Draeger, consul in Seville, was also absent. Herr

Sauermann, allegedly working for the Abwehr and honorary consul in Las Palmas,

opposed the sequestration of the Lufthansa plane and was even threatened by the

rebels with arrest. Another agent, 'Bremen', posted in Barcelona, was told by one of

his contacts about the impending coup a few days before it took place.21 He left

Spain and by the time he reported to Berlin his information was already obsolete.

Neither the Gestapo, the SD or the Nazi party were involved in the coup

Towards the end of 1933, with a recently elected conservative government in

office, the Spanish security authorities had approached the embassy in Madrid with

a request that the information exchange on subversive activities be renewed.

Nothing seems to have come out of this because, in early 1935, Francisco de

Agramonte, the Spanish ambassador in Berlin, underlined the Spanish wish to

engage in co-operation activities with the Gestapo.

In 1935 the Gestapo was looking for ways to conclude secret arrangements

against Communist 'subversion'. One was already in force with Hungary.22 The

Gestapo wanted another with Poland. Suddenly Spanish wishes coincided with the

Gestapo's genuine interests. This was no trivial matter. In Spain the war minister,

Jose Mar?a Gil Robles, became involved. Franco, as chief of staff, was also informed.

On the German side, Canaris was brought into the picture.23 However, for a

number of reasons these contacts bore no fruit.

The Gestapo's interest did not founder. After the Popular Front elections in

Spain, SS-Obersturmbannf?hrer (Lieutenant-Colonel) Heinrich ('Gestapo') M?ller as

well as such luminaries of the Nazi terror machine as Heinrich Himmler and

Reinhard Heydrich told the Wilhelmstrasse that they wished to second an agent to

the Madrid embassy. The ministry immediately agreed. The agent's remit was to

20 Documents in AA, PA, Geheimakten 1920-1936, II FM. 10, Milit?rische Nachrichten. Geheim:

April 193 5-August 1935, vol. 3. 21 'Bremen's report in BA-MA, M/1390/PG 80785. 22 Von Kamphoevener, 4 Mar. 1934; AA to Madrid and Warsaw, 11 Sept. 1935; von B?low

Schwante, 18 Sept. 1935, as in note 17. 23

V?lckers, Madrid, to Berlin, 2 Oct. 1935; von Welczeck to Berlin, 21 Oct. 1935, in AA, PA,

Abteilung Inland, Inland II-geheim, 83-60 Polizeibakommen mit Spanien.




observe Spanish political developments and gather material about left-wing activ

ities. SS and Security Service (SD) Oberinspektor Paul Winzer started his work in

May 1936.24 He followed events closely but the uprising surprised him in Barcelona

where he was attending the people's Olympic games. Penniless and without contacts

he immediately left Spain by sea, as Abwehr's man 'Bremen' also did.

The SD was caught unawares by the rebellion, even in the region where Spain's crack troops were concentrated. We do not know whether Adolf Sonnenhol, at the

Tetuan consulate general, was active on behalf of the SD at that time. However,

Johannes Bernhardt was. According to one of the documents kept in his Nazi party

personal file, he had being doing some freelance reporting for the SD since 1934. This is important: at those early dates ordinary Nazis did not work for the SD. Only some of the truly faithful or ambitious did.

That the military rebellion caught the Wilhelmstrasse by surprise has been widely

acknowledged in the literature. It has nevertheless been stated that the German

embassy and the Nazi party organisation were in an uneasy relationship in Spain and

that the party, at least, was more aware of what was cooking. This assertion lacks

corroborative evidence.

The Nazi party organisation in Spain (around 700 members in July 1936 within a

German community estimated at around 13,000) was no better informed than the

Wilhelmstrasse. In the wake of the Popular Front electoral victory, German

diplomats had enjoined utmost care upon all party members. After the murder of

Wilhelm Gustloff, the Nazi party chief in Switzerland in March 1936, all the Nazi

archives were deposited for safe-keeping with the diplomatic and consular represen tations. The communications with the AO were channelled through them.25

Contrary to allegations in the literature, the official German circles in Spain and the

Nazi party enjoyed a good relationship, something which did not occur in other

countries.

In spring 1936 Walter Zuchristian, the Nazi party's chief in Spain, fell out with

the AO leader Ernst Wilhelm Bohle because of their disagreement about the party's activities. Bohle wanted Zuchristian to intensify open propaganda, as the Nazis were

doing in certain Latin American countries. Given the Spanish political situation,

Zuchristian was aghast and eventually resigned. Suddenly the organisation was in

crisis. To resolve the situation, a senior SS official, Erich Schnaus, travelled to

Madrid with a special authorisation from Reichsf?hrer Himmler. He appointed a new

party chief, Hans Hellermann, who was employed in a German company in

Barcelona.

One of Hellermann's first decisions was to request the Barcelona consulate

general to return the party files. The consulate complied. A month later, after the

military rebellion had started, they fell into the hands of the militias. Both the

24 Documents in AA, PA, Ibid., ioi 83-60E, T?tigkeit des SD; der Abwehr, der Agenten und

Polizeiattaches: 1936-1944, vol. 1. 25 Von Kamphoevener to Burbach, 22 Feb. 1936, in AA, PA, Pol Abt. II, Spanien, Politik 29

Nationalismus, Faschismus und ?hnliche Bestrebungen: M?rz 1920-Mai 1936; Schwarzrotbuch. Doku

mente ?ber den Hitlerimperialismus (Barcelona: Asy-Verlag, 1937), illustration 123, 225.




anarchists and the communists tried to demonstrate on the grounds that such

documentation suggested that the uprising had been prepared with Nazi help. However, Hellermann's zeal was not reciprocated in Morocco, one of the hot spots of the rebellion. On 4 July 1936 Langenheim wrote to Madrid asking for permission to retrieve the party files from the Tetuan consulate. The Gustloff emergency seemed to be over and he wanted to have his group's documents back.

The activation of contacts with the Third Reich by General Mola

Sanjurjo died on 20 July when his plane crashed on take-off as he was returning to

Spain from Portugal. The rising had suddenly lost its leader. Three days later a

National Defence Junta was established under the chairmanship of General Miguel Cabanellas. Mola, but not Franco, sat on the Junta and took over responsibility for

continuing Sanjurjo's contacts with the Third Reich. However, while Franco was

safe in far away and well-controlled Morocco, Mola had to deal with furious

fighting in northern Spain. Franco and Beigbeder contacted K?hlenthal on 22 July. They sent him a telegram

requesting that, as a matter of the utmost urgency, German private companies

dispatch ten transport planes to Spanish Morocco. The contract was to be signed as

soon as possible.26 Mola acted vis-?-vis Germany only two days later. On 24 July the German legation in Lisbon sent Killinger a telegram on behalf of the Marquis of

Quintanar. Killinger was asked whether the Aviation Industry Federation would be

willing to dispatch some mat?riel to Spain.27 This simple enquiry may suggest that

Mola was anxious not to overplay his hand. Nonetheless, he was too slow. That same

evening Franco's emissaries were in Berlin.

Only two days later, on 26 July, Grote, at the receiving end in Lisbon of the

Mola-Quintanar-Killinger link, presented the rebels' wish-list to the German

legation: ten Junkers transport planes plus, if possible, 20 bombers. All were to be sent to Burgos via Genoa because the Italians were

already co-operating. A contract

was to be signed in Portugal.28 Three points should be noted. The first is that Mola, like Franco and Beigbeder

earlier, requested supplies from German private companies to be paid for later. The

second is that Mola wanted the planes to be allocated to his own troops. The third is

that it is unclear whether Mola was aware of Hitler's decision. When Mola's requests arrived at the Wilhelmstrasse on the night of 27 July, they had been overtaken by events. Hitler had made up his mind the day before.

Nevertheless Mola was keen to pursue his own course of action. He immediately decided to reinforce his d?marche through a personal emissary to Berlin. His choice

was the noted conservative editor Jos? Ignacio Escobar, Marquis of las Marismas

(later Valdeiglesias), who met with ambassador von Welczeck in Paris on 26 July to

26 Text in Akten zur deutschen ausw?rtigen Politik, D, III (Baden-Baden: Imprimerie Nationale,

1951), doc. 2, 5. Thereafter AD AP. 27

Ibid., doc. 7, 10. 28

Ibid., doc. 12, 14.




request a visa.29 Mola must have been desperate. Within a few days he also

mobilised a former Spanish ambassador to France, Jos? Mar?a Qui?ones de Le?n,

who sent one of his previous staff members, Eduardo Propper de Callej?n, to the

German capital.

According to Escobar's not necessarily trustworthy account, his introductions for

Berlin were at a very low level. He met at the Wilhelmstrasse with one of his former

Madrid acquaintances, Kurt von Kamphoevener,

on 28 July, who sent him to

Veltjens, the arms dealer. By then Franco knew that his mission to Hitler had been

successful.

Allegedly, Escobar had no great difficulty in convincing Veltjens. He then

returned to Paris to discuss the situation with Qui?ones de Le?n. At the beginning of August he went on to Spain to see Mola. He reported that Mola's name carried

enough punch in Berlin to convince the Germans to give more supplies on credit.

This assertion, however, seems far-fetched. Indeed, by then Mola knew better. He

telegraphed Franco that Agramonte, who had jumped ship and defected, must

inform the Germans about the identity of views between the two generals as far as

the rebellion was concerned.30

What had happened was that the Fiihrer's decision to give assistance to Franco

had rendered all of Sanjurjo's prior contacts with Germany obsolete. As a result

Franco's position was greatly enhanced. Mola had lost whatever chance he might have had of playing a more forceful role in the early stages of the rebellion.

Franco's emissaries in Berlin

On 20 July (the day Sanjurjo perished) Franco gave instructions from Morocco that

the D-APOK be sequestered in the Canaries. The availability of this plane in an area

under rebel control offered Franco the means of sending emissaries to Berlin so

quickly. Neither Mola nor other rebellious generals had anything similar to hand.

It is puzzling that Franco did not chose Beigbeder as one of his emissaries since

his absence would obviously compromise Franco's request. Customarily, this issue

has been explained by emphasising that the Arabic-speaking Beigbeder was of

critical importance in convincing the natives to assist the rebellion. However, in

view of Beigbeder's contacts in Berlin and his earlier visit to Germany, Franco's

decision remains odd. The most likely explanation is that, in addition to his

reluctance to lose Beigbeder's support in dealing with the natives in Tetuan, Franco

may not have believed that his emissaries to Berlin would be successful.

For a military

man as rank-conscious as Franco it is also puzzling that he chose

instead a very low-level officer: Captain Francisco Arranz. Arranz was utterly

unknown in the exalted echelons at which Franco was aiming. On the other hand,

Franco was aware that Langenheim, as chief of the Nazi party in Morocco, had to

go because his absence from the mission would be difficult to explain.

29 Jos? Ignacio Escobar, As? empez?

. . . (Madrid: G. del Toro, 1974), 76-7, 86-7. 30 Servicio Hist?rico Militar, documentaci?n nacional, Ai, L40, C37.




In the 1970s Bernhardt claimed that he had suggested to Franco that he

(Bernhardt) should be sent to Berlin, and Franco himself left some obscure

scribblings which may be held to support that claim.31

The only account of how the emissaries reached Hitler was given by Bernhardt.

Although by now it has become established history, it can be shown to be incorrect

on the basis of new documentary evidence.

According to Bernhardt, he and Langenheim went to see AO chief Bohle, who

telephoned the Ausw?rtiges Amt. Bohle was told not to do anything. Given the

seriousness and fluidity of the situation in Spain the sizeable German community should not be put in danger. Bohle disregarded this advice and telephoned Rudolf

Hess, who was spending his holidays at his parents' retreat in the village of

Reicholdsgr?n in Thuringia. Hess agreed to receive Bernhardt and Langenheim, who travelled in the company of three AO members (Kraneck, Burbach and

Fischer). Bernhardt spoke to Hess in Kraneck's presence and convinced him of the

importance of their mission.

Hess then telephoned Hitler in Bayreuth, who replied that he would receive the

emissaries. He did so in the evening. Only Bernhardt, Kraneck and Langenheim were admitted to the F?hrer's august presence. Langenheim started translating Franco's letter but soon lost his nerve. Bernhardt completed it and explained to the

F?hrer the reasons for the Spanish uprising which, he claimed, was directed against the communist threat. During the long journey from Tetuan to Berlin he had

memorised what he would say and had tested it out on Bohle and Hess. After some

reflection, Hitler decided to assist the rebel general. He called the war minister, Werner von

Blomberg, the aviation minister, Goring, and a naval representative,

Commander Karl Coupette, and informed them of his decision. Von Blomberg

quickly agreed, but Goring was at first more difficult to convince. However, when

he realised that the operation would involve the airlifting of a whole army across the

sea he became enthused. Most surprisingly, Bernhardt was able to recall Franco's

SOS to Hitler literally.32 This brief account seemed to tally with well-known parameters. These are found

in the German diplomatic documents recording the arrival of the mission and the

initial reactions of the Ausw?rtiges Amt.33 The account also fitted with a letter

which Bohle wrote to the Wilhelmstrasse chief of protocol on 7 July 1939

explaining why Kraneck and Fischer were deserving of a Spanish decoration

(subsequently granted). Bohle's letter is the only document describing any of the

circumstances leading to the Bayreuth meeting. Incidentally, Bohle, who wrote

31 Reproduced in Luis Su?rez Fern?ndez, Franco. El general de la Monarqu?a, la Rep?blica y la Guerra

Civil (Madrid: Actas, 1994) ,332-333. 32 Full account in Hans-Henning Abendroth, Mittelsmann zwischen Franco und Hitler. Johannes

Bernhardt erinnert IQ36 (Marktheidenfeld: Willy Schleunung, 1978). Nazi exploitation in Wilfred von

Oven, Hitler und der spanische B?rgerkrieg. Mission und Schicksal der Legion Condor (T?bingen: Grabert,

1978). A less colourful version appears in Angel Vi?as, La Alemania nazi y el 18 de Julio. Antecedentes de la

intervenci?n alemana en la guerra de Espa?a (Madrid: Alianza, 1974 and 1977). This author was also taken in

by Bernhardt. 33 AD AP, D, III doc. 10, 11-12.




in-house because he had been promoted to a position as junior minister in the

Wilhelmstrasse in early 1937, also mentioned the presence of an admiral. This has

led a great many authors to identify him as none other than Canaris.

Bohle's bureaucratic letter contained an egregious error which has not been

highlighted in the literature: he referred to von Blomberg as a Generaloberst (the

highest rank for a general). This reference was, however, wrong. Von Blomberg was the first field marshal of the Wehrmacht, appointed by Hitler in April 1936.

Why Bohle should have made that mistake when writing of all the possible

recipients to the protocol chief is unknown. Might the rank of the naval

representative have been erroneous as well? Bernhardt's mention of Coupette

seemed to clarify this issue.

Disturbing in Bernhardt's recollections is his unmistakable self-aggrandisement: He convinced Bohle. He convinced Rudolf Hess, the key to reaching the F?hrer.

He persuasively translated Franco's SOS and recalled it almost verbatim forty years later. He had spoken without undue inhibition and proved his mettle at the

Bayreuth meeting. He had saved Franco. By inference, he made Langenheim's and

Kraneck's presence almost an irrelevance.

Some questions are unavoidable. Why should Bohle not have listened to

Langenheim, his representative in Tetuan? Why should Langenheim not have been

admitted to the critical conversation with Hess? Why should Langenheim and

Kraneck not have spoken throughout the meeting with Hitler? Although initially taken in by Bernhardt's allegations, one of the present authors grew increasingly

sceptical of such self-aggrandising statements which became ever more embellished

and inherently less plausible. Bernhardt's unwillingness to say a single word about

his previous connection with the SD was also highly suspect. Today, new

documentary evidence is available which casts further doubts on Bernhardt's

credibility.

How Franco's emissaries reached Hitler

A leap forward is necessary to explain the context in which that evidence was

generated. Before the collapse of the Third Reich, the Western Allies had been

trying to convince Franco of the need to curtail German intelligence activities in

Spain and to expel intelligence and Nazi officers. Franco had dragged his feet and

the number of returnees to Germany had remained at a very low level.

Spanish procrastination continued well after the German capitulation. Not

surprisingly, the Allies increased their pressure on the Spanish government. Many of

the former Third Reich officials in Spain became extremely concerned about their

future, afraid that they might be sent back to occupied Germany. One of the German officials whose expatriation had been requested was the

former consul general in Bilbao, Friedhelm Burbach, briefly mentioned in Bohle's

1939 letter. During the Second World War his post had been important because

Bilbao was one of the seaports through which the export of iron ore from northern

Spain took place. Both the Germans and the Allies were keen to learn how much




ore was being sent to the other side. Burbach himself had worked with the Abwehr,

and the Allies wanted to see him back in Germany. They did not get him. Burbach

had rendered Franco a service of the utmost importance.

In 1946 Burbach wrote to the Spanish head of state on 1 and 12 April. Six years earlier Burbach had been made a commander of the Orden Imperial del Yugo y las

Flechas whose grand master Franco himself was. Burbach's first letter has not yet been found but his second letter has.34 In the former he apparently described the

Bayreuth meeting. On 12 April he reported on his own role in the transmission of

Franco's SOS to Hitler. According to this letter, a few days after the uprising in July

1936 Burbach received in Berlin a telegram from Langenheim requesting him to be

at his AO office the following morning.

Langenheim had previously visited the AO in April or May. He had talked to

Kraneck35 and, most certainly, to Burbach, who had become the head of the

department dealing with Spain and the Nazi party in Spanish Morocco. Langenheim had acquired some land and had legal difficulties with it. He was anxious to solve

them and had repeatedly pestered not only the embassy in Madrid but the

Wilhelmstrasse and the AO.36

On 25 July 1936 Langenheim arrived at the AO with two companions: Arranz

and Bernhardt. He explained the aims of the mission and showed Franco's letter.

Burbach's first reaction was one of caution. He knew Spain well and had been

acting chief of the Nazi party there. He told Bohle that he was familiar with

Franco's 1931 farewell address as director of the Spanish Military School. He realised

the importance of Franco's SOS and decided to argue his case further up the AO

hierarchy. Nevertheless, Bohle refused to meet Franco's emissaries. Burbach

persuaded him to telephone the Wilhelmstrasse, whose well-documented reaction

strengthened Bohle's initial resolve to avoid getting involved in such a serious affair.

Burbach then argued that the AO had not always followed the Wilhelmstrasse's

lead and suggested that Bohle call his number two, Alfred Hess, who could contact

his brother, Rudolf. (In 1946 Burbach reported to Franco that he had felt safe in

making that suggestion because he was an old school friend of the Hess brothers;

they had all been at the Evangelisches Paedagogium in Bad Godesberg at the same

time.37) Finally Bohle consented. Alfred Hess was ill and had not gone to his office

that day. He was reached at home by telephone. Burbach impressed upon him the

importance of the matter and said that he trusted Langenheim absolutely. Alfred

Hess replied that his brother was spending his holidays in the spa of Bad Kissingen. He would call him and transmit Rudolf's reply.

34 Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Madrid, R-2159, expediente 6. 35

Brosch, Tetuan, to Madrid, 27 May 1936, in AA, PA, Deutsche Botschaft in Madrid: 310-7

Einreise Deutscher nach Marokko und Tangerzone: Januar 1929-Mai 1936. 36

Ibid., 14-11/2, Reklamation Langeheim, 2 volumes. 37 Wolf Ruediger Hess (ed.), Rudolf Hess: Briefe 1?08-1Q33 (Munich: Langen-M?ller, 1987), 54,

gives evidence that the two brothers were at the same school and at the same time. According to his

published curriculum vitae, Burbach coincided with them: Maria Keipert and Peter Grupp (eds.),

Biographisches Handbuch des Deutschen Ausw?rtigen Dienstes, 1871-1943, I (Paderborn: Sch?ningh, 2000).




While they were awaiting Rudolf Hess's reaction, Burbach prevailed upon Bohle

to receive the emissaries. He also requested Bohle's permission to call his good friend Baron von Gablenz, Lufthansa's chairman, to ask for a

plane in case the

F?hrer should be willing to receive Franco's emissaries. When Alfred Hess called

back, it was to say that his brother had convinced Hitler over the phone that it

would be interesting to receive Franco's mission.

The above account obviously does not tally with Bernhardt's self-serving recollections. We have verified Burbach's key statements and found them to be

plausible. Bohle did trust Alfred Hess. This is evident from the very good staff report he wrote on him.38 According to the relevant local press Rudolf Hess was

holidaying in Bad Kissingen at that time (although two days before, 23 July, he had

participated in a conference in Hamburg39). When he wrote to Franco, Burbach was so sure of his facts that he suggested that

the truthfulness of his report could be checked via his 1936 witnesses: Arranz,

Bernhardt and Langenheim. Yet Burbach made some mistakes. He wrote that the

meeting with Hitler took place at the Villa Wahnfried (Bernhardt concurred with

this thirty years later). However, from 1936 onwards Hitler allegedly used to stay at

the adjoining Siegfried Wagner Haus, as indicated by no less than Winifred Wagner herself40 A more important mistake is that Burbach claimed that Admiral Raeder

was also present in Bayreuth.

Further doubts can be cast on Bernhardt's recollections. One of our sources,

Klaus E. Franke,41 showed us written circumstantial evidence which convincingly demonstrates that Commander Coupette did not attend the Bayreuth meeting.

According to Robert Fischer, Kraneck's deputy, the latter had told him that at a

certain moment the question arose whether German mat?riel could be sent by sea to

Morocco. We surmise that somebody may have asked for expert advice at that

moment. We also doubt very much that Franco's letter could have remained

unopened and untranslated.

We have found no way to check many of the colourful details given by Bernhardt about the Bayreuth meeting. However, his reference to Hitler's initial

reticence seems logical, because he had never been interested in Spain before. The

same could also be said about Goring. The allegation that von Blomberg immedi

38 Bundesarchiv, Berlin-Lichterfelde, Alfred Hess' personal file.

39 Kissinger Saale-Zeitung, 30 and 31 July; V?lkischer Beobachter, 24 July 1936.

40 As reported in Die Zeit, 18 July 1975. 41 His pseudonym was 'Lynkeus' from Faust, Part 2, Act 5, 'Deep Night' (English spelling is

Lynceus). Franke was an auditor at the Reich-owned Deutsche Revisions- und Treuhandgesellschaft in

charge of revising all transactions connected with German public investment in Spain, Portugal and

Spanish Morocco between 1937 and 1944. He became privy to the implementation of German

economic policy and was falsely accused of defeatism. Franke was brought before the ominous

Volksgerichtshof but, by sheer luck and contacts, was sent to a concentration camp pending the arrival

of the witnesses for the prosecution from Spain. He always thought that Bernhardt (through Winzer) had double-crossed him to prevent Bernhardt's exposure as a less than adequate manager. Franke rebuilt

his fortunes in post-war Germany and collected an immense amount of material dealing with German

economic policy towards Spain which, unfortunately, is still unavailable. He died in Frankfurt in 1998

before seeing the results of our research.




ately accepted the F?hrer's decision is credible. But no other corroborative evidence

has so far become available.

Franke went to Spanish Morocco in 1937. He became friendly with Langenheim and they talked about the July 1936 events. He informed us in writing that

Langenheim had given him information which diverged from the account made

public by Bernhardt. Franke also wrote that he had discussed the Bayreuth meeting with Bernhardt himself during the Second World War. He said that his notes, not

made available to us, indicated that Bernhardt's public account was wrong. In the

late 1970s Franke and Bernhardt had several telephone conversations regarding the

latter's embellishments of the Bayreuth meeting. Franke sent us the typewritten

transcription of one conversation in which Bernhardt freely acknowledged that he

had invented many details.

Although several details remain unknown, it can safely be asserted that:

Bernhardt's account about his role in the transmission of Franco's SOS is highly

suspect; Langenheim's and Burbach's role should instead be highlighted; the new

key man in the causal chain is Alfred Hess; since Bernhardt's account has turned out

to be self-serving regarding the arrival of Franco's emissaries in Bayreuth, there is no

guarantee of his credibility as far as many other details of his trip to Germany are

concerned; it remains puzzling that Bernhardt did not consider the possibility of

contacting the SD. It is a fact, however, that many of the SD and SS files were

destroyed, and any SD-Bernhardt connection while he was in Germany may

remain for ever undocumented.

Why Hitler helped Franco

It is a well-known fact that the German Ministries of Foreign Affairs and of War had

initially limited themselves to observing the events in Spain. They worried, as did

their counterparts in other European capitals, about their nationals and the need for

their repatriation. Grand Admiral Raeder recalled that he had had some difficulties

in persuading Hitler on 22 or 23 July to allow German ships to depart for Spain.42 The F?hrer was afraid that some incident might occur.

Historians have emphasised the absence of foreign policy advice at the Bayreuth

meeting. Hitler's mistrust of diplomats has been much highlighted. In the circum

stances, that absence is perhaps not so surprising. However, neither his trusted aide

and propaganda minister Joseph Goebbels nor Joachim von Ribbentrop, soon to

become ambassador in London, both of whom were in Bayreuth, were brought in.

More telling perhaps is another fact little noted by historians. Von Blomberg and

Foreign Minister Konstantin von Neurath were both at the races in Munich-Riem

on 26 July43 but the former did not consider it opportune to refer to Hitler's

decision of the previous night. When von Neurath returned to the Wilhelmstrassee

42 Erich Raeder, Mein Leben. Von 1935 bis Spandau 1955, II (T?bingen: Fritz Schlichtenmayer,

1957), 80. 43 V?lkischer Beobachter, 27 July 1936.




he blithely endorsed the dispositions taken by his subordinates following the arrival

of Franco's mission.

Whatever the Bayreuth details, the historical discussion about Hitler's motivation

to help Franco continues unabated. If what Grand Admiral Raeder stated in his

memoirs is true, the F?hrer certainly made a complete volte-face within two or

three days. Why? In the last two decades, the emphasis on Hitler's military motivations has waned.

It was based on G?ring's recollections in prison about the possibility of enabling his

Luftwaffe to gain experience in the Spanish civil war. The decision concerned

transport planes (what Franco had requested) and some fighters for protection

purposes. The latter were forbidden to engage in combat unless under attack.

The literature which emanated from the former East Germany overstressed

economic reasons. German capitalism allegedly saw in the intervention in Spain an

opportunity for exploiting Spanish natural resources for its nefarious purposes of

aggression and conquest. However, a thorough analysis of the commercial relations

between Spain and the Third Reich up to June 1936 gives a picture at odds with

that interpretation.

Up to that moment, German imports from Spain had been rising continuously.

They involved all the Spanish goods which Nazi Germany required for its rear

mament drive (especially iron ore and pyrites). Relations were based on a strict

compensation mechanism which obviated the need to deplete the scarce foreign

exchange holdings of the Third Reich.44 Both partners were happy with the

system.45

Hitler's decision was his alone. But even the Third Reich's second man,

Hermann Goring, must have been aware that there were no economic or

commercial problems with Spain. Two months earlier Goring had chaired a high level meeting to examine the possibility of expanding German imports of the

products necessary for rearmament. The only areas where existing arrangements

were good were Spain, the Balkans, Turkey, Iran and South America.46 Two weeks

later, on 26 May 1936, when Goring chaired another high-level meeting to deal

with imports of specific raw materials, Spain

was not mentioned.47

In early July, what worried the Wilhelmstrasse in the commercial area were the

repercussions on German exports to Spain in the wake of an increase in Spanish

import duties.48 Furthermore, historians have not examined the implications of an

operation attempted by the iron-ore hungry Third Reich in 1935: the sale to

Spanish companies of the mining concessions of the Mannesmann brothers in

44 Documents about the last commercial negotiations before the civil war in AA, PA, Handakten

Clodius, Spanien: August 1934-Januar 1937, vol. 3. 45 For Spanish public satisfaction El Sol, 13 Mar. 1936. 46 Niederschrift der Sitzung des Gutachter-Ausschusses ?ber Exportfragen, in Bundesarchiv Berlin

Lichterfelde, Beautragter f?r den Vierjahresplan, R26, I/36-Er?rterungen ?ber Deutschlands Bezie

hungen zum Weltmarkt. 47

Ibid., 1/11-Sitzung des Gutachter-Ausschusses f?r Rohstoff-Fragen am 26.5.1936. 48 Sabath to Koelfen, 7 July 1936, in AA, PA, Handelspol. Abt. III, Handel 13-1-Anfragen und

W?nsche zum Handelsvertrag mit Spanien: Juni 1936-Januar 1942.




Spanish Morocco. Such concessions had been taken into Reich's ownership in July 49

1934.

A different matter is that Hitler, or the Germans in general, never contemplated the possibility of giving Franco war mat?riel gratis. But this had never entered the

rebels' minds. Franco, Mola and Gonzalo Queipo de Llano (the 'butcher of Seville'

was also aware of Franco's SOS) had always indicated their willingness to sign the

necessary contracts and to pay for the German mat?riel they requested.

If military and economic reasons for Hitler's decision are discarded, only

ideological and strategic motivations are left. As far as the purely ideological aspects are concerned, it should, nevertheless, be remembered that the anti-communist

motivation was used by Hitler tactically according to need. In many instances he

leaned towards the anti-communist rationale as a mere cover for his actions or

simply to dupe his interlocutors. Although his anti-communism was genuine, we

wonder whether it can by itself explain so complete a departure in Hitler's foreign

policy towards a country for which he had not felt the slightest interest until that

time.

We tend to give more importance to strategic considerations. In the medium

term Hitler's undoubted aim was to defeat France. A victorious left-wing govern ment in Spain would strengthen France's position and even the French-Soviet link.

If Franco won, the opposite would be the case. Some German diplomats, in Spain and elsewhere, argued along these lines. There is no reason why Hitler himself

should have been immune to such reasoning.

What is amazing is the speed with which Hitler took his momentous decision.

Operating within his strategic and highly personal parameters he perceived an

opportunity to weaken the French position and immediately acted upon it.

There may have been tactical reasons as well. When Hitler meditated on 25 July 1936 he must have also pondered the meaning of Franco's requests to Mussolini, about which Hitler must certainly have known. The previous day Franco's

emissaries had coincided in Marseilles with other colleagues sent by Franco to the

Duce. It would be surprising if Hitler did not factor the Italian element into his

cogitation.

Hitler's decision meant that Franco, to his own surprise, had hit the jackpot. From the very beginning German military aid was delivered to him alone. Junkers

planes were immediately put to the task of ferrying crack troops across the Strait of

Gibraltar. Weapons followed suit. For logistical reasons, Mussolini also supplied Franco since Spanish Morocco was easier to reach from Italy. The former chief of

staff, despite his late-in-the-day commitment to the rebellion, found himself in the

enviable position of being the only recipient of all foreign aid. Nobody would have

envisaged this possibility even a few weeks earlier.

The memoirs of Franco's cousin and long-serving adjutant show that Franco

49 Documents in AA, PA, Deutsche Botschaft in Madrid, 310-4, Mannesmann-Interessen: Januar

1931-April 1936, vol. 2.




used his windfall ruthlessly.50 With an increasing number of his troops on the

mainland, Franco drip-fed Mola a strictly limited volume of weapons and ammuni

tion. He was obviously keen to ensure his upper hand in the overall balance of

military operations.

Although Mola had been the chief conspirator he had no alternative but to

consent. The man in charge of the operation in Berlin, General Helmut Wilberg, travelled to Spain to reassure Franco about the F?hrer's decision to concentrate

German help on him. Bernhardt was sent to inform Mola that he would receive

German weapons through Franco alone.

One can explain Franco's ascendancy among the rebel leaders on the basis of a

number of reasons dear to the military mindset: seniority and a previous distin

guished career are customarily mentioned. Paul Preston has also analysed the

repercussions of Franco's successes in the field, and his cunning in pandering to the

political and psychological motivating factors behind the rebel coalition, particularly

among the monarchists.

In our view, two additional factors must be highlighted: German and Italian help with modern weapons and German assistance in ferrying troops across the Strait of

Gibraltar. They provided the ultimate foundation for the rise of the Caudillo.

What happened to the intermediaries

The destinies of the people who had been instrumental in promoting Hitler's

decision to help Franco were widely divergent. Burbach was put in charge of an AO committee to deal with the settlement in

Germany of the refugees coming from Spain.51 In January 1938 he was posted to

the embassy in Salamanca. Six months later he became the German consul in

Bilbao. He seems to have been an unambitious person. We have found no record

that he boasted about the role he had played in July 1936 until he felt compelled to

write to the Spanish head of state. He was very popular in Bilbao and died in August

1959

Langenheim returned to his beloved Morocco. Thanks to Beigbeder (the new

Spanish high commissioner) he solved his long-lasting problems with his properties:

simply the Spaniards gave him new ones. He was a frequent guest at Beigbeder's and worked for the Abwehr, as did one of his sons. Another two fell during the war.

At the end of 1944 the Spanish authorities asked Langenheim to leave Morocco.

The German charg? d'affaires wrote to the Spanish Foreign Minister on his behalf

on 8 January 1945. He recalled that Langenheim, with the help of a second German

citizen, had informed the F?hrer about the importance and possibilities of the 1936

rebellion. This seems to indicate that these higher echelons of German diplomats in

50 Francisco Franco Salgado-Araujo, Mi vida junto a Franco. Guerra de Africa, Monarqu?a, Rep?blica,

Guerra Civil y posguerra (Barcelona: Planeta, 1977), 351-4. 51 Burbach's work in this area is explored in J?rg van Norden, 'Heim ins neue Deutschland Adolf

Hitlers'. Die Evakuierung der Spaniendeutschen w?hrend des Spanischen B?rgerkrieges (Saarbr?cken: Verlag fur

Entwicklungspolitik, 1998).




Spain were aware of Langenheim's role in the run-up to Bayreuth. The d?marche

was effective: Langenheim was allowed to settle down in the peninsula, although he

was not spared some chicaneries. He obviously had to pay a

price for not having

been at the centre of power during the war years.

Captain Arranz was promoted. According to Franke, the Germans gave him a

substantial amount of money in the international city of Tangier. Not surprisingly, he gravitated towards German interests and became active in German-controlled

business. Franke also informed us that Arranz was one of the two Spaniards who

supported Bernhardt's request for Spanish citizenship after the Second World War.

Like Franco, Bernhardt also hit the jackpot. Before July 1936 he had entertained

thoughts of emigrating to Argentina. After Bayreuth he became Goring's hatchet

man in charge of an increasingly hardheaded German attempt to satelize the Spanish

economy. The Third Reich might not have been able at all to exploit Spain

economically before the putsch, but this situation later changed radically. Under the

conditions of a long civil war the way was opened for penetrating and exploiting

Spain economically.52

Bernhardt joined the SS as an Obersturmbannf?hrer in 1937. By 1943 he had

become Oberf?hrer (quasi-general) and was one of the highest SS officials serving outside Germany or Nazi-controlled areas. He was also at the forefront of the

economic warfare waged in the Iberian peninsula against the Allies. Rolling in

public money, he made many friends but also, because of his high-handedness,

many enemies, not least among Spaniards. With great sang-froid he helped his

former enemies disentangle the intricacies of German public investments in Spain. He emigrated to Argentina in the 1950s and died in Munich in February 1980.

What about Mola's unsuccessful helper? Jos? Ignacio Escobar, Marquis of

Valdeiglesias, became heavily involved in the network of Reich-controlled busi

nesses in Spain. According to Franke, Bernhardt remunerated him handsomely. Escobar was the second Spaniard who supported Bernhardt's application for Spanish

citizenship. He also became vice-president of a formerly German public company in

Spain, Productos Agr?colas, S.A. (Prodag), through which undeclared SD and

Gestapo agents had been infiltrated.53 Valdeiglesias dabbled in Spanish-German relations in the 1950s, became involved in touristic activities and remained a long

serving member of the tame Francoist Cortes until their voluntary dissolution in

1976.

52 The standard works in this area are Rafael Garcia Perez, Franquismo y Tercer Reich (Madrid: CEC,

1994) and Christian Leitz, Economic Relations Between Nazi Germany and Franco's Spain, 1936-1943

(Oxford: Clarendon, 1996). 53

According to Franke, in the early 1940s Prodag's ownership was transferred to the brother of

Wolfram Sievert, director of Himmler's Ahnenerbe and executed in Nuremberg after the war. Later on

Escobar was instrumental in turning the company over to its manager in Spain, Ernest Peche. On

Peche's death in 1957, his wife inherited the company. In 1959 Frau Peche married Luis Mendoza

whose son, Ramon, transformed Prodag into a small empire through which enormous transactions

were carried out with the Soviet Union in the 1970s. At this time it was reported in the media that

Prodag was one of the infiltration channels used by the KGB. If true, this would have a very rare case of

history repeating itself, first with the SD and later with the KGB!




Kraneck climbed further up the Nazi ladder. He played the role of a party judge to the full. In 1938 he joined the legal department of the Wilhelmstrasse and worked

for Bohle who praised him unstintingly according to his Nazi party personal file. He

became a member of the rubber-stamping Reichstag and was killed in action on 30

December 1943 fighting for Greater Germany.

Conclusions

This article has shown the impact of chance and personality upon a particular historical situation. Neither the Wilhelmstrasse nor the War Ministry were in favour

of giving assistance to the Spanish rebels. Diplomats, the Nazi party and all the

security organs of Nazi Germany had remained in ignorance of the impending

coup.

Three events were crucial for the German decision in favour of Franco. The first

one was undoubtedly Sanjurjo's mortal accident. The second was the possibility of

pressing a German plane into the fateful Berlin flight. The third was the use of

Langenheim, an

acquaintance of another insignificant party member, Burbach. Such

events provided the necessary conditions but were not sufficient in themselves. It

was logical that Franco's emissaries were not enthusiastically welcomed in Berlin.

Outside the AO nobody in a position of authority would have contemplated

putting them in contact with the F?hrer.

It is well known that access to Hitler was one of the rarest and most precious

commodities in the Third Reich's political life. Even many cabinet ministers did

not enjoy unrestricted access to their leader. The fact that Franco's emissaries could

reach Hitler within 24 hours is nothing short of extraordinary. The sufFicient

condition then was the operation of the Burbach?Alfred Hess?Rudolf Hess chain.

Without it, it might have been impossible to confront the F?hrer with the

possibility of taking a historically meaningful decision vis-?-vis a country, Spain, which had been until then very far away from his preoccupations and endeavours.

Hitler, we surmise, basically for strategic reasons linked to his ardent desire to

weaken France's position agreed to give some assistance to the rebel Spanish

general. His intervention was limited but, if our interpretation is correct, it

contained a dynamic element apt to lead the F?hrer to raise the stakes seamlessly. The importance of Hitler's gamble for German foreign and military policy was

limited. In the wake of the semi-failure of the military coup Hitler's decision was of

far greater significance for the parties in conflict in Spain. The initial balance of

forces in the Spanish theatre moved in favour of the rebels and, in particular, of

Franco, significantly contributing to his exaltation as military and political supremo two months later.

