Francisco Depra vs Agustin Dumlao

7/29/2019 Francisco Depra vs Agustin Dumlao

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Francisco Depra VS Agustin DumlaoGR L-57348 16 May 1985

Facts:

Depra is the owner of a parcel of land to which Dumlao, living in an adjoining lot, had built akitchen that encroached an area of 34 square meters. The encroachment was discovered in arelocation survey of Depras property. Upon discovery, Depras mother wrote a demand letterasking Dumlao to move back from his encroachment. She then filed a case of UnlawfulDetainer against Dumlao.

In the trial court it was proven that Dumlao was a builder in good faith; thus the MunicipalCourt rendered it judgment that reads:

Ordering that a forced lease is created between the parties with the plaintiffs, as lessors, andthe defendants as lessees, over the disputed portion with an area of thirty four (34) squaremeters, the rent to be paid is five (P5.00) pesos a month, payable by the lessee to the lessorswithin the first five (5) days of the month the rent is due; and the lease shall commence on the

day that this decision shall have become final.

Neither party appealed. However, Depra did not accept the payment of rentals so thatDumlao deposited such rentals with the Municipal Court.

Depra then filed a Complaint for Quieting of Title against Dumlao, the latter admitted theencroachment but alleged, that the present suit us barred by res judicate by virtue of thedecision of the Municipal Court.

DEPRA claims that the Decision of the Municipal Court was null and void ab initiobecause its jurisdiction is limited to the sole issue of possession, whereas decisions affectinglease, which is an encumbrance on real property, may only be rendered by Courts of FirstInstance.

Issue:

I. Whether or not the Municipal Courts decision was null and void ab initio because it has nojurisdiction over the case?

II. Whether or not the factual situations of DUMLAO and DEPRA conform to the juridicalpositions respectively defined by law, for a "builder in good faith" under Article 448, a"possessor in good faith" under Article 526 and a "landowner in good faith' under Article 448?

Held:

I. Addressing out selves to the issue of validity of the Decision of the

Municipal Court, we hold the same to be null and void. The judgment in a detainer case iseffective in respect of possession only (Sec. 7, Rule 70, Rules of Court). The Municipal Courtover-stepped its bounds when it imposed upon the parties a situation of "forced lease", whichlike "forced co-ownership" is not favored in law. Furthermore, a lease is an interest in realproperty, jurisdiction over which belongs to Courts of First Instance (now Regional TrialCourts) (Sec. 44(b), Judiciary Act of 1948; Sec. 19 (2) Batas Pambansa Blg. 129). Since theMunicipal Court, acted without jurisdiction, its Decision was null and void and cannot operateas res judicata to the subject complaint for Queting of Title. Besides, even if the Decisionwere valid, the rule on res judicata would not apply due to difference in cause of action. In theMunicipal Court, the cause of action was the deprivation of possession, while in the action toquiet title, the cause of action was based on ownership. Furthermore, Sec. 7, Rule 70 of theRules of Court explicitly provides that judgment in a detainer case "shall not bar an actionbetween the same parties respecting title to the land. "


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II. ART. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built sown or planted in goodfaith,

shall have the right

to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity

provided for in articles 546 and 548, or

to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land, and the one who sowed, theproper rent.

However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerablymore than that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if theowner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after proper indemnity.The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the courtshall fix the terms thereof (Paragraphing supplied)

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, DEPRA has the option either to pay for the encroachingpart of DUMLAO's kitchen, or to sell the encroached 34 square meters of his lot to DUMLAO.

He cannot refuse to pay for the encroaching part of the building, and to sell the encroachedpart of his land, 5 as he had manifested before the Municipal Court. But that manifestation isnot binding because it was made in a void proceeding.

However, the good faith of DUMLAO is part of the Stipulation of Facts in the Court of FirstInstance. It was thus error for the Trial Court to have ruled that DEPRA is "entitled topossession," without more, of the disputed portion implying thereby that he is entitled to havethe kitchen removed. He is entitled to such removal only when, after having chosen to sell hisencroached land, DUMLAO fails to pay for the same. 6 In this case, DUMLAO had expressedhis willingness to pay for the land, but DEPRA refused to sell.


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HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO, petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT & HEIRS OF SINFOROSO PASCUAL, respondents.

FACTS:

On October 3, 1946, Sinforoso Pascual, now deceased, filed an application for foreshorelease covering a tract of foreshore land in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, having an area ofapproximately seventeen (17) hectares. This application was denied on January 15, 1953. Sowas his motion for reconsideration. Subsequently, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest, alsonow deceased, Emiliano Navarro, filed a fishpond application with the Bureau of Fisheriescovering twenty five (25) hectares of foreshore land also in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan.Initially, such application was denied by the Director of Fisheries on the ground that theproperty formed part of the public domain. Upon motion for reconsideration, the Director ofFisheries, on May 27, 1958, gave due course to his application but only to the extent of seven(7) hectares of the property as may be certified by the Bureau of Forestry as suitable forfishpond purposes. The Municipal Council of Balanga, Bataan, had opposed EmilianoNavarro's application.

Aggrieved by the decision of the Director of Fisheries, it appealed to the Secretary of NaturalResources who, however, affirmed the grant. On the other hand, sometime in the early part of1960, Sinforoso Pascual flied an application to register and confirm his title to a parcel ofland, situated in Sibocon, Balanga, Bataan, described in Plan Psu-175181 and said to haveanarea of 146,611 square meters. Pascual claimed that this land is an accretion to his property,situated in Barrio Puerto Rivas, Balanga, Bataan, and covered by Original Certificate ofTitle No. 6830.

On March 25, 1960, the Director of Lands, represented by the Assistant Solicitor General,filed an opposition thereto stating that neither Pascual nor his predecessors-in-interestpossessed sufficient title to the subject property, the same being a portion of the publicdomain and, therefore, it belongs to the Republic of the Philippines.

During the pendency of the land registration case, that is, on November 6, 1960, SinforosoPascual filed a complaint for ejectment against Emiliano Navarro, one Marcelo Lopez andtheir privies, alleged by Pascual to have unlawfully claimed and possessed, through stealth,force and strategy, a portion of the subject property covered by Plan Psu-175181. Thedefendants in the case were alleged to have built a provisional dike thereon: thus they havethereby deprived Pascual of the premises sought to be registered. This, notwithstandingrepeated demands for defendants to vacate the property.

The case was decided adversely against Pascual. Thus, Pascual appealed to the Court ofFirst Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Balanga, Bataan. Because of the similarity of theparties and the subject matter, the appealed case for ejectment was consolidated with theland registration case and was jointly tried by the court a quo.

During the pendency of the trial of the consolidated cases, Emiliano Navarro died onNovember 1, 1961 and was substituted by his heirs, the herein petitioners. Subsequently, on

August 26, 1962, Pascual died and was substituted by his heirs, the herein privaterespondents.

On November 10, 1975, the court a quo rendered judgment finding the subject property to beforeshore land and, being a part of the public domain, it cannot be the subject of landregistration proceedings. On December 15, 1980, we granted the Solicitor General, acting ascounsel for the Director of Forestry, an extension of time within which to file in this court, apetition for review of the decision dated November 29, 1978 of the respondent appellate courtand of the aforecited resolution dated November 21,1980.


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ISSUE :May the land sought to be registered be deemed an accretion in the sense that itnaturally accrues in favor of the riparian owner or should the land beconsidered as foreshore land?

RULING:The disputed property was brought forth by both the withdrawal of the waters of Manila Bayand the accretion formed on the exposed foreshore land by the action of the sea whichbrought soil and sand sediments in turn trapped by the palapat and bakawan trees plantedthereon by petitioner Sulpicio Pascual in 1948. Anchoring their claim of ownership on Article457 of the Civil Code, petitioners vigorously argue that the disputed 14-hectare land is anaccretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and Bulacan Rivers which run their courseon the eastern and western boundaries, respectively, of petitioners' own tract of land.

Accretion as a mode of acquiring property under said Article 457, requires the concurrence ofthe following requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be gradual andimperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the

land where the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited, while alluvium is the soil deposited onthe estate fronting the river bank ; the owner of such estate is called the riparian owner.Riparian owners are, strictly speaking, distinct from littoral owners, the latter being owners oflands bordering the shore of the sea or lake or other tidal waters.

Petitioners' claim of ownership over the disputed property under the principle of accretion, ismisplaced. The principle of accretion is only applicable to owners whose estates are adjacentto rivers as stated in Article 457 of NCC. The disputed land is an accretion on a river bankBUT NOT ON A SEA BANK, or on what used to be the foreshore of Manila Bay which isadjoined petitioner own tract of land on the northern side. As such the applicable law is not

Art. 457 but Art 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters 1866. The disputed property is an accretion

on a sea bank, Manila Bay being an inlet or an arm of the sea; as such is part of the PUBLICDOMAIN, the herein disputed land is intended for public uses, and so long aas the land inlitigation belongs to the public domain and is not reserved for public use, IT IS NOTCAPABLE OF BEING APPROPRIATED BY ANY PRIVATE PERSON, except throughexpress authorization granted in due form by a competent authority. Only executive andlegislative have right and power to make the declaration that the lands so gained by action ofthe sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishmentof special industries or for coast guard services. Petitioner failed to show that either executiveor legislative has declared the disputed land as qualified under ART 4 of the Spanish Law ofWaters 1866, to be property of petitioners as owners of the estate adjacent thereto.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review is hereby DENIED and DISMISSED.Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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Francisco Depra vs Agustin Dumlao