Framework for Sustained Peace, Development, and

Poverty Eradication

Dr. Taj Elsir Mahjoub

Nairobi 2005

Outline

1. JAM: Motivation, Objectives, Scope and Process

2. Emerging Shared Vision for Poverty Eradication Strategy and MDGs

3. Program and policy priorities

4. Financing Needs and Institutional Arrangements

5. Monitoring Arrangements

6. Conclusion

1. Motivation: Machakos Protocol, 2002

Lays out the parties’ vision to achieve sustained peace

Addresses key causes of the conflict

Presents a historic opportunity to overcome the devastation of war and neglect (5Rs)

Need for extraordinary efforts to realise this opportunity

JAM: Objectives and Scope

Objectives: Assessment and costing of the reconstruction and development

requirements for consolidation and sustenance of peace in the post-conflict Sudan

Framework for sustained peace, development and poverty eradication with clear benchmarks for assessing progress

Scope and Emphasis: Diagnostic: Quantitative, qualitative, field work, conflict, environment

and gender analysis and consultations Poor and most disadvantaged parts of the country, Policies and programs focus on poverty eradication, acceleration to

reach the MDGs and on redressing disparities Thematic Areas: Institutional development, rule of law, economic

policy, productive sectors, basic social services, infrastructure, livelihoods and social protection, and information and statistics)

Covers reconstruction and development needs within national priorities, efforts and budget commitments

Covers the Interim Period, through 2011, but focuses on critical first two years (2005-07)

JAM: Process and Structure

Conducted by the World Bank and the United Nations Partnership with technical teams from GOS and SPLM Substantial input from Civil Society and international

development partners Focus on capacity building Running for nearly one year, in parallel to the peace process,

and to support the peace process through joint technical dialogue and policy training

Ownership Process: Ensure local ownership and buy-in from domestic and international stakeholders through broad-based consultations

Structure: (Core Coordination Group, Core Teams, Higher/National Committees, Council of Ministers/ Leadership Council)

December 2003: CCG established in Nairobi

August 2004: Joint Poverty Eradication Strategy developed by parties

Jan/Feb 2005: Core team to draft synthesis report – GoS, SPLM, UN, WB – in Addis Ababa

May 2004: Signing of 3 Naivasha Protocols

Sectoral Field

Assessment M

issions Drafting of

cluster reports

and synthesis

report

February 2004: Preparatory phase initiated

January 2005: Signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement

September 2004: Official launch of JAM at joint retreat in Nairobi

Consultations and

sharing of final

report

March 2005: Final report circulated to donors

April 2005: Donors conference in Oslo

JAM Timeline

September 2004: IPF meeting in Oslo

Dec 04/Jan 2005: Joint sectoral sessions/workshops

2. Emerging Shared Vision for Poverty Eradication and the MDGs

1. Implementing the CPA;

2. Building decentralised governance, characterised by transparency and accountability;

3. Ensuring macro-stability;

4. Comprehensive capacity building programmes at all levels;

5. Enabling environment for private sector and rural development;

6. Empowering local communities and civil society groups;

7. Managing resources in an environmentally sound way

8. Exerting maximum efforts to spread a culture of peace

9. Promoting access to services

10. Building a sound and simple system to monitor and evaluate progress towards the MDGs

Patterns of Growth and Poverty Important economic gains achieved in 1990s following macro

stabilization, but pattern of growth is unbalanced

Wide poverty variation both between--and within--North, South, and three areas

NorthNorth SouthSouth

(Darker color indicates higher level of poverty)(Darker color indicates higher level of poverty)

Human Development IndexState-level and Cross-Country Comparison

Disparities in outcomes large, both across states and compared to neighbors and countries with similar income levels, with Southern Sudan among the worst in the world

Worse-off states are comparable to Ethiopia, which has a much lower per capita income

0.20.25

0.30.35

0.40.45

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3. Program And Policy Priorities

Two broad phases: Immediate recovery and consolidation of

peace in the first 2 ½ years (mid-2005-2007) Scaling-up for MDGs in Phase II (through

2011)

Embedded in the CPA, and building on the principles laid out for the Poverty Eradication Strategy (PRSP)

National Government (NG) and Northern States

Committed to strategic objectives:

1. Enable consolidation of the CPA at all levels through capacity building and increased political commitment;

2. Improve governance through promoting human rights, decentralization, improved management capacity, and anti-corruption measures;

3. Broad-based growth of income-earning opportunities through stable macroeconomic framework and policy reform; and

4. Expanding access to basic services.

Cross-cutting objective: Ensure pro-poor programs that make unity attractive

2005* 2006 2007 Phase I Total

Share of total (% )

Capacity building & institutional development

11 28 39 78 2

Governance and rule of law 21 56 56 133 4 Economic policy 23 63 44 130 4 Productive sectors 93 203 211 507 16 Basic social services 217 580 697 1495 47 Infrastructure 17 47 318 382 12 Livelihoods and social protection** 68 180 161 409 13 Information & statistics 7 25 27 59 2 Total 458 1183 1552 3193 100

Notes: * For 2005, July-December only. ** Excluding DDR (estimates not yet available). For details see Volume II. Costs, in particular for infrastructure, will be revised based on further technical analysis and studies.

Phase I JAM costs for National Government (including Three Areas) by Cluster (million US$)

Government of Southern Sudan Strategic objectives:

1. Developing physical infrastructure for roads, river and air;

2. Prioritizing agriculture, and promoting private sector development;

3. Restoring peace and harmony (including through access to basic services, including health, education and water);

4. Regenerating social capital (including safe return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees); and

5. Developing institutional infrastructure for better governance, focusing on public service and service delivery capacity.

Cross-cutting objectives: Achieve rapid results while building long term capacity; and clustering of services to enable development planning decisions in the short to

medium term.

Ambitious program that would be accelerated further provided that implementation proceeds rapidly. Early commitments necessary to build capacity

Phase I JAM costs for Southern Sudan by Cluster (Million US$)

2005* 2006 2007 Phase I Total

Share of total (% )

Capacity building & institutional development 107 236 268 611 17 Governance & rule of law 30 67 46 144 4 Economic policy 1 2 2 4 0.1 Productive sectors 55 120 133 308 9 Basic social services 138 415 442 995 28 Infrastructure 197 260 556 1013 29 Livelihoods and social protection** 76 177 194 446 13 Information & statistics 5.1 13.0 13.3 31 1.0 Total 608 1290 1655 3553 100

For infrastructure: Phased strategy with rapid scale-up once adequate

planning and management capacity is in place and technical and feasibility studies have been prepared

Higher assessed needs to be presented for 2007 if sufficient implementation capacity in place

Notes: * For 2005, July-December only. ** Excluding DDR (estimates not yet available). For details see Volume II. Costs, in particular for infrastructure, will be revised based on further technical analysis and studies.

High and rising Pro-Poor Ratio, Declining External Share (%)

Total JAM needs Financing gap National Government 4.3 1.2 of which Three Areas 0.7 Government of Southern Sudan 3.6 1.4 Total 7.9 2.6

4a. Financing Needs: Phase I (US $ billions)

2004 2005 2006 2007

National Government

Poverty reducing/Non-South expenditure 11 14 27 30

Share of JAM financed externally - 40 36 18

Government of Southern Sudan Pro-poor/Total spending - 45 65 72

Share of JAM financed externally - 43 41 39

4b. Aid Management Arrangements and the Multi-Donor Trust Funds

“In fragile states, as we support state-building and delivery of basic services, we will ensure that the principles of harmonization, alignment and managing for results are adaptable to environments of weak governance and capacity”

Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, March 2005

Donors asked to work mostly through two MDTFs, established in the CPA, to minimize fragmentation and transaction costs:

One for NG for North and the Three Areas One for Southern Sudan World Bank as administrator

In the South, MDTF to be implemented by a Program Implementation Agency (PIA); appropriate arrangements being put in place in the North

Regular “consortium” meetings to assess results, discuss future directions, and renew pledges

5. Monitoring Framework Immediate start to monitoring of JAM implementation to cultivate a

results-based focus and culture of public & donor accountability.

Results matrices have been developed At the cluster level Overall summary monitoring framework

Monitoring framework is instrument for dialogue at several levels: Line agency, cabinet, NG and GOSS - donor and donor-donor

reported to Sudan Consortium

Designed to be comprehensive –including security and political -- framework – and with integral link to emerging Poverty Eradication Strategy

Sample of Summary Monitoring Framework 1 – Institutions & Decen. 2 – Governance & Rule of Law 3 – Economic Policy

NG, GOSS: Decentralization and competencies of lower levels of government clarified

NG: Interim National Constitution adopted NG: Policies conducive for macroeconomic stability with high growth maintained

NG, GOSS: National Civil Service Commission established

All levels: National Assembly, Council of State Assembly, and State Legislature established

NG: Bank of Sudan restructured including establishment of Bank of Southern Sudan branch, enacting banking laws, rules & borrowing regulations

GOSS: New Ministries established NG, GOSS, 3 A: Commissions, institutions, etc. as agreed in CPA established and operational

NG: Finalize preparations and begin issuance of the new currency

3 A: Requirements for state governments in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile reviewed. Abyei Executive Council

GOSS: Adoption of Southern Sudan constitution, and state constitutions

NG: National Petroleum Commission, MTDF operational

GOSS: System and formula for intergovernmental transfers established

NS, 3 A: State constitutions adopted GOSS: MDTF operational

NG: Framework for Civil Service Reform approved including resizing plans and review of pay structure

NG, GOSS: Review of regulatory framework for NGO and media underway

NG, GOSS: Public Expenditure Review (PER) initiated, and work on functional classification of the budget continues

GOSS: Recruitment policy and stocktaking of civilian employees finalized

NG, GOSS: Begin review of customary laws and practices

All levels: Joint Interim Poverty Eradication Strategy (I-PES) elaborated in a participatory way and finalized

GOSS: Local Government Act adopted 3 A: Decision of the Abyei Boundaries Commission published

GOSS: Auditor General and internal auditors in place

NG: Review of regulatory framework for media

NG, GOSS: JNTT, including monitoring and evaluation unit, established

All levels: Media communication strategy developed to support peace, returnees

NG: FFAM established & begin work on progressive and transparent formula for state transfers

Up t

o e

nd D

ece

mber

2005

Conclusions

1. Historic opportunity building on CPA

2. Fully owned and locally grounded framework

3. Basis for policy and programs to address challenges ahead jointly with development partners, focused on results

4. Implications for Darfur