Framework Answers File

2AT: Deontology

3AT: Util/Consequentalism

4AT: Cummiskey

5AT: Pain-Pleasure Calculus

6AT: Neuro Ethics

7AT: Determinism

8AT: Skepticism

9AT: Relativism

11AT: Moral Realism

12AT: Expressivism/Quasi-Realism

13AT: Kantian Political Theory

14AT: Aristotelian Naturalism

15AT: Cognitivism

16AT: Non-Cognitivism

17AT: Error Theory/Moral Skep

18AT: Emotivism

19AT: Prescriptivism

20AT: Virtue Ethics

21AT: Intuitionism

22AT: Communitarianism

23AT: States ARE Moral Agents

24AT: States ARENT Moral Agents

25AT: Social Contract

26AT: Contractualism

27AT: Veil of Ignorance

28AT: Levinasian Ethics

29AT: Intent/Kavka Analysis

AT: DeontologyAT: Util/ConsequentalismAT: CummiskeyAT: Pain-Pleasure Calculus1) This commits a serious is-ought fallacy: just because man is governed by his response to pain and pleasure doesnt mean that he ought to act to end pain.

2) We have no comparative standard for different types of pain and pleasure. For example, the pleasure of a good meal for someone could be as good as the pleasure of sex for someone else. Theres no way we can objectively judge what constitutes pain and what constitutes pleasure. 3) What we know as good or pleasing is limited by our experienceswe dont know if something else is potentially better. For example, a little child playing with sticks in the mud knows that this is the most enjoyable experience he had. If asked if he wants to go to the beach, hed probably be apprehensive because his knowledge of what is pleasurable is limited. Similarly, our wanting to avoid death or pain could be just as unfounded because we have no knowledge of whats on the other side. AT: Neuro EthicsAT: DeterminismAT: SkepticismAT: Relativism1) C.S. Lewis, Professor of Literature at Cambridge, Mere Christianity, 2005

I know that some people say the idea of a Law of Nature or decent behaviour known to all men is unsound, because different civilisations and different ages have had quite different moralities. But this is not true. There have been differences between their moralities, but these have never amounted to anything like a total difference. If anyone will take the trouble to compare the moral teaching of, say, the ancient Egyptians, Babylonians, Hindus, Chinese, Greeks and Romans, what will really strike him will be how very like they are to each other and to our own. Some of the evidence for this I have put together in the appendix of another book called The Abolition of Man; but for our present purpose I need only ask the reader to think what a totally different morality would mean. Think of a country where people were admired for running away in battle, or where a man felt proud of double-crossing all the people who had been kindest to him. You might just as well try to imagine a country where two and two made five. Men have differed as regards what people you ought to be unselfish to-whether it was only your own family, or your fellow countrymen, or everyone. But they have always agreed that you ought not to put yourself first. Selfishness has never been admired. Men have differed as to whether you should have one wife or four. But they have always agreed that you must not simply have any woman you liked. But the most remarkable thing is this. Whenever you find a man who says he does not believe in a real Right and Wrong, you will find the same man going back on this a moment later. He may break his promise to you, but if you try breaking one to him he will be complaining "It's not fair" before you can say Jack Robinson. A nation may say treaties do not matter, but then, next minute, they spoil their case by saying that the particular treaty they want to break was an unfair one. But if treaties do not matter, and if there is no such thing as Right and Wrong- in other words, if there is no Law of Nature-what is the difference between a fair treaty and an unfair one? Have they not let the cat out of the bag and shown that, whatever they say, they really know the Law of Nature just like anyone else?2) Different peoples conceptions of morality has stayed the same, but their knowledge of fact has changed.

For example, the Nazis did not believe that killing innocent people was moral; instead they believed that the Jews were not innocent, but rather criminals, a grave threat to their society. People who led witch hunts in the 17th century did not think killing women was okay, instead they believed them to be inhuman, parts of the Devil. Their morality was the same as ours, but they had different conceptions of fact than us. No culture believed that killing innocent people was the right thing to do. So this proves that around the world, people inherently have the same conception of what is morally right or wrong. And, although the practices of societies differ it does not mean that the underlying principles of morality are not the same. Velasquez et al 1:

Most ethicists reject the theory of ethical relativism. Some claim that while the moral practices of societies may differ, the fundamental moral principles underlying these practices do not. For example, in some societies, killing one's parents after they reached a certain age was common practice, stemming from the belief that people were better off in the afterlife if they entered it while still physically active and vigorous. While such a practice would be condemned in our society, we would agree with these societies on the underlying moral principle -- the duty to care for parents. Societies, then, may differ in their application of fundamental moral principles but agree on the principles.3) The theory of moral relativism is inherently contradictoryit states that 1) there are no universal moral principles but it also states that 2) one ought to adhere to the moral principles of ones own groupbut that itself is a universal moral principle. 4) If morality is subjective via cultural beliefs it would mean that any attempt at moral reform is impossible. Non-conformity is deemed immoral. Plus subjective morality assumes that all members of society have the same views on morality. Velasquez et al 3:

Other philosophers criticize ethical relativism because of its implications for individual moral beliefs. These philosophers assert that if the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on a society's norms, then it follows that one must obey the norms of one's society and to diverge from those norms is to act immorally. This means that if I am a member of a society that believes that racial or sexist practices are morally permissible, then I must accept those practices as morally right. But such a view promotes social conformity and leaves no room for moral reform or improvement in a society. Furthermore, members of the same society may hold different views on practices. In the United States, for example, a variety of moral opinions exists on matters ranging from animal experimentation to abortion. What constitutes right action when social consensus is lacking?

5) Just because some principals are relative to cultures does not prove that all principals of morality are subjective. Velasquez et al 2:

Also, it is argued, it may be the case that some moral beliefs are culturally relative whereas others are not. Certain practices, such as customs regarding dress and decency, may depend on local custom whereas other practices, such as slavery, torture, or political repression, may be governed by universal moral standards and judged wrong despite the many other differences that exist among cultures. Simply because some practices are relative does not mean that all practices are relative.6) We cannot assume that because some morality is subjective that no morality is subjective; universal moral standards can exist among cultural differences. Velasquez et al 4:

Perhaps the strongest argument against ethical relativism comes from those who assert that universal moral standards can exist even if some moral practices and beliefs vary among cultures. In other words, we can acknowledge cultural differences in moral practices and beliefs and still hold that some of these practices and beliefs are morally wrong. The practice of slavery in pre-Civil war U.S. society or the practice of apartheid in South Africa is wrong despite the beliefs of those societies. The treatment of the Jews in Nazi society is morally reprehensible regardless of the moral beliefs of Nazi society.For these philosophers, ethics is an inquiry into right and wrong through a critical examination of the reasons underlying practices and beliefs. As a theory for justifying moral practices and beliefs, ethical relativism fails to recognize that some societies have better reasons for holding their views than others.5) If morality is subjective via cultural beliefs it would mean that any attempt at moral reform is impossible. Non-conformity is deemed immoral. Plus subjective morality assumes that all members of society have the same views on morality. Velasquez et al 3:

Other philosophers criticize ethical relativism because of its implications for individual moral beliefs. These philosophers assert that if the rightness or wrongness of an action depends on a society's norms, then it follows that one must obey the norms of one's society and to diverge from those norms is to act immorally. This means that if I am a member of a society that believes that racial or sexist practices are morally permissible, then I must accept those practices as morally right. But such a view promotes social conformity and leaves no room for moral reform or improvement in a society. Furthermore, members of the same society may hold different views on practices. In the United States, for example, a variety of moral opinions exists on matters ranging from animal experimentation to abortion. What constitutes right action when social consensus is lacking?

AT: Moral RealismAT: Expressivism/Quasi-RealismAT: Kantian Political Theory

AT: Aristotelian Naturalism

AT: Cognitivism

AT: Non-Cognitivism

AT: Error Theory/Moral Skep1) This is the premise of Error Theory/Moral Skep-->All moral statements are false. Well that statement was just a moral statement, how do we know that that statement was false as well? 2) C.S. Lewis, Professor of Literature at Cambridge, Mere Christianity, 2005

Every one has heard people quarrelling. Sometimes it sounds funny and sometimes it sounds merely unpleasant; but however it sounds, I believe we can learn something very important from listening to the kind of things they say. They say things like this: "How'd you like it if anyone did the same to you?"-"That's my seat, I was there first"-"Leave him alone, he isn't doing you any harm"- "Why should you shove in first?"-"Give me a bit of your orange, I gave you a bit of mine"-"Come on, you promised." People say things like that every day, educated people as well as uneducated, and children as well as grown-ups. Now what interests me about all these remarks is that the man who makes them is not merely saying that the other man's behaviour does not happen to please him. He is appealing to some kind of standard of behaviour which he expects the other man to know about. And the other man very seldom replies: "To hell with your standard." Nearly always he tries to make out that what he has been doing does not really go against the standard, or that if it does there is some special excuse. He pretends there is some special reason in this particular case why the person who took the seat first should not keep it, or that things were quite different when he was given the bit of orange, or that something has turned up which lets him off keeping his promise. It looks, in fact, very much as if both parties had in mind some kind of Law or Rule of fair play or decent behaviour or morality or whatever you like to call it, about which they really agreed. And they have. If they had not, they might, of course, fight like animals, but they could not quarrel in the human sense of the word. Quarrelling means trying to show that the other man is in the wrong. And there would be no sense in trying to do that unless you and he had some sort of agreement as to what Right and Wrong are; just as there would be no sense in saying that a footballer had committed a foul unless there was some agreement about the rules of football.3) Extend all the cards.

Im winning default by RISKeven the slightest chance that the neg is wrong and reality does exist justifies an aff ballot, people are being blown up and killed right now. Any risk that a single person is dying outweighs his vague mumbo jumbo.

4) If there is no way to prove that anything is true, there is no basis to vote aff or neg because theres no such thing as fairness or no obligation towards education. So youll just have to vote aff because I like pudding.

AT: Emotivism

AT: Prescriptivism

AT: Virtue Ethics

AT: Intuitionism

AT: Communitarianism

AT: States ARE Moral Agents

AT: States ARENT Moral AgentsAT: States lack a single will, ability to form a single intent

a) Even individuals lack the ability to form one single intent just like the state. Just like different policy-makers within the state have different intents and views towards an action, individuals have different motivations going in their heads towards an actionaltruistic, selfish, etc. Whenever we consider taking an action, we dont form one single will, but rather a compromise of our different wills, and we ultimately take a single course of action.

b) strange conception of agencyuntenable that humans and states operate under same agency standards

AT: States lack self-awareness. There is no state that conceives of itself that is a state.

a) Just because states dont have constant self-awareness, doesnt mean they dont have holistic self-awareness. For example, people change as a person, their?

people change as a persondoesnt mean that it needs constant self-awareness, just a holistic self awareness

b) People who form the state have a conception of their stateliness---for example the president acts differently as a statesman than as an individual.

AT: you have to exist within a moral realm and the international arena isnt a moral realmthere is no legislation

a) beg the question of if states are moral actors in the first place (states arent moral actors because theres no international moral arena, and theres no international moral arena because states arent moral actors) (Thomas DonaldsonInternational Deontology Defended)

AT: Theres no higher arena to enforce morality for states.

a) Well theres no higher arena to enforce morality for individuals.

AT: Social Contract

AT: Contractualism

AT: Veil of Ignorance

AT: Levinasian EthicsAT: Intent/Kavka Analysis1) The Kavka analysis states that intentions determine whether an action is moral or not. However, Alfred Mele, in a direct answer to Kavka, writes theres no such thing as intention, only reasons to do something.

Alfred R. Mele, Effective Deliberation about what to intend: Or striking it rich in a toxin-free environment, Philosophical Studies, Volume 79, Number 1, pg. 85-93

According to a popular view, practical reasoning or deliberation, by its very nature, is about what to do, not about what to intend to do. This view is threatened by the alleged existence of reasons for intending to A that are not also reasons for A-ing. For example, in Gregory Kavka's toxin puzzle (1983), a billionaire offers people a million dollars for intending by midnight to drink a certain nonfatal toxin tomorrow. Since the payoff is for intending, not for drinking, people desirous of riches seemingly have a reason for intending to drink the toxin that is not also a reason for drinking it - a reason constituted by a desire to gain a million dollars and a belief that one's intending to drink the toxin would suffice for that. Further, someone possessed of such a reason seemingly may deliberate about what to intend. Suppose an agent, Ann, were to receive not only the standard toxin offer, but also a counter-offer: another billionaire, whom Ann knows to be somewhat less trustworthy, offers her 1.5 million for not intending to drink one toxin and for intending instead to drink two. It looks as though Ann may deliberate about whether to intend to drink one toxin or, instead, to intend to drink two.We are faced, then, with an apparent challenge to the following pair of theses: (T1) Reasons for intending to A do not extend beyond reasons for A-ing; (T2) Deliberation, by its very nature, is never (even in part) about what to intend. My primary concern is a related thesis: (T3) Reasons for intending to A that are not also reasons for A-ing cannot play a deliberative role in the information of an intention to A. Let us say that a reason for intending to A that is not also a reason for A-ing is a special reason for intending. T. L. M. Pink represents the view that there are no special reasons for intending (i.e., T1) as a "conventional view" and attributes it to Aristotle, G. E. M. Anscombe, Donald Davidson, and Michael Bratman (Pink 1991, pp. 344-45). Anscombe claimed that "grounds of intention are only reasons for acting" (1963, p. 90). That a philosopher who focuses on relatively normal cases of intentional action and associated practical reasoning should arrive at this position is unsurprising. In normal cases of deliberation, on a popular view, we deliberate about what to do and ot~r intentions fall in line, either as deliberative conclusions or as consequences (in part) of concluding deliberative judgments) But in normal cases, if the popular view is right, there is no reward for intentions themselves, independently of the behavior that they prompt or sustain in the intending agent. Should it be granted that atypical cases are conceivable - cases featuring "special" reasons for intending - the conceptual landscape would look different: there would seem to be a deliberative route to intentions that the conventional view does not countenance, a route involving deliberative consideration of special reasons for intending.

This argument is going to be game over for the affirmative because it is giving you a reason why intentions arent going to be as important

2) Fallacy of Origin

Just because moral intentions form the basis for moral actions doesnt mean that moral permissibility is based on just moral intentions. Just because water and food form the basis of human life doesnt mean that we are morally obligated to protect food and water. Moral Intentions are a necessary condition, but not a sufficient condition to form a moral action. 3) Assumes that

4) When coupled with the state as an actor, this is COMPLETELY condradictory in so far as a state cannot form an intention. Moreover, we cannot accurately determine the intent for a state (or anyone else for that matter).