FOURTH SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT

Brief summary on the International Advisory

Board for the UAE nuclear program

The International Advisory Board (IAB) was a concept first developed by the UAE government to augment the transparency of its peaceful nuclear energy program. Indeed, the commitment to form such a body was among the original commitments undertaken by the UAE government in its original white paper describing its intent to evaluate and potentially deploy peaceful nuclear energy within its borders.

More specifically, the IAB represents an unprecedented collection of internationally recognized experts in various disciplines associated with the nuclear energy sector. The board includes world-class expertise in the areas of nuclear safety, security and non-proliferation, as well as regulation, quality assurance, operations, human resource development and waste management associated with the construction, operation and decommissioning of civil nuclear power plants. Led by Dr. Hans Blix, the former Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (from 1982-1997), the IAB is charged with conducting semi-annual reviews of the UAE’s entire peaceful nuclear energy program and subsequently preparing a semi-annual report summarizing their observations, findings and recommendations. The decision by the UAE government to make these reports available to the public in hard-copy form and over the internet represents yet another example of the latter’s commitment to achieving the highest standards of transparency in its peaceful nuclear energy program.

The IAB, while not invested with any legally binding powers, has nevertheless been designed to be an independent advisory body. As stated above, after each of its semi-annual meetings, the Board will issue a report detailing the consensus views of its members with regard to the progress achieved by the program, as well as any areas of concern that merit special attention. The Government will not seek to edit these consensus IAB views and will undertake to publish them free of modification, as intended by the IAB members. Notably, however, the government and the IAB membership have agreed to work together to make those modifications necessary to avoid the dissemination of any sensitive security-related information to which the IAB may have access

While the IAB’s semi-annual reports may address additional topics, they will always be required to specifically address the issues of:

1. Nuclear safety2. Nuclear security3. Nuclear non-proliferation4. Program transparency5. Program sustainability

The UAE government, and those entities involved in the UAE will use the Board’s semi-annual reports to improve performance and, where necessary, allocate additional resources in order to ensure the successful implementation of the over-all program. It is hoped that the UAE populace and the international community will use the reports as an objective source of information via which they may become more informed about and follow the progress of the UAE’s nuclear sector.

Contents

1 Safety1 Safety assessment and recommendations 5 Security5 Security assessment and recommendations 6 Non - proliferation6 Non-proliferation assessment and recommendations8 Transparency8 Transparency assessment and recommendations 9 Sustainability9 Sustainability assessment and recommendations 11 Acknowledgement

CHAIRMAN’SPREFACE

With great satisfaction, I transmit to you the fourth report of the International Advisory Board on the development of the United Arab Emirates’ Nuclear Power Program. This report recognizes the continued progress made in the five areas of the IAB’s mandate and new challenges that arise. The challenges include: learning from the Fukushima accident, developing a waste disposal policy, and creating and sustaining employment for the nuclear industry. For its part, the Board is committed to provide recommendations to help the responsible entities to improve their performance in meeting all challenges. I would like to thank all the entities for their contributions to the fourth meeting of the Board and supporting this report and for endorsing the Board’s recommendations. Thanks are also due to the Board members for their continuous efforts in developing this report.

With respect,Dr. Hans Blix

Dr. Hans Blix IAB Chairman

BOARD MEMBERS

Mr. Jacques Bouchard Special advisor to the Chairman of CEA (Atomic Energy Comission) - France

Ambassador Thomas Graham Executive Chairman of Light Bridge Corporation - USA

Lady Barbara Judge Former Chairman of the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority

Mr. Jukka Laaksonen Former Director General of Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority - Finland

Dr. KunMo Chung Former Minister of Science and Technology - Republic of Korea

Mr. Takuya Hattori President of Japan Atomic Industrial Forum Inc. (JAIF)

Dr. Mujid Kazimi Professor of Nuclear & Mechanical Engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Sir John Rose Former Chief Executive of Rolls - Royce plc

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The fourth meeting of the International Advisory Board (IAB) for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) nuclear power program was held in Abu Dhabi on November 20 and 21, 2011. Eight of the nine members of the Board were in attendance. The Board meeting was opened by the IAB Chairman on the evening of November 20. At this meeting Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi, the UAE representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency delivered a detailed report for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) via telephone from Vienna. This was followed by a comprehensive presentation by Dr. William Travers, the Director General of the Federal Authority for Nuclear Regulation (FANR), accompanied by his senior colleagues.The subsequent discussions were held the next day at the Braka Nuclear site - some 300 kilometres west of Abu Dhabi - following a two-hour tour of the site. At this session, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC), led by CEO Mohamed Al Hammadi accompanied by his senior staff, conducted a highly detailed, in-depth briefing covering a number of subjects. The ENEC presentation was followed by briefings by Khalifa University (KU) and the Critical National Infrastructure Authority (CNIA).

The briefings by the various stakeholders focused on the five central areas of the IAB’s responsibility: safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability. The Board had formulated a number of questions and requests in its Report on the third semi-annual meeting which was held in March 2011. All of these requests were addressed throughout the various briefings during the course of their fourth meeting. Of greatest importance amongst these were requests to visit the nuclear site at Braka; a briefing on an assessment of safety issues associated with the reactors to be deployed at the Braka site in light of the lessons learned from the Fukushima accident; and a briefing on cyber security.

To specifically highlight the response to Fukushima, MOFA presented the general response by the government of the UAE to Fukushima and FANR described the progress of its Fukushima task force. FANR is closely following the reaction of other countries and has requested a report from ENEC on how lessons learned from the accident

would be applied to the Braka 1 and Braka 2 nuclear power plants. ENEC presented the interim results of its Fukushima assessment to the Board. The Board once again found the government of the UAE in its nuclear power program to be fully committed to the principles of safety, security, non-proliferation, transparency and sustainability.

Safety assessment and recommendations

Upon Conclusion of the third meeting of the IAB the Board had some questions on the subject of safety and summarized these in its Report. A set of such questions pertained to the issue of site selection. For example, can locations of reactors within the site boundaries be changed or are they fixed? To what extent did the proximity of international borders versus technical considerations influence the selection of the site, and what specific risks are associated with the selected site? Second, how are radiation emitters to be analysedand what will the procedure be for setting limits for workers? Third, the Board requested more information on the verification and validation procedure to ensure compatibility of the Westinghouse digital instrumentation and control system with the APR-1400.

The Fukushima accident took place a few days after the March 2011 Board meeting and in its Report the Board requested a report on lessons learned from Fukushima and their application to safety considerations related to the reactors to be deployed at the Braka site. The Board also added a number of additional requests for information on the aftermath of the Fukushima accident. In particular the IAB wanted to know the potential vulnerability of the APR-1400 to be deployed at the Braka site to earthquakes

SAFETY

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and high water levels from the Gulf. To what extent will the elevation of the reactors and other safety critical facilities on the site affect this? How will the lessons learned specifically affect existing plans for construction? Furthermore, the Board inquired about relevance of climatic differences between Korea and the Gulf.

ENEC presented its response to some of these specifics throughout its discussion of site selection. ENEC examined the effect of high water in the Gulf either caused by a storm or a high tsunami. The Braka site is located on the Gulf, as stated above, some 300 kilometres west of Abu Dhabi. The site grade level at the power block area where the safety-related structures are situated is established at elevation (EL) 6.5 m. The forebay area where the storm surge effects are dominant is established at EL 7.5 m to comply with a dry site concept. It is estimated that the wave run-up from cyclones would be a maximum of 3.40 meters and the associated high tide another 3.09 meters for a total of 6.49 meters as the maximum sea water level near the reactor site. This would leave approximately a one meter safety margin against inundation in connection with the storm event that has been used as the design basis.

The analysis relied upon by ENEC concludes that the nearest place where a Fukushima class undersea earthquake could take place would be along the western coast of India. The resulting tsunami would have some distance to travel and then have to enter the Gulf through the narrow entrance of the Straits of Hormuz. This would significantly diminish any tsunami threat with the maximum wave level run-up estimated at 3.12 meters and an associated high tide of 1.99 meters, totalling a 5.11 meter increase, again well within the safety margin.

With respect to a direct earthquake danger, while historically there is considerable seismic activity in Iran, particularly along the Gulf coast, and a Fukushima grade event that occurred around 750 kilometres away at Makran (8.5 magnitude), there is little historical seismicity in the Gulf itself and virtually none on the Arabian shore. Thus, there would appear to be little threat of an earthquake to the Braka site.

Dust and sandstorms however are another matter.

For planning protection against them, ample reference data and practical experience has been collected from the oil and gas industry. ENEC is planning for about four major sandstorms and eight to 20 dust storms per year, plus forecasting that most of the year will be affected by dust haze. FANR is awaiting technical submission on relevant environmental data and design measures to mitigate the effect of sandstorms and dust storms. The Board showed interest in hearing more about how this might affect the reactors.

ENEC selected the preferred site and has presented the technical justifications of site characteristics in the Preliminary Safety Analysis Report that accompanied its December 2010 application for a construction license. FANR is reviewing this information including its hydrology and general suitability and will make a recommendation in the context of issuing the license.

With respect to the issue of radiation protection, FANR-Reg-04 establishes dose limits and requires optimization of public and occupational exposures from nuclear facilities. The approach is consistent with the ICRP (International Commission on Radiological Protection) recommendations that are generally used as a reference for national and international radiation protection standards. Occupational exposures will be set below a level chosen by the operator and approved by FANR. FANR- Reg- 11 establishes detailed requirements for the radiation protection program for nuclear facilities; for predisposal management of nuclear waste; for the clearance and discharges of radioactive material; and for environmental monitoring. The Operator is to establish a safety case for discharges to ensure that public exposure is minimized and in any case below dose limits. The Operator is also to establish an environmental monitoring program to demonstrate compliance.

Turning explicitly to the issue of Fukushima and the application of lessons learned to the reactors to be built at the Braka site, three agencies-MOFA, FANR and ENEC-had important contributions to make.

First on the agenda was MOFA. Ambassador Al Kaabi began with general comments focused on the governmental and public response to

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the Fukushima accident. He noted that after careful consideration the government has decided on no change to its policy on nuclear power for the Emirates and the results of a recent public survey indicated that 85% of the public supported nuclear energy for the UAE. The government will, however, incorporate any lessons learned from Fukushima. ENEC has been asked to conduct a review of the reactor design in light of the accident. Accordingly the government will closely follow related international action, particularly at the IAEA and specifically with respect to additional regulations for operation and for the industry.

FANR in its briefing noted that it has established its own Fukushima task force. Its purpose is to learn and apply appropriate lessons from the Fukushima accident to FANR’s regulatory work and to the licensing of the Braka nuclear power site. In addition, FANR has requested ENEC to submit a report “describing its assessment of how recent experience at Fukushima and lessons learned so far have been applied to address any potential safety issues at the Braka facility”. This report by ENEC is due on December 31, 2011. Upon request by the Chairman, the Board will be furnished with a copy of this report as soon as it is available so as to permit discussion on the report at the next Board meeting.

FANR will also monitor the actions of regulators in other countries and evaluate their applicability to the UAE. FANR has specifically followed actions of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group. Also FANR will support the actions of the international community in response to the action plan of the IAEA and at various international meetings. There will be continuous outreach by FANR to national stakeholders within the UAE on the various issues relating to Fukushima.

ENEC presented an interim analysis of its assessments developed so far in preparing the Fukushima report due to be submitted to FANR by the end of 2011. After the Fukushima accident ENEC established a safety review task force. ENEC and KEPCO [1] teams met at the end of September 2011 to discuss the applicability of various action items decided upon by the Korean government in relation to Fukushima to

the Braka site. The teams met again in October 2011 to develop a common proposed list of such items for the Braka site. Meanwhile ENEC has forged ahead in its preparation of the report.

The following are some of the interim developments, which have resulted from the ENEC-KEPCO collaboration, and the development of the draft report on Fukushima lessons. It has been concluded that there is no need to increase design parameters for potential earthquakes since a conservative evaluation has always been pursued at the Braka site. The seismic alarm system will be somewhat modified. As indicated earlier in this Report the planned 6.5.meters elevation at the power block area is considered sufficient to protect against tsunamis as well as storm surge. Nevertheless, there is a plan under development for watertight doors for auxiliary buildings to increase the margin beyond design basis events. An important lesson of the Fukushima accident was the importance of a reliable electrical power supply, and strengthening power supply systems has been widely considered, taking into account the Braka site-related safety issues. There is an on-going review of the potential impact of sandstorms, dust storms, other dust events and dust haze on various design features. There is also an intensive and on-going assessment of the risk of complete station blackout (i.e., loss of both all off-site power and on-site power from emergency diesel generators of a plant unit. The existing current provisions for complete station blackout comprise two turbine driven auxiliary feed water pumps per plant unit and a common air cooled emergency diesel generator (AAC) serving the entire NPP. Plans for increasing plant robustness to address possible complete station black-out include: DC battery life extension (8 to 16 hours); emergency diesel generators cross-tie between different plant units via AAC cabling; AAC diesel fuel tank capacity increase (8 to 24 hours); and possible improvements in power supply protection against seismic and flooding events.

Passive fire barriers and active fire protection systems are being analyzed, especially in view of their capability to prevent fire propagation between spaces housing redundant power supply systems.

SAFETY

[1] KEPCO should mean ‘the KEPCO nuclear group’, which consists of KEPCO, KHNP, KEPCO E&C (KOPEC), KPS, KNF and other member companies of the KEPCO

nuclear group

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The severe accident mitigation design features already included in the APR-1400 that is to be deployed at the Braka site include: primary coolant depressurization system using pilot operated steam relief valves (opening by operator control is possible) for preventing core melt down in high-pressure conditions; a large volume reactor cavity; a reactor cavity flooding system; a hydrogen management system (passive recombiners and back-up igniters in small spaces such as steam generator boxes); large dry pre-stressed containment; and a back-up system for emergency containment spray (using fire truck and external hook-up). Possible new systems under evaluation for increasing plant robustness at the Braka site include an external spent fuel pool fill line and a passive hydrogen recombiner in the spent fuel building. At the Board meeting with FANR on November 20, 2011 there was an extensive discussion of whether or not it would be desirable to include in the design of the APR-1400 reactors to be deployed at Braka so-called “core catchers,” in order to eliminate the possibility of molten core penetrating the containment boundary. No conclusion was reached at that time.

The Chairman noted after the three briefings on Fukushima: the Board would like to see and discuss the ENEC report to FANR on Fukushima; ENEC has checked and calculated the risks for seismic events, storm surges and tsunamis and found the results reassuring; batteries for emergency electricity are designed to last longer than at Fukushima; the Board is interested in hearing more particularly about dust storms. In addition, during the FANR briefing the Chairman raised the issue of the separation of individual nuclear power plants. He noted that in Florida consideration was being given to require the separation of future nuclear power plants to reduce the risk that more than one will be shut down because of a particular hurricane. There are safety, economic (down time), and security issues involved. Director General Travers responded that FANR knew of nothing that would argue for changing plans to locate several reactors at the Braka site but this issue is still being evaluated. The Board recognized that consideration has already been given to the matter but would like to hear more about

this subject at the March 2012 meeting.

FANR indicated that it was about halfway through the 9,000 page application for a construction license at the Braka site. FANR said it uses Contractors to assist in the technical review of the application. Also, FANR utilizes safety evaluations performed by the Korean Institute for Nuclear Safety (KINS) as reference and has contracted external expert organizations to conduct independent safety analysis to verify the analysis submitted by KEPCO. As guidance for its own safety review and assessment FANR is using the Standard Review Plans of the US NRC. Furthermore some advice is received from the IAEA. However, any FANR regulatory judgments will be entirely its own. Thus far, 1,420 requests for additional information (RAI) have been issued to ENEC and there have been 1,170 responses by ENEC. Ninety-one of these FANR RAI’s are related to site evaluation leading to the FANR judgments on such things as possible seismic, tsunami and storm surge threats referred to earlier in this Report. The Board would like to have a further report on progress toward the construction license at its next meeting.

Lastly, on safety, in response to the previous questions of the Board as to the compatibility of the Westinghouse digital instrumentation and control system with the APR-1400, FANR Director General Travers and Tim Herrmann from ENEC stated that the general Westinghouse “Common Q” platform has been licensed by the U.S. NRC in 2001 for safety critical nuclear applications. It has been used in the Westinghouse AP600 and AP1000 designs and by application of APR-1400 specific, which makes it compatible with the APR-1400.

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Security assessment and recommendationsAt the March, 2011 meeting the IAB expressed its desire for a detailed presentation on the issue of cyber security. The Board also asked for more information on the design basis threat (DBT) process and plans for fresh and spent fuel transportation.

Cyber security as the Board requested was a major agenda item for the fourth meeting of the IAB. Cyber attacks have been taken into account to define the DBT. FANR regulations require the applicant/licensee to protect against unauthorized access to communication or computer systems for the purpose of: gaining unauthorized access to sensitive nuclear information; altering system parameters or data; operating, or denying access to equipment or functions; or defeating components of the physical protection system. FANR defines cyber security as “The protection of equipment, systems and networks against attacks by individuals or organizations that would seek to cause harm, damage, or adversely affect the confidentiality, integrity or availability of an information system or that seek to use an information control system for an unauthorized purpose that will affect the functions performed by such equipment systems or networks.” ENEC has been required by FANR to develop a cyber-security plan as part of the physical protection plan for the Braka site. FANR will review the plan and inspect its implementation.

At the fourth IAB meeting ENEC presented the essential details of its cyber security plan. The Board concluded that the plan contains essential features of an advanced security system, in line with approaches seen by the Board members elsewhere. Furthermore, there are innovative approaches that provide security against potential malevolent acts by internal actors who conduct maintenance and testing of digital protection and control systems. The plan will include intensive and continuing training for all personnel and active involvement of security at all stages. The CNIA stated in its briefing that the ENEC cyber security plan would have its full support. The Board expressed its satisfaction that so much thought had been devoted to this highly

important subject.

The CNIA presented a full briefing on the DBT process. The CNIA is responsible for the development of the DBT and communicating it to FANR. It will review and revise the DBT as threat conditions require and will develop a vulnerability assessment to support appropriate protective measures. On the subject of fuel security, CNIA will ensure the protection of nuclear materials at the Braka site. On the subject of fuel supply, it should be noted that as part of the Prime Contract KEPCO will provide the fabrication services for initial core, two reloads and two optional reloads for each nuclear power plant. KEPCO and ENEC have agreed to modify the Prime Contract to allow ENEC to procure the enriched uranium product from diverse sources to enhance security of supply and build commercial capability in ENEC for the long term. KEPCO retains responsibility for the fabrication of the initial core and two reloads. Protection of the transportation of spent fuel will be, of course, part of the UAE nuclear waste disposal plan. Further, in the interest of maintaining security of fuel supply ENEC is also studying the feasibility of developing a fuel assembly plant in Abu Dhabi. CNIA is assisted in its development and maintenance of the DBT by the technical support of FANR. The impact of a large commercial aircraft is within the set of requirements that FANR has established by regulation that an applicant/licensee shall address, that is a design specific assessment of the potential effects of the impact of a large commercial aircraft. ENEC has developed an Aircraft Impact Assessment Report which remains classified. Further, FANR provides by regulation that its Physical Protection Plan includes requirements on the transport of nuclear material.

SECURITY

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Non-proliferation assessment and recommendationsThe IAB in its Report on the third meeting of the Board requested as a regular agenda item information on progress of the implementation of relevant international instruments including the Additional Protocol. Ambassador Al Kaabi provided the requested information in his MOFA report.

The UAE ratified the Additional Protocol (AP) in December 2010 and submitted the initial declaration report in accordance with AP in May 2011. All declaration reports related to the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the AP have been submitted to the IAEA on time. All clarification questions by the IAEA have been answered and other information exchanges on non-proliferation related issues have been conducted in an exemplary manner. Also, development of UAE legislation and more detailed national regulations have properly taken into account the non-proliferation aspects. Stakeholders with non-proliferation obligations have been trained to ensure the awareness of related expectations. Most of the remaining part of the non-proliferation section of the third Report was focused on the necessity of developing a waste disposal policy. The UAE participated in the April 2011 review meeting of the contracting parties to the IAEA Convention on Nuclear Safety. Considerable positive interest was expressed in the UAE approach at the meeting. Under the leadership of the UAE, the GCC commissioned a joint study in December, 2010, to assess potential

areas of cooperation in the field of nuclear energy. The study was completed in June and a comprehensive set of recommendations were made. The subsequent GCC Ministerial meeting adopted the recommendations which define areas of focus for future cooperation; eleven of the 98 recommendations are for cooperation in nuclear waste management. Further, the UAE submitted its first national report in October, 2011, under the IAEA Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management in time to participate in its May, 2012, review meeting.

The UAE Federal Nuclear Law states that the government will issue a national strategy for the long term management of radioactive waste and spent fuel. The study began in February of 2011. Considerable progress has been achieved. The relevant study will be completed in May, 2012. All members were of the view that the development of a policy for management by the UAE of its high level waste is important. Ambassador Al Kaabi stated that he plans to brief the Board on the outcome of the UAE study after May, 2012.

ENEC gave a presentation on the development of the UAE national policy on radiological waste and spent fuel. All options are being maintained pending a UAE decision on this subject. Pursuant to the prime contract, storage capacity at each unit sufficient for spent fuel from 20 years of operation must be provided. Also ENEC is working to segregate sufficient space at the Braka site to permit future construction of a dry cask storage facility. The first phase of the storage plan will involve interim storage for spent fuel for 10-100 years; phase 2 will be ultimate disposition.

NON-PROLIFERATION

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NON-PROLIFERATION

The three options for long-term spent fuel disposal are: reprocess the fuel outside of the UAE; a commercial fuel lease agreement which includes sending spent fuel back to the country of origin; and, a deep geological repository in the UAE. ENEC is currently conducting a table top study to identify possible sites for such a geological repository in the UAE. ENEC is working jointly with FANR and the MOFA in developing the UAE waste disposition policy.

In the view of the Chairman, the UAE must clearly distinguish between low, intermediate and high-level waste; and the UAE must look for a storage site, or sites within its own territory, as there may be no other place where the waste can be sent.

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TRANSPARENCY

Transparency assessment and recommendations

In its Report on the third meeting the Board mentioned ENEC and CNIA plans for reporting news about nuclear related accidents around the world to the general public. The Board emphasized the critical importance of careful decision making and warned against any premature statements by people in responsible positions in connection with the nuclear safety. Also, the Board would like to be briefed on how the Fukushima accident was reported to the public in the UAE.

The UAE nuclear power program continues to receive high marks in the news media with respect to its commitment to transparency. For example, about a month after the meeting, on December 27, 2011, a very positive article on this subject was published in The National. In addition, as mentioned above, the First National Report submitted by the UAE in August 2010, with respect to measures taken to implement the Convention on Nuclear Safety was very well received by the other states’ parties to the Convention at the April 2011 meeting. The early submission by the UAE enabled it to participate in the highly constructive Convention peer review process - which takes place at three year intervals - at this April, 2011 meeting. The UAE Program was described as being an “outstanding approach.”

Lastly, the Board noted in Ambassador Al Kaabi’s briefing the statement that according to a recent survey, 85% of the public in the UAE continue to believe that peaceful nuclear power program is important for the nation even after Fukushima. The board believes that it is important to monitor long term trends of the opinion polls as well as the difference between the opinion of local people near the site and the opinion of the general public. At its March, 2012 meeting the Board would like to have an update on the UAE’s efforts to maintain such good public support ratings including the view of local people near the site. The views of the international community and people in neighboring countries is also important. The Board urges the UAE to keep up its outstanding work in this area.

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Sustainability assessment and recommendations

In its report from the third meeting the Board requested that a visit should be arranged to the Braka site, that the Board should be further informed about the housing developments around the site, about inducements to retain qualified personnel, and about the supply chain to support the program being developed by KEPCO. The ENEC view of the effectiveness of this effort would also be valuable.

The visit to the Braka site was carried out on November 21, 2011 and the Board was very impressed by what it saw. The security already being provided by CNIA is efficient, the cement manufacturing plant has already been built, and the site appeared quite sizable and well situated with considerable on-going activity. The Board was informed during the tour of the site that 3,000 workers were already located at the site and that there would soon be in the range of 10,000 as construction of the power plants begins. ENEC presented a briefing on plans for the Operators Village. It is to be located at Ruwais, on the coast some 240 kilometres west of Abu Dhabi City and approximately 55 kilometres east of the Braka site. The master plan for the Operators Village was approved in September, 2011. Mixed-use development is envisioned with up to 2,200 residences. There will be three phases to be completed in 2015, 2020 and 2030 respectively. The buildings will be contemporary with community facilities which will include religious, educational, healthcare, community/cultural and governmental services. There will also be small parks and recreational spaces. ENEC staff will begin mobilization to the Braka site in mid-2013, numbers will increase steadily through 2014, and there will be a major increase in 2015 with the commissioning of Unit 1. By early 2017, it is expected that there will be over 5,000 residents within the Village.

ENEC briefed the IAB on its staff retention program including corporate training, engineer training, and Senior Reactor Operator (SRO) training along with feeder programs to find highly qualified individuals. A pilot program exists for Emiratis who wish to be SRO trainees.

This program, to consist of 12 trainees, is conducted by ENEC in cooperation with KEPCO. A contract has been signed with Westinghouse to conduct a SRO equivalency course. Abu Dhabi Polytechnic began its higher diploma in nuclear technology course in September, 2011 with 39 students. There are also scholarships to study abroad for BS and MS degrees involving some 131 students, fifteen of whom are females. SRO bonuses are planned with additional compensation and a shorter work schedule for those who work at the Braka site. ENEC understands that long-term staff retention is an important issue. There will continue to be considerable emphasis on as high a percentage of Emiratis as possible (recognizing that some international personnel will need to be retained long term) and a significant percentage of female employees. The UAE nuclear power program will require a maximum commitment by the UAE to its human capital needs.

FANR also is committed to long-term human resource goals. The current core team of experienced international personnel in nuclear

regulation has a strong training and mentoring background. In the mid-term the objective is to develop a skilled cadre of UAE nationals in key areas of responsibility moving long-term to establish nuclear expertise and skills of nuclear expertise within the country while ensuring appropriate support by international experts. The FANR staff is expected to rise to over 200 in 2012. FANR will continue to work with Khalifa University and ENEC to develop the necessary educational infrastructure and a strong UAE nuclear personnel capacity.

Khalifa University (KU) presented a progress

SUSTAINABILITY

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report to the Board on November 21 at the Braka site. KU has many academic partnerships including major relevant institutions in the Republic of Korea (KAIST), the United States (Texas A&M) and the IAEA (NKM Unit). The Nuclear Engineering faculty presently comprise of 4 permanent professors and one laboratory engineer, supplemented by 4 KAIST professors on secondment from KAIST. Besides the MSc program in Nuclear Engineering, the BSc program in Mechanical Engineering now includes a minor in Nuclear Engineering directed to all Scholarship students. MSc students comprise 5 now in their 2nd year of study and 7 enrolled in their first year. In addition the Nuclear Engineering Department now has 4 commissioned research laboratories in the areas of Nuclear Instrumentation & Control, Reactor Design & Analysis, Nuclear Materials Science, and Nuclear Environmental and Waste Management. In the Board’s judgment Khalifa University is demonstrating a sound commitment to the long-term future of nuclear academics and research in the UAE.

The IAB stressed the importance of competent professionals in order to achieve a successful UAE nuclear power program. The program should emphasize professional competency in connection with planning, design, construction, operation, maintenance and management of nuclear power plants. On the job hands-on experience is essential. General disciplinary education is not enough. Hands-on, on-site training and education should be essential.

ENEC presented an update on the supply chain for the program. A Supplier Conference for ENEC’s corporate requirements was organized in 2011 followed by two smaller workshops to assist specific suppliers. Also ENEC has organized and hosted foreign trade missions, including missions from the United States, France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Australia. Lastly, an update on the development of a nuclear liability regime was provided by Ambassador Al Kaabi. The UAE is committed to join the 1997 Vienna Convention and the 1988 Joint Protocol. There is on-going internal consultation on the proposed UAE federal legislation nuclear liability draft. There also has been consultation on this subject with the IAEA Office of Legal Affairs. The draft

legislation has been submitted to the cabinet but as yet no decision has been reached. Also the UAE has accepted the GCC recommendation that the GCC member states join the 1997 Vienna Convention and harmonize implementing regulations. The next steps for the UAE are the following: deposit the Instrument of Accession with the IAEA to become a party to the Vienna Convention; deposit the Instrument of Accession with the IAEA to become a party to the 1988 Joint Protocol; and after the consultation process is complete submit a final draft of the federal law to the cabinet.

The Board commends the UAE and all of the supporting entities for an outstanding and constructive meeting and the continuing success and progress of the nuclear power program. In the view of the board it was an excellent piece of work as all of the Board’s questions from the third meeting were answered and as requested there was a visit to the Braka site along with comprehensive presentations on Fukushima and cyber security.

The primary subjects on which the Board would like to be briefed on at the March, 2012 meeting are the following: a progress report on the Construction License-what issues are still open?; other potential uses of nuclear power in the UAE beyond the straightforward use of electricity generation, such as desalinization and industrialization; issues surrounding the co-location of multiple nuclear power reactors; further consideration of the nuclear waste issues, including the search for a possible site for high-level waste disposal; ENEC’s report on Fukushima; the potential effects of sand and dust storms on the nuclear power plants to be deployed at the Braka site; more on the development of the Braka site; recruitment—including that of women; more on the development of research compatibility in the UAE such as at Khalifa University; and an update on efforts to maintain the current strong public support of the program, including a description of how the Fukushima accident was reported to the UAE public.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The International Advisory Board wouldlike to thank all those who were involvedin developing this report.