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Congress of the Republic of the Philippines HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

House of Representatives Complex Constitution Hills, Quezon City

IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT OF BENIGNO S. AQUINO III AS PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ACT Teachers Party-List Representative ANTONIO L. TINIO; National Artist for Literature BIENVENIDO LUMBERA; CYNTHIA N. LUMBERA; Alliance of Concerned Teachers Philippines Chairperson (ACT Philippines) BENJAMIN G. VALBUENA, Secretary General FRANCISCA L. CASTRO, and Deputy Secretary General VLADIMER A. QUETUA; Quezon City Public School Teachers Association (QCPSTA) President DR. PRISCILLA D. AMPUAN; ACT National Capital Region-Union Secretary JOSELYN F. MARTINEZ; Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) President LOUIE L. ZABALA; ACT State Universities and Colleges Spokesperson CLEVE KEVIN ROBERT V. ARGUELLES and Local Universities and Colleges Representative VERONICA L. GREGORIO; All-UP Workers Union (AUPWU) Former National President FELIX PARIṄAS and National President DR. RAMON GUILLERMO; Congress of Teachers and Educators for Nationalism and Democracy (CONTEND-UP) Chairperson DR. GERARDO LANUZA; UP Kilos Na Convenor SARAH JANE RAYMUNDO; and AIM Faculty Association President PROF. EMMANUEL LEYCO,

Complainants.

IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON AQUINO III

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PREFATORY

The people have risen up against institutionalized patronage and legitimized graft and corruption as embodied by the pork barrel system. Their nationwide rage and activism pushed the Supreme Court (SC) to promulgate Belgica vs. Ochoa1 and declare as unconstitutional portions of that system, the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) or “congressional pork” and two forms of “presidential pork,” for violating the principles for a democratic and transparent government.

Ruled the High Court, “provisions of past and present Congressional

Pork Barrel Laws…which authorize/d legislators—whether individually or collectively organized into committees—to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight…[and] all informal practices of similar import and effect.”2 The SC has ruled that the practice of dealing pork to lawmakers (1) violates constitutional principles of separation of powers, the non-delegability of legislative power, and the presidential veto power; (2) impairs public accountability; and (3) subverts genuine local autonomy. In other words, congressional pork, however dealt, destroys the foundations of democratic and transparent government and allows the people’s money to be used for purposes other than their interest.

The Decision embodies the letter and spirit of the law, clear and undeniable to everyone—most especially the President, the highest official duty-bound to implement all laws. This law, in turn, ensures that the interests of the people are served, through the proper and transparent management and disbursement of the funds they have entrusted to the government.

In spite of the Decision, and contrary to his pronouncements to the public that “it is time to abolish PDAF,”3 President Benigno Simeon Aquino III has retained the congressional pork barrel—albeit in ways that are hidden in plain sight, an open secret running rampant in agencies directly under his watch.

By his perpetuation of informal practices of dealing pork barrel to

members of Congress to the detriment of public interest, President Benigno 1 G.R. No. 208566, 19 November 2013. Hereinafter, the Decision.

2 The Decision, pages 69-70.

3 Pahayag ni Pangulong Aquino ukol sa abolisyon ng PDAF, ika-23 ng Agosto 2013. Available in

http://www.gov.ph/2013/08/23/pahayag-ni-pangulong-aquino-ukol-sa-abolisyon-ng-pdaf-ika-23-ng-agosto-2013/. Last accessed on 10 August 2014.

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Simeon Aquino III broke his oath of office and betrayed the public trust. By his blatant violation of the legal prohibition against congressional pork, he deliberately, gravely, and culpably violated the Constitution. With these acts, he has proven himself unfit and undeserving to continue occupying the seat entrusted to him by the Filipino people.

THE ACTION

1. This is an impeachment complaint against President Aquino for his betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution in relation to his blatant violation of the law prohibiting congressional pork barrel laid down in the Belgica v. Ochoa ruling.

2. Complainants accuse Benigno Simeon Aquino III, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, of betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution. This Complaint will detail how he, as Chief Executive, has laid in place procedures and practices which allow legislators to exercise post-enactment discretion, intervention, and participation in the use of lump-sum funds appropriated for a number of national government agencies. In short, he is responsible for perpetuating the prohibited Congressional Pork Barrel.

JURISDICTION

3. This verified impeachment complaint is being filed before the House of Representatives, for immediate referral to its Committee on Justice pursuant to its rules and Article XI, Section 3 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.4

PARTIES

4. Complainants, all Filipinos and of legal age, are: a. ACT Teachers Party-List Representative Antonio L. Tinio, a member of the House of Representatives; b. Bienvenido Lumbera, National Artist for Literature;

c. Cynthia N. Lumbera;

4 Section 2 (a) and (b), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings in the House of

Representatives in relation to Section 42, Rule X and Section 28 (aa), Rule IX of the Rules of the House of Representatives and Francisco, Jr. vs. House of Representatives (G.R. No. 160261, 10 November 2003), which implement Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution on the initiation of impeachment complaints.

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d. Benjamin G. Valbuena, Chairperson of the Alliance of Concerned Teachers Philippines;

e. Francisca L. Castro, Secretary General of ACT Philippines;

f. Vladimer A. Quetua, Deputy Secretary General of ACT Philippines; g. Dr. Priscilla D. Ampuan, President of Quezon City Public School Teachers Association (QCPSTA);

h. Joselyn F. Martinez, Secretary of the ACT National Capital Region-Union;

i. Louie L. Zabala, President of the Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA);

j. Cleve Kevin Robert V. Arguelles, Spokesperson of ACT State Universities and Colleges;

k. Veronica L. Gregorio, Local Universities and Colleges Representative of ACT SUCs;

l. Felix Pariñas, Former National President of All-UP Workers Union (AUPWU);

m. Dr. Ramon Guillermo, National President of AUPWU;

n. Dr. Gerardo Lanuza, Chairperson of Congress of Teachers and Educators for Nationalism and Democracy (CONTEND-UP);

o. Prof. Sarah Jane Raymundo, Convenor of UP Kilos Na; and

p. Prof. Emmanuel Leyco, President of the AIM Faculty Association. 5. Complainants may be served with orders and notices from this

House of Representatives through counsel at the address indicated below. 6. Respondent Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III is the incumbent

President of the Republic of the Philippines. He may be served with a copy of this complaint and notices from the House of Representatives at New Executive Building, Malacañang Palace Compound, J.P. Laurel Street, San Miguel, Manila.

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STATEMENT OF FACTS

7. Although discretionary lump sum funds such as PDAF, Malampaya funds, and the President’s Social Fund have been plaguing the public coffers for decades, multibillion-peso scams erupted one after another beginning mid-2013. News and official government reports, mainly Report No. 2012-03 released by the Special Audits Office of the Commission on Audit5 on the allocation and use of Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructure including Local Projects (VILP), proved that these amorphous funds are highly vulnerable to dissipation in favor of the likes of Janet Lim-Napoles, her fake NGOs, and her politician cohorts.

8. Aside from detailing how billions of public funds are lost to graft

and corruption, these accounts show how discretionary lump sums are used for political patronage from the lowest level of government up to the highest. News investigations and analyses detail how the PDAF and its earlier incarnations greased the wheels of Congress6 and, in the process, deprived the people of basic social services.7

9. Widespread public outrage against the pork barrel system fuelled

the August 26 “Million People March” in Luneta, Manila and in several protest sites in and out of the country. It also gave rise to various anti-pork alliances across sectors and classes, all demanding the abolition of all forms of pork, the prosecution of those accountable for looting the public coffers, and the rechanneling of these funds to basic social services. One such alliance is the #AbolishPork Movement, which would later spearhead the People’s Initiative Against Pork (PIAP) to enact a law abolishing the pork barrel system.

10. From late August to early September 2013, three petitions were

filed before the SC questioning the constitutionality of the PDAF. On 10 September, the SC issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the DBM, National Treasurer, Executive Secretary, or any person acting under their authority from releasing the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the General Appropriations Act (GAA) of 2013.8

5 Hereinafter, the COA Report.

6 Pork is a Political, Not A Developmental, Tool. Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, Chua, Yvonne T.

and Cruz, Booma http://pcij.org/stories/2004/pork.html. Last accessed on 9 August 2014. Cited in Belgica (page 3). 7 The people have spoken: End institutionalized plunder now! Center for People Empowerment in Governance

Issue Analysis No. 03, 25 August 2013. Posted in http://www.cenpeg.org/IA%202013/PDF/CenPEG_Analysis_End_Pork_Barrel_Aug_25_2013.pdf. Last accessed on 10 August 2014. 8 Republic Act 10352

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11. On 19 November 2013, the SC promulgated Belgica v. Ochoa, which defines the pork barrel system as “the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members.”9

12. The outlawed PDAF or “congressional pork barrel,” on the other

hand, is “a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices.”10

13. Concluded the High Court: “The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, non-oversight, post[-]enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has similarly violated the principle of non[-]delegability of legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy x x x. “For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic unrest and vociferous public debate, the

9 The Decision, page 35.

10 Ibid.

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Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and no other’s. “WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators—whether individually or collectively organized into committees—to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction x

x x.”11 14. In sum, the SC outlawed the PDAF or “congressional pork barrel”

because it violates separation of powers, non-delegability of legislative power, and the President’s power to veto items in an appropriations law; impairs public accountability; and subverts genuine local autonomy. These principles for democratic government and transparent management of the people’s money are diluted if not altogether defeated however way pork is cooked and served to lawmakers, “whether through formal measures written into the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies.”12

15. The Decision also recognizes that congressional pork perpetuates

political patronage, citing recent and not-so-recent history—“Over the decades, ‘pork’ funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously, owing in no small part to previous Presidents who reportedly used the ‘Pork Barrel’ in order to gain congressional support.”13 Adds Justice Arturo Brion on his separate concurring opinion:

“A lump sum appropriation like the PDAF cannot and should not pass Congress unless the Executive and the Legislative branches collude, in which case, the turn of this Court to be an active constitutional player in the budget

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The Decision. Emphases supplied. 12

The Decision, page 43. 13

The Decision, pages 17-18. Citations omitted and emphases supplied.

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process comes into play. The PDAF, as explained in the Opinions of Justice[s] Carpio and Bernabe, is a prime example of a lump sum appropriation that, over the years, for reasons beneficial to both branches of government, have successfully negotiated the congressional legislative process, to the detriment of the general public.

x x x

“[C]urrent practices [prove] that Congress has given him [the President] his own pork barrel—generally, lump sum funds that he can utilize at his discretion without passing through the congressional mill and without meaningful congressional scrutiny. As I have stated, this is a constitutionally anomalous practice that requires Court intervention as the budgetary partners will allow matters to remain as they are unless externally restrained by legally binding actions. “Congress, for its part, is given significant authority to decide on the projects and activities that will take place, and to allocate funds for these national undertakings. It has not at all complained about the loss of its budgeting prerogatives to the President; it appeared to have surrendered these without resistance as it has been given its share in budget implementation as the current PDAF findings show. Thus, what confronts the Court is a situation where two partners happily scratch each other’s back in the pork barrel system, although the Constitution prohibits, or at the very least,

limits the practice.”14

16. Two days after the Decision was handed down, the Aquino administration through Presidential Communications Operations Office Secretary Herminio “Sonny” Coloma Jr. said that the administration “will comply with the decision of the Supreme Court (SC) declaring the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) unconstitutional.”15

17. A month after the decision was handed down, the Aquino administration enacted the General Appropriations Act for 2014 (2014 GAA).16 His administration branded it a “pork-less budget,” because the PDAF item was deleted. The administration explained that sum of the amounts from the P24.25-billion item were “realigned,” at the instance of legislators, to other items in several agencies.

18. Of these “realignments,” a total of P20,761,644,000 are allotted

for new programs of the Departments of Health (DOH), Labor and Employment (DOLE), and Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), and Public Works and

14

Justice Brion’s separate opinion to the Decision, pages 9 and 11. Emphases on the original. 15

Aquino government to comply with the decision of the Supreme Court declaring the Priority Development Assistance Fund unconstitutional posted in http://www.pcoo.gov.ph/archives2013/nov21.htm Last accessed on 10 August 2014. 16

Republic Act 10633

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Highways (DPWH); the Commission on Higher Education (CHED); and the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA). These amounts are the “House pork,” to wit:

IMPLEMENTING AGENCY

PROGRAM AMOUNT (in ‘000 Pesos)

DOH Assistance to Indigent Patients - “for hospitalization and the grant of assistance to indigent and poor patients” (Special Provision [SP] 8)17

3,193,950

DOLE Government Internship Program (GIP) and Tulong Panghanapbuhay sa Ating Disadvantaged Workers “TUPAD” Project - “for the payment of stipend of beneficiaries equivalent to seventy five percent (75%) of the existing minimum wage in the area” - “for the payment of wages of displaced workers resulting from weather and regulatory shocks and internal conflict during their short-term employment under the TUPAD Project” (SP 8)18

1,022,000

TESDA Special Training for Employment Program - “for the conduct of community-based specialty training for employment” (SP 4)19

1,022,000

DSWD Crisis Intervention Program - “to provide financial assistance to individuals and families in crisis situations” (SP 4)20

4,090,000

DPWH Regional and Local Infrastructure Program - “for the construction and rehabilitation of the following local infrastructures: a.) Local Roads and Bridges; b.) Classrooms and Academic Buildings; c.) Multi-Purpose Buildings; and d.) Levels 2 and 3 Water Supply Systems” (SP 8)21

7,309,494

CHED Scholarship Program - “for the grant of scholarship assistance to deserving students” (SP 3)22

4,124,200

TOTAL HOUSE PORK 20,761,644

19. The SPs covering the programs funded by House pork have the

same provisos ostensibly intended to prevent a repeat of the Napoles scam, including a condition that the beneficiary shall first comply with requirements

17

2014 GAA, page 407. 18

Ibid, page 458. 19

Ibid, page 477. 20

Ibid, page 553. 21

Ibid, page 508. 22

Ibid, pages 649-650.

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of the agency and the school or hospital, an authority for the agency to use up to 1% of the fund for administrative costs, an authority for the agency to engage a third party agency or organization to monitor the program’s implementation, a ban on delegation or transfer of funds to CSOs, and a condition that the program’s implementation shall be subject to guidelines to be issued by the agency.

20. These programs were not among those in the proposed budget of the President for 2014.23 Neither were they deliberated upon by the House of Representatives as part of the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year 2014.24 Budget Secretary Florencio Abad, Jr. also admitted that “the funds are not part of their regular programs.”25 These SPs were added only after the General Appropriations Bill went past the Lower House and the promulgation of Belgica, when it became glaring that retention of PDAF will be not only be unpopular but illegal.

21. Senators, for their part, “realigned” their “Senate pork,”

amounting to a total of P1,794,500,000 to the following Special Purpose Funds and line agencies:

SENATOR SPECIAL PURPOSE FUND OR

AGENCY AUGMENTED AMOUNT

(in million pesos)

A. Cayetano Calamity Fund 200.00

P. Cayetano Calamity Fund 200.00

Santiago Calamity Fund 200.00

Ejercito Calamity Fund 200.00

Recto Calamity Fund 200.00

Estrada Local Government Support Fund: Lla-lo, Cagayan LGSF: Caloocan LGSF: Manila

50.00

50.00 100.00

Lapid DPWH DOH DSWD

193.00 5.00 2.00

Revilla DPWH DOH UP System

84.50 75.00 35.00

Trillanes PNP Philippine Army Philippine Navy CHED TESDA

7.40 27.95 22.00 36.20

4.00

23

Or the 2014 National Expenditure Program. 24

House Bill 2630. 25

‘Pork’ still working for lawmakers, Abad: What’s wrong with political patronage? by Salaverria, Leila B., Philippine Daily Inquirer, 6 March 2014 (http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/582716/pork-still-working-for-lawmakers. Last accessed on 10 August 2014.)

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DOH 102.45

1,794.50

22. Explaining the realignments, Abad told the Senate Committee on

Finance that the realigned funds are for scholarships under state universities and the Commission on Higher Education (20%); employment under DOLE and TESDA (10%); medical assistance under the DOH (15%); “assistance to persons in crisis” under the DSWD (20%), and local infrastructure projects under the DPWH (34%). He also stated for the record that P24.5 million was allocated per congressman per district albeit “for specific projects only.”26

23. It should be noted that the appropriations for DOH, less the

“realignments” at the instance of the three senators, amount to nearly P10.5 million for each of the 289 Members of the House of Representatives.27 Appropriations for DOLE and TESDA amount to nearly P3.5 million for each House Member; for DSWD, P14 million; and CHED, also P14 million.

24. The said amounts are corroborated by a form28 circulated among

House Members, after approval of the 2014 budget.

25. Pursuant to the said Special Provisions, the DSWD issued in February 2014 Memorandum Circular No. 2,29 the implementing guidelines for the Crisis Intervention Program.30 Wisely, it does not mention “congressman/woman” and “senator,” nor indicate that he or she could have a say in pinpointing the beneficiaries of the financial, medical transportation, or burial assistance or any of the services under the program. Unwisely, the memo was routed to the offices of all congressmen/women by DSWD employees, who practically just tendered to congressional staff the memo contained in an unmarked brown envelope.31

26. Officials of the said agencies, including their Secretaries, also held several meetings with legislators to orient the latter on how to access the funds in these programs. One such meeting was conducted on 20 May 2014, at the Andaya Hall, South Wing Building of the House of Representatives, by Dr. Janette Garin, Undersecretary for the Women, Children, and Family Cluster of the DOH.

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Abad: PDAF realigned in 2014 budget, Corpuz, Niña, ABS-CBN News, 23 October 2013 (http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/10/23/13/abad-pdaf-realigned-2014-budget. Last accessed on 10 August 2014.) 27

At the time the 2014 GAA was passed. 28

Annex A. 29

Annex B. 30

Found in the 2014 GAA as part of the additional P4,090,769,000 given to DSWD (amount represents the difference between the 2014 GAB approved by the House of Representatives and the 2014 GAB approved by the bicameral conference committee). 31

Affidavit of Ms. Andrea Karla Guray, administrative staff of ACT Teachers Party-List Rep. Antonio Tinio. Annex C.

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27. Undersecretary Garin conducted the meeting upon a letter of invitation to House Members “to discuss the Medical Assistance Program.”32 It was attended by a number of House Members and congressional staff.

28. The Medical Assistance Program is the program designed by DOH

to implement the abovementioned Special Provision 8 of the DOH budget in the 2014 GAA, with appropriated funds amounting to over P3.1 billion.

29. Undersecretary Garin made a presentation on the guidelines then recently signed by Secretary Enrique Ona for the Medical Assistance Program,33 using a slide presentation,34 then entertained questions from the audience. An audio recording of the meeting and a partial transcript are attached to this Complaint.35

30. The following are several things of note in the briefing:

a. Undersecretary Garin is there as representative of the DOH. She also said that “this whole program [MAP] was transferred to my office.” b. The DOH drafted the guidelines for the MAP in consultation with the House Members, amending them three times. There was a lot of confusion among the Members caused by “lapses” on the part of DOH, because “the guidelines that was given to you was in contrary to the initial guidelines that I presented to the Speaker and the officers of the House.” c. The DOH recognizes that the funds earmarked for the Medical Assistance Program are not DOH’s funds but the House Members’,36 with repeated references to the assistance fund for indigents being the “congressional fund” and “your funds,”37 and the guarantee letter as “tulong ni Congressman, tulong po ng opisina.” d. The DOH acknowledges the authority of the House Member to identify indigent patients38 and to determine whether persons will

32

Letter of invitation from the Office of the Undersecretary to Rep. Antonio L. TInio (Annex D). 33

Annex E, distributed during the briefing. 34

Annex F 35

Annexes G and H, respectively. The recording is authenticated by Mr. Romel Guisinga (Annex I). 36

USEC GARIN: “So, the decision of the Department is to do away with all walk-in patients because in the first place it was made clear to us that these funds are not DOH funds but are actually funds of Congressmen who are there to assist their constituents.” 37

On one occasion, Undersecretary Garin said, “For the DOH-retained facilities, mali naman po talaga, lalo na ‘pag sinasabi nila na ‘Uy, sorry po, wala po ditong pondo yung Congressman niyo’. Hindi po talaga dapat sabihin ‘yun.” 38

USEC GARIN: “If in case nagpadala kayo ng pasyente, pagka-padala niyo ng pasyente, sinabi na ‘Wala po ditong pondo yung opisina niyo,’ which usually happens. This is something that we admit should not happen but unfortunately the process of requesting the funds and downloading it takes a lot of time.”

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qualify as such.39 Undersecretary Garin mentioned that the DOH in certain instances can issue a guarantee letter (GL) for a person asking for medical assistance with just one phone call from the House Member.40 She also assured the audience that their referred patients are guaranteed of assistance—“We will not let the patient wait. We will not let your office wait.”—and that the GLs will be “good as cash…kumbaga parang SM gift check.” e. The signed guidelines did away with documentary requirements of proving one’s qualification for the assistance.41 f. The DOH has assigned “focal persons” to be on call for the processing of guarantee letters from House Members, planning to install at least three personnel so that there is someone to assist referred patients “24/7.” A list of focal persons per hospital was also distributed by electronic mail the day after the briefing.42 Undersecretary Garin also said they have trained enough staff, and will add more in the future, to accommodate the requests of all House Members.43 g. There are three procedures for the implementation of the MAP.

i. For DOH-retained hospitals with downloaded funds:

39

USEC GARIN: “Okay, so the qualifications will be a recommendation from the MAP officials, and who are the MAP officials? Kayo ‘yan, these are the Congressman or your designated personnel.” 40

USEC GARIN: “So, the proposal that we have in this case [when the funds have not yet downloaded to the House Member’s chosen hospital] kung saka-sakaling pagdating [ng pasyente], wala diyaan, walang pondo ýung office or whatever, we have a directory that will be given to you and that will be e-mailed to all your offices. In that directory, there are two persons in-charge of all hospitals, so makikita ninyo dun sa directory, andidito yung mga pangalan ng mga hospitals and then kung sino yung contact person na tatawagan ninyo. So, for any problem, you immediately call, text or e-mail the persons in-charge of that hospital and automatically they will issue a guarantee letter direct to your office and direct to the hospital.” 41

USEC GARIN: “Now, on the implementing mechanism, we also learned that because it was going together with PAU or the Public Assistance Unit of the Department of Health, nagkaroon ng maraming requirements so on the provision of Medical Assistance there were requirements as to the original complete prescription for medicines and medical supplies, the original laboratory request, the original physician’s order request form and the statement of account, all of this, so for your previous guidelines under Section 4 (B) that whole paragraph has been deleted so we, the new guidelines that you have now, it’s totally deleted.” 42

Electronic mail from the Public Assistance Unit to the Office of Rep. Tinio with the subject “final directory” sent on May 21, 2014 (screenshot, Annex J). The e-mail contained a copy of the slide presentation and the list of focal persons as attachments. 43

REP. SY-ALVARADO: “Yun po bang ating available personnel in your office ho can accommodate all congressmen’s concerns with regards to the sending of guarantee letters kasi po katulad lamang pos a aking distrito po ay napakarami po na nabibigyan namin dati ng guarantee letter e kung minsan po animnapu, minsan po isandaang pasyente x x x E kung kaming lahat e halos three hundred congressman kami, can they all accommodate all of us po for that particular thing?” USEC GARIN: “[W]hen this program came in and initially we thought it will be assigned to my office, we trained people x x x Actually ni-retrieve namin yung lahat na trinain, we started calling them, we had a meeting last week, dinagdagan ng tao, so makakayanan po nila. And ahm, if there will be a bottleneck at some point of time, nagdadagdag po kami nang nagdadagdag ng tao. But for now, people who were facilitating before that’s a total of 6 or 7 people ahm, now they are 14 and 21. So yun po situation po. For sure they can accommodate everybody.”

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- The hospitals provides the medical assistance upon request made directly by the House Member to the hospital

ii. For DOH-retained hospitals without downloaded funds: - Requests are made to the MAP unit, which issues a guarantee letter to the patient. The GL is presented to the hospital cashier, which then provides assistance on behalf of the hospital. A bill is sent to the MAP Unit for verification and payment.

iii. For non-DOH government health facilities: - Same for DOH-retained hospitals without downloaded funds.

h. Names of DOH officials are deleted in the GL in recognition of the “political points.”44 The signatory in the old GL, Assistant Secretary Jimmy Lagajid, was removed so that there will be no doubt in the minds of beneficiaries as to “who facilitated the funds,”45 i.e., the House Representative. i. The DOH has now banned from receiving the assistance walk-in patients who go straight to hospitals without going to a congressman or congresswoman’s district office first.46

j. The Undersecretary also mentioned that any excess from the GLs can be used for “take-home” medicines.47

44

USEC GARIN: “We also understand na yung guarantee letter na unang nirelease, medyo yung format, I mean it’s good, it’s okay. Unfortunately, the format creates a lot of questions kasi nga parang it’s, it’s an indigency program of the DOH. Nawawalan ngayon ng, let`s admit it, the political points in, in the case of the office requesting it kasi ang nakapirma dun is Asec. Lagajid and it was placed there na hindi pwedeng i-honor pag Saturday and Sunday. Andudun din yung nakalagay na it’s charged in the office of the Secretary. So all of these were deleted. We will be giving you the new format of the guarantee letter.” 45

USEC GARIN: “Tinanggal na rin namin yung pumipirma, si ASec Jimmy Lagaji. ASec Jimmy is, kaya siya nandiyadiyan before, kasi siya yung head ng PAU Office and he is the HEA of Secretary Ona. We also admit na hindi nga maganda tingnan na meron ibibigay kayo tapos makikita ng pasyente na ‘ASec Lagajid’ kasi nawawalan ngayon ng points na totoo naman na kayo ang nag-facilitate ng pondo.” 46

USEC GARIN: “Ito palang dalawang forms [from the PAU] because it’s a PAU or a Public Assistance Unit Office, yung isang form na pinapadala sa inyo parang yung mga walk-in patient na gustong magpatulong. The PAU office writes a recommendation and sends it to your office. So medyo hindi maganda kasi parang ang feeling tuloy ng pasyente nagpunta siya sa DOH, ngayon itutulak namin sa office ninyo. ‘Pag hindi agad na-entertain ng office ninyo, marami pang salita. So the decision of the department is to do away with all walk-in patients because in the first place it was made clear to us that these funds are not DOH funds but are actually funds of Congressmen who are there to assist their constituents. So the referral letter if ever you receive one coming from DOH, don’t mind that but we already gave instruction. I mean I personally gave instructions last week to do away with all of those. Kasi hindi pi-puwedeng yung mga kapag may lumalapit dun ire-refer namin sa inyo. You know best and you know better sino ang nanganagilangan ng tulong sa distrito ninyo. Isa pa, hindi rin talaga namin alam kung constituent ninyo because they can always say they’re from this district, they’re from this area tapos hindi naman.” 47

USEC GARIN: “Now, meron ding mga tanong yung billing amount daw, hindi nagko-coincide sa requested amount sa guarantee letter. We already gave instructions for the hospitals, kung kunwari ang pinabigay ninyong tulong is four thousand or let’s say five thousand. Yung billing niya kasi nabawasan pa pala ng Philhealth or whatever naging let’s say three thousand five hundred na lang para hindi na tumagal, pakuha ninyo na lang ng take-home meds niya. Kasi meron namang mga gamot din na inuuwi sa bahay so pakuha na lang dun. Idadagdag na lang nila sa bill yun. The hospital wouldn’t mind as long as the amount stipulated in

15

k. Since the 2014 GAA states that the funds are for medical assistance only, medical missions are not allowed. The Undersecretary then suggested ways of going around the prohibition. She also suggested for Congress to include medical missions in the enabling SP for the DOH funds in the 2015 budget.48 l. That issuances and instructions are released to offices and hospitals of DOH to implement the MAP in accordance to the above.

31. During the open forum, mechanisms used by the DSWD for its

House pork were revealed by a House Member who said that he “was able to talk to Secretary Dinky [Corazon Soliman].” According to him, DSWD’s assistance fund is identified by the local government unit chosen by the legislator:

“Ang napagkasunduan doon namin regarding yung situations like us na malayo kami sa regional office, malayo kami sa mga regional hospitals or national agencies e ida-download po nila, meron na po silang ginawang MOA from the Central Office pipirma yung regional director ng DSWD at ida-download po yung pondo, let’s say 12 million. Sabi ni Secretary, ‘Cong, kahit kalahati lang muna kasi masyadong malaki.’ So yung kalahati po ida-download lang sa local government na gusto mo na mag-iimplement ng programa ng DSWD at yung provincial government na yun, it will be signed by the governor and the regional director of the Department. Yung pondo na yun, ang responsible na po ay yung LGU.”

32. On 13 February 2014, the Philippine Information Agency (PIA)

Region XII issued a press release entitled “DOLE 12, solons partner for employment, government internship projects.” It states that, together with the Department of Labor and Employment-Region XII, the eight congressional representatives of Region XIII are “setting up plans for the implementation of programs and activities for funds coursed through the agency.”

33. DOLE Regional Director Ofelia Domingo confirmed the P3.5-

million allotment per congressional district for beneficiaries to be identified by the congressmen under the Tulong Panghanapbuhay sa Ating Disadvantaged Workers or the TUPAD program and the Government Internship Program.

the guarantee letter will be the amount will be the amount that the hospital will honor. If the bill is like five thousand and the guarantee letter is four thousand five hundred then they have to pay for the 500 kasi medyo mahirap silang i-ano...” 48

USEC. GARIN: “Ay just last…last concern pala. Ang daming tumatawag tungkol sa procurement of medicines. While we would like to support that, our dilemma is that our hands are tied because in the funds that were approved, naka-specify kasi siya na hospital assistance. May we just request na kung pu-pwede for the next year, specified dun na puwede yung procurement of medicines for medical missions because as of now, DBM does not allow us…So yun naman yung medyo dilemma namin but then if you have medical missions, these are like out-patient, you can group them together like oh you can have a diabetes clinic or you can have a hypertensive clinic and then the laboratories and the medicines that they will be using can be charged to the hospital. So, pu-pwede po ‘yung ganun.”

16

Domingo also cited that she met with the solons in early January “to inform the latter of the availability of the said budget and set the initial steps for the required work plan.”

34. It will be recalled that TUPAD and GIP have been provided with

appropriations amounting to P1.02 billion as per Special Provision 8 of the DOLE budget in the 2014 GAA. The abovementioned allocation of P3.5 million per congressional district are to be funded from this appropriation.

35. A copy of this article as it appeared in the website of the PIA Region XII is attached to this Complaint as Annex K.49

36. Other reports from the DOLE Regions X50 and V51 also confirm the

P3.5-million allocation per district reflected in the form circulated after the approval of the 2014 GAA. These reports from official sources indicate that the DOLE Regional Offices recognize the entitlement of district representatives to pinpoint beneficiaries for the GIP and TUPAD Program. The press release for DOLE X approved for release by Regional Director Atty. Alan M. Macaraya said that “Interested applicants are advised to visit their respective Congressional Districts Offices.”

37. On 22 April 2014, lists of focal persons for DOH, DOLE, and CHED

were provided by the Office of the Speaker to House Members.52 The lists contain the names and contact numbers of (1) assigned staff in each of the 136 covered hospitals for the MHCAP, (2) focal persons for the GIP and TUPAD programs of DOLE, and (3) CHED regional directors for its scholarship program.53

38. On 4 August 2014, the House Committee on Appropriations

conducted a hearing on the CHED’s implementation of their scholarship programs as mandated in Special Provision 3 of the CHED budget in the 2014 GAA, with appropriations amounting to P4.1 billion. According to Chairperson Isidro Ungab, the hearing is “an oversight committee hearing x x x We can act as an oversight body especially for x x x public funds.”

39. The meeting was not announced in general as is usually done

following the Rules of the House. Neither were the regular and ex-officio members of the Committee on Appropriations given notice that it will be held

49

Taken from http://r12.pia.gov.ph/index.php?article=1611392260408. Last accessed on 10 August 2014. 50

A copy of this article is attached to this complaint as Annex L. Taken from http://ro10.dole.gov.ph/default.php?retsamlakygee=356&resource=cfe6055d2e0503be378bb63449ec7ba6. Last accessed on 10 August 2014. 51

A copy of this article is attached to this complaint as Annex M. http://www.bicolmail.com/2012/?p=13798. Last accessed on 10 August 2014. 52

Affidavit of Ms. Guray, Note 31. 53

Annex A of the affidavit of Ms. Guray.

17

on that day and its agenda. Rep. Tinio was informed of the same only by chance, when he heard a fellow congressman mention it at a hearing of another committee, and was thus able to attend it.

40. A member of Tinio’s staff also attended the hearing and made an

audio recording of a portion of the proceedings.54 41. Present during the hearing were Chairperson Patricia Licuanan

and Director Isabel Inlayo from the CHED, Director Cristy Clasara from the DBM, and State Auditor Julieta Escaño and Director Sofia Gemora from the Commission on Audit (COA), as well as staff of these departments together with House Members and their staff.

42. During the hearing, some disgruntled legislators present made

Chairperson Licuanan explain why their lists of recommended scholars were not being funded by CHED.

43. From the answers of Chairperson Licuanan, it was clear that she

knew that due to the Decision, legislators are now prohibited from taking part in the implementation of CHED’s scholarship programs, like they did under the PDAF system.55 She explained that the COA on December 2013 issued the agency a negative audit observation.56

44. Chairperson Licuanan acknowledged said that due to the Supreme

Court decision on PDAF, some of the Regional Directors treated the P14 million allocation-per district as additional scholarships that they could award to qualified applicants from the general public. Pertaining to the earmarked funds from the realigned PDAF, Chairperson Licuanan said that “We told them [the Regional Directors] what the restrictions were. That actually, this is not true, you do not have P14 million per district na extra. This will really be for the congressmen.”

45. Chairperson Licuanan also explained that CHED publicized that

there are available scholarship slots, and thus opened the P4.1 billion-worth of scholarships to all applicants—but assured the legislators that CHED would give priority to the list of beneficiaries submitted by lawmakers:

54

Audio recording of the hearing (Annex N), attested by affidavit of Atty. Maneeka Asistol Sarza, Legislative Staff of Rep. Antonio L. Tinio (Annex O), with a transcript of the recording (Annex P). 55

SEC. LICUANAN: “I know I don’t have the refinements of whether it’s oversight or whatever but the fact is, my understanding is that, well you used the term earlier, ‘illegal post intervention’. So in other words, you make the law, you don’t implement it.” 56

SEC. LICUANAN: “We have a previous encounter with the Commission on Audit. They had a very serious audit observation levelled to us, report to us that essentially, the way we were handling some of the PDAF that came to us as well as the congressional scholarships we give out was different from our usual scholarships which follow the same set of CHED guidelines.

“That was even before PDAF became an issue. We said, all right, in which case, we will make sure that the same guidelines prevail for all the scholarships that we handle, including the congressional ones.

18

“So that was what we were doing. But the system, I guess, take time. x x x That’s [the public announcement of available scholarship slots] our duty. We had a lot of grants, we have to make this public. But in our adjustments already internally, we said that priority would be given to the recommended—the listahan of the congressmen.”

x x x

“Finally, I had to say, “Okay, people, this is the way it has to be. I know this

was supposed to be illegal. Dapat wala na, but actually, meron pa.”

46. The Secretary added, “I am also…accepting the political reality

that this is PDAF.”

47. From these facts, Aquino’s impeachable offenses of betrayal of public trust and culpable violation of the Constitution are evident.

FIRST IMPEACHABLE OFFENSE:

BETRAYAL OF PUBLIC TRUST

Aquino betrayed the public trust by perpetuating congressional pork through informal practices in defiance of the ruling of the Supreme Court, to the

detriment of public interest

Aquino also betrayed the public trust by breaking his oath that he will faithfully and conscientiously fulfil his duties as President and preserve and defend the Constitution, execute our laws, and do justice to every person

“Betrayal of public trust”

48. On 30 June 2010, Aquino swore to all Filipinos thus: “Ako si Benigno Aquino III. Matimtim kong pinanunumpaan na tutuparin ko nang buong katapatan at sigasig ang aking mga tungkulin bilang Pangulo ng Pilipinas, pangangalagaan at ipagtatanggol ang kanyang Konstitusyon, ipatutupad ang mga batas nito, magiging makatarungan sa bawat tao, at itatalaga ang aking sarili sa paglilingkod sa Bansa. Kasihan nawa ako ng

Diyos.”57

49. The SC has defined “betrayal of public trust” as “acts which are just short of being criminal but constitute gross faithlessness against public trust, tyrannical abuse of power, inexcusable negligence of duty, favoritism, and gross exercise of discretionary powers.”58 They need not amount to 57

Seksyon 5, Artikulo VII, Saligang Batas ng Republika ng Pilipinas. 58

Gonzales v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196231, 4 September 2012

19

criminal offenses, but their commission proves that the public officer is unable to comply with his or her oath of office and refuses to serve the people.

50. According to the SC, the ground is “broad enough to cover any

violation of the oath of office,”59 unless the same is attended by “human error and good faith.”60

51. The framers of the Constitution gave examples of acts constituting

betrayal of public trust, namely, betrayal of public interest, inexcusable negligence of duty, tyrannical abuse of power, breach of official duty by malfeasance or misfeasance, cronyism, and favoritism, among others. By the manner and degree that they are committed, these acts prejudice public interest and tend to bring the office into disrepute.61

52. By perpetuating congressional pork through informal practices in defiance of the ruling of the Supreme Court, Aquino violated his oath of office and betrayed public trust through wilful breach of official duty by malfeasance.

53. This offense to the people is compounded or made graver by his

act of deceiving the public, whom he led into believing that he will comply with the law against congressional pork and eliminate it once and for all, while secretly perpetuating it through informal arrangements between Congress and the departments under his command.

54. He knowingly, deliberately violates the Decision, which has the force and effect of a law enacted by Congress, by authorizing his Cabinet secretaries who head the agencies handling the funds formerly known as PDAF to set up informal practices enabling House Members to intervene, assume, or participate in the implementation of certain programs, including the exercise of discretion in the use of agency funds, during the budget execution stage.

55. Specifically, these programs are:

a. Assistance to Indigent Patients of the DOH,

59

Gonzales citing the Proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission: MR. REGALADO: [T]his is with respect to Section 2, on the grounds for impeachment, and I quote: “…culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, graft and corruption or betrayal of public trust.” Just for the record, what would the Committee envision as a betrayal of the public trust which is not otherwise covered by the other terms antecedent thereto? MR. ROMULO: I think, if I may speak for the Committee and subject to further comments of Commissioner de los Reyes [the proponent of the addition of betrayal of public trust as a ground], the concept is that this is a catch-all phrase. Really, it refers to his oath of office, in the end that the idea of a public trust is connected with the oath of office of the officer, and if he violates that oath of office, then he has betrayed that trust.

60 Gonzales.

61 Proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner De los Reyes

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b. Government Internship Program (GIP) and Tulong Panghanapbuhay sa Ating Disadvantaged Workers “TUPAD” Project of the DOLE,

c. Special Training for Employment Program of TESDA, d. Crisis Intervention Program of the DSWD, and e. Scholarship Program of the CHED.

56. Based on implementing guidelines subsequently issued by the

DOH, the Assistance to Indigent Patients is being implemented as the Medical Health Care Assistance Program62 or, as Undersecretary Garin refers to it, the Medical Assistance Program.63

57. In the case of CHED, its scholarship program is essentially being

implemented as the “Special Study Grant Program for Congressional Districts.”64 Hidden congressional pork

58. The prohibited intervention of House Members in the implementation of these programs include the post-enactment identification of localities, hospitals, and schools in the case of DOH, CHED, and TESDA funds; the assignment of amounts that will be earmarked for and downloaded to each; and the identification of beneficiaries and the amount of financial assistance to be extended to them.

59. This system is no different from the system of “soft projects” and

their manner of implementation under the outlawed PDAF. 60. However, the whole system under the old PDAF is in black and

white—embodied in the Special Provisions for the PDAF item in the GAA, administrative issuances from the DBM and the implementing agencies, and memoranda of agreement between House Members and implementing agencies.

61. With the Belgica Decision, these written or formal practices have

now been prohibited. The PDAF item and any reference to it are not found in the 2014 GAA; neither can they be seen in the guidelines issued by the six mentioned agencies to implement their respective programs.

62

Note 34. 63

USEC. GARIN: “So first and foremost in behalf of the Department of Health, allow me to apologize for all the chaos and confusions that the Medical Assistance Program has created.” 64

As mentioned by Region X. See Note 63.

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62. However, the SC foresaw that it will be possible to perpetuate the PDAF through informal practices, and thus likewise prohibited “all informal practices of similar import and effect”—meaning, even unwritten practices by which lawmakers are allowed to participate in any manner in the implementation of these programs. These practices will be difficult to document as they leave no paper trail explicitly acknowledging the entitlement of legislators to these funds and their role in the implementation of the programs.

63. Informal practices in the PDAF and PDAF-like schemes necessarily

require the cooperation between the department and the legislator. It will be necessary, then, to establish the linkages between them and the protocols they use in the course of this unlawful cooperation.

64. Such linkages and protocols are sufficiently described in (1) the

hearing of the House Committee on Appropriations on the CHED’s implementation of its scholarship programs, (2) the briefing by Undersecretary Garin with House Members and their staff, both conducted within the very grounds of the House of Representatives, and (3) the public statements of the Regional Directors of DOLE. As admitted and acknowledged by Aquino’s cabinet secretaries and other executive officials, the congressional pork barrel continues to exist despite the ruling against it

65. Aquino, after the Decision announced to the public, through his communications secretary, that his administration “will comply with the decision of the Supreme Court (SC) declaring the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) unconstitutional.” From the very words of the announcement, plus (1) the fact that his administration did not move for the reconsideration of the ruling and (2) his earlier announcement that “it is time to abolish the PDAF,” Aquino had no purpose other than to mislead the public into believing that they have seen the last of congressional pork barrel.

66. However, congressional pork is really not gone but has merely

gone into hiding, with the full knowledge and under the instructions of Aquino. This is evident from the admissions of his cabinet secretaries and regional directors of at least three agencies to which the House pork was realigned.

67. Faced with the negative COA observation and the Belgica

Decision, Chairperson Licuanan admitted during the Appropriations Committee hearing that CHED had to go through the motions of publicly announcing the availability of scholarship slots and applying their general

22

guidelines on scholarships, but to her, the entitlement of lawmakers to name the scholars remain—“But in our adjustments already internally, we said that priority would be given to the recommended—the listahan of the congressmen.” Most telling are her following statements:

a. “I know this [giving priority to lawmakers’ lists of referred scholars] was supposed to be illegal. Dapat wala na, but actually, meron pa.” b. “I am also accepting the political reality that this is PDAF.”

68. For her part, Undersecretary Garin clearly stated that the P3.2

billion MAP funds for medical assistance are the funds of lawmakers: “So the decision of the Department is to do away with all walk-in patients because in the first place it was made clear to us that these funds are not DOH funds but are actually funds of Congressmen who are there to assist their constituents.”

69. “Additionally, she made it clear that it is the lawmakers who will

identify the beneficiaries of medical assistance: “Okay, so the qualifications will be a recommendation from the MAP officials, and who are the MAP officials? Kayo yan, these are the Congressman or your designated personnel.”

70. The Regional Director of DOLE-XII, admitted in her press release

that DOLE-XII is implementing the GIP and TUPAD programs in close coordination with the eight congressional representatives of her region, even to the point of inviting the latter to prepare their “work plans” which will be the “basis for the release of funds.” In the case of

71. Considering the scope and significance of the mechanisms

described, the admissions of these officials from three agencies under Aquino’s watch betray the Executive Branch’s—Aquino’s—design to institute systems that allows the treatment of funds under its management as the lawmakers’, to be disbursed per these politicians’ discretion and not the agencies’.

As admitted and acknowledged by Aquino’s cabinet secretaries and other executive officials, the agencies handling the House pork still set aside personal lump sums for House Members which they can tap and disburse according to their discretion

23

72. Also admitted were the specific earmarked amounts which were tucked into the five agencies after the “realignment” of PDAF. From the forum conducted by Undersecretary Garin, the “closed-door” meeting of the Committee on Appropriations with Secretary Licuanan, and the press statements issued by the three DOLE Regions, the amounts of House pork handled by DOH, CHED, and DOLE, are proven to be P3.19 billion, P4.1 billion, and P1.02 billion, respectively. Also admitted are the allocations of each House Member: P10.5 million, P14 million, and P3.5 million, respectively.

73. As shown by the meetings and public statements, the

implementing agencies consider these per-district allocations as personal lump sums of each legislator—a lawmaker recommends or refers beneficiaries to the agencies, and the latter is bound by such recommendation and referral.

74. Chairperson Licuanan admitted that she informed her Regional

Directors of the restrictions against legislators naming the scholars post-GAA, “But actually, this is not true, you do not have P14 million per district na extra. This will really be for the congressmen.”

75. “We had a lot of grants, we have to make this public. But in our adjustments already internally, we said that priority would be given to the recommended—the listahan of the congressmen.”

76. Undersecretary Garin also proved this entitlement granted to the

legislators: a. “Okay, so the qualifications will be a recommendation from the MAP officials, and who are the MAP officials? Kayo ‘yan, these are the Congressman or your designated personnel.” b. “We have a directory that will be given to you and that will be e-mailed to all your offices. In that directory, there are two persons in-charge of all hospitals, so makikita ninyo dun sa directory, andidito yung mga pangalan ng mga hospitals and then kung sino yung contact person na tatawagan ninyo. So, for any problem, you immediately call, text or e-mail the persons in-charge of that hospital and automatically they will issue a guarantee letter direct to your office and direct to the hospital.” c. “We will not let the patient wait. We will not let your office wait.” 77. DOLE-XII Regional Director Domingo stated, “The decision as to

how much the legislators would allocate for emergency funds and the Government Internship Program (GIP) depends on the congressional representative.” This, after she held “a meeting with the eight legislators in

24

SOCCKSARGEN or their representatives to inform the latter of the availability of the said budget.” Per the approved announcement of DOLE-X Regional Director Atty. Alan M. Macaraya, “Interested applicants are advised to visit their respective Congressional Districts Offices.” Aquino’s cabinet secretaries and other executive officials demonstrated that they have put in place procedures and mobilized a significant amount of personnel and resources to enable lawmakers to exercise illegal post-enactment authority over the programs funded by the House pork

78. The meetings with Secretary Licuanan65 and Undersecretary Garin66 detail the procedures by which their executive agencies allow the exercise by legislators of post-enactment authority beyond oversight. These procedures are enabled through the mobilization of a significant amount of personnel and resources. The public statements of the Regional Directors67 that they involved solons in the formulation of work plans for the GIP and TUPAD Programs and their advice to applicants to visit the district offices of these solons are glaring official admissions of this fact.

79. The mechanisms for CHED essentially consist of its regional offices ostensibly following the general guidelines for all scholarship programs but, following “internal adjustments,” “priority would be given to the recommended—the listahan of the congressmen.”

80. For DOH, the mechanisms involve tremendous resources of the

agency, including personnel in 136 covered hospitals who are on call “24/7” to automatically issue guarantee letters (which are “good as cash”) to patients referred by lawmakers.

81. For DOLE, the mechanisms consist of the granting of slots for

emergency employment or government internship in accordance with the “work plans” set up by the solons.

82. For DSWD, it was shown that Secretary Dinky Soliman herself has

made arrangements with at least one solon to allow him to identify the local governments where the assistance funds will be distributed. This also shows that the DILG is also in on the informal schemes allowing illegal post-enactment intervention.

65

Paragraphs 44 to 46 of this Complaint. 66

Paragraphs 30 to 31 of this Complaint. 67

Paragraphs 32 to 33 of this Complaint.

25

83. The innocuous identification by legislators of beneficiaries prior to the enactment of the 2014 GAA, granting but not conceding that they indeed occurred pre-GAA, inevitably extends to the prohibited meddling of individual lawmakers into the functions of the implementing agency post-GAA.

84. The totality of these circumstances show a grand design—across

executive agencies, relating to billions of public monies, and involving at least seven top members of Aquino’s cabinet68—which cannot possibly occur without the knowledge and license of Aquino. This grand design consists of the Executive Branch bending over backwards to allow congressional pork barrel to live on through hidden means—something already prohibited by the law as pronounced by the Supreme Court.

The mechanisms admitted by Aquino’s alter egos and subordinates are necessarily informal—to conceal from the public the persistence of congressional pork barrel and the fact that the Chief Executive is subverting the law and public institutions

85. In the case of CHED, it is the Chairperson of the agency herself—the alter ego of the President—who demonstrated awareness of “the political reality that this is PDAF,” retaining all the infirmities of the old, written system where legislators identify who should receive the funds, to be handed out according to this legislator’s list regardless of the qualifications set by CHED’s guidelines.

86. Also part of the prohibited informal practices is the unwritten

understanding (that is, not in the 2014 GAA, the guidelines, or any of the issuances of CHED) that each House Member has specific earmarked amounts that can be distributed in the form of scholarships, medical or financial assistance, internships, and emergency employment.

87. These informal practices are evidence of Aquino’s bad faith. Any

governmental act, especially one involving billions of public funds, should have a basis and/or proof in writing, considering the state policy of transparency in the management of public resources and accountability of public officers. Nowhere in the guidelines governing the implementation of the MHCAP, for instance, is there an indication that an indigent patient is one who has walked into a solon’s office first before walking into the hospital, or that medical assistance will be surely be issued upon the recommendation of a legislator. The guidelines for CHED’s scholarships have even removed any apparent trace of the old Congressional Special Study Grant Program, and yet, priority is still

68

The five agencies plus DBM and DILG.

26

being given to “the listahan of the congressmen,” following CHED’s “internal adjustments.”

88. The culture of recommendation and referral is still occurring

within executive agencies handling House pork despite the absence of written grounds for it. Indeed, there will be no written grounds for it. The Executive Branch is hiding the pork from the public whom he has misled into believing Aquino when he said “Panahon na po upang i-abolish ang PDAF.”

89. Informal practices of dealing with pork do continue to exist in

post-PDAF times, like the informal practices relating to PDAF have persisted and been constantly observed throughout the years.69

90. As the news reports and official government sources above prove, these concealed practices cannot help but surface, the conspiracy to perpetuate a noxious system mutually beneficial to fellow pork-holders and influence-peddlers cannot be kept hidden. Even hidden under the cloak of executive secrecy, public officials such as Members of the House of Representatives, state auditors, even one of the secretaries handling the implementation of funds which turn out to be still pork will surely come out in the open and express their opposition to pork and its inevitable expenditure for political patronage and matters other than public purposes. With his perpetuation of these informal practices, Aquino is the mastermind behind hidden congressional pork, and is forcing the entire bureaucracy of the involved agencies to implement illegal acts

91. As stated above, Chairperson Licuanan is the alter ego of the President for CHED. Her knowledge of the persistence of PDAF, although in another form, and her agency’s actions in implementing scholarship programs, are likewise the knowledge and actions of Aquino, her principal. The actions of Undersecretary Garin, as they concern affairs with the Congress and relate to billions of pesos in public funds and a major program in which grand resources and personnel of the DOH are mobilized, are also the actions of Aquino.

92. Aquino’s other alter ego, his budget chief Secretary Abad, defends

the “realignments” of legislators and their “duty” to recommend. In addition to the totality of circumstances already detailed, this pig-headed defense of congressional pork shows that Aquino is (1) fully aware that the legislators’ post-enactment authority or their entitlement to particular earmarked funds prohibited by the Decision is alive and oinking in the post-PDAF budget and (2)

69

The Decision, page 43.

27

also fully aware of, if not endorsing, the outlawed informal practices going on within his Cabinet. These circumstances are not coincidental but reflect a common, overarching policy to retain a system already outlawed by the SC.

93. In the midst of all these, Aquino has never issued a categorical

directive or mere statement confirming the Decision as to the outlawed participation of lawmakers in program or project implementation and that he will brook no violation of this law under any of the agencies under his leadership on the national and local levels.

94. The statements and acts, including the how-to-access meetings,

are ascribed to the heads of agencies—that is, members of his cabinet and his alter egos—their local alterns, and legislators who are members of his Liberal Party and its coalition. Secondly, these are not incidents isolated in one agency or locality but well-reported, even by Aquino’s own PIA, to be occurring as an open secret in all the agencies above and in the provinces and regions.

95. Being the Chief Executive, no major policy is implemented in the

departments, bureaus, and offices he heads—especially one that is universal to those given the realigned funds and involving a significant amount of public funds—without his knowledge and consent.

96. At the very least, the “take-care clause” makes it Aquino’s duty to

exercise the greatest diligence to ensure that inviting and allowing legislators to refer and recommend projects and beneficiaries in any manner beyond their limited role of oversight do not occur. His denial, therefore, of these informal practices in the face of indisputable reports, granting for the sake of argument that he really does not know what is going on in his agencies, is an admission of negligence in the performance of his duties.

97. While Aquino’s cabinet secretaries are the chief implementors of

hidden congressional pork, those in the entire bureaucracy down to the smallest government employee tasked to secure the secrecy of a purported “closed door meeting” or assigned as a “hospital assigned staff” or focal person for scholarships and internship are forced to commit illegal acts. These rank-and-file officials are under orders to allow legislators to name beneficiaries of programs, long after their role as legislators is done. They are turned into instruments with which Aquino can flout the law. By perpetuating congressional pork through informal practices, Aquino prejudices the public interest

98. The SC through the Decision has prohibited congressional pork

barrel in whatever name and form for being abhorrent to separation of

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powers, non-delegability of legislative power, the President’s veto power, public accountability, and genuine local autonomy. It also echoed the people’s observation that the President and Congress are “happily scratching each other’s back in the pork barrel system,” damaging the public interest in the process. This damage is well known to the public.

99. Well documented—and an open secret—is the nature of congressional pork as largesse distributed by the President to lawmakers, either to secure their cooperation especially for the executive’s pet bills, or protect him or her from impeachment. Aquino’s immediate successor, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, used pork as well as other perks to thwart five impeachment complaints against her since 2005 over strong charges of electoral fraud and other constitutional violations, even as she consistently denied it to progressive legislators critical to her, especially those who supported her impeachment.70

100. As congressional pork is the grease that turns the wheels of Congress in the direction dictated by the President, so it is also the grease that allows accountability for irregularities to slough off from the executive branch, especially its chief. Under the pork barrel system, legislators, individually or collectively, intrude into the implementation of projects and programs—which should be the sole province of the executive branch. This intrusion in turn impairs the objectivity of the legislators whose duties as members of congress include overseeing whether the projects and programs are being implemented properly, or at all, by the executive branch. This dilution, even defeat, of the checks and balances system is well articulated in the Decision.

101. From the meetings with Secretary Licuanan and Undersecretary Garin, the evils sought to be prevented by the prohibition against PDAF are still present with the perpetuation of Aquino’s PDAF-like schemes for the hidden congressional pork.

102. The protocols in the MAP as described by Garin to legislators amply demonstrate how the system of checks and balances—a mechanism that gives life to the Constitutional provision of accountability of public officers—is dissolved. First, her audience and the ones who aided in the drafting of the MAP guidelines are those who are duty-bound to check her Department in its implementation of the funds, investigating whenever necessary whether taxpayers’ money are properly and efficiently spent. As the SC said in its Decision, Congress cannot be expected to exercise its oversight function objectively, or at all, if its Members were part of the program to be investigated.71

70

CenPEG, Note 7. 71

The Decision, pages 51-52.

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103. The SC added, “[A]llowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation—a matter before another office of government—renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.”72 Indeed, allowing legislators to approve guidelines for the distribution of what the DOLE deems are “not DOH funds but are actually funds of Congressmen” and giving them power to say who exactly should get these funds, renders them susceptible to taking advantage of their power.

104. The second way in congressional pork destroys the system of exacting the accountability of public officials is seen in the deletion in the guidelines of standards that would at least ensure that public funds are not given to just anybody, especially those who should not qualify for an assistance were it not for the endorsement of the House Member. DOH has waived several documentary evidence previously required under the PDAF like original complete prescriptions for medicines and medical supplies, laboratory requests, physician’s order request forms, and statements of account, which would have ensured that the funds will go to those who really need them, not to a Napoles-type individual or a fake NGO.

105. The hearing with Secretary Licuanan shows that CHED’s guidelines on scholarships are being reduced to lip service, if not completely erased, with the priority status accorded to “the listahan of the congressmen.” These guidelines, such as those with regard to priority courses or the requirement to submit lists of actual scholars prior to downloading of funds to the higher education institutions, are safeguards that would ensure that the public funds appropriated for scholarships will indeed go to scholarships, and not for other purposes, including political accommodation and patronage. As aptly observed by one daily, “In the first place, the primary reason for the abolition of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) was to safeguard public funds by ensuring that it is used entirely for the welfare of the people and not for the benefit of legislators.”73

106. But the deeper injury caused by congressional pork, like any

other kind of pork, lies in the denial of equal access of the people to basic social services. This happens in either of two ways.

107. First refers to the culture of referral and recommendation coming from politicians so ingrained in our society through decades of the pork barrel system. Due to this practice, only persons who carry guarantee letters or referrals can afford a medical check-up or procedure, or enrol in

72

Ibid, page 52 73

CHED’s priority courses for scholarship grantees, Catanduanes Tribune, 3 May 2014. http://www.catanduanestribune.com/article/3R1P. Last accessed on 10 August 2014.

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college, or receive employment assistance. Those unlucky enough not to have these golden tickets given by politicians will have to forego going to the clinic or a higher education. Instead of enjoying services which are supposed to be theirs for the taking as a matter of right, the people under pork have to knock on the doors of politicians to seek patronage or influence before they could they avail of these services—as matter of privilege.

108. The MAP guidelines have even strengthened this culture. Whereas under the PDAF, guarantee letters are required, a hospital under the MAP guidelines can even issue a guarantee letter to a person with just one call of the House Member in case the funds have not yet been downloaded to the his or her chosen hospital. Also under MAP, patients referred by politicians are guaranteed of assistance—“We will not let the patient wait. We will not let your office wait,” said Undersecretary Garin on behalf of the DOH.

109. Worse, “walk-ins” in government hospitals, or those who went straight to the hospital without first securing a guarantee letter, are disallowed. It is the politician who has the power to determine if a patient is “worthy” of assistance—not the needs of the patient, not the social workers and doctors and other medical personnel who have the competence to determine these needs.

110. Under this hidden, worsened congressional pork, what should be right of everyone is now seen as a privilege. Under this system already banned by the highest court of the land, people who get sick should not call the doctor—they should call a politician. Those who cannot fully afford a college education, at their young age, are taught that they need to seek powerful patrons first before they can continue their studies. The same goes for the unemployed before they can get ease their joblessness and earn income while in between jobs.

111. Under this hidden, worsened congressional pork being perpetuated by Aquino, the delivery of basic public services such as education, health care, social welfare, and employment assistance is politicized. The politicization of services denies access to the majority of the Filipino people who have neither the means nor the clout to go to the district offices of legislators or the House of Representatives in Quezon City. This is the evil when we course the delivery of basic social services to politicians.

112. There is a second manner in which equal access of the people to basic social services is denied. The practice of putting gigantic lump sums (which the SC said to have fattened through 23 years at least 12 times74)

74

From P2.3 billion in 1990 to P24.79 billion in 2013. The Decision, page 17.

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which are to be disbursed per the discretion of a sole or a few individual officials have consistently denied the people of genuine and longer-term investments for services and infrastructure for their welfare. The people under pork have been forced to forgo 12,500 classrooms which could have been built with the P10 billion PDAF pocketed by Napoles, her political cohorts, and fake NGOs, and lost P74.3 billion—the total PDAF budgeted by the Aquino administration75—that could have more than adequately equipped and sustained schools, hospitals, and other public infrastructure, and spent for job creation.

113. It should be noted that the people—the victims of pork—demand for the abolition of the pork barrel system because it deprives them of basic social services even as it leaves the government open for those who wish to exploit its resources for personal use, including political patronage. Aquino and his subalterns spit in the face of this public sentiment by using the people as scapegoats in their argument for the “necessity” of the culture of patronage central to pork:

“Interviewed in the House of Representatives, Abad said it is still the legislators’ duty to attend to their constituents’ needs even if they no longer have the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) to fund it. “‘There’s nothing wrong if legislators recommend projects kasi trabaho nila ‘yan’, Abad said. ‘Otherwise, magagalit ang constituents nila.’

x x x “Abad said lawmakers had to retain the privilege of lobbying with government agencies because they have constituents they need to take care of. “‘Instead of completely deleting [the PDAF] in the budget, Congress just decided to reallocate it because there are scholars, people undergoing dialysis who need help. We can’t just suddenly pull the plug on that’, he said. “Abad, however, insisted that the practice of recommending projects does not circumvent the Supreme Court’s ruling on the PDAF, which bans lawmakers from intervening or participating in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution.”76

75

Aquino more than doubled the congressional pork dispensed annually to the men and women of Congress, from the P10,861,211,000 (GAA 2010) under the Arroyo administration to P24,620,000,000 (GAA 2011). 76

Abad defends lawmakers’ practice of recommending projects to govt agencies, 5 March 2014, http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/351235/news/nation/abad-defends-lawmakers-practice-of-recommending-projects-to-govt-agencies. Last accessed on 10 August 2014.

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114. Aquino and his administration defended the act of tucking the discretionary lump sum fund formerly known as PDAF into the budgets of the agencies. His budget Secretary Florencio Abad, exhibiting his rejection of the Belgica decision, was quoted as saying that political patronage is expected, and should even be tolerated:

“‘Pork’ still working for lawmakers “Abad: What’s wrong with political patronage? “MANILA, Philippines—Budget Secretary Florencio Abad sees nothing wrong with lawmakers asking the executive agencies that received the realigned congressional pork barrel funds to help their constituents seeking medical assistance, scholarships and the like. “Abad said lawmakers can refer their constituents to the agencies as this was part of their job and their duties as representatives of the people. “As to concerns that this would only perpetuate the evils of political patronage, Abad said political patronage will continue to exist as long as poverty remains and people continue to ask for help from their representatives.

115. “‘There has always been political patronage. You know why? Because people will always go to their representatives. When they wake up in the morning, when they’re in Manila, people line up and ask for help. Can you eliminate that? That’s something you cannot eliminate. Until we are able to address rather substantially the problem of poverty, people will always find a way to go to their mayor, governor, congressman,’ he told reporters at the House of Representatives.”77 By perpetuating congressional pork through informal practices, Aquino is committing, at the maximum, malfeasance in the performance of his official duties or, at the minimum, nonfeasance

116. The above discussion shows that at the maximum, Aquino has breached of his oath of office through malfeasance by perpetuating congressional pork through informal practices, something which is prohibited by law. The law says that he should not deal pork to Members of Congress, yet he violates this law.

117. At the minimum, Aquino has breached of his oath of office

through nonfeasance by failing, upon official and unofficial reports that informal practices of accessing pork still occur, despite the Decision, in at least three of his agencies. The law, even the fundamental law of the land, says 77

Supra, Note 25. Emphases supplied.

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that he should do all within his power to faithfully and conscientiously execute the laws78 by installing policies against referral and recommendation by lawmakers and stopping the violations already reported, yet he fails to do so.

118. His violation of his sworn duties perpetuates political patronage and works to the detriment of public interest, depriving the people of equal access to basic social services.

119. In sum, Aquino, by retaining the congressional pork barrel through informal acts in violation of the SC Decision prohibiting them, has betrayed public trust, a treachery to the people compounded by his false assurance that his administration will comply with the said Decision.

120. It is clear, then, from the foregoing that Aquino is guilty of the impeachable offense of betrayal of public trust.

SECOND IMPEACHABLE OFFENSE: CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION

Aquino knowingly, wilfully, and intentionally violated Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution by perpetuating informal practices of congressional pork barrel in defiance of the clear and express prohibition of the Supreme Court

“Culpable violation of the Constitution”

121. Aquino’s malfeasance and nonfeasance as regards the law on congressional pork barrel discussed in the foregoing paragraphs amount to his culpable violation of the Constitution.

122. According to the framers of the Constitution, “culpable violation

of the Constitution” means (1) wilful and (2) intentional breach or violation of the Constitution. Commentaries explain that this offense covers violations committed intentionally, voluntarily, in bad faith, and not due to errors of law or honest mistake of judgment.79

123. Since the ground is provided for by the Constitution, a document

ratified by ordinary people, the term is understood to have its ordinary

78

Sections 5 and 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. 79

Bernas, citing Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution of the Philippines (1939); and Report of the Special Committee on the Impeachment of President Quirino (1949).

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meaning. Thus, “culpable violation” can take on the ordinary or layperson’s term—deserving blame, or guilty of doing something wrong.80

124. “Culpable violation” can also take the meaning of “culpability” in

criminal law, that is, lack of foresight or skill (criminal negligence), freedom of action, and knowledge or intelligence accompanying the act of violation.

125. Whether in the ordinary or legal sense, Aquino committed

culpable violation of the Constitution by his maintenance and defense of the congressional pork barrel through informal practices. Aquino is duty-bound to faithfully and conscientiously execute the laws yet he violates the law against congressional pork barrel

126. Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution made the faithful execution of the laws one of the primary duties of the President:

“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,

and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”81

127. Due to Article 8 of the Civil Code, this duty of the President extends to jurisprudential pronouncements:

“Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.”

128. In Arturo de Castro v. Judicial and Bar Council,82 the High Court

explained in unequivocal terms the force and effectivity of jurisprudence:

“Judicial decisions assume the same authority as a statute itself and, until authoritatively abandoned, necessarily become, to the extent that they are applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations, not only of those called upon to abide by them, but also of those duty-bound to enforce obedience to them.”

129. The SC in this pronouncement pertains to decisions promulgated

by all courts having judicial power83 especially itself, which wields the highest judicial authority. It also pertains to all persons including public officials mandated to abide and enforce laws especially the President, who is the chief of all law-enforcement authority.

80

Merriam-Webster. 81

Or the “take care clause.” Emphases supplied. Also, the oath of the President in Section 5, Article VII. 82

G.R. No. 191002, 20 April 2010. 83

Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.

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130. Despite the clear and express prohibition of the SC, Aquino

perpetuates informal practices of congressional pork barrel. This act amounts to a violation of a pronouncement of no less than the highest judicial authority by no less than the highest law-enforcement authority, so soon after that decision is promulgated and in the amount of at least P25 billion.

131. Aquino’s violation is wilful and deliberate as it is being done in

the face of a clear and express pronouncement of the SC. Furthermore, beyond his fundamental duty to faithfully execute an express prohibition of the law, Aquino, being the President of the Republic, knows that all these principles have constitutional underpinnings and are the very bases of a working democratic and transparent government.

132. The gravity of Aquino’s sins to the Filipino people is evident in the

clear, mandatory, and all-encompassing words of the Belgica decision. “For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law,” said the High Court, “any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect.” Stressing the nature of these violations, the Court added that informal practices, though unwritten, are likewise “acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.”

133. From the foregoing, Aquino is clearly guilty of the impeachable

offense of culpable violation of the Constitution.

CLOSING

134. Complainants’ accusation is simple: The Supreme Court has laid

down the law clearly and expressly prohibiting congressional pork barrel including informal practices of dealing it. President Benigno Simeon Aquino III has no choice but to implement this law, yet he perpetuates congressional pork barrel by instituting hidden, unwritten means that allow legislators to intrude into the areas of budget implementation and themselves decide where the congressional pork should go. This violation of the law erodes the system of checks and balances, perpetuates political patronage, and deprives the people of their rights to basic social services.

135. We have here someone expected by the public and the

Constitution to take the lead in implementing the law, yet he is the one who instructs his alter egos to violate it, or at the very least, sits down and does nothing about the widespread violation happening right under his nose.

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136. In filing this impeachment complaint, Complainants do not wish to deprive the people lining up outside legislators’ offices in the hopes of securing a scholarship, or medical, financial, or social welfare assistance of the economic amelioration that congressional pork surely affords them. Complainants are saying that no Filipino should ever have to knock on the doors of politicians before they could avail of basic social services, all of which should be theirs by a matter of right.

137. This is the purpose of the demand for the abolition not just of PDAF but also of any scheme like it—the rechanneling of these public funds to sustain and promote basic social services and the complete transparency and accountability in the management of these funds. All the government has to do is ensure that every peso is spent to provide for the needs of the people—not for “pogi points” of any public official, not to line the pockets of the few, and not for the political leverage of those in power.

138. Aquino’s position that there is nothing wrong with the supposed entitlement of legislators to large chunks of public funds, that patronage will always be there, shows that he does not heed this demand for the abolition of congressional pork along with all forms of pork barrel.

139. There is no doubt, therefore, why he has erected mechanisms across several of his agencies and mobilized significant public resources to allow the enabling of unconstitutional legislators’ entitlement and their consequent intervention in budget implementation.

140. Complainants have found that Aquino has thrown away their faith. They call on Congress to institute the only proceedings allowed by the Constitution by which he can be made to explain his breach of fealty to public interest and culpable violation of the Constitution and, eventually, be removed from office.

RELIEF

PREMISES CONSIDERED, Complainants pray that the House of Representatives Committee on Justice declare that this impeachment complaint is SUFFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE and that there is PROBABLE CAUSE TO IMPEACH PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON COJUANCGO AQUINO III.

Other reliefs just and equitable under the premises are prayed for. Quezon City, 11 August 2014.

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ASSISTED BY:

MANEEKA ASISTOL SARZA Roll No. 57897

IBP LRNo. 011274/12-17-12 PTR No. 7621794/3-17-14/Quezon City MCLE Compliance IV-0023102/2-26-14