FOTN 2012 Summary of Findings

0100101001100110101100100101001100110101101000011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011010010100110011010110010010100110011010110010010100110011010110010010100110011010110010010100110011010110010010100110011010110100101001100110101100100101001100101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011001001010010100101001100110101100100101001100110101101000011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001100100101001100110101100100101001100110101101000011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011001001010011001101011010010100110011010110010010100110011010110010010100110011010110010110010010100101001010011001101011001001010011001101011010000110011010110010010100110011010110010010100110011010110010010100110011010110010010100110011010110010010100110011010110100101001100110101100100101001100110101100100101001100110101100100101001100110101100100101001

Freedomon the Net 2012

a global assessment of internet and digital media

summary of findingswww.freedomhouse.org

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2012 A Global Assessment of Internet

and Digital Media

Sanja Kelly Sarah Cook Mai Truong

EDITORS

September 24, 2012

OVERVIEW: EVOLVING TACTICS OF INTERNET CONTROL

1 FREEDOM HOUSE Freedom on the Net 2012

EVOLVING TACTICS OF INTERNET CONTROL AND THE PUSH FOR GREATER FREEDOM

By Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook1

As of 2012, nearly a third of the world’s population has used the internet, and an even greater portion possesses a mobile phone. The internet has transformed the way in which people obtain news, conduct business, communicate with one another, socialize, and interact with public officials. Concerned with the power of new technologies to catalyze political change, many authoritarian states have taken various measures to filter, monitor, or otherwise obstruct free speech online. These tactics were particularly evident over the past year in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Ethiopia, Uzbekistan, and China, where the authorities imposed further restrictions following the political uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia, in which social media played a key role. To illuminate the nature of these evolving threats and identify areas of growing opportunity, Freedom House has conducted a comprehensive study of internet freedom in 47 countries around the globe. This report is the third in its series and focuses on developments that occurred between January 2011 and May 2012. The previous edition, covering 37 countries, was published in April 2011. Freedom on the Net 2012 assesses a greater variety of political systems than its predecessors, while tracing improvements and declines in the countries examined in the previous two editions. Over 50 researchers, nearly all based in the countries they analyzed, contributed to the project by researching laws and practices relevant to the internet, testing the accessibility of select websites, and interviewing a wide range of sources. This year’s findings indicate that restrictions on internet freedom in many countries have continued to grow, though the methods of control are slowly evolving and becoming less visible. Of the 47 countries examined, 20 have experienced a negative trajectory since January 2011, with Bahrain, Pakistan, and Ethiopia registering the greatest declines. In Bahrain, Egypt, and Jordan, the downgrades reflected intensified censorship, arrests, and violence against bloggers as the authorities sought to quell public calls for political and economic reform. Declines in Mexico occurred in the context of increasing threats of violence from organized crime, which began to directly influence free speech online. Ethiopia presented an unusual dynamic of growing restrictions in a country with a tiny population of users, possibly reflecting a government effort to establish more sophisticated controls before allowing access to expand. And Pakistan’s downgrade reflected extreme punishments meted out for dissemination of allegedly blasphemous messages and the increasingly aggressive efforts of the telecom regulator to censor content transmitted via information and communications technologies (ICTs).

Sanja Kelly is the project director for Freedom on the Net at Freedom House. Sarah Cook is a senior research analyst at Freedom House.



INTERNET FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY

Of the 17 countries that experienced numerical declines since the 2011 edition of Freedom on the Net, only four are designated as electoral democracies by Freedom House's flagship publication Freedom in the World. Another three countries included for the first time in Freedom on the Net 2012 showed a negative trajectory since January 2011: Sri Lanka, Syria, and Uzbekistan. None of the three are electoral democracies.

At the same time, 14 countries registered a positive trajectory. In some countries—such as Tunisia, Libya, and Burma—this was the result of a dramatic regime change or political opening. Elsewhere—as in Georgia, Kenya, and Indonesia—the improvements reflected a growing diversity of content and fewer cases of arrest or censorship than in previous years. The remaining gains occurred almost exclusively in established democracies, highlighting the crucial importance of broader institutions of democratic governance—such as elected representatives, free civil society, and independent courts—in upholding internet freedom. While proposals that could negatively affect internet freedom did emerge in democratic states, civil society, the media, and the private sector were more likely to organize successful campaigns to prevent such proposals from being formally adopted, and the courts were more likely to reverse them. Only 4 of the 20 countries that recently experienced declines are considered electoral democracies (see figure below). Despite the noted improvements, restrictions on internet freedom continue to expand across a wide range of countries. Over the past decade, governments have developed a number of effective tools to control the internet. These include limiting connectivity and infrastructure, blocking and filtering content that is critical of the regime, and arresting users who post information that is deemed undesirable. In 2011 and 2012, certain methods that were previously employed only in the most oppressive environments became more widely utilized. To counter the growing influence of independent voices online, an increasing number of states are turning to proactive manipulation of web content, rendering it more challenging for regular users to distinguish between credible information and government propaganda. Regimes are covertly hiring armies of pro-government bloggers to tout the official point of view, discredit opposition activists, or disseminate false information about unfolding events. This practice was in the past largely limited to China and Russia, but over the last year, it has been adopted in more than a quarter of the countries examined. The Bahraini authorities, for example, have employed hundreds of “trolls” whose responsibility is to scout popular domestic and international websites, and while posing as ordinary users, attack the credibility of those who post information that reflects poorly on the government.



Both physical and technical attacks against online journalists, bloggers, and certain internet users have also been on the rise in 2011 and 2012, demonstrating that the tactics previously used against opposition journalists are now being applied to those writing in the online sphere as well. Moreover, the attacks have become more violent. In Azerbaijan, for example, a prominent journalist and contributor to several online news sites died of stab wounds after being attacked by unknown assailants. In Mexico, for the first time, individuals who had circulated information online about organized crime and corruption were brutally murdered, with the killers often leaving notes that cited the victim’s online activities. As another method of controlling speech and activism online, governments have imposed temporary shutdowns of the internet or mobile phone networks during mass protests, political events, or other sensitive times. While the most widely reported example occurred in Egypt in January 2011, this report’s findings reveal that both nationwide and localized shutdowns are becoming more common. Prior to its downfall, the Qadhafi regime in Libya shut off the internet nationwide in March 2011, and large swaths of the country remained disconnected until August 2011. Select regions in Syria have experienced repeated internet shutdowns during 2011 and 2012, as the regime has tried to prevent citizens from spreading information and videos about the government’s attacks on civilians. Localized internet shutdowns also occurred in China and Bahrain during antigovernment protests, and localized mobile phone shutdowns occurred in India and Pakistan due to security concerns. Based on the types of controls implemented, many of the countries examined in this edition of Freedom on the Net can be divided into three categories: 1. Blockers: In this set of countries, the government has decided to block a large number of

politically relevant websites, often imposing complete blocks on certain social-media platforms. The state has also invested significant resources in technical capacity and manpower to identify content for blocking. Among the countries that fall into this category are Bahrain, China, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Vietnam, Syria, Thailand, and Uzbekistan. Although most of these governments employ a range of other tactics to curb internet freedom—including imposing pressure on bloggers and internet service providers, hiring pro-government commentators, and arresting users who post comments that are critical of the authorities—they use blocking and filtering as a key tool for limiting free expression. Over the past year, governments in this group have continued to refine their censorship apparatus and devoted greater energy to frustrating user attempts to circumvent the official blocking.

2. Nonblockers: In this category, the government has not yet started to systematically block

politically relevant websites, though the authorities may have demonstrated interest in restricting online content, particularly after witnessing the role online tools can play in upending the political status quo. Most often, these governments seek the appearance that their country has a free internet, and prefer to employ less visible or less traceable censorship tactics, such as behind-the-scenes pressure from government agents to delete content, or anonymous cyberattacks against influential news sites at politically opportune times. These states also tend



to have a harsh legal framework surrounding free speech, and in recent years have arrested individuals who posted online information that is critical of the government. Among the countries that fall into this category are Azerbaijan, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.

3. Nascent blockers: These countries—including Belarus, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Russia—

appear to be at a crossroads. They have started imposing politically motivated blocks, but the system has not yet been institutionalized, and it is often sporadic. For example, in Russia, the government officially blocks material deemed to promote “extremism,” but due to the vague definition of extremism, political websites are occasionally blocked as well. In addition, regional courts in Russia have at times ordered the blocking of websites that unveil local corruption or challenge local authorities. Other countries in this group, such as Pakistan, have seriously considered instituting nationwide filtering, but have not yet implemented it, thus not fully crossing into the first category.

Despite the growing threats, the study’s findings reveal a significant uptick in citizen activism related to internet freedom, which has produced several notable mobilization efforts and legislative victories. In several European countries, fierce public opposition to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) has prompted governments to step away from ratification of the treaty. In Pakistan, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and activists played a key role in exposing and resisting the government’s plan to impose systematic, nationwide filtering. In Turkey, demonstrations against a proposal to implement mandatory filtering of content deemed “harmful” to children and other citizens drew as many as 50,000 people, prompting the government to back down and render the system voluntary. In the United States, campaigns by civil society and technology companies helped to halt passage of the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA) and the Protect IP Act (PIPA), which were criticized for their potentially negative effects on free speech. The simultaneous blacking out of popular websites by their administrators as a form of protest helped increase public awareness of the two bills, and the tactic has since been repeated in countries like Jordan and Italy in the face of potentially restrictive legislation. In largely democratic settings, the courts have started to play an instrumental role in defending internet freedom and overturning laws that may infringe on it. In Hungary, the Constitutional Court decided in December 2011 that the country’s restrictive new media regulations would not be applicable to online news sources and portals. In South Korea in August 2012, the Constitutional Court issued its third decision favorable to internet freedom in two years, ruling against the real-name registration system. In countries where the judiciary is not independent, public and international pressure ultimately yielded executive branch decisions that nullified negative court rulings. In Azerbaijan, Bahrain, China, Egypt, Syria, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, at least one jailed blogger or internet activist was pardoned or released from extralegal detention following a high-profile campaign on his or her behalf. And in a dramatic reversal from previous practice, dozens of activists were released from prison in Burma, though the restrictive laws under which they had been jailed remained in place.



Since 2011, China has exerted a greater influence in the online world, emerging as an incubator for sophisticated new types of internet restrictions. The Chinese method for controlling social-media content—restricting access to international networks while coercing their domestic alternatives to robustly censor and monitor user communications according to Communist Party directives—has become a particularly potent model for other authoritarian countries. Belarus’s autocratic president has praised China’s internet controls, and Uzbekistan has introduced several social-media platforms on which users must register with their real names and administrators have preemptively deleted politically sensitive posts. In Iran, a prominent internet specialist likened the intended outcome of the country’s proposed National Internet scheme to the Chinese censorship model, with users enjoying “expansive local connections,” but having their foreign communications filtered through a “controllable channel.” Meanwhile, reports have emerged of Chinese experts, telecommunications companies, or hackers assisting the governments of Ethiopia, Libya, Sri Lanka, Iran, and Zimbabwe with attempts to enhance their technical capacity to censor, monitor, or carry out cyberattacks against regime opponents. Alongside China, authoritarian countries such as Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan have recently increased efforts on the international stage to institutionalize some of the restrictions they already implement within their own borders. For example, this coalition of states in 2011 submitted to the United Nations General Assembly a proposal for an internet “code of conduct,” which would, among other things, legitimize censoring of any website that “undermines political and social order.” Moreover, some of these countries have been at the forefront of an effort to expand the mandate of the International Telecommunication Union—a UN agency—to include certain internet-related matters, which could negatively impact free expression, user privacy, and access to information.

Freedom on the Net 2012 identifies a shifting set of tactics used by various governments to control the free flow of information online. While blocking and filtering remain the preferred methods of restriction in many of the states examined, a growing set of countries have chosen other tools to limit political and social speech that they view as undesirable. These alternative tactics include (1) introduction of vague laws that prohibit certain types of content, (2) proactive manipulation, (3) physical attacks against bloggers and other internet users, and (4) politically motivated surveillance. New Laws Restrict Free Speech and Prompt Arrests of Internet Users Responding to the rise of user-generated content, governments around the world are introducing new laws that regulate online speech and prescribe penalties for those found to be in violation of the established rules. The threat in many countries comes from laws that are ostensibly designed to protect national security or citizens from cybercrime, but which are so broadly worded that they can easily be turned on political opponents. In Ethiopia, for example, a prominent dissident blogger

KEY TRENDS



was recently sentenced under an antiterrorism law to 18 years in prison for publishing an online article that called for greater political freedom. In Egypt, after the fall of President Hosni Mubarak in early 2011, several bloggers were detained and sentenced to prison for posts that were critical of the military or called for protests against military rule. Of the 47 countries analyzed in this edition, 19 have passed new laws or other directives since January 2011 that could negatively affect free speech online, violate users’ privacy, or punish individuals who post certain types of content. In Saudi Arabia, a new law for online media, which took effect in February 2011, requires all news websites and websites that host video or audio content to register with the government. Similarly, the government of Sri Lanka issued a directive that requires websites “carrying any content relating to Sri Lanka” to register for accreditation with the Ministry of Mass Media and Information, whether they are based inside or outside the country. While the authorities often claim that such regulations will “protect” online journalists or users, in effect they make it easier to block and fine websites containing content that is politically or socially unacceptable to the government. An increasing number of countries are passing laws or interpreting current legislation so as to make internet intermediaries legally liable for the content posted through their services. For instance, in April 2012, Malaysia’s parliament passed an amendment to the 1950 Evidence Act that holds the hosts of online forums, news outlets, blogging services, and businesses providing WiFi responsible for any seditious content posted by anonymous users. In Thailand, pressure on intermediaries intensified in May 2012 after a forum moderator for the popular online news outlet Prachatai received a suspended eight-month jail sentence and a fine for not deleting quickly enough an anonymous reader’s criticism of the royal family. As a consequence, intermediaries in some countries are voluntarily taking down or deleting potentially offending websites or posts on social networks to avoid legal liability. In the most extreme example, intermediary liability in China has resulted in private companies maintaining whole divisions responsible for monitoring the content of blogs, microblogs, search engines, and online forums, deleting tens of millions of messages or search results a year based on administrators’ interpretation of both long-standing taboos and daily Communist Party directives. Reports have emerged of similar preemptive deletion by moderators in other countries, such as Kazakhstan, Vietnam, and Saudi Arabia. In India, amid several court cases regarding intermediaries’ responsibility for hosting illegal content and new guidelines requiring intermediaries to remove objectionable content within 36 hours of notice, much evidence has surfaced that intermediaries are taking down content without fully evaluating or challenging the legality of the request. For example, in December 2011, the website “Cartoons against Corruption” was suspended by its hosting company after a complaint filed with

Countries that passed a new law in 2011‐2012 that negatively impacts internet freedom: Argentina, Bahrain, Belarus, Burma, China, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Vietnam



the Mumbai police alleged that the site’s cartoons ridiculed India’s parliament and national emblems. As a result of such dynamics, large swaths of online content are disappearing, and the losses are far more difficult to reverse than the mere blocking of a website. Laws that restrict free speech are also forcing a growing number of internet users and content providers into court, or putting them behind bars. Two Tunisians were given seven-year prison sentences in March 2012 for publishing online content that was perceived as offensive to Islam and “liable to cause harm to public order or public morals,” an offense found in the largely unreformed penal code from the era of autocratic former president Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali. In some countries, harsh penalties are also applicable to content transmitted through other ICTs as evidenced in the case of a Pakistani man who was sentenced to death in 2011 for sending an allegedly blasphemous text message via his mobile phone. In Thailand, a 61-year-old man was sentenced to 20 years in prison after he allegedly sent four mobile phone text messages that were deemed to have insulted the monarchy; several months into his sentence he died in prison due to illness. Paid Commentators, Hijacking Attacks Spread Misinformation In addition to taking steps to remove unfavorable content from the internet, a growing number of governments are investing significant resources and using deceptive tactics to manipulate online discussions. Already evident in a small sets of countries assessed in previous editions of Freedom on the Net, the phenomenon of paid pro-government commentators has spread over the past two years, appearing in 14 of the 47 countries examined in this study. Even where such dynamics had previously emerged, their prevalence has evolved and expanded, as governments seek to undermine public trust in independent sources of information and counter the influence of particular websites and activists. Paid commentators rarely reveal their official links when posting online, nor do governments inform taxpayers that state funds are being spent on such projects. Moreover, some of the tactics used to manipulate online discussions—including spreading false statements or hacking into citizens’ accounts—are illegal in many of the countries where they occur. In Cuba, an estimated 1,000 bloggers recruited by the government have disseminated damaging rumors about the personal lives of the island’s influential independent bloggers. In some countries, such as Bahrain and Malaysia, the government or ruling party is reported to have hired international public relations firms to engage in such activities on its behalf. In Russia, media reports indicated that the ruling party planned to invest nearly $320,000 to discredit prominent

Countries where pro‐government commentators were used to manipulate internet discussions in 2011‐2012: Bahrain, Belarus, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Malaysia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Ukraine, Venezuela

In 26 of the 47 countries assessed, a blogger or other ICT user was arrested for content posted online or sent via mobile phone text message.



blogger Aleksey Navalny, including through a possible scheme to disseminate compromising videos using a Navalny look-alike. China’s paid pro-government commentators, known informally as the “50 Cent Party,” are estimated to number in the hundreds of thousands, while an Iranian official claimed in mid-2011 that 40 companies had received over $56 million to produce pro-government digital content. Rather than creating their own websites or social-media accounts to influence online discussion, some governments or their supporters have hijacked the online presence of their critics and altered the content posted in an effort to deceive the growing audience of citizens who are shifting from state-controlled media to alternative sources of news. In Jordan, the popular Amman News website was hacked, and a sensitive statement by tribal leaders calling for reforms was forcibly deleted. In Burma, prior to the government’s shift to a more tolerant attitude toward dissent, the website of the exile news outlet Irrawaddy was hacked, and fake news items that could discredit the outlet or sow discord among the opposition were posted. In Egypt, in the run-up to elections in late 2011 and early 2012, a Facebook account used for reporting electoral violations was hacked, and pro-military messages were disseminated. Some hijackings or impersonations have targeted influential individuals rather than news websites. In early 2012, a fake Twitter account was created using the name of a British-Syrian activist whose reports on a massacre by Syrian government forces had drawn international attention. The fake account’s postings combined plausible criticism of the regime with comments that seemed to incite sectarian hatred. In one of the most notable examples of this dynamic, since August 2011, the blogs and Twitter accounts of at least two dozen government critics and prominent figures in Venezuela—including journalists, economists, artists, and writers—have been hacked and hijacked. The messages disseminated in their names have ranged from support for the government’s economic policy and criticism of the opposition presidential candidate to threatening comments directed at other users. Physical Attacks against Government Critics Intensify Governments and other powerful actors are increasingly resorting to physical violence to punish those who post critical content online, with sometimes fatal consequences. In 19 of the 47 countries assessed, a blogger or internet user was tortured, disappeared, beaten, or brutally assaulted. In five countries, an activist or citizen journalist was killed in retribution for information posted online that exposed human rights abuses. This rise in violence has taken different forms in different countries. In some repressive states—like China, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Vietnam—reports abound of individuals being tortured in

Countries where government critics faced politically motivated cyberattacks in 2011‐2012: Bahrain, Belarus, Burma, China, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Malaysia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe



custody after being detained for online activities. In Bahrain, the moderator of an online forum was killed in police custody in April 2011, within one week of his arrest. His body showed clear signs of abuse, and a commission of inquiry subsequently confirmed his death under torture. In other countries, such as Cuba, the authorities have shifted tactics, replacing long-term imprisonment with extralegal detentions, intimidation, and occasional beatings. In Sri Lanka and Uzbekistan, online critics of the government have disappeared under mysterious circumstances, with previous official harassment fueling suspicions that they are being illegally detained. In China, following online calls for a Tunisian-style Jasmine Revolution in February 2011, dozens of bloggers, lawyers, and activists who had large followings on social-media sites were abducted in one of the worst crackdowns on free expression in recent memory. Several of those detained were sentenced to long prison terms, but most were released after weeks of incommunicado detention, with no legal record or justification for their arrest. Many reported being beaten, deprived of sleep, or otherwise abused, with at least one lawyer contracting tuberculosis within only 21 days in custody. In a newly emerging phenomenon, bloggers and citizen journalists in a number of countries were specifically targeted by security forces while reporting from the field during periods of unrest or armed conflict. In Kazakhstan, a blogger was reportedly assaulted by police who held a pistol to his head after he uploaded video footage to YouTube that showed local residents protesting a government crackdown. In Egypt, several well-known online activists were badly injured during police and military assaults on protesters, causing one blogger to lose his right eye and another to suffer 117 birdshot wounds. The circumstances surrounding the attacks raised suspicions that the individuals had been singled out by members of the security forces, who either responded to their filming of events or recognized them as influential online opinion leaders. In both Libya and Syria, citizen journalists who had gained international prominence for their live online video broadcasts were killed in targeted attacks by government forces. Bloggers and citizen journalists are also facing violence by nonstate actors or unidentified attackers. But even in these cases, impunity for the perpetrators or possible pro-government motives have given the assaults an appearance of at least tacit official approval. In Indonesia, Islamists beat a man who had started a Facebook group promoting atheism, then reported him to the authorities. Police arrived and arrested the user, who was subsequently prosecuted, while the attackers went unpunished. In Thailand, a professor leading a petition campaign to amend restrictive lèse-majesté legislation was assaulted by two unidentified people in an incident that rights groups believed was connected to his advocacy. In some countries, attacks by nonstate actors have proved fatal, as with the killings in Mexico mentioned above. In Pakistan, a series of bombing attacks against cybercafes by Islamist militants have led to several deaths and dozens of injuries.

Countries where a blogger or ICT user was physically attacked or killed in 2011‐2012: Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Burma, China, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Libya, Mexico, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Syria, Thailand, Uzbekistan, Vietnam



Some of these attacks against online writers are especially cruel. In Jordan, a female blogger was stabbed in the stomach. In Kazakhstan, reporters from an online television station were beaten with baseball bats. In Egypt, an online columnist suffered broken wrists after being beaten and sexually assaulted. In Syria, the body of a freelance photographer killed by security forces was mutilated. And in China and Uzbekistan, detained activists and journalists were forcibly medicated with psychiatric drugs. However, extralegal harassment of online activists and bloggers is not always so extreme. In a wide range of countries, intimidation takes more mundane but also more pervasive forms. In Bahrain, Belarus, Cuba, Turkey, Thailand, and Vietnam, individuals have been fired from their jobs, barred from universities, or banned from traveling abroad after posting comments that criticize the government or otherwise cross “red lines.” In Russia and Azerbaijan, the harassment has expanded to activists’ families, with parents receiving calls from security personnel who press them to stop their adult children’s activism. In addition to individual users, the offices of news websites or free expression groups have been subject to arbitrary attacks. In Belarus, Jordan, and Thailand, security forces or unidentified armed men raided the editorial offices of popular online news and information sites, confiscating or destroying equipment. In Venezuela, the offices of a civil society group that is active in defending online freedom of expression were burglarized on two occasions. And in Sri Lanka, an arson attack destroyed the offices of a popular online news site that had supported the president’s competitor in the 2010 election.

Surveillance Increases, with Few Checks on Abuse

Many governments are seeking less visible means to infringe upon internet freedom, often by increasing their technical capacity or administrative authority to access private correspondence via ICTs. Governments across the full spectrum of democratic performance—including South Korea, Kenya, Thailand, Egypt, and Syria—have enhanced their surveillance abilities in recent years or announced that they intend to do so. Of the 19 countries that passed new regulations negatively affecting internet freedom in 2011 and early 2012, 12 disproportionately enhanced surveillance or restricted user anonymity. Although some interception of communications may be necessary for fighting crime or preventing terrorist attacks, surveillance powers are abused for political ends in many countries. Even in democratic settings, proper procedures are not always followed, resulting in violations of user privacy. In the more repressive and technically sophisticated environments, authorities engage in bulk monitoring of information flows, often through a centralized point. Intelligence agencies then gain direct access to users’ communications across a range of platforms—mobile phone conversations, text messages, e-mail, browsing history, Voice over IP discussions, instant messaging, and others. The most advanced systems scan the traffic in real time, with preset keywords, e-mail addresses, and phone numbers used to detect communications of interest to the authorities. Voice-recognition



software is being applied in a growing number of countries to scan spoken conversations for either sensitive keywords or particular individuals’ voices. Even in less technologically advanced settings, the government has little trouble accessing user communications once an offender has been identified, as service providers can be required to retain data and content and submit them to the authorities upon request. In most authoritarian countries, security services can intercept communications or obtain user data from service providers without a judicial warrant. Some democratic governments also have highly advanced monitoring equipment, but court approval is needed to access user information, and what is retained usually involves the time and recipients of communications rather than their actual content. Surveillance in nondemocratic countries is often political in nature, aimed at identifying and suppressing government critics and human rights activists. Such monitoring can have dire repercussions for the targeted individuals, including imprisonment, torture, and even death. In Belarus, Bahrain, Ethiopia, and elsewhere, activists found that their e-mails, text messages, or Skype communications were presented to them during interrogations or used as evidence in politicized trials. In Libya, following Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi’s ouster, journalists discovered a sophisticated monitoring center and a storage room filled with dossiers of the online activities of both Libyans and foreigners. Such revelations have raised serious ethical questions and public relations problems for Chinese companies and some firms based in developed democracies that have been known to supply surveillance tools to repressive regimes. Even governments with sophisticated technological capabilities are finding that it is not always possible to trace a particular message to its author. Several countries have therefore passed regulations requiring real-name user registration, whether at the point of access, via a service provider, or directly with the government. In Iran, new regulations require cybercafe customers to submit personal information before using a computer. In China, major microblogging services were given a March 2012 deadline to implement real-name registration for their users. Kazakhstan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia also passed regulations enhancing restrictions on user anonymity. A large number of middle-performing countries—some of them democracies—are also expanding their surveillance abilities. While there are fewer fears in these settings that the government will engage in pervasive, politically motivated monitoring, rights safeguards and oversight procedures are lagging far behind the authorities’ technical capacities and legal powers. For example, in a number of democratic or semidemocratic states—such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, and Mexico—regulations passed over the last year and a half have expanded the authority of security and intelligence services to intercept communications, sometimes without requiring a court order. Even when a judge’s permission is required by law, approval is sometimes granted almost automatically due to inadequate judicial independence. In a classic example of the legal ambiguities surrounding surveillance in some countries, Indonesia has nine different laws authorizing surveillance, the most recent of which was passed in October 2011. Each law sets different standards of accountability, with only some requiring judicial approval.



The proliferation of surveillance without appropriate safeguards almost inevitably leads to abuse or inadvertent violations of user privacy. A range of countries have experienced scandals in recent years involving individual politicians or law enforcement agents who misused their powers to spy on opponents or engage in extortion. In 2011, India’s federal authorities had to rein in the availability of certain interception equipment acquired after the 2008 terrorist attacks in Mumbai, as it had been improperly employed by state governments. In April 2012, Mexico’s new Geolocation Law came into effect, allowing law enforcement agencies, including certain low-level public servants, to gain access to the location data of mobile phone users, without a warrant and in real time. Although such tools are intended to facilitate the apprehension of drug traffickers and violent criminals, there are credible fears that user data will fall into the wrong hands, as organized crime groups have infiltrated Mexico’s law enforcement agencies. Indeed, previously collected data on mobile phone purchasers were found to have already been posted for sale online. Even in more developed democracies, where surveillance generally requires judicial approval and oversight mechanisms are fairly robust, concerns have increased that the government is becoming too intrusive. In 2012, the British government announced a proposal to expand the existing surveillance measures and require ISPs to keep certain details of their customers’ social networking activity, e-mail, internet calls, and gaming for a period of 12 months. In the United States, controversial provisions of the PATRIOT Act were renewed in May 2011, and legal ambiguities regarding data stored in the “cloud” have prompted concerns among experts. Pending legislation in Australia and South Africa has come under criticism for broadening service providers’ surveillance obligations and legalizing the mass monitoring of transnational communications, respectively.

After reviewing the findings for the 47 countries covered in this edition of Freedom on the Net, Freedom House has identified seven that are at particular risk of suffering setbacks related to internet freedom in late 2012 and in 2013. A number of other countries showed deterioration over the past two years and may continue to decline, but the internet controls in those states—which include Bahrain, China, Iran, Syria, and Ethiopia—are already well developed. By contrast, in most of the countries listed below, the internet remains a relatively unconstrained space for free expression, even if there has been some obstruction of internet freedom to date. These countries also typically feature a repressive environment for traditional media and have recently considered or introduced legislation that would negatively affect internet freedom. Malaysia Although the Malaysian government places significant restrictions on traditional media, it has actively encouraged internet and mobile phone access, resulting in an internet penetration rate of over 60 percent and a vibrant blogosphere. No politically sensitive websites are blocked, and a

COUNTRIES AT RISK



notorious security law was repealed in early 2012, but other infringements on internet freedom have emerged in the last year. Prominent online news outlets and opposition-related websites have suffered cyberattacks at politically critical moments. Bloggers have faced arrest or disproportionate defamation suits for criticizing government officials or royalty. And legal amendments rendering intermediaries liable for seditious comments were passed in April 2012, as were changes to the penal code that criminalized “any activity detrimental to parliamentary democracy.” In the watershed general elections of March 2008, the ruling coalition lost its two-thirds parliamentary majority for the first time since 1969, and the use of the internet for political mobilization was widely perceived as contributing to the opposition’s electoral gains. As Malaysia prepares for another set of highly contentious elections scheduled to take place by April 2013, greater efforts by the government and ruling party to increase their influence over the internet are anticipated. Russia Given the elimination of independent television channels and the tightening of press restrictions since 2000, the internet has become Russia’s last relatively uncensored platform for public debate and the expression of political opinions. However, even as access conditions have improved, internet freedom has eroded. Since January 2011, the obstacles to freedom of expression online have evolved, with massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, smear campaigns to discredit online activists, and extralegal intimidation of average users intensifying. Nevertheless, online tools—such as social-media networks and video-sharing platforms—played a critical role in galvanizing massive public protests that began in December 2011. The government, under the renewed leadership of President Vladimir Putin, subsequently signaled its intention to tighten control over internet communications. Since May 2012, the parliament has passed legislation that recriminalized defamation and expanded the blacklisting of websites, while prominent bloggers face detention and questionable criminal prosecutions. As the Kremlin’s contentious relationship with civil society and internet activists worsens and the country prepares for regional elections in October, such controls appear likely to increase. Sri Lanka Although internet penetration remains at around 15 percent of the population, since 2007 there has been an incremental growth in the influence and use of online news sites and social-media tools for civic and political mobilization. The government has responded with arbitrary blocks on news websites and occasional attacks against their staff, a dynamic that has intensified since January 2011. In November, the government suddenly announced a policy requiring websites that carry “any content related to Sri Lanka” to register with the authorities, and a prominent online journalist and cartoonist remains “disappeared,” apparently in police custody. The country’s judicial system has proven a poor safeguard against these infringements, with the Supreme Court recently refusing to even open proceedings on a petition that challenged the arbitrary blocking of five prominent websites focused on human rights and governance. In June 2012, police raided two news websites’



offices, and in July the government announced new registration fees for such sites, illustrating the potential for further assaults on internet freedom in the coming year. Libya The political unrest and armed conflict in Libya, which in 2011 led to a dramatic regime change, was also reflected in the country’s internet freedom landscape. The online environment was notably more open after the rebel victory in October 2011 than during the Qadhafi era or the period of civil conflict, when the internet was shut off in large areas of the country. A frenzy of self-expression has since erupted online, as Libyans seek to make up for lost time. Nevertheless, periodic electricity outages, residual self-censorship, and weak legal protections pose ongoing challenges to internet freedom. Meanwhile, the passage and subsequent overturning in mid-2012 of restrictive legislation under the guise of preventing the glorification of the Qadhafi regime highlighted the ongoing threats to online expression as different actors seek to assert their authority. Such dynamics, alongside factional fighting and recent violence in response to a YouTube video that insulted Islam, illustrate the potential pitfalls for internet freedom in Libya as the country embarks on a transition to democracy under the leadership of a new legislative body elected in July. Azerbaijan

As the host of two high-profile international events in 2012—the Eurovision Song Contest in May and the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) in November—the government of Azerbaijan has been eager to promote itself as a leader of ICT innovation in the region. Indeed, with few websites blocked, the internet remains much less restricted than print and broadcast media, the main sources of information for most citizens. Nevertheless, as internet usage has increased dramatically over the past two years, online tools have begun to be used for political mobilization, including a series of Arab Spring–inspired prodemocracy protests in early 2011. The authorities have responded with increased efforts to clamp down on internet activities and stifle opposition viewpoints. Rather than significantly censoring online content, the government has employed tactics such as raiding cybercafes to gather information on user identities, arresting politically active netizens on trumped-up charges, and harassing activists and their family members. In a worrisome development, the authorities ramped up their surveillance capabilities in early 2012, installing “black boxes” on a mobile phone network that reportedly enable security agencies to monitor all communications in real time. While international attention on Azerbaijan’s human rights record has led to some positive developments, including the recent release of imprisoned bloggers and website editors, there is concern that after the global spotlight fades, a crackdown will ensue. Furthermore, with a presidential election expected in 2013—and online tools potentially serving as an avenue for exposing electoral fraud—the risk of additional restrictions being imposed on internet freedom in Azerbaijan over the coming year remain high.



Pakistan

Mobile phones and other ICTs have proliferated in Pakistan in recent years, spurring dynamic growth in citizen journalism and activism. The government, and particularly the Pakistan Telecommunications Authority (PTA), has responded with increasingly aggressive efforts to control the new technologies. These efforts were especially pronounced between January 2011 and mid-2012, resulting in an alarming deterioration in internet freedom from the previous year. Disconcerting developments included a ban on encryption and virtual private networks (VPNs), a death sentence imposed for transmitting allegedly blasphemous content via text message, and a one-day block on all mobile phone networks in Balochistan Province in March 2012. Several other initiatives to increase censorship—including a plan to extensively filter text messages by keyword and a proposal to develop a nationwide internet firewall—were shelved after facing resistance in the form of civil society advocacy campaigns. Despite these victories, additional restrictions on internet freedom have emerged since May 2012: a brief block on Twitter, a second freeze on mobile phone networks in Balochistan, and a new PTA directive to block 15 websites featuring content about “influential persons.” Evidence has also surfaced that the government is in the process of installing sophisticated internet surveillance technologies. Together, these developments signal the government’s continued commitment to controlling the internet and new media. As access expands and general elections approach in April 2013, such efforts are likely to increase. Rwanda

The government of Rwanda under President Paul Kagame has been applauded for its commitment to economic development and reconstruction since the country’s devastating genocide in 1994. Investment in ICTs over the past two decades has led to the expansion of internet and mobile phone usage. Nevertheless, internet penetration remains low at only 7 percent, and widespread poverty continues to impede access to ICTs. Moreover, alongside its generally strict control over civic and political life, the government has begun exerting greater control over digital media. In the lead-up to the presidential election in 2010, the authorities blocked the online version of an independent newspaper for six months. Other online outlets have reported government requests to delete content related to political affairs or ethnic relations. Furthermore, violence against online journalists, though sporadic, appears to be on the rise, and one editor living in exile was sentenced in absentia to two and a half years in prison in June 2011. These worrying incidents have fueled concerns that the government’s firm restrictions on print and broadcast media—particularly regarding content on the ruling party or the 1994 genocide—are crossing over into the internet sphere. In one ominous sign, in August 2012 the government approved legislation that, if passed by the Senate, would enable security and intelligence services to conduct widespread surveillance of e-mail and telephone communications.



Country (by Freedom on the Net 2012 ranking)

Web

2.0

blo

cked

Not

able

pol

itic

al

bloc

kin

g

Loca

lize

d o

r na

tion

wid

e IC

T sh

ut d

own

Prog

ov’t

com

men

tato

rs

man

ipul

ate

onli

ne

dis

cuss

ions

New

law

/re

gula

tion

in

crea

sing

cen

sors

hip

or

pun

ishm

ent

pas

sed

New

law

/re

gula

tion

in

crea

sing

sur

veil

lanc

e or

res

tric

tin

g an

onym

ity

Blo

gger

/IC

T us

er

arre

sted

for

pol

itic

al o

r so

cial

wri

ting

s

Blo

gger

/IC

T us

er

phy

sica

lly

atta

cked

or

kill

ed (

incl

. in

cust

ody)

Tech

nica

l att

acks

aga

inst

go

vern

men

t cr

itic

s

Estonia

USA

X

Germany

Australia

Hungary

Italy

Philippines

United Kingdom

Argentina X

X

South Africa

Brazil

Ukraine

X

Kenya

Georgia

Nigeria

South Korea

X

X

Uganda

Kyrgyzstan

X

Mexico

X

X X

India X

X

X X X

Indonesia

X X X X

Libya X

X

X X X

Malaysia

X X X X

X

Jordan

X X X

KEY INTERNET CONTROLS BY COUNTRY (JANUARY 2011 – MAY 2012)



W

eb 2

.0 b

lock

ed

Not

able

pol

itic

al

bloc

kin

g

Loca

lize

d o

r na

tion

wid

e IC

T sh

ut d

own

Prog

ov’t

com

men

tato

rs

man

ipul

ate

onli

ne

dis

cuss

ions

New

law

/re

gula

tion

in

crea

sing

cen

sors

hip

or

pun

ishm

ent

pas

sed

New

law

/re

gula

tion

in

crea

sing

sur

veil

lanc

e or

res

tric

tin

g an

onym

ity

Blo

gger

/IC

T us

er

arre

sted

for

pol

itic

al o

r so

cial

wri

ting

s

Blo

gger

/IC

T us

er

phy

sica

lly

atta

cked

or

kill

ed (

incl

. in

cust

ody)

Tech

nica

l att

acks

aga

inst

go

vern

men

t cr

itic

s

Tunisia

X

Turkey X X

Venezuela X

X

X

Azerbaijan

X X

Rwanda

Russia

X X

X

X

Zimbabwe

X

X

Sri Lanka

X

X

X X

Kazakhstan X X X

X X X X X

Egypt X

X X

X X X

Thailand

X

X

X X X X

Pakistan

X X

X X X

Belarus

X

X X X X

X

Bahrain X X X X X

X X X

Saudi Arabia

X

X X X X X X

Vietnam

X

X

X X X

Burma X X

X

X X X

Ethiopia X X

X

X

Uzbekistan X X X

X X X

Syria X X X X X X X X X

China X X X X X X X X X

Cuba X X

X

X X

Iran X X

X

X X X X

Total # of countries

15 17 10 14 15 12 26 19 19


CHARTS AND GRAPHS OF KEY FINDINGS

FREEDOM ON THE NET 2012: GLOBAL SCORES Freedom on the Net aims to measure each country’s level of internet and digital media freedom. Each country receives a numerical score from 0 (the most free) to 100 (the least free), which serves as the basis for an internet freedom status designation of Free (0-30 points), Partly Free (31-60 points), or Not Free (61-100 points). Ratings are determined through an examination of three broad categories: Obstacles to Access, Limits on Content, and Violation of User Rights.

A. Obstacles to Access: assesses infrastructural and economic barriers to access; governmental efforts to block specific applications or technologies; and legal, regulatory and ownership control over internet and mobile phone access providers.

B. Limits on Content: examines filtering and blocking of websites; other forms of censorship and self-censorship; manipulation of content; the diversity of online news media; and usage of digital media for social and political activism.

C. Violations of User Rights: measures legal protections and restrictions on online activity; surveillance; privacy; and repercussions for online activity, such as legal prosecution, imprisonment, physical attacks, or other forms of harassment.

COUNTRY

FREEDOM ON THE NET

STATUS 2012

FREEDOM ON THE NET

TOTAL 0-100 Points

A. SUBTOTAL: OBSTACLES TO

ACCESS 0-25 Points

B. SUBTOTAL: LIMITS ON

CONTENT 0-35 Points

C. SUBTOTAL: VIOLATIONS OF

USER RIGHTS 0-40 Points

Estonia Free 10 2 3 5

USA Free 12 4 1 7

Germany Free 15 4 3 8

Australia Free 18 2 6 10

Hungary Free 19 5 6 8

Italy Free 23 4 7 12

Philippines Free 23 10 5 8



COUNTRY FREEDOM

ON THE NET STATUS

FREEDOM ON THE NET

TOTAL 0-100 Points

A SUBTOTAL: OBSTACLES TO

ACCESS 0-25 Points

B SUBTOTAL: LIMITS ON

CONTENT 0-35 Points

C SUBTOTAL: VIOLATIONS OF


United Kingdom

Free 25 1 8 16

Argentina Free 26 9 9 8

South Africa

Free 26 8 8 10

Brazil Free 27 7 6 14

Ukraine Free 27 7 8 12

Kenya Free 29 10 7 12

Georgia Free 30 9 10 11

Nigeria Partly Free 33 12 9 12

South Korea

Partly Free 34 3 12 19

Uganda Partly Free 34 11 8 15

Kyrgyzstan Partly Free 35 13 10 12

Mexico Partly Free 37 11 11 15

India Partly Free 39 13 9 17

Indonesia Partly Free 42 11 11 20

Libya Partly Free 43 18 9 16

Malaysia Partly Free 43 10 14 19

Jordan Partly Free 45 13 12 20

Tunisia Partly Free 46 14 12 20

Turkey Partly Free 46 12 17 17

Venezuela Partly Free 48 15 14 19



COUNTRY FREEDOM

ON THE NET STATUS

FREEDOM ON THE NET

TOTAL 0-100 Points

A. SUBTOTAL: OBSTACLES TO

ACCESS 0-25 Points

B. SUBTOTAL: LIMITS ON

CONTENT 0-35 Points

C. SUBTOTAL: VIOLATIONS OF


Azerbaijan Partly Free 50 13 16 21

Rwanda Partly Free 51 13 19 19

Russia Partly Free 52 11 18 23

Zimbabwe Partly Free 54 17 14 23

Sri Lanka Partly Free 55 16 18 21

Kazakhstan Partly Free 58 15 23 20

Egypt Partly Free 59 14 12 33

Thailand Not Free 61 11 21 29

Pakistan Not Free 63 19 18 26

Belarus Not Free 69 16 23 30

Bahrain Not Free 71 12 25 34

Saudi Arabia

Not Free 71 14 26 31

Vietnam Not Free 73 16 26 31

Burma Not Free 75 22 23 30

Ethiopia Not Free 75 22 27 26

Uzbekistan Not Free 77 19 28 30

Syria Not Free 83 23 25 35

China Not Free 85 18 29 38

Cuba Not Free 86 24 29 33

Iran Not Free 90 21 32 37



FREEDOM ON THE NET 2012: GLOBAL GRAPHS

1012

151819

232325262627272930

333434353739

424343454646485051525455

58596163

69717173757577

838586

90

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Estonia

USA

Germany

Australia

Hungary

Italy

Philippines

United Kingdom

Argentina

South Africa

Brazil

Ukraine

Kenya

Georgia

Nigeria

South Korea

Uganda

Kyrgyzstan

Mexico

India

Indonesia

Libya

Malaysia

Jordan

Tunisia

Turkey

Venezuela

Azerbaijan

Rwanda

Russia

Zimbabwe

Sri Lanka

Kazakhstan

Egypt

Thailand

Pakistan

Belarus

Bahrain

Saudi Arabia

Vietnam

Burma

Ethiopia

Uzbekistan

Syria

China (PRC)

Cuba

Iran

47 COUNTRY SCORE COMPARISON (0 = Most Free, 100 = Least Free)

Free (0‐30) Partly Free (31‐60) Not Free (61‐100)



SCORE CHANGES: FREEDOM ON THE NET 2011 VS. 2012

*A Freedom on the Net score decline represents a positive trajectory () for internet freedom.

1 1 12 2

3 34

5

13

35

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

FOTN

2011‐2012 Score Chan

ge

COUNTRY FOTN

2011 FOTN

2012 TRAJECTORY

Kenya 32 29 Notable

Indonesia 46 42 Notable

Georgia 35 30 Significant

Burma 88 75 Significant

Tunisia 81 46 Significant

COUNTRY FOTN

2011 FOTN

2012 TRAJECTORY

USA 13 12 Slight

Germany 16 15 Slight

Cuba 87 86 Slight

Brazil 29 27 Slight

Nigeria 35 33 Slight

Italy 26 23 Notable

SCORE IMPROVEMENTS

Free

Partly Free

Not Free



*A Freedom on the Net score increase represents a negative trajectory () for internet freedom.

‐9

‐8

‐6

‐5 ‐5

‐3 ‐3 ‐3

‐2 ‐2 ‐2 ‐2 ‐2

‐1 ‐1 ‐1 ‐1

‐10

‐9

‐8

‐7

‐6

‐5

‐4

‐3

‐2

‐1

0

FOTN

201

1-20

12 S

core

Cha

nge

COUNTRY FOTN

2011 FOTN

2012 TRAJECTORY

Azerbaijan 48 50 Slight

Malaysia 41 43 Slight

South Korea

32 34 Slight

Venezuela 46 48 Slight

Iran 89 90 Slight

Saudi Arabia

70 71 Slight

Rwanda 50 51 Slight

Turkey 45 46 Slight

COUNTRY FOTN

2011 FOTN

2012 TRAJECTORY

Bahrain 62 71 Significant

Pakistan 55 63 Significant

Ethiopia 69 75 Significant

Egypt 54 59 Significant

Mexico 32 37 Significant

Jordan 42 45 Notable

Kazakhstan 55 58 Notable

India 36 39 Notable

China 83 85 Slight

SCORE DECLINES

Free

Partly Free

Not Free



Eight countries assessed in Freedom on the Net 2012 registered no overall score change from the previous edition. However, a closer look at the score changes within the survey’s three broad categories reveals how internet freedom restrictions have evolved in nuanced and dynamic ways. Notably, the gains many of the countries listed below made in the “Obstacles to Access” category—which reflect the rise of internet and mobile phone penetration or decreased regulatory obstacles—were offset by increases in limits placed on content or violations of user rights.

COUNTRY FOTN 2011

FOTN

2012

A. OBSTACLES TO

ACCESS

TRAJECTORY

B. LIMITS ON

CONTENT

TRAJECTORY

C. VIOLATIONS

OF USER

RIGHTS

TRAJECTORY

Australia 18 18 Slight No change Slight

Belarus 69 69 Notable No change Notable

Estonia 10 10 No change Slight Slight

Russia 52 52 Slight Slight No change

South Africa 26 26 Slight Slight No change

Thailand 61 61 Slight Slight Notable

Vietnam 73 73 No change Slight Slight

Zimbabwe 54 54 Slight Slight No change

NO OVERALL SCORE CHANGE: CATEGORY TRAJECTORIES



Among the 47 countries covered in this study, one notable contingent of states were those where the internet remains a relatively unobstructed domain of free expression when compared to a more repressive or dangerous environment for traditional media. This difference is evident from the comparison between a country’s score on Freedom House’s Freedom on the Net 2012 assessment and its score on the Freedom of the Press 2012 study. The figure below is a graphical representation of this phenomenon, focusing on the 28 countries in this edition where the gap between their performance on the two surveys is 10 points or greater. This difference reflects the potential pressures in both the short and long term on the space for online expression. Among the 28 are six of the seven states identified as “countries at risk”: Malaysia, Russia, Sri Lanka, Libya, Azerbaijan, and Rwanda.

* The front-row bar reflects a country's Freedom on the Net 2012 score; the back-row bar reflects the country's score on Freedom House’s Freedom of the Press 2012 index, which primarily assesses television, radio, and print media.

0

20

40

60

80

100

Hungary

Italy

Philippines

Argen

tina

Brazil

Ukraine

Ken

ya

Geo

rgia

Nigeria

Uganda

Kyrgyzstan

Mexico

Libya

Malaysia

Jordan

Ven

ezuela

Azerbaijan

Rwanda

Russia

Zimbabwe

Sri Lanka

Kazakhstan

Belarus

Bahrain

Saudi A

rabia

Vietnam

Burm

a

Uzbekistan

Free (0‐20) Partly Free (31‐60) Not Free (61‐100)

COUNTRIES AT RISK: INTERNET FREEDOM VS. PRESS FREEDOM



The figure below depicts the relationship between internet penetration rates and the level of digital media freedom as assessed by the Freedom on the Net 2012 study. Each point is plotted to reflect its level of internet penetration as noted in the report, as well as its performance in the survey. To minimize possible overlap among variables, the scores have been adjusted to exclude performance on the first two questions of the Freedom on the Net methodology, which assess the degree of internet access in a given society. Of note is a potential trajectory for the Partly Free countries in the middle, which may move towards greater repression (the high-tech, Not Free countries on the middle right) or better protection of free expression (the mid-penetration, Free countries on the left) as digital media access rates increase.

Argentina

Australia

Azerbaijan

Bahrain

Belarus

Brazil

Burma

China

Cuba

Egypt

Estonia

Ethiopia

Georgia

Germany

Hungary

India

IndonesiaIran

Italy

Jordan

Kazakhstan

Kenya

KyrgyzstanLibya

Malaysia

Mexico

Nigeria

Pakistan

Philippines

Russia

Rwanda

Saudi Arabia

South Africa

South Korea

Sri Lanka SyriaThailand

Tunisia

Turkey

Uganda

UK

Ukraine

USA

Uzbekistan

Venezuela

Vietnam

Zimbabwe

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Inte

rnet

Pen

etra

tion

Rat

e, 2

011

(per

cent

)

Freedom on Net 2012, Adjusted Score (0 = Most Free, 100 = Least Free)

INTERNET FREEDOM VS. INTERNET PENETRATION

Free (0‐30)

Partly Free (31‐60)

Not Free (61‐100)



REGIONAL GRAPHS

23

34

39

42

43

55

61

63

73

75

85

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Philippines

South Korea

India

Indonesia

Malaysia

Sri Lanka

Thailand

Pakistan

Vietnam

Burma

China

43

45

46

59

71

71

83

90

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Libya

Jordan

Tunisia

Egypt

Bahrain

Saudi Arabia

Syria

Iran

ASIA (0 = Most Free, 100 = Least Free)

MIDDLE EAST & NORTH AFRICA (0 = Most Free, 100 = Least Free)

Free (0‐30)


Not Free (61‐100)



26

29

33

34

51

54

75

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

South Africa

Kenya

Nigeria

Uganda

Rwanda

Zimbabwe

Ethiopia

26

27

37

48

86

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Argentina

Brazil

Mexico

Venezuela

Cuba

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA (0 = Most Free, 100 = Least Free)

LATIN AMERICA (0 = Most Free, 100 = Least Free)

Free (0‐30)


Not Free (61‐100)



27

30

35

46

50

52

58

69

77

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Ukraine

Georgia

Kyrgyzstan

Turkey

Azerbaijan

Russia

Kazakhstan

Belarus

Uzbekistan

10

12

15

18

19

23

25

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Estonia

USA

Germany

Australia

Hungary

Italy

United Kingdom

EURASIA (0 = Most Free, 100 = Least Free)

EUROPE & OTHERS (0 = Most Free, 100 = Least Free)

Free (0‐30)


Not Free (61‐100)

Free Partly Free Not Free No Data

Freedom on the Net 2012A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT OF INTERNET AND DIGITAL MEDIA

Nigeria

Egypt

Jordan

Libya

Tunisia

Italy

Germany

U.K.Belarus

Estonia

GeorgiaUkraine

Turkey

Hungary Kazakhstan

Russia

USA

Mexico

Cuba

Venezuela

Brazil

Argentina

AzerbaijanUzbekistan

Kyrgyzstan

IranSyria

Bahrain

Pakistan

India

Sri Lanka

China

Burma

ThailandVietnam

Malaysia

Indonesia

Australia

South Korea

Philippines

SaudiArabia

Ethiopia

KenyaUganda

Rwanda

Zimbabwe

SouthAfrica

METHODOLOGY & CHECKLIST OF QUESTIONS

FREEDOM HOUSE Freedom on the Net 2012 31

METHODOLOGY This third edition of Freedom on the Net provides analytical reports and numerical ratings for 47 countries worldwide. The countries were chosen to provide a representative sample with regards to geographical diversity and economic development, as well as varying levels of political and media freedom. The ratings and reports included in this study particularly focus on developments that took place between January 1, 2011 and May 1, 2012. The Freedom on the Net index aims to measure each country’s level of internet and digital media freedom based on a set of methodology questions described below (see “Checklist of Questions”). Given increasing technological convergence, the index also measures access and openness of other digital means of transmitting information, particularly mobile phones and text messaging services.

Freedom House does not maintain a culture-bound view of freedom. The project methodology is grounded in basic standards of free expression, derived in large measure from Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

“Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media regardless of frontiers.”

This standard applies to all countries and territories, irrespective of geographical location, ethnic or religious composition, or level of economic development.

The project particularly focuses on the transmission and exchange of news and other politically relevant communications, as well as the protection of users’ rights to privacy and freedom from both legal and extralegal repercussions arising from their online activities. At the same time, the index acknowledges that in some instances freedom of expression and access to information may be legitimately restricted. The standard for such restrictions applied in this index is that they be implemented only in narrowly defined circumstances and in line with international human rights standards, the rule of law, and the principles of necessity and proportionality. As much as possible, censorship and surveillance policies and procedures should be transparent and include avenues for appeal available to those affected.

The index does not rate governments or government performance per se, but rather the real-world rights and freedoms enjoyed by individuals within each country. While digital media freedom may be primarily affected by state actions, pressures and attacks by nonstate actors, including the criminal underworld, are also considered. Thus, the index ratings generally reflect the interplay of a variety of actors, both governmental and nongovernmental, including private corporations.

WHAT WE MEASURE



The index aims to capture the entire “enabling environment” for internet freedom within each country through a set of 21 methodology questions, divided into three subcategories, which are intended to highlight the vast array of relevant issues. Each individual question is scored on a varying range of points. Assigning numerical points allows for comparative analysis among the countries surveyed and facilitates an examination of trends over time. Countries are given a total score from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) as well as a score for each subcategory. Countries scoring between 0 to 30 points overall are regarded as having a “Free” internet and digital media environment; 31 to 60, “Partly Free”; and 61 to 100, “Not Free.” An accompanying country report provides narrative detail on the points covered by the methodology questions. The methodology examines the level of internet freedom through a set of 21 questions and nearly 100 accompanying sub-points, organized into three groupings:

A. Obstacles to Access—including infrastructural and economic barriers to access; governmental efforts to block specific applications or technologies; legal and ownership control over internet and mobile phone access providers.

B. Limits on Content—including filtering and blocking of websites; other forms of censorship and self-censorship; manipulation of content; the diversity of online news media; and usage of digital media for social and political activism.

C. Violations of User Rights—including legal protections and restrictions on online activity; surveillance and limits on privacy; and repercussions for online activity, such as legal prosecution, imprisonment, physical attacks, or other forms of harassment.

The purpose of the sub-points is to guide analysts regarding the factors they should consider while evaluating and assigning the score for each methodology question. After researchers submitted their draft scores, Freedom House convened three regional review meetings and several international conference calls, attended by Freedom House staff and a range of local experts, scholars, and civil society representatives from the countries under study. During the meetings, participants reviewed, critiqued, and adjusted the draft scores through careful consideration of events, laws, and practices relevant to each item. After completing the regional and country consultations, Freedom House staff did a final review of all scores to ensure their comparative reliability and integrity.

THE SCORING PROCESS



CHECKLIST OF QUESTIONS

1. To what extent do infrastructural limitations restrict access to the internet and

other ICTs? (0-6 points)

Does poor infrastructure (electricity, telecommunications, etc) limit citizens’ ability to receive internet in their homes and businesses?

To what extent is there widespread public access to the internet through internet cafes, libraries, schools and other venues?

To what extent is there internet and mobile phone access, including via 3G networks or satellite?

Is there a significant difference between internet and mobile-phone penetration and access in rural versus urban areas or across other geographical divisions?

To what extent are broadband services widely available in addition to dial-up?

2. Is access to the internet and other ICTs prohibitively expensive or beyond the reach of certain segments of the population? (0-3 points)

In countries where the state sets the price of internet access, is it prohibitively high?

Do financial constraints, such as high costs of telephone/internet services or excessive taxes imposed on such services, make internet access prohibitively expensive for large segments of the population?

Do low literacy rates (linguistic and “computer literacy”) limit citizens’ ability to use the internet?

Is there a significant difference between internet penetration and access across ethnic or socio-economic societal divisions?

To what extent are online software, news, and other information available in the main local languages spoken in the country?

Each country is ranked on a scale of 0 to 100, with 0 being the best and 100 being the worst.

A combined score of 0-30=Free, 31-60=Partly Free, 61-100=Not Free.

Under each question, a lower number of points is allotted for a more free situation, while a higher number of points is allotted for a less free environment.

Unless otherwise indicated, the sub-questions listed are meant to provide guidance as to what issues should be addressed under each methodology question, though not all will apply to every country.

A. OBSTACLES TO ACCESS (0-25 POINTS)



3. Does the government impose restrictions on ICT connectivity and access to particular Web 2.0 applications permanently or during specific events? (0-6 points)

Does the government place limits on the amount of bandwidth that access providers can supply?

Does the government use control over internet infrastructure (routers, switches, etc.) to limit connectivity, permanently or during specific events?

Does the government centralize telecommunications infrastructure in a manner that could facilitate control of content and surveillance?

Does the government block protocols and tools that allow for instant, person-to-person communication (VOIP, instant messaging, text messaging, etc.), particularly those based outside the country (i.e. YouTube, Facebook, Skype, etc.)?

Does the government block protocols and Web 2.0 applications that allow for information sharing or building online communities (video-sharing, social-networking sites, comment features, blogging platforms, etc.) permanently or during specific events?

Is there blocking of certain tools that enable circumvention of online filters and censors?

4. Are there legal, regulatory, or economic obstacles that prevent the existence of diverse business entities providing access to digital technologies? (0-6 points)

Note: Each of the following access providers are scored separately:

1a. Internet-service providers (ISPs) and other backbone internet providers (0-2 points) 1b. Cybercafes and other businesses that allow public internet access (0-2 points) 1c. Mobile phone companies (0-2 points)

Is there a legal or de facto monopoly over access providers or do users have a choice of access provider, including ones privately owned?

Is it legally possible to establish a private access provider or does the state place extensive legal or regulatory controls over the establishment of providers?

Are registration requirements (e.g. bureaucratic “red tape”) for establishing an access provider unduly onerous or are they approved/rejected on partisan or prejudicial grounds?

Does the state place prohibitively high fees on the establishment and operation of access providers?

5. To what extent do national regulatory bodies overseeing digital technology operate in a free, fair, and independent manner? (0-4 points)

Are there explicit legal guarantees protecting the independence and autonomy of any regulatory body overseeing internet and other ICTs (exclusively or as part of a broader mandate) from political or commercial interference?

Is the process for appointing members of regulatory bodies transparent and representative of different stakeholders’ interests?

Are decisions taken by the regulatory body, particularly those relating to ICTs, seen to be fair and apolitical and to take meaningful notice of comments from stakeholders in society?

Are efforts by access providers and other internet-related organizations to establish self-regulatory mechanisms permitted and encouraged?



Does the allocation of digital resources, such as domain names or IP addresses, on a national level by a government-controlled body create an obstacle to access or are they allocated in a discriminatory manner?

1. To what extent does the state or other actors block or filter internet and other

ICT content, particularly on political and social issues? (0-6 points)

Is there significant blocking or filtering of internet sites, web pages, blogs, or data centers, particularly those related to political and social topics?

Is there significant filtering of text messages or other content transmitted via mobile phones?

Do state authorities block or filter information and views from inside the country—particularly concerning human rights abuses, government corruption, and poor standards of living—from reaching the outside world through interception of e-mail or text messages, etc?

Are methods such as deep-packet inspection used for the purposes of preventing users from accessing certain content or for altering the content of communications en route to the recipient, particularly with regards to political and social topics?

2. To what extent does the state employ legal, administrative, or other means to force deletion of particular content, including requiring private access providers to do so? (0-4 points)

To what extent are non-technical measures—judicial or extra-legal—used to order the deletion of content from the internet, either prior to or after its publication?

To what degree does the government or other powerful political actors pressure or coerce online news outlets to exclude certain information from their reporting?

Are access providers and content hosts legally responsible for the information transmitted via the technology they supply or required to censor the content accessed or transmitted by their users?

Are access providers or content hosts prosecuted for opinions expressed by third parties via the technology they supply?

3. To what extent are restrictions on internet and ICT content transparent, proportional to the stated aims, and accompanied by an independent appeals process? (0-4 points)

Are there national laws, independent oversight bodies, and other democratically accountable procedures in place to ensure that decisions to restrict access to certain content are proportional to their stated aim?

Are state authorities transparent about what content is blocked or deleted (both at the level of public policy and at the moment the censorship occurs)?

Do state authorities block more types of content than they publicly declare?

Do independent avenues of appeal exist for those who find content they produced to have been subjected to censorship?

B. LIMITS ON CONTENT (0-35 POINTS)



4. Do online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users practice self-censorship? (0-4 points)

Is there widespread self-censorship by online journalists, commentators, and ordinary users in state-run online media, privately run websites, or social media applications?

Are there unspoken “rules” that prevent an online journalist or user from expressing certain opinions in ICT communication?

Is there avoidance of subjects that can clearly lead to harm to the author or result in almost certain censorship?

5. To what extent is the content of online sources of information determined or manipulated by the government or a particular partisan interest? (0-4 points)

To what degree do the government or other powerful actors pressure or coerce online news outlets to follow a particular editorial direction in their reporting?

Do authorities issue official guidelines or directives on coverage to online media outlets, blogs, etc., including instructions to marginalize or amplify certain comments or topics for discussion?

Do government officials or other actors bribe or use close economic ties with online journalists, bloggers, website owners, or service providers in order to influence the online content they produce or host?

Does the government employ, or encourage content providers to employ, individuals to post pro-government remarks in online bulletin boards and chat rooms?

Do online versions of state-run or partisan traditional media outlets dominate the online news landscape?

6. Are there economic constraints that negatively impact users’ ability to publish content online or online media outlets’ ability to remain financially sustainable? (0-3 points)

Are favorable connections with government officials necessary for online media outlets or service providers (e.g. search engines, e-mail applications, blog hosting platforms, etc.) to be economically viable?

Are service providers who refuse to follow state-imposed directives to restrict content subject to sanctions that negatively impact their financial viability?

Does the state limit the ability of online media to accept advertising or investment, particularly from foreign sources, or does it limit advertisers from conducting business with disfavored online media or service providers?

To what extent do ISPs manage network traffic and bandwidth availability to users in a manner that is transparent, evenly applied, and does not discriminate against users or producers of content based on the content/source of the communication itself (i.e. respect “net neutrality” with regard to content)?

To what extent do users have access to free or low-costs blogging services, webhosts, etc. to allow them to make use of the internet to express their own views?

7. To what extent are sources of information that are robust and reflect a diversity of viewpoints readily available to citizens, despite government efforts to limit access to certain content? (0-4 points)

Are people able to access a range of local and international news sources via the internet or text messages, despite efforts to restrict the flow of information?

Does the public have ready access to media outlets or websites that express independent, balanced views?



Does the public have ready access to sources of information that represent a range of political and social viewpoints?

To what extent do online media outlets and blogs represent diverse interests within society, for example through websites run by community organizations or religious, ethnic and other minorities?

To what extent do users employ proxy servers and other methods to circumvent state censorship efforts?

8. To what extent have individuals successfully used the internet and other ICTs as tools for mobilization, particularly regarding political and social issues? (0-6 points)

To what extent does the online community cover political developments and provide scrutiny of government policies, official corruption, or the behavior of other powerful societal actors?

To what extent are online communication tools (e.g. Twitter) or social networking sites (e.g. Facebook, Orkut) used as a means to organize politically, including for “real-life” activities?

Are mobile phones and other ICTs used as a medium of news dissemination and political organization, including on otherwise banned topics?

1. To what extent does the constitution or other laws contain provisions designed

to protect freedom of expression, including on the internet, and are they enforced? (0-6 points)

Does the constitution contain language that provides for freedom of speech and of the press generally?

Are there laws or legal decisions that specifically protect online modes of expression?

Are online journalists and bloggers accorded the same rights and protections given to print and broadcast journalists?

Is the judiciary independent and do the Supreme Court, Attorney General, and other representatives of the higher judiciary support free expression?

Is there implicit impunity for private and/or state actors who commit crimes against online journalists, bloggers, or other citizens targeted for their online activities?

2. Are there laws which call for criminal penalties or civil liability for online and ICT activities? (0-4 points)

Are there specific laws criminalizing online expression and activity such as posting or downloading information, sending an e-mail, or text message, etc.? (Note: this excludes legislation addressing harmful content such as child pornography or activities such as malicious hacking)

Do laws restrict the type of material that can be communicated in online expression or via text messages, such as communications about ethnic or religious issues, national security, or other sensitive topics?

Are restrictions of internet freedom closely defined, narrowly circumscribed, and proportional to the legitimate aim?

Are vaguely worded penal codes or security laws applied to internet-related or ICT activities?

C. VIOLATIONS OF USER RIGHTS (0-40 POINTS)



Are there penalties for libeling officials or the state in online content?

Can an online outlet based in another country be sued if its content can be accessed from within the country (i.e. “libel tourism”)?

3. Are individuals detained, prosecuted or sanctioned by law enforcement agencies for disseminating or accessing information on the internet or via other ICTs, particularly on political and social issues? (0-6 points)

Are writers, commentators, or bloggers subject to imprisonment or other legal sanction as a result of posting material on the internet?

Are citizens subject to imprisonment, civil liability, or other legal sanction as a result of accessing or downloading material from the internet or for transmitting information via e-mail or text messages?

Does the lack of an independent judiciary or other limitations on adherence to the rule of law hinder fair proceedings in ICT-related cases?

Are individuals subject to abduction or arbitrary detention as a result of online activities, including membership in certain online communities?

Are penalties for “irresponsible journalism” or “rumor mongering” applied widely?

Are online journalists, bloggers, or others regularly prosecuted, jailed, or fined for libel or defamation (including in cases of “libel tourism”)?

4. Does the government place restrictions on anonymous communication or require user registration? (0-4 points)

Are website owners, bloggers, or users in general required to register with the government?

Are users able to post comments online or purchase mobile phones anonymously or does the government require that they use their real names or register with the government?

Are users prohibited from using encryption software to protect their communications?

Are there laws restricting the use of encryption and other security tools, or requiring that the government be given access to encryption keys and algorithms?

5. To what extent is there state surveillance of internet and ICT activities without judicial or other independent oversight, including systematic retention of user traffic data? (0-6 points)

Do the authorities regularly monitor websites, blogs, and chat rooms, or the content of e-mail and mobile text messages, including via deep-packet inspection?

To what extent are restrictions on the privacy of digital media users transparent, proportional to the stated aims, and accompanied by an independent process for lodging complaints of violations?

Where the judiciary is independent, are there procedures in place for judicial oversight of surveillance and to what extent are these followed?

Where the judiciary lacks independence, is there another independent oversight body in place to guard against abusive use of surveillance technology and to what extent is it able to carry out its responsibilities free of government interference?



Is content intercepted during internet surveillance admissible in court or has it been used to convict users in cases involving free speech?

6. To what extent are providers of access to digital technologies required to aid the

government in monitoring the communications of their users? (0-6 points)

Note: Each of the following access providers are scored separately:

1a. Internet-service providers (ISPs) and other backbone internet providers (0-2 points) 1b. Cybercafes and other businesses that allow public internet access (0-2 points) 1c. Mobile phone companies (0-2 points)

Are access providers required to monitor their users and supply information about their digital activities to the government (either through technical interception or via manual monitoring, such as user registration in cybercafes)?

Are access providers prosecuted for not doing so?

Does the state attempt to control access providers through less formal methods, such as codes of conduct?

Can the government obtain information about users without a legal process?

7. Are bloggers, other ICT users, websites, or their property subject to extralegal

intimidation or physical violence by state authorities or any other actor? (0-5 points)

Are individuals subject to murder, beatings, harassment, threats, travel restrictions, or torture as a result of online activities, including membership in certain online communities?

Do armed militias, organized crime elements, insurgent groups, political or religious extremists, or other organizations regularly target online commentators?

Have online journalists, bloggers, or others fled the country or gone into hiding to avoid such action?

Have cybercafes or property of online commentators been targets of physical attacks or the confiscation or destruction of property as retribution for online activities or expression?

8. Are websites, governmental and private entities, ICT users, or service providers subject to widespread “technical violence,” including cyberattacks, hacking, and other malicious threats? (0-3 points)

Are financial, commercial, and governmental entities subject to significant and targeted cyberattacks (e.g. cyber espionage, data gathering, DoS attacks), including those originating from outside of the country?

Have websites belonging to opposition or civil society groups within the country’s boundaries been temporarily or permanently disabled due to cyberattacks, particularly at politically sensitive times?

Are websites or blogs subject to targeted technical attacks as retribution for posting certain content (e.g. on political and social topics)?

Are laws and policies in place to prevent and protect against cyberattacks (including the launching of systematic attacks by non-state actors from within the country’s borders) and are they enforced?

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Completion of the Freedom on the Net publication would not have been possible without the tireless efforts of the following individuals.

As project director, Sanja Kelly oversaw the research, editorial, and administrative operations, supported by Asia research analyst Sarah Cook and staff editor Mai Truong. Together, they provided essential research and analysis, edited the country reports, conducted field visits in Turkey, Malaysia, and South Africa, and led capacity building workshops abroad. Over 50 external consultants served as report authors and advisors, and made an outstanding contribution by producing informed analyses of a highly diverse group of countries and complex set of issues.

Helpful contributions and insights were also made by Daniel Calingaert, executive vice president; Arch Puddington, vice president for research; Danilo Bakovic, internet freedom director; as well as other Freedom House staff in the United States and abroad. Intern Ezgi Ozturk provided indispensable research, editorial, and administrative assistance.

This publication was made possible by the generous financial contributions of the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor (DRL), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Google, and Yahoo. Freedom House is also grateful to the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs for their grant to support future editions of Freedom on the Net. The content of the publication is the sole responsibility of Freedom House and does not necessarily reflect the views of DRL, USAID, Google, Yahoo, the Dutch Ministry, or any other funder.

CONTRIBUTORS


CONTRIBUTORS FREEDOM HOUSE RESEARCH TEAM

Sanja Kelly, Project Director, Freedom House

Sarah Cook, Senior Research Analyst, Freedom House

Mai Truong, Staff Editor, Freedom House

REPORT AUTHORS AND ADVISORS

Argentina: Eduardo Bertoni, Director, Center for Studies on Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (CELE), Palermo University School of Law, Argentina; Atilio Grimani, Research Assistant at CELE

Australia: Alana Maurushat, Director, Cyberspace Law and Policy Centre, University of New South Wales

Azerbaijan: Khadija Ismayilova, journalist; Vafa Fati-Zada, independent researcher

Brazil: Omar Kaminski, President, Brazilian Institute of IT Law; Ivar A. M. Hartmann, Researcher, FGV Law School in Rio de Janeiro

Burma: Min Zin, Burmese journalist and columnist for Foreign Policy’s Transitions blog

China (Advisor): Xiao Qiang, Director of China Internet Project and an adjunct professor, Graduate School of Journalism, University of California, Berkeley

Cuba: Ernesto Hernández Busto, blogger and journalist based in Spain

Georgia: Giorgi (Giga) Paitchadze, blogger, Tbilisi

Germany: Jeanette Hoffman, Director, and Christian Katzenbah, Project Manager for Research, Alexander von Humboldt Institute for Internet and Society, Berlin

Hungary: Sandor Orban, Program Director, South East European Network for Professionalization of Media; Borbála Tóth, independent researcher

India: Ketan Tanna, Feature and Web Editor, The Free Press Journal, Mumbai

Indonesia: Enda Nasution, blogger and founder of Salingsilang online portal, Jakarta

Iran: Mahmood Enayat, Director, Iran Media Program, Annenberg School of Communication, University of Pennsylvania

Italy: Giampiero Giacomello, Assistant Professor of International Relations, University of Bologna

Jordan: Yahia Shukkier, journalist at al-Arab al-Yawm and lecturer, Media Faculty, Middle East University, Amman

CONTRIBUTORS


Kazakhstan: Adil Nurmakov, Associate Professor, International IT University, Almaty

Kenya: Grace Githaiga, Associate, Kenya ICT Action Network, Nairobi

Kyrgyzstan: Tattu Mambetalieva, Director, Civil Initiative on Internet Policy (CIIP), Bishkek; Artem Goryainov, IT Programs Director, CIIP

Mexico: Alejandra Ezeta, Director, Ciudadanos en Medios: Democracia e Información

Nigeria: ‘Gbenga Sesan, Executive Director, Paradigm Initiative Nigeria

Pakistan: Bytes for All, Islamabad

Philippines: Jacques D.M. Gimeno, Program Director, Philippines Center for Islam and Democracy; Sheen Gimeno, independent researcher

South Africa: Alex Comninos, independent researcher from South Africa and doctoral student, Department of Geography, Justus-Liebig University, Giessen

Southeast Asia (Advisor): Bridget Welsh, Associate Professor in Political Science, Singapore Management University

South Korea: Yenn Lee, Visiting Scholar, Royal Holloway, University of London

Sri Lanka: Nigel Nugawela, researcher, Center for Policy Alternatives, Colombo (at time of writing)

Syria: Mohammad al-Abdallah, Syrian human rights activist and independent researcher

Thailand: Arthit Suriyawongkul and Thaweeporn Kummetha, Thai Netizen Network

Turkey: Yaman Akdeniz, Professor of Law, Istanbul Bilgi University and founder of Cyber-Rights.org

Uganda: Peter Mwesige, Executive Director, African Centre for Media Excellence (ACME); Grace Natabaalo, Program Associate, ACME; and Ashnah M. Kalemera, Program Officer, Collaboration on International ICT Policy for East and Southern Africa

Ukraine: Tatyana Lokot, doctoral student at the Philip Merrill College of Journalism, University of Maryland; head of new media programs in Kyive-Mohyla Journalism School (at time of writing)

United Kingdom: David Banisar, independent researcher, London

United States: Center for Democracy and Technology, Washington DC

Uzbekistan: Zhanna Hördegen, lawyer and Research Fellow, University Priority Research Program on Asia and Europe, University of Zurich

The analysts for the reports on Bahrain, Belarus, China, Egypt, Estonia, Ethiopia, Libya, Malaysia, Russia, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, Venezuela, Vietnam and Zimbabwe are independent internet researchers who have requested to remain anonymous.

ABOUT FREEDOM HOUSE


ABOUT FREEDOM HOUSE Freedom House is an independent private organization supporting the expansion of freedom throughout the world. Freedom is possible only in democratic political systems in which governments are accountable to their own people, the rule of law prevails, and freedoms of expression, association, and belief are guaranteed. Working directly with courageous men and women around the world to support nonviolent civic initiatives in societies where freedom is threatened, Freedom House functions as a catalyst for change through its unique mix of analysis, advocacy, and action.

Analysis: Freedom House’s rigorous research methodology has earned the organization a reputation as the leading source of information on the state of freedom around the globe. Since 1972, Freedom House has published Freedom in the World, an annual survey of political rights and civil liberties experienced in every country of the world. The survey is complemented by an annual review of press freedom, an analysis of transitions in the post-communist world, and other publications.

Advocacy: Freedom House seeks to encourage American policymakers, as well as other government and international institutions, to adopt policies that advance human rights and democracy around the world. Freedom House has been instrumental in the founding of the worldwide Community of Democracies, has actively campaigned for a reformed Human Rights Council at the United Nations, and presses the Millennium Challenge Corporation to adhere to high standards of eligibility for recipient countries.

Action: Through exchanges, grants, and technical assistance, Freedom House provides training and support to human rights defenders, civil society organizations, and members of the media in order to strengthen indigenous reform efforts in countries around the globe.

Founded in 1941 by Eleanor Roosevelt, Wendell Willkie, and other Americans concerned with mounting threats to peace and democracy, Freedom House has long been a vigorous proponent of democratic values and a steadfast opponent of dictatorships of the far left and the far right. The organization’s diverse Board of Trustees is composed of a bipartisan mix of business and labor leaders, former senior government officials, scholars, and journalists who agree that the promotion of democracy and human rights abroad is vital to America’s interests. 1301 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036 120 Wall Street, New York, NY 10025 (202) 296-5101 (212) 514-8040

1301 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20036 120 Wall Street, New York, NY 10025 (202) 296-5101 (212) 514-8040

Documents

FOTN 2012 Summary of Findings