Fortifications and democracy in the ancient Greek world

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3057639

OberandWeingast.Fortificationsanddemocracy.1

FortificationsanddemocracyintheancientGreekworld

JosiahOberandBarryWeingast.StanfordUniversity

Draftof170801

Abstract:Inthemodernworld,access-limitingfortificationwallsarenottypicallyregardedaspromotingdemocracy.ButinGreekantiquity,increasedinvestmentinfortificationswascorrelatedwiththeprevalenceandstabilityofdemocracy.ThispapersketchesthebackgroundconditionsoftheGreekcity-stateecology,analyzesapassageinAristotle’sPolitics,andassessesthechoicesofHellenistickings,Greekcitizens,andurbanelites,asmodeledinasimplegame.Thepaperexplainshowcitywallspromoteddemocracyandhelpstoexplainseveralotherpuzzles:whyHellenistickingstaxedGreekcitiesatlowerthanexpectedrates;whyelitesinGreekcitiessupporteddemocracy;andwhyeliteswerenotmoreheavilytaxedbydemocraticmajorities.Therelationshipbetweenwalls,democracy,andtaxespromotedcontinuedeconomicgrowthintothelateclassicalandHellenisticperiod(4th-2ndcenturiesBCE),andultimatelycontributedtothesurvivalofGreekcultureintotheRomanera,andthusmodernity.Weconcludewithaconsiderationofwhetherthewalls-democracyrelationshipholdsinmodernity.

1.Introduction:Democraticwalls?

Howmuchhasdemocracytodowiththedevelopmentofurbanarchitecture

intheancientGreekworld?1JessicaPaga(2013),whohasanalyzedtheimpactof

theemergenceofdemocracyonthearchitecturaldevelopmentoftheclassicalGreek

1BasedonapaperwrittenforColloquiumonArchitectureandDemocracy.PrincetonUniversity,February2014.OurthankstoJohnMafordiscussionofHellenisticpoliticsandsociety.Sections3-5areadaptedfromOber2015b:Appendix2.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3057639


city-stateofAthensindetail,makesastrongargumentthattheansweris,“agreat

deal.”Paga,incommonwithotherclassicalarchaeologistsandarchitectural

historianswhohaveaddressedthequestionofdemocracyandarchitecture,focuses

primarilyonintramuralcivicandsacredbuildingsandspaces.Inthispaperwetake

astepbacktolookatacategoryofarchitecturethat(sowewillargue)helped

sustaindemocracy(ifnotliberaldemocracy:Ober2017aandbelow)acrossthe

Greekworldinthelate-andpost-classicalperiods:i.e.themassivestoneandbrick

fortificationsthatframedurbanspaces.

Wewillmakewhatwesupposeisacounter-intuitiveclaim:Inlate-classical

andHellenisticGreekantiquity,biginvestmentsbycity-states(Greekpoleis)in

militaryarchitecture(especiallymonumentalcitywallsandoutworks,butalso

fortifiedvillages,garrisonforts,watchtowersinthecountryside)wereclosely

relatedtothespreadofdemocracyacrosstheecologyofcity-states,andcontributed

materiallytothestabilityofdemocracywithinthosestates.

InthispaperwelookonlyattheGreekevidence,butwithaneyetowards

whatwesupposemightbeawiderphenomenon.Thegeneralrelationshipbetween

walledcitiesandtheemergenceandpersistenceofmoreorlesscitizen-centered

formsofpoliticsisalargerquestionofwhichtheancientGreekcaseisonlyone

particularinstance.2Itisimplausiblethatthereisanydirectcausalrelationship

betweenwallingacityandtheemergenceofdemocracy.Yetroughlysimilar

politicalandeconomicdynamicscould,wesuppose,producecertainregularitiesin

socialoutcomes(albeitatahighlevelofabstraction)amongpremodernsocieties2Forthewiderhistoricalframesee,forexample,Tracy2000,sectionsIandII;CreightonandHigham2005.


thatbothdevelopedcivicinstitutionsandbuiltwalledcities–despitemarked

culturalandtechnologicaldifferencesamongthosesocieties.Testingthat

hypothesisgoesfarbeyondwhatwecanattempthere,butitwould,webelieve,bea

fruitfulareaforfutureresearch.

Iftheclaimthatfortificationwalls,intendedtoenableinsiderstoexclude

unwantedothersfromadefinedspace,promoteddemocracyseemscounter-

intuitive,itisbecauseinantiquity,asinmodernity,democracywasstrongly

associatedwithopeningaccess–toinstitutions,totrade,andtoculture.

Fortificationsareintendedtodenyaccess–atleasttocertainpersonsundercertain

conditions.Inmodernitywallsareassociatedwithpoliticalorderspredicatedon

limitingaccess(tospaces,institutions,rights).TheconstructionofthefamousBerlin

Wallin1961,forexample,wasundertakenbyanautocraticstate,determinedto

limitmovementbyitsownsubjects.TearingdowntheBerlinWallin1989was,

alternatively,associatedwithopeningaccessandwithdemocratization.

Modernstateswithdemocraticconstitutionsdosometimesinvestheavilyin

fortificationsintendedtolimitaccess.Examplesincludethemassivewalls

(sometimeseuphemisticallyreferredtoas“fences”)builtbytheUSonitsborder

withMexicoandbyIsraelonitsborderwithPalestiniancommunities.Fortifications

mayormaynotbejustifiableasmeasuresnecessaryformodernstatestopromote

nationalsecurity,butwall-buildingisquiteunlikelytobecitedbypoliticaltheorists

asanexampleofastate’sopen-accessordemocraticpolicies.Wewillreturntothe

questionofdemocracyandmodernsecuritywallsinsection6.Insections2-4we

willshowthattherewasapositivecorrelationbetweenlateclassicalandHellenistic


Greekfortificationsanddemocracy.Weseektoexplain,byuseofasimplemodel,

howthatthatcorrelationarosefromapositivereciprocalrelationshipbetweenthe

demandsofsecurityandtheincentivesofeliteandnon-elitecitizensofGreekcity-

states.Insection5wedemonstratethatthemodeltracksthehistoricalrecord,as

understoodbyrecentscholarshipinthefieldofancienthistory,tolerablywell.

2.WallsandregimesintheancientGreekcity-stateecology

Therelationshipbetweenwallsanddemocracydevelopedagainstthe

backgroundconditionsforemergenceanddevelopmentoftheGreekcity-states.We

focushereontheagefromPlatoandAristotletotheRomantakeoveroftheGreek

cities,thatis,roughlythefourththroughsecondcenturiesBCE.TheGreekcity-state

ecologyintheearlyandmid-fourthcenturieswascharacterizedbyagreatmany

independentorsemi-independentstates–some1100states,accordingtoa

comprehensiverecentstudy(HansenandNielsen2004),withatotalpopulationof

some8-9millionpersons(Hansen2008;cf.Ober2015b,chapter2).

Whileallancientcity-statesaretinybymodernnation-statenorms,the

Greekstatesrangedwidelyinsize,fromstateswithapopulationofafewthousand

tothosewithapopulationofuptoaquartermillion,withterritoriesrangingfroma

littleoveradozenkm2uptoseveralthousandkm2.Competitionamongthecity-

stateswasintense.Thatcompetition,alongwiththeemergenceoflegalregimesthat

encouragedsubstantialinvestmentbyindividualsinhumancapital,resultedina

remarkableeconomicandculturalefflorescence:TheGreekworldsawstrikingly


highlevelsofbothintensive(percapita)andextensive(demographic)growthinthe

halfmillenniumfrom800-500BCE(Morris2004,Ober2015b).Butinter-state

competitionwasalsopotentiallydeadly(viz.thePeloponnesianWarof431-404),

andtheGreekstatesfacedexternalthreatsfrompredatoryempires(viz.thePersian

Warsof490-478).OnthefrontiersoftheGreekworld,andespeciallyintheregions

aroundtheBlackSea,Greekcitiesconfrontedraidsby(whilealsotradingactively

with)nomadicorsemi-nomadicpeoples.3

FailureagainstlocalGreekrivals,externalimperialists,ornomadicraiders

could,andfairlyoftendid,meandestructionofurbaninfrastructureorevenstate

death(extermination,enslavement,orforcedmigrationofthepopulation).Among

thetypicalGreekresponsestoendemicsecuritythreatswere(1)developingforms

ofsocialorganizationthatpromotedeffectivemobilizationofsoldiersand(2)

constructionoffortificationsaimedatdefendingcitiesandruralpopulations.The

preferenceforstrongcitywallswasnotuniversal:Sparta,famously,remained

unwalledinclassicalantiquity,ontheprinciplethat“ourfightingmenareourwalls.”

SomeGreekpoliticaltheorists,notablyPlatointheLaws(6.778d-e),arguedagainst

wallingtheidealcityonthemoralgroundsthatbravemenoughtwillinglytofight

theirenemiesintheopenfield.

Wallingacitywasnotacasualdecision.Inanypremodernsociety,evenone

thatwasasrelativelyprosperousasancientGreece,theconstruction,maintenance,

andmanningoffortificationwallsamountedtoahugecost.Frederiksen(2011:1)is

surelyrighttosaythat,“citywallsbelongtothecategoryofpublicarchitectureand3Theconceptofefflorescence,amoreorlesssustainedperiodofpremoderneconomicandculturalgrowth,isdevelopedbyGoldstone2002.


musthaveconstitutedthemostexpensiveandlaboriousundertakingforthe

communitiesthatbuiltthem.”Yettheno-walloptionseemstohavebecomeless

attractiveovertime.AsFrederiksen’s(2011)collectionofevidenceofdatesofcity

wallsdemonstrates,fortificationshadcometobeanimportantfeatureinthepubic

architectureofanumberofmajorGreekcitystatesbytheearlyfifthcenturyBCE.

BythelaterclassicalandHellenisticperiod,Greekcitywallshadbecome,on

theaverage,muchmoresubstantial(increasinglybuiltofstone,ratherthanmud-

brick),muchmorearchitecturallydeveloped(towers,crenellations,indentedtrace),

andinmanycasestheywereaugmentedwithoutworksandelaboratesystemsof

ruraldefense(forts,watchtowers,pass-controlwalls).4Figure1showsthegrowth

inthenumberofknown(tomodernscholarship)fortifiedpoleisintheGreekworld,

from900to323BCE.Evengiventheincompletestateofourinformation,itissafeto

saythatby323BCE,mostmajorGreekcitieswerewalled,andthetrendcontinued

intothethirdandsecondcenturies.

[Figure1abouthere]

Meanwhile,arangeofregimetypeswaspossibleforagivenGreekpolis–

canonically:tyranny,oligarchy,anddemocracy.Thedistinctionbetweenoligarchy

anddemocracy,fortheGreeks,wasamatterofwhatpartofthenativeadultfree

4Frederiksen(2011:111)counts121poleiswithevidenceofhavinghadfortificationsby480BCE.PerFigure1,by323BCEthecount(basedonHansenandNielsen2004)is537.OnGreekfortificationsandtheirhistoricaldevelopmentseeMaier1959,Winter1971,Lawrence1979,Ober1985,Ober1991,McNicoll1997,Camp2000.MorerecentworkissurveyedbyFrederiksenetal.2016.


malepopulationenjoyedbothfullprotectionofcivillawandsubstantial

participationrights(i.e.thechancetovoteinacitizenassembly,sitonajury,serve

asamagistrate).InaGreekdemocracy,mostnativeadultfreemaleshadbothcivil

andparticipationrights;inanoligarchyonlyafraction(generallyasmallfraction)

hadmeaningfulparticipationrights,althoughmany,perhapsmost,otherresidents

wouldhavehadamoreorlessextensivepackageofcivilrights(Simonton2017).

Athensis,forusasformanyancientGreekwriters,themodelGreekdemocracy.But

manypoleislackingvariousofAthens’signatureinstitutionswereregardedbythe

Greeksasdemocracies,becauseenoughnativemaleshadenoughparticipation

rightsforthestatetocountasdemocraticbyGreekstandards(Robinson2011).

Aswithfortifications,therewassubstantialchangeinregimeprevalence

overtime.Tyrannywasfairlyrareaftertheearlyfifthcentury(withthenotable

exceptionofthecity-statesofGreekSicily,wheretyranny,anduprisingsagainst

tyrants,remainedprevalent).Whenwecompareknowninstancesofdemocracyand

oligarchyinthefifthandfourthcenturies,itisclearthatdemocracywasascendant.

Bytheendofthefourthcentury,perhapshalformoreofallpoleiswere

democracies(Teegarden2014).IntheHellenisticperiod(fromroughly323-146

BCE)democracyincreasinglybecamethestandardformofgovernmentforGreek

poleis(Gauthier1993,Grieb2007,Ma2013).Measuredby“extentoftheauthority

ofthedemosoverallrelevantpublicaffairs”(Ober2008:292-93),mostHellenistic

citiesmaynothavebeennotasdemocraticaswasclassicalAthens.

ButrecentscholarshiphastendedtoviewHellenisticcitiesas“real”Greek

democracies,ratherthannarrowoligarchiesparadingunderthenamedemocracy.


AmongthekeyfeaturesoftheHellenisticGreekcitiesthattrackrelevantfeaturesof

classicalAthensaretheverysubstantialcontributionofelitestopublicgoods

(includingfortificationprojects)andtheapparenteagernessofthoseelitestohave

theircontributionsrecognizedbytherestofthecitizenry,intheformofcivichonors

(includinginscriptionsdescribingthefortification-buildingprocess:Maier1959).

Althoughcontributionswerenotintheformofdirecttaxesonincome,itisfairto

saythatGreekdemocraciestendedtotaxthewealthymoreheavilythandid

oligarchies,inwaysthatpushedbackagainstextremesocialinequality(Lyttkens

2012;Ober2017b).

WhileresidentsofGreekstatesfavoreddemocracyforanynumberof

reasons,itseemsprobablethatmorepoleischosetoinvestmoreheavilyinbigger

andbetterfortificationsspecificallyinanadaptiveresponsetoanevolvingsecurity

threat:lateclassicalandearlyHellenisticadvancesinwarfareandsiegecraft

(Marsden1969,Campbell2011,Winter1971:157,Frederiksen2011:94).The

questionishowthatadaptivechoiceaboutfortificationsrelatedtothechoicesof

elitesandnon-elitesinrespecttoregimetype:Why,first,wouldchangingsecurity

threatsnotonlyleadtobiggerinvestmentsinmilitaryarchitecture,butalsobe

positivelycorrelatedwithmoredemocracy?Doesthesecuritythreat/wall-building

anddemocracycorrelationpointtoacausalrelationship?Ifacausalrelationship

exists,whichwaydoesthecausalarrowpoint:fromdemocracytowall-building,or

fromwall-buildingtodemocracy?Wewillarguethatarecursiverelationshipexists

betweenwallsanddemocracy,suchthatmoredemocraticstateswerebetterableto

secureresourcesforwall-building,andalsomoreabletodefendwallsagainst


securitythreatstothecitythatalsothreateneddemocracy..Moreover,wallsand

democracyarerecursivelyrelatedforthefollowingreason.Elitesbelievedthat

buildingwallsandsustainingdemocracywereimportantfortheirownsecurity

againstthreatsofappropriation(orworse)byexternalforces.Thisbeliefimplied

thatelitesweremorelikelytopaytaxesandotherwisecooperatewiththe

democraticregime,andlesslikelytoseektosubvertit.Non-elitedemocraticcitizens

werelesslikelytotaxelitesatanextortionaterate,andmorelikelytograntelites

desirablehonors,ifeliteswereseenastheirpartnersinmaintainingasecureand

democraticcommunity.

3.Aristotleonfortificationsinachangingworld

Writinginthelaterfourthcentury,thephilosopherAristotle,inbook7ofthe

Politics,setsoutwhatheregardedasapractical(asopposedtoutopian)planfora

“bestpracticallyachievablepolis.”Hecallsthisthe“polisofourprayers”–itisthe

formofcommunitythathesupposesavirtuousperson,onewhocaresappropriately

abouthumanflourishing(hisownandthatofhisfellowcitizens)oughttohopefor

andtoworktobringabout.MostofAristotle’sdiscussioninbook7concernssocial,

political,andeducationalinstitutions.Hispolis,althoughinimportantways

intendedtobearistocratic(politicalauthorityistobedistributedonthebasisof

virtue),isalsodemocratic,intheGreeksense:Allnativefreemalesinthepolisof

ourprayersturnouttobecitizens,whopossessbothlegalrightsandparticipation

rights,inthesenseof“rulingandbeingruledoverinturns”(Ober2005,2015a).


Aristotleassumesthatthepolisofourprayerswillexistinanenvironmentof

potentialconflict.Heisconcernedtoensurethatallcitizenshadtherightmotivation

(includingownershipofrealestateinsecurity-sensitiveborderzones)andtheright

training,civicandmilitary,soastoensurefullmobilizationofcompetentsoldiersin

timeofwar.But,unlikePlato,Aristotlespecificallyadvocatesforwallstobebuilt

aroundthecentralcityofhispolisofourprayers,andmoreoverheurgesthat

architecturallyadvancedfortificationwallsbedefendedbythebestavailable

militarytechnologyandbycitizensfamiliarwiththattechnology:

Asregardswalls,those[i.e.Plato]whoaverthatcitieswhichpretendtovalorshouldnothavethemholdtooold-fashionedaview—andthatthoughtheyseethatthecitiesthatindulgeinthatformofvanityarerefutedbyexperience.…[because]thesuperiornumbersoftheattackersmaybetoomuchforthehumanvalorofasmallforce[fightingintheopenfield,againstaninvasion],ifthecityistosurviveandnottosufferdisasterorinsult[inthecaseofaninvasionthatcannotbedefeatedinthefield],thesecurestfortificationofwallsmustbedeemedtobethemostwarlike,particularlyinviewoftheinventionsthathavenowbeenmadeinthedirectionofprecisionwithmissilesandartilleryforsieges....notonlymustwallsbeputroundacity,butalsoattentionmustbepaidtotheminorderthattheymaybesuitable…inrespectofmilitaryrequirements,especiallythenewdevicesrecentlyinvented.Forjustastheattackersofacityareconcernedtostudythemeansbywhichtheycangaintheadvantage,soalsoforthedefenderssomedeviceshavealreadybeeninventedandotherstheymustdiscoverandthinkout;for[potentialaggressors]donotevenstartattemptingtoattackthosewhoarewellprepared(ἀρχὴνγὰροὐδ᾽ἐπιχειροῦσινἐπιτίθεσθαιτοῖςεὖπαρεσκευασμένοις).Politics7.1330b-1331a–emphasisadded.

AristotlewaswritingthePoliticsinthethirdquarterofthefourthcentury,a

timeofgreatchangesintheGreekworld.Mostsaliently,bythelastthirdofthe

fourthcenturythecity-stateecologyhadrelativelyfewfullyindependentcity-states:

Macedoniankingdoms,firstunderKingPhilipII,thenunderAlexanderIII(the


Great)andhissuccessors,cametoexerciseaformofhegemonyovermany,

althoughnotall,oftheGreekpoleis.

TheMacedoniankingdomswerenotopenaccesspoliticalorders,but

rather—aswithsomanyempires–tendedtobepredatory,rent-seeking,

imperialisticstates.Surprisingly,however,therentsextractedbytheMacedonian

kingsfromtheGreekcity-statesofthemainland,Aegean,andwesternAnatoliawere

relativelylow.Moreover,theMacedoniankingsinterferedinlocalaffairsmuchless

thanmightbeexpected.Whilemanynotableexceptionscanbecited,forthemost

partthekingsleftthepoleiswithintheirrealmswithasurprisinglyhighlevelof

localindependence.Aswehaveseen,manyoftheHellenisticcity-stateswere

democracies.Variousfeaturesof“democraticurbanarchitecture”familiarfrom

classicalAthensbecamemoreprevalentintheHellenisticpoleis.Meanwhile,a

highlyrefinedperformativelanguageofmutualaccommodationwasdeveloped,

whichhelpedkingsandGreekcitiestocommittoamutuallybeneficialequilibrium.

Insomeways,therefore,lifeinaHellenisticGreekpoliscontinuedmuchasithad

beforetheMacedoniantakeover–includinginter-poliswars,andveryconsiderable

resourcesbeingspentoncityfortification.5

Perabove,thestandardregimefortheGreekpoleisintheperiodof

Macedoniandominationwasaformofdemocracy,supportedfinanciallybyhigh

levelsofcontributionbylocalurbanelites.Thisisalsoinitiallysurprising:Why

5Forthedistinctionbetweentherent-seeking“naturalstate”andthe“openaccessorder”seeNorth,Wallis,andWeingast2009).OntheHellenistickingsaslarge-scalerobbers,outtoextractasmuchastheycouldfromtheirterritories,seeAustin1986.ThebeststudiesoftherelationsbetweenHellenistickingsandGreekstates,andthelanguageofnegotiationareMa1999,2000,2003.


wouldelitesinsomanyGreekcitiesinthelateclassicalandHellenisticperiodhave

agreedtomoredemocratic(andhighertax)formsofgovernment?Theanswerto

thatquestioniscertainlycomplex.AlexanderIIImayinitiallyhavepromoted

democracyfortheAnatolianGreekcities,inpartbecausehisopponent,theKingof

Persia,hadfavoredoligarchyandbecauseAlexandersoughttodistinguish

MacedonianfromPersianhegemony.Alexandermayalsohavebelievedthat

democracywouldreduceconflictwithinandamongtheGreekcities;apeaceful

Anatolianlittoralwouldenablehimtofocusonthebigprizeofconqueringtherest

ofthePersianempire.

DemocracywassubsequentlystabilizedintheHellenisticcity-statesbythe

introductionofrobustdemocraticinstitutions,includinglawsthatpromoted

commonknowledge,pushedagainstpluralisticignorance,andloweredthe

democratic“revolutionarythreshold”inthefaceofoligarchicchallenges–thereby

makingsuchchallengeslesslikely(Teegarden2014).Thephenomenonof

“Hellenisticdemocracy”remainsstriking,however,andfindinganadditionalreason

forelitestocooperatewithcitizenmasses(athighexpensetothemselves)ishardly

otiose.

Thefourfeaturesofthelateclassical/HellenisticGreekworldthatwehave

sketchedabove–moreinvestmentinfortificationbycity-states,moredemocratic

city-states,lowerthanexpectedlevelsofrentextractionbyhegemonicrulers,and

localelitecooperationwithdemocraticregimes–are,webelieve,related.Thekey

totheirrelationshipcanbefoundintheunderlinedpassageofAristotle’sPolitics,


citedabove:“[potentialaggressors]donotevenstartattemptingtoattackthose

whoarewellprepared.”

Aristotleissometimescriticizedforbeingexcessively‘polis-centric’–for

failingtoattendtothegreatchangesthatwereafootwhenhewaswritingthe

Politics.Oneofushasarguedelsewhere(Ober1998,chapter7),however,that

Aristotle’s“bestpracticalpolis”wasdesignedwiththeemergentworldof

Macedonianhegemonyverymuchinmind.Thisargumenthasanimportant

implicationforthepresumptivelywell-preparedpolis,withitsup-to-date

fortifications,artillery,andwell-motivateddefenders:wemaysupposethat

prominentamongtheunnamedaggressorswhowillnot“evenstartattemptingto

attack”isapotentiallypredatoryMacedonianking.

ItisplausiblethataMacedonianking,evenonewiththeresourcesofaPhilip

IIoranAlexanderIII,might“notevenstartattemptingtoattack”awell-defended

citybecausesiegesofwell-fortifiedGreekcitieswereextremelyexpensive

undertakings,andkingscouldnotalwaysexpecttobesuccessfulwhentheychoseto

besiegemajorGreekcities.Philip,Alexander,andtheSuccessorsputagreatdealof

energyintodevelopingtechnology(torsioncatapults,siegetowers)andstrategies

ofsiegecraft.Theirsieges,whenattempted,wereindeedoftensuccessful.Yetthese

siegesincludedsomespectacularfailures:JustatthetimethatAristotlewaswriting

thePolitics,PhilipfailedtocapturethemajorcitiesofByzantionandPerinthosafter

majorsiegesin340BCE.Ashortgenerationlater(andafterAristotle’sdeath)

Demetrius“BesiegerofCities”failedtotakeRhodesin305.Examplescouldbe

multiplied.Moreover,evenasuccessfulsiegewaslikelytobeverycostly–tyingupa


greatdealofmanpowerandresourcesforextendedperiodsoftime.Alexander’s

famoussiegeofTyre,aprominentPhoeniciancity-state,took7months.

Theproblem,fromthepointofviewofthepotentialbesieger,wasthatthe

Greekcities,whentheywerebroughtunderMacedonianhegemonicauthority,were

alreadywell-fortifiedandwell-defended,andtherewereagreatmanyofthem.If,

absentprovocation,akingattackedcitieswithinthegeographicareaheclaimedto

ruleinanobviouslypredatorymanner,therestofthefortifiedcitiesinhisrealm

losttheirincentivetocooperateinfuturewithhim.Theymight,instead,refuseto

paytaxesand,worse,mightcoordinatewithothercitiesinresistance.Theymight

alsoseekanalliancewithinarivalking,asdidthecityofRhodeswhichreceived

substantialaidfromKingPtolemyI,MacedonianrulerofEgypt,whenconfrontedby

Demetrius’attackin305BCE.

Giventheseconditions,akinghadgoodreason,onthefaceofit,notto“even

startattemptingtoattack”awell-fortified,well-defendedcityifhebelievedthathe

couldgaintherevenueheneededotherwise.WesuggestthatAristotlerealizedthis.

But,moresaliently,theHellenistickingscertainlyknewitandtheresidentsofthe

fortifiedGreekcitieswithintheirrealmsknewit;andeachsideknewthattheother

knewit,andsoon.Thatistosay,theking’sdisincentivetoattack,ifacitywerewell-

fortifiedandwell-defended,wasamatterofcommonknowledge(onwhich,see

Chwe2001).

Inthemodelsetoutbelow,weexplainseveralresults:whyawell-fortified

citywasmorelikelytobewell-defendedifitwasademocraticcity;whya

hypotheticalelitememberofademocraticcityfacedwithsiegewouldnotbelikely


toseethatasanopportunitytoseektosubvertthedemocracydespitethe

opportunitytodoso;andwhyaking,confrontedwiththissituation,wouldbemore

likelytonegotiateamoderatetaxratethantopursueanattackthat,ifsuccessful,

wouldallowhimtotaxatextortionaterates.

4.Modelingchoices:King,City,EliteGame

Ourreconstructionintheprevioussectionofwhoknewwhatasamatterof

commonknowledgeallowsustosetupasimplegameplayedbyaking,a

democraticcity,andaneliteresidentofthatcity,intheextensiveform.Thegamewe

sketchinthissectionassumesrationality:Eachplayerisassumedtohave

preferenceshaveanordinalranking(A>B>C)andthatorderistransitive(i.e.ifA>B

andB>C,thenA>C).Players’preferencesarebasedonexpectedutilitymaximizing

(theirchoicesaredeterminedbythegoalofgainingtheoutcomethatdeliversthe

playermostutility,takingprobabilitiesintoaccountwhererelevant).Utility,here,

isdefinedsimplyinmaterialtermsofgettingorkeepingwealthandhonors.The

decisionsaremadebystylizedplayerswhomaketheirchoices(movesinthegame)

underconditionsofincompletebutsymmetricinformation:Thatis,theoutcomeof

the“lottery”thatdecides,inthecaseofanattack,whethertheattackwillsucceed

cannotbeknownwithcertaintyinadvance.Butallplayershavethesamelevelof

knowledgeaboutthelottery–thatis,theirbeliefsaboutthelikelihoodoftheattack

succeedingareidenticalandcommonknowledge..Otherthanthelottery,players

areassumedtohavecompleteinformation.


Thegameisobviouslyanabstractionfromthemuchmessierrealworldof

ancientGreekpoliticsanddecision-making,wheremanyactorsinteract,decisions

arenotformallyrational,andinformationisoftenasymmetric.But,asthe

applicationofgametheorytotheproblemofwhywarsareeverfoughthasshown

(Fearon1995),formalizationmaybeusefulinsofarasitoffersaframeworkfor

explainingpuzzlingphenomena.Inourcase,thepuzzlesarethecounterintuitive

correlationbetweenmoredemocracyandmoreinvestmentinmilitaryarchitecture,

therelativelylowrentsdemandedfromGreekcitiesbytheverypowerfulHellenistic

kings,andtheacceptanceofdemocracybyGreekeliteswhopaidrelativelyhigh

taxesunderdemocraticregimes.

InthisgamethethreeplayersaretheKing(K),thewalled,democraticCity-

state(C),andanElitecitizenofthatstate(E).Forpurposesofsimplification,we

assumethattheCity-stateisindependent(thatis,notcurrentlypayingtaxestoK)at

theoutsetofthegame.6

TheKingmovesfirst,decidingeithertothreatentheCitywithattack

(demandingthattheCitysubmitandthuspayhighrents,intheformoftaxes,asthe

priceofpeace),oralternativelytonegotiatearelativelylow-rentagreement(Q)

withtheCity;QisassumedtobelowerthantherentlevelthattheKingcould

demandiftheCitysubmittedunconditionally.IfKchoosestonegotiatealowrent-

agreement,thegameendsandtheoutcomeisQ.IfKchoosestothreaten,C(thatis,

thedemocraticmajorityofthecurrentlydemocraticcity)decideswhethertoresist

6IfinsteadweassumedthegameconcernedaCity-statefacinganattackbyaKingtowhomitwascurrentlypayingtaxes,asimilarresultwouldfollow,barringsomeimplausibleassumptionsaboutthecurrenttaxrate.


orsubmit.IfCdecidestosubmit,thegameends,andtheoutcomeisthatCandEpay

highrentstoK.IfCdecidestoresist(or,moreplausibly,ifChadformulateda

generalpolicyof“resistanceifandwhenthreatened”inadvanceofK’sdecision),

thenEmustchooseeithertosupporttheexistingdemocracyortosubvertthe

democracy,transformingtheCity’sregimeintoanoligarchy.IfEchoosesnotto

supportdemocracy,Knowdecideswhethertocarrythroughonhisthreat,orto

backdown.IfKattacks,thenwithprobabilityp´,K’sattacksucceedsandwith

probability1-p´thenow-oligarchicCity,withoutthesupportofthedemocratic

masses,beatsbackK’sattack.IfEinsteadchoosestosupportdemocracy,Kagain

decideswhethertocarrythroughonhisthreat,ortobackdown.IfKattacks,then

withprobabilityp<p´,theattacksucceedsandwithprobability1-p>1-p´,the

democraticCity(elitesanddemocraticmassesworkingtogether)beatbackthe

attack.

Eachplayer’schoicesaredeterminedbyexpectedpayoffsforeachoutcome.

ThepayoffsforeachplayerforeachpossibleoutcomearelistedbelowandinTable

1.TheextensiveformofthegameisillustratedasadecisiontreeinFigure2.

[Table1andFigure2abouthere]

Thepayoffstotheplayersforeachpossibleoutcomearecalculatedasfollows:

N:KchoosestonegotiatetaxrateQwithCandE.KacceptsCandE’sofferif

Qishigherthanhisotheravailablepayoffs.CandEwillmakeanofferQthatKwill

acceptifQleavesbothCandEwithbetterpayoffsthanareotherwiseavailableto


them.ThenegotiationyieldsanexpectedpayofftoKbetween2and5.C’spayoff,

between-5and-2,stheinverseofK’s.E’spayoffis2pointsbelowthatofC,because

Emustpaythebulkofthetaxesandmustacceptdemocracyasthecity’sregime.7

S:Csubmits.Inthiscase,KcandemandthatCpulldownitsfortifications

(Herodotus1.164,6.46-47forearlyexamples;cf.Frederiksen2011:45withn.56)

andsetsaveryhightaxrateandcanchangetheratewhenandashewishes,

althoughhecannotplunderthecitybecausedoingsowillincreasethelikelihood

thatothercity’swillresist.ThisisaverygoodoutcomeforK,whogetshighrentsat

lowcost(payoffof9),butinverselyandequallybadforC(payoff-9)andE(payoff

-9)whomustpaythoserents.

AD:KattacksandCisdemocratic.If,counterfactually,therewasnocosttoK

inmountingtheattack,andifhisprobability(p)ofsuccessintheattackwere1,then

K’spayoffwouldbe15:hecanplunderthecityandwillgaininreputation.Buthe

mustpaythecostsofcarryingouttheattack,sohisnet(p=1)payoffis15-5=10.In

thisbranch(ofsubgame)thegame,weassumep=0.6:Khasabetterthaneven

chanceofsuccessbecauseofhighlydevelopedHellenisticsiegecraft.Butpis

substantiallylessthan1becauseCiswell-walledandwell-defended.IfKattacksand

fails,hispayoffis-10becauseCwillpaynorents,andK’sfailurewillmotivateother

citiestorevolt.K’spayoffisthevalueofsuccesstimesp,theprobabilityofsuccess,

plusthevalueoffailuretimes1-p(theprobabilityoffailure).Thus,K’sexpected

payoffforthelottery(L)iscalculatedas0.6(10)+0.4(-10)=2.

7Thenegotiationsbetweenthesplendidly-walledAnatoliancityofHerakleiaunderLatmoswithZeuxis,theenvoyofKingAntiochusIII,provideanexample:Ma1999:169-70,185-86,198-99.


C’spayoffiscalculatedinthesameway.IfK’sattacksucceeds,C’spayoffis-

15:thecityissubjecttobeingplunderedandpotentiallysacked;ifK’sattackfailsC’s

payoffis10:Cpaysnotaxesandgainsinhonorandinfluencewithother

independentcities.Undertheassumedprobability(1-p=0.4),C’sexpectedpayoff

forthelotteryiscalculatedas0.6(-15)+0.4(10)=-5.E’spayoffisindexedtothatofC,

butbecauseEmustpayhighertaxesinademocraticCity,E’spayoffisalways2

pointslowerthanthatofC,ifCisdemocratic.

AO:KattacksandCisnotdemocratic.PayoffstoK,C,andEarecalculatedin

thesamewayasabovebutusingp´(theprobabilityK’sattacksucceedsifCisnot

democratic)wherep´>p(theprobabilitythatK’sattacksucceedsifCis

democratic)becausetheoligarchiccityhasfewerwell-motivateddefenders.Herep´

issetat0.8,whichyieldsanexpectedpayofftoKof6.C’spayoffis-10.BecauseCis

notdemocratic,E’spayoffisidenticaltothatofC.

BDorBO:Kbacksdown.Kreceivesapayoffof-2,becausehereceivesno

rentsfromCandlosesinreputation,althoughhedoesnotfacerevoltsinothercities,

insofarashisforcesareintact.Creceivesapayoffof5,beingsparedpaymentof

taxes,andgainingsomewhatinreputation,butnothavingthespoilsofvictory.E’s

payoffis,asusual,2pointslowerthanthatofC,ifCisdemocratic.

Wecalculatetheequilibriumofthisgamethroughtheusualmethodof

backwardinduction.Atthepenultimatenodeofthegame,Kmustdecidewhetherto

attackortobackdown.Giventhepayoffsundertheassumedconditionsofthe

lottery,hewillchoosetoattackoverbackingdown.Atonenodeback,Emustdecide

betweendemocracyandnon-democracy.Allotherthingsbeingequal,Eprefers(low


tax)oligarchyto(hightax)democracy.ButbecauseK’sattackislesslikelyto

succeedifCisdemocratic,EprefersADtoAO,soEchoosesdemocracy.Backingupa

node,CmustdecidewhethertoresistK’sthreatsortosubmit.BecauseCprefersAD

toS,Cchoosestoresist.Finally,atthefirstnodeofthegame,Kmustchoose

between,Q,therelativelylownegotiatedrent,orthreatenthecityinaneffortto

gainhigherrents.Kknowsthatifhechoosestothreatenthecity,thecitywillresist

andwillremaindemocratic,leadingtothelotteryAD.Ontheassumptionofcommon

assumptionsabouttheoutcomeofthelotteryandotherwisefullinformation,K

knowsthatCandEwillofferQhigherthanhisexpectedpayoffinthelottery(i.e.

abovehisreserveprice),sohechoosestonegotiate:N,whichisthegame’s

equilibriumsolution.

Thesolutiontothegamedependsontheexpectedpayoff-basedpreferences

(boththeirordinalrankandtheircardinalintensity)oftheplayers(Table2).Those

payoffsincludeeachplayer’sexpectationsabouttheoutcomeofthelottery,and

theirsharedbeliefthattheking’sattackhasahigherprobabilityoffailingifthe

walledcityisdemocratic.Thereasonsforthatbeliefarenotmysterious:Aristotle

hadpointedoutinthePoliticsthatdemocracywasingeneralmorestablethan

oligarchy(seeOber2005,2015a);recentworkbyhistoriansofGreekantiquityhas

helpedtoshowwhythatwastrue(Simonton2017,Teegarden2012,2014).

Democracy,bothancient(Scheidel2005),andmodern(ReiterandStamm2002),

hasbeencorrelatedwithsuccessatwarasaresultofhighermobilizationratesand

highermoraleamongsoldiers.Highmobilizationrateshavebeencorrelated,for

moderndemocracies,withmoreprogressivetaxratesandthatcorrelationcanbe


explainedbytheassumptionthatcitizenmassesbelievethat,intimesofhigh

mobilization,elitesoughttopaymore(ScheveandStasavage2012,2016).Elites

evidentlyagree,insofarasdemocraciesarenotoverthrownduringorinthe

aftermathofperiodsofhighmobilization.

5.Reality-tracking

Inadditiontoexplainingthepuzzlesnotedabove,severalimplicationsofthe

gameappeartotrackhistoricalreality.First,asAristotlesawquiteclearly,ifwe

changethesecondplayerinthegamefromwell-walledCitytounwalledCity,the

regimebecomesirrelevant.TheKingcanthreatenwithconfidencebecauseifthe

unwalledCity’sforcesfacetheKingintheopenfield,theywillcertainlylose.Since

thatisalso(asAristotlepointsout)amatterofcommonknowledge,theunwalled

Citywillsubmit.So,undertheconditionspertaininginthelateclassical/Hellenistic

world,democracyisstronglyrelatedtofortifications:Insofarastheconditions

modeledinthegamearerelevantforelitechoices,andinsofaraselitechoices

determinedemocraticstability,itisonlywhentherearefortificationsinplacethat

democracyisstablysustained.Theelitesubmitstodemocracybecauseanexpanded

andwell-motivatedcitizenryimprovestheprobabilitythatthepoliswillsurvivean

attackbytheKing;thatis,p<p´.

Thegameascurrentlyformulateddoesnotincludetheoriginaldecisionto

buildcitywalls(ortorebuildanoutmodedwalltoahigherstandard).Inorderto

addressthequestionofhowmakingthechoicetowallthecitymightchangethe


picture,wecouldbeginthegameatanearlierpointintime,withthecityasyet

unwalled(orpoorlywalled).WemightthenpositademocraticCitythatchooses

whetherornottoproposebuildingawall,tobepaidforinlargepartbytaxingthe

elite.Inthecasethattheproposalismade,anElitemustchoosewhetherornotto

supportthatproposal.Presumably,theElite’sdecisiontopayforthewallinvolves

theconditionthattheriseintheexpectedvalueofthestrongerwallrelativetothe

weakerwallexceedstheknowntaxesitmustprovidetobuildthewall.Alternatively,

wecouldimaginethecityasbeingruledbyanoligarchy,sothegamestartswiththe

Elitechoosingtobuildawallornot,inrecognitionthatconstructionwillbecostly

andislikelytoleadtoaregimechangeinfavorofdemocracy.Theassumptionof

eitherversionofthisextendedgameisthatnotwallingthecitywillleadtothe

outcomeofSubmit.Theequilibriumoutcomeofeitherversionofanextendedgame

woulddependonwhetherthepayoffstotheEliteintheeventofnotwallingare

betterorworsethantheSubmitpayoff.

Democracyisnotdirectlycausedbyfortifications,but,accordingtothelogic

ofthegame,fortificationsareanecessaryconditionfordemocracy(insofaras

sustainingdemocracyisamatterofelitechoice).Ontheotherside,insofaras

fortificationsareineffectualwithoutdefenders,anddemocracyincreasesthe

effectualityofdefenders(1-p>1-p´),thenhavingdemocracymakesthechoiceto

investinfortifications(i.e.topaytaxestosupportfortifieddefenses)arationalone

fortheElite.Defenseofwallsrequiredalotofreliablemen:welltrained(intheuse

ofcatapultsandprojectileweapons,capableofdeployingeffectivelyetc.),andnot

treasonous.Thismeans,inthefirstinstance,thedefendersshouldbecitizensrather


thanmercenaries,andthecitizensshouldhavegoodreasontosupportthecurrent

regime(emphasizedbyAeneasTacticus,Poliorcetica,amid-fourthcenturyBCE

writerondefenseofcities).Thus,animplicitimplicationofthegameisthat

democracyimpliesanon-marginalincreaseintheprobabilityofdeterrence(1-p>

1-p´)overanoligarchy,andthedifferencemustbelarge.Absentthiseffect,thelogic

ofthegameimpliesthattheElitewouldpreferoligarchytodemocracy.

Next,thepayoffschangewhentheprobabilityoftheKingsucceedinginhis

attackchanges:Thehigher(orlower)theprobabilitythattheKing’sattackwill

succeed,thehigher(orlower)thenegotiatedtaxrateQ(K’srents)willbe.This

meansthat,unlessKandCcancrediblycommittodisarmament(weassumethey

cannot),KingandCityeachhaveanincentivetocontinueinvestinginsiegecraftand

defensivemilitaryarchitecture,respectively.ThedemocraticcitizensoftheCity

(who,inthegame,preferdemocracytooligarchybecausetheyreceivedistributive

benefitsfromtaxingtheelite)alsohaveanincentivetocontinuetomobilizeandto

trainforcitydefense.TheseconditionsaremanifestinthehistoryofHellenistic

militarydevelopments,asnotedabove.

Third,thegameyieldsaseriesofcomparativestaticresults.Forexample,if

thespreadbetween1-pwithpayoffADand1-p´withpayoffAO(theprobabilitythat

theattackwillfaildependingonwhetherthecityisdemocraticornot)ischanged,

thenthepayoffstoeliteswillchangeaswell.Ifthespreadisdecreasedsignificantly

(e.g.ifthedemocraticcitizensrefusetotrainormobilize),thenElitewillpreferAO

toADandsowillchoosetosubvertthedemocracy.Likewiseifthespreadbetween

City’spayoffsandElite’spayoffs(inthegamesetat2)isincreasedsignificantly(e.g.


ifthedemocraticmassesincreaseElite’staxburden,ordecreaseElite’shonors)E

willonceagainpreferAOtoADandsowillchoosetosubvertthedemocracy.Since

weassumethatthemassofcitizenspreferthatthedemocracynotbesubverted,

theyhaveastrongincentivetocontinuetotrainandmobilize,toexerciserestraint

insettingthetaxrateontheelites,andtocontinuetoofferhonorstotheelites.

Massesandelitesthushavegoodreasontostayincommunicationregarding

expectationsandduties.Infact,asophisticateddiscourseofreciprocalgratitude

developedbetweenelitesandmassesindemocraticGreekcitiesandeliteswere

taxedatratestheygenerallyfoundtolerableandwereofferedsubstantialhonors

(Ober1989,Ma2013,Domingo2016).

Fourth,theprobabilityoftheKing’ssuccess,evenwhenthecityis

democratic,remainssubstantial(p>1-p).Thelikelihoodthat,weretheKingto

threaten,thethreatwouldberealandthathissiegewouldsucceed,meansthatthe

citymustexpecttopaysomerents(Q)totheKing.Aswehaveseen,asthe

likelihoodofKing’sattackincreases,sotoo,asageneralrule,dohisexpectedrents

(i.e.pandQarepositivelycorrelated,althoughthestrengthofthatcorrelationwill

varywithotherfactors).Thenegotiationsare,insum,realnegotiations–eachside

hassomethingtogainandsomethingtolose.Yet,underplausiblescenariosforthe

probabilityofattacksuccess,thereisanequilibriumwithoutfightingthatallcan

agreeto.Theideathatasolutionexiststhatcanbeagreeduponisthebackground

conditionagainstwhichdevelopedtheperformativelanguageofKing-City

communicationthathasbeenexploredindetailbyMa(1999).Thebackground


conditionisnotadequatefullytoexplaintheperformativelanguageoritseffects,

butthebackgroundistheenablingconditionofthelanguage.

Fifth,wehaveassumedinsettingupthegamethattheinformationrelevant

toformingexpectationsabouttheresultofthelotteryissymmetrical,andthusthat

allplayersmakethesamecalculationsofprobabilities.Butthisassumptionwillnot

alwaysholdintherealworld(cf.Fearon1995).TheCityortheKingmaymakea

mistakeinestimatingprobabilities(perhapsbyover-estimatingitsownstrength),

ormaypossessinformationthattheothersidedoesnothave(e.g.asecretadvance

insiegetechnologyormilitaryarchitecture),leadingtodifferingexpectationsabout

theprobableoutcomeofthelottery.Astheestimatesofprobabilitiesbecome

increasinglydivergent,theequilibriumsolutionof“negotiate”isdestabilized.The

likelihoodthattheKingwillattackincreases:eitherbecauseherateshischancesof

successhigherthandoestheCity,orbecausetheCity,over-ratingitsownchancesof

foilingtheattack,offersataxratethatisbelowtheKing’sreserveprice(i.e.his

calculatedvalueofthelottery).Mistakesarepotentiallyverycostlytoeitherside.

BothKingandCitythereforehavestrongincentivestokeeplinesofcommunication

open,andtoshareinformation.Thissituationis,onceagain,manifestinthe

diplomaticlanguagestudiedbyMa(1999).

Sixth,andfinally,althoughthenegotiatedrentlevelQisnotthefirstchoiceof

anyoftheplayers,thatequilibriumsolutionarguablyhadpositiveeffectson

economicgrowth–perhapsmorepositivethananygivenplayer’sfirstchoicewould

havehad.AlthoughwedonotyethavegooddataformeasuringGreekeconomic

growthafter323BCE,itseemslikelythatthesurprisinglyrobustgrowth(by


premodernstandards)oftheGreekeconomyintheprevioushalf-millenniumwas

sustained,atleastinsomepartsoftheGreekworld,intheHellenisticperiod.

Variouspossibleexplanationscanbeprovidedforcontinuedgrowth:Thefirst

reflectsAdamSmith’s(1981[1776])principalreasonforeconomicgrowth,an

expandingdivisionoflabor(WealthofNationsBookI).Thus,thegreaterGreek

worldexpandedinsizeandcomplexityasaresultofMacedonianmilitarypower–

andthisincreasedthepotentialpayofftoGreekcitiesfromspecializationand

exploitationofrelativeadvantagesinproductionanddistributionofgoods.

Counterfactually,however,hadtheHellenisticKingstaxedtheGreekcitiesatthe

high“Submission”rate,theunderlyingconditionsthathad(asarguedinOber

2015b)producedtheclassicalefflorescence–vigorouscompetitionbetween

relativelywealthycitiesinthecontextofsocialordersthatencouragedindividual

andcollectiveinvestmentsinhumancapital–wouldhavecometoanend.

TheHellenistickingswereoftenwillingtoforegotheuncertainprospectof

long-termgainsforreadilyachievedshort-termpayoffs(Austin1986).Bylowering

thelikelihoodofashort-termpayofftotheKing,theconjunctionoffortificationsand

democracypushedbackagainstthattendency,leadingtoacertainlevelofrestraint

incoerciverentextraction.Restrainedrentextractionhelpedtocreatethe

conditionsthatsustainedavibranteconomy,andtherebyenabledtheGreekworld

tocontinuetomakesubstantialculturaladvances.ThatwastheGreekculturetaken

upbytheRomans,whentheytookovertheGreekworldinthecourseofthesecond

andfirstcenturiesBCE.


RomansiegecapacitywasofadifferentorderfromanythingtheGreekshad

developed,soasomewhatdifferentgamewasplayedintheGreekworldafterRome

replacedtheHellenisticMacedoniandynastsasimperialhegemon.Thequestionof

whathappenedtotheworldofGreekfortificationsanddemocracyinthefaceofthe

Romantakeovermustbethesubjectofanotherpaper.Nonetheless,weobservethat

thegameinthispapercouldbeusedtoanalyzethesamequestionabouttheRoman

world;todoso,wewouldhavetorelyonadifferentsetofassumptionsreflecting

therealityofRomanmilitarypower.8

SufficeittosayherethatdemocracydidnotfareverywellundertheRomans,

atleastinthelongrun.ThearchitectureofGreekcitieswassubstantially

transformedintheRomanerainwaysthatmightreasonablyberegardedas

fundamentallynon-democratic(Wycherley1962).YettheGreekculturethatwas

takenupbytheRomanswas,eventuallyandinfragmentaryform,passedalongto

usviatheessentialintermediaryoftheHellenisticworldofcitiesandkings.To

whateverdegreewesupposethatthewesterntraditionispredicatedon

transmittedGreekculture,itis,therefore,alsopredicatedonaninitiallycounter-

intuitiverelationshipbetweencitywallsanddemocracy.

6.Modernsecuritywallsanddemocracy

Whethertheunderlyingdynamicsofthatrelationshipholdinotherhistorical

casesinwhichwefindacoincidencebetweenhighinvestmentsincityfortifications8OntheRomanpolicyofdefortificationofGreektowns,seeFrederiksen2011:1n.6;45-46.


andtheemergenceandpersistenceofcitizen-centeredpoliticalinstitutions

(whetherornotthoseinstitutionsareproperlyunderstoodasdemocraticorliberal)

isanothersubjectforfutureresearch.Inthemeantime,theGreekcasecomplicates

thesimpleassociationofmassivewallswithanti-democraticregimes,anassociation

thatmightseemtobeimpliedbytheBerlinWall.Ofcoursetheprimarypurposeof

theBerlinWallwaspreventingdissatisfiedcitizensfromleavingthestate,rather

thansecuringcitizensagainstacredibleexternalthreat.Thewallserectedbythe

Greekpoleismightseemtobemorecloselyrelatedtothesecuritywallserectedby

IsraelandtheUS,asnotedintheintroduction.

Allowing,forthesakeoftheargument,thedebateablepropositionthata

meaningfulsecuritythreatexiststhattheIsraeliandAmericanwallscouldhelp

control,wemightaskwhetherobjectionstothewallsarerightlythoughtofas

originatingincommitmentsarisingfromdemocracyorliberalism.Democracy,as

collectiveself-governmentbycitizens,andliberaldemocracy–whichaddsthemoral

commitmentsofindividualautonomy,humanrights,socialjustice,andreligious

tolerance,whilepotentiallyreducingcivicparticipation–areoftenconflatedin

contemporarypoliticalandmoraltheory.But,asDuncanBell(2014)has

demonstrated,“liberaldemocracy”isarecentcoinage.Oneofushasarguedthat

basicdemocracyandliberaldemocracyarenotidenticalandthatacoherenttheory

ofnon-liberal(asopposedtoanti-liberal)democracyarrivesatconclusionsthat

differinsomewaysfromdominantversionsofliberaldemocratictheory(Ober

2017a).Ifitcouldbeshownthatwall-buildingisnotdetrimentaltothewell-

functioningofself-governmentbycitizens,itcouldbeargued(again,basedonthe


debatablepremiseofarealandsubstantialincreaseinsecurity)thatwall-building

byamodernstateisunobjectionablefromthepointofviewofatheoryof

democracy,evenif(asseemsprimafacielikely)itisobjectionableonliberal

grounds.

Mightwegoonestepfurther,byaskingwhetherapositiveandreciprocal

relationshipexistsbetween(non-liberal)democracyandsecuritywallsin

modernity,aswehavearguedthattherewasinlateclassicalandHellenisticGreek

antiquity?Leavingasidethevexedquestionofwhetherdemocracy(orliberal

democracy)requires(orpermits)constraintsonthefreemovementofpersons

acrossstateborders(onwhichsee,forexample,Stilz2011),theargumentmight

hangontheconditionsunderwhicheliteswillsupportademocraticorder,by

refrainingfromsubvertingitandbypayingprogressivetaxestodefendit.

WehavesuggestedthatGreekelitessupporteddemocracybecausewithout

massmobilizationbynon-elites,theelites(andtheircity-state)weremore

vulnerabletoexternalthreats.Asnotedabove,recentworkbyScheveandStasavage

(2012,2016)hasshownthatmassmobilizationintimeoflarge-scalewarisa

primaryreasonthatdemocraticcitizensdemand,andelitesaccept,more

progressivetaxation.Thevalidityofthatgeneralargumenthasbeendemonstrated

byWalterScheidel(2017).Theresultofmassmilitarymobilizationislowerin-

country(asopposedtobetween-country)materialinequality,whichmaybe

thoughtofasinherentlygoodfordemocracy.Thequestionthenbecomes:whatis

therelationshipbetweenmodernsecuritywalls,mobilizationofcitizens,and

taxationofwealthelites?


Supposing(exhypothesi)thatsecurityisenhancedbywallsbuiltbymodern

states,isenhancedsecuritypredicatedonamobilizedpopulationofdemocratic

citizensreadyandwillingtodefendthewallsandonthewillingnessofelitestopay

forthem?IntheIsraelcase,thedemocraticstatedoesrequirenear-universal

militaryconscriptionofcitizensandimposesquiteasteeplyprogressivetaxon

income.So,whilemuchmoreworkwouldneedtobedonetoprovethepointone

wayoranother,itispossiblethattheIsraelcasecouldsupportahypothesisofa

positiverelationshipbetweenbasicdemocracyandwallsinmodernity,mirroringin

somerelevantparticularstheancientGreekcase.

Incontrast,theUScaseseems,onthefaceofit,nottoprovidesupportfor

thathypothesis.TheUSdoesnotcurrentlyconscriptitscitizensformilitaryservice.

Thereareca.21,000agentsintheUSBorderPatrol,whichmaysoundlikealot.9But

theyrepresentatinyfractionofthecitizenbodywhencomparedwiththe

mobilizationofGreekcitizensintimeofinvasion,orthemassmobilizationsstudied

byScheve,Stasavage,andScheidel.Meanwhile,therepeated(andrepeatedly

debunked)claimbythen-candidateandnow-PresidentDonaldTrump,thata

"impenetrable,physical,tall,powerful,beautiful,southernborderwall"willbepaid

forbyMexico,ratherthanbyUStaxpayers,underlinesthedecouplingofproposals

forbuildingnewsecuritywallswiththewillingnessofdemocraticelitestopayfor

them.10TheUSretainssovereignauthoritytocontrolmovementacrossitsborders.

9https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/along-us-borders/overview.AccessedJuly10,2017.10CandidateTrump’sborderwallproposalandclaimthatMexicowouldpayforit:http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-37243269.PresidentTrumppubliclyrepeatedthatclaimonJuly7,2017:https://www.theguardian.com/us-


ButargumentsforthevalueofAmericanborderwallsinenforcingthatauthority

oughtnotbepredicatedonthesalutaryrelationshipbetweenfortifications,

democraticcitizenship,andprogressivetaxationthatweobserveinHellenistic

Greece.

news/2017/jul/07/trump-mexico-border-wall-pena-nieto-g20-summit.AccessedonJuly10,2017.


Figure1.KnownwalledpoleisintheGreekworld.

Sourcedata=Frederiksen2011,exceptfor-323=HansenandNielsen2011.

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

-900 -800 -700 -500 -480 -323 DatesBCE

walledcities


Table1.PayoffstoKing,CityandElite.

King(K) City(C) Elite(E)

S Csubmits 9 -9 -9AO KattacksCnotdemocratic 6 -10 -10N Negotiate >2/<5 <-2/>-5 <-4/>-7AD KattacksCdemocratic 2 -5 -7BD KbacksdownCdemocratic -2 5 3BO KbacksdownCnotdemocratic -2 5 5Figure2.King,City&EliteGame

K=King.C=City.E=Elite.L=Lottery.N=Negotiate.S=Submit.BO=Kingbacksdown(cityoligarchic).BD=Kingbacksdown(citydemocratic).AO=Kingattacks(cityoligarchic).AD=Kingattacks(citydemocratic).p=probabilityADsucceeds.1-p=probabilityADfails.p´=probabilityAOsucceeds.1-p´=probabilityAOfails.Assumedvalueofp=0.6.Assumedvalueofp´=0.8.

K&

E&

C&

L&

K

N&>2/<5,&<62/>65,&<64/>67&

S&9,&69,&69&

L&

KBO&62,&5,&5&

AO&

AO&

BD&62,&5,&3&

AD&

AD&} p&

16p&

} p'&

16p'&&6,&610,&610&

&2,&65,&67&


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Fortifications and democracy in the ancient Greek world