FORMIDABILE GENUS ARMOR UM:

THE HORSE ARCHERS OF THE

ROMAN IMPERIAL ARMY

by

DAVID WILLIAM McALLISTER

B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1991

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF

THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

in

THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES

(Department of Classics)

THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA

April 1993

^

ABSTRACT

The equites sagittarii formed a considerable force in the

auxilia of the early and middle empire, but they, and particularly

their role and employment, have received little scholarly

attention. This paper will attempt to define their place on the

battlefields of the high Empire.

While horse archers are known to have been used in eastern

armies such as the those of the Persians and Parthians with great

effect, they were recruited into and employed by the Roman army in

strength only starting at the reign of Augustus. Units of horse

archers were almost exclusively recruited from eastern lands and

were employed there as well, not only in war, but also as the

border garrisons of Pannonia, Dacia, Africa, and the Levant.

Chapter one discusses the equipment in use by horse archers.

The bows in use were invariably compound recurved bows of eastern

design. Other specialized archery equipment was also eastern in

origin while their general military and cavalry equipment seems to

have been standard Roman military issue.

Horse archers, like all military systems, can be defined in

terms of their characteristics: qualities which determine their

pattern of effectiveness, and therefore role, on the battlefield.

The characteristics of horse archers are: flexibility, mobility,

vulnerability, and firepower. Chapter two analyzes mounted

archers' characteristics to explain in detail the reasons for their

effectiveness.

Chapter three looks at the question:^Were these units

ii

invariably bow-armed? It appears that they had at their disposal

a variety of weapons (including javelins and other weapons) for use

according to the situation.

Chapter four analyzes the evidence of the role of horse

archers in all phases of war: the advance to contact, the attack,

the pursuit, the defence, and the withdrawal. They were were

especially valuable in independent battlefield operations, due to

their mobility.

Appendix one is a list of known and suspected units of

sagittarii, together with a brief commentary on certain of the

mounted units.

Mounted bowmen's firepower has a certain pattern of

effectiveness. Appendix two analyzes arrow fire through

application of the Theory of Small Arms Fire in order to explain

certain paradoxes of archer employment on the battlefield.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract^ ii

Table of Contents^ v

Acknowledgements^ vi

INTRODUCTION^ 1

Chapter One^Weapons and Equipment^ 13

1. Archery^ 132. Bows^ 163. Arrows^ 194. Horses and Cavalry Equipment 235. Protective Clothing^296. Other Equipment^ 31

Chapter Two^A Military Analysis of Horse Archery^33

Chapter Three^Questions of Armament^ 43

Chapter Four^Operational Employment^ 58

1. Advance to Contact^622. Attack^ 763. Pursuit^ 814. Defence^ 855. Withdrawal^ 866. Summary^ 89

Chapter Five^Conclusions^ 92

Appendix One^Bow-Armed Units^ 95

Appendix Two^Analysis of Arrow Fire with Referenceto the Theory of Small Arms Fire^102

List of Figures^ 109

Figures^ 112

Glossary^ 124

Bibliography^ 127

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would first of all like to thank my thesis advisor,Professor James Russell, for his support and advice, and for hiscriticism of the earlier forms of this work, without which it wouldindeed be vastly inferior.

I also owe a debt of gratitude to Raymond Gabin, who kindlyconsented to apply his military knowledge to review some of thechapters; and especially to my fiancee, Christine Parker, not onlyfor her advice and suggestions, but also for her unflagging supportwhile I was researching and writing. All errors and omissions areof course mine alone.

Of course, one needs not only scholarly assistance to write apaper of this length. I would like to thank in particular myCommanding Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Roderick Bell-Irving, forhis indulgence and understanding in allowing me a reduced workschedule for research and writing; and my fellow subalterns of theSeaforth Highlanders of Canada, for their support and constantcomments about "how the Roman archers would have done it". Thisthesis is dedicated to them. Ducimus.

li

INTRODUCTION

It is not known who the first people were to combine

horsemanship and archery; probably the combination is as old as

both skills, and preceded such technological innovations as the

chariotl. We first encounter the bow in the hands of a cavalryman,

however, in the near East in the first millenium before Christ, in

the armies of the Scythians and Assyrians2. Although mainly known

for its infantry phalanx, fifth-century Athens maintained a force

of horsemen, among whom were a number of mounted archers3. This

may have been partly as a counter against the cavalry of the

Persians, but already it is clear that these troops were becoming

more important. The high point in the history of the mounted

archer came with the destruction of Crassus' army at Carrhae in 53

B.C. by a Parthian army composed mostly of lightly-armoured, bow-

1The prevailing view is that chariots preceded cavalry, andthis is supported by Assyrian and Egyptian reliefs (see Y. Yadin,The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands [Jerusalem 19631 4-6); but itis hard to believe that this technological innovation precedes anon-technological one. Some of the first known mounted archerswere nomads, and these peoples produced little in the way ofpermanent artwork that would record their methods of hunting orfighting. That the skills of mounted archery could be acquired ina relatively short time can be demonstrated by the fact that thePlains Lakota (Sioux) Indians of North America gained them soonafter the horse was introduced to them: see E. McEwen et al. "EarlyBow Design and Construction" Scientific American, June 1991. 76-82.

2Seen on a stone relief found in the palace of Ashurnasipal IIat Nimrud: Yadin (op. cit.) 297, 384-5; G. Denison, A History of Cavalry (London 1913) 10-11.

3G.R. Bugh, The Horsemen of Athens (Princeton 1988) 221-4; andXenophon, Memorabilia III, 3, 1.

armed cavalry.

Although by the late Republic the Romans had experienced first

hand the effectiveness of mounted archers, there is no evidence of

these troops in a Roman military force until the time of Caesar

when they formed part of a contingent sent to Caesar's rival Pompey

by Antiochus I of Commagene4. The equites sagittarii first make

their appearance as regular auxiliaries in Germanicus's campaign

against the Chatti5. From this point on, references to them become

more frequent in the epigraphical and literary sources as they came

to assume a greater role in the Roman military of the Empire.

The nomenclature assigned to the alae and cohortes

sagittariorum gives some evidence for the history of these units.

The names show, for example, that they were raised mostly in the

east, especially in the provinces of Syria and Thrace°. Obvious

examples of these are the cohortes Commagenorum, Antiochensium,

Damascenorum, and Thracum. Some come from areas outside the

boundaries of the early Empire. Parthia, for example, was

obviously the origin of some of the mounted archers in the ala

Parthorum et Araborum. The cohors XX Palmyrenorum milliaria

equitata sagittariorum seems to have been formed in the late second

century A.D., about the time Palmyra became part of the Roman

Empire, from the numerus Palmyrenorum that is known to have served

in Dacia in the early part of the same century. Unit titles, where

4Bellum Civile III, 4, 5.

5Tacitus, Annales II, 16.

°See Appendix one for a full listing of known bow-armed units.

2

they appear, may supply an approximate terminus post quem for the

employment of the bow-armed units to which they were granted. A

number of bow-armed units, for example, bear the Imperial titles

Augusta, Flavia, or Ulpia. These titles seem to have been assigned

when the units were raised or reorganized7. Two such units were

the cohortes I Flavia Damascenorum

after the revolt of Civilis

possible to assign precise

and I Flavia Canathenorum,

in 69-70 A.D.8. It is not

dates to the formation or

formed

always

dissolution of each unit.

There is evidence for the existence of a total of twenty four

mounted, bow-armed auxiliary units in the Roman army from the first

to the third centuries A.D.9. As we have seen, they were raised

mainly in the east and they appear to have served mainly in the

east as well. At least three units composed of mounted archers

formed part of the garrison of Dacia in the second century, as well

as at least seven units of foot archers. Pannonia had a similar

number of horse archer units among its garrison, as did the African

provinces of Mauretania Tingetana, Numidia, and Egypt. At least

four mounted archer units are known among the garrison of Syria,

and from the late second century the cohors XX Palmyrenorum was

7Aks far as can be determined, there is no evidence of theawarding of such titles to bow-armed units as a reward forperformance in battle. See P.A. Holder, Studies in the Auxilia of the Roman army from Augustus to Trajan. BAR International Series#70 (Oxford 1980) 14-18.

8Holder (op. cit.) 16.

9At least four other mounted units may have been sagittaria aswell. See Appendix one.

3

stationed at Dura-Europos. Only one unit of bow-armed cavalry is

known to have served in Germany: the cohors I Flavia Damascenorum

milliaria equitata. While a cohors Ramiorum sagittariorum is known

to have served in Britain, no alae or cohortes sagittariorum are

known to have been raised in or to have served in Gaul, Hispania,

or Italy.

But what was their role? What was it about them that caused

their commanders to use them as they did, and what made them so

effective on the battlefield? How were they used? The purpose of

this thesis is to attempt an answer to these questions, applying

where relevant the techniques of military analysis and an

understanding of military affairs based on experience.

SOURCES

The sources for the employment of horse archers in the Roman

military are primarily literary, though there are also considerable

amounts of archaeological, papyrological, and epigraphic evidence

for their equipment, distribution, history, and composition.

The historians of the Roman imperial period furnish the

greatest amount of information on horse archers. Many details of

their employment, especially as a screen and guard for the army on

the march, can be gleaned from a careful reading of Josephusm.

Tacitusll gives hints of their actions in attack and pursuit.

MEspecially Bellum Iudaicum II, 500-1; III, 66-9; and V, 47-9.

"Ann. II, 16-7

4

Arrian is an especially important source as he was in command of an

army in Cappadocia in 135 which included horse archers12; he was

also a historian, and his account of Alexander the Great's army in

India13 is valuable as comparative evidence for the role of the

mounted archers in an ancient army. Ammianus Marcellinus had first

hand experience of military affairs, so that his history might

reasonably be expected to contain useful information on mounted

archers. He does refer to them as a "formidable arm of the

servicel", but unfortunately he makes few other references to this

type of cavalry and these are too vague to be of much value.

Finally, Procopius in his Bellum Gothicum frequently describes the

Roman battle line of the sixth century which was mainly composed of

mounted archers. Although war in his day differed greatly from the

high Empire, being by that time largely a contest between cavalry

formations, he occasionally mentions small forces of horse archers

operating as independent units apart from the main force. Since

this seems also to have been the function of the horse archers in

the high Empire, some indications of their employment in that role

may be garnered from Procopius's account of them in his day.

Unfortunately the writers of the Greek tactical manuals,

Aeneas Tacticus (mid fourth century B.C.), Asclepiodotus (early

first century B.C.), and Onasander (mid first century A.D.), are

"Eirccc4; Komi AAAivow

13'Avdeficcatc 'AXE4dcv8pou , e specially V, 14-8.

un ...formidabile genus armorum..." Res Gestae XVI, 12, 7.

5

silent on mounted archery in war. The latter two do contain some

indication of ancient thinking on cavalry, albeit from an earlier

time, but these references are nevertheless of little use. The few

references to archers and cavalry that are found in the

Strategemata of Frontinus and Polyaenus likewise do little to

illustrate the employment of mounted archers but do give some

indication of the use of cavalry. Vegetius15 (late fourth century

A.D.) does not, unfortunately, mention mounted bowmen. On the

other hand, he is of considerable value for his many references to

archery, the training of soldiers, and the use of cavalry in Roman

times. Finally the Strategikon, attributed to the Byzantine

emperor Maurice (late sixth or early seventh century A.D.),

although it describes, like Procopius, a type of battle much

different from that of the high Empire, contains16 important

references to the training and employment of bow-armed infantry and

cavalry which can serve as indications of earlier practise.

Most modern scholarship on the subject of the equites

sagittarii has been confined to consideration of them as archers or

as cavalry, not as a distinct arm of the service. Another body of

scholarship has been concerned with archery equipment and the

history of bow-armed units. These topics are important for any

discussion of mounted archers, but comparatively little attention

has been paid to details of employment and their role on the

battlefield of the high Roman Empire. The most comprehensive work

15De Re Militari, especially book I.

MEspecially in book XII.

6

on the archer in Roman service is that of J.C. Coulston17. While

he includes much discussion on the subject of archers, Coulston

concentrates mainly on technical details of the evidence for the

construction of archery equipment and the physics behind the

operation of bows18 and does not discuss questions of employment

with any great sophistication. Though dealing with a period

considerably later than ours, A.D.H. Bivar's19 study of the eastern

frontier of the Byzantine empire and the equipment and tactics of

both the Byzantines and their enemies provides comparative evidence

of the use of archer-cavalry in the earlier Empire. A number of

other writers28 have discussed archers in some detail; they have,

however, not been concerned with the technical details of the

deployment of horse archers themselves on the battlefield.

The main epigraphic evidence for horse archers in the Roman

period is to be found in tombstones, which give indications of

which units were bow-armed as well as details of their equipment.

The tombstones having the most value for a study of horse archers

""Roman Archery Equipment" in M.C. Bishop, ed. The Productionand Distribution of Roman Military Equipment. BAR InternationalSeries #275 (Oxford 1985) 220-336.

18 W.F. Paterson's article ("The Archers of Islam" Journal ofthe Social and Economic History of the Orient 9 (1966) 69-87)provides similar detail on later Persian and Arabic archery.

19"Cavalry equipment and Tactics on the Euphrates Frontier"Dumbarton Oaks Papers 26 (1976) 272-291.

20E. g.g P. Medinger "L'arc Turquois et les archers Parthes a labataille de Carrhes" Revue Archeologique 6, II (1933) 227-234; D.B.Saddington "The Roman Auxiliaries in Tacitus, Josephus, and OtherEarly Imperial Writers" Acta Classica XIII (1970) 89-124; and H.van de Weerd and P. Lambrechts "Note sur les corps d'archers auhaut Empire" Die Araber in der Alten Welt I (1964) 661-667.

7

are reproduced here (figs. 18-21). Military diplomas locate bow-

armed units and indicate when they were present at various

locations and in combination with what other types of military

units. Important details of day-to-day activities and equipment

are found in the papyri and graffiti from Dura-Europos. An

especially well-documented unit of mounted archers, the cohors XX

Palmyrenorum milliaria sagittariorum equitata, was stationed there

after the late second century.

Columnar sculpture provides some evidence for archery and

cavalry equipment. Unfortunately, Trajan's column is of little

help for a study of mounted archers. A careful examination of this

column did not reveal any mounted archers on it, and the pedites

sagittarii that do appear on it are armed in an improbable and

inconsistent manner21 (figs. 14, 16, 23-4). Examination of the

Marcus column is only marginally more useful, as it shows at least

one bow-armed cavalryman (fig. 22). Unfortunately, his equipment

is damaged, and the foot-archers on the same column (fig. 25) are

shown armed in the same improbable manner as those on Trajan's

column22.

The equipment and weaponry used by the equites sagittarii, and

indeed most auxiliaries in the service of Rome, are reasonably well

understood. How they dressed, armed and protected themselves, and

21See Florescu, F.B. Die Trajanssdule (Bonn 1969) passim, andCoulston (op. cit.) 235. The bows are depicted with curled ears,which is a feature totally unknown from archaeological or othersculptural evidence.

22See G. Becatti, Colonna di Marco Aurelio (Milan 1957) passim,and Coulston (op. cit.) 235.

8

equipped and mounted their horses, has generated a considerable

scholarship based on archaeological finds, sculptural

representations, the occasional literary reference, and exhaustive

attempts at reconstructions. A chapter is included briefly

reviewing the evidence on his bow and his mount, the two components

that, along with himself, made the eques sagittarius so effective

as a weapon system, to employ the terminology of current military

theory.

Analysis of any military system, however, requires not just

analysis of technology but also analysis of its use: in order to

understand how it "ticks" we must look at what actually affects how

it operates. We must, in short, look at its characteristics.

Horse archers can be fast, and they need not be within arms' reach

of their enemy to kill him. This much is obvious, but much more

can be understood from a closer examination. Chapter two discusses

in detail the characteristics of the mounted archer: not of the

Roman version per se but of any individual armed with a bow and

riding a horse.

During the research for this paper I became aware of a gap in

knowledge that was being continually ignored or glossed over in the

literature. Coulston23 partially recognized the problem and

wondered how the mounted members of the cohortes equitatae

sagittariorum were armed. One of the difficulties lies in the

absence of any depictions showing them as bow-armed. This is only

part of the problem, however. No force equipped inflexibly can

230p. cit., 284-5.

9

operate with flexibility. The cohorts of mounted archers that

garrisoned Rome's eastern provinces had a multitude of fighting, as

opposed to engineering, tasks to fulfil, including border patrol,

policing, and convoy and dignitary protection 24, as well as

defence. To limit their armament to bows would be to endanger the

soldiers and hinder them in the performance of their tasks. Such

a limitation would also be counterproductive to the original and

principal raison d'être for the cohors equitata, namely economy

with flexibility 25 . Chapter three is devoted to a closer look at

the evidence of armament.

Chapter four forms the central focus of the thesis. In this

chapter a number of ancient battles are examined to determine how

the Romans employed their horse archers in battle. It is not my

intention to provide an exhaustive survey of all appearances of

mounted archers in the literature of the Roman period, but to cover

only those where the evidence is sufficient and reliable enough to

give a clear picture of events, and where enough detail is supplied

to reach general conclusions of a comprehensive nature concerning

their role in battle as a whole and in support of other arms, and

not just their deployment in a single action or manoeuvre.

According to current military theory, battles are composed of a

number of phases. These phases, as well as the characteristics of

24Border patrol, policing, and convoy and dignitary protectionare fighting tasks in that those engaged in them must always beprepared to fight even if battle never occurs.

25R.W. Davies "Cohortes Equitatae" in Service in the Roman Army(New York 1989) 140-51.

10

the equites sagittarii discussed in chapter three,^provide a

framework for analyzing their role on the Roman battlefield of the

high Empire.

No work on Roman archers would be complete without a list of

the units they served in. The most complete list to date is that

of Eric Birley, published in 1977 by Jeffrey Davies 26 . It is

reproduced here, with some modifications, in the first appendix,

along with a brief commentary. The second appendix contains an

analysis of the "fire" 27 of archers in terms of modern military

practice. This exercise may explain certain puzzling aspects of

the employment of archers, both mounted and on foot, by quantifying

what would be obvious to one who has been in the position of

controlling or creating fire, but would be only dimly perceived by

one unaccustomed to these experiences. A glossary is also supplied

to explain the many technical terms employed in the discussion:

not only military terms, but especially those concerning the bow.

The bow is a complex instrument with many components, some with

Arabic names that would be unfamiliar to the non-specialist.

I have six years' experience in military matters including

comprehensive training as a regular infantry officer in the

Canadian Forces. My training has been in the command of both

dismounted and mechanized infantry forces as well as in the more

theoretical aspects of war. In addition, I have commanded an

26"Roman Arrowheads from Dinorben and the Sagittarii of theRoman Army." Britannia 8 (1977) 269-70.

27For the meaning of "fire" in this sense, see Glossary.

11

infantry platoon for one year. On the basis of this experience, I

have applied my personal knowledge to the subject of mounted

archers in order to provide a new approach to their study. I will

be successful if I have provided some contribution to the

monumental scholarship on which I base my work.

12

CHAPTER ONE

WEAPONS AND EQUIPMENT

Horse archery needs certain basic equipment: the bow, the

arrow, the horse and its associated gear, protective clothing for

the archer, and related items such as the quiver and the bow-case.

This chapter will cover the essential elements of horse archery and

the equipment used, in order to give a clear picture of how these

soldiers were equipped and what they were capable of.

1. ARCHERY

The mechanics of shooting an arrow consist of three actions:

drawing the string, holding the string back and sighting the shot,

and loosing the arrow. This section will briefly cover these

actions as well as the question of range and penetration (see figs.

1 and 3).

Known alternately as a "hold" and a "release", the way in

which the archer holds the arrow on the string is clearly

associated with the drawing of the string. The most common hold

today is called "Mediterranean". In this hold the arrow is placed

along the left side of the bow resting on the side of the left

hand, the string is fitted into the nock, and the base of the arrow

is gripped between the tips of the index and middle fingers of the

right hand. The tips of the right hand index, middle, and ring

fingers hook over the string. This appears to be the only hold

13

used by archers in the service of Rome28. When an arrow is fired

using this hold, the fletchings of the arrow brush down the left

arm. This hold thus precludes the use of a shield as it will foul

or damage the fletchings. A smooth band known as a bracer is often

worn on the left forearm to protect it from abrasion by the arrow

as it moves-past29.

Another common hold is the "Mongolian", where the arrow is

placed along the right hand side of the stele and both the arrow

and string are held between the right thumb and the side of the

index finger. As the arrow is on the right-hand side of the stele,

it does not touch the left forearm, and so a small shield can be

worn strapped to the left forearm38. The Mongolian hold requires

the use of a thumb-ring, usually made of bone, to protect the thumb

from abrasion; these rings have not been identified before the

Byzantine period, and so the Mongolian hold was probably not used

by Roman auxiliaries of the high empire31.

When the arrow has been placed on the string, the archer faces

the target and raises the bow with his left hand, keeping the bow

vertical; at the same time he pulls the string back with his right

28J•C• Coulston, "Roman Archery Equipment" The Production andDistribution of Roman Military Equipment. BAR International Series275 (Oxford 1985) 278.

29Ibid., 275-6.

mW.F. Paterson, "Shooting Under a Shield" Journal of the Society of Archer-Antiquaries 112 (1969) 27-8.

31See below (note 29).

14

hand to his right cheek or ear32, and aims at the target, sighting

above or below the arrowhead, depending on the range. It is best

to hold this position for as little time as possible to reduce

fatigue and shaking.

To loose the arrow the archer must ensure that the string

slides smoothly off his fingers without catching on clothing or

equipment, and that the arrow is also unobstructed. At target

practise he would "follow-through" by holding his firing position

until the arrow hit the target, but in battle he would not waste

time between shots.

The range of accuracy of the ancient bow has been estimated33

to be in the order of 150 m for a stationary firer and target; it

would be less if the firer or the target were moving. Since the

bow used by a mounted archer would most likely have been smaller,

its range would have been reduced34. More precise figures are not

possible owing to variations in individual skill and in the quality

of equipment produced.

Finally, perhaps because of a scarcity of reconstructions of

Roman archery equipment, precise details of armour-piercing

32Procopius (Bellum Gothicum I, 1, 15) mentions that archersof his day drew the string to the ear; he contrasts this with theHomeric (cf. Ii. iv, 123) practise of drawing the string to thechest, which would result in inaccurate aiming.

33I4.E. McLeod "The Range of the Ancient Bow" Phoenix 19 (1965)1-15; and idem, "The Range of the Ancient Bow: Addenda" Phoenix 26(1976) 78-82. Vegetius mentions a target range (de re militari I,15) of six hundred Roman feet.

34Coulston (op. cit.) 291; and see below, section 4 on cavalryequipment.

15

capability of this equipment are not known. Parthian horse archers

were able to penetrate armour with their arrows at Carrhaem.

Assuming that they did not come far within the maximum range of the

Roman legionaries' pila and their auxiliaries' bows, the Parthians

probably came no closer than 30-50 T1136 from the Roman line.

Because of the smaller bow used on horseback and the difficulty of

aiming while galloping it seems best to assume a distance of 30-50

m as the maximum for effective penetration of enemy armour from

horseback, and perhaps double that range for striking unarmoured

targets37.

2. BOWS

There were two main types of bow used in the ancient world:

the self-bow and the compound bowm. The self-bow is made of a

single piece of shaped wood (the stave), more or less straight,

tightly strung with a string of leather or sinew. This form of

mPlutarch, Crassus XXV, 6

mthese figures are based on an arbitrary figure for the rangeof the Roman auxiliaries' bows of 80-100 m and the fact that theywere behind the lines of legionaries.

37For a more complete discussion of the application of fire todifferent types of targets, see Appendix two.

mthe main works on the subject are: Coulston (op. cit.) 220-366 and especially 222-259; and W.F. Paterson "The Archers ofIslam" in The Journal of the Economic and Social history of the Orient 9. (1966) 69-87. See fig. 3 for a depiction of the parts ofthe bow.

16

bow, the mainstay of the English battle line at Agincourt39, was

used in Crete and Gaul since well before Roman times" and is

characterised by slower initial arrow velocity (and thus range and

power) for a given draw weight°. Since the eastern auxiliaries

that are the subject of this study did not use the self-bow, little

more mention will be made of it here.

The compound bow (fig. 3) is a development from the self-bow,

making use of horn and sinew as compound levers and springs to

increase the power imparted to the arrow on release.

"The thin wooden core provides adhesive

strength and the general shape but plays a

minor part in the bow's physical actions.

When a stave is drawn the horn belly is pulled

into a compressed curve and the back sinew is

stretched. The bow is constructed to elicit

the maximum distance of curve and stretch by

39P. Warner, Firepower (London 1988) 33.

"that Cretan mercenaries were using self bows may be impliedfrom Xenophon (Anabasis III: 3, 7 and 4, 17): the first passagedescribes the Cretans' range as less than that of the Persians'(...a yap EArec Naximpa T8V IIepaoiv kge)om...); while the secondimplies that their bows were of the same size (...geyeamaimitgaviHemmitaw...). Since it is clear that the compound bow was usedby eastern peoples including Persians (Burke, "A History ofArchery"), a significantly shorter range indicates the use of theconsiderably less powerful self-bow.

°For a detailed discussion of the physics behind self- andcompound bows, see Coulston (op. cit.) 245-8, P.E. Klopsteg, "ThePhysics of Bows and Arrows" The American Journal of Physics 11(1943) 175-92, and W.F. Paterson, "The Archers of Islam" TheJournal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 9 (1966)69-87.

17

making it in a "reflexed" shape so that it

reverses itself when unstrung.^The extra

distance from the reversed to strung positions

gives a greater potential energy storage than

with a straight self-bow stave."42

The lever action of the ears increases the pull on the string

by differing amounts: most when the string is slightly pulled

back, and progressively less as the draw length increases. This

effect causes the firer to feel as if the "...pull on the bowstring

reduces, though this is not, in fact, the case..."43. As energy

is stored in the bow itself, and in the dustars and ears in

particular, and not in the arm and shoulder muscles of the firer,

this bow is less tiring to draw", and so greater power can be

attained for a given amount of exertion.

Upon release the levers tend to accelerate the arrow more or

less smoothly until it leaves the string. This acceleration is a

more efficient transfer of power to an arrow than the steadily

decreasing hard push of a self-bow45, and thus greater power is

transferred to the arrow on firing.

42Coulston (op. cit.) 245.

43Paterson (op. cit.) 79.

"Coulston (op. cit.) 247.

45See Klopsteg (op. cit.).^Self-bows must have the stringmoving at very low speeds at the moment the arrow leaves it inorder to reduce the "virtual mass" of the limbs; a compound bowachieves this by having the limbs, in effect, "unroll", and so theyare moving very slowly (and the string comparatively quickly) atthe arrow's final contact with the string.

18

The ears of the compound bow can give a further useful effect.

The archer's tombstone found at Housesteads (fig. 12), on the

assumption that this is an accurate representation46, shows the

ears of the bow angled forward although the bow is at rest; such a

design causes the string, when the arrow has been loosed, to press

against the inside of the ears close to the dustars. The string is

thus effectively shortened, which imparts a final acceleration on

the arrow.

Bowstrings in the Roman era were most probably made from sinew

or leather, but because of their organic and fragile nature none

survives, and we are limited to conjecture their actual nature.

Whatever material they were made from, however, they had to be kept

dry in order to prevent stretching47.

3. ARROWS

Arrows are the most variable piece of archery equipment. The

length of the arrow varies according to the size of the archer and

his draw length; the materials from which it is made depend upon

the type of bow used and the intended target. As is the case with

bows, I will attempt to give as complete a description as possible,

with emphasis on what is relevant to my study of horse archers48.

"As Coulston (op. cit., 236-7) believes.

47See Coulston, op. cit., 270.

lAs with the bow, Coulston (op. cit., 264-70) discusses thesubject in great detail; the reader is referred to his article fora more extensive treatment. See figs. 4-7 for roman arrows and

19

An arrow is composed of an arrowhead; a shaft or stele; and

vanes or fletchings (fig. 4).

Arrowheads are usually made from metal, iron being the most

commonly used metal for war arrows because of its hardness and

toughness. Flight arrows, used in distance shooting competitions,

sometimes had ivory tips49. Such tips were not designed for

penetration but only for aerodynamic qualities as they would have

shattered upon striking anything tougher than skin or dirt".

Military units would have had a supply of properly made arrowheads

on hand. When these ran out, or if there was not sufficient time

to prepare the metal properly, craftsmen would be forced to use

substandard materials or techniques".

Arrows had various cross-sections. Most surviving examples

are vaned, the most common would be trilobate (fig. 6), although

occasionally ones with four vanes are attested. Vaned arrowheads

would often be barbed. Some are flat-bladed (fig. 5); these are

usually not barbed. Arrowheads with a square cross-section are

arrowheads.

49See Paterson (op. cit.) plate IV.

"Apparently the Huns used bone tips for their war arrows; uponhitting an unarmoured enemy these could splinter and causeconsiderable damage (Amm. Marc. XXXI, 2 and see Coulston [op. cit.]268).

"The arrowheads of defenders of Masada seem to have beenhastily fabricated. One was analyzed and found to be made of lowquality iron without tempering; Coulston (op. cit., 270), citingKnox et al., "Iron Objects from Masada: Metallurgical Studies"Israel Exploration Journal 33 (1984) 99-100.

20

known as bodkin52. Finally, there are fire-arrow heads, consisting

of a pointed cage of three curved bars, into which flammable

material would be inserted, then lit (fig. 7).

Obviously different forms of arrowhead have different

functions. The heavier the arrow, the greater momentum it will

carry, and thus greater penetration. Flat-bladed arrowheads

contain less material and so are lighter. Their shape also lends

them to easier sharpening. They are therefore more suitable for

soft targets (animals and infantry or cavalry unprotected by

armour) than the trilobate versions, which are considerably heavier

and tougher, owing to their self-reinforcing shape. Trilobate

arrowheads also suggest a more sophisticated manufacturing process

than the flat examples (which are often simply hammered out) and so

could be examples of prepared stocks rather than emergency

supplies. Little survives from antiquity regarding recommendations

for use of different arrowhead designs".

There were two methods of attaching arrowheads to shafts:

sockets and tangs (figs. 4 and 7). The first is self-explanatory,

except that either glue or a pin would hold the parts together; the

second depended upon a hollow stele or one made hollow by drilling,

and the arrowhead was pushed or hammered in and held in place by

52These appear to have been used for target practise on an ox-skull found in Northumberland with several small, square holespunched in it (Coulston [op. cit.] 265). This is apparently theonly extant example of a practice target from antiquity.

"The Ghunyah of Taybughah, a medieval Arabic archery manual,apparently contains such recommendations for different equipment,but unfortunately it is unavailable to me at present.

21

friction.

The shaft or stele was made from a variety of materials. In

the Roman west, wood dowels were commonly used; in the east, hollow

reed or cane was the norm. Sometimes a composite construction is

found, where the arrowhead is joined to a wood dowel, which is in

turn attached to a reed shaft; Coulston believes that this was to

prevent the more fragile reed from splitting upon impact with an

armoured target54 which would lessen the arrow's momentum and

penetration. At the base of the stele is the notch or nock, which

must be wide and deep enough for the string to fit properly55 (fig.

8). At the base of the stele near the nock the vanes or fletchings

are attached. The purpose of fletchings is to give the arrow

stability in flight and therefore accuracy and penetrative power.

All evidence from antiquity indicates that these were made from

bird feathers56. They were glued in place, and sometimes further

fastened with a whipping of sinew front and back. The exact

location of the fletchings on surviving examples is important for

reconstruction of shooting methods. It has been claimed57, for

example, that fletchings extending right back to the nock make the

540p. cit., 268.

55An example found at Dura-Europos has a nock depth of 0.95 cmand a width of 0.4 cm at its deepest. See S. James "Dura-Europosand the Introduction of the "Mongolian Release"" Roman MilitaryEquipment: the Accoutrements of War. BAR International Series#336 (Oxford 1987) 77-84.

56The surviving arrows from Dura-Europos have featherfletchings. See James (op. cit.) 78, and figs. 3 and 4.

57James (op. cit.) 78-81.

22

"Mediterranean release" impossible58.

As different firers have arms of different lengths, their draw

lengths will differ correspondingly. Arrows must therefore be made

in a length appropriate for each firer. This suggests that each

archer in an archer unit will have his own personal supply in the

form of a quiverful or two of arrows sized for him, ready at his

side in battle. Once these run out, however, he would be reduced

to using stock issue arrows of uniform length, or recovered enemy

arrows, until he could have more made for him59.

4. HORSES AND CAVALRY EQUIPMENT

The subject of the Roman cavalry horse is extremely complex,

58James (op. cit., 78) is probably correct that the arrowsfound at Dura could not be shot using the Mediterranean release,i.e. gripping the stele with the index and middle finger at thestring and thus crushing the fletchings; but James fails toconsider the Sassanid release, wherein the arrow is held betweenthe tip of the middle finger and the side of the index finger,which is extended straight along the arrow between the fletchings(see W.F. Paterson, "The Sassanids" Journal of the Society of Archer-Antiquaries 112 (1969) 30; and my fig. 1). This grip wouldavoid crushing the feathers (see especially my fig. 2 for adepiction of an arrow being drawn with the fletchings extending allthe way back to the base of the fingers). The thumb ring alsofound at Dura is indeed interesting but, since little is known ofits context, it is difficult to conclude with James that the"Mongolian release" was used at Dura-Europos during the Romanperiod.

59Here as throughout this chapter I follow Coulston (op. cit.,270), but he does not provide evidence to support this statement.A useful analogy is that the butt lengths of modern Canadianinfantry weapons can be adjusted as appropriate for each firer. Ifa soldier loses his rifle in battle he must be prepared to make dowith one of the wrong size until it can be adjusted for his armlength.

23

and only certain topics are of importance to a study of the

employment of mounted archers60. This section will attempt to

cover these topics in enough detail to give the reader a clear

picture of how they affect archers. As for cavalry equipment, I

will restrict discussion to the saddle and some bridle equipment,

as these are the main items of significance for this study.

The horse of Roman times was somewhat smaller than his modern

counterpart. Hyland's examination of military horse bones from the

Roman eram indicates an average height of approximately 150 cm62,

which is average for modern horses; the Romans, however, preferred

the largest horses available to them for war purposes, and many of

the breeds preferred for civilian employment were much smaller.

Robust horses were preferred by Roman cavalrymen as they were

easier to ride for a rider whose saddle did not have stirrups. The

reason for this was that a a horse of robust appearance usually had

a wider back, and frequently also displayed the the phenomenon

known as a "double back" characterized by ridges of muscle along

either side of the spine. This would have ensured both a more

comfortable ride and made it easier for a rider to maintain his

balance.

The build of the horse has another effect: the "...well to

60The definitive work on the subject is that of A. Hyland(Equus: the Horse in the Roman World. [London 1990]), and much ofthe information in this section comes from this source.

MOp. cit., 68.

621 use metric measurements rather than the technically correctterm "hands" used in measuring horses in order not to introduce yetanother definition to confuse the reader.

24

moderately fleshed animal usually has a good food conversion ratio

with a slower metabolism than the leaner types..."63. In other

words, it can go longer with less feeding than a slim horse. It

is, however, "...usually not such an enduring animal as the lean,

racy type of equine.. . "64. This suggests that cavalry mounted on

smaller horses would have to take greater care to ensure adequate

forage for their mounts but could operate over longer distances and

in tougher terrain than their heavier-mounted comrades.

The disposition of the mount is also of great concern.

According to Hyland, "...Arabians are sometimes too clever and

individualistic, more suited to...Oriental warfare...in a looser

formation. A more phlegmatic animal is more suited to close-order

action. ..."65. Hyland suggests as well that Oriental units would

be less apt to use mares than stallions, and that stallions would

be left uncastrated66. A list of cavalrymen and their horses of

the cohors XX Palmyrenorum from Dura-Europos67, however, includes

°Ibid., 69.

"Ibid., 69.

°Ibid., 79-80.^This does not mean that each man was anindividual, off fighting on his own somewhere; obviously in orderto produce an effect on the enemy there must be concentration offire. The horses had to be close enough to enable their riders toproduce such an effect but leave enough space for them to be ableto pick targets and fire without hitting their comrades in theback.

66Because of related cultural attitudes men in middle easternlands today do not like to ride mares. p. 81.

67PDur. 97; see R.O. Fink, "Roman Military Records on Papyrus".(Michigan 1971) 340 - 4; and R.W. Davies, "The Supply of Animals tothe Roman Army and the Remount System" Service in the Roman Army(New York 1989) 157-9.

25

mares (equum quadrimam or probatam). The other horses are male

(equum quadrimum or probatum), but it is unclear whether this

refers to stallions or geldings, or indeed whether any distinction

was made.

We turn now to cavalry equipment. As Coulston says, "...it

might be expected that eastern archers exhibited oriental features

in their clothing and armour. On the contrary the tombstones of

auxiliary sagittarii suggest that they differed not at all from

other auxiliarii except in the carrying of archery

Little can be discerned from these tombstones

about the saddles they rode on but the other parts of the horse's

tack or equipment seem to be identical to that employed by other

auxiliaries; it therefore seems most likely that the saddles were

the same as well. Such standardisation would make sense in the

Roman army as myriad types of equipment only burden the supply

system unnecessarily. The only item that seems not to have been

standard was the bit.

We shall first examine the Roman military saddle. Contrary to

popular belief, imperial Roman cavalry saddled their horses. The

saddle used has been reconstructed69 (figs. 9-11) from various

pieces of evidence and appears to have given the rider a

considerable amount of support with its four inward-curving

"horns". This support may have been sufficient to ensure that

613Coulston (op. cit.) 278.

69See P. Connolly, "The Roman Saddle" Roman Military Equipment: the Accoutrements of War. BAR International Series 336 (Oxford1987) 7 - 27; and Hyland (op. cit.) 130-44.

26

stirrups would in most situations have proved less of an advantage

than is usually believed70. Curving over the hips and thighs from

front and back, they kept the rider in his seat, with assistance

from the rider's thighs, during all types of manoeuvres including

turns, movement uphill and downhill, and close quarter battlen.

The traditional assumption has been that the size of the bow

was limited because the rider had little support from his saddle.

This meant "lack of stability", on the assumption that the drawing

of a large bow (and therefore one with a large draw weight) would

unbalance the rider because of his lack of footing72. There are

two objections to this assumption. First, it is now clear that the

cavalryman had very good support indeed from his saddle. Second,

drawing a bow, regardless of its weight, does not unbalance the

archer; no actual weight is produced, and almost none is shifted.

A large bow, however, is more cumbersome. It is more difficult to

shift from a target on one side to one on the otherm. A large bow

also requires a correspondingly longer bow-case, which was carried

vertically on the side of the horse to the immediate rear of the

saddle. If it were too long, it would be an encumbrance, perhaps

even hitting the ground or getting entangled with the horse's legs

mCoulston (op. cit.) 292.

nConnolly (op. cit.) 12, 16 - 7; and Hyland (op. cit.) 130-4.

72Paterson (op. cit.) 85.

The archer has to lift it up and over the horse's neck;clearly, if the target is in motion across the horse's front, thearcher must take his aim off it for a time. Also in a situationwhere an enemy is almost directly in line with the horse's frontthe archer will have difficulty directing fire upon him.

27

during some manoeuvres. Thus it seems that a shorter bow would be

desirable; however, Coulston claims that "...it is not always the

case that bows used on horseback were short...and the trend in

central Asia was for an increase in length over time..."74.

Perhaps the later horsemen developed techniques and technology to

counteract the problems of a long bow. The question, however,

remains open.

The final piece of cavalry equipment to be covered briefly is

the bit. Usually the rider conveys commands to the horse through

three channels: the action of the bit and the reins, knee

pressure, and voice. The first and last pose problems for a

mounted archer, however. In order to use his bow he must drop the

reins, and in the din of battle auditory commands would be of

limited use. The bow-equipped rider must therefore give all

commands to the horse through knee pressure and movement. When not

in battle, however, he may elect to put away his bow, and take up

the reins for easier control of his horse. The bit used by the

Romans has been tested on horses by Hyland 75 and she describes it

as "punishing" and "crue1"76. It seems highly unlikely that

horsemen who have reached such a level of control over their horses

that they do not need reins in battle would resort to the use of

such an extreme tool when away from action. There is, however, no

74Coulston (op. cit.) 246. He does not, unfortunately, backthis statement up.

750p. cit., 136-40 and plates 9-14.

760p. cit., 138-40.

28

evidence for other, more gentle bits.

To conclude on the horse used by the Oriental horse archer of

the Roman army: it was small by today's standards, and even

somewhat smaller than its comrades in contemporary cavalry units.

In temperament it would probably have been spirited and even

"volatile"77. For best effect it would probably have had a wide

back; it could have been either male or female, and there is no

evidence for the practise of castration. It was saddled with the

horned cavalry saddle that gave its rider considerable support, and

it appears doubtful that the severe bit of the Roman cavalry was

used. So much for the animal; now we turn to the rider.

5. PROTECTIVE CLOTHING

Unfortunately, there are few sculptural representations of

Roman mounted bowmen from the high Empire. Those that do exist,

however, tend to show them "...dressed and armoured in the same

manner as other auxiliary units..."78. Funerary representations

of equites sagittarii show them wearing tunics and either short or

long trousers (figs. 18-22), and only the tombstone of the ala

Parthorum et Araborum (fig. 18) seems to show one wearing a

helmet79. The horse archer on the Marcus column80 (fig. 22),

"Hyland (op. cit.) 81.

78Coulston (op. cit.) 280.

79This tombstone is badly damaged, however, rendering detailsunclear.

29

however, is clearly depicted wearing lorica hamata. His head, on

the other hand, is damaged and it is impossible to tell whether he

is wearing a helmet, but, as his clothing otherwise resembles that

of other auxiliaries on the column, it seems reasonable to include

the helmet among his armour. No Roman representations depict an

archer's horse with protective armour81.

There exist a number of representations of Roman foot archers

(figs. 14-16, 23-25). These seem to show much the same clothing as

the depictions of horse archers. All but one of the foot archers

on Trajan's column "...appear in the well-known ankle-length robes,

with conical "spangenhelme" and either loricae squameae or

hamatae..."82. These may indeed not be Roman or Middle Eastern

soldiers at all, but Sarmatian83. The other archer is dressed like

other auxiliaries&. All other representations of foot-archers

show them without armour or at most a helmet°.

mCichorius's scene LVII; fig. 22.

81Nor do the the horse archer grafitti from Dura-Europos, whichalso seem to show the rider either bareheaded, or with a conicalcap or helmet (F. Cumont Fouilles de Doura-Europos - Atlas [Paris1926] Plate XCVIII; and Inventaire des inscriptions Palmyreniennes de Doura-Europos. [Paris 1939] 69); these representations arebelieved by M. Rostovtzeff (The Excavations at Dura-Europos: Preliminary Report of the 5th Season of Work. Oct. 1932 - Mar. 1933 [New Haven 1934] 264; quoted in Coulston [op. cit.] 280, note 110)to be not of auxiliaries in Roman service but of irregularPalmyrenes or Sassanids.

82Coulston (op. cit.) 279.^The archers are in scenes LXX,CVIII, and CXV.

°Ibid.

&Scene XXIV.

°Coulston (op. cit.) 278-80.

30

Although Vegetius recommended that foot archers wear armourm,

representations of archers in Roman service of the high Empire seem

to indicate that the equites sagittarii wore little in the way of

protective armour. As stated above87 the type of release most

probably used in the Roman period precluded the use of a shield

when firing the bow. This seems to be confirmed by the

representationsin sculpture, none of which depict archers using

shieldsm.

6. OTHER EOUIPMENT

To carry arrows an archer needs a quiver and to keep his bow

dry, and carry his bow when unstrung, he needs a bow-case89. Since

there are no representations of bow-cases in Roman art of the high

Empire", it is difficult to determine what form of bow-case Roman

auxiliaries may have used. Quivers, however, are shown suspended

from the right hand side of the saddle to the rear of the rider's

mDe Re Militari I, 20 and II, 15.

87Section one, Archery, p. 11.

mCoulston (op. cit.) 281.

89For a detailed description of the evidence for and use ofbow-cases and quivers in the medieval and ancient world seeCoulston (op. cit.) 270-275.

"The tombstone of the eques of the ala Parthorum et Araborum(fig. 18), seems to show the archer's quiver as long and curved,though it is also possible that the object depicted may be a bow-case. As the tombstone is badly damaged, it is impossible toidentify the object with certainty.

31

lee. They appear to be about one metre long, and are straight

and cylindrical in shape (figs. 19-21). Their capacity is unknown,

but the author of the Strategikon recommends that horse archers in

his day carry quivers of "thirty to forty" arrows92.

It seems likely that horse and foot archers carried some sort

of a weapon for use as a last-ditch defence weapon. Archers from

the Roman period are not shown with swords as side-arms. One

representation from Housesteads, however, shows a foot-archer

carrying a long knife (fig. 12). This same archer is also carrying

what appears to be a bill-hook in his right hand, used perhaps for

the collection of arrow materials93. Swords, on the other hand,

would be of little use to an archer who, after all, carried no

shield. The horse archer would rely on his speed to carry him from

danger, and his dagger, if indeed he carried one, when in dire

straits. They would in any case be out of sight on the left hand

side of the horse, which could explain their absence from the

surviving representations. It is therefore unlikely that mounted

archers carried swords.

91An exception is the tombstone of a member of an alaScubulorum from Walbersdorf, Austria, where the archer carries hisquiver on his back on a strap (mentioned but not shown by Coulston[op. cit.] 271). Foot archers carry their quivers in this manner(see fig. 12), presumably to keep them from dragging on the ground.

92Strategikon I, 2.

93Coulston (op. cit.) 280.

32

CHAPTER TWO

A MILITARY ANALYSIS OF HORSE-ARCHERY

The study of the military, any military, is not simply a study

of the equipment used. It comprises also, in part, the study of

how this equipment was used, and why it was used that way. This

chapter is intended to answer the question of how this equipment

affected the way these individuals did their job. In order to

answer this question it will be necessary to analyze horse-archery

in a theoretical sense. Before undertaking this analysis, it is

necessary first to provide definitions, using the examples of

legionary infantry and foot archers before proceeding to mounted

archers. From this, it will become clearer just how mounted

archers should be viewed, and precisely how the three arms

compared.

Military theorists in part explain military systems in terms

of their "characteristics". A "characteristic" may be defined as

a feature of a system that establishes the system's effectiveness

when the system is operating in its normal or intended context. In

other words, the characteristic determines the system's use on the

battlefield. In a military sense everything has its

characteristics 94 . Because of technology, contemporary infantry

94To use a contemporary analogy, the modern Canadian lightmachine gun is, among other things, "...a belt and magazine fed,gas-operated weapon, capable of a sustained high volume of fire in

33

and armour have additional characteristics such as "communication"

which their ancient counterparts could not share. Most land arms,

ancient and modern, however, may be characterized under the

following headings:

1. Flexibility:^the fluid nature of the battlefield

necessitates rapid reorganization and the performance of

several different types of tasks.

2. Mobility:^in order to exploit enemy weakness, or to

minimize the effect of their own weakness, forces must be

moved around the battlefield guickly95. In particular, a

high degree of mobility can aid in achieving surprise.

3. Vulnerability: such factors as armour, camouflage, degree

of training, and discipline affect the ability of a soldier to

stay alive on the battlefield and so the ability of a force to

carry out its tasks.

4. Firepower: the effects of weapons and ammunition (range,

penetration, and destructive effects), and logistic effects

bursts..." Canadian Forces Publication B-GL-317-019/PT-001 TheLight Machine Gun 5.56mm C9 (Ottawa 1987) 2-24.

95It is important to realize that the mobility of a force islimited by that of its logistical "tail"; that is, no force canmove faster than that part of it that is carrying its shelter,food, and weapons' supplies such as ammunition, replacements, andspare parts.

34

(rate of fire and ammunition supply).

Employing these rather technical concepts derived from current

military theory let us now define the characteristics of Roman

legionary infantry, since they are familiar and relatively well

understood. Roman military commanders put special emphasis on the

flexibility of their units. Vegetius describes a sort of military

"cross-training" for the infantry. This includes not only

marching96, jumping97, fighting with the scutum and g/adium98, and

throwing the hasta99, but also swimming100, throwing rock101 and

leadl" missiles, archery103, and mounting horses104.

Legionaries could expect to be employed in building not only the

regular military works like fortifications but aqueducts and roads

96Vegetius De Re Militari I, 9.

97To clear ditches and other obstacles; op. cit., I, 9.

980p. cit. I, 11.

990p. cit. I, 14.

1000p. cit. I, 10.

1010p. cit. I, 16.

1020p. cit. I, 17.

1030p. cit. I, 15.

1040p. cit. I, 18. Although Vegetius does not name the arm tobe trained in this way, and although it might seem to bespecifically a cavalry skill, I think it in keeping with the spiritof the first book to take this passage to refer to the training ofthe infantry, as most modern commentators seem to assume: forexample Davies (op. cit.) 15.

35

and other public projects as well105. A force so trained is

flexible and provides a commander with the ability to do more tasks

with the same number of resources and provides the force with

greater security. A legionary could thus be expected to be

proficient at fighting a battle, at carrying messages on horseback

or even serving as a replacement for wounded cavalry106, and at

defending a camp after an unsuccessful battle107. Certainly the

cavalry had the advantage herem, since they could be employed

dismounted to reinforce the infantry in a situation that afforded

little room for manoeuvre109. This would certainly be a much more

common situation than the reverse, since, owing to the amount of

training necessary for a cavalryman to become proficient, it would

be difficult for infantry to take the place of cavalrylio.

Legionary infantry was extremely mobile although not very fast

or, when in formation, manoeuvrable. They could go across rivers

by swimming or fording, through dense woods, through broken country

and over steep hills, but not for more than about fifteen or twenty

10Davies (op. cit.) 64.

mThere is no evidence for this, but for the opposite, cf.n.17 infra.

107E.g. as an archer.

108Cf. R.W. Davies's (op. cit., 146-50) opinion that the needfor flexibility in provincial garrisons led to the introduction ofcohortes equitatae.

109Cf. Ostorius Scapula against the Iceni, Tac. Ann. XII 31, 4.

110Although an infantry legion did have a large supply ofhorses, most of these horses were chosen for traits (eg. docility)which would be an asset to beasts of burden but a liability for thecavalry. See Davies (op. cit.) 158-61.

36

miles a day. They would have to stop about noon in order to give

time for the completion of the camp to give the soldiers some

measure of protection from surprise attack at night, and this would

further decrease their mobilitym.

All soldiers, regardless of their type, are vulnerable all the

time. The fact that legionary infantry had to build fortifications

at every night's bivouac was a reflection of this vulnerability;

and obviously in battle even armour could not protect them fully

from enemy weapons.

Finally, legionary infantry had sword and spear with which to

kill their enemies. This was the equivalent of the "firepower"

characteristic of modern armies. In terms of range these are both

severely limited, and the value of the spear was further restricted

by the number carried, usually no more than two. Once these were

gone, the only hope for resupply until the end of the battle was to

pick up a used one from the ground"2.

Archers' characteristics are the same in general, although the

specifics are different. Foot-archers frequently fought alongside

slingers or cavalrym as a component of the levis armatura. As

such, they had to remain unencumbered by armour in order to keep up

with the horses or escape enemy pursuers. Nor could they carry

Vegetius (op. cit.) I, 9; and H.P. Judson Caesar's Army(Boston 1888) 63.

1121 realize I am oversimplifying legionary use of missile-weapons; but the weight and size of a pilum or hasta was adisadvantage which the Romans early on had to develop tactics toovercome.

113E.g. Caesar, BC III, 88, 6, and 93, 3.

37

shields as it is impossible to carry a shield and shoot a bow

simultaneously114. This vulnerability limited their employment to

situations where they could be adequately covered by troops, or

placed in a location that was difficult to attack by virtue of

steepness or obstacles"5. Because of the heavy investment of

time spent in practice to maintain proficiency in archery the time

available to archers for training in other military skills must

have been limited. As a consequence, their flexibility as a

fighting force would suffer. Furthermore, because bow-strings of

sinew or leather lose their elasticity when exposed to wet, archers

become useless when there is rain or snow116.

Mobility, being an essential merit of the foot archer on the

battlefield, was clearly among the major characteristics of this

arm of the military. Foot archers were able to move rapidly from

a position in reserve or on a flank to deal with an unexpected

opportunity or emergency as a member of a group. A single foot

archer could approach the enemy front line with comparative

immunity on his own to snipe, create disorder, and terrorize the

enemy, then retreat to safety if threatened.

The foot-archer's prime characteristic, however, was his

firepower. He could, depending on the type of bow used, fire

114see supra, p. 12.

lnE.g., Arrian Trugt; KaukVámov 12-13.

116This happened to Antiochus's archers in Lydia (FrontinusStrategemata IV 8, 30).

38

deadly and accurate missiles at a long range117 either at

individuals or broad targets such as masses of troops. He could

fire several arrows per minute until his quiver was empty, at which

point he would have had to return to draw more from his regimental

stores or pick up any he could find on the battlefield. His

effective firepower would, of course, be expected to drop

considerably when moving over difficult terrain or at speed. If,

for example, he was obliged to climb a series of hills or run

following cavalry or from a pursuing enemy, his ability to fire

accurately and draw the bow with force would be adversely affected.

An eques sagittarius can be seen in a military sense as an

improvement over his pedes counterpart in all of the above

categories, though there were some limitations. He shared with

other cavalry the ability to carry out a role dismounted. He was

able to close with and retire from the enemy at greater speed, and

bypass or outflank an infantry battle line. Thus, he may have been

used in situations where the distance would have been too great for

a dismounted archer to cover in the time necessary. A horse-

mounted archer was faster than one on foot but, as a rule, this

advantage could only be realized in open country; he lost this

mobility when faced with steep hills or very rough terrain. He was

able to cross fast rivers more safely than foot soldiers, and could

even facilitate the crossing of infantry in such situations, but he

117Coulston (op. cit., 290-1) quotes a variety of sources, mostarriving at a figure of 200 to 300 m for accuracy and 100 to 150 mfor an effective (killing) range; this latter range would obviouslydrop for an armoured target. See supra, pp. 3-4.

39

had to take care to keep his bow and string dry 118. A formation

of horse-archers could turn, wheel, advance, and retire like other

cavalry, much faster than a similar formation of infantry, but

always assuming that the terrain was open and reasonably level. In

close or broken country it would have been very difficult to move

at all and keep formation. Close country also presented another

danger to cavalry: vulnerability to ambush or trap. Infantry were

also liable to be surprised where visibility was low but were more

suited to fighting in these conditions119. Depending on the

amount of armour worn by a horse-archer and his mount, he was more

or less vulnerable to attack by other horse archers or by different

cavalry. On the other hand, his speed would usually have enabled

him to outdistance a pursuer, and he would still have been able to

harass him while retreatingin. Furthermore, compared to other

cavalry, their inability to carry a shield obviously limited their

protection from all forms of weapon.

There were other disadvantages too. The larger the bow, the

larger the bow-case, and the need for this bow-case121 makes use

"8Cf. Caesar's use of cavalry in river crossings to slow thewater for the infantry and to catch any who lost their footing inthe swift current (BG VII, 56; and see Judson [op. cit.] 70).

119Horses can be wounded or killed, or merely frightened; theythen become difficult to control and the resulting confusion makesan organized response difficult. Infantry, on the other hand, canmove about more freely and, when well trained, are less likely tobe so completely surprised that they are incapable of response.

1201.e. the Parthian shot.

121This would be necessary to keep the unstrung bow and itsstrings safe from moisture and to facilitate their carrying whennot in use. See supra, p. 28, and Coulston (op. cit.) 270.

40

of a large bow on horseback an impracticability. The case needed

for a six- or even five-foot bow would not only come close to

dragging on the ground but might interfere with the horse's legs

during running. Finally, the need to be able to shift from one

target to another that might require sighting from different sides

of the horse quickly militates against the use of a large bow,

which would have to be lifted over the horse's neck and head122.

Thus the size of bow that could have been used on horseback was

limited, and with it its range and armour-piercing capability.

Horse-archers would have been able to compensate for this

disadvantage to a degree by their mobility, but if they could be

kept away from their targets by a force of foot-archers employing

longer-range bows, their usefulness would diminishm.

It is conceivable that a mounted archer could carry larger

amounts of ammunition simply by carrying more quivers or bundles of

arrows. There is no actual evidence for this possibility, however,

although there are signs that ancient commanders recognized the

problem of archers' limited ammunition supply and attempted to deal

with it in other ways124. Horse-archers could pick used arrows

122Moreover, shooting at a target directly to the front of thehorse would be almost impossible; see supra, p. 25.

mCrassus's foot-archers at-Carrhae were probably armed withself-bows instead of compound bows like the Parthians; thus theywere outranged and unable to affect the Parthian horse-archers'access to the Roman infantry.

124Cf. Surenas's use of a train of camels loaded with arrows atCarrhae (Plutarch Crassus, XXV). This prodigious use ofammunition, and the incredible logistical preparations necessary tosupport it, foreshadows modern practise.

41

from the field like their unmounted counterparts, albeit with less

ease, but they held the advantage in that they could retire in

small groups to a rear location to be resupplied and return to the

battle far more quickly125.

So we see that the effectiveness of horse-archers can be

defined in terms of their flexibility, mobility, vulnerability, and

firepower. In open ground they represent improvement in all of

these characteristics over pedites sagittarii in one way or

another, except in range and armour penetration, i.e. "firepower".

This disadvantage they make up for in part by their ability to

close with and retire from their enemy at speed causing casualties

the whole time. They were, like all cavalry, at a disadvantage in

close country, and would have to be protected by infantry. In some

situations the way ahead would have to be cleared of enemy before

the cavalry could proceed. These characteristics would form the

basis for an ancient commander's disposition of his units of

equites sagittarii.

125Cf. Plutarch, Crassus, XXV.

42

CHAPTER THREE

QUESTIONS OF ARMAMENT

Central to the question of the employment of horse archers is

the question of their arming. Were these soldiers entirely, and

exclusively, bow-armed? Or were units or individuals allowed

greater flexibility to equip themselves according to the needs of

the situation? Furthermore, if they were permitted to choose

weaponry according to the situation, was it only during garrison or

border control duties, or did this flexibility extend to when they

were employed as part of an expeditionary army? This section will

show that, contrary to what is generally believed, the equites

sagittarii had the flexibility to use bow, spear, and even club and

sling according to the requirements of the situations they found

themselves in.

To begin, it is necessary to establish what was required to

ensure effectiveness in a unit of horse archers. Caesar126,

Tacitus127, and Josephusull all refer to units of equites

126Bellum Civile III, 4, 5. Amongst Pompey's forces were 200mounted archers sent by the Commagenian Antiochus I.

127Annales II, 16, 12.^Mounted archers were part ofGermanicus' force against the Chatti and accompanied his legions atIdistaviso.

1282e11um Iudaicum II, 500, 5: Antiochus IV of Commagene sent2000 horse- and 3000 foot-archers along with Cestius Gallus; Gallusalso took six cohortes of auxiliary infantry and four a/ae. Ifthese units were quingenary, the Commagenian and Roman totals wouldbe approximately the same; Josephus may have confused the two here.D.B. Saddington, "The Roman Auxiliaries in Tacitus, Josephus, and

43

sagittarii, these being ethnic units supplied en masse by client-

kings129. Their ability on horseback and with the bow would have

required them to begin their training at an early age; Sarmatians,

for example, received training in horsemanship and archery starting

at an early age and kept it up at a high level throughout their

lives. This phenomenon of training in specialist skills from an

early age had good parallels. Children of the Balearic Islands,

for example, were believed in antiquity to have been allowed to eat

only when they had secured their food by hitting it with a missile

from their slingm. Whether this was true or not, other ancient

civilisations certainly placed an emphasis on training their male

children in military skillsm.

Horsemanship, especially at a level of skill where a bow can

be used effectively while galloping, is extremely difficult to

master and would require daily training for many years. For many

peoples their safety and livelihood depended on an effective horse

other Early Imperial Writers" in Acta Classica XIII (1970) 117-8does not seem to notice this and accepts that the auxiliary forcesconsisted of both Roman and client-king forces. A more detaileddiscussion would be outside the scope of this paper.

129Caesar and Josephus say exactly this; it is in any eventperfectly natural for these units, whose specialist skills were notfound in the Roman world itself at the time, to be recruitedoutside the boundaries of the Empire.

130Strabo III, 5, 1 in Griffiths "The Sling and its Place inthe Roman Imperial Army" in van Driel-Murray, ed. Roman MilitaryEquipment: the Sources of Evidence. BAR International Series #476(Oxford 1989) 263; and Vegetius, De Re Militari I, 16.

mE.g. the ancient Spartans and Athenians; wrestling, javelin,and discus throwing have obvious military applications and probablyhad a military origin.

44

archer force capable of providing defence: the Palmyrenes and

Nabataeans, especially, depended on horse archers to secure the

routes through the desert that brought their cities trade and

supplies. They also revered the skills of the mounted archer to

the extent that some of the gods they worshipped were mounted

archers132. They must have devoted considerable effort to the

raising of horses suitable to carrying these mounted archers and no

doubt spent a comparable effort in archery training. Without

question, mounted archery requires a considerable amount of

training for it to be effective in battle.

In practise it proved difficult for mounted archers to

maintain their skills at a high standard for several reasons. Once

a unit has been removed from its place of origin, it did not take

long even in peacetime, before disease, accidents, and retirement

would take their toll and replacements would have to be found.

Obviously a replacement for a specialist unit would have to be able

to carry out the tasks required of him. Reinforcements for horse

archer units must therefore have required comparable training if

they were to equal the performance of their comrades already in

service. These replacements must have come from either the same

place as the units in which they were being enrolled or from some

region where horse-archery traditions were equally strong.

The evidence for the origin of the auxiliary sagittarii, as

132Coulston (op. cit., 237) and see M.I. Rostovtzeff "TheCaravan-Gods of Palmyra" JRS 22 (1932) 107-116 for others.

45

distinct from their officersm, is quite well documented. Van de

Weerd and Lambrechts134 show with reasonable certainty that they

were recruited in Syria and the east, the traditional lands of the

mounted archer. This suggests that military ability and specialist

knowledge, at least in the case of the sagittarii, were to Roman

commanders the crucial factors for recruitment rather than ease of

recruitment. Moreover, there must have been some provision for the

transportation of replacements from the east to units that were

stationed far away. Units such as the cohors I Hemesenorum

milliaria equitata, the numerus Palmyrenorum Porolissensium, and

the cohors I sagittariorum, stationed in Pannonia Inferior, Dacia,

and Germania Superior respectively, were the beneficiaries of such

a systemlm. The considerable expense and trouble of finding and

recruiting men in the east, and transporting them to the locations

of their new units to receive their initial military training,

underscores the importance placed on the effectiveness of bow-armed

units.

The evidence for this practise, however, is far from

mThere are, on the other hand, signs that officers ofauxiliary sagittarii were, for a time, exclusively Italian inorigin at a time when many auxiliary units were commanded byofficers of eastern origin. H. van de Weerd and P. Lambrechts("Note sur les corps d'archers au Haut Empire" Die Araber in derAlten Welt [Berlin 19641 661-677), relying on prosopographicalevidence, believe that this evidence, if pointing to a regularpractice, indicates a fear in the Roman high command of theloyalties of their equites sagittarii.

'340p . cit., 667-70.

135G.L. Cheesman, The Auxilia of the Roman Imperial Army(Oxford 1914) 82-4, H. van de Weerd and P. Lambrechts (op. cit.661-2), and J. Davies (op. cit. 261-2).

46

conclusive. Kennedym points to a number of Parthian units that

formed the force of horse-archers in the Roman army before Syrian

units were recruited which may have lost their function as bow-

armed units since there was presumably no mechanism for recruitment

and replacement from skilled sources. As the supply of skilled

recruits from the original source dried up, it became more and more

difficult to train new members recruited locally to a decent

standard. This resulted in the gradual transformation of the

character of these units from sagittarii to more conventional

auxiliary regiments"7. Coulstonm discusses the tombstone of

136,D.L. Kennedy, "Parthian Regiments in the Roman Army" J.Fitz, ed. Limes: Akten des XI Internationalen Limeskongresses (Budapest 1976) 530.

137Kennedy bases his conclusion that Parthian units stoppedbeing bow-armed mainly on the lack of the -sag suffix ininscriptional evidence. While he may find it "surprising" thatonly one text referring to a Parthian unit describes it as - sag, isit not more surprising that any would describe a Parthian unitas such? As he himself says, "Parthian soldiers are notedfor.. .above all.. .horsemanship and archery" (op. cit., 527) andindeed, those Parthians most likely to become mercenaries and fightfor Rome are from the lower classes. These lower classes suppliedthe horse-archers to the Parthian armies, while the upper classessupplied the armoured lancers. The "Parthian shot" was a leitmotifin Roman literature (Coulston [op. cit.] 292). Since the Parthianswere so universally known as mounted archers, it would be asredundant officially to title them "archers" as it would be todayto title the Seaforth Highlanders "infantry". All highland unitsare infantry. As he notes, however, "...there is no evidence toshow continued oriental archers being drafted to the regimentsafter their formation..." (527). We must be careful to distinguishbetween recruitment and membership on the one hand, and tacticalfunction and armament on the other. My point is that although thefirst may, and in the case of archers almost certainly will, havean effect on the second, it is not the only factor.

1381985: 289. The tombstone is discussed by N. Benseddik inLes troupes auxiliares de l'armee romaine en Mauretanie Cesarienne sous le Haut-Empire (Algiers 1979), 38-40, fig. 11, which isunavailable to me.

47

a soldier of the ala I Augusta Parthorum, stationed in Mauretania.

This depicted the deceased armed with a spear and javelin, evidence

that could be construed to indicate that this regiment had ceased

being bow-armed at some stage. Since there is no archaeological or

other evidence whatsoever to suggest that it was ever bow-armed,

however, we must conclude that it had lost whatever function it may

originally have had as a regiment of archers early onm.

Other units were not kept so far from home and, in Coulston's

words, "...the strategically important Eastern regiments would not

have been allowed to decline in skill... nuo These would have

been units such as the cohors XX Palmyrenorum, whose situation was

vital in controlling an important trade route in the desert and in

patrolling a large section of frontier territory. Palmyra is close

to Dura Europos and recruiting, selection, and transport of new

troops was thus much simpler. This is not to say that these units

would not train with other weapons as well. Clearly they would

have been obliged to use a variety of weapons in order to carry out

their tasks for which the bow was unsuitableul.

Evidence of the difficulty in maintaining a high standard of

ability in a unit of horse-archers comes from El-Kantara, Numidia

139"None of the known personnel of the ala Parthorum were oforiental origin and perhaps two centuries of isolation inMauretania resulted in a change of weaponry." Coulston (op. cit.)289.

1400p. cit. 289 (e.g. the coh. XX Palmyrenorum).

ulConvoy protection, for example, requires that soldiersengaged in it be armed with both short- and long-range weapons.Those protecting a convoy must be able to fight attackers who havepenetrated a missile screen and have come to close quarters.

48

in the form of a tombstone (I.L.S. 9173). A Palmyrene centurion,

Agrippa, of the cohors III Thracum Syriaca equitata undertook the

training of the Palmyrenian archers of the cohors I Chalcidenorum

(curam [e]git Palmyr. [s]ag.). The cohors I Chalcidenorum, with a

numerus Palmyrenorum, was in the area long enough to construct an

amphitheatre and other public works, and during this time perhaps

the archery skills of the numerus had begun to deteriorate. In any

case, a senior soldier from a unit of archers stationed in an area

where archery traditions were strong was brought in, and the

assumption may reasonably be made that it was to maintain the

skills of the archers and not simply take care of the soldiers

themselves142.

A further example of an expert moving about to train archers,

and particularly horse archers, is Barsemis Abbei of Carrhae143.

His career included tours with a numerus Hosroruorum, the cohors I

Hemesenorum milliaria sagittaria equitata, and the ala firma

Katafractaria. As Coulstonl" says, "To judge from this series of

units Barsemius must have been an equestrian trainer and/or an

archery expert... (perhaps) a skilled horse-archery campidoctor."

Shooting skills, it should be noted, were not the only skills

required in an archer-unit that would begin to deteriorate with

142For further discussion of this case see J. Carcopino "Lelimes de Numidie et sa garde Syrienne" Syria VI (1925) 119-22.

1431, ...Barsemis Abbei dec(urio) ala firma Katafractaria exnumero Hosro [en] orum, mag ( i s ter) coh (ortis mil iariae )Hemes(enorum), n(atione?) d(omo) carris..." CIL III, 10307.

1440p. cit., 289.

49

time spent away from where the unit was recruited. The members of

such a unit would also need to have considerable skill to build

bows, and ample time to acquire and practise the skill145. Like

archery itself, the knowledge of making bows requires a lifetime of

training and practisel". The climate in which bows are

constructed might also have been a factor in the efficiency of

archery units removed from their original home in the east. The

application of the layers of glue-soaked sinew requires low

humidity and warm temperatures, features not normally associated

with northern European climates. It is thus possible that a

decline in the quality of bows coming from the regimental stores

persuaded commanders to diversify their weaponry.

This is not to say that a mounted unit that began to use other

forms of weaponry would lose its function as horse-archers, as

clearly archery training was a part of life for all Roman soldiers.

Indeed a unit of mounted archers would serve as a repository of

knowledge of archery and horsemanship second to none and could be

the source of skilled trainers for the other arms. This is

speculation, it is true, but the sequence of Barsemius Abbei's

career leads to the conclusion that an expert in one form of

fighting could be sent to units of different function as a

campidoctor to broaden their training and increase their

flexibility.

1451i period of up to a year for bow construction is recorded inthe Ghunyah of Taybughah (Coulston [op. cit.] 249).

1461g.F. Paterson, "The Archers of Islam" Journal of the Social and Economic History of the Orient 9 (1966) 69-85.

50

It is generally assumed that a unit of mounted archers must be

armed exclusively with the bow. This assumption, implicit in most

writing on auxiliaries147, however, requires some qualification.

The bow-armed cavalry of other ancient peoples is frequently

represented carrying other weapons in addition to the bowm. The

Strategikon attributed to the Byzantine emperor Maurice describes

the Byzantine battle line as consisting of horse-archers with those

inexpert at the bow carrying light javelins149. The Byzantine

battle line of the sixth century described in Procopius was armed

with the bow but certainly could hold its own in a hand-to-hand

melee; it too used sword or spear as requiredm.

There is plenty of evidence for the cross-training of other

branches of early imperial auxiliary cavalry in other forms of

weaponry. Arrianl" discusses it in detail in his manual on

cavalry training. There exists, moreover, the text of an imperial

in Kennedy (op. cit.), Cheesman (op. cit.), andSaddington (op. cit. 91, 95, 117-119).

mCoulston (op. cit., figs. 33, 44), Y. Yadin The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands (New York 1963) 295-7, A.D.H. Bivar"Cavalry Equipment and Tactics on the Euphrates Frontier" DumbartonOaks Papers 22 (1976) 282.

149Strategikon II, 3. In the case of the Byzantines we aredealing with a main battle line intended for close contact with theenemy and not a unit of chasseurs, but my point is that differencesin ability and level of training were recognized and dealt with bya modification of armament; individual soldiers were expected to beflexible enough to use different weapons according to thesituation, and this manual prescribes training sufficient to bringthis about.

150.Bellum Gothicum I, 1, 12-3.

151Teritl tarrucT1 43, 1.

51

address given by Hadrian to units of cavalry given after a parade-

ground demonstration. In it the Emperor praises the troopers of

the cohors VI Commagenorum for, among other things, their vigorous

use of slings and javelins152. The use of slings points to a

great deal of training for both men and horses. Not only is

slinging a difficult skill to master153 but unless horses become

accustomed to the sound of an object whirling over their head, they

may rear or bolt154. Infantry units of the Imperial period were

certainly expected to be generalists in weapon skills. Vegetius in

his De Re Militari describes training in the use of the bow as well

as the slingm for regular legionary infantry, while infantry are

also to be taught to ride horses156. Birley's belief 157 that all

of the cohortes Comma genorum were primarily and originally bow-

armed seems correct, but, for the reasons already stated, there is

152” verum vos fastidium calore vitastis strenue faciendo quaefieri debebant. addidistis ut et lapides fundis mitteretis etmissilibus confligeretis..." CIL VIII, 18042, 11. 8-11.

1531K.B. Griffiths, "The Sling and its Place in the RomanImperial Army" C. van Driel-Murray, ed. Roman Military Equipment: the Sources of Evidence. BAR International Series #476 (Oxford1989) 264. He observes that it is not clear from the text whetheror not the equites were mounted when they used the slings; however,all of the other exercises described in the text are cavalryexercises (frequens dextrator, Cantabricius densus...saluistisubique expedite "the right wheels were in quick succession, theCantabrian gallop was done tightly together, and you jumpedeverywhere promptly"), so it seems most likely that the slingingwas also done on horseback.

154Hyland (op. cit.) 168.

1551, 15-16

1560p. cit., I, 18.

157In J. Davies (op. cit.) 270.

52

no reason to believe that they, or any other bow-armed unit for

that matter, used the bow to the exclusion of all other forms of

weaponry158.

If, however, the cohors VI Commagenorum was indeed bow-armed,

we must explain why it is not referred to as such in the address of

Hadrian. The text in fact describes them as fighting

missilibusm but this word, when it can be defined with

certainty, refers to javelins or other weapons rather than to

arrows168. Coulston161 suggests that the horsemen of the cohortes

equitatae sagittariorum may have been armed with javelin and spear,

and bases this on the evidence of Hadrian's address. However, in

a unit where the career pattern went from pedes to eques162, it

seems unlikely that a soldier would be made to re-arm and re-train

on his promotion; rather, he would stay with the weapon or weapons

that he had trained in for many years. The commanders of bow-armed

units had made a considerable investment in recruiting and

158Certainly the fact that they, and the Ituraeans andPetraeans, were well known as archers may help to explain why thereis so little reference to them as such in the epigraphical sources.Of the ala Augusta Ituraeorum and the cohortes II FlaviaCommagenorum, I Augusta Ituraeorum, and III Ulpiae Petraeorum (allattested as sagittariorum) only the coh. II Flavia Commagenorum isso attested more than once. Cf. my comments on the Parthians, note13 supra.

1591. 10.

1601 know this from my own survey of the literature but I havebeen unable to find any corroborating discussion in scholarlywriting.

1610p. cit., 285. He does not make any conclusions, however.

162R.W. Davies (op. cit.) 145 and note 31.

53

selection from lands where horsemanship and archery skills were of

a high standard. This system was intended to ensure an effective

corps of archers. It is scarcely credible that they would squander

this investment by forcing these archers, when they had been

promoted equites, to acquire the skill of, for example, spearmen.

In conclusion, the reference to the cohors VI Commagenorum in

the address by Hadrian does not necessarily mean that it was not

bow-armed. Clearly it was armed with a variety of weapons, and it

demonstrated its prowess in the use of the spear and in

horsemanship to its Emperor in the parade commemorated by the above

inscription. This suggests either a series of formal, standardized

parade-ground rehearsed formations for show and training, or that

cavalry units were cross-trained in weaponry. Indeed, it is likely

that both were the case.

In addition to the epigraphical and literary evidence

discussed above, tombstones and other archaeological finds provide

further evidence for the arming of mounted archers. It is clear

that many of the units thought to have been composed of archers

have been identified as such only on the basis of a single

tombstone showing a soldier engaged in that activity163.

Furthermore, ...no equites cohortales appear as tombstone

figures..."1", so we have no indication of how they were armed

163The ala I Augusta Ituraeorum, the cohors I Ascalonitarumequitata, and the cohors II Flavia Commagenorum equitata areexamples of units only once described as bow-armed. See Appendix1 for further examples.

164Coulston (op. cit.) 284.

54

from this direction. Archaeological evidence of laths and

arrowheads is not taken as evidence of an archery function for a

unit since many units had a supply of bows and arrows for mural

defence and general training as a matter of course165. Indeed, it

is known that a soldier from a non-archer unit could take

sufficient pride in his accomplishments with the bow to commemorate

them in stone166. It should not, therefore, be surprising that

another could do the same, and show himself riding or shooting the

bow when his unit was not officially designated as bow-armed. Thus

some of these funerary depictions of archers may represent nothing

more than pride in the deceased's skill as an archer, and not that

he belonged to a bow armed unit. Some of the tombstones showing

mounted archers, therefore, may be taken as evidence not of the

proliferation of units armed in such a way, but as further evidence

for the detailed cross-training of the Roman military167.

As far as a unit such as the cohors XX Palmyrenorum was

concerned, normal patrol and border control duties would surely

165J• Davies (op. cit.) 265; and Coulston (op. cit.) 285.

1660L III, 3672 (= ILS 2558), and Dio LXIX, 9, 6. A soldierof the cohors Batavorum milliaria equitata swam the Danube in fullkit, then fired an arrow straight up and hit and broke it withanother before it hit the ground, all under the gaze of the emperorHadrian.

167MY comments above on units from known areas of horse-archerytraditions notwithstanding. For example, the ala Celerum is onlysuspected to be bow-armed on the basis of an inscription describinga trooper as highly skilled in archery (...vir sagittandiperitissimus...: CIL III, 4832). Although this unit did serve inArabia and may have been recruited there (J. Davies [op. cit.] 269)I think that this is hardly reason to assign such a role to theentire regiment. The trooper of the a/a Batavorum (see note 43)was also very skilled in archery.

55

require considerable flexibility in weaponry. In a large

expeditionary army a general could always call upon different units

for different tasks, but auxiliary alae and cohortes garrisoned in

isolation often had large areas under their control. In these

situations, a variety of possible situations might arise calling

for flexibility in armament. The use of a cohors equitata for riot

control is attested168, and for escort duties169 a smart commander

would ensure that his men were prepared for both short- and long-

range fighting. Indeed the caravan-gods of Palmyra, gods of

convoy-escort, are depicted mounted and armed with both bow and

spearlm.

Our evidence for the armament of archer units in large-scale

expeditionary armies is somewhat less equivocal. Arrian, in his

INn414 imacCALA6vwv, groups his units according to armament. Horse

archers are employed in the advance guard precisely because they

are horse archers: their characteristics such as mobility and

firepower suit them for this task, and their use of weapons other

168E.g. a cohors equitata was taken to Jerusalem by Florus inA.D. 66 to carry out riot control; the cavalry was used for crowdcontrol but later, when the crowd became too unruly the infantrycontained them with clubs (or "riot-batons" to use Davies'modernistic euphemism) and the cavalry moved them on (cf. J. Davies[op. cit.] 88, 147).

169Escort duty is attested in the papyri for cohors XXPalmyrenorum (for which see J.F. Gilliam, Roman Army Papers [Amsterdam 1986], and R.W. Davies [op. cit.] 146-7) and in the Actsof the Apostles 23.23, 31-33 Paul was escorted to Caesarea bycavalry and infantry, presumably members of the same cohorsequitata.

lmSee p. 45 supra.

56

than bows would render them much less effective.^Likewise

Josephusln seems to describe an expeditionary army advance guard

composed in large part of innat64otat. A commander could, of course,

re-arm his mounted archers for an upcoming battle in which he saw

little use for them; we lack evidence for this sort of flexibility,

however172.

Since it is clear that skilful use of the bow on horseback

requires years of training to acquire and constant practise to

maintain, a horse-archer unit without a source of skilled recruits

to draw from, would, after a period of time, begin to lose its

proficiency. A unit could obtain a skilled instructor such as

Agrippa or Barsemis Abbei to help resist this tendency, to be sure,

but his students' generally lower standards of skill at the time of

recruitment would begin to limit what they would be capable of

after training. Eventually it would be necessary to arm some or

even the majority with other weapons in order to give them some

effectiveness on the battlefieldim. The fact that some units

did, however, maintain a high level of skill in archery in order to

carry out their mission does not mean that these units did not

train with other weapons; in fact, on account of the variety of

tasks required of them, they were most probably able to use

whatever weapon they needed.

171Bellum Iudaicum III, 115-126, and V, 47-9.

172Evidence is only lacking for mounted archers, however. Forother cavalry, see Chapter 2 supra.

173As in the case of the Strategikon.

57

CHAPTER FOUR

OPERATIONAL EMPLOYMENT

The equites sagittarii undoubtedly formed an important part of

the Roman field army of the high Empire. Their employment on the

battlefield, however, has received little attention. Coulston174

believes that their employment has already been studied in detail

but the studies to which he refers either discuss horse archers

only amongst other arms175 or confine consideration of them to a

limited periodlm. These studies also tend to be more concerned

with historical issues, with limited attention to purely military

considerations1". Those scholars who have an interest in the

military tend to confine their interest to broad strategic and

political topics relating to auxiliary forces, to terms of service,

or to archaeological questions. Such inquiry is vital, to be sure,

but an understanding of the soldiers themselves, why they fought,

and especially how they closed with their enemy and killed him, is

the most certain way to discover what made the Roman military

'740p. cit., 220. Coulston is referring to the employment ofarchers in general, not specifically horse archers. Obviouslythere are significant differences in the role of the two arms.

175E.g. D.B. Saddington, "Roman Auxiliaries in Tacitus,Josephus, and Other Early Imperial Writers" Acta Classica 13 (1970)89-124.

176Saddington (op. cit.), and P. Medinger, "Les archers Partheset l'arc Turquois A la bataille de Carrhes" Revue Archeologique serie 6, no. 2 (1933) 227-234.

Somewhat of an exception to this rule is E. Darko, "Note surles corps d'archers au haut empire" Altheim and Stiehl, eds. DieAraber in der Alten Welt (Brussels 1935) 287-310.

58

machine so effective. Politics and strategy do not win battles.

What makes groups of armed men so effective in violent combat does.

Such a study of the military with emphasis on its lower levels

has been ably done for the Greek world by Victor Hanson178 but

Rome has so far gone without this kind of treatment. Mordecai

Gichon's discussion of the Roman military in the Jewish revolts";

is highly realistic and obviously based on experience of soldiering

and especially soldiering in desert conditions. His treatment,

however, views war from the perspective of the general, not of the

prefects, tribunes, and centurions. These junior officers

commanding the a/ae, turmae, and centuriae had to decide how best

to employ men and carry out their tasks at regimental and company

level. How precisely these commanders employed them, however,

remains unclear. In this chapter, therefore, I intend to explore,

through analysis of the relevant sources, literary and

archaeological, and of scholarly literature, why the equites

sagittarii were so important, how they fought, and how their

commanders employed them.

Before addressing these questions it is necessary to provide

a few definitions. War, on an operational or tactical, as opposed

to a strategic or political level, is considered by military

theorists to take place in a number of phases. These phases differ

178v Hanson, The Western Way of War (New York 1987).

179M. Gichon, "Aspects of a Roman Army in War According to theBellum Judaicum of Josephus", P. Freeman and D. Kennedy, eds., TheDefence of the Roman and Byzantine East, BAR International Series297(i) (Oxford 1986) 287-310.

59

by virtue of the different requirements they impose on commanders

affecting disposal of troops, logistical preparations, and spirit

of operations. On an individual level war is simply attack and

defence. At sub-unit level (i.e. company or squadron in modern

terms, or centuria or turma for a Roman auxiliary unit) and unit

level (i.e. battalion or regiment, or cohors or a/a), however,

there are five different phases of operations, which fall into the

basic categories of attack and defence. It will be convenient to

take these five phases of war in the order presented below, if only

because that is the order in which Western military schools teach

them. "Attack" is composed of:

1. Advance to contact: movement of a force towards a

known or suspected enemy location or through enemy-held

or -dominated country. Enemy reaction is unknown and so

all-round defence is essential, as is thorough

reconnaissance. Economy of force is often achieved by

the use of highly mobile, lightly equipped units for

reconnaissance and protection.

2. Attack: the process of closing with and destroying

the enemy including preparatory fires. Maximum combat

power and violence applied at the "right" point in time

and space is prerequisite for successmcl.

180The definition of the term "right" as applied to time andplace varies over time and even between and within armies at thesame time. Until the Second World War it was common to attack only

60

3.^Pursuit: the pursuit of a defeated enemy force in

withdrawal. Never allowing a force to regroup, rest, or

prepare for further operations will weaken it and hasten

its defeat. Highly mobile forces are well used in this

phase to keep up constant pressure.

Defence is divided into:

1. Defence proper: holding of ground against an enemy

force intent on its capture.^A fortification is a

defensive position and we may also consider a battle line

receiving an attack to be in a defensive posture. Mobile

reserves detailed to plug gaps, launch counterattacks,

and relieve worn out troops are as essential to the

success of the defence as is dogged persistence in

maintaining position.

2. Withdrawal: the movement of a force, which might be

in or out of contact, with the intention of removing it

from circumstances unfavorable for battle. Withdrawals,

of course, can themselves be designed to lead an enemy

into a larger trap or onto ground unfavorable for him.

strongpoints; now it is common to bypass strongpoints and exploitareas of maximum weakness.

61

What does all this have to do with mounted archers? As with

all troops, mounted archers' actions in battle vary according to

the phase of war their leader is fighting at any given moment. It

is necessary that the reader understand what they are and what

happens in them in order to understand why the equites sagittarii

do what they do.

1. ADVANCE TO CONTACT

We turn first to the advance to contact. In antiquity this

often consisted of an army moving from one fortified camp to

another in hostile country.^Two sources contain our main

references to such movements, Josephus 181 and Arrian182.^Both

authors must be regarded as extremely important since they both had

first-hand experience as generals. One was a leader of such

movements, while the other, before becoming an observer of military

actions from the Roman side, had commanded troops in several major

actions against them183.

Josephus has two notable digressions on the organization of

181For ref., see below.

182Arrian, INmoc4; icate/dahNow, especially 1-2.

183With proper regard for their limitations as sources we canmake considerable use of them. "...Josephus' accounts must.. .beread with due criticism. This must necessarily be most severe whendealing with his opinions of political motives...and...when dealingwith the narrative of their (definite persons) deeds. On the otherhand, descriptions of...institutions and their functioning (italicsmine)...have been largely sustained by all outside evidenceavailable." Gichon, op. cit., 287.

62

the Roman column of march. The first describes the army under

Vespasian marching into Galilee in 67184; the second that of Titus

on its way to Jerusalem in 70185.

auxvO 6 Kai Napa COW 13ocauliew ovvitten avRgaxixOv,'Avrthxou Rev Kai 'Aypirna Kai Zoaigou napaaxogevow &vacSuyxkliovc ice4oi); to4Otac xai )ca,iou; tivirciç, toi 8e "Apapo;Waxen) xaiouc negwavroc inneic ivI itcoc nevtaxtcrxtliotc,

frrav46tat...tolic Rev ye xrul,olic tóveinxo6ixov Kaito4Ocac poayetv exe)teuoev, thc ecvaxOrtotev Tac e4a7ttvaiouc

Ov noXeRiew entSpoptic; icai. Stepeuvev tac ikrOrtovc xaiXoxdoOat truvagevag 0A,a; . . . (BJ I I I, 68, 116 )

.../cp6; oic at te 're6v aaiAwvauggaxiat nai) rleiou; xaiovxvoi Vint (loth Ivpiac trixoupot auviWov....npotOvn 8i eicnoXeRiav TIN npoilyov Rev oi 13ccathxoi Kai nay toavpRaxtx6v.... (B,7 v, 42, 47)

"Also, a great allied force had beengathered by the kings Antiochus186,Agrippa187, and Soaemus188, each providingtwo thousand foot-archers and one thousandcavalry, while the Arab Malchus sent athousand cavalry and five thousand foot. Themajority of the latter were archers.... He(Vespasian) ordered the light-armed troops ofthe auxiliaries and the archers to go inadvance, in order to beat off any sudden enemyattacks and search suspicious woods suitablefor ambushes."

...In addition to these came the kings'forces in much greater strength, and a great

184Be11um Iudaicum III, 115-126.

185 j V, 47-49.

16.Antiochus IV of Commagene.

ivAgripp a II of Chalcis.

lmSoaemus, king of Emesa.

63

number of allied troops from Syria.... Thekings' forces and the entire auxiliary forcepreceded Titus on his march into enemyterritory."

The advance guard of the army of Vespasian consisted of "the

auxiliaries and archers" whose task was reconnaissance and forward

protection; that of Titus's army was made up of the client-kings'

forces with the remainder of the auxiliary force. Auxiliaries are

not referred to as being in any other part of the order of march,

except as the rear guard of Vespasian's army. The client kings'

forces with Vespasian's army consisted largely of archers both

mounted and on footm; Titus also received auxiliaries from the

kings. We may conclude that a large portion of the advance guard

of both armies consisted of mounted archers.

Let us take a closer look at the organization of this portion

of the army. It is the light-armed troops and the archers who go

ahead of the main bodyl". If Josephus's statement that the

"entire force"'m of troops contributed by the kings to Titus'

army was deployed in the advance guard was true also for

Vespasian's march, and assuming Josephus's figures of the kings'

contribution to Vespasian's army are correct, then there were up to

189What Antiochus, Agrippa, and Soaemus sent is not madeperfectly clear. Josephus says that they each contributed twothousand foot-archers, and one thousand cavalry (BJ III, 68) but Ithink that cdtenac certainly refers to both infantry and cavalry.Malchus of Arabia, however, clearly sent a large force of both footand horse archers (BJ III, 68).

190BJ III, 116

191BLT^42, 47.

64

eleven thousand foot archers and four thousand horse archers

preceding Vespasian's legionsm. The composition of Titus' army

is less clear, but it seems reasonable to assume that the client-

kings made similar contributions. There was as well a considerable

body of regular auxiliaries accompanying Vespasian's army193.

The point of this is not a mere exercise in "bean counting".

Fifteen thousand is a very large body of troops with which to find,

mark, and guard a routem. Gichonm on the evidence of

passages from Caesarm, believes that Roman advance guards were

echeloned in depth (i.e. divided into two bodies: the larimi

antecursores and the antecursores) as is the practice in more

192Since Antiochus, Agrippa, and Soaemus each supplied threethousand troops, and Malchus sent six thousand. However, I believethat Josephus is giving very rounded numbers here, rather thanexact parade or paper strengths. He is writing a history, not amilitary manual, and thus may reasonably be expected to giveapproximate figures or pass over details of interest toprofessional soldiers in the interest of producing a readable text.

193There were twenty-three cohorts (ten infantry, thirteencohortes equitatae: " TiOv 8g amp& ai &Ica ggv glxov avec )0cruc 7ce0i)c,8g Xourai, Senapeig ecvec gaicoaiouc ggv ICE4oi)c, iniceic 8g &at& Erman; . . " BJ III ,67.) and six a/ae of regular auxiliaries with Vespasian's army. Ofthese, five cohorts and one ala were from Caesarea, and five a/aewere from Syria. Some of these units were probably bow-armed.Josephus does not describe precisely where these were located inthe order of march, but merely says that "light infantry...and alarge amount of cavalry..." ("...7m0A..xaiteiyvtangwvolynA..." BJ III,126.) formed part of the rearguard. For a more detailed breakdownof Vespasian's army according to the evidence of Josephus, seeGichon (op. cit., 303-8).

194This figure does not include any regular auxiliaries thatmay have been included in the advance guard as well.

1950p. cit., 291.

196BG II, 17 and 19; BC III, 75.

65

modern armies. Evidence for this tactic is absent from all ancient

sources197, as is the essential provision of flank guards.

Gichon198 suggests that this omission from the sources may be

explained because it seemed self-evident and not worth mentioning.

Josephus, like Caesar and Arrian, was a general, and so his

interest in military matters can be expected to spill over into his

writing. On the other hand, he was writing for a wider audience,

who could be expected to have little interest in this degree of

detail. This will explain why he omits some information of

interest to historians and soldiers in the interest of producing a

readable text. However, even without explicit reference to

them, it should be possible to establish some information about the

advance and flank guards. Their sheer number, and the speed with

which they could cover ground compared to the remainder of the

force, suggests that they probably both operated far in front of

the main body and, even if echeloned in depth, covered a great

lateral distance.

Gichonm calculates the overall length of Vespasian's force

as between 30 and 35 kilometres.^The conclusion is obvious:

...the head of the troops entered camp for their overnight rest,

197Except for Arrian; see pp. 70-72 infra.

198Op. cit., 290-1.

199For example, Josephus, when describing the marching order ofthe legions, says simply that "a centurion" ( "... ucticateArcapxoc..."BJ III, 124) kept the legionaries in order; at six thousand men perlegion, I think more than one would be necessary.

aw0-.p cit., 307.

66

before the last of the troops were able to leave the site of the

previous overnight-stay... "a". The length of an average day's

march for a Roman army has been calculated202 at a little over 30

kilometres. The army would leave camp around dawn203 and march

until about midday. Probabably the antecursores would leave

shortly before the remainder of the force in order to leave a large

enough space204.

The enormous length of the train consisting not only of

soldiers but of equipment, pack animals, and baggage as well will

require it to have considerable protection along its entire length.

Their number suggests that the antecursores did not merely scout

and clear forward of the main body but well off to the flanks as

well, thus providing flank protection. But what sort of forces are

required to perform such a task? Unless the ground ahead is

thickly wooded or full of defiles, clearing it and guarding it is

a relatively simple matter of searching possible enemy ambush sites

and occupying locations dominating the march route and approaches

to it. Small parties can search large areas, and a force of a few

hundred would be sufficient to hold almost any key point at least

201 ibid.

NmH.P. Judson, in Caesar's Army (Boston 1888) 67, arrived atthis figure with reference to American army staff tables.

203Josephus, BI V, 51.

204There must be a space between the advance guard and the mainbody so that both elements will have space for manoeuvre in case ofcontact with the enemy.

67

temporarilym. Josephus provides us with an example of a limited

cavalry force, though not specifically identified as composed of

horse archers, conducting reconnaissance: Titus in 70 scouted

Jerusalem with a force of six hundred206. Such a use of small

parties is more economical and effective in clearing a route than

employing large forces, which are more difficult to manoeuvre as

well. The more sub-units into which an advance guard can be

divided, the more ground it can cover.

If an advance guard was organized along these or similar lines

we might account for the lack of references to flank guards in the

surviving literature as follows. The advance guard would cover

such a wide area that it would take on the responsibilities of

flank guard by clearing and occupying areas far to either side of

the march route. Flank guards per se would therefore not exist in

the Roman army as they would be unnecessary. The job that they

perform in more modern armies would be done by the advance guard.

An enemy attack through the latter would be unlikely given the time

required to penetrate them. Indeed, the large numbers of troops

that we have seen preceding the Roman armies in response to the

Jewish revolts would require an enormous area to either side of the

205E. g. Suetonius, Divus Iulius 68, 3, where an infantry cohortholed up in a turret held four legions at bay for a few hours,despite having 130,000 arrows shot at them.

aldi.RAJ V, 52-65. The six hundred tmAirmw buiwv_u areobviously forming a bodyguard for Titus. Were this a lessimportant reconnaissance (i.e. a route reconnaissance, which acommander does not normally carry out) the number would likely bemuch smaller.

68

main body unless they were grouped in several echelons. Such an

organization in echelons, however, would be clumsy and dangerous

without provision for wide reconnaissance.

One point to be kept in mind is that cavalry are suited for

scouting and skirmish; conversely, they are useless at capturing

and holding ground207. Even foot archers are vulnerable when

faced with an attack by determined infantry. Germanicus covered

them with auxiliary infantry at Idistavisom for this very

reason, and Arrian planned to protect his foot archers with the

infantry of a cohors /ta/ica209.

The mobility of horse archers and their inability to hold

ground seem to support the view that they would form part of the

antecursores or primi antecursores rather than a picket force.

Their characteristics make them more suited to reconnaissance of

selected locations and pinning any enemy there until the arrival of

an attack force proper. The speed with which they were capable of

moving suggests that they would not have travelled as part of a

force including infantryvo. Unfortunately, Josephus does not

207This point is axiomatic and a truism for the student of war;cf. Caesar, BG VII, 80, 7.

208Tac, Ann. I, 16.

209.Arrian, "Eicugtgicaul'AXemov 13.

mArrian (see pp. 69-71 infra) does not include any infantryin his advance guard; rather, the cohortes equitatae even seem tobe divided, the cavalry in the advance guard, the infantryfollowing with the remainder of the auxiliaries. Interestingly,the cohortes equitatae are divided for battles as well; for more,see Davies, "Cohortes Equitatae." in Service in the Roman Army (NewYork 1989) 141-152.

69

provide more explicit information on this subject.

Our most informative source for the actual deployment of horse

archers in the field is our second major authority, the second

century Roman writer and general Arrian. While commanding the army

in Cappadocia in 135, Arrian issued a set of orders to his army for

dealing with an attack into the province by the Alani. His order

of march against the Alani seems to have included horse archers, in

an arrangement similar to that supposed for Vespasian's army, as a

protective guard in front of the rest of the advance guarel. He

actually says that the horse archers are behind the forward

reconnaissance screen, in two groups under the command of

decurions:

`Hydaeou Rev TIN than; oval-Lac TC4); icoctaalcOnovcflat:ea; êiri Svoiv tecawivouc av t oiniop hyr.p.Ovt.toinotc St to); innoto4enac 'CO'66 Ilerpaiouc, ica toótouç tni,Svoiv. ecy•fprcow St akoi); o SencSecpxat. tni^toircot;trozroixecov oi anO tfjç en.% finvt Abinocvoi 6voga.ovvrenixecov abtoic oi %fig =tip% Tric tealinn; tv 'Panay,fç amccov Mohr% Kopivetoc. tni tokotc St of. dcne ç ERIN fiOvolux Katovoi. auv<teyrecxecov St ainotg Trupaiot Kai KypivaiotKai oi ecnO ç nOrric Tatruci16. augntivrow St wimpy dcpxtuoAnuirptoc. iti TO6T01.; St ot Kat01: 1,7C71Eig, icat abtoi tni 6o, Kaiwimpy inTia0co ticomentrapxoc, 15anep èiviowatoniSou. (licta4t;'Kate( 'Ail.avow 1-2)

"The mounted reconnaissance troops are tolead the entire army grouped in twoformations, each under its own commander.Following these will be the Petraian horsearchers, also in two formations under thecommand of decurions. Following them are tobe grouped the men of the ala Auriana. With

mArrian, "Ertcc4t; -Kat& 'Abivoyv 1.

70

them are to be deployed are the troops of thecohors 1111 Raetorum under the command ofDaphnes of Corinth. Following these will bethe men of the ala Colonorum; let the Ituraeiand the Cyrenaians and the men of the cohors IRaetorum be deployed with them. Demetrios isto command all of them. The Celtic cavalryare to follow them, also in two formationsunder the command of the centurion who is incharge of their camp."

Clearly the horse archers follow the icataaminot to protect them

and cover any deployment of the main force or the advance

guard212. Does the phrase bd. tcrinot; imply that the Petraians are

right behind the iconaminot, or that they follow at some distance?

The same phrase when used later in the same passage seems to

indicate that the Colonoi follow closely the Raeti. Do the

innovgama take on any of the reconnaissance tasks? Again, Arrian

is not completely clear, but their position close behind the

212A problem lies in the chain of command and deployment. WhenArrian says that the decurions are in charge, does this mean incharge of individual turmae? Or does he mean of the two divisions,and would decurions, normally commanders of turmae, be put incharge of such larger forces? The Ilerpcciovc have been identified asthe cohors III Ulpia Petraiorummilliaria (see E. Birley, quoted inJ. Davies, "Roman Arrowheads from Dinorben and the Sagittarii ofthe Roman Army" Britannia 8 (1977) 269; and R. Davies, op. cit.,143.). If this identification is correct then there were up to 125eguites (assuming a strength of approximately 250 for the equitescohortales of a milliary cohort) in each of the two groups intowhich the lead mounted archers are divided, or about three or fourturmae. Given the rigid hierarchy within the rank centurio, it isreasonable to suppose a similar system for decuriones. Having thesenior decurio in each group in charge would then not seem sostrange. Arrian is telling the tribunus cohortis that he wants himback ready to command the rest of his soldiers if contact is made,and to leave the less demanding task of commanding the cavalrytroops to his junior officers.

71

reconnaissance troopsm would indicate that they are there for

protection of these tconotaicentot; they could perhaps have taken part

if a reconnaissance in force was required, but there is no

indication of this.

What is the organization of the rest of the advance guard?

Arrian does not describe it in detail, but it is reasonable to

speculate that the other mounted units that follow the Petraians -

the a/a Auriana, the equites of the cohors IV Raetorum, the ala

Colonorum, and finally the equites of the cohortes I (?) Ituraeorum

(sagittariorum), III Cyrenaica (sagittariorum), and I Raetorum - do

so in a body, ready to deploy where they are needed214. As to why

oiWomiinmeic follow these last in two detachments, it may have had

something to do with the fact that the horse of the four cohortes

equitatae which they precede are working as flank guards. The

total number of horse in the advance guard would be around 2000 -

an effective striking force in any situationm.

Apart from the references in Josephus and Arrian discussed

above, there is little other evidence for mounted archers

participating in an advance guard. Caesarm used mounted

213A numerus exploratorum: Ritterling (1902), quoted in theTeubner edition of Arrian (Vol. II, Scripta Minora, A.G. Roos, ed.[Leipzig 1968] 177).

214The fact that they are under the command of a singleindividual (Daphnes of Corinth) may support this supposition.

2151 partly follow R. Davies in this paragraph; see op. cit.,143.

216Caesar, BG II, 19

72

reconnaissance detachments sent far in front of the main body of

his armies. Ammianus Marcellinus also makes passing reference to

such forces217. Of course equites sagittarii are not the only

military arm suitable for such a role; any light armed cavalry will

do, but those armed with the bow have the advantage of range, so

important in a skirmish, which is, after all, a hit-and-run affair.

But, as we have seen, the evidence of mounted archers in the

advance to contact points to their use as a fighting force.

The evidence of Josephus and Arrian considered thus far points

to a fighting role for mounted archers in the advance to contact,

but furnishes no evidence of their actually fighting. Evidence for

this is available only in an oblique form through Arrian's account

of the battle which occurred between the forces of Alexander the

Great and the Indian king Porus upon Alexander's crossing of the

river Hydaspes. Our main source for this battle is book five of

Arrian's ',04.1)(cOpm)%1Nat pocatc218. Admittedly, Alexander was not a

Roman, but Arrian, being a Roman general as well as an historian,

was in a unique position to analyze and comment, and it is

reasonable to suppose that his interpretation of events was based

in part on his own personal experience.

2'17E.g. Amm. Marc. 31, 12, -for exploratores and 27, 2 forspeculatores. Both these references are to reconnaissancedetachments operating in front of the main body; for a detaileddiscussion of such operations in Ammianus, see N. J. E. Austin,Ammianus on Warfare, Collection Latomus 165 (Brussels 1979) 117-139.

218Dioodorus (XVII 87-91) also has an account of the battle butit is extremely sketchy and omits the river Crossing entirely.

73

Sg innoto4Otac it; irticr% trnou npoetate....TaiNxovi Se te) to4cpxti irpocytta4c toO6 to4Otac enartvbump._ Kai gni toiyrouc tà v npika tiatip.wat 'A)14av8povpin(); AiyEt tok irnot64otag, akOv 8g olyetv tokitpoaayetv yap oilleilvat 116pov 4iw tti that! &wallet... 66 OgKatOakv &pad; to ickfieoc TO tin/^evtaii0a OVcogbruccaelv akoic 41:w tij ap.4). akeyv taro?... ('Aveliccatc'AAE4dcv8poi) v, 13 - 15)

"(Alexander) stationed the horse archersin front of the entire force of cavalry....(When he advanced) he ordered Tauron, thearcher-commander, to lead them against thecavalry.... (Ptolemy) says that Alexanderfirst sent his horse archers against these(enemy that had appeared), and that he wasbringing up the rest of the cavalry, since hebelieved that Porus was pressing forward withhis entire force.... When he learnedaccurately the strength of the Indians,immediately he made a violent attack on themwith the cavalry that was with him..."

After crossing the river Alexander arrayed his battle line as

follows: various infantry on the left and bringing up the rear,

his cavalry on the right, his archers and other missile-armed

troops on either flank, and his mounted archers in front of his

entire force of cavalrym. He advanced his cavalry and light-

armed foot quicklym; his infantry followed more slowly. First

contact was made with a force of chariots and possibly cavalry.

Though unsure about the strength of this force, Arrian reports that

Alexander sent his cavalry against it, led by his horse archers,

and destroyed it. In the above passage, Arrian seems to suggest

that Alexander's horse archers were used to pin a large opposing

m'Aveeriam; —v (Vol. I, Anabasis. A.G. Roos, ed. 1967: Teubner[and all further references unless otherwise indicated]), 13, 4.

22014, 1.

74

force before the battle. Evidently Alexander wished to destroy

this force in detail to prevent their returning to Porus with

information on the attacking force, or to prevent them from being

a problem in the upcoming main battle. In either case, the horse

archers are clearly not believed by Arrian or his source Ptolemy to

have been able to defeat such an enemy in detail or quickly, and

for this reason they were replaced in the attack by the remainder

of the cavalry, a force which was capable of accomplishing this.

Alexander seems to have intended that by engaging his mounted

archers he would gain time for his infantry to catch up and move

into battle formation. It became obvious, however, that it was not

necessary to commit his entire army, so he sent just the cavalry.

Alexander himself was at this point countering the mobilit y221 of

the chariots with the far greater mobility and firepower of his

mounted archers. He could have used any of his cavalry as a

forward guard, but his employment of horse archers for this role

suggests that they were only lightly armed for melee purposes222.

Alexander thus employed his horse archers in this battle first as

a covering force, to pin down the Indian vanguard before effecting

their destruction in detail by regular cavalry.

To conclude on the role of horse archers in the advance to

contact, the only explicit evidence we have for their use in the

221Not so great, as it turned out; the chariots got stuck inthe mud (15, 2).

222.A covering force pins its enemy most effectively by notbecoming involved in a pitched battle (and thus getting killed); itdelays and deceives the enemy by hit and run tactics: mobility andfirepower.

75

Roman army is in Arrian and Josephus. In both authors they seem to

form part of the very first element of the advance guard and

perform there a role of skirmishing and perhaps reconnaissance to

locate and pin down small enemy forces. The advance guard or

antecursores, according to the evidence of Josephus, probably

covered a wide enough area to protect the main body from flank

attack. Although from very different circumstances, the

comparative evidence of Alexander the Great's use of horse archers

comes from Arrian's pen and seems to corroborate the evidence of

Roman times. Horse archers could also make up part of a larger

fighting force advancing in front of the main body.

2. ATTACK

The next phase of war we turn to is the attack. If a Roman

army meets an enemy force the commander can either decide to stop

and fortify, to withdraw, or to attack. In this section we shall

look at the role of the horse archer in the attack.

We turn again to Arrian's account of Alexander's final battle

with the Indian king Porus.

"11811tc vrOc fieXouc tyiyvero icai t4ticev tri, to ictpactO 66vvilov Thy ivribv toi); i7riroto4errac, Ovrocc tc ,caiovc, thgtapgat TO6C Torkti t.earidecac Tib V 7COX.E4LiOni It] NurvOriti 'ccT,65v to4eugaixov icat T6jv triton/ It brelAican. icat a*.ctc St TO1‘);ttocipovc Exow toi); t7téaçnapfiXavvev 64toK tri tO 66vugovTiOv pocpriipow...CAvalkcat; 'AX4dcv6pou v, 16)

"As he was already within range Alexandersent his horse archers, a force of about a

76

thousand, against the Indians' left wing, inorder to disorder those of the enemy arrayedthere by the storm of arrows and the horses'charge. He himself, with the cavalry of the"Companions", violently charged the Indians'left wing..."

After advancing on the Indian army, Alexander kept his army

out of range until the infantry caught up, and began a series of

manoeuvres which both gave time for the infantry to rest and

deceived Porus about his intentions for the battle223. Alexander

attacked the Indian left flank with his cavalry, having ordered his

infantry commanders not to attack until the enemy was plainly in

confusion from the Macedonian cavalry attack.

Horse archers once again led the attack on their enemy. Their

purpose was plainly not to destroy the Indians in detail but to

damage their morale and command structure, thus paving the way for

the main attack by the regular cavalry224. Arrian says that

Alexander planned to hit the Indians once they were thrown into

confusion, and since up to that point only his horse archers had

been in contact, it is only logical to see them as the agents of

the Indians' confusionm Arrian's phrasing suggests certain

things about Alexander's employment of horse archers in this

mArrian is explicit about the first point, but the second isimplicit from his description in 16, 1.

224It is not entirely clear from the text whether Arrianbelieved that the horse archers were attacking infantry or cavalry.I believe that Arrian means "cavalry" here, but whichever arm theywere attacking, the conclusions are the same.

mIt is preferable to regard them as agents for confusing theinfantry on the flank, as it makes little sense to weaken the enemyat one point and then attack elsewhere.

77

battle. That the Indians would be confused by the "density" of the

arrows suggests volley fire rather than individual sniping; it also

suggests a formation compact enough to produce a dense storm of

arrows. The fact that the charging of the horses would also have

an effect also suggests a somewhat compact formationm. Such a

formation would facilitate getting out of the way of the remainder

of the cavalry when it charged immediately following the horse

archers' attack227.

In the next phase the main infantry forces joined battle and

the cavalry fought a somewhat detached fight, although the Indians

were driven back upon their own forces. Little can be made of the

part of horse archers here except that, as their casualties were

lightm and it seems that they were at best lightly armed with

melee weaponsm, they likely played at most a supporting role.

According to the evidence of Arrian, therefore, Alexander

used his horse archers to throw the Indian force into disorder

before charging it with his regular cavalry. It seems that the

Macedonian horse archers fought from a distance and avoided close

combat, and that they employed volley fire and formations dense

Mu Somewhat" compact because if the horsemen were too closetogether they would not have been able to shoot without hitting themen in front of them; for this very effect, see Procopius, BellumGothicum: V, 27, 47.

2271.e. in order to exploit the effects of the arrows best,just as Roman legionary infantry charged immediately upon throwingtheir Iona; and as modern infantry try to attack at the earliestpossible time following cessation of artillery fire.

nEiTen killed from an original force of a thousand: V, 18, 3.

229see above, Chapter one, p. 31, under Other Equipment.

78

enough to wreak significant damage on their target.

The role of horse archers in the attack may be further

illustrated by Tacitus's account of the battle of Idistavisom

where both mounted and unmounted archers played an important role.

noster exercitus sic incessit:auxiliares Galli Germanique in fronte, postquos pedites sagittarii; dein quattuorlegiones et cum duabus praetoriis cohortibusac delecto equite Caesar; exim totidem aliaelegi ones et levis armatura cum equitesagittario ceteraeque sociorum cohortes....Visis Cheruscorum catervis, quae per ferociamproruperant, validissimos equitum incurrerelatus, Stertinium cum ceteris turmiscircumgredi iubet, ipse in temporeadfuturus.... praemissus eques postremos aclatera impulit. ...Arminius...incubueratquesagittariis, illa rupturus, ni RaetorumVindelicorumque et Gallicae cohortes signaobiecissent... (Tac. Ann. II, 16-17)

"Our forces advanced in the followingorder: Gallic and German auxiliaries infront, followed by foot archers; next camefour legions with Caesar (Germanicus),accompanied by two Praetorian cohorts andpicked cavalry; following them, an equalnumber of other legions, light-armed troops,the mounted archers, and the rest of theallied cohorts.... Having seen groups ofCherusci which had rashly begun their attack,Germanicus ordered his elite cavalry to attacktheir flank, and Stertinius with the remainderof the cavalry troops to circle around to therear. He himself would follow at the righttime.... The cavalry that had been sentforward attacked the (enemy) flanks and rear....Arminius ...had pressed his attack on thearchers, and would have routed them if theRaetian, Vindelician, and Gallic cohorts hadnot stood in his way..."

amTac. Ann. II, 16. The text is the Oxford Classical Text,C.D. Fisher, ed. (Oxford 1985).

79

Foot archers, covered by auxiliary infantry, led the Roman

army against the Germans drawn up on the plain next to the river

Weser. One German tribe, the Cherusci, failed to maintain

discipline and began the battle by attacking the auxiliary and bow-

armed advance guard231. These auxiliaries fought back, supported

by Germanicus's picked cavalry force which attacked the German

flank232.

Germanicus also sent the "remainder" of his cavalry under

Stertinius around to attack the enemy's rear. Tacitus, however,

does not make clear whether his horse archers are included. As no

other mounted troops are explicitly mentioned, it seems best to

take them as forming part of this force. The auxiliary force at

the rear of the Roman legions was clearly the rear guard and it is

unlikely that Germanicus would have let himself be exposed to

surprise attack from this directionm. Moreover, since Tacitus

231Saddington (op. cit., 92: note 26) unaccountablymisrepresents Furneaux (The Annals of Tacitus. 2nd. ed. [Oxford1907] ) as taking the sagittarii here as the equite sagittario ofII, 16. Furneaux says in fact that they are pedites sagittarii.

222 Furneaux (ad loc.) evidently believed that the archers andthe Gallic and German auxiliary force deployed into line upon beingattacked, with the archers on the right. This is an overlymechanistic view of Roman tactics and battle drill. Clearly forthe archer commander to deploy his troops between his coveringforce and the enemy would have been insanity. It is not whathappened anyway. Since the "...Raetorum Vindelicorum et Gallicaecohortes signa obiecissent..." and prevented the Germans frombreaking through, they must have been in front of the archers.

MA provision probably resulting from his experience ofcampaigning in Germania, with its natives' propensity for guerillawarfare (as he encountered following this battle [Tac. Ann. II,19]), and since he had already received one attack from the flank,it is likely he would be on his guard for others.

80

makes no further mention of the rear guard, it seems most likely

that they stayed at the rear and formed a reserve, taking no part

in the battle until perhaps the very end.

Thus the evidence of Arrian and Tacitus indicates that the

function of mounted archers in the attack was to support other

forces. Arrian's account of Alexander's army suggests that mounted

archers would support an attack by preceding it and "softening up"

the enemy. The battle of Idistaviso as recounted by Tacitus gives

an example of how mounted archers could be used with other cavalry

to relieve the pressure on a force under attack by engaging the

enemy from another direction. In this use they are little

different from other cavalry, but as their exact function is not

recorded, we cannot be certain whether they preceded other forms of

cavalry in the flank attack, as was the case in Arrian's account of

Alexander's battle against Porus's Indians.

3. PURSUIT

The next phase of war is the pursuit. Unfortunately there is

no direct evidence for actual actions of mounted archers in the

pursuit, but Arrian, in the 1Nma4t; xata'Aulavani, provides an explicit

description of their intended role in this phase.

TO & tianlaiv N.ucccv Kat& eDtac xai A,Oxov; Oxite4vvrerayggvov t4CCIT6C1X0 VA; 14*, to gtv 'PA; xipaatvtxatepat,c, npol3arjv Exov toi); &aim; np$5 xai toi);to4errac, A,Oxot •51)o, TO 8i Tij giom 44.Xayyt, A,Oxot E4 * fillit0V.TIZIKYCCOV Sg /Sam Rev ix/cc/T*1m 700)61.0V tfic 050=nm;

81

g4)EaTrpcgtoxrav, cbc ôirEptocSav Ikcip a*rfic. Oaot 8gX01704)Opot f icovrapOpot f gaxatpoOpot f zaacoOpot eic telcrdluiyuit icaTipokev...ecncoaeevrov 8g ei giv 4rn ?Lam&ygwycat, Staxaveiv M AZ; zeCticecc Tec4Etc icat 71;FACC6VELV toi);

newrac toi); A,Oxou; (kW TO1‘); iplacac. cenixEloct 8gnixinou; awe; -Kai /yawl, bratiacmatv. toi); 8g •IllaucVaal; EncaOat jtv TOiC gnEX.oviwouatv, ev vi4Et 8g Kai=wad rti 8uget xpwivouc, 66 ei Rev (Puri1 icaprrEpec icatixot,gic8e4aaeat cv npforriv 8iogtv docgittotc TOT.; tn./wig, ci 8g TLCbacrcpainj icatoacciAtivot, enttiecaket toic einorp4ovatv...("Erca4; Iona 'Maven/ 20-21, 27-28)

"The entire cavalry force, organized by theregiments and the eight squadrons2254, is tosupport the infantry. Part, consisting of twosquadrons, (having formed up) on each flank,is to keep the infantry and the archers infront of itself as a guard; the other part,consisting of six squadrons, (is to form up)at the middle of the infantry battle-line....All of the mounted archers are to form up nearthe infantry battle-line, so they can fireover it; while all of the lance-, pike-,sabre-, and axe-bearing (cavalry) will form upon each flank... If when the enemy have beenrepulsed and their flight should becomeapparent, not all, but only half of thecavalry turmae must move through the infantrybattle-line and charge on; whichever troopsdrive through first are to form up and charge.The other half is not to make a wholeheartedcharge but must follow the pursuers information, so that if, on the one hand, astrong retreat should ensue, (those following)might take over the lead in the pursuit withtheir horses fresh; while, on the other hand,if a reversal should occur, they might attack(the enemy) who are forcing the retreat..."

234The "iancoug ?oath" seem to be the cavalry of the cohortesequitatae accompanying Arrian's army. Although there were nine ofthese cohorts, one (the cohors III Cyrenaica) is only present as avexillatio, and its cavalry seems to be grouped with the cohorsIturaeorum (A.B. Bosworth, "Arrian and the Alani" Harvard Studies in Classical Philology 81 [1977] 249-50).

82

Apparently only the Xáxot of immycogama, of which there were

fivem, were to take part in the pursuit. The remainder of the

cavalry were drawn up on the flanks, and the pursuit force was

clearly instructed to pass through the infantry. The other cavalry

were instructed to wait for a signalm, presumably to join

battle, while during the battle itself the inircragozat would provide

only fire support. The iniccrth4grat thus seem to have been employed

primarily as pursuers. The horse archers were divided into two

parts for the pursuit in order that some would remain fresh if

needed, one half to maintain close contact with the enemy, and the

other to remain properly arrayed in formation to take over the

pursuit with fresh horses when the occasion demanded it. Those

actively pursuing were expected to lose their formation when doing

so, and thus might have been more easily put to flight in their

disorganized state.

Arrian's plan for the conduct of the pursuit made full use of

the mobility and firepower of mounted archers, and also provided

for possible reverses or problems. The fact that only theinnougamn

were to pursue the enemy is significant, since they were the only

force capable of maintaining pressure on the enemy while still not

coming into close contact with him. If the enemy were to turn

about and fight, the pursuers were still separated from them, and,

owing to their lack of encumbering equipment, could outdistance the

235See Bosworth (op. cit.) 237.

.6iXintlX0V rt -Kai TO 4iivertta npocrixevOvrav. . . " 21.

83

enemy; moreover, they could harass the enemy even if put to flight

themselves. They also had a backup force for relief should this

happen. If the enemy should turn about in strength, they could

delay his approach to the infantry line and thus give it a chance

to re-form or redeploy.

Tacitus237 provides one possible example of mounted bowmen

pursuing a defeated enemy in an action that may be more properly

termed a rout.

...quidam turpi fuga in summa arborumnisi ramisque se occultantes admotissagittariis per ludibrium figebantur, aliosprorutae arbores adflixere. (Tac. Ann. II,17)

...(after the battle of Idistaviso) Somewho had shamefully fled by climbing to thetops of trees and hiding amongst the brancheswere shot as a lark by archers. Others weredashed to the ground when the trees werefelled."

Tacitus does not specify to which force these archers

belonged. Archers mounted on horses, however, certainly had the

mobility with which to hunt down a scattered enemy, and since

Tacitus informs us that the forest floor was clear beneath high

branchesm, cavalry could have operated there. It therefore

seems plausible that the sagittarii who hunted down and killed

German fugitives following the battle of Idistaviso were mounted,

237Tac. Ann. II, 17-18.

2381, ...editis in altum ramis et pura humo inter arborumtruncos..." Tac. Ann. II, 16

84

probably the same ones that took part in Stertinius's flank attack

earlier in the battlem.

The evidence from Arrian and possibly Tacitus, therefore,

points to an important role for equites sagittarii as a pursuit

force following a successful battle. Their horses gave them the

speed to run down infantry and other cavalry, and their bows gave

them the long range, accurate firepower with which to harass and

keep pressure on their enemy and still maintain the separation that

their vulnerability made necessary. It is significant that in the

one certain reference to their role in the pursuit they are the

only cavalry that pursue. Their characteristics obviously made

them best suited for this task.

4. DEFENCE

Apart from one reference in Arrian there is no evidence for a

role for mounted archers in the defence. Mounted archers are

mobile, and lightly armouredm, and, like other cavalry, are

unable to hold ground against a determined infantry assault. They

can, however, contribute firepower. This is exactly the role that

Arrian envisaged for them in support of his infantry battle line

against the Alans. Arrian seems to have intended that the storm of

arrows from his archers would provide his main line of defence

239see pp.79-80 supra.

240See above, chapter one, pp. 35-7, under Protective Clothing.

85

against the armoured Alan cavalr^He placed his innoAama

behind the line of infantry "...so that they can fire over

it...1,242. They are engaged in providing missile support to the

infantry along with foot-archers to the rear and flanks and

artillery to the flanksm. However, since Arrian has irECoitogencct

immediately behind the infantry, the mounted archers seem almost to

be an afterthought. The foot-archers are presumably placed where

they are with the task of engaging the enemy, as they have no

ability to support a pursuit; their fire would be masked by their

own pursuing forces244. The horse archers are located behind the

infantry in order to make a speedy transition from defence to

pursuitm. Their height and weapon range merely gives them the

ability to assist with fire support.

Apart from this passage from Arrian, there is no evidence,

Roman or otherwise, for the employment of mounted archers in the

defence. Nor, given their lack of defensive armament, can a common

active role be readily envisaged.

5. WITHDRAWAL

N°See Bosworth (op. cit.) 236-7.

242-Extot4; nevi ,Axa' vwv 21.

mTragu; icauk 'Aakirvwv 18-19.

24Although the cohortes NUmidarum, Cyrenaica, Bosporanorum,and Ituraeorum are formed up behind the infantry (1Nmgtgicaui'MAvwv18), only the archers formed up on the right flank and covered bythe cohors Italica are ordered to support the pursuit (29).

245 27.

86

The final phase of war is the withdrawal. An active role for

mounted bowmen in this phase can be envisaged but unfortunately

there is no evidence for it from the high Empire. There is,

however, a brief mention in Procopiusm about mounted archers

conducting a feigned withdrawal, from which some information may be

gleaned.

In A.D. 537 Rome was under siege by the Ostrogoths. The Roman

commander, Belisarius, encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements,

decided to take the initiative against the besiegers. According to

Procopius, he sent a force of two hundred horse archers to a

location near the enemy camp where they were to wait in full enemy

view, and, if attacked, to hold off the enemy until out of arrows

and withdraw at full speed to Rome, where an ambush was set. This,

according to Procopius, is precisely what happened, and "...not

less than one thousand Goths are said to have died in this

action.. ,247

Does this passage, however, provide an accurate account of

events? The Strategikon prescribes for Byzantine troops of the

sixth or early seventh century quivers holding up to forty

arrows 248. Skilled archers can fire up to about fifteen arrows

per minute. At this rate, and assuming a similar ammunition

supply, the Byzantine archers had between two and three minutes of

mBellum Gothicum V. 27.

24711^Aiyovrat Si reneot ateaaov f iltot v 1:4 tpyq? wimp ducoeaveiv. "•

Bellum Gothicum V, 27, 11.

248Strategikon I, 2.

87

shooting before they exhausted their ammunition and were forced to

retreat. The Byzantines would hardly have begun firing until their

targets were in range249, but even a dismounted manm could have

covered the distance of a bowshot in less than two minutes. The

Goths were mounted31 and would therefore have closed with the

Byzantines well before the latter had run out of ammunition. It

thus seems more likely that the Byzantines withdrew before all

their arrows had gone, and fired at their pursuers while

retreatingm, and in this way incited them to follow to the

ambush at the city wall.

This tactic, the so-called "Parthian Shot", is known from the

defeat of Crassus by the Parthians at Carrhae in 53 B.C.253.

There too, mounted archers turned and fired at their pursuers,

causing considerable damage. Arabic archery manuals from the

middle ages also describe a variety of shots, some of them to the

rearm. Such a skill "...was common to all good horse-archers

from the Scythians to the Crimean Tatars...pm. Although there

249Less than 200 m; see chapter one, p. 22, under Archery.

250Running at 10 mph, or 4.5 m/s: not a difficult speed, evenwhen burdened by equipment.

251Be//um Gothicum V, 27, 9.

mProcopius himself says in another context they are adept atdoing this : " . . .814mcovu5c; 're 13aaetv tai); 7COXEILiC/U; xai (peliyovrac . . " BellumGothicum I, 1, 14.

mPlutarch, Crassus 24, G.

mThe Ghunyah of Taybughah, cited in Coulston (op. cit.) 292.

mIbid.

88

is no direct evidence of mounted archers in Roman service using

this tactic, it is probable that they were well acquainted with it,

and therefore were able to make use of it if necessary.

Unfortunately no evidence survives from the high Empire of

Roman use of horse archers in an organized withdrawal. The

preceding example from Procopius shows how bow-armed cavalry was

able to withdraw from a pursuing enemy while continuing to engage

him. It is possible that a retreating army would use their horse

archers in a similar manner to delay and disrupt the enemy pursuit.

6. SUMMARY

The equites sagittarii of the high Empire seem to have been

above all a support arm on the battlefield. In the advance to

contact they seem to have played a very important part; the

evidence of Josephus and Arrian indeed suggests that they formed a

large part of the advance guard and flank guard which was necessary

to protect the army from surprise attack while on the march. A

fighting role is all that can be certainly deduced from the

evidence, but pure reconnaissance would certainly not have been

beyond their capabilities.

When an army attacked, the comparative evidence of Arrian's

account of Alexander suggests that mounted archers may have led the

attack. Their job was to cause casualties and confusion among the

enemy and to weaken them for the main attack which would soon

follow. If part of the main army was in difficulty, a commander

89

could send a force including horse archers to relieve them, as

happened at Idistaviso. The mobility of horse archers allowed them

to pursue a withdrawing or scattered enemy most effectively, and to

keep them from regrouping. Arrian in his Ilicricicacci'ALMNwv provides

detailed evidence of a Roman commander's intended use of mounted

archers in the pursuit.

Owing to their difficulty in holding ground, mounted archers

could contribute little to a static defence except their fire.

Although one can imagine an important role for mounted archers in

the withdrawal because of their ability to manoeuvre and run from

harm's way while maintaining a steady fire upon their attackers

while ammunition lasted, no direct evidence of such a role survives

from the high Empire. Only comparative evidence from the Byzantine

period allows us to glimpse how the ancients employed them in this

phase of war.

In conclusion, the employment of any arm depends on the

situation and on the experience and knowledge of the commander, and

this is especially true for the deployment of bow-armed cavalry.

Mounted archers were clearly a support arm on the battlefield of

the high Empire. Their light armour meant that they were too

vulnerable to remain in close contact with an enemy for long or to

hold up against a determined attack, but their mobility and

firepower enabled a hit-and-run role which was of greatest value in

the mobile phases of war, viz, the advance to contact, the attack,

the pursuit, and the withdrawal. Judging from the evidence of the

historians, they seem to have been an important arm, despite the

90

scarcity of evidence for their use in battle.

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSIONS

The equites sagittarii fought in the service of Rome from the

early Empire onwards. That they were an important arm of the Roman

military is evident from their numbers: twenty four units armed

with the bow can be certainly identified as being mounted, and at

least four other mounted units may have been sagittariae256 .

Further discoveries of inscriptions, especially diplomas, may yet

increase this number.

Although they were raised and to some extent trained in the

east, Rome's archers seem to have used much the same dress and

equipment as other auxiliary units, differing mainly in the

ancillary equipment needed with bows. Their bows were of eastern

design. Compound and recurved, made of wood, sinew, bone, and

glue, they were extremely powerful weapons, capable of punching an

iron arrowhead through armour plating. The arrows fired were of a

number of different designs, each perhaps with its own specific

use; unfortunately the intended uses have not entirely come down to

us today.

Units of mounted archers seem to have ridden small, fast

Arabian horses, bred in the same areas where the skills of mounted

archery flourished. These horses were best suited to the type of

looser, faster warfare that the mounted archers engaged in. Their

saddles and other equipment, however, seem to have been the same as

36see Appendix one.

92

other auxiliary units used. When it was necessary to use weapons

other than the bow, they would probably have used standard issue as

well.

As a military system, horse archers can be understood in terms

of their characteristics: flexibility, mobility, vulnerability,

and firepower. They were flexible enough to use different

equipment according to the situation, and even operate dismounted

if necessary; mobile like all cavalry, and vulnerable, since they

could not use a shield; but above all they had the firepower of

their bow and arrows. It is these four things that determined

exactly how horse archers were effective, and thus how their

commanders would use them.

As mentioned above, the equites sagittarii seem to have had

the flexibility to use different weapons if the situation demanded

them. Since they often formed provincial garrisons, they would

have to have had access to a variety of weapons in order to carry

out the multitude of tasks required of them. Some inscriptional

and literary evidence points to this conclusion as well.

As can be expected from cavalry, mounted archers seem to have

been most used in the mobile phases of war: the advance to

contact, the attack, the pursuit, and the withdrawal. Of these,

only their actions in the pursuit are little attested in literary

sources. Horse archers seem to have had been of little use in the

defence, and may have been dismounted, especially for mural

defence. Horse archers used their combination of mobility and long

range, penetrative firepower to harass and soften up an enemy, or

93

pin him down until heavier forces could be brought to bear.

This much is known about mounted archers, and much can be

surmised, but many questions remain. The detailed history of the

Palmyreni sagittarii is not clear. What was the sequence of events

from their initial raising as a unit in Roman service to the

establishment of the cohors XX Palmyrenorum milliaria equitata

sagittariorum? As stated above257, it seems unlikely that the

harsh bit used by regular Roman auxiliary cavalry would be used by

horse archers as well. Did they use another form of bit?

Furthermore, the military works of Vegetius and Arrian need up-to-

date commentaries and translationsm These will facilitate

further research into the study of all aspects of the Roman

military.

The Roman military machine of the Empire is a natural object

of study because of its tremendous successes and failures, in which

the equites sagittarii played a part. Although they were little

referred to in literature, their part seems to have been an

important one.

257See chapter one, pp. 28-9, under Cavalry Equipment.

mThere is a recent English translation of the INmgt; by B.H.Bachrach (A History of Alans in the West [Minnesota 1973] 126-132;from Bosworth [op. cit.] 217), but apparently it is "... riddledwith errors and useless for historical interpretation." (ibid.).

94

APPENDIX 1

BOW-ARMED UNITS

In 1977 J. L. Davies259 published Eric Birley's list of the

bow-armed units of the Imperial Roman military of the first to

third centuries. I reproduce it here, together with a brief

commentary on some of the units known or suspected to have been

mounted.

a. Alae:

1. I Batavorum2. Celerum2613. I Hamiorum Syrorum (Mauretania Tingitania)4. I Augusta Ituraeorum

259"Roman Arrowheads from Dinorben and the sagittarii of theRoman Army" in Britannia 8 (1977) 269-70.

260This unit is only believed to be bow-armed from CIL III,3676, which however identifies it as the coh. I Batavorum. The alahas been placed at Razboieni in Dacia during the reign of Hadrian.See I. B. Cataniciu, The Evolution of Defence Works in Roman Dacia,BAR International Series 116 (Oxford 1981) 24, 30, and notes 200and 371.

NOSpeidel ("The Roman Army in Arabia" Aufstieg und Niedergangder ROmischen Welt II, 8 [1977] 702-3) makes a case for the originof this unit as under Philip the Arab; apparently it originallyserved in Arabia but moved to Noricum sometime after the mid thirdcentury, as shown by a tombstone at Virunum.

262This unit is only known to be bow-armed by the evidence ofCIL XVI, 99, and perhaps from a diploma of 154-161 (M. Roxan Roman Military Diplomas 1978-1984 [London 1985] no. 182). This unit mayhave been stationed at Micia in Dacia before the reign of Hadrian(Cataniciu [op. cit.] note 122).

95

5. Parthorum et Araborum2636. (I Sag)ittariorum Surorum milliaria2647. I Thracum veteranorum2658. III Augusta Thracum sagittariorum (Pannonia)

b. Cohortes:

1. I Antiochensium2662. I Apamenorum equitata (Eg

^) 267

3. I Ascalonitarum equitata'4. I Bosporanorum equitata

263The only reason to believe that this unit should be includedhere is a single sculpture of a mounted archer (fig. 18; for thetext, see AE 1959, 188: "...ala part(h)o(rum) et araborum...");but see chapter three and Kennedy (op. cit.) for a closerdiscussion of the problem of Parthian units in Roman service.

2 See infra, note 25.

266This unit has been tentatively identified from threediplomas of 154-161 (Roxan [op. cit] nos. 102, 103, and 110, p.168-70, 172-3, and 182). It seems possible, based on the numberthat are known to be composed of archers, that most units ofThracum were bow-armed. This is merely speculation, however.

266This unit is only known to be bow-armed from a diploma of161. They may have some connection with the forces sent byAntiochus IV of Commagene to Vespasian's army in Galilee in 67; seep. 59 supra. This unit apparently constructed a stone camp atDrobeta in Dacia in the early part of the second century. Amongthe later occupants of this fort were the coh. I Sagittariorum.See Cataniciu (op. cit.) 11-12.

NWCIL VI, 3654; and III, 600 (= ILS 2724).

268This unit is only known to be bow-armed from CIL XVI, 106.This unit is mentioned elsewhere (in III, 600, for example) but isnowhere else called sag(ittariorum).

269Evidence that this unit exists comes only fromTicra4t; 3 and18; Ritterling ("Zur Erklárung von Arrians 'DerAx4Kicatd'A),av6iv" WienerStudien 24 (1902) 363: quoted in Roos' Teubner edition of Arrian)believes that it is equitata, based on Arrian's wording (3

. . . Bocriropavoi ag iti 'MA'AM; 140i ia•vrav. . . " , suggesting that the Boanoptavoihad falai; as well as infantry); he also believes that this unit ismilliary, a concllusion not supported by the text. I followRitterling in assigning it the ordinal I, keeping in mind Arrian's

96

5. I Flavia Canathenorum milliariam6. I Flavia Chalcidenorum equitata2717. I Cilicumm8. II Classica9. II Flavia Commagenorum equitatam10. III Cyrenaica11. II Cyrrhestarum12. I Flavia Damascenorum milliaria equitatam13. I Hamiorum14. I milliaria Hemesenorum equitata civium Romanorum15. I Augusta Ituraeorum (Dacia Superior)16. I Ituraeorum (Mauretania Tingetana)

habit in this work of mentioning a unit's designation only if it isother than the ordinal I. Either of the possible names(Bosporanorum or Bosporiana) can be supported by the text, and Ibelieve Birley hesitates to assign the unit a name for this reason;but an ala I Bosporanorum is known at Cristesti in Dacia (Cataniciu[op. cit.] 22, 24, and notes 187 and 371) in the reign of Hadrian,and so I assign the cohort the same name.

mRoxan (op. cit.) nos. 51/104, p.174. Perhaps this unit isthe same as the cob. I Augusta Canathenorum equitata known to be inMotha, Arabia before 125. See Speidel (op. cit.) 709.

mThis unit is known to be sagittaria only from CIL III, 6658.

mThis unit was stationed in Moesia, and it is known to bebow-armed only from a diploma of 145/146. It has been, however,tentatively identified as such in a diploma of 112 (Roxan [op.cit.] 85, p.146). This unit is not to be confused with the cohorsI Flavia Cilicum equitata, which formed part of the garrison ofSyene. See Speidel (op. cit.) 785.

mThis unit may have constructed and certainly garrisoned theearthwork fort at Micia in Dacia during the reign of Hadrian. SeeCataniciu (op. cit.) 14-15, 22, 43, and notes 184 and 380.

mThis unit was stationed in-Germania Superior and was one ofthe few units of mounted archers to serve outside of desert areasor areas with a mounted archer threat. I believe that theplacement of this unit is evidence of a desire of Roman commandersto maintain a flexible force throughout the Empire. Beyond theneed for dry conditions for the construction and storage of bows,however, there seems to be no explanation why this would not holdtrue for Britannia, where we have no evidence whatsoever for unitsof mounted bowmen.

97

17. I Numidarum27518. XX Palmyrenorum milliaria equitatam19. III Ulpia Petraeorum milliaria equitata27720. I sagittariorum (Egypt)21. I sagittariorum (Germania Superior)22. I sagittariorum milliaria equitata (Dada)27823. I Aelia sagittariorum milliaria equitata (Pannonia Superior)24. I Ulpia sagittariorum equitata25. III sagittariorum26. I milliaria nova Surorum equitata (Pannonia Inferior)27. I Syrorum27928. II Syrorum milliaria equitata (Mauretania Tingitana) NW

mRitterling finds it necessary to label this unit asequitata, apparently because of its placement with the Boanoptavoi inTircattc 18. Nothing in the text, however, supports this: footarchers from this unit are indeed placed in the battle line alongwith the foot archers from three cohortes equitatae, but when it ismentioned before, in INmgt; 3, there is no suggestion that it ismounted. As with the cohors Bosporiana (see above, note 10) Ifollow Ritterling in attributing to it the ordinal I.

mThis fascinating cohort deserves a book all to itself. Thereader is referred to M.P. Speidel ("Europeans' - Syrian EliteTroops at Dura-Europos and Hatra" in Roman Army Studies 1[Amsterdam 1984] 301-309), and the rebuttal, D.B. Campbell ("WhatHappened at Hatra? The Problem of the Severan Siege Operations" inFreeman and Kennedy, eds. The Defence of the Roman and Byzantine East i, BAR International Series 297[i] [Oxford 1986] 51-8) for oneinteresting problem pertaining to the Palmyrenes.

277The equites of this cohort were at the head of the regularunits of Arrian's army: INmgt; 1.

mSee supra, note 8; they may also have occupied the forts ofTibiscus and Zavoi for a time (Cataniciu [op. cit.] 22). Mentionedas sagittaria in AE 1959, 311 but not as mill. This unit mayperhaps be identified with the -cohors I Cretum sagittarior(um)mentioned in a diploma of 110 from Porolissum: CIL XVI, 163.

mThis unit is known to be bow-armed only from AE 1961, 358;and 1962, 304 (mil (es) coh(o)rt(is) Syro(r)um sagit(tariorum)).

mThis unit is known to be bow-armed from CIL XVI, nos. 181(II Syror(um) saggit(ariorum)), 170, and 182; and perhaps a diplomafrom 109 (Roxan [op. cit.] no. 84, p. 144).

98

29. I Thracum sagittaria (Dacia Superior) 2131

30. III Thracum Syriaca equitata31. I Tyrorum (Dacia Inferior) N232. II Ulpia equitata

C. Numeri:

1. Hemesenorum2. Palmyrenorum Porolissensiumm3.^Osrhoenorum

Probable Units284

a. Alae:

1. I Commagenorumm2. I Augusta Parthorum3.^Sebastenorum

mEvidence of diplomas from Dacia shows that it was presentthere in the early second century, although its location has yet tobe identified. See Cataniciu (op. cit.) note 160. It was there atleast until 179, when it is attested in a diploma (Roxan [op. cit.]no. 123, pp. 196-7).

282This unit is known to be bow-armed from Dacian diplomas (CILXVI, 1934 = ILS 2685; and AE 1962, 264: I Tyr(orum)sag(ittariorum)) but is as yet unlocated (Cataniciu [op. cit] 30,45).

NO ...It is probable that the numerus PalmyrenorumPorolissensium c. R. at least contained horse archers because ofthe likely 3rd century formation of an a/a and a cohorsPalmyrenorum from it...." Coulston, [op. cit.] 285. This unit isgenerally identified as the Palmyreni sagittarii mentioned in earlysecond century diplomas of Dacia Superior (Cataniciu [op. cit.]note 181, and see J.C. Mann "The "Palmyrene" Diplomas" in Roxan[op. cit.] Appendix II, pp. 217-9).

284J. Davies passes over the following probable alae andcohortes without comment. Presumably he regards them as bow-armedon the basis of their origin.

285This unit is suspected to have been in Egypt and Nubia from83 to 96 (Speidel [op. cit.] 784-5).

99

4.^Palmyrenorum286

b. Cohortes:

1.^I Chalcidenorum equitata2871. II Chalcidenorum2. I milliaria Hamiorum3. II Hamiorum4. I Sebastenorum5.^Seleuciensium

c. Numeri:

1.^Surii Sagittariiam

286This unit is my own addition to Birley's list. Evidencethat it may be bow-armed is the well-known function of its parent(the numerus Palmyrenorum Porolissensium) and sister unit (thecohors XX Palmyrenorum).

287This unit is my own addition to Birley's list. It seemslikely that this unit was composed of archers in view of theinscription (ILS 9173) naming the Palmyrene Agrippa who was put incharge of a force of Palmyrene archers attached to this unit. Inthis I follow J. Carcopino, "Le Limes de Numidie et sa gardeSyrienne" in Syria 6 (1925) 119-20.

amThis unit is my own addition to this list. Cataniciu (op.cit.) mentions such a unit in her index; at the pages she sites,however, there is only mentioned a "numerus Syrorum". This unitapparently formed part of the Flavian garrison of Romula along withthe cohors I Flavia Commagenorum. The origins of both of theseunits suggest that they were composed of archers. It may be arguedthat garrisoning a location with archers alone would giveinsufficient flexibility to deal with problems; Romula is, however,situated on an interior defence line in Dacia, closely flanked byother, differently armed units: the cohors II Flavia Bessorum atCincsor, the a/a I Asturum (which at least constructed the fort atHoghiz, and possibly was stationed there), and the cohors IINumidarum at Feldioara (Cataniciu [op. cit.] 30 and n. 72). Italso faces the Roxolanian Sarmatians to the southeast across theCarpathian mountains: this fact suggests that at least one of thetwo units was mounted. The a/a I sagittariorum Surorum milliariais only known from the early third century (R.W. Davies [op. cit.]269); it may be possible to suggest a link similar to that betweenthe numerus Palmyrenorum Porolissensium and the later cohors andala Palmyrenorum (see note 21 supra).

100

All the cohortes Commagenorum, Ituraeorumm, and UlpiaePet raeorum.

289A cohors II Ituraeorum equitata is known to be in Nubia from99 until at least 131 (Spiedel [op. cit.] 786, 788).

101

APPENDIX 2

ANALYSIS OF ARROW FIRE IN TERMS OFTHE THEORY OF SMALL ARMS FIRE

Frequently in ancient accounts of battle foot-archers and

other missile troops such as slingers are spoken of as massed on

the flanks of the infantry290. Exactly why they were placed there

is never mentioned, but modern commentators have been quick to

explain their placement as a tactic to cover or protect the flank

of the infantry formation291. It seems likely that this was not

the case, however, and that their placement is to be explained, not

as any sort of a protective force, but simply as mass missile

support for the main fighting force. Their exact location would be

determined by how best they could take advantage of the effect of

the fire of their weapons and the pattern that multiple missiles

form when fired at the same target or a general area. There are

good reasons to question this explanation of the placement of foot-

archers on the flanks. The vulnerability of archers to infantry is

well known today, and was certainly understood by the ancients292.

290Most notably Arrian, Mgt; 12-14; also (Pseudo) Caesar, deBello Africo 60 and 81.

mCoulston Hop. cit.] 292-0, however, mostly avoids analysisof reasons, and contents himself with a straightforward rehearsalof evidence.

292the most striking examples are Caes. BG VII, 80, 7 (Gallicfoot archers were killed when they were attacked by Romaninfantry); and BC III, 93-4. Maurice's Strategikon (XII: trans.Dennis, 1984. 127-169) never prescribes that foot-archers beplaced where they are vulnerable to the enemy. They are always to

102

It is absurd that a body of troops would be protecting others

against troops to whom they are especially vulnerable. By their

very nature they are most effective with their enemy at a distance.

Their opponents understood this, and would attempt to close with a

bow-armed enemy as fast as possible in order to nullify the effects

of the arrowsm

Modern commanders analyze a situation, and decide how best to

employ their projectile weapons, by applying the theory of small

arms fire. This theory applies to all projectile weapons, ancient

and modern, and will be a convenient means to understand why

weapons are employed as they are. The effects of weapons are

obvious to one who fires them or directs their fire; these effects

are, however, not at all obvious to one who has not used the

weapons. I will first describe the theory (see figs. 26 and 27).

No weapon, no matter how accurate, can hit precisely the same

spot with a missile every time it is fired, even if it is set on a

perfectly unmoving base and fired at precisely the same point of

aim every time. This fact is due to many factors. Small

variations in missile mass and aerodynamics, propulsion variations,

and perturbations in the air over the flight path of the missile

increase or decrease range and deviation left or right of and above

and below the target. The decrease in number of these variations

be protected by other arms. Where they are not in or behind theinfantry or cavalry battle line, they are on the flank, but eventhere they are to be protected by heavy cavalry, or by heavyinfantry when acting as a flank guard for the cavalry (p. 144).

mTac. Ann. VI, 35.

103

is inversely proportional to their magnitude; in other words, the

larger the deviation, the less likely the deviation is to occur.

A large number of missiles fired from a single weapon at a

given point of aim, then, will tend to describe a cone, bent into

the parabola of the trajectory, with its axis the optimum

theoretical path from the weapon to the target. The intersection

of this cone with the ground is known as the beaten zone, and takes

the form of an ellipse with its long axis parallel to the line from

the weapon to the target. Its total area is directly proportional

to the distance the missiles are fired.

Factors affecting the shape of the beaten zone are the shape

of the ground on which the missiles fall, the aspect of the firer

to the ground, and the angle at which the missile is travelling

when it hits the ground. If any obstacles such as ditches, mounds,

or walls lie in the beaten zone, they will create dead ground or

ground which is free from the missiles' impact. As well, if the

ground on which the missiles fall is tilted toward the firer, or if

the firer is higher in elevation than the target, the beaten zone

will be smaller, less elongated, and denser in impacts; this type

of fire is known as plunging fire, since the missiles hit the

ground or their target at a high angle: they plunge down into it.

Plunging fire is also created when missiles are fired at a high

angle or at the extreme end of their range; in both cases the

missile has lost most of its forward momentum and is dropping more

than moving forward.

While the beaten zone is the area on the ground where the

104

missiles actually hit, the missiles' trajectory creates a much

larger area where targets can be hit depending on their height

above ground. That is, the missile is descending for a while

before it hits the ground; a standing human can be hit at any

location where a missile descends below his height. For obvious

reasons this is known as the dangerous zone and forms an ellipse

the same width as that of the beaten zone but much longer. Its

shape too is affected by the shape of the ground and the firer's

aspect to the ground at his target.

A single weapon firing a single shot at a single target is

known as a point weapon and its fire is known as point fire. This

fire is used against individuals or single objects. When a weapon

or group of weapons is fired at a broad target or area - a mass of

troops, for example, or the space on the ground between wall

turrets - it becomes an area weapon and its fire area fire. This

fire is used for harassment, attrition, or area denial and is

represented by machine gun fire today.

In order to maximize the effectiveness of the fire of a

limited number of weapons or of an area weapon the firers place

themselves so that the long axis of their weapons' beaten zone is

coincident to the long axis of the target. In terms of battle,

both ancient and modern, this means placing missile weapons on the

flanks. Fire from the flank is known as enfilade fire.

The value of plunging enfillade arrow fire against a battle

line of armoured infantry lay in the fact that the infantry were

relatively well protected in the direction of the threat that is

105

perceived as the greatest, usually the front, by their shields

while parts of their arms, legs, and necks were bare when seen from

the sides and from above. Arrows fired from a distance could not

penetrate the armour of a line of men directly but were certainly

able to wound if they dropped from the sky or hit the men from the

flank. Arrows fired from close range, however, had the power to

penetrate thicker armour; but if the enemy was within a hundred

metres or so the archers would have to spread out in order to give

more than just the men in the front the opportunity to shoot. The

arrows would have had to be fired at such a low trajectory that

only the front men in a compact formation could fire, but a loose

formation was extremely vulnerable if attacked by infantry. This

fact required that the archers find cover294 or height above their

enemiesm

When considering the effects of ancient weaponry it is

absolutely essential that one consider what it would actually be

like to face these weapons in battle. Imagine a soldier in the

ranks in an armoured infantry formation before combat. All that

would be visible to him would be the helmets, shields, and spears

of those around, and ranks of the enemy to the front seen as

glimpses between his comrades' heads. The fear of every man

increases the closer he gets to the enemy ranks, and faltering or

294Arrian (IN=4; 13) placed light infantry in front of hisarchers on the flanks to protect them.

295horse archers could be used behind the line to fire over it;cf. Arrian ('amg14 21).

106

breaking ranks now would mean weakening the line and encouraging

the enemy. Consider the effect upon the soldier of arrows falling

thickly around him at this moment. He is surprised; the missiles

have come from an enemy the soldier has probably not yet seen. If

he himself is not wounded, he has seen his comrades hurt, heard

them screaming, seen their blood, and watched them falling and

being trampled by those behind them. This is an experience

soldiers cannot be trained for but can only be inured to by

experience296 .

Regardless of their experience, however, a sudden deadly

missile attack from an unseen enemy terrified and demoralised

soldiers and made them vulnerable to the enemy to their front at

precisely the worst time. Such an attack would also have

devastating consequences if it was delivered during a crucial

moment after battle had been joined, causing either a loss of

momentum for those getting the upper hand or the "final straw" for

those nearing rout.

Archers give a commander the flexibility to launch this kind

of attack at the most opportune time and place on the battlefield,

and horse archers have even greater utility because of their

greater speed, being able to move to wherever they are needed and

then depart at speed if threatened. Foot-archers, because of their

location on the ground, when firing their weapons en masse at a

large target such as an infantry battle formation, create plunging

296Romans threw their pila and then immediately charged theirenemies with drawn swords to gain exactly this effect; before theenemy had time to recover from his shock they were upon him.

107

fire with a large dangerous zone. The large dangerous zone and its

alignment with the enemy's battle line make them most valuable on

the flanks.

Thus it appears that the use of foot-archers and other missile

troops on the flanks can be explained by application of the theory

of small arms fire: the bow used en masse creates a pattern of

fire on the ground that is exploited most efficiently when it is

fired from the flanks. The same theory is also a convenient way of

looking at the usefulness of any missile troops in any given

situation.

108

LIST OF FIGURES

Fig. 1

Fig. 2

Fig. 3

Fig. 4

Fig. 5

Fig. 6

Fig. 7

Fig. 8

Figs. 9-10

Fig. 11

Fig. 12

The Sassanid hold.^From W.F. Paterson "TheSassanids". Journal of the Society of ArcherAntiquaries 112 (1969) fig. 1.

Different representations of the Sassanid hold fromPaterson (op. cit.) fig. 2.

The parts of the compound bow. From Coulston 1985:fig. 1.

The parts of the arrow. From Coulston (op. cit.)fig. 8.

Roman flat-bladed tanged arrowheads. From Coulston(op. cit.) fig. 42.

Roman trilobate tanged arrowheads. From Coulston(op. cit.) fig. 46.

Roman arrowheads found at Bar Hill, Scotland. Notethe fire-arrowheads in the centre. From R.W.Davies, Service in the Roman Army. (New York 1989)Fig. 4.6.

Arrow steles found at Dura-Europos. Note how thefletchings on the far left example extend all theway to the nock. From S. James, "Dura-Europos andthe Introduction of the Mongolian Release" RomanMilitary Equipment: the Accoutrements of War. BARInternational series #336. (Oxford 1987) fig. 4.

A reconstructed Roman saddle in use. Note the widerange of movement possible. From P. Connolly "TheRoman Saddle" Roman Military Equipment: theAccoutrements of War Plates

Side view of a reconstructed Roman saddle. Notehow the "horns" seem to hold the rider in thesaddle. From A. Hyland: Equus: the Horse in the Roman World (London 1990) Plate 8.

Tombstone of an archer of the cohors I Hamiorumfound at Housesteads. Note the strongly recurvedbow with set-back handle, and the unusual hook-shaped device in his right hand, and the long knifetucked into the belt on the archer's left side.From Coulston (op. cit.) fig. 26.

109

Fig. 13

Fig. 14

Fig. 15

Fig. 16

Fig. 17

Fig. 18

Fig. 19

Fig. 20

Fig. 21

Fig. 22

Detail of the bow in fig. 12. From Coulston (op.cit.) fig. 27.

Bow detail from Trajan's column, scene CXV. Notethe strong recurve, and the unusual curling of theears. From Coulston (op. cit.) fig. 23.

The tombstone of Monimus, an archer of the cohors IIturaeorum. His bowstring seems to be slacklystrung. From Davies (op. cit.) fig. 4.5.

An auxiliary archer from Trajan's Column, sceneXXIV. His dress seems to be the same as that ofthe other auxiliaries on the column, but his bowhas the same strange shape seen in fig. 14. FromCoulston (op. cit.) fig. 19.

A Palmyrene representation of caravan-escort gods.Both are carrying what appear to be combinationbow-cases and quivers slung from their saddles; theleft-hand rider seems to be holding a bow in hisleft hand. From Coulston (op. cit.) fig. 33.

The tombstone of a member of the ala Parthorum etAraborum. The rider may be carrying a combinationbow-case and quiver but the representaton is toodamaged for certain identification. The horsearcher seems to be flocking three arrows on thestring at once! From Coulston (op. cit.) fig. 31.

The tombstone of an archer of the a/a I AugustaIturaeorum from Gyor, Hungary. He is shooting at around target from which three arrows protrude.From Davies (op. cit.) fig. 4.3.

Another member of the ala I Augusta Ituraeorum,from Tipasa, Algeria. From Coulston (op. cit.)fig. 32.

The tombstone of Flavius Proculus, an equessingularis Augusti from Mainz. From Coulston (op.cit.) fig. 29.

The sole surviving columnar representation of amounted archer. From the Marcus Column, sceneLVII. Note the lorica hamata. From Coulston (op.cit.) fig. 25.

Figs. 23-24 Foot archers from Trajan's Column, scenes CXV andCVII respectively. Because of their unusual dressthey may not be regular auxiliaries but Sarmatiansin Roman service. From Coulston (op. cit.) figs.

110

20 and 22.

Fig. 25 The^cone^of^fire.^From^Department^of NationalDefence Publication B-GL-317-019/PT-001 The LightMachine Gun 5.56 mm C9^(Ottawa 1987)^fig. 2-2.

Fig. 26 The beaten zone. From idem,^fig.^2-4.

Fig. 27 The dangerous zone. From idem,^fig.^2-6.

1 11

FIGURES

Fig. 1

1^

2^

3^

4

FIG. 21. After Morse, Additional Notes, Fig. 30. Sassanid c. A.D. 400.2. After Morse, A. & M. Methods, Fig. 57. Sassanid 5th cent. A.D.3. Ardashir I (?), from silver plate, Archaeological Museum, Teheran, item No. 7700. cf. Fig. I.4. Firoz 1 (A.D. 458-484), Hermitage Museum, Leningrad.

Fig. 2

112

Fig. 3

113

1

Fig. 4

ARROW TERMINOLOGY

Fig. 5

114

4.6) Arrow-heads and bone terminals from composite woodand bone bows found in the well in the headquartersbuilding of the fort at Bar Hill on the Antonine Wall,Scotland.

Fig. 71

Fig. 8

115

116

Fig. 11

Fig. 12 Fig. 13

117

Fig. 16

Fig. 17

119

.t^gtof '"77^E447

t.

Fig. 20Fig. 18

Fig. 19

120

Fig. 21

Fig. 22

Fig. 23

121

Fig. 24

Fig. 25: Cone of Fire

122

Fig. 26: Beaten Zone

FIRST CATCH

BEATEN ZONE

DANGEROUS ZONE

DANGEROUSSPACE

Fig. 27: Dangerous Zone

123

GLOSSARY

Because this paper deals with a technical topic, in order to

avoid confusion some definitions are necessary. I hope I am not

insulting the reader's intelligence but it occurs to me that the

distinction between, for example, "tactics" and "strategy" may not

be completely clear to someone without experience of the military.

Other terms are certainly obscure and I include them here in order

not to burden the chapters with constant definitions.

Back: The generally convex surface of the bow facing the target.

Belly: The surface of the bow facing the firer.

Bodkin: A type of arrowhead without blades, with a square ortriangular cross-section.

Braced: The bow, when strung; also called "at rest".

Characteristic: an attribute which determines the effectiveness ofa weapon or weapon system in battle. As this paper will show,the characteristics of horse archers are flexibility,mobility, vulnerability, and firepower.

Dustar: The "limb" or flexible section of the bow; between the"grip" and the "ear".

Ear: The stiff outer section of the dustar; usually stiffened withhorn and designed to act as a lever. Also known as the"siyah".

Fire: the application of weapons or ammunition to a target.Fires can be short- or long-range, and are usually coordinatedor timed for maximum effect. As this paper will show, onefunction of horse archers in the attack was to prepare theenemy with their fire before the main attack.

124

Fletching: The feathers attached at the base of the stele tostabilize the arrow in flight.

Grip: The handle area in the middle of the bow where it is heldand the arrow is rested during firing.

Guard: a protective force placed between one's army and the enemy.The job of the guard (be it advance, flank, or rear) is togain information and to delay, deceive, and destroy the enemy;in other words, a guard does its job by fighting.

Knee: The recurved junction between the ear and the dustar.

Lathe: The bone piece used to stiffen the ear; also refers to bonestiffeners for the grip.

Loose: To release the string and fire the arrow.

Nock: The notch on the back surface (facing the target) of theear. Also refers to the notch on the end of the arrow intowhich the string is fitted.

Reflexed: The bow, unstrung.

Screen: a reconnaissance force whose job is merely to locate theenemy and gain information about him. A screen does not fightexcept in self-defence.

Stave: The bow itself, excluding the string.

Stele: The shaft of the arrow, made from reed or wood.

Strategy: the art of forcing upon the enemy one's own plan ofaction, usually by disposing armies. The allies' strategy in1944 was to create a third European front to divide the Germanarmies.

Tactics: The art or skill of disposing men and machines on theground, especially in contact with the enemy. When confrontedby an enemy with a weak flank, a commander may decide toattack that flank. The flank attack is his tactic.

Tang: A spike on the rear end of the arrowhead, designed to fitinto a hollowed out section of the stele.

Trilobate: Formed of three "vanes" or blades.

Weapon: a device with which to kill. A weapon may or may not bethe actual means of killing: for example, a bow is a weaponeven if it does not have arrows with it.

Weapon system: the entire means by which a weapon is brought to

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bear in battle. A horse archer, including bow, man, horse,protective clothing, extra ammunition, and other equipment, isa weapon system.

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