METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 1 7 , No. 1, January 1986 0026-1068 92.00

FORMAL FOUNDATIONALISM AND SKEPTICISM

MICHAEL P. LEVINE

As Ernest Sosa presents it, formal foundationalism appears 10 be a meta- epistemological position about the meaning of epistemic justification. In “The Foundations of Foundationalism” he says,

Formal foundationalism in epistemology holds that the notion of episte- mic justification or warrant is recursively definable in terms of a neces- sary truth. . . using a non-epistemic basis and a non-epistemic generator.’

Sosa holds the view that there may be alternative or multiple principles of proper basicality. He says,

It should be noted that formal foundationalism does not entail a doc- trine of objectively unique foundations for empirical knowledge. For there might be several alternative recursive specifications on the class of justified beliefs, making use of different bases and generators, without any evident criterion for selecting one as objectively correct. If so, there might be different bases determining different foundations, none objectively prior or superior to the others2

If this is so, then unless oneassumes that all recursive definitions will ultimately generate the same class of justified beliefs, formal foundationalism can, I think, be shown to entail epistemological relativism which in turn implies skepticism. In correspondence Sosa has said that he would want to make such an assumption.

However this assumption seems to be unwarranted since alternate bases or generators (arguably) do generate different classes of justified beliefs. For example, different criteria of proper basicality entail different classes since those basic beliefs are themselves part of the class of justified beliefs. In defense of his assumption, Sosa (and I think Plantinga as well) would want to argue that different criteria of proper basicality do not necessarily entail different classes of justified belief^.^ It may be that beliefs which are properly basic on one criterion of proper basicality can be justified as non-basic beliefs

Ernest Sosa, “The Foundations of Foundationalism,” Nous 14 (1980), pp. 547-564. Quote is from p. 55 1.

Sosa, p. 552. Plantinga claims that there may be alternate criteria of proper basicality and there-

fore, I suppose, alternate recursive specifications of the class of justified beliefs. See Alvin Plantinga, “Is Belief in God Properly Basic?,” Nous XV (1981), pp. 41-41.

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88 NOTES

given some alternate criterion of proper basicality. It may also be the case that beliefs which are properly basic can also be justified in terms of some relationship they have to non-basic beliefs, and via these beliefs to other pro- perly basic beliefs. (On this view, beliefs which are properly basic require no further justification in terms of other beliefs since they are self-justifying, but they may be justified in terms of other beliefs as well.) In either of these cases it would be possible for “several alternative recursive specifications on the class of justified beliefs” to ultimately generate the same class of justified beliefs.

What I cannot argue for here is a doctrine of objectively unique founda- tions for empirical knowledge-e.g., a single criterion of proper basicality. This would show, in the most direct way, the unacceptability of formal founda- tionalism as understood by Sosa. I also cannot argue against the possibility of the two cases mentioned above that would make it possible for a set of alter- nate recursive specifications on the class of justified beliefs to ultimately generate the same class of justified beliefs. Therefore, in what follows I am assuming that “several alternate specifications on the class of justified be- liefs” will not ultimately generate the same class of justified beliefs. In this case, although Sosa’s formal foundationalism does not entail “a doctrine of objectively unique foundations for empirical knowledge,” it can be shown to entail skepticism.

Thus, what I shall argue is that in order to avoid epistemological relativism, which entails skepticism simpliciter, the foundationalist must reject formal foundationalism as a meta-epistemological position.

Relativism would be the view that there are different and equally valid methods of reasoning that could be used to justify epistemic judgments (i.e. that there are multiple structures of epistemic justification). Each method has its own criteria to determine the validity of epistemic judgments. Know- ledge would be relative to a particular recursively definable specification of the class of justified beliefs. If there could be “different bases determining different foundations with none objectively prior to or superior to the others,” then a belief would always be justified relative to a particular foundation. No claim could be made for the universality of epistemic principles (i.e. the uni- versal validity of such principles). If substantive or normative epistemology involves the construction of epistemic norms valid for all epistemic agents, then belief in the relativity of epistemic justification entails a denial of the possibility of normative epistemology.

What may be justified on one foundation may not be justified on another, but then how can we ever know if we are really justified in any of our beliefs? Indeed, how can we ever really be justified in any of our beliefs whether or not we can know that we are justified? To choose between foundations we would have to rely on some third foundation - one that would enable us to say that we are justified in our beliefs based on one but not the other of the foundations, and so on. Ultimately we could never be justified in our choice of a foundation. We would be left with an arbitrary decision. However, an

NOTES 89 arbitrary decision would be unjustified and could not enable us to determine what we do or do not know. However, the problem is not simply that we cannot determine what we do or do not know. Rather the problem is that knowledge would itself be impossible because knowledge cannot be based on an arbitrary decision. We cannot decide to know something simply by specifying a foundation for our knowledge.

This is a similar argument in ethics that suggests methodological relativism in ethics implies ethical skepticism. Paul Taylor says,

When the methodological relativist asserts that all moral knowledge is ‘relative’ to a given culture, he is ruling out the very conditions that make it possible for such a thing as genuine moral knowledge to exist at ail.4

Just as methodological relativism in ethics would entail ethical skepticism, formal foundationalism as an account of epistemic justification would entail skepticism sirtipliciter.

Neither foundationalism (i.e. substantive foundationalism), coherentism, or contextualism, understood as normative positions in epistemology entail a denial of skepticism. It is one thing to analyze the structure ofjustification and another to suppose that the criteria imposed by that structure can be met. However, neither do they entail skepticism since they dohold that the structure of justification is unique (i.e. knowledge is not relative). They are epistemo- logical “absolutists.” They believe that no matter how people actually go about justifying their knowledge claims, the structure of justification is universally applicable to all epistemic agents, and that the justification for their true beliefs must conform to that structure if it is to be considered knowledge.

I conclude that in order to avoid an epistemological relativism that entails skepticism formal foundationalism, in the form that Sosa presents it, must be rejected.

University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA

* Paul Taylor, Principles of Ethics (Encino: Dickenson, 19751, pp. 25-26.