Forgotten Origins: Nuclear Weapons and Environmental Security

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Forgotten Origins: Nuclear Weapons and Environmental Security

Chad Michael Briggs

Dept. Political ScienceCarleton University

Ottawa, [email protected]

Presentation for the‘Resources, the Environment, and National Security’ Panel

International Studies Association Annual ConferenceWashington, D.C.

February 19, 1999

Abstract Numerous analyses of environmental security focus upon the nuclear fallout and waste issues of the militaryduring the Cold War, but several larger questions often remain unanswered. Many assume that theenvironment and conceptions of nature played little role in the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons in the postwar years, but their presence was vital. This paper argues that people understood natureas seen through the physical sciences, but this vision differed between the scientists and those of the general

public. These differing views on the nature of atomic energy, coupled with historical events of the SecondWorld War, contributed to current understandings of environmental security in the United States. Rather than simply providing a way of understanding nature and the environment, the physical scienceswere implicated in their destruction, as national and environmental security quickly becameintertwined.

It is wrong to think that the task of physics is to find out how Nature is. Physics concerns what we say about Nature.

-Nils Bohr



In the world of human thought generally, and in physical science particularly, the most important and fruitful concepts are those towhich it is impossible to attach a well-defined meaning.

-H.A. Kramers

Much of the current environmental security literature, if not all such writings since 1989,

has proceeded on the assumption that issues of the environment or nature were simply not on the

security agenda of states during the Cold War. In some ways, this may be an admonishment of

previous inattention, that for all the other issues associated with the Cold War, we should have

been more aware of these issues and how they affected security. Rather, critics tell us, the realists

and neo-realists could not conceptualize such issues, nor would they consider them too important

if they could. The integrity of the state, the sovereign entity of the international system, was

judged according to its military capabilities and those military threats arrayed against it. The

environment, even as it became an important policy and politics area during the 1960s and 1970s,

was an invisible player in this highly military domain.

Largely, we describe the natural environment as a victim of the Cold War. It was not only

degraded by national security structures and resultant actions, but its very existence was held

hostage by them, as well. There are various considerations to this issue, from natural resource

access of the 'Third World' by the militaries, to the direct damage of the environment caused by

state militaries while undertaking weapons production and testing. Of these various approaches,

however, one of the most poignant and frightening issues has been that of the military-industrial

nuclear programs in the U.S. and former U.S.S.R., for these fell into the heart of the Cold War

and seemed to symbolize all that went wrong with conceptions of national security during that

time. Issues of nuclear waste and weapons testing were written largely in the imaginations of

those studying the Cold War and its legacy, while the environment silently suffered at the hands

of ‘security.’

Nevertheless, was the Cold War environment’s influence truly as illusory as we claim? Itmay be easy to dismiss the idea of nature and the environment as a contemporary issue during the

Cold War, for some might argue that they were simply not on the agenda of most states in any

form until the Cold War was well into its most dangerous form of the early 1960s. This would be

to imply that states were simply guilty of carelessness and a lack of interest in the subject, or that



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we simply did not address the subject of the environment in the nuclear dimension until the

1980s. Such an argument would be correct in some respects, for it was true that states did not

account for natural resource degradation concerning how the drive for security might affect theenvironment. In another sense, however, such a statement may be a misunderstanding of all the

questions involved, for nature has always been intricately intertwined with nuclear or atomic

issues. The more appropriate question to ask might be: what role did the environment play in this

process of nuclear security in the U.S.? Why does it seem that they missed the environment? In

other words, we are not asking how nuclear security issues affected the environment, but rather,

how the conceptions of the environment affected nuclear security.

These are not simple questions, for they include consideration of several dimensions of

thought in the nuclear issue, in addition to government structures, political pressures, and the way

in which science understood nature in the United States. These questions are, however,

important. It is difficult to integrate the environment into national security for the very reason

that such security has been so detrimental to the environment in the past. Yet if one is to get

beyond this cognitive barrier, a deeper understanding of just why it has been so difficult to

consolidate security and environment might prove instructive. That these institutional biases exist

and harm the environment, it is necessary to consider why this is so.

This paper argues that the dominant conception of nature and the environment in the

United States helped to create the very security dilemma which would itself so greatly harm the

physical environment. As current conceptions of the environment did not necessarily exist then,

it is well to remember that people’s understanding of nature was closely related to how the

sciences described the world. To varying degrees, this is still the case today, but the physical

sciences and their understanding of nature made an enormous impact upon both national and

environmental security as a result of the Second World War and the development of atomic

energy.

We can explain the relationship between nuclear issues and the environment on several

different levels, the first two of which bear mentioning before going into more detail regarding

the third. On one level, it is the preparation for nuclear war and the resulting civilian/military

programs which pose the threat. The production of warheads and ill-designed nuclear power



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plants generate waste, threaten populations with radiation, and undermine more emotional

considerations of well-being among those peoples confronted with the problem. This is the

dimension which appears most often in the security and policy literature, and finds its mostexpressive outlet in Mike Davis's article "Dead West: Ecocide in Marlboro Country.” Davis1

astutely points out that the structures of national security and nuclear testing have created intense

problems for those living in areas regarded to be 'marginal' and of less concern than the more

overriding national security of the States, and that the secrecy involved has prevented much

discussion on the topic. It is in these marginal geographical areas in which one of the most ironic

of security paradoxes occurs, for their insecurity relative to others is largely caused by the very

state which is claiming to provide for their security. Such arguments have circulated and held

sway for quite some time, tracing much legitimacy back to the work of such dissident physicists

as Andrei Sakharov’s work on the effects of radioactive fallout in the 1960s. 2

What these writers do not address in their works is the other dimension in the nuclear-

environmental relationship, one which is so obvious that noticing it is difficult. That is to

consider that nuclear war, itself, posed one of the most fundamental threats to the natural

environment imaginable. Apocalyptic visions of the end of nature come naturally with envisaging

the end of the world, and hardly a soul has dared argue that nuclear weapons were anything but

the quintessential danger of modernity when it came to the environment. The discussions3

surrounding environmental damage due to nuclear war emphasized the direct effects resulting

from the detonation of such warheads, and on a much larger scale than the weapons testing

mentioned above. In this vein, one often thinks of the somewhat dubious contentions of nuclear

winter popularized by Carl Sagan in the early 1980s, which again does not engage the larger

questions regarding the very existence of such weapons. 4

One can then approach the third notion, that nuclear weapons and the destruction they

cause are supremely feared not simply because of the immense and unfathomable death and

injuries which would be involved in any nuclear exchange. People also closely relate them to

ideas about fundamental forces of nature and the role which science should and does play in

modern society.



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Science, Nature, and Promise:

Since the 17 century, people’s understanding of nature and the environment have beenth

greatly influenced by the sciences, providing ways of seeing the world which were quite differentfrom previous religious or animistic world-views. Such changes in understanding have not come

easily, nor has the impact of modernity been felt without much struggle. The question has always

remained of whether science has had a positive impact on society, and whether the intentions of

scientists in gaining an understanding of nature have been forthright or mischievous. This is very

much the case with the Cold War and development of atomic energy.

It is entirely plausible to assert that the Cold War conception of national security arose

from liberal intentions to make the world a better place, especially on the part of the scientists

concerned. As Spencer Weart eloquently recounts, modern science has always concerned itself 5

with notions of transforming the world, and many of these scientists saw nuclear energy to be a

force of incredible value in forming the gleaming 'white cities' of tomorrow. This is closely6

associated with the idea that one can translate unlimited energy to the eradication of poverty, that

the unsuitable vagaries of nature can be tamed to suit the needs of men and women. H.G. Wells

popularized many of these notions in his science fiction stories, for just as in the Island of Dr.

Moureau and The World Set Free , nature was a force to be overcome.

This is not to suggest that the intentions of scientists were as deliberately dark and brutal

as some interpretations of Bacon and Newton might suggest, or even that they possibly conceived

certain intentions at the time. Note that there were significant differences in thought between

those who were aware of scientific inquiry, and those who were involved in such research. This

was particularly the case with respect to technology in the early part of this century, and its

relationship with physics. It was a rare physicist who would make claims for the beneficial

application of physics research, for most of that generation held true to the joking claim of the

Cambridge University scientists, “Thank God none of this is useful.” 7

The physicists of the first half of the 20 century were guided much more by the allure of th

new knowledge, for nuclear and quantum physics were then completely new fields of study.

From the main research centers in Göttingen, Copenhagen, and Cambridge, the physicists created

a sort of international community, dedicated to accurately modeling the structure and workings of



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the atom. To say that they were actively engaged in transforming the world would be quite

misleading, for only a few physicists spoke of the possible applications of such work. The

weapons implications of nuclear physics, although mentioned in futuristic terms in The World Set Free with its atomic bomb, were viewed as physically impossible until the late 1930s. The

neutron was newly discovered, and until the theoretical models indicated that a sustaining chain

reaction was possible in the element uranium, scientists did not take such fantastical ideas

seriously. This did not occur until early in 1939. 8

The popular conception of such research and knowledge during this time was quite

different, and related to people’s conceptions of the role and power of nature. Physicists could

not explain the nature of radioactivity until later physical models could be constructed, but to

many others, its discovery and existence suggested that it contained nearly magical powers. Many

saw radioactivity as beneficial, and its associated applications could only be health inducing, as

well. The dangerous nature of radioactivity was not well understood until perhaps the 1950s, and9

not made public until the 1960s, so in the first half of the century, many non-scientists could only

view the possible uses of radiation with positive connotations. The atom was, after all, a

breakthrough in scientific understanding of our world, and for those who were taken with the

notion of modernization (which included many people in North America, Europe, and the Soviet

Union), they understood that to “harness “ the atom was to control forces otherwise beyond their

control. To control nature, especially at a time in which most deaths in the industrial world still

came from influenza, could only mean that things would turn out for the better.

The dark side of such ideals was that science may not be able to transform society so

much as warp and distort it, for the Pandora's Box of nature's secrets could go beyond the control

of the scientists and society hoping to tame them. Romantics saw simply learning these secrets as

a violation of nature, a close analogy to how others could abuse and use such knowledge against

natural systems and humankind. These fears likewise found their voice in stories and newspaper

editorials of the early 1900s, with people warning that the power of the atom might go

unchecked, and could even cause a chain reaction to destroy the earth. The public did not base10

these fears as much upon science as they did upon fantasy, with guarded illusions regarding the

mythical nature of the atom and radioactivity. The fear was that knowing too much about nature



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Fission occurs when the nucleus of the atom is split, and the resultant loss of mass releases energy, anda

subatomic particles (which are manifested as light and radioactivity). The traditional belief was that the atom (or itsnucleus) was inviolate, and could not be intentionally split, especially as the remaining matter would have transmutedinto different elements. It was further understood that neither protons nor electrons could do the job– po sitively charged

protons would repel other protons, while electrons were much too sm all. The neutron, which carried no electrical charge but had the same mass as a proton, was the ideal possibility. The basis for a sustained chain reaction was to find anelement which, when its nucleus was split, would emit at least two neutrons as radiation, so that the reaction would

progress geometrically over time. Only Uranium and Plutonium had the necessary properties.235 239

was dangerous. Even if science could uncover natural forces, was not modernity flirting with the

danger of producing a Dr. Frankenstein, and he, in turn, creating his monster?

As this particular research led to the creation of the atomic bomb, it is important to ask whether its creation during World War II was a certainty. Was this research manipulating nature

by stealing her secrets, and was the atomic research of the 1920s and 1930s a natural progression

to the Manhattan Project? The short answer to this is no, but some explanation is necessary,

especially as such an answer runs counter to the arguments made by many critics of science.

These critics frame the creation of the American atomic bomb as the prime example of science’s

drive toward domination, as well as showing its violent tendencies. Although the nature of many

current research projects is analogous to the Manhattan Project (largely owing to their federal

defense-related funding), to claim that these are basic characteristics of scientific inquiry does

not necessarily follow. Rather, the development of the A-bomb was a result of political fears and

motivations of the time, not of a fatalistic drive within scientific research. The motivations were

to come from outside sources, and those sources believed in the control so often mentioned by

science’s critics.

As stated, few of the scientists involved realized the potential of atomic research in

creating weapons of mass destruction, though they were instrumental in the development of

models essential to their construction. The discovery of the neutron, made in 1932, gave no

indication that a weapon would be possible– it was up to individuals (especially Leo Szilard and

Iréne Joliot-Curie) to make the connection that a sustained chain reaction might be feasible. The a

discovery of the neutron was key, however, for without the neutron, no model of nuclear fission

was possible. What was even more remarkable in historical terms was the timing of its discovery.

The Coming War:



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Within twelve months of Frank Chadwick discovering the neutron in February 1932,

Franklin Roosevelt was elected in the U.S. (November 1932) and Adolf Hitler came to power in

Germany (January 1933). Had these events not occurred at roughly the same time, the political11

history of physics may have been quite different. The rise of National Socialism in Germany, in

particular, was a key factor (if not the key factor) in the development of the atomic bomb.

Hitler’s anti-Semitic policies, coupled with a distaste for the newer theories of relativity and

probability, forced many of the brightest minds in physics to flee Germany, Austria, Italy, and

Hungary, just as his invasions of countries such as France and Denmark also prompted a mass

exodus of physicists. While some of them went to work at Cambridge, the one country most open

to providing positions for these scientific refugees was the United States, where such notables as

Einstein and von Neumann could be found. In this way the United States, which did not have a

notable community of physicists until that time, was suddenly in possession of the brightest

minds on the subject.

However, Hitler and his government provided much more than a ready supply of

physicists to the U.S. and Britain. Many emigrating scientists were Jewish, and had very strong

feelings against the Nazis and their policies, and a genuine fear of their actions. Once war broke

out in 1939, many of the physicists’ worse fears had been confirmed. A lingering fear remained

among several of their number, and one could describe this as their worst fear: that Germany

would be able to develop and use an atomic bomb. Germany still had large numbers of

competent physicists (including Werner Heisenberg), it had a large industrial capacity, and

perhaps most important, it was thought that Hitler had the will to actually use such a ‘device’.

With this in mind, Leo Szilard proposed two things to his colleagues, which were the first

steps in aligning science with national security. First, all further research regarding nuclear

fission was to be withheld from international publication, a proposal which met with much

derision from a community of scholars used to sharing their findings with others, regardless of

their nation of origin. Secondly, he approached Albert Einstein in September 1939, explaining

the possibility of the development of an atomic bomb. Einstein himself had not yet made the

connection that such a weapon might be possible, but immediately understood that it would be

catastrophic if Germany developed the bomb first. With such motivation, Einstein took the



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remarkable step of writing a letter to President Roosevelt, urging him to develop the bomb before

Germany could. This is remarkable because of his openly pacifist attitude of the past, and the

letter itself would later cause him much guilt and grief.12

Later that year, Roosevelt approved what was later to become the Manhattan Project, but

not without stiff resistance from many in the military. It took several presidential advisors to13

bring FDR around to the idea that such a massive investment as would be required for the

Manhattan Project was necessary, but at last, FDR confidant Alexander Sachs was able to

convince Roosevelt that this project was necessary to prevent domination by the Germans. Even

so, the project started quite slowly, hampered by the lackluster performance of the U.S. Bureau of

Standards, which was originally put in charge of the research and production, and by the lack of

available funds to start the project. In fact, it was not until December 6, 1941 (the very day before

the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor) that Congress granted substantial funding and backing to

begin research in earnest. 14

The research was propelled by the firm belief that the Germans had already begun such

research, themselves, and so it may be little surprise that it was the foreign-born scientists who

worked the hardest and more earnestly on the project early on. This motivation created an almost

institutional character, driving the scientists to pursue or tolerate actions which under any other

circumstances, would have compelled them to quit or retire from the effort.

The notion that the Germans already had a dangerous start in theatomic-armaments race had become so deep rooted that it wastreated as a certainty. “We were told day in and day out that it wasour duty to catch up with the Germans,” recalls Leona Marshall,one of the few women in the project. There was never any doubt of this hypothesis. It silenced scruples that occasionally cropped up. 15

It was then that the humanitarian ideals of scientific liberation came into contact with

state security. It was to prove a most unhealthy combination. In 1942, the U.S. government gave

control of the project to the military, officially becoming the Manhattan Project and coming

under the guidance of Brigadier General Leslie Groves. Groves, an engineer who had been

responsible for construction of the newly-completed Pentagon Building, viewed his job as more

akin to the strict application of science– that is, how to translate physics, chemistry, and



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metallurgy into a working atomic bomb. With the aid of the newly-appointment director, Robert

Oppenheimer, the geographically disparate scientists involved in the project were collected in

Los Alamos, New Mexico, to work under strict security and supervision. The military censoredall ingoing and outgoing mail, they allowed little contact with those outside the “compound,” and

even the scientists’ wives were not to be told the nature of their husbands’ research. 16

The extreme nature of security surrounding the Manhattan Project was most unusual for a

scientific project, and was so pervasive that different teams at Los Alamos were kept unaware of

what their colleagues were doing next door. Living conditions were miserable, their academic

lives had been completely disrupted, but the goal, the idea that they were racing to prevent

Germany from developing the bomb first, was the impetus to ignore all other considerations as

secondary. But by surrendering control of their science to the military, people’s perceptions of

science (and of physics, in particular) were changed permanently.

The Second World War changed the face of science, so that as Daniel Kevles later wrote,

physics became identified with national security. If science was our way of understanding17

nature, then the environment, too, became intertwined with security.

After the Bomb:

Following the Trinity test in July 1945, the Genie was out of the bottle, so to speak. Prior

to this time, the knowledge that the bomb existed was the most important secret.

Someone said, when the first atomic bomb went off, that the onlyimportant secret is now let out— the thing works. After that, anydetermined country could make the bomb, given a few years. 18

It then remained to consider Nils Bohr's warning to Truman shortly afterwards, that this

scientific revolution would require a similarly radical change in society, if they were both to

survive. What seemed more the case was that the practice of science was changed to cater to theneeds of the state. Although science had, of its own accord, discovered the mystery of the atom, it

was the state which had pushed this science headlong into the further developments, and then

used those technologies for purposes of national security. Particularly because of the awful and

overwhelming effects of the war, nuclear issues quickly became intertwined with the state and

what it considered most important for its survival.



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The earlier worries about the effects of nuclear energy upon the environment did not

disappear. Most often, they simply changed form, for with the start of the Cold War around 1947

the first two dimensions of environmental threats to nature (mentioned earlier) raised their respective heads. The notions of a security and secrecy state referred to by Davis and Deudney 19

were largely imposed during this time (though it was an easy carry-over from the war), and the

nuclear projects of the government were kept under tight lock and key. This prevented effective

outside regulation and oversight, and meant that the only real form of safety regulation was that

imposed by the scientists, themselves. The veil of secrecy alone was the most daunting20

challenge for many of those most interested in the environmental factors of nuclear radiation and

possible accidents, for these were kept cloaked in secrecy in the name of national security. 21

That this scientific secrecy was the historical outcome was not predetermined. It is related

to what was mentioned above, of the idea that nuclear physics was somehow a natural 'secret'

stolen and appropriated from the earth for America's use, rather than a wasting asset which was

not so much a secret as simply an advantage in industrial processes. Although there were

attempts to return scientific knowledge to the same base from which it had come, once the

Second World War was over much of the scientific research was either directly or indirectly

controlled by the government. Change from state control to the more international flavor of the

past would be extremely difficult, and the push for international control of atomic power is one

such example of how turning back the clock was difficult.

The U.S. government hoped that their nuclear monopoly could be used as a strong

diplomatic lever to help shape the postwar world, and the conventional wisdom of the time was

that the States should not give their nuclear 'secret' to anyone else to use. Scientists and several22

key people in Washington thought differently. They realized that the use of nuclear weapons was

a terrible threat to all humanity, and that perhaps the only rational choice of action to take was to

create international control of nuclear weapons and supplies. Several key people in Washington,

including the heads of the State Department and War Department (later the Dept. of Defense),

realized that the atomic bomb changed strategic thinking, and that attempting to maintain sole

control of these technologies would result in an arms race.

Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson and physicist David Lillienthal thus proposed



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their plan for effective international control and cooperation of nuclear weapons, which was

meant to bring the Soviets into the fold and not alienate them into forcing a new nuclear arms

race. Secretary of Defense Henry Stimson was quite vocal in his concerns that such a race23

might well spell destruction for both societies, and President Truman largely agreed. Considering

Truman’s strong feelings against communism, this was a bit of a surprise, but the fact that his

key advisors were supportive of such a plan made the decision easier. So, too, were a fair

majority of the very scientists who had created the bomb, and their interest in the subject had

turned them quite vocal after the war. 24

The Acheson-Lillienthal Plan was not to be, however, for the White House handed it over

to others (such as Bernard Baruch) for implementation, who had opposing ideas regarding

nuclear control and the notion of secrets in relation to security. Feeling that science had

discovered new ways of understanding nature, Baruch changed the plan so that this new

knowledge would be held solely by the United States. Any international plan for atomic energy

could only be used, they argued, to keep powers such as the U.S.S.R. in check. Although the U.S.

tabled the plan at the newly-minted United Nations, the Soviets (predictably) refused the offer on

the grounds that it would have been too intrusive into their state and would have left them at a

serious disadvantage against the U.S. 25

Although such plans may have never come to fruition, in any case, it is important to

reiterate that the notion of a nuclear 'secret' was based upon beliefs that the knowledge to build

nuclear weapons was some force of nature to which American scientists alone were privy. Apart

from the actual production process (which is mostly a matter of time, money, and technology for

any industrialized country), there were no scientific secrets to be had. It was a political fantasy

based upon conceptions of nature and the image of science 'stealing' these secrets from the

environment. It also played to the fears of radiation and atomic power of previous years, for this

was terrible knowledge which could only be used in the hands of the virtuous, not to those

federations whose slogans portended the downfall and destruction of Western society. 26

We are not as concerned with the outcome of one particular plan, for various factors

others than Baruch may have impeded or outright blocked passage of such a measure. Rather,

what is of interest are the differing ways in which people viewed atomic power then, as well as



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the role of scientists themselves. What was important to them was their view of science and

technology , and the realization that the two are not the same, easy as it may be to confuse the

terms. Studying physics and inquiring into nature are not the same as constructing an atomic bomb, but the role these scientists had taken made that connection seem real. Possession of

knowledge is different from the decision to employ it, and after the Allies realized that the

Germans’ atomic weapons project was minimal, those scientists working on the project began to

strongly object to the idea of actually using the bomb against human targets. 27

Nevertheless, the military leaders, especially Gen. Groves himself, saw no reason to let

such a potent weapon lay idle. This was particularly true as long as discussion centered around

the coming plan for an invasion of the Japanese mainland in 1946, an invasion which would have

resulted in countless casualties on both sides. As well, the progression of the war had led to what

many now refer to as ‘total war’, exemplified by Army Gen. Curtis LeMay’s firebomb attacks on

Tokyo (which killed more people than the attacks on either Hiroshima or Nagasaki). This was a28

true example of knowledge serving as power, and the U.S. government was hardly willing to

release these ‘secrets’ from its possession.

The Environment Meets National Security:

Here is where the real paradox begins. For in trying to assert that the U.S. and its allies

alone should hold the secrets of nature, meant that any true security of the States would be

compromised, be it national or environmental. This secrecy led to the lack of oversight and

understanding of the impacts these issues had upon Americans at home, and appropriated the

nuclear energy field primarily for military purposes. Other factors such as basic mistrust were at

work, of course, but it is interesting that the environment did play a role in the thinking of these

issues so early in the Atomic Age. Again, the earlier dangers and worries about atomic energy

played their part, though this time writ large into the entire national security state of the U.S. The

traditional conception of national security disappeared with the advent of atomic weaponry, for

no longer could territory be protected from the dangers such weapons posed.

The U.S. feared the 'loss' of Western Europe and the democratic values which it shared

with that part of the world, for it sensed that the postwar world was still entirely chaotic and that



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a dangerous sense of disorder prevailed. To use David Campbell's approach, then, to say that 'we'

in the West were threatened by this disorder by 'they' in the Communist states, was to inscribe a

simple black and white relationship onto the world. It meant that those fearing a loss of self-29

identity in the European countries would try all the harder to assert the sense of 'we', to project

outward for causes of a threat and to contain the expansionist Soviet Empire. Although nuclear

weapons were soon to erase all advantages of borders and boundaries of safe vs. dangerous, there

was a frantic attempt to reinstate just such a sense of security and well-being.

In the most dangerous of ironies, the search for this traditional concept of security only

undermined it further, for American attempts to assert nuclear 'superiority' translated into an

immense arms race which further threatened the state and the environment. Truly, the security30

of natural systems and of the state were largely the same when it came to these weapons, and

were both compromised in attempts to provide for greater security. Destruction at the hands of

nuclear weapons would harm the biosphere and populations as well as military targets. It was a

totality that people considered threatened, not simply the 'state'. In fact, the state had become a

somewhat unavailing concept in the territorial sense, since any nuclear war would not be fought

to gain control of U.S. or Soviet ground, nor were the geographical advantages previously

enjoyed by those countries very important. Such security was a mere construct, while the31

natural environment and people's health were important considerations in that formulation.

Even when the Eisenhower administration proposed the Atoms for Peace program, it was

again a call between those who believed in the role that modernity had to play in shaping society,

and those who were worried about health effects of radiation and fallout from bomb tests.

Though some criticized the administration for its approach, it worked all the harder to deny what

it did know about the negative effects of nuclear energy or the radiation in fallout. This may be32

called denial in its most basic form, and it was present in many aspects of the nuclear debate,

however ironic it may have been. 33

There were doubtless other levels of national security invoked during this time, ones

which justified large levels of conventional forces and interventions in other states. During the

Cold War, however, all basic questions of national security ultimately led back to the question of

nuclear weapons, and most basic fears of the Soviets also led back to such considerations. The34



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immense agenda-setting properties of the nuclear issue precluded any real consideration of the

environment as a separate factor. Furthermore, the urgency of the perceived problem created a

need for quick action which prevented the lengthy research which would normally have beenundertaken with such a new and possibly dangerous scientific area. It is quite reasonable to say,

for example, that civilian nuclear power would still be in its prototype stage today were it not for

the military needs of nuclear energy. 35

The dynamic of environmental worries worked both ways. Not only were questions of

nature and modernity's role important in considering the fear of nuclear war, but people often

projected fears of nuclear war onto environmental issues, as well. We may see this psychological

projection as a way of coping with the helplessness felt by many people when the issue of nuclear

war was raised, and they often transferred it onto environmental issues. Nuclear power plants,36

for example, though a qualitatively different beast than nuclear weapons, became the targets for

many groups in the anti-nuclear field, for as many of them indicated, attempts to stop such power

plants were steps in the right direction. If people could not affect the larger superpower conflicts,

at least something could be done. It is the basic distrust of modernity and liberal promise of

emancipatory science which held true for both environmentalist and anti-nuclear demonstrators,

and it should be no surprise that these people were often the same.

To those struck by the importance of developing and using the A-bomb, it was not simply

the loss of life which was the issue, but what the atomic bomb represented in terms of nature and

modernity. To many, the bomb represented all that was wrong with science and technology, a

dark side to a society which had prided itself upon such achievements until WWII. The notion of

modernization was certainly not dead, but now people had a true culprit for its failings, as

science was and has been implicated time and again since Hiroshima. Certain people were simply

against the idea of ‘stealing secrets’ from nature, and pointed out how dangerous that practice

had become. Since the work of the Manhattan Project had at once conflated science and the

military, or science with technology, the target was an unavoidably large one. Once the

environmental movement began growing in the 1960s and 1970s, the onus of science as

insecurity was drawn in even starker terms.

This may be how the topic of Davis's environmental approach surfaced, by projecting



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basic and fundamental fears of nuclear war and the dangers of nature’s secrets onto the domestic

level. That it was missed for so long may come as no surprise when one considers the larger

issues at stake, though the irony here is that the two levels were dependent upon one another.One could not exist without the other. Environmental damage of 'Marlboro Country' would

persist if there existed a greater perceived threat of harm from the Soviets, one in which natural

issues were so important that they were not often mentioned. People may have taken them for

granted. Perhaps after the invention of the thermonuclear warhead in the 1950s, what was the use

of worrying about the environment when it came to national security? For if such weapons were

ever used, who would be around to worry about such questions? The powerful imagery of barren

wastelands depicted in futuristic Mad Max stories is frightening more for its lack of modernity,

or even for the barren wastes of what were once natural ecosystems, than they are for what we

actually see. It is because of the realization that it was modernity that could cause those

wastelands. Both were threatened at the same time. 37

Now that the Cold War is over, it is easy to sit back and point out with such indignation

the environmental damage caused by the preparation for a nuclear war, and rightfully so. There

has been extensive radioactive contamination of many parts of the U.S., which is estimated to

cost the Dept. of Energy some US$100 billion to ameliorate over the next ten years. The extent38

of such contamination in the former Soviet Union is reported to be at least 100 times worse, with

no cleanup in sight. Still, these are issues seen with the benefit of hindsight, and with39

consideration of those problems with which we must deal today. During the Cold War, the

problems were presented quite differently, and the perceived dangers much more overarching and

difficult to grasp.

Conclusion:

The environment was always a factor in the nuclear debate, and it was written into the

Cold War national security of the U.S. in ways which made it seem as if it were being ignored. It

was not. One must simply understand that not only was the environment being threatened by the

national security of the time, but the entire notion of the state and all of its trappings, were as

well. The illogic of security over the fifty years after WWII made possible the simultaneous



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threat to a nation as a whole, while the (often good) intentions of policymakers and scientists led

them to pronouncements that they were acting to ensure everyone's security. Denial of the basic

threat, of 'we' threatening ourselves, was not an easy thing to admit, even more so for theimmense stakes involved.

Rather, some critics shifted blame for the loss of security, be it national or environmental,

onto the people and practice deemed responsible for creation of the atomic bomb. This included

not just nuclear physicists, nor simply physicists overall, but the entire ‘project’ of science

(assuming such a thing ever existed) was culpable. Surely some individuals could be considered

so guilty, but the special attention paid to science and the ‘death of nature’ had at least as much

to do with the powerful mythology built up around scientific discoveries. This attribution of

special powers and responsibility was made by both sides of the nuclear debate, for those in

support of the Cold War felt that science had all the answers, and that it alone had a special

faculty to strengthen Cold War security. After the shock Americans felt at the Soviet launch of

the Sputnik satellite in 1957, what else was to be done but to advocate massive increases in

federal funding for science education? When Reagan was looking for a way to increase U.S.

security in the 1980s, where else need he look but to believe that the American scientific

community could find the answers to his Star Wars (SDI) program?

As the quotation by Nils Bohr states at the beginning of this paper, physics concerns what

we can say about nature. But these interpretations depend upon where one begins in the security

debate, for different people claim that science says quite conflicting things about nature. As well,

people’s perceptions of how science affects nature differs greatly between C.P. Snow’s “Two

Cultures,” for while some claim that knowledge of nature holds promise for the future, others40

assert that such knowledge is dangerous and perhaps not even authentic. No matter the position

one holds in the debate on modernism or national security, two interesting points exist to keep in

mind concerning science and environmental security.

The first is that perceptions of nature and the environment did play a role in the early

security debates and formulations, even if it was not obvious or explicitly remarked upon.

Scientists viewed the discovery of atomic fission differently than did those in the U.S.

government, for while one considered fission a rapidly wasting secret, the other thought fission to



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be more akin to a national security secret about nature–- stamp “Top Secret” on the documents

and no one would know or find out. Many in the U.S. government considered it unlikely that the

Soviets could build an atomic bomb within forty years, if at all. (It was first detonated in 1949)The second point to keep in mind is that this outcome, the building of the bomb during

WWII and the close connection between scientific research and the military, was not a certainty.

The scientists were persuaded to act as they did because of certain historical circumstances, not

because the project of science so dictated. The process of physics becoming synonymous with

national and environmental security was dependent upon certain events at the time, as well as the

differing perceptions of science and nature detailed above.

As these dominant conceptions of nature and the environment helped to shape security as

we now know it, it should be of little surprise that academics should address its historical legacy

in terms of how the environment was always missing from security. Although it was a

consideration, nature was not addressed by those writing traditional security because they thought

that nature and the environment could be controlled. Indeed, that belief among policy makers

heavily contributed to the nuclear security dilemma of the Cold War, both in terms of national

and environmental security. If we are to understand our current difficulties in these areas, perhaps

it is best to focus upon how they first came to be.







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22. Beckman, Peter R, Larry Campbell, Paul W. Crumlish, Michael N.Dobkowski, and Steven P. Lee., 1992. The Nuclear Predicament:Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War and Beyond. New York: PrenticeHall.

Crockatt, Richard., 1995. The Fifty Years' War. London: Routledge.The Soviet perspective on what the U.S. was up to at this

point is quite interesting, as contained withinHolloway, David., 1994. Stalin and the Bomb: the Soviet Union and

Atomic Energy 1939-1956. New Haven: Yale University Press.

23. A fair account of the Acheson-Lillienthal Plan may be foundwithinRhodes, Richard., 1995. Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb.

New York: Simon & Schuster. also see Crockatt, 1995, op. cit.

24. Hewlett, Richard G., 1962. The New World, 1939-1946. A Historyof the United States Atomic Energy Commission. V. 1.University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.

25. Stimson, Henry L., [1945] 1989. Henry L. Stimson's Appeal forAtomic Talks with Russia. in : Paterson (ed.) Major Problemsin American Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 1914. Lexington,MA: DC Heath & Co. pp. 277-279

This issue is also dealt with in Clarfield, Gerard H. and Wiecek,William M., 1984. Nuclear America: Military and CivilianNuclear Power in the United States, 1940-1980. New York:Harper & Row.

26. Weart (1988, op. cit.) had an interesting account of the roleof the 'Aviators' in early science literature, men who would bevirtuous enough to be able to handle such weapons for the benefitof the globe. He contends that the Strategic Air Command eventuallysaw themselves in much the same light.

27. Jungk., 1956, op. cit.

28. LeMay would later go on to head the Air Force’s Strategic AirCommand, as well as becoming Air Force Chief of Staff.

2 9 . Campbell, David., 1992. Writing Security: United States ForeignPolicy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis, Universityof Minnesota Press.

30. One should refer to the basic document of national securitystrategy of the time, NSC-68, which contains Acheson's plans formilitary expansion and is based upon ideas first set forward inGeorge Kennan's 'Long Telegram' (though he was to maintain that hewas misinterpreted). Were it not for the Korean War, it is unlikely



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that things would have turned out as they did.National Security Council., [1950] 1989. National Security Council

Paper No. 68 (NSC-68) in : Paterson (ed.) Major Problems inAmerican Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 1914. Lexington, MA:DC Heath & Co. pp. 301-305

Miscamble, Wilson D., 1992. George F. Kennan and the Making ofAmerican Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press.

Kennan, George F., [1946] 1989. George F. Kennan's "Long Telegram,"in : Paterson (ed.) Major Problems in American Foreign PolicyVolume II: Since 1914. Lexington, MA: DC Heath & Co. pp. 284-288

Also refer to the account of American foreign policy inPaterson, Thomas G., 1989. American Expansionism and Exaggerations

of the Soviet Threat. in : Paterson (ed.) Major Problems inAmerican Foreign Policy Volume II: Since 1914. Lexington, MA:DC Heath & Co. pp. 340-352

31. In considering possible alternative nuclear regimes, please seeTarr, David W., 1991. Nuclear Deterrence and International

Security. White Plains: Longman Publishing.Also of great interest are the moral and philosophical judgementsmade inBailey, Alison., 1989. Posterity and Strategic Policy: A Moral

Assessment of Nuclear Policy Options. New York: UniversityPress of America.

32. Boyer., 1994. op. cit. The official history of the Atoms forPeace program can be found in:Hewlett, Richard G., 1989. Atoms for peace and war, 1953-1961;

Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission. A History of theUnited States Atomic Energy Commission. V. 3. Berkeley:University of California Press.

33. Again, on this subject please refer to Weart, 1988, op. cit.Also fair sources areLifton, Robert J., 1987. Nuclear Illusions : in Evan & Hilgartner

(eds.) The Arms Race and Nuclear War. Edgewood Cliffs:Prentice-Hall, pp. 224-227 and

Moyer, Robert S., 1987. The Enemy Within. (same as above), pp. 228-231.

Lifton, Robert Jay and Eric Markusen., 1990. The GenocidalMentality: Nazi Holocaust and Nuclear Threat. New York: BasicBooks.

Lifton, Robert Jay and Greg Mitchell., 1995. Hiroshima and America:A Half Century of Denial. New York: Avon.



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34. Boll, Michael., 1988. National Security Planning. Lexington:University of Kentucky Press.Walker, Martin., 1993. The Cold War: A History. New York: Henry

Holt.

35. This is an idea put forward by Weart (1988, op. cit.), who ishimself a nuclear physicist, but it is echoed at times by otherwriters.

36. Please see Weart, 1988, op. cit; Moyer, 1987, op. cit.; andLifton, 1987, op. cit.

37. For an interesting study of films and the nuclear age, see:Henriksen, Margot A., 1997. Dr. Strangelove’s America: Society and

Culture in the Atomic Age. Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress.

38. U.S. Senate. Comm. of Environment and Public Works, SubComm. onNuclear Radiation. Status of Nuclear Waste & Safety Issues. May 6,1992.For further current sources on the DOE's polcies, also seeOregon Office of Energy., 1996. Cleaning up Hanford's NuclearWeapons Wastes.<http://www.cbs.state.or.us/external/ooe/nucsafe/hanclnup.html>Gerber, Michelle., 1996. PUREX Plant: The Hanford Site's HistoricWorkhorse.<http://www.hanford.gov/whc/gerber/0435-8th>Gerber, Michelle., 1996. PUREX Plant Waste Management Was a Complex

Challenge<http://www.hanford.gov/whc/gerber/0435-9th.htm>

39. For sources on such problems in the former USSR, seePeterson, D.J., 1993. Troubled Lands: The Legacy of Soviet

Environmental Destruction. Boulder: Westview Press.Leskov, Sergei. "Lies and Incompetence." The Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists. June 1993.

40. Snow, C.P., 1963, op. cit.

Documents

Forgotten Origins: Nuclear Weapons and Environmental Security