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Article by Graeme Mollison
with Cranfield University
Air New Zealand’s links with Cranfield University in the United Kingdom began in 2007 when the airline was
in the early stages of developing RNP (Required Navigation Performance) operations at Queenstown. RNP
operations were in their infancy at this time and the airline opted for a phased development of its programme
whereby approaches and departures were initially flown only in VMC (visual meteorological conditions). The
airline’s intention was that as its experience with RNP grew, it would be able to refine procedures further
and progressively operate to lower minima in instrument meteorological conditions.
Air New Zealand
Forges Link
It was during these early phases that the airline decided it might
be worthwhile having an independent review of its Queenstown
RNP operation carried out. Enter Dr Steve Jarvis PhD, MSc, Bed,
MErgS, MRAeS from Cranfield University. He was targeted by
the airline for his expertise in areas such as task analysis, error
prediction, workload assessment and CRM training consultancy.
Dr Jarvis accepted the airline’s invitation and enlisted the
assistance of Matt Ebbatson (now Dr Matt Ebbatson and currently
employed by Monarch Airlines in the UK). The two familiarised
themselves with the B737-300 aircraft (Dr Jarvis now has a full type
rating) and RNP operations before travelling to the other side of
the world to begin their task. During their initial visit, they spent
two weeks of very long days (and nights) gathering information
followed by another month of analysing data, and compiling results
and recommendations.
During the course of their assessment, they conducted pilot
surveys, reviewed approach and departure procedure design,
assessed flight deck ergonomic issues specifically associated
with the B737-300 aircraft and shadowed pilots through their
RNP training.
From flight simulator exercises already conducted by the airline,
some phases of the RNP operations planned for the future had
already been identified as generating a particularly high workload
for pilots. Clearly, the workload would be significantly higher if it Above: An Air New Zealand B737 at Queenstown. The input from Cranfield University has been an integral part of the airline’s successful RNP operations into Queenstown. Photograph: Graeme Mollison
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Using the procedures that have subsequently been developed
incorporating the input of Dr Jarvis and his associates at Cranfield
University, Air New Zealand’s Boeing 737-300 and Airbus A320 aircraft
currently have the ability to operate to within approximately 1,000 ft
of the runway elevation at Queenstown whilst still cocooned in cloud.
Since Dr Jarvis’s first visit in 2007, the relationship between the
airline, Dr Jarvis and Cranfield University has continued to evolve.
Dr Jarvis is now a regular visitor to the airline’s Auckland base, and
has since completed reviews on Airbus A320 Queenstown RNP (not
a full review) and subsidiary Air Nelson’s Bombardier Q300 GNSS
operations. He continues to provide regular advice on the airline’s
Human Factors/Crew Resource Management (CRM) programme.
This has resulted in significant developments with human factor
elements becoming increasingly embedded within the airline’s
briefings, training and culture.
Dr Steve JarvisDr Steve Jarvis, PhD, MSc, Bed, MErgS, MRAeS started out
as an employee of British Aerospace’s Air Weapons Division
where he specialised in mathematical modelling before
making a career change, and moving into education and
psychology. With more than 20 years of flying experience
under his belt, he is a qualified instructor and display pilot,
so it is not surprising that he chose to specialise in aviation
psychology. Dr Jarvis is currently a Lecturer/MSc Course
Director in the Department of Systems Engineering and
Human Factors at Cranfield University.
As part of his various research assignments, he has
undertaken professional training in airliners such as the
Boeing 737, and worked with airlines such as British Airways,
Cathay Pacific and Air New Zealand. He has also worked
for the UK Civil Aviation Authority, researching aviation
decision-making, and for Airbus, where he looked into
maintenance human factors.
Dr Jarvis is a member of the UK CRM advisory panel and
contributes to the British Airways Human Factors Standards
Group. He currently teaches MSc and CPD (continuing
professional development) courses in accident investigation
and aviation safety assessment at Cranfield University, and
consults widely in the area of commercial flight operations
and crew resource management.
Cranfield UniversityCranfield University was established by the UK government in 1946 as a specialist provider of postgraduate education for aeronautical engineers.
Located on an active commercial airfield about an hour from London, the university currently graduates approximately 53% of all UK aerospace engineering postgraduates, and offers a wide range of associated programmes in human factors, safety and air transport management.
The university offers both full-time and part-time courses to students from around the world, not only specialising in education but also applied research and development in partnership with major companies such as Airbus, Boeing, BAe Systems and Rolls Royce.
The university boasts large-scale experimental facilities including wind tunnels, icing tunnels, a B747 flight simulator (fixed-base) and a Jetstream 31 “flying classroom” aircraft. There is also a large cabin simulator and a Boeing 737 cabin simulator, which is used to conduct research into various aspects of cabin safety, including the factors that might influence human survival in aircraft accidents.
The specialist facilities and courses offered at the university are many and varied—from Aircraft Accident Investigation, run in collaboration with the UK Air Accidents Investigation Branch, to Astronautics and Space Engineering.
were combined with non-normal events such as a navigation system
or engine failure. Such threats either had to be mitigated adequately
or removed altogether before any such procedure was implemented.
Jarvis and Ebbatson used this information as a starting point and
combined it with information from a pilot feedback survey and
their own first-hand experiences, and looked at things with a fresh,
highly-critical eye. They had to consider the worst-case scenarios—
high workload, inclement weather, etc.—and then consider how
and where they thought the systems that were currently in place
would be likely to weaken. Simply put: what were the biggest threats
and could they be mitigated adequately?
The process they used also involved a pilot workload study utilising
electronic pilot workload monitors, which were installed in Air New
Zealand’s B737-300 flight simulator specifically for the task.
As a direct result of Dr Jarvis’s recommendations, Air New Zealand
has made a number of changes to its RNP procedures, including
simplifying its engine failure procedures, streamlining checklists and
briefings, and adding a brightly coloured decal to the LNAV (lateral
navigation mode) selector mode button to assist pilots in making a
prompt and correct mode selection during critical phases of flight
(an ergonomic issue identified with the B737 “Classic” model).
Left, top: Workload study equipment installed in Air New Zealand’s B737-300 flight simulator.
Pilots report their workload on a scale of one to five—five being the highest. They practice first in order to become comfortable with using the equipment. When the blue light flashes, the pilot reports his or her current workload by pressing the button positioned near the control yoke.
The study looked at normal operations and non-normal operations such as an engine failure. Not surprisingly, the single engine missed approach scenario stood out as generating the highest workload. The study also identified that there was a significant difference between the workload of the captain (always pilot flying for Queenstown operations) and the first officer (pilot monitoring), and the importance of the way in which essential information is communicated to the pilot flying when he or she is working to capacity. For example, communicating information such as “0.3 nautical miles right of track” is of little use if the pilot flying does not have the spare mental capacity to process it adequately. The Jarvis recommendation (which was adopted) was that the pilot flying must be given information he or she can use. For example, “0.3nm right of track and increasing—you need to turn left.”
Left, middle: The overhead panel in a B737.
Left, bottom: The green decal (top centre) of the autopilot panel clearly identifies the LNAV button and eliminates the possibility of confusion. Such simple “fixes” can provide critical safety improvements.
Right: The ergonomics of older cockpits
(like this Lancaster) were
a far cry from those of today’s
multi-engineaircraft and took little account of human factors.
Above, from left: Dr Steve Jarvis and Matt Ebbatson in a B737-300 simulator. Dr Steve Jarvis in a B737 simulator. Matt Ebbatson running workload analysis.
Above, far right: Changeable weather and the steep rugged terrain surrounding Queenstown challenge pilots and navigation systems.
Malcolm Taylor Malcolm TaylorMalcolm Taylor
Malcolm Taylor
Graeme Mollison
Graeme Mollison
Graeme Mollison
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