Foreword Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law

Foreword Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law

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ThePhilosophicalFoundationsofTortLawDavidG.Owen

Printpublicationdate:1997PrintISBN-13:9780198265795PublishedtoOxfordScholarshipOnline:March2012DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.001.0001

ForewordWhyPhilosophyMatterstoTortLawDAVIDG.OWEN

DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198265795.003.0001

AbstractandKeywords

Thecollectionofessaysinthisbookprovidesanexpansivephilosophicviewoftortlawissuesbymanyofthescholarswhohavehelpeddevelopthedisciplineinitsrecentemergencefromthemistsofacademicobscuritytoitspresentpositionasaneo-quasi-disciplineofitsown.Thephilosophyoftortlawinsomewaysisveryold.Asrevealedinseveraloftheessayshere,philosophicalexaminationoftortlawproblemsisconventionallytracedtoAristotlesdiscussionofcorrectivejusticeinNicomacheanEthicswrittensome2,500yearsago.Then,in1982and1983,acriticalmassdevelopedwhenanumberofscholars,includingJulesColeman,ErnestWeinrib,andGeorgeFletcher,offeredavarietyofdiverseviewsontortlawandphilosophyinlawandphilosophy.Thiswasanimportanteventintheevolutionoftort.

Keywords:philosophy,tortlaw,Aristotle,NicomacheanEthics,JulesColeman,ErnestWeinrib,GeorgeFletcher


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I.ABriefIntellectualHistoryofTortLawandPhilosophyThephilosophyoftortlawinsomewaysisveryold.Asrevealedinseveraloftheessayshere,philosophicalexaminationoftortlawproblemsisconventionallytracedtoAristotlesdiscussionofcorrectivejusticeinNicomacheanEthicswrittensome2,500yearsago.Aristotle,however,providedlittlemorethanaskeletaldescriptionofthelawsCorrectivefunctionofrectifyingtortswrongfulinterferenceswiththeholdingsofanotherandasimilarlyskeletaldescriptionofhowthiscorrectivefunctionfitstogetherwiththelawsbroaderfunctionofallocatingasocietysscarceresourcesamongitsmembersaccordingtoprevailingprinciplesofdistributivejustice.Movingforwardintime,onebeginstoseesomefleshinginofAristotlescorrectivejusticeskeleton,first,byThomasAquinasandhismedievalfollowers,andthenbyvariousnaturallawtheoristsoftheEnlightenment,suchasHugoGrotiusandSamuelPufendorf.Lateintheeighteenthcentury,ImmanuelKantexpoundedthepowerfulethicofequalfreedom,whichheconceivedtobethemoralfoundationofrights,justice,andlaw.Explicitlyorimplicitly,Kantsmoralandlegalphilosophyhasbecomeapillarformuchofmoderntort-lawtheory.AlthoughKantsequalfreedomethicaddedsignificantsubstantivecontenttoAristotlescorrective-justicestructure,hiselaborationofthatcontentremainedgeneralandabstract.Insearchingformorespecificcontent,onemaytravelforwardintimeintoAnglo-Americanjurisprudence,whereonemightnextnotethepublicationin1881ofOliverWendellHolmes,Jr.sTheCommonLaw,arguablythefirstmodernefforttounravelfundamentalproblemsofthecommonlaw,includingtortlaw,inbasicphilosophicterms.Butthebridgebetweentortlawandphilosophyremainedthereafterbutlightlytravelledformanydecades.1

(p.2) ModernAnglo-Americanscholarshipontortlawandphilosophywasprecededby,andtoalargeextentemergedinreactionto,importanteconomicefficiencytheoriesoftortliabilityfirstexpoundedinthe1960sandearly1970sbyRonaldCoase,2GuidoCalabresi,3RobertMorris,4andRichardPosner.5Theseimportantforaysintorttheory,whichattemptedtoexplainthedevelopinglawoftortsineconomicterms,laidthefoundationforaproliferationofwritingontheeconomicsoftortlawthatdominatedthetheoreticaltortlawscholarshipinthe1970sandmuchofthefollowingdecade.6Tortlawscholarshipofthistype,whichviewedthelawoftortsthroughtheconsequentialistlensofeconomicanalysis,spurredasharpresponseinthe1970sfromthoseintheacademywhothoughtthatthefoundationsoftortlawrestedmorefirmlyonmoralground.7Thus,in1970,CharlesFriedpublishedhisbook,AnAnatomyofValues,in1972GeorgeFletcherpublishedhisarticle,FairnessandUtilityinTortTheory,8in1973RichardEpsteinpublishedhisfirstarticleonthetopic,ATheoryofStrictLiability,9andJulesColemanin1974beganhislongjourneyinto(p.3) torttheoryscholarshipwithOntheMoralArgumentfortheFaultSystem.10Foranumberofyearsthereafter,whilethelawandeconomicsscholarschurnedoutanincreasinglyelaboratebodyofliterature,thestudyoftortlawandphilosophypercolatedunobtrusively.11

Investigationintothephilosophicalrootsoftortlawmaturedinsophisticationandbegantotakeontheappearanceofadiscipline,albeitanascentone,inthe1980s.Startingthedecade,IzhakEnglardin1980critiquedthetorttheoryliteratureofthepreceding


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decadeinTheSystemBuilders:ACriticalAppraisalofModernAmericanTortTheory,12andErnestWeinribenteredthefraywithhisfirsttortlawandphilosophyarticle,TheCaseforaDutytoRescue.13Then,in1982and1983,acriticalmassdevelopedwhenanumberofscholars,includingColeman,14Weinrib,15andFletcher,16offeredavarietyofdiverseviewsontortlawandphilosophyinLawandPhilosophy.17Thiswasanimportanteventintheevolutionoftorttheoryforatleasttworeasons.Forone,itwasthefirstunitedoppositionbyleadingscholarstothetheretoforelargelyunchallengedsupremacyoftheeconomictheoristsutilityandefficiency-basedapproachesthathadbecomeentrenchedasthedominanttheoreticalscholarshipofthetime.Foranother,itpresentedsidebysidetheradicallydifferentconceptionsofcorrectivejusticeofJulesColemanandErnestWeinrib,whosewritingsonthesubjectcametoframeandsignificantlyshapetheevolvingconceptionoftortlawandphilosophyasitisbroadlyunderstoodtoday.Asthe1980s(p.4) progressed,WeinribandColemancontinuedtorefinetheirrespectivemodels,andmoreandmorelegalscholarsjoinedthesearchforphilosophicalilluminationofthelawoftorts.18Andasthedecademovedalong,thephilosophyoftortlawscholarshipincreasinglyevolvedintoexplicit,systematicapplicationsofformalphilosophicprinciplestolegalproblemsofresponsibilityforharm.19

Alsoduringthe1970sand1980s,inthehallsofthephilosophers,anumberofscholarslaidimportantphilosophicgroundworkthatwasindispensabletothelawyersindevelopingmoralconceptionsoftortlaw.Twoespeciallyimportantbookspublishedintheearly1970s,JohnRawlsmonumentalATheoryofJustice20andRobertNozickspowerfulAnarchy,State,andUtopia,21offeredadramaticchallengetoconsequentialistandutilitarianconcepts.Despitetheirsignificantdifferences,thesetwoworkstogetherprovidedavitalinfusionofneo-classicalrights-basedmoraltheoryintothedebateonpoliticaltheory.Andsomephilosophersinthisperiod,notablyJoelFeinberg22andJudithJarvisThomson,23beganquiteexplicitlytoaddresstheissuesofgreatestinteresttotortlawyers,thoseconcerningmoralresponsibilityforharmingothers.24

The1990sdecadehasbeenshapingupasthedecadeofthebooks.Therewerenonedevotedtoadeepandsystematicinquiryintothephilosophyof(p.5) tortlawwhenthepresentvolumewasfirstconceivedin1991.JulesColemanpromptlyremediedthatwithhispublicationin1992ofRisksandWrongs.25There,rejectingconventionalrationalchoiceliberalism,heplacestortlawwithinthebroaderlegalsystemandexplainsitsroleasameansofrectifyingwrongfullosses,notinefficientexchanges.Tortliability,heargues,merelyrectifiesthewrong;itdoesnotrightit.Compensationforatortdoesnotservetolegitimateanunconsented-totaking;rather,itisthevictimsdue.Thus,hearguesthattortpracticeisbestconceivedasrectification-of-wrong-done,notasasubstituteforefficientcontract.Alsoin1992,twoimportantsymposiaontortlawphilosophyappearedSymposiumonRisksandWrongs,26centeringaroundColemansbook,andSymposium:CorrectiveJusticeandFormalismTheCareOneOwesOnesNeighbors.27Thenextyear,1993,witnessedthepublicationofanumberofimportantcollections,includingSymposiumonLegalFormalism,28whichcenteredaroundErnestWeinribswork,acollectionofessaysontorttheoryeditedbyKenCooper-StephensonandElaineGibson,TortTheory29andIzhakEnglardsbook,ThePhilosophyofTortLaw,30inwhichhe


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critiquesonceagain(butmorebroadlyanddeeply)recentAnglo-AmericantortlawtheoriesandexaminesaswelltheEuropeanhistoricalrootsoftortphilosophy.31

Withinafewweeksofthepresentvolumegoingtopress,ErnestWeinribhaspublishedhisbook,TheIdeaofPrivateLaw,32inwhichheplacestortlawinthebroadercontextofprivatelaw.Viewingprivatelawfromwithinitself,intermsofitsinternalintelligibility,Weinribarguesthattheconceptualperspectiveofprivatelawembodiesacorrelativityofrightsand(p.6) dutieshighlightingthecentralityofthenotionofcausationofharmandthedistinctionbetweennonfeasanceandmisfeasance.GroundinghisperspectiveoftortlawinAristoteliancorrectivejusticeandKantsphilosophyofright,hearguesthatprivatelawshouldbeviewedasacoherent,self-understandingenterprise.Fromthisperspective,Weinribfurtherexpoundshistheoryoftortlawasanormativeunitintegratingthedoingandsufferingofharmthatisresolvedinbipolarlitigationbetweentheplaintiffanddefendant.

Thisbringsustothepresentvolume.Thecollectionofessayshere,eachwrittenespeciallyforthisvolume,isdesignedtoprovideanexpansivephilosophicviewoftortlawissuesbymanyofthescholarswhohavehelpeddevelopthedisciplineinitsrecentemergencefromthemistsofacademicobscuritytoitspresentpositionasaneo-quasi-disciplineofitsown.PartI,THENATUREANDREALMOFTORTLAWANDPHILOSOPHY,containingessaysbyPeterBirks,JulesColeman,andTonyHonor6,attemptstoprovideastructuralframeworkforunderstandingthenatureoftortlawandthegeneraltypesofproblemsinvolvedinaphilosophicinquiryintothisparticulardomainoflaw.PartII,PRINCIPLESANDVALUESUNDERLYINGTORTLAW,whichincludesessaysbyRichardPosner,GeorgeChristie,JamesGordley,RichardWright,andIzhakEnglard,exploresthevarietyofabstractprinciplesandvaluesthoughtbydifferentscholarstofurnishtortlawwitha.substantive,philosophicfoundationethicsbelievedtoprovideitwithnormativecontent.InPartIII,PHILOSOPHICALPERSPECTIVESONTORTLAWPROBLEMS,theinquiryshiftstothemajortortlawperplexitiesinneedofnormativehelpfromthedomainofphilosophy.Inthefirstsectionhere,ResponsibilityandtheBasisofLiability,JohnFinnis,RichardWright,KenKress,JohnAttanasio,andIinquireintohowphilosophicconceptsofresponsibilityforharmshouldbefittogetherwithoneormoreoftheconventionalgroundsoftortiousliabilitybaseduponintent,negligence,orstrictliability.Thenextsection,ConnectingAgencyandHarm:Risk,CausationandDamage,containsessaysbyStephenPerry,ChristopherSchroeder,TonyHonor6,JeremyWaldron,BruceChapman,andPeterBenson,eachexploringthenatureoftheconnectionsintortlawbetweenagency,risk,andharm.InthefinalsectionofPartIII,VictimResponsibilityforHarm,KennethSimonsswitchestheinquirytotheplaintiffsconduct,focusinguponthenatureandsignificanceofavictimsresponsibilityforcausingaccidentalharm.ClosingoutthevolumeinanAFTERWORD,BernardWilliamsreversestheinquiryoftheotheressaysandaskswhatphilosophersmaylearnfromstudyingthelawoftorts.

(p.7) II.TheNatureandRealmofTortLawandPhilosophyHowlawandphilosophybroadlyfittogetherisalargeandcontroversialtopicthatranges


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farbeyondthescopeofthisvolume.Ofinteresthereisthemuchnarrowerquestionofhowtortlawmaybeinformedbytheteachingsandprinciplesofphilosophy.Thelawoftortsconcernstheobligationsofpersonslivinginacrowdedsocietytorespectthesafety,property,andpersonalityoftheirneighbors,bothasanapriorimatterandasadutytocompensateforwrongfullycausedharm,expost.Tortlaw,inotherwords,involvesquestionsofhowpeopleshouldtreatoneanotherandtherulesofproperbehaviorthatsocietyimposesoneachcitizenforavoidingimproperharmtoothers,andfordeterminingwhencompensationforharmisdue.Moralphilosophy(ethics),andtosomeextentpoliticalphilosophy,arethemselvesconcernedwithprinciplesofproperconduct.33Andsobothfields,tortlawandphilosophy,involveasearchfornormsofproperbehaviornormsthatmaybeusedforevaluatingtheproprietyorwrongfulnessofparticularinstancesofharmfulconduct.

TheessaysinPartIframetheinquiryfortheremainderofthevolume.Theissuesconsideredinthispartmaybeviewedasstructural,inthattheyinvolveatonceamicro-tortexaminationoftheinternalstructureofatortwhatitisthatmakesatortatort,andamacro-tortexaminationoftheproperplacementofthelawoftortswithintheexternalstructureofotherlawthelawofproperty,contracts,restitution,andcrimes.Thenatureofatort,itsnecessaryelements,therelationofitsinternalnormstobroadersocialnorms,andtheobjectivesofasystemoftortlawwithinthebroaderlegalsystemarethekindsofissuesinvestigatedinthisopeningpartofthecollection.

InTheConceptofaCivilWrong,PeterBirksbeginstheinquirybyprovidingastructuralanalysisofthenatureofatort,orcivilwrong,exploringwhereitfitswithinthebroaderstructureofthecommonlaw.Fromthisperspective,heexamineshowtheconceptofacivilwrongrelatestoandisdistinguishablefromtheothercommonlawconceptscontract,unjustenrichment,andotherevents.Locatingtortwithinaschemecontainingtheseothercommonlawcategories,aclassificationapproachwhichhefindscoherent,Birksproposesthattortlawbeviewedbroadlytoincludeallappropriateresponsestotortiousbehavior,includingtherestitutionofwrongfulgains.Bysofocusingonhowtortandtheothercommonlawcat-egoriesdifferandoverlap,Birksprovidesinsightsintothenatureofacivilwrongatortwhichhedefinesasthebreachofalegaldutywhichaffects(p.8) theinterestsofanindividualtoadegreewhichthelawregardsassufficienttoallowthatindividualtocomplainonhisorherownaccountratherthanastherepresentativeofsocietyasawhole.Birksexplainstheuniversalrequirementthatthecoreoftortinvolvesabreachoflegalduty(aprimaryobligation)whichgeneratesafurtherdutytocompensatethevictim(asecondaryobligation).Hepostulatesandexploresthenotionthatthecoretortcaseincludesthreeprimaryelements:harm,conduct,andblameworthiness.Heconcludesthatneitherharmnorblameworthinessisessential,leavingonlyconductamountingtoabreachofdutyasthesoleimperativeinthecoretortconcept.Arguingthattheremedialobligationsforbreachofdutyintortarepolicy-based,ratherthanlogicallynecessary,hedistinguishestortfromtheotherthreecommonlawcategories,theremediesforwhicharedictatedbythecausativeeventitself.Findingthatthebroadformalconceptofacivilwrongisweakandabstract,Birksconcludesthat,foracompleteexplanationoftheconceptofacivilwrong,onemustturn


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tothepoliciesandvalueslyingbeneaththeprimaryduty,whereprinciplesofeconomicefficiencycompeteforrecognitionwithethicsofliberalautonomyandmoralpaternalism.

In1992,JulesColemanpublishedhisbook,RisksandWrongs,wherehepresentscorrectivejusticeastheprinciplethatthosewhoareresponsibleforthewrongfullossesofothershaveadutytorepairthem,andwherehearguesthatthecoreoftortlawembodiesthisconceptofcorrectivejustice.Inhisessayhere,ThePracticeofCorrectiveJustice,Colemanprobesfurtherintothenatureofcorrectivejusticeanditsroleinthelawoftorts,Broadlyviewed,correctivejusticeisoheofthenormsthatapplywhenpersonsaresomehowconnectedwiththemisfortunesofothers,providinganimportantlinkbetweenagentsandvictims.Rootinghisparticularconceptionofcorrectivejusticeinliberalpoliticalmorality,Colemanmaintainsthattheconceptisproperlyviewedasthedutytomakerepair,tomakegoodthevictimsloss,butonlyifthelossiswrongful,andonlyiftheagentisresponsibleforhavingbroughtabouttheloss.Heclaimsaswellthatthose(includinghimself)whooffercorrectivejusticeaccountsoftortlawarecommittedtotheclaimthatcorrectivejusticehasobjectivesemanticcontent.Thisleadshimtoadiscussionofthemeta-ethicsoftheconceptofcorrectivejustice.Arguingforananti-realistapproachtotheconcept,heclaimsthatitscorecontentisdrawnfromthepractices(includingtortlaw)inwhichitfigures.Andsohespeaksofthepracticeofcorrectivejustice.ThusColemancontendsthattortlawitselfhelpsprovidecontenttocorrectivejustice,whilecorrectivejusticeinturnservesasacriterionforassessingexistingtortpractice.Asforthesubstantiveessenceofcorrectivejustice,hemaintainsthatitcontainsacoherentcorethatincludeshumanagency,rectification,andcorrelativity.Finally,Colemanexploresotherfeaturesofthepracticeofcorrectivejustice,arguingthatitscontentispre-political(p.9) (independentoflegalandotherpoliticalinstitutions),non-instrumental(independentofsocialgoals,likecostavoidance),whileremainingultimatelydependentonthemoral,legal,andpoliticalpracticesalreadyexistingwithinthecommunity.

BorrowingfromH.L.A.Hartsapproachtothecriminallaw,TonyHonor6posesandanswerssixquestionsthattogetherframemuchofthemoralaspectoftortlaw.Inhisfirstessayhere,TheMoralityofTortLawQuestionsandAnswers,Honor6arguesthatthethresholdaimoftortlaw,likethecriminallaw,istominimizeundesirableconduct.Buthenotesthatotherprinciplesalsoconstraintortlawinthepursuitofthisaim.Thuscorrectivejustice,basedonequality,requiresaharm-doertoputthematterright,whichintortlawusuallyrequiresthepaymentofcompensationtothevictim.Whilefaultisanimportantbasisofresponsibilityforharm,HonorsnotionofOutcome-responsibilityprovidesabroaderformofresponsibilitythatmaygenerateadutytocompensateongroundsotherthanfault.Distributivejustice,inHonorsview,includesthenotionthatlossesfromrisk-creatingconductshouldfallupontheactorcommensuratewiththepossibilityofgainshesoughtfromtheconduct.Underprinciplesofretributivejustice,hemaintains,thepenaltyimposedonthedefendantshouldnotbedisproportionatetothewrong.Byspreadinglosses,insuranceadvancesthegoalsofdistributivejusticeaswellasretributivejustice,HonorSexplains,andithelpsassurethatstrictliabilitydoesnotimposeaburdenonthedefendantgreaterthanhisbenefitorfault.Inadditiontothe


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constraintsofproportionality,hearguesthattortresponsibilityshouldbelimitedtoharmwithinthescopeofthepertinentliabilityrules.Honor6alsoreasonsthatprinciplesofbothcorrectiveandretributivejusticesuggestthatresponsibilityshouldbeproportionedaccordingtothemannerandextenttowhichthevictimcontributedtotheharmfuloutcome.Finally,hecontendsthatcertainformsofstatecompensationschemes,suchasthedistributionofmotoringriskstoallmotoristsortheentirecommunity,appearcompatiblewithprinciplesofrisk-distributivejustice.Inreviewingtheanswerstothesixquestionsposedatthestart,Honor6explainsthatthetortsystemisjustifiedasameansbywhichthestate,subjecttotheconstraintsofjustice,seekstoreduceundesirableconductbytreatingcertainindividualinterestsasrightsthattheright-holderisempoweredtoprotectwheninfringedbyconductmarkedasacivilwrong.

III.PrinciplesandValuesUnderlyingTortLawArethereprinciples,values,ortruthsofmoraltheorythathelpthelawoftortsestablishnormsofproperconductforavoidingharmtoothers?Ifso,whatmightsuchnotionsbe,andfromwhencedidtheyderive?Isthereuse(p.10) inorganizingtorttheoryaroundtheprinciplesinternaltotortlawitself,suchasthedoctrineofforeseeability?Whatlessonsmaybelearnedfromastudyoftheethicalinquiriesofthegreatphilosophers,fromAristotletoAquinasandhisfollowers,toKantandHegel?Andhow(ifatall)mightsuchprincipleshelpexplain,justify,andguidethelawoftortstoday?Moreparticularly,shouldtortlawbeviewedineconomicterms,asamanifestationofwealthmaximizationprinciples,orshoulditbeviewedinsteadasareflectionofamoralethicsuchasequalfreedom?Orisitreallycomprehensibleonlyintermsofthepluralisticworldofconflictingvaluesabroadinsociallife?ThesearethekindsofquestionsexaminedbytheessaysinPartII.

Sometimeago,RichardPosnerbegananinquiryintothephilosophicaljustificationsfortheeconomicexplanationoflawthathehasdevelopedovertheyears.34Thepurposeofhispresentessay,WealthMaximizationandTortLaw:APhilosophicalInquiry,istorestate,refine,andamplifythephilosophicalversionofhisargumentthatwealthmaximizationisthebestnormativeguidetothelawoftorts.Ratherthanbeingderivedfromasinglemoraltheory,suchasutilitarianism,Posnerarguesthatwealthmaxi-mizationisconsistentwithavarietyofmoraltheoriesandrepugnanttonone.Forillustration,PosnerfirstexplainshowParetooptimality,basedontheliberalnotionofconsent,mayberoughlyaccomplishedthroughthenegligencesystem,sinceactors(whoarealsopotentialvictims)wouldprobablypreferasysteminwhichthesumofliabilityandaccident(victim)insurancecostsareminimized.Next,heexplainshowcommon-sense-ruleutilitarianismfavorsliabilityrulesthatminimizethesumofthesesamecosts,andsomaximizewealth.Nor,inPosnersview,isAristoteliancorrectivejustice,whichseekstorectifywrongfultransactions,incompatiblewithwealthmaximization,forthelattertheoryprovidesguidanceinascer-tainingthetypesoftransactionsthatshouldbeconsideredwrongful.EvenKantiandeontology,heargues,whichproscribestheuseofothersmerelyasends,isconsistentwithasystemoftortlawwhichaccommodatesconflictingactivitiesbymaximizingtheircombinedvalue,anapproachwhichenjoinspotentialinjurersandvictimsaliketoaccorddueconsiderationtoeachothersinterests.Finally,


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hearguesthat,althoughthewealth-maximizingdamagesprinciplesoftortlawdotendtoratifyratherthanredistributepre-existingholdingsofwealth,broad-basedegalitarianismissimplyunachievableasapracticalmatterthroughchangesinthetortsystem.Thus,Posnerconcludesthatthetheoryofwealthmaximization(p.11) supportstheexistingsystemoftortlawbecauseitisrootedin,andnotinconsistentwith,thevariousmoraltraditionsofsociety.

InTheUneasyPlaceofPrincipleinTortLaw,GeorgeChristieexplorestheroleofprincipleintortlaw,andhedoessoskeptically.CitingCokesassertionthatReasonisthelifeofthelaw,ChristieremindsusofHolmesrejectionofthisviewinhisfamousaphorism,Thelifeoflawhasnotbeenlogic:ithasbeenexperience.Yettheurgeoflawyerstofindsomecoherentlogicalstructureinthelaw,observesChristie,persists.Christienotespreliminarilytheimportanceanddifficultyofobtainingagreementontheverymeaningofaparticularprincipleandonpropermethodsofapplyingittoconcretefactsituations.ExaminingthesearchforprincipleintheBritishtort-lawcasesconcerningresponsibilityforeconomicloss,pureandotherwise,Christietracestheriseandfalloftheprincipleofforeseeabilityasthecontrollingprincipleinthiscontext.HethenturnstotheuseandabuseoftheforeseeabilitylimitationprincipleinAmericancases,firstintheeconomic-losscontextandtheninregardtoparent-childrecoveryforlostconsortium,showinghowtheprinciplehascausedperhapsmoreconfusionthanhelpfulguidanceinbothcontexts.ButChristierejectsthenihilist(orextremerealist)viewofprincipleasnonsense,arguinginsteadforamoremoderateposition.Becausetheverypurposeofalegalsystemistorequiredecision-makerstojustifytheirdecisionsaccordingtosomerelevantcriteria,Christiereasonsthatprinciplecanplaysomeroleinprovidingcriteriafordecision-making.Inreflectingtherichlydiversegoalsandvaluesoflife,Christiearguesthatprinciplesaremoreproperlyviewedasdevicesbywhichhumansseektoachievethegoodlifethanasultimatesorendsinthemselves.Principlesguidedecision-making;theydonotcontrolit.Hefurthercontendsthatdecisionsincomplexcasesaretoocomplicatedtobemadetodependuponsomesinglenormativeprinciple,whetherforeseeabilityorsomethingelse.Christieconcludesthatwemusthavemoremodestexpectationsofhowprinciplemayhelpthelawoftorts.

JamesGordleyinvestigatestheancientrootsoftortlawinhisessay,TortLawintheAristotelianTradition.AristotlesbriefaccountofcorrectivejusticeinNicomacheanEthics,explainsGordley,wasthestartingpointforphilosophicalanalysisoftortlawbyThomasAquinasandThomistscholarsinmedievalandearlymodernEurope.GordleyarguesthatthebroaderAristotelianconceptionoftorttheorydevelopedbyThomasandhisfollowersbetterjustifiesthelawoftortsthandothetheoriesofmoderntort-lawscholars.Beginningwithanexplanationofcorrectiveanddistributivejustice,GordleydescribeshowanAristotelian-ThomisticaccountofthedefenseofnecessityprovidesabetterexplanationofmodernAmericanandEuropeantortlawdoctrinethandointerpretationsofmodernscholars.CorrectivejusticeintheAristoteliantradition,whichaimsattherestorationofapre-existingequality,linkstheplaintiffsrightandthedefendants(p.12) duty:thedefendantmustpaybecausehehasuseduptheplaintiffsresourcesforhisownends.GordleyexplainshowAristotle,Thomas,andCajetanrested


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responsibilityforaccidentalharmonthenotionofprudence,whichentailsaweighingofrisksandprecautions,asinthemodernapproachtonegligenceexplainedbyJudgeLearnedHandinformulaictermsintheCarrollTowingcase.Gordleyargues,however,thattheAristotelian-Thomisticaccount,inwhichtheweighingofcostsandbenefitsisascribedtothemoralvirtueofprudence,ismoresatisfactorythantheaccountofmoderneconomistswhosetheoriesrestonincentivesandefficiency.AlthoughtheAristoteliantraditionneveradequatelyaddressedstrictliability,Gordleycontendsthatstrictliabilitycanbeexplainedbytheprinciplesofthattradition:anactorshouldbeliableifhechoosestouseupanothersresourcesforhisownends,forexamplebyexposingotherstoespeciallyhighrisksinordertoobtainsomebenefitforhimself.

InRight,Justice,andTortLaw,RichardWrightexploresthenormativefoundationoftortlaw.AgreeingwithErnestWeinribthatpluralisttheoriesarebynatureincoherentandindeterminate,andarguingthattheutilitarianefficiencynormofmaximizingaggregatesocialwelfareisnormativelydeficient,Wrightoffersatheoryoftortlawbasedonthesinglefoundationalnormofequalfreedom.HeelaboratesKantsconceptsoffreedomandright,notingthattheprimarypurposeofthestateunderKantiantheoryofmoralityandlawistoenforceeachpersonsbasicrightofequalfreedom.WrightthenturnstoaconsiderationofAristotlesconceptionsofcorrectiveanddistributivejustice,arguingthattheyconstitutethenegativeandpositiveaspects,respectively,oftherightofequalfreedom.Heassertsthat,assuch,theyareindependentbutcompatibleandcomprehensivetypesofjustice,withdistinctdomains,grounds,andstructures.Correctivejustice,heexplains,appliestoindividualinteractionsandrequiresthattheeffectsofsuchinteractionsontheinteractingpartiesresourcesbeconsistentwitheachpartysequalnegativefreedom,whiledistributivejusticefocusesonapersonsstatusasamemberofthepoliticalcommunityandrequiresthatthecommunitysresourcesbedistributedtopromotetheequalpositivefreedomofeachpersoninthecommunity.Wrightarguesthattortlaw,beingconcernedwithindividualinteractions,isgroundedincorrectivejustice.Heseekstodemonstratethatcorrectivejustice,withitscriterionofequalnegativefreedom,explains,justifies,andilluminatesthegeneralstructure,content,andinstitutionsoftortlaw,includingtheavailabilityofpunitivedamagesinappropriatecases.Finally,stressingthelogicalandnormativecorrelativityofrightsanddutiesandthebilateralstructureoftherightsanddutiesofcorrectivejustice,Wrightarguesthatproposedalternativestotortlaw,suchascompulsoryno-faultinsuranceschemesorat-faultriskpools,whichignorethisbilateralcorrelativity,areunjustandhenceunjustifiable.

(p.13) Inthispartofthevolume,eachoftheessaystothispointfocusesuponabstractprinciplesandvaluesthoughttounderliethelawoftorts.Intheessaythatconcludesthissection,TheIdeaofComplementarityasaPhilosophicalBasisforPluralisminTortLaw,IzhakEnglardengagesaquestiononwhichthepriorauthorshavedisagreed:whethertortlawisbestexplainedintermsofasingleprincipleorvalue,orwhetherinsteaditrestsonamultiplicityofnorms.Arguingthattherealityoftortlawispluralistic,ashesoughttoshowinanextensiveanalysisoftortpracticesinhisrecentbook,35Englardexplainsandnormativelydefendsthisthesisinhisessayhere.Unimpressedbyargumentsofmonists(suchasErnestWeinrib)andcriticallegalstudiestheorists(such


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asJackBalkin)thatpluralisticapproachesareincoherentandunintelligible,Englardclaimsthatpositivetortlawisbaseduponpolyvalentjustificationsthatinfactareoftenlogicallyincompatible.EnglardfindsjustificatorysupportforhispluralisticconceptionoftortlawinanotioncoinedcomplementaritybytheDanishphysicist(andquasi-philosopher)NielsBohrtoaddressthewave-particledualityproblemofquantummechanics.Thecomplementarityterm,explainsEnglard,wasmeanttoconveytheideathatthefullunderstandingofphysicalrealitymayrequiretheuseofcontrasting,mutuallyexclusivemodels.Bohrbelievedthatthesignificanceofcomplementarityextendedbeyondatomicphysicstootherfieldswhereitsepistemologicalimportanceforempiricalknowledgecouldbefruitfullyemployed.ExploringtheancientlineageoftheprincipleofpolardualityinsuchformsasYinandYang,Englardnotesthedifficultiesinmovingthecomplementaritynotionfromitsdescriptiveroleinexplainingphysicalrealitytotheprescriptiverealmofestablishingnormsforsociallife.Finally,Englardexplainsinavarietyofcontextshowtheidealvisionofharmonybetweencontrastingprinciples,ascapturedinthecomplementaritynotion,isahelpfulphilosophicalconceptionthatprovidesadeepenedunderstandingoftortlawproblems.

IV.PhilosophicalPerspectivesonTortLawProblemsThefocusofthisfinalpartofthevolume,PartIII,isonphilosophicnotionsatplaywithinthecontextofparticulartortlawproblems.Thesubjectoftortlawmightfairlybesaidtoinvolvethenatureandextentofanactorslegalresponsibilitytoavictimforcausingharm.Ifso,thenoneimportantpreliminaryquestionfortortlawmustbehowresponsibilityforcausingharmshouldbedefinedandlimited.Shoulditrestonlyupontheactorsmoraldesert,limitedbynotionsofblameworthinessforactingupon(p.14)choicesthatarebysomemeasurebad,asviewedexante?Orshouldtheconceptoftortresponsibilitybewidenedtoembracetheharmfulconsequencesoftheactorsconduct,includingvictimneeds,expost?Indoctrinalterms,shouldliabilitybebasedonfaultorshoulditinsteadbestrict?Andhowshouldsuchconceptsbedefined?QuestionssuchasthesearethesubjectofthefirstsectionofPartIII.Thenextsectioninthispartexploresthethreelinkingaspectsoftortlawthatservetoconnectanagentsresponsibilityandavictimsharmrisk,causation,anddamage.ThefinalsectioninPartHIconcernstheproblemofcontributoryvictimfaultthenatureofavictimsownfaultyconduct,andhowitshouldbearontheresponsi-bilityintortofanotherpersonalsoresponsibleforthecausingthevictimsharm.

A.ResponsibilityandtheBasisofLiabilityForatleastacentury,thebasisofliabilityintortlawhasbeenorderedformallyaccordingtoatripartiteresponsibilityscalebasedontheculpabilityoftheactor.Onthisbasis,tortactionsconventionallyhavebeenclassifiedintooneofthefollowingcategories:(1)intentionallyinflictedharm,(2)negligentlycausedharm,and(3)no-faultorstrictliabilityforcausingharm.Theessaysinthissectionexplorephilosophicalfoundationsoflegalresponsibilityforcausingharmtoothersfromthisvantagepoint,examiningtortlawobligationsfromtheperspectiveofoneormoreofthesethreeseparatebasesofliabilitygroundedinfault.


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Thefirstthreeessaysinthissectionexaminefundamentalaspectsofthefault-basedtheoriesofrecoveryintortintentandnegligenceeachauthorsearchinginadifferentwayforanunderstandingofthemeaningoffaultforcausingharm,inbothmoralandlegalterms.Thelasttwoessaysinthissectionfocusonresponsibilityfordangerousactivitiesandthings.Puttingtouseandtryingtocopewiththehazardsindangerousthingshasinheredinthehumanconditionsincethedawnofman.Whetherthegoalhasbeentoharnessandcontrolthedangersoffireorwildanimalsor,morerecently,ofgunpowder,reservoirs,orthepowersinherentintheproductsofmodernengineering,physics,andchemistry,thedestructivepowerofsuchthingssometimesescapesandcausesharm.Incasessuchasthese,tortlawhastendedtoturnawayfromtheexplicitlyfault-basedapproachofnegligencedoctrinetowardothertheoriesofliabilitycalledstrict.Onwhatbasisthepersonmakingorusingthedangerousthingshouldbeliableforresultingaccidentalharm,whetherstrictlyforallsuchharmormerelyformisadventuresthatresultfromfault,isaproblemthathaslongconfoundedcourtsadjudicatingtortclaimsforsuchlosses.

Beginningtheinvestigationhere,myessay,PhilosophicalFoundationsofFaultinTortLaw,inquiresintotheessentialsoffaultforcausingharmthat(p.15) supportresponsibilityforbothintentionaltortsandnegligenceandthatexplainandjustifythegreatbulkoftort-lawdoctrine.Theinquirycentersonaconsiderationofthenatureofhumanchoice,action,andharm,whichtogetherilluminatethefundamentalsofmoralresponsibilityforcausingharm.Firstconsideredfromthisperspectivearetheidealsoffreedom,equality,andcommongood.Undertheumbrellaofequalfreedom,threeprinciplesofchoicewhichIcallthechoice-endprinciple,thechoice-harmprinciple,andthechoice-blameprinciplehelpexplainthemoralqualityofharmfulhumanbehaviorinvarioustortlawcontexts.Inorderingthepertinentvalues,Iarguethattheequalfreedomethicislexicallypriortoutility,butthatutilityservesavitaldefaultfunctionthatplaysamajorroleinascertainingresponsibilityforaccidentalharm.Whentheorderinginquiryshiftsfrombehavioralidealstotheinterestssubjecttoharm,Iarguethathumanlifeandlimbareproperlyvaluedmorehighlythanproperty,wealth,andconvenienceinthecontextofintentionalharms,butthat,whenthefocusshiftstoaccidentcases,theequal-freedomethicgenerallyrequiresthatallinterestsbethrownwithoutpreferenceintothedecisionalcalculus.Finally,applyingthesevariousperspectivestothephilosophicessentialsoffaultforbothintentionalandaccidentalharm,Iconcludethatthereislittleplaceinmoraltheoryforrulesofstrictliabilityintortlaw,andthatthegreatbulkofthelawoftortsinsteadisproperlybasedonfault.Thenextessay,IntentioninTortLaw,byJohnFinnis,exploresthepar-ticularrealmofliabilityforintentionallyinflictedharm.Investigatingthenatureandsignificanceoftheconceptofintentionatworkintortlaw,FinnisarguesforacommonsenseviewoftheconceptandagainstvariousconstructiveextensionsofthenotionemployedovertheyearsbycourtsandtheRestatementofTortsthatdeprivetheconceptofitsnormativepower.Illustratingwiththespringguncaseshowmisuseoftheintentionconceptmayconfuseanalysisoftortlawproblems,heexplainsthatintentionplaysacentralroleinmoralassessmentbecauseofitsfocusonthedeliberation,proposalsforaction,andchoicethatliebehindaction.Simplystated,[w]hatoneintendsiswhatonechooses.Accordingly,hecriticizestherejectionofintentionby


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economictheoristsforfailingtocomprehenditsmoralsignificanceintortlaw.Finniscritiquestheconceptsofintention(andrelatedmotivations)inearlyHouseofLordsopinionsholdingthatabadmotive(intenttoharm)doesnotrenderotherwiselawfulconductunlawful(tortious),andhecontraststhenotionofrealintentiontotheconstructive,objectiveformulationoftheconceptembodiedintheRestatementssubstantiallycertaintoresult(alternative)definition.Commonmoralityfindsnormativesignificanceinreal(asopposedtocon-structive)intent,Finnisargues,inlargepartbecausetheprocessofactuallychoosingaresultendures,persists,andremainsinoneswill,therebyformingapermanentpartofthepersonscharacter.Forapersontochoose(p.16) toharmanotherpersonistheparadigmaticwrong,theexemplaryinstanceofdenialofright.Thecommonperceptionofintentconflictswiththeutilitarianmodel,whichallowsintentionalharmifitmaximizeswealth.Yetaprimaryfunctionofgovernment,Finnismaintains,istoapplycommutativejusticetorectifysuchintentionalharmsbyrequiringtheactortorepairthevictimsloss.Distinguishingthefairnessprinciplesofnegligencelawfromtheconceptofintent,henotestheanalogicalrelationshipbetweenthetwo.Finnisconcludesbyreiteratingthatrealintentionshouldnotbeconfusedwithartificialconceptualextensions,thatintentionasproperlyunderstoodismorallysignificant,andthatintenttoharmisapersewrong-makingfactorinanyconduct.

Turningtheinquiryfromintentionallycausedharmtoaccidentalharm,RichardWrightinhisessayhereexplorestheKantian-Aristotelianfoundationsofnegligence,themostcommonbasisofliabilityforaccidentalloss.InTheStandardsofCareinNegligenceLaw,Wrightarguesthattheequalfreedomnormisnormativelymoreattractivethanitschiefcompetitor,utilitarianefficiency,contendingthatitalsobetterexplainstheoutcomesofthenegligencecases.InafrontalassaultonJudgeLearnedHandsfamousrisk-utilityformula,whichgenerallyisthoughttoreflecttheutilitarianefficiencyapproach,Wrightarguesthattheformulaisbothanalyticallyanddescriptivelyflawed.Heexaminesvariousnon-utilitarianeffortstojustifyorcriticizetheHandformulaincludingthoseofRonaldDworkin,ErnestWeinrib,CharlesFried,GeorgeFletcher,andLeslieBenderandconcludesthatallfallintotheaggregation-of-intereststrapofutilitarianism.Identifyingthreedifferentaspectsofthestandardsofcareinnegligencelawtheriskstakenintoaccount,the(objectiveversussubjective)perspectivesapplied,andthesubstantivecriteriaofreasonablenesshearguesthateachoftheseaspectsisformulateddifferentlydependingonwhetherthedefendantsortheplaintiffsnegligenceisatissue,andthatonlytheequalfreedomtheorycanexplainandjustifythisdifferingtreatment.Wrightconcludesbysurveyingthestandardsofcareinanumberofrecurringcontextsthoseinvolvingdefendantstreatingothersasmeans,sociallyessentialactivities,premisesliability,participatoryplaintiffs,paternalisticdefendants,plaintiffsself-interestedconduct,plaintiffsself-sacrificingconduct,andfailurestoaidorrescue.Hemaintainsthat,consistentwiththeequal-freedomtheorybutnotwiththeutilitarianefficiencytheory,differentstandardsofcareareappliedinthesedifferentsituations,dependingprimarilyonwhoputwhomatriskforwhosebenefit,andonwhetherthepersonputatriskconsentedtotherisk.

InTheSeriousnessofHarmThesisforAbnormallyDangerousActivities,KenKress


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exploresthebasisofliabilityforactivitiesthatareinsomewayspeciallydangerous,activitiesthatgenerallyareclassifiedinAmericantortlawtodayasabnormallydangerous.Kresschallengestheconventional(p.17) approachtoliabilityinthiscontext,whichheviewsasbaseduponanotionofsuper-riskofexpectedharm.Bysettingliabilityonthetraditionalanalyticpillarsofexpecteddisvalue(probabilityofinjurytimesanticipatedharm)anduncommonness,theconventionalanalysismanifestsaconcernforconsequentialist,utilitarian,andefficiencyrationaleswhichKressfindsinadequateifnotunacceptable.Instead,heoffersasolutionwhichhecallstheseriousnessofharmthesis.Hisviewoftheproperbasisofliabilityinthisarea,majesticinitssimplicity,isthatthedominantfactorofimportanceisthesizeofthelossifitdoesoccurtheseriousnessofharmandonlysecondarilythe(conditional)probabilitythatlosswilloccuriftheinstrumentalityescapestheactorscontrol.Kresscriticizesutilitariancost-benefitanalysesonanumberofgrounds,andhearguesthatthemaximindecisionruleisrationallypreferableundercertaincircumstanceswhichheelaborates.Butheultimatelyrejectsmaximindecision-making,concludingthatitprovidesinsufficientjustificatorysupportforaspecialruleofstrictliabilityforabnormallydangerousactivities.Becausetheabnormallydangerousactivitiescasesarebestexplainedintermsofseriousnessofharm,Kressconcludesthatthisthesisissuperiortoconventionalanalysesofliabilityinthisbranchoftortlaw.

Inanarticleseveralyearsago,JohnAttanasioofferedanaggregate-autonomyjustificationforGuidoCal^ bresisstrictliabilityapproachtoproductsliability.36Attanasiotherearguedthattheaggregateautonomyprincipleobligatesproductmanufacturers(throughliability)andotherconsumers(throughhigherprices)tosurrendersmallamountsofwealthtoprovidecompensationtopersonsseverelyinjuredinproductaccidents.ManufacturersshouldbeliableforsuchinjuriesonastrictliabilitybasiswhentheyarethebestdecidersunderCalabresianeconomictheory,accordingtoAttanasio,inordertomaximizetheinternalizationofaccidentcoststomanufacturersandtherebypromotethegreatestaggregateautonomyinsociety.Inhispresentessay,AggregateAutonomy,theDifferencePrinciple,andtheCalabresianApproachtoProductsLiability,Attanasiofurtherexplainsanddevelopsthisthesis.WhilethewritingsofJohnRawlsprovideonlygeneral,amorphoussupportforaCalabresianstrict-liabilityapproachtoproductsliability,Rawlswork(particularlythedifferenceprinciple)didinspirethedevelopmentoftheprincipleofaggregateautonomyinboth,thebetteroffarerequiredtoassistthelessadvantaged.Thus,althoughtheaggregate-autonomytheoryisrootedpartiallyinNozickiannotionsoffreedom,thetheoryborrowsegalitarianaspectsfromRawls.Ultimately,Attanasiosays,theprincipleofaggregateautonomyseekstomaximizethenumberofindividualsinsocietywhohaveatleastsomeminimallevelofautonomy.MorethanRawlsdifferenceprinciple,(p.18) theaggregateautonomyethicseekstoprovideforthebasicneedsofaccidentvictims,anditaccomplishesthisbyexactingsmallamountsofwealthfromothermembersofsociety.Inthismanner,Attanasioconcludes,theprincipleofaggregateautonomyhelpsreconcilethefundamentaltensionbetweenlibertyandequality.

B.ConnectingAgencyandHarm:Risk,Causation,andDamage


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Thissectioninvestigatesthecomplexlinkbetweenresponsibilityandharm,alinkcomprisedofmanystrands.Atitscenteristhefundamentalconnectinginstrumentofcausationthevitalnexusthatbringstogetherintoatortanagentsmisconductandresultingharm.Viewedfromthecenter,thequestionposedisWhatcausedwhat?Causationissuesarecolored,however,byissuesofresponsibilityandharmthatconnecttoitoneitherside.So,mattersbearingonresponsibilityandriskneedfirsttobeunderstoodinordertodecideorevendefinetheissueofWhatcausedwhat?So,too,ontheotherside,tortlawmustdecidewhatcountsasharm,iftheWhatcausedwhat?questionistomakemuchsense.Allthreeaspectsofthetortlawlinkingproblemareexploredwithinthissection.

Inhisessay,Risk,Harm,andResponsibility,StephenPerryexploresthenatureofrisk,howitrelatestoharm,andultimatelyhowthetwointerconnectwithresponsibilityintortlaw.Perrybeginswithaninquiryintothetwomainconceptionsofprobabilitythatareplausiblecandidatesforunderstandingthemoralsignificanceofrisk,whichhetermstheobjectiveandepistemicconceptions.Emergingfromtherelativefrequencytheoryofprobability,themostbasicunderstandingoftheobjectiveconceptionregardsprobabilitiesasjustacertainkindofempiricalfactintheworld.Perryexplainshowtheepistemicconception,accordingtothepreferredreasonablenessaccount,viewsprobabilityjudgmentsasestimatesofobjec-tiveprobabilitiesintherelativefrequencysense.Suchjudgmentsarebasedoninductivereasoning,andtheyarealwaysrelativetoagivenbodyofevidence.Perrynextexaminesthepropositionadvancedrecentlybysometheoriststhatsubjectinganothertoariskofharm,orreducinghischanceofavoidingharm,shoulditselfbeviewedasaformofharmredressableintort.Hearguesthatlostchance,understoodsimplyasaprobabilityintherelativefrequencysense,doesnotconstituteharminitsownright,butthatlostopportunity,understoodintermsofdetrimentalreliance,mightwelldoso.Finally,Perryconsiderswhenanagentwhoseriskyconductcausesharmtoanotherbearsmoralresponsibilityfortheharm.Arguingthatsuchresponsibilityshouldbegroundedinanepistemicnotionofrisk,herejectsthelibertarianargumentthatactorsshouldbeheldmorallyaccountableforthematerializationofanyobjectiveriskstheycreate,atheorythatleadsunacceptablytoastandardofabsoluteliability.Instead,Perryfavorsa(p.19) notionofoutcome-responsibilitythatisrootedintheavoidabilityofharm.Avoidability,heargues,presupposesanepistemicviewofriskthatwouldlimitresponsibilityintorttoharmthatisforeseeable.Perryconcludesthatthisprovidesamoralbasisforbothnegligenceandrisk-basedstrictliability.

Howisthefactthatsomeactorhascausedanotherpersontosufferalossrelatedtoaresponsibilitytorepairtheloss?SoasksChristopherSchroederinCausation,Compensation,andMoralResponsibility,inwhichheexploreshowcausationrelatestoresponsibilityforharmandhowtheelementofcausationmoregenerallyfitsinthelawoftorts.Arguingthatadutytocompensateinheresinthebasicstructureoftortlaw,reflectedbythemaxim,Ifyoubreakit,youpayforit,Schroedersessayinvestigatestheelusivenessofthesearchforaconvincingmoralrationaleforthecompensationduty.Pursuingthesearchforsucharationale,hedividesthetortparadigmintoitsthree


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essentialelements(1)avictimwhosuffersanundeservedloss,(2)adeficientactor,and(3)anactionthatcausestheloss,andhesubjectseachtocertainstandardmodesofmoralevaluation.Findingeachoftheseelementsdeficientinprovidingajustificationforimposingacompensationobligationontheactor,Schroederthenexplorestheadequacyofthemorecomplexhumanagencyoutcome-responsibilitytheoriesofTonyHonor6andStephenPerry.Althoughherecognizesthataharmfuloutcomemaywellimposeresponsibilitiesbeyondsimplyacknowledgingonesagencyinproducingthatharm,Schroederfindssuchtheoriesinadequatetosupportthedutytocompensate;allthatoutcome-responsibilitycansupplyisareasonforaresponse,notforaparticularresponse,andcertainlynotforadutyfullytorectifythevictimsloss.Schroederturnsfinallytotheprincipleofequalitythatentitleseachpersontobetreatedwithequaldignityandrespect.Notingtheusefulnessofthisconceptinascertainingthefaultinessofconduct,aswhentheactorfailstorespectequallytheinterestsofthevictim,Schroederarguesthateventhispowerfulbasisforascertainingthemoralqualityofanactissimplyincapableofsupplyinginadditionarationaleforthedutytocompensate,forrequiringtheactorinparticulartorectifythevictimsloss.Hequestionswhethertheconceptofequaldignityandrespectcanbeconsistentwithdrawingthekindofsharpdistinctioncontemplatedbythedutytocompensateonthebasisofthesinglefactofcausation.Causationbyitself,hereasons,providestooslenderareedforsuchasharpdistinction.AridsoSchroederconcludesthatonemustlooksomewhereotherthancausationtofindajustificationforthedutytocompensateintortlaw.

In1959,TonyHonoreandH.L.A.Hartpublishedthefirsteditionoftheirseminalwork,CausationintheLaw?37There,theyarguedthattobeacauseofsomeevent,aprioreventmusthavebeenacausallyrelevant(p.20) conditionoftheresultingevent,inthattheprioreventwasanecessaryelementinasetofpriorandconcurrentconditionsthattogetherwassufficienttoproducetheresult.In1965,JohnMackieappliedtheHartandHonoreapproachtocausalregularitiescausalgeneralizationsoftypesofevents,ratherthanspecificeventsinatheorythatwassometimesapplicabletospecificeventsaswell.CritiquingMackiestheory,andelaboratingupontheHartandHonor6causal-relevancyapproach,RichardWrightin1985propoundedwhathetermedtheNESS(NecessaryElementofaSufficientSet)test,38anapproachtocausationthathasreceivedwideacceptanceinrecentyears.

Inhisessayoncausationhere,NecessaryandSufficientConditionsinTortLaw,TonyHonor6continuestounraveltheelusivemysteriesofcausation.TakingtheNESStestasthestandard,heexaminesvariouswaysinwhichtheNESSandbut-fortestsagreeanddiffer.Intermsoftheiragreement,Honor6explainstheimportanceoftyingtheplaintiffsharmtothedefendantsbreachofdutyratherthansimplytothedefendantsconduct,andthenecessityunderboththeoriesofformulatingandansweringcounterfactualhypotheticalquestions.Hethenexaminescontextswherethetwocausationtheoriesinterpretproblemsdifferently,sometimesproducingthesameandsometimesdifferentcausalconclusions.Fromthisperspective,Honor6exploresthreetypesofoverdeterminationcases,thoseinvolving(1)similarcausalprocessesculminatingatthesametime,(2)differentcausalprocesses,and(3)subsequentcausationofharmthatalready


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hasoccurred.Finally,heinquiresintoproblemsofindeterminacy,showingthatneithercausationtheoryadequatelyexplainsthecausalperplexitiesofhumandecision-makingandbehavior;neithercanfullyunravelthemys-teriesofwhatcaused,persuaded,orprovokedsomeonetoactashedid,butsomethinganalogoustotheideaofsufficiencycanaidourunderstanding.Honoreconcludesthatcausationisimportanttotortlawinthatithelpstoexplainpuzzlingevents,fixtheouterlimitsofsocialresponsibility,andassurethatliabilityisimposedonlyfor(unlawful)conductthathaschangedthecourseofeventsfortheworse.

TheapparentunfairnessofatortregimethatimposesfulltortliabilityuponpersonswhosemomentaryinadvertencehappenstoresultinmassivelossesisthetopicofJeremyWaldronsessay.InMomentsofCarelessnessandMassiveLoss,Waldronsinvestigationintothelogicandfairnessofthetortsystemthusexplorestheconnectionandsometimesgrossdisparitybetweenthedegreeofavictimslossandthedegreeoftheactorsfault.Pointingtotheintuitiveunfairnessofsuchasystemintermsofindividualdesert,heconsidersandrejectstheargumentthatissuesofdesertshouldbelefttothedomainofretributivejusticeandthecriminallaw,wheretheyare(p.21) morewidelyacceptedasbeingcentraltoresponsibility.Agapingdisproportionbetweenthemoralcharacterofapersonsactionsandtheconsequencesattendantthereto,Waldronargues,seemstoviolatenotionsoffairnessanddesertasmuchintortaselsewhereinthelaw.Henextexaminestheso-calledannulmenttheoryoftortlaw,wherethegoalissaidtobethesimultaneousannulmentoftheactorsgainsandthevictimslosses,andheexplainsitsinabilitytoresolvethefairnessproblemunderconsideration.Nordoesadistributivejusticefocusontheunfairnesstothevictimofsufferingthelosshelpmuch,inWaldronsview:themerefactthatanaccidentcausedadisruptioninthepriorjustdistributionofgoodsprovidesnomorereasonforforcingthedisruptionupontheactorthanleavingituponthevictim.Questioningwhetherthecausalrequirementintortlawmaynotbetoostronginlimitingtheclassofpersonsaskedtoshoulderanenormouslosstotheactorandthevictim,Waldronsuggeststhatabroaderinsuranceapproachtoaccidentlossesmaybepreferabletothelawoftorts.BorrowingthepenallotterytheoryofcriminalpunishmentproposedbyDavidLewis,Waldronexploresthepossibilityofviewingapersonsriskyactionasimposingachanceorlotteryuponpotentialvictims.Iftheactorsinadvertenceinaparticularcaseunluckilyhappenstocauseinjuryifthevictimsnumberisunluckilycalledupthenneitherfairnessnordesertwouldseemtobemuchoffendedbyplacingtheconsequencesofthelotterychosenbytheactoruponhishead.Fromthisperspective,thepurchasecostofinflictingalotteryuponothersistoaccepttheconsequencesoneself.Bysoimposingrisks(ofliability)onnegligentactorscorrespondingpreciselytotherisksthatnegligentactorsimposeonothers,evenformassivelosseswhentheydooccur,Waldronarguesthattheall-or-nothingdamageslotteryapproachoftortlawmayexplainawaytheappearanceofunfairnessinsuchliability.Evenassoviewed,however,heconcludesthatthetortsystemremainsunattractivetosocialinsuranceschemesforaddressingaccidentalloss.

Theroleoftort-lawdamagesincorrectivejusticegenerally,andfornon-pecuniarylossinparticular,isthetopicofBruceChapmansessay,Wrongdoing,Welfare,andDamages:


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RecoveryforNon-PecuniaryLossinCorrectiveJustice.Notingthatthegeneralprincipleoftort-lawdamagestraditionallyhasheldthatsuchdamagesshouldrestoretheplaintifftothepositionhewouldhaveoccupiedhadthetortnotoccurred,restitutioinintegrum,Chapmaninvestigateshowandwhythisclassicprinciple,atleastintheparticularcaseofnon-pecuniaryloss,mightbeinconsistentwithmoderntortlawtheories.Compensationtheoristsfromtheleftwouldmostliketopreservescarceeconomicresourcesforthepressingfinancialneedsofvictims,whileeconomictheoristsontherightwouldcompensatenon-pecuniarylossesonlytothelimitedextentthatpersonswouldinsure,themselvesagainstsuchlossesexante.Althoughcorrectivejusticetheory(p.22) wouldseemtorequirefullcompensationforunjustinflictionsofnon-pecuniarylossasmuchasforothertypesoflosses,Chapmanarguesthatcorrectivejustice,althoughinfactrequiringfullcompensationforthepecuniarycostsoffuturecareandfutureearningsloss,doesnotrequirecompensationfornon-pecuniaryloss.AdoptingErnestWeinribsconceptionofcorrectivejustice,whichfocusesupontheinherentcorrelativityofthedefendantsdoingandtheplaintiffssufferingofharm,Chapmanreasonsthatcorrectivejusticeshouldonlycorrectforwrongfullosseswithinthespaceofrights,andthatitshouldnototherwisebeconcernedwithavictimswelfare.Explainingthatmoneydamagessimplycannotrepairthekindofrightsdamagesufferedwhenlossesareofthenon-pecuniarykind,heclaimsthatmoneydamagesinthiscontextcanonlyservetoincreasethevictimswelfareinsomerespectwhichisirrelevanttothewrongfulact.Thus,becausecorrectivejusticedoesnotsupportcompensationforsuchlosses,hemaintainsthatnominaldamagesaloneareappropriateforthistypeofloss.Chapmanfurtherexplainsthattheargumentforverylimiteddamagesforthistypeoflossisbaseduponmoneyslackofutilityitsinabilitytorestoretheplaintiffsspecificwelfarelosswithintheambitofthedefendantswrongdoingaverydifferentmatterfromhowtheplaintiffmightactuallychoosetouseamonetaryaward.HedistinguishestheideathatmoneymayhavenoutilityinrestoringtheplaintiffslossfromMargaretJaneRadinsnotion,basedonhertheoryofcorrectivejusticeasredressratherthanrectification,thatmoneymaybeincommensurablewiththevictimsloss.Chapmanconcludesthattheconceptofthelimitedutilityofmoney,onwhichallcontemporarytorttheoriesseemtobeagreed,precludesawardinganythingbutnominaldamagesfornon-pecuniaryloss.

Oneofthemoredifficultandcontroversialareasoftortdoctrineconcernsthejudicialexclusionofliabilityforeconomiclossesofcertaintypes.Inparticular,courtsandscholarshavelongstruggledtodefinethepropercontextsinwhichthelawoftortsshouldallowrecoveryinnegligenceforpureeconomicloss.Notwithstandingmanyyearsofrigorousscrutiny,thereisstilllittleagreementonthenatureoreventhepossibilityofanunderlyingrationaleforexcludingsuchlossesfromtortrecoveryconsistentwiththeconceptionofnegligenceasdevelopedinthiscentury.InTheBasisforExcludingLiabilityforEconomicLossinTortLaw,PeterBensonboldlyentersthisquagmireofdoctrineandtheory,examiningandorderingthedifferentcategoriesofeconomiclossthroughananalysisthatseekstoremaininternaltothelawbydrawingontheveryprinciplesandconsiderationsthatarepresentinit.Incontrasttoprevailingpolicy-basedapproaches,Benson(followingRawls)proposeswhathecallsapublicbasisofjustificationthatrootstheanalysisofdoctrineinpurelyjuridicalnormativeconsiderations.Hearguesthatthere


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isasinglerationalethatexplainswhyeconomiclossclaimsareallowedinsomesituationsbutnot(p.23) inothers.Recoveryisallowed,hecontends,onlywheretheplaintiffsclaimagainstthedefendantsoundsinmisfeasance:itmustrestonlyonsuchinterestswhichtheplaintiffcanvalidlyassertinsomelegallyrecognizedmannerashisown,exclusiveofthedefendant.Onlythen,arguesBenson,willaninterestqualifyasaprotectedinterestforthepurposesoftortlaw.Throughthisanalyticalprism,theeconomiclosscasesmaybeseenasreconcilableonthebasisofafundamentalandpervasivefeatureofthegeneralconceptionofliabilityfornegligencewithoutrecoursetoconsidera-tionsofpolicyorofdistributivejustice.

C.VictimResponsibilityforHarmIttakestwotoTango,andittakesanactorandavictimtomakeatort.Avictimspresenceataplaceandtimewhenheiscollidedintobyanactorisalwaysamatterofthevictimspriorchoices,atleastinpart.Perhapsthevictimwillinglychosetoplacehimselfinadangerousspottoachieveaparticularobjective.Orperhapsthatobjective,orthevictimschoiceforsomeotherreason,orthevictimsmethodofactingtoachievetheobjectivewasabadonebysomemeasure.Thequestionexploredhere,inthisfinalsec-tionofPartIII,ishowthelawoftortsshouldmakethismeasurehowtortlawshoulddetermineifavictimsharm-producingconductwasimproperand,ifso,whetherthatfactshouldrelieveatortiousactorofresponsibility(inwholeorpart)forthevictimsharm.

Turningtheinquiryawayfromtheinjurerandtowardthevictimofanaccidentalinjury,KennethSimonsprobesthefundamentalsofcontributoryvictimfaultformsofdefenseinContributoryNegligence:ConceptualandNormativeIssues.Whileitmayseemobviousthatapersonwhocarelesslystepsintodangershouldhavehisrecoveryfordamagesagainstanegligentactorreducedoreliminatedonthebasisofhisownfault,Simonsfindsthatthegroundsforthatconclusionarefarfromobvious.Understandingtheverynotionofvictimfaultornegligence,inhisview,raisesavarietyofdifficultquestions.First,insayingthatthevictimisatfaultornegligentinfailingtotakeaparticularprecaution,dowemeanthatthevictimshouldhaveactedotherwise,thathisconductwasdeficient,andthatareductioninhisdamagesisonewaytorectifythismoralfailure?Ordoweinsteadbelievethatthevictimhadarightnottotaketheprecaution,butthathisacceptanceofadamagereductionisthelegitimatepriceofexercisingtheright?Onthelatterview,Simonsreasons,thevictimsconductwouldseemtobedevoidoffaultandsomorefairlymightbeviewedasaformofplaintiffsstrictresponsibility.Undereitherview,Simonsexplains,thevictimsdutytousereasonablecareisonlyconditional,inthatitappliesonlyifthevictimchoosestosuetheinjurer.Turningtothesubstantiverationalesforlimitingavictimsrecovery,Simonsconsiderswhetherthoserationalesjustify(p.24) applyingidenticalordistinctcriteriatovictimandinjurernegligence.Fromthisperspective,hefirstexaminestheKantianviewofnegligenceasbasedupontheinjurersunjustifiableegoismandconcludesthatitcannotexplainlimitingthevictimsrecovery.Next,heprobesbeneaththesurfacesymmetryoftheutilitarianHandformulaandfindslurkingthereanumberofproblemsofaggregationthatundermineitscoherencewhenappliedtovictimconduct.Simonsthenexaminesamoralparityapproachwhichhefindsmore


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promising,underwhichtheplaintiffisboundtoapplythesamestandardtohimselfastothedefendant.Healsoconsidersaforfeiturerationale,whichwouldjustifytheapplicationofverydifferentcriteriatovictimandinjurernegligence,thenexplorestheeffectofrelaxingtheassumptionthatthevictimposesrisksonlytohimself,andfinallyinspectstherationalesforandimplicationsoflimitingavictimsrecoveryundertheplaintiffsstrictresponsibilityapproach.Simonsconcludesthatthereasonsthatjustifyprovidingthevictimwitharemedyfortheinjurersnegligencedonotsufficetojustifylimitingtheremedyforthevictimsnegligence.

V.FromTortLawtoPhilosophyPassingtheBatonTheessaysinthisvolume(withonenotableexception)arewrittenbylawyerssearchingformeaninginthelawoftorts,lookingforanexplanationandjustificationfortheprinciplesandrulesoftortlawinanotherdiscipline,philosophy.Whilesomeinterbreedingbetweenlawandphilosophyhasoccurredoverthecenturies,bothdisciplineshaveremainedremarkablyinsulareventothisday.Oneofthegreatstrengthsofthehumanintellectisitsabilitythroughreasontoorganizefactsandconceptsintocastle-likestructuresofthemind,structuresthatthemselvescontainnumerousinterconnectedchambersofelegantlyrefinedandever-expandinginterrelationshipsofthought.Butthechambersandespeciallythecastlesofdifferentintellectualdisciplineshavethickwalls,thickenedandreinforcedoverthecenturiesagainstoutsideattack,permittingseparatecommunitiesofscholarstocontinuetoliveandthinkwithinandornamenttheirrespectivechambersandcastlesinisolatedcomfort.ButwhilethistypeofBalkanbuttressingofthoughthasinmanywaysstrengthenedtheinternalintegrityofthoughtwithintheseparatebastionsofdiscipline,theresultinginbreedingspawnsdefectsthatweakenthestructures,sometimessuperficiallybutothertimespenetratinginsidiouslytotheveryfoundationsandintegrityoftheentirecastle.

Bothlawandphilosophyovertheyearsindifferentwayshavebeenguiltyofthistypeofinsularperspective,andatleastthelawhassufferedfromit.Asperhapsistruewithalldisciplines,lawandphilosophybothinmanywayshavelongbeenover-specializedandover-technical,inboth(p.25) theirlanguageandtheirconcepts.Andascloseastortlawoughttobetomoralandpoliticalphilosophy,neitherthelawyersnorthephilosophersknowverymuchabouteachothersdiscipline.Onefunctionofthisvolume,then,maybetohelpthetwodisciplinescomealittlebittogether,inthespecificrealmofthelawoftorts.Theimportantpremisehereisthatbothdisciplinesmaybeenrichedandstrengthenedbylearningfromoneanother.Yetthiscollectioncannotmakeclaimtointerdisciplinarystatusinanyfullsense,foreachessaybutoneiswrittenbyalawyer.39Althougheachessaypurportstobeaphilosophicalstudy,eachiswrittenfromatortlawpointofview,fromtheperspectiveofwhatphilosophycandoforlaw,ofhowthelawcanbenefitfromborrowingthetypeofreflectivethoughtthatbelongstophilosophy.EventhetitleofthisForeword,WhyPhilosophyMatterstoTortLaw,unabashedlymakesthispoint.

Whiletheefforttobringtogetherthelearningofthesetwoseparatedisciplinesisnotatallaneasytask,surelyitisworththeeffort.Thisvolumecontinuestherecentmarchoftort


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lawyersintotheforeignlandofphilosophy,ajourneybeguninearnestlessthanaquartercenturyagoandonlyveryrecentlyacquiringanynumbersorsenseofrealdirection.Withafertile(perhapsmilitaristic)imagination,onemightcloseoneseyesandenvisionaplatoonofacademiclawyersmarchingoutoftheCastleofLawacrossthemeadowsandintotheCastleofPhilosophy.Nowthatthelawyer-invadershavesurveyedthephilosophicbootyontheinside,andpickedandchosenaccordingtoeachonestaste,theyhavemarchedbacktotheirownlandstoproclaimhowthephilosophiccuriositiestheyhavepilferedmaybeusedtofortifytheCastleofLaw.

Theessaystothispointinthevolumeoffersuchthoughtsfromtortlawtheoristsonhowphilosophymayhelpdeterminewhattortlawis,whatitshouldbedoing,andhowitmaybetteraccomplishitsobjectives.InthevolumesAfterword,WhatHasPhilosophytoLearnfromTortLaw?,BernardWilliamsturnsaphilosopherseyebackintheotherdirection,withalookathowphilosophymaybenefitfromexaminingthelawoftorts.Williamspostulatesthatlawgenerally,andtortlawinparticular,mightbeofinteresttophilosophersinprovidingalaboratoryforstudyinginstancesofproblem-solvingunderpressure,wherethecommunitymustdecideinapracticalandconclusivewaywhattodoabouttheconsequencesofintentionaloraccidentalharm.Inthismanner,thestrengthofconceptsanddis-tinctionsaretestedbythelawinacrucibleofrealityinawaythatphilosophicalreflectioncannotdoalone.HecharacterizesthisperspectiveasthePicture,thatthelawmightremindphilosophyofrealitybyrevealingdistinctionsrecognizabletocommonsenseunderpressurewheremuchturnsontheoutcome.WilliamsanticipatesthatthePicturemaybesubject(p.26) totwoprincipalobjections.Firstisthatthisviewoverestimatestheeffectsoflegalconceptsappliedbyargumentwithinthelegalprocessthatcasesaredecidedonthebasisofvaluesexternaltothelaw,suchasutilityorwealthmaximization,andthatthelegalconceptsexplicitlyapplied(suchasnegligenceandproximatecausation)aremerelydecorativerationalizations.ThesecondobjectionisthatthePictureunderestimatestheseparatenessoftheconceptsandprocessesofthelawfromcommonsense,suchthatthelawsspecialistwaysofthinkingaretooremovedfromthekindsofextra-legalthoughtofinteresttophilosophytoprovideinsightsinthislatterrealm.

WilliamsfindsthatneitherobjectionisfataltothePicture,fortortlawnecessarilyforcestheresolutionofissuesoffaultandresponsibility,particularlyintermsoftheagentsstateofmindandthedirectnessoftheconnectionbetweenthatstateofmindandtheresultingharmfulconsequences.Whileheobjectstoattemptstogroundeverydaymoralityinethicaltheory(especiallyinaunifiedmonistictheory),heacknowledgestheimportancetoaliberalsocietyofexplainingtheapplicationofpower,whichincludesacourtsapplicationoftortlawrulestoresolvedisputes.Forthispurpose,thetheorygeneratedbyphilosophicalreflectionmayhelpbothexplainandimprovethelaw.Althoughthiswayoflookingatthematterlargelyturnsitbackaround,intooneofhowphilosophycanhelpthelaw,Williamsreasonsthatthisbacksideofhisquestioninheresinphilosophysexplorationofwhatthelawistryingtodo.Findingnotionsofresponsibilityandthevoluntary(includingTonyHonorsnotionofoutcomeresponsibility)interestingtophilosophy,hecautionsagainstpushingtoohardfordeepandadequatetheoriesofthe


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voluntaryandmoralresponsibility.WilliamsconcludesthatthereistruthinthePicture,thatthelawprovidesinsightsintotheconceptsofphilosophyunderextremeconditions,andheobservestheimportanceofarrivingatanadequatetheory(providedbylawandphilosophytogether)ofhowphilosophicalconceptsworkinlaw.

BernardWilliamsessayservesmorethanasadecorativebookendfromamemberofadifferentdisciplineforavolumeofessaysabouttheoriesofthelawofprivatewrongs.Surelyitdoesprovideimportantclosinginsightsofinteresttolegalscholarsonthereciprocalinterestsofthedisciplineofphilosophyinvokedbyeachofthelawyerswritingabouttortlawtheory.Butevenmoreimportantly,itservesasanopeningoffertothephilosopherstoenterthefray,tojoinbattlewiththelawyers,andengagethelawoftorts.AsWilliamsmakesclear,focusingontherelationshipbetweenphi-losophyandtortlawrevealsnumerouswaysinwhichphilosophycancometotherescueofthisareaofthelaw.Andwhiletortlawmightnotrequirerescue40byphilosophers,itcertainlycouldmakegooduseofit.Manyofthephilosophicalconceptsinvokedbythelawyersinthisvolume,suchas(p.27) notionsoffreewill,utility,andtruth,havebeenrejectedbymanymodernphilosophersastheoreticallysuspectandoutmoded.If,indeed,suchconceptshavenophilosophicvaluefortortlawproblems,iftheycannotmeaningfullyhelplawyersunderstandhowthecontentoftort-lawdoctrineshouldbeframed,thensurelyitisthephilosophersjobtoprovethispointandtoteachthelawyershowinsteadtoaddressthekindsofissuestheyconfrontinthelawoftorts.

OnemaysenseacertainskepticisminBernardWilliamsessayaboutthestrengthoftheunderlyingrelationshipbetweenlawandphilosophy,acertainacceptanceoftheseparatenessofthetwodisciplines;thereisnopersuasiveevidenceintheessaythatheperceivesanimportantfoundationallinkbetweenthetwo.Thiscontrastsquitesharplywiththeperspectivesofmostofthelawyerswritinginthevolumewhoeitherargueexplicitlyorpostulateimplicitlythatthelawoftortsisconstructeduponphilosophicalfoundations.Perhapsthisismerelywishfulthinkingofthedoersofashallowdisciplinelawhopingtogivehistoricalandintellectuallegitimacytoacraftthathasservedformostofitsexistenceaslittlemorethanakindofwindowdressingtogussyuptherawexerciseofpower.Ormaybethetortlawyerssoonerthanthephilosophershavesensedafundamentalinterrelationshipthatreallydoesexistbetweenthetheoreticalandpracticaldisciplinesofhowpeopleoughttoandmusttreatoneanotherintheworld.Almostalltheessaysinthisvolumearecommittedtothelatterview,andonemaysenseanimplicit(perhapsbegrudging)discoveryofatleastalit-tleofitstruthintheprogressionofanalysisinWilliamsessay.

Whetherthesuspicionsofmanymodernphilosophersaboutthevalidityandusefulnessofmoraltheorizingderivemerelyfromthetrendsofskepticismandnihilismpervadingmanydisciplinesinthetwentiethcentury,orwhethertheyderiveinsteadfromtruevacuousnessinsuchconcepts,isdifficulttoknow.Butknowwemust,iflaworphilosophyinactionistounderstanditself.Theimportanceofthecurrentstudyisthatsuchphilosophicalsuspicions,justasthetortlawyersgrandtheories,canbetestedwithspecialreliability,asWilliamsargues,inthereal-worldlaboratoryofthelawoftorts.More


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thananyotherareaofthelaw,tortlawoffersexamplesofhowpeopleshouldandshouldnottreateachotherexamplesfromnearlyeverycontextofharmfulhumaninteraction.Fromsuchmyriadsituations,tortlawalsoraisesimportantissuesofhowthecommunityshoulduseitspowertorespond,throughtheprivatelawofcivilwrongs,tocomplaintsofpersonshurtbyotherhumanbeings.Howthelawoftortsdealswithsuchissues,andhowitoughttodealwiththem,certainlyshouldbemattersofinteresttophilosophers.

Surelystumbling,thetortlawyershaveruntheopeninglap,andthebatonhasnowbeenpassed.

Notes:(1)OnesuchtravellerwasHarvardLawSchooldean,JamesBarrAmes:[T]hespiritofreformwhichduringthelastsixhundredyearshasbeenbringingoursystemoflawmoreandmoreintoharmonywithmoralprincipleshasnotyetachieveditsperfectwork.ItisworthwhiletorealizethegreatethicaladvanceoftheEnglishlawinthepast,ifonlyasanencouragementtoeffortforfurtherimprovement:JamesBarrAmes,LawandMorals,22HARV.LREV.97,113(1908).ConsideralsotheobservationofProfessorIsaacs:Ourprogresshasbeenmarkedintwowaysbythehighermoralnotionstowhichweseektoadaptourlaw,andbyagreaterabilitytoadaptthelawtoanygivenmoralnotion:NathanIsaacs,FaultandLiability,31HARV.LREV.954,978(1918).Otherscholarsalsoexploredthedepthsoftortlawjustificationsalongtheway.See,e.g.,ClarenceMorris,RoughJusticeandSomeUtopianIdeas,24HARV.LREV.730(1929);GlanvilieWilliams,TheAimsoftheLawofTort,4CURRENTLEGALPROB.137(1951);Rev.FrancisE.Lucey,LiabilityWithoutFaultandtheNaturalLaw,24TENN.LREV.952(1957);RobertE.Keeton,ConditionalFaultintheLawofTorts,72HARV.LREV.401(1959).

(2)R.H.Coase,TheProblemofSocialCost,3J.L.&ECON.1(1960).

(3)GUIDOCALABRESI,THECOSTSOFACCIDENTS(1970);GuidoCalabresi,SomeThoughtsonRiskDistributionandtheLawofTorts,70YALEL.J.499(1961).SeealsoGuidoCalabresi&DouglasMelamed,PropertyRules,LiabilityRules,andInalienability:OneViewoftheCathedral,85HARV.L.REV.1089(1972).

(4)C.RobertMorris,Jr.,EnterpriseLiabilityandtheActuarialProcessTheInsignificanceofForesight,70YALEL.J.554(1961).

(5)RichardA.Posner,ATheoryofNegligence,1J.LEGALSTUD.29(1972).Scholarshiponthemoralandlegaldimensionsofeconomictheorydeepenedinthe1970s.See,e.g.,KENNETHJ.ARROW,THELIMITSOFORGANIZATION(1974);RICHARDA.POSNER,ECONOMICANALYSISOFLAW(1972).

(6)See,e.g.,WilliamM.Landes&RichardA.Posner,ThePositiveEconomicTheoryofTortLaw,15GA.L.REV.851(1981).CulminatingperhapsinWILLIAMM.LANDES&RICHARDA.POSNER,THEECONOMICSTRUCTUREOFTORTLAW(1987);STEPHENSHAVELL,ECONOMICANALYSISOFACCIDENTLAW(1987).


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(7)Notethecomplaintsofacoupleofscholarsatthetimethatthelawhas"gonea-whoringafterfalsegods"andthatalloftheravingaboutlossabsorptionhasblindedlawyerstotheobviousconcernoftortlawwithrightandwrong:EdwardVeitch&DavidMiers,AssaultontheLawofTort,38M.L.R.139,1423(1975)(quotingWeir).SeeEdwardVeitch,BookReview,22NIR.LQ560,563(1971)(complainingthattorttheoristsasagrouphavebeenledbythenosebyeconomiststoolong).

(8)5HARV.L.REV.537(1972).

(9)2J.LEGALSTUD.151(1973),followedbyhisDefensesandSubsequentPleasinaSystemofStrictLiability,3J.LEGALSTUD.165(1974).

(10)71J.PHIL.473(1974).Colemanpublishedseveralmoreessaysontorttheoryinthe1970s,includingJulesL.Coleman,TheMoralityofStrictTortLiability,18WM.&MARYL.REV.259(1976).

(11)DuringwhichtimeGlanvilleWilliamsandB.A.HepplepublishedFOUNDATIONSOFTHELAWOFTORT(1976),MarshallShapopublishedTHEDUTYTOACTTORTLAW,POWER,&PUBLICPOLICY(1977),andGuidoCalabresiandPhilipBobbittpublishedTRAGICCHOICES(1978).SeealsoJohnBorgo,CausalParadigmsinTortLaw,8J.LEGALSTUD.419(1979);RichardA.Epstein,NuisanceLaw:CorrectiveJusticeanditsUtilitarianConstraints,8J.LEGALSTUD.49(1979).

(12)9J.LEGALSTUD.27(1980).SeealsoIzhakEnglard,CanStrictLiabilityBeGeneralized?,2OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.245(1982).

(13)90YALEL.J.247(1980).Alsoin1980wasDavidG.Owen,RethinkingthePoliciesofStrictProductsLiability,33VAND.L.REV.681(1980),andWilliamH.Rodgers,Jr.,NegligenceReconsidered:TheRoleofRationalityinTortTheory,54So.CAL.L.REV.1(1980).ThenextyearwitnessedGaryT.Schwartz,TheVitalityofNegligenceandtheEthicsofStrictLiability,15GA.L.REV.963(1981),and1982sawPeterCane,JusticeandJustificationsforTortLiability,2OXFORDJ.LEGALSTUD.30(1982).

(14)JulesL.Coleman,MoralTheoriesofTorts:TheirScopeandLimits,PartsI&II,1LAW&PHIL.371(1982);2LAW&PHIL.5(1983).SeealsoJulesColeman,CorrectiveJusticeandWrongfulGain,11J.LEGALSTUD.421(1982).

(15)ErnestJ.Weinrib,TowardaMoralTheoryofNegligenceLaw,2LAW&PHIL.37(1983).

(16)GeorgeP.Fletcher,TheSearchforSynthesisinTortTheory,2LAW&PHIL.63(1983).

(17)ValuesintheLawofTort:ASymposium,PartI,1LAW&PHIL.369(1982)(withanIntroductionbyMichaelBaylesandBruceChapman,andessaysbyJulesColeman,TheodoreBenditt,JosephSteiner,andS.C.CovalandJ.C.Smith);PartII,2LAW&PHIL.3(1983)(withanIntroductionbyMichaelBaylesandBruceChapman,andessaysby


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JulesColeman,ErnestWeinrib,GeorgeFletcher,andRobertPrichardandAlanBrudner).

(18)See,e.g.,StevenD.Smith,RhetoricandRationalityintheLawofNegligence,69MINN.L.REV.277(1984).

(19)See,e.g.,RONALDDWORKIN,LAWSEMPIRE(1986)ch.8;SymposiumonCausationintheLawofTorts,63CHI.-KENTL.REV.397(1987)(withaForewordbyMarioRizzo,articlesbyErnestWeinrib,JulesColeman,JudithJarvisThomson,MichaelMoore,RobertCooter,RichardWright,MarkKelman,AlanSchwartz,andanAfterwordbyRichardEpstein).Therewereaswellanumberofimportantbooksandarticlesontorttheorythatappliedphilosophicalprinciplestotortlawproblems,butlessformally.Forexample,seeMarshallS.ShaposTOWARDSAJURISPRUDENCEOFINJURY:THECONTINUINGCREATIONOFASYSTEMOFSUBSTANTIVEJUSTICEINAMERICANTORTLAW(1984)(reporttotheABA),andGuidoCalabresisIDEALS,BELIEFS,ATTITUDES,ANDTHELAW(1985).

(20)JOHNRAWLS,ATHEORYOFJUSTICE(1971).

(21)ROBERTNOZICK,ANARCHY,STATE,ANDUTOPIA(1974).

(22)See,e.g.,JOELFEINBERG,DOINGANDDESERVING(1970);J.Feinberg,HarmandSelf-interest,inLAW,MORALITY,ANDSOCIETYESSAYSINHONOUROFH.L.A.HART(P.M.S.Hacker&J.Raz(eds.),1977),285.

(23)See,e.g.,JUDITHJARVISTHOMSON,ACTSANDOTHEREVENTS(1977);JUDITHJARVISTHOMSON,RIGHTS,RESTITUTION,ANDRISK(1986);JUDITHJARVISTHOMSON,THEREALMOFRIGHTS(1990).

(24)Alsoduringthe1980s,tortlawwascritiquedfromavarietyofperspectivesincludingMarxism,theCriticalLegalStudiesmovement,pragmatism,andfeminism.See,e.g.,THEPOLITICSOFLAW(DavidKairys(ed.),1982);RichardL.Abel,ASocialistApproachtoRisk,41MD.L.REV.695(1982);LeslieBender,ALawyersPrimeronFeministTheoryandTort,38J.LEGALEDUC.3(1988);DavidM.Engel,TheOvenBirdsSong:Insiders,Outsiders,andPersonalInjuriesinanAmericanCommunity,18LAW&SOCYREV.551(1984);DuncanKennedy,DistributiveandPaternalistMotivesinContractandTortLaw,withSpecialReferencetoCompulsoryTermsandUnequalBargainingPower,41MD.L.REV.563(1982);StephenD.Sugarman,DoingAwaywithTortLaw,73CAL.L.REV.555(1985),elegantlycritiquedinDavidG.Owen,DeterrenceandDesertinTort,73CAL.L.REV.665(1985).

(25)JULESL.COLEMAN,RISKSANDWRONGS(1992).

(26)15HARV.J.L.&PUB.POLY621(1992)(withaForewordbyLarryAlexanderandarticlesbyJulesColeman,MargaretJaneRadin,RandyBarnett,JeanHampton,DavidGauthier,StevenWalt,EmilySherwin,KennethSimons,ChristopherWonnell,RichardCraswell,AlanSchwartz,RichardArneson,StephenPerry,andClaireFinkelstein).


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(27)77IOWAL.REV.403(1992)(withanIntroductionbyKenKress,anarticleandcommentbyErnestWeinrib,andarticlesbyJulesColeman,StephenPerry,PeterBenson,RichardWright,AnitaAllenandMariaMorales,DennisPatterson,JohnStick,RichardHyland,MarlenaCorcoran,andStevenHeyman).

(28)16HARV.J.L.&PUB.POLY579(1993)(withaForewordbyDennisPatterson,anarticleandresponsebyErnestWeinrib,andcommentsbyStephenPerry,JeanLove,andKenKress).

(29)TORTTHEORY(KenCooper-Stephenson&ElaineGibson(eds.),1993)(withessaysbythefollowingCanadianlegalscholars:ErnestWeinrib,StephenPerry,KenCooper-Stephenson,BruceChapman,J.C.Smith,LucieLiger,ElaineGibson,KateSutherland,TedDecoste,AllanHutchinsonandRobertMaisey,DanielJutras,LakshmanMarasinghe,DavidCohen,andBruceFeldthusen).

(30)IZHAKENOLARD,THEPHILOSOPHYOFTORTLAW(1993).

(31)Englardalsoexaminesspecificareasoftortlawpractice,addressingphilosophicissuesinsuchareasasdefamation,informedconsent,punitivedamages,economicloss,andmasstorts.Importantlyintermsofthepresentvolume,Englardoutlinesinhisbookthepluralisticcomplementaritytheoryoftortlawwhichhefurtherdevelopshere.

(32)ERNESTJ.WEINRIB,THEIDEAOFPRIVATELAW(1995).

(33)Epistemology,thephilosophyofknowledge,helpsinamorelimitedfashiontoinformtheconnectionbetweenriskandresponsibility,asStephenPerryexplainsinhisessayinPartIII.

(34)RichardA.Posner,Utilitarianism,Economics,andLegalTheory,8J.LEGALSTUD.103(1979);RichardA.Posner,TheEthicalandPoliticalBasisoftheEfficiencyNorminCommonLawAdjudication,8HOFSTRAL.REV.487(1980).HecontinuedtheinquiryinRICHARDA.POSNER,THEECONOMICSOFJUSTICE(1981),chs.3&4andRICHARDA.POSNER,THEPROBLEMSOFJURISPRUDENCE(1990),chs.12&13,andinvestigatedtheparticulardomainoftortlawinWILLIAMM.LANDES&RICHARDA.POSNER,THEECONOMICSTRUCTUREOFTORTLAW(1987).

(35)IZHAKENGLARD,THEPHILOSOPHYOFTORTLAW(1993).

(36)JohnB.Attanasio,ThePrincipleofAggregateAutonomyandtheCalabresianApproachtoProductsLiability,74VA.L.REV.677(1988).

(37)Theworkisnowinitssecondedition.H.L.A.HART&TONYHONORE,CAUSATIONINTHELAW(2dedn1985).

(38)RichardWright,CausationinTortLaw,73CAL.L.REV.1735(1985).

(39)Althoughanumberoftheauthorshavereceivedformaltraininginphilosophy,allbut


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BernardWilliamsareteachersofthelaw.

(40)Yaniav.Bigan,155A.2d343(Pa.1959);Note,AComparativeStudy,52COLUM.L.REV.631(1952)(examininggeneralno-duty-to-rescueruleofAnglo-Americantortlaw).

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Foreword Why Philosophy Matters to Tort Law