FOREWORD - CEAS Serbia · 2019. 2. 9. · This is the target of Russian state security agencies. Dagestani, in 2012 Russian intelligence gave him new passport, new name and ticket

For three years Ukraine has been standing on the front line in the conflict with Russia. This front line stretches not only across the Crimean Peninsula and Donbass but to other regions beyong Ukraine.

Today Kremlin is trying to use elements of hybrid war everywhere: in Europe, Middle East, Central Asia, North Africa and America.

Many people do not understand the motives, or logic behind the actions, further steps. Often such strategy seems to be illogical, full of emotions and unpredictable. But it is not like that. Russia is pushed ahead by the desire to restore the greatness of empire at any price. This desire is multiplied by internal economic problems inside Russia.

For successful forecasting the future actions of the Kremlin, one should thoroughly investigate the lifestyle within the Russian Society, study the Sociopolitical undercurrents facilitating policies, and the mentality or reasonability of the Russian elites.

In Ukraine, we know better we have lived to long under the reign of the Russian empire, and ultimately paid a high price for the knowledge acquired.

This paper is about one more front line that Kremlin did not declare publicly to the world. Russia traditionally has interests in the Middle East and the Central Asia. The share of Muslim population in Russia is still growing. This process stimulates spreading of radical religious thoughts.

Such cocktail of internal problems and foreign policy ambitions has reccessitated the policy position of Russia.

Now, we stand at the precipice of time, with the Russian destructive aggression view. This would ultimately spread to other parts of the world. I hope this piece of work by Ukrainian experts, specializing in Russian studies helps to provide a timely warning.

FOREWORD

Russia’s communication and collaboration with terrorist organizations in the Middle East

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The US National Council on intelligence in its 2012 “Global trends 2030: Alternative worlds” report considers the reduction in number of ethnic Russians and growth in the number of Muslims in the state to be the main demographic challenge for Russia. As of today, Russia has approximately 20 million Muslims, their number will increase by 19% by 2030. This trend will lead to the social tension growth and ethic and religious conflicts inside Russia. Damir Muhetdinov, the first deputy Head of Muslim’s Spiritual Administration of the Russian Federation claimed that in 2050 the President of Russia might be a Muslim in view of the dominance of Muslim population.

The situation and risks of violence in Caucasus on the ISIS activity background in the Middle East, extreme high unemployment rate in the Caucasus region, like Ingushetia (30.7% in August this year), Chechnya (17.1%) and Karachaevo-Cherkessia (15.2%) makes it vital for Kremlin to reduce threats and the level of tensions and

protests, especially among the local youth. It is also interested in the control over the Muslim community and its psycological condition.

The process of detection and isolation of those believers who are ready to follow radical Islamic ideology, Jihad and to join terrorist organizations, is the priority of Russian security agencies. The large territory of Muslim residence and their growing number make it impossible to use the standard practice of surveillance via agent network effectively. Thus, the authorities use the method of testing believer’s individual adherence to radical Islam and views through provocative propaganda in mosques that are under their control.

Nowadays, Russian authorities use radical Muslim ideology and communication channels with terrorist groups abroad to reduce the number of extremist elements, potential jihadists and supporters of radical Islam inside Russia. The Kremlin can minimize internal threats through the export of fighters from radical Muslims areas of Russia outside its boundaries.

Russian military and political leadership have resorted to the expelling of extremist elements out of the state borders in order to minimize the risks within its territory and create trouble spots in other parts of the world, thus fulfilling its geopolitical and military tasks.

Russian state establishment has got communication channels with main terrorist groups in the Middle East and Central Asia including Al Qaeda and ISIS, likely to be used by Kremlin to coordinate efforts in order to fulfill foreign and internal policy goals. Through this channels Moscow provides the outflow of radical elements from Russia to local conflict zones abroad to minimize internal risks concerning the Muslims in the country.

In November 2012, a case spreading of extremist literatures was filed against Mufti Gabdoonur Kamalutdin, who handed it over to a serviceman of one of the military units in Kirov region.

In December 2012, banned literatures in the mosque of one of the settlements of Myrninsky district was confiscated from Mufti Musa Sagov in Yakutia.

Musa Kamurzoev, the imam of the Chita mosque, recruited into terrorist organizations (including military servicemen of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation), and was accused of acquiring explosives.

In March 2009, Muhammadgali Khuzin, Mufti of Perm Krai, claimed that extremist literature was sold in some mosques of Moscow.

Haji Khudzhaev, the imam of the Ishim community of Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Asian Part of Russia, was put on the international wanted list for crimes aimed at violent upheaval in Uzbekistan.

In 2004, Yusuf-Dmitriy Petrichenko, the imam of the village of Singhul Tatarsky (Tyumen region), was charged with disseminating extremist literature and preparing terrorist attacks.

On May 30, 2007, the city court of Pyatigorsk found Abdulla-Anton Stepanenko, the imam of the local mosque, was found guilty under Article 282 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation (received the support of Ravil Gaynutdin).

On April 16, 2008, Ordzhonikidzevsky Ufa Court found Imam Said Baiburin (Muslim Spiritual Directorate of the Republic of Bashkortostan and member of the Council of Muftis of Russia) guilty of public calls for extremist activity.

On May 27, 2013, the court of Novosibirsk sentenced two imams of Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Asian Part of Russia, Ilkhom Merazhov and Kamil Odilov to imprisonment for extremist propaganda.

In July 2013, two imams of the Council of Muftis, Sergeant Svatov and

Haidar-Ali Bugusynov were accused of recruiting into terrorist groups in the Altai.

The Mufti Council of Russia, established in 1996, promotes radical ideology in communities under its control to detect the most dangerous or ready to jihad-ready-believers among the citizens. In 2008, a high profile case of the MCR publishing extremist literature took place in Russia.

There are multiple proofs of the distribution of jihadist literature in mosques by the Council controlled Muftis. The adherence to radical Islam triggered the criticism of the Mufti Council of Russia by the media and even earned the opposition of several Muftis sticking with traditional Islam.

Here are some examples of extremist activities of the MCR Muftis within the territory of Russia:

OSINT Report 5

RUSSIAN TIES WITH ISIS

As of 2017, a number of Muftis have been noticed displaying sympathy for radical groups: Nafigulla Ashirov (Hizb ut Tahrir), Ali Evteev (Muslim Brotherhood), Mukaddas Bibarsov (Tablighi Jamaat), Nafigulla Ashirov, Hayaz Fatkullin (The Nur Movement).

Reportedly, the authorities of detention facilities encourage the recruitment of the people convicted of serious crimes into the ranks of ISIS.

Thus, on the basis of data analysis, it can be argued that Russian security agencies directly encourage and facilitate the departure of radical Islamists abroad. For example, Sharapudinov, 38, told Reuters that in December 2012 Russian intelligence officers presented him with an unexpected offer. If he agreed to leave Russia, the authorities would not arrest him. In fact, they would facilitate his departure. “They said: ‘We want you to leave.’ Sharapudinov agreed to go. A few months later, he was given a new passport in a new name, and a one-way plane ticket to Istanbul. Shortly after arriving

in Turkey, he crossed into Syria and joined an Islamist group Sabri Jamaat that would later pledge allegiance to radical Sunni group Islamic State. Reuters has identified five other Russian radicals who, relatives and local officials say, also left Russia with direct or indirect help from the authorities and ended up in Syria1. The scheme continued until at least 2014, according to acting and former officials as well as relatives of those who left. The departure of Dagestani radicals in large numbers made the situation in the republic healthier.” Magomed Abdurashidov, said Anti-terrorist Commission of Makhachkala.


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The head of the Mufti Council, Ravil Guynutdin, starting from the beginning of 1990s, developed close ties with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) Embassy in Russia and he is a consistant defender of Wahhabis ideology in Russia, effectively counteracting attempts to ban Wahhabis on the state legislative level. In early 1990s, he started receiving financial support from such Saudi structures as Inrahim-bin-Ibrahim Fund, Hayat ul-Igasa etc.

In 2008, he claimed that listing the extremist materials forbidden for distribution in the Russian Federation, as well as a number of Muslim books, violated the freedom of conscience. According to the statement of Mufti of Perm Krai Khuzin, the Chairman of the Council of Muftis of Russia Ravil Gainutdin repeatedly questioned the legality of including a number of extremist books in the list of banned literature, and a significant part of the materials on this list was published under the stamp of the Council of Muftis.

Damir Muhetdinov, the first deputy Head of the Muslim Spiritual Administration of the Russian Federation and the person responsible for Crimea, is adherent of Wahhabism ideology despite the official position of Russian state policy on Wahhabism. In fact, his chief in the Muslim’s Spiritual Administration of Russia is Ravil Guynutdin, the same person who manages the Mufti Council of Russia. But even after the Second Chechen War and multiple counter-terrorist operations in the country nobody from the Council or its Muftis were arrested for extremist propaganda and radical Islamism despite of scandals, evidences and publications in the media. This can be a strong indirect proof of links between the Council and the security agencies of Russia.

It is important to underline that Wahhabi imams in Central Asia were favored in the time of the Soviet Union by state security structures because of their foreign origin/education and lack of communication with local tribes.

Other proofs of the Council’s direct and indirect links with state security agencies of the Russian Federation are:

• all those who received Islamic education in Uzbekistan madrasah in Bukhara during Soviet Union period were linked with KGB;

• some of Council members were participants in the state negotiations during Soviet period on quota of KGB;

• Ravil Guynutdin regularly visited Crimea in March, 2014 after annexing the peninsula to suppress the opposition movements of Crimean Tatars against the Russian invasion. It was impossible without coordination and approval with FSB;

• the deputy of the Council’s Head Tagir Haji Galyamov is the member of the Civil Chamber of Russia Ministry of defense (MoD);

• Emirali Ablaev, the head of Muslim Spiritual Administration of Crimea, is trying to reassign Crimean Tatars religious community and to distance them from Crimean Tatars Majilis’s leader Mustafa Djamilev. This is the target of Russian state security agencies.

Dagestani, in 2012 Russian intelligence gave him new passport, new name and ticket to join Sabri Jamaat (the part of ISIS). Photo by REUTERS/Maria Tsvetkova, Dec. 2015.

Saadu Sharapudinov

OSINT Report 7

Official statements indicate that some elements among believers in mosques and suspected of supporting jihad were arrested at the Council’s prompting. But according to official data (September, 2015) of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 1,800 Russian citizens were fighting on the side of ISIS forces2.

For example, “Jaish al-Muhajireen wal-Ansar” group ( )

under the command of Abu Umar al-Shishani was almost entirely brought up to strength by the citizens of the Russian Federation (300-400 people, 2013). In 2012, this group merged with ISIS.

Another statement by this law enforcement body for October this year named 2,500 fighters.

Admittedly 40-50% of them were expelled to Syria and Iraq via resources, and communication channels under control of the Mufti Council of Russia. Evidently, Moscow is interested in the elimination of these jihadist followers through military conflicts abroad. Parallel to this, the number of terrorist attacks inside Russia has reduced after the development of this ‘export channels’.

The Mufti Council of Russia plays the role of connecting link between Russian state security agencies and radical (terrorist groups) abroad. According to Tanay Cholkhanov, who was

the member of pro-Russian battalion Vostok (separatist unit of so called Donetsk People’s Republic) and former press-secretary of the Mufti Council of Russia in Crimea, the Council is partially financed by such foreign organizations3 as:

• The World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), based in KSA.

• The Muslim World League (WML) based in KSA.

WAMY branch in USA was opened in 1992 by Abdullah bin Laden (nephew of Osama bin Laden) and soon closed and banned by authorities. In 1990s WAMY actively worked with Deen Dar Anjuman who recruited mercenaries to fight in Kosovo, Bosnia and Chechnya. According to “Terrorism, Al Qaeda, and the Muslim World; The Challenge Within the Muslim World”, July 9th, 2003 by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, WAMY is involved in religious and Jihadi training for its member organizations.

WAMY’s secretary general Nazir Qureshi according to the Indian government statements was the key-person who organized financial aid channels to Hizbul Mujahideen, operated in Kashmir. The Indian government contends that 90 percent of the funding for Kashmir militants is from other countries and Islamic organizations like the World Association of Muslim Youth.


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According to the Indian magazine “Frontline” (11th December, 2002), Mohammed Ayyub Thukar, President of the World Kashmir Freedom Movement was affiliated with Muslim World League, WAMY, and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since 2004, WAMY established links with Ansar Al-Islam (Iraq) organization. In August 29th, 2014 it made an alliance with ISIL forces. Ansar Al-Islam also has an alliance with jihadist Al-Nusra Front in Syria. The WAMY also has the only Pakistani-based Jamiat Taleba Arabia organization. The members of the Jamiat Taleba

Arabia fought under the umbrella of Gulbadin Hakmatyar’s Hizbe Islami in Afghanistan and, in Occupied Kashmir, under the discipline of the hizbul Mujahideen. It is important that Farid Asadullin, the advisor to the Head of the Mufti Council of Russia was a member of negotiation group of Moscow with Hakmatyar.

The Mufti Council of Russia also received financial support from Muslim World League.This organization is tied to Abu Sayaf (Philippines) that is close to ISIL and Muslim Brotherhood, banned in the US.

So, the Russian establishment has opportunities, contacts and existing communication channels with different terrorist groups in the Middle East, including factions of ISIS, if needed for foreign policy and military operations. The period of communication via these channels (since 1990s) and number of fighters from Russia in the Middle East corroborates the claims of the existence of communication, at least, on the level of factions’ commanders.

In November 2015, the head of the Cabinet of the unrecognized republic of Ichkeria, Akhmed Zakayev, stated in his interview4: “I have already got 100% proof that ISIS is currently controlled by Russian security agencies. This is the part of Iraqi militaries who worked under Saddam. You know, they were allies of Putin and the KGB. And another part from North Caucasus, whom they sent there as soon as the so-called ISIS started to shape up. This is a network of agents who are influenced, and controlled by the Russian security agencies,” he said.

After the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, representatives of the military circles of the Baath Party entered the core of ISIS. For example, Izzat Ibrahim ad-Douri, handler of The Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, as well as the ex-deputy of Saddam Hussein and the secretary of Ba’ath entered the IS leadership.

ISIS’s deputy leader Abu Muslim al-Turkmani was an Iraqi army major. Abu Ayman al-Iraqi, a former colonel in Iraqi Air Force intelligence now plays a leading role in ISIS’ military council. After al-Zarqawi’s death in 2006, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi began to bring in more Iraqis, particularly former Saddam officers. Many of the Saddam-era officers have close tribal links to or are the sons of tribal leaders in their regions, giving IS a vital support network as well as facilitating recruitment.

Iraqi, handler of The Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order, ex-secretary of Ba’ath

Ibrahim ad-Douri

OSINT Report 9


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There is documentary evidence that Kremlin has got channels of communication with the ISIS at the level of ties with the Ba’athist elites of Iraq. Russian intelligence has had links with the Iraqi Ba’ath since the Iran-Iraq war, as well as under Y.Primakov head of the Russian Foreign Intelligence.

In April 2003, when Baghdad was taken by American troops, British journalists David Harrison of the Daily Telegraph and Patrick Graham of the Guardian found convincing evidence of close cooperation between Russian and Iraqi intelligence services. The documents they found in a half-ruined building of the Iraqi intelligence headquarters, proved that Moscow provided intelligence for the Saddam regime. Harrison and Graham also found a lot of personal files of the agents of Iraqi intelligence (Mukhabarat), some of them including two-week course proficiency certificates collected in Moscow in September 2002. This information is also confirmed by the Pentagon’s report5.

The Russian issued certificate of Mohammad Jasim al-Mansouri– member of Mukhabarat, who graduated from the advanced training course of the Special Training Center (Russia) in Sept. 15, 2002 in ‘Acoustic surveillance means speciality.’ Photo by David Harrison / the Daily Telegraph, 2003.

Mukhabarat office in Baghdad where Mansouri’s documents were found. Photo by David Harrison / the Daily Telegraph, 2003.

His certificate, which bears the double-eagle symbol of the Russian Federation and a stylized star symbol that resembles the seal of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, uses a shortened version of al-Mansouri’s name. It says he entered the Moscow-based Special Training Center’s “advanced” course in “acoustic surveillance means” on Sept. 2, 2002, and graduated on Sept. 15.

“The study program has been fulfilled completely and successfully,” says the certificate, which bears an illegible signature of the center’s director.

Marashi, who has written a detailed study of the Iraqi security apparatus for the Monterey Institute, said Russia’s training of Iraqi intelligence agents started in 1973.

On April 17, 2003, spokesman for the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), Boris Labusov confirmed that Iraqi spies received training in specialized counterintelligence techniques in Moscow last fall -- training that appears to violate the United Nations resolution barring military and security assistance to Iraq.

Contacts of Russian security agencies with Mukhabarat enabled the Kremlin to get into additional indirect contacts with terrorist organizations in the Middle East, as Saddam’s Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) maintained a working

relationship with Palestinian terrorist groups, secretly sent representatives to meet with them and trained scores of non-Iraqi Arabs to attack Israel.

IMINT and OSINT analysis indicates that IS-militants have got Russian-made weapons. A significant part of it fell into the hands of terrorist organizations as war booty, as the consequence of fighting with government troops of Assad. The other part was grabbed from Hezbollah units. At the same time, the origin of some weapons cannot be attributed to war booty.

Thus, there are documentary data proving that the units of ISIS use Russian RPG-29 “Vampire” in the fight against armored vehicles. The product entered service with the USSR Armed Forces only in 1989 and was not mass-produced, thus excluding the possibility of export supplies in the Soviet era. The product is not in service with the RF Armed Forces, it is just exported. In 2010, “Planta” Chemical Plant of Nizhny Tagil considered the possibility of upgrading the ammunition through its capacity amplification. RPG-29 was registered to have been used by Russian-terrorist forces against the UAF in Donbas.

Some photos of Russian ISIS supporters posted on social networks prove the existence of modern examples of small arms that are in service with the Russian Federation.

“I can’t think of anybody in the Iraqi security service that hasn’t been trained in Russia,” said Ibrahim Marashi, a research fellow at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies6.

One of the graduating officers, identified in his personnel file as Sami Rakhi Mohammad Jasim al-Mansouri, 46, is described as being connected to “the general management of counterintelligence” in the south of the country. Born in Basra, he joined the Mukhabarat on May 1, 1981, according to his file. His “party position”— a possible reference to the ruling Baath Party— is listed as “lieutenant general.”

The certificate of completion for the course in acoustic surveillance techniques bears the double-eagle symbol of the Russian Federation and a stylized star symbol that resembles the seal of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service.

The Russian issued certificate uses a different version of al-Mansouri’s name — Mohammad S. Radhi. The hand-scribbled note in Arabic at the top of the certificate is the same name as the personnel file.

OSINT Report 11

Analysis of the video footage obtained after the seizure of the Russian military base near Palmyra by the ISIS forces in December 2016, proves a hypotesis that ISIS counterattacks followed by the grab of the base area can be seen as a mechanism for the transfer weaponry and ammunition.

As one can see in the video8, a lot of weaponry were abandoned at the base: at least one automatic anti-aircraft cannon S-60 (57 mm); four anti-aircraft cannons ZU-23-2; spare barrels for ZU-23-2; portable minefield breaching mount UR-83P; optical sights PGO-7 for rocket-propelled grenade launcher RPG-7; aircraft cannon GSh-23L; stacks of ammunition boxes (250 pieces, about 350,000 7.62×39 rounds); high-explosive tank shells (125mm); probably, at least one “Kord” machine gun (12.7mm). Also, plenty of small arms (approximately 200 pieces total, on the ground and in the boxes, mainly 7.62mm AKMS rifles and 30-40 brand new AK-74U rifles) and 20 DShKM large caliber (12.7mm) machine guns have been seized. This means that ISIS would find almost everything at this base fitting for their mobile guerrilla tactics and satisfying all its needs: DShKM heavy machine guns for “jihad-cars” (which terrify Assad’s troops), ZU-23-2 anti-aircraft cannons for gun trucks, RPG grenades and a large quantity of small arms and ammunition. BMP-97 “Vystrel” and several trucks9 were caught up among the seized military equipment10.

Frame-by-frame analysis gives reasons to claim that the military equipment at the base did not have any combat signs: there are no bullet holes, glass and tires are intact. This indicates that the base was abandoned without action, and there were no attempts to destroy weaponry and ammunition. Considering the possibility of air strikes, as well as the elimination of ammunition and the military equipment destruction in retreating, the facts indicate a high probability of using the scheme for arms transfer to ISIS11.


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In January 2017, direct proofs indicated the activation of Russia’s work with Palestinian political factions with a view to consolidate them and back up its influence in the Middle East, as well as bid with the new US administration on geopolitics and spheres of influence.

On January 16, 2017, representatives of various Palestinian movements and parties met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia in Moscow. The representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Palestinian National Liberation

HAMAS AND HEZBOLLAH

FM S.Lavrov met representatives of various Palestinian movements and parties in Moscow, Jan. 16, 2017. Photo by M.Dzhaparidze / TASS.

FM S.Lavrov met representatives of various Palestinian movements and parties in Moscow, Jan. 16, 2017. Photo by EPA

Movement (Fatah), the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (IJ), the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), The Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian National Initiative, and the Communist Party of Palestine attended the meeting.

The meeting followed the session of the Preparatory Committee of the Palestinian National Council in Beirut, in the course of which a communiqué was adopted, confirming the policy of consolidation and formation of a joint government of national unity, so that all Palestinian territories would be within its competence. The meeting in Moscow is Kremlin’s attempt to get a handle on this process.

According to our estimates, Russian foreign intelligence agency uses the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences to work with representatives of HAMAS, Fatah, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Islamic Jihad and other Palestinian groups.

OSINT Report 13

The details of the meeting and seating of the members of the Palestinian delegation and the head of the foreign ministry of the Russian Federation indicate that Russian side is dominant in this process and moderates the meeting of representatives of Palestinian organizations without being a negotiating party. A similar meeting was held in the Moscow area in 2011 for the last time. The Kremlin has set for itself the task of uniting Palestinian political structures under the auspices of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the Arab Peace Initiative, with a view to create a government of national unity. Russia’s foreign policy focus on the PLO corresponds to the Soviet era Kremlin’s political course, which in 1988 recognized the state of Palestine. Moscow continues its work with Palestine, hoping to gain a center of influence in the Middle East, tearing the axis of support for the West, thus continuing the policy of the Soviet Union, focused on Syria and Yasser Arafat’s PLO.

In November 2016, under the facilitation of Moscow, attempts to negotiate the accession of the HAMAS organization to the PLO have already been undertaken. PLO representative Abu Yusufм declared then that the PLO had to determine the methods of struggle for Palestinian groups. The unification process would increase their effectiveness in confronting Israel and achieving the goal — to return the Palestinian territories to the 1967 borders.

To implement the project of consolidating the Palestinian factions into the government of national unity, Kremlin needs, first of all, to settle the conflict between Fatah and HAMAS. Thus, Hamas strongly disagrees with the presence of Fatah’s henchmen

in the Gaza Strip. In turn, Fatah, which is part of the PLO, does not see representatives of HAMAS in the PNA structures. Despite the fact that a member of the Fatah political bureau, Azzam al-Ahmad, expressed the hope of reaching an agreement with HAMAS to hold general elections in the PA by June 2017, which is an extremely optimistic forecast. In its turn, Tel Aviv considers the Fatah-HAMAS reconciliation process and the unification of Palestinian organizations as undermining the Israeli-Palestinian negotiation process for a peaceful settlement of the conflict. Thus, further RF policy will focus on the parallel strengthening of cooperation with both organizations.

Presence of the Islamic Jihad representatives at the meeting, not having a socio-economic platform and not seeking to become a political movement, speaks for Russia’s attempt to create the appearance of participation of all Palestinian factions and movements in the process of shaping a political platform for the future PA government, neutralizing the risks of future claims on the part of separate groups.

The RF activation in the process of strengthening communication with Palestinian groups comes against the background of Tehran’s termination of financial assistance to the HAMAS movement, associated with the latter’s participation in supporting the Syrian opposition (under the influence of Qatar and the KSA). The situation in Egypt deprives the Gaza Strip of an alliance with the Egyptian “Muslim Brotherhood”, which would allow the Strip to be unlocked. This means that Russia is using financial and economic factor in negotiations with the Palestinian factions.


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If Moscow succeeds in introducing HAMAS representatives into the official PNA and PLO structures, the entire Palestinian movement will be Islamized. At the

same time, speaking about the Russian Federation, the creation of a government of national accord is its step towards the political and international legitimization of HAMAS, which is important with relations to the precedence of betting on paramilitary structures in conflicts.

If Moscow coordinates its actions in the process of the Palestinian negotiations with Doha, this means that it agrees with the intensification of the Islamization of the Palestinian movement as a whole. If such coordination does not exist, Kremlin, in the long run, will ultimately give way to Qatar’s position of influence on the PLO due to the religious factor. Recently, HAMAS has been afraid of

the IS cells strengthening in the Gaza Strip. The Russian Federation can take advantage of the situation and place a public bet on HAMAS, as a force capable of resisting the

IS within this territory. In this context, Moscow may increase the supply of arms to the movement.

Such support is similar to the one Moscow is rendering to Hezbollah in Syria. This will enable Kremlin to break the mould, through positioning organizations, recognized as terrorist in the United States and the EU, as fighters against IS and international terrorism.

Military and technical assistance to HAMAS will strengthen its weight and influence among Palestinian factions, as well as claim of control over security agencies in the government of national unity. Such scenario could push HAMAS into a deal with Fatah, counting on a “long-

term” game and prospects of strengthening after infiltrating in the government.

On November 15, 2015, Russia’s special envoy for the Middle East Mikhail Bogdanov said that Russia did not view and did not intend to view HAMAS and Hezbollah as terrorist organizations. He explained that this viewpoint was due to the fact they “have never committed any terrorist attacks within the Russian territory.”

At the same time, he made a statement on Hezbollah organization: “Some people say that Hezbollah is a terrorist organization. We maintain contacts and relations with them, because we do not view them as a terrorist organization. They have never committed any terrorist attacks within the Russian territory... This is a legitimate social and political force”.

Mikhail Bogdanov did not explain whether the preparation and carrying out of terrorist attacks against civilians — for example, suicide bombings on buses and at discos — was a criterion for the recognition of a terrorist group. He also overlooked the fact that Russian citizens living in Israel repeatedly became the victims of HAMAS and Hezbollah12.

The leadership of Russia ignored the “Request for the detention of HAMAS leaders and the investigation of their crimes against the citizens of Russia in Israel” in summer of 2012.

OSINT Report 15

On August 3, 2014, Israeli media referring to the IDF reported that Russian-made Kornet anti-tank missiles (AT-14 Spriggan), produced by Russian military plant, were discovered in the mosque taken over by the IDF soldiers, where terrorists established a military depot. Analysis indicates those were new modifications, pointed at a target using a laser beam, unlike the old ATGMs. Kornet ATGM was used both by HAMAS and Hezbollah. During the terrorist act on April 7, 201113, for which HAMAS took credit, the school bus was struck by 9M133 Kornet anti-tank missile.

This ATGM system of Russian (non-Soviet) production was recorded to be used for the first time in December, 2006, while undermining Merkava Mark IV Israeli tank14.

Kornet ATGM was developed by the Tula Instrument Design Bureau in the post-Soviet period, in 1998. These products come into the view while studying weapons in service with, for example, the IslamicFront in Syria (video)15, as well as in Iraq, where several cases of their use by ISIS militants against M1 Abrams tanks of the Iraqi army were recorded.

In regard to Kornet ATGM, it is conceivable that it was handed over by neighboring countries. However, such explanation cannot be applied to 9P135M Konkurs ATGM, seized from Hezbollah by Israeli IDFs during the Lebanon War of 2006. There is photographic evidence of the existence of such weapons in the arsenal of this organization during the battle of Qalamoun in 2013. At the same time, the “F” mark on the targeting block is present on all products of Konkurs from Hezbollah. Similar marking can be seen on products seized by the ISIS group. Most likely, they fell into their hands as the booty from Hezbollah units.


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Hezbollah’s ATGM 9P135M Konkurs during the battle of Qalamoun in 2013. 9P135M Konkurs ATGM, seized from Hezbollah by Israeli IDFs in 2006.

Consequently, 9P135M Konkurs ATGM could not have been obtained as booty from Syrian governmental troops. Similarly, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data excludes the supply of this product from Qatar and Turkey, as potential weapon suppliers for rebel groups in Syria. Libya’s supply options are also excluded, as the Russian Federation, according to SIPRI, supplied only 9M123 / AT-15 there. In this regard, the emergence of this weapon can only be explained by its direct transfer from the Russian Federation, either to Hezbollah, or ISIS.

Russian military expert Igor Korotchenko in an interview with RIA Novosti of June 2013, commenting on the hypothesis of Kornet supplies, said that Russia always requested an end-user certificate6.”This means that the government of the country in question grants Russia an official guarantee that the weapons supplied by the Russian side will be used only by the armed forces of that state. I believe that legal buyers of Russian arms would at least refrain from such re-export supplies.” Consequently, this fact confirms the version about direct supplies, rather than re-export of Konkurs to Hezbollah and HAMAS units. At the same time, this fact indicates that Russian military and political leadership knew that part of Kornet ATGMs had been handed over to HAMAS and Hezbollah by Bashar Assad’s government out of 2000-2005 export supplies.

There is no doubt that Konkurs ATGMs are supplied as part of the practical testing of Russian anti-tank complexes against tanks that are in service with the NATO countries. Such actions are an opportunity for the Russian Federation to test such products under combat conditions. In addition,

Supplier/recipient (R)or licenser (L) Comments

R:Syria

Year of order/licence 1998 1998 1998 2002 2004 2005

No. ordered 1500 500 1000 1000 250 250

Weapondesignation

9M119Svir/AT-11

9M131Metis-M/AT-13

9M133Kornet/AT-14

9M133Kornet/AT-14

9M133Kornet/AT-14

9M133Kornet/AT-14

Weapondescription

Anti-tankmissile

Anti-tankmissile

Anti-tankmissile

Anti-tankmissile

Anti-tankmissile

Anti-tankmissile

No.delivered/produced

1500 500 1000 1000 250 250

Year(s) Of Deliveries 2000-2005 1999-2001 1998-1999 2002-2003 2005 2006

Analysis of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute data indicates that 9P135M Konkurs complexes were not officially supplied to the territory of Syria and Lebanon between 1998 and 2016.

OSINT Report 17

according to time parameters, the use of Russian ATGMs coincided with the active phase of new Russian MBTs’ development, including sample 148 (Armata).

In July 2016, the evidence of Russia supplying drones to Hezbollah, pro-Iranian Lebanese group, and conducting technical reconnaissance against Israel was obtained. This was evident from the fact that a UAV launched from the territory of Syria, presumably from one of Hezbollah bases in the mountains of Kalamun (the place where Konkurs ATGM’s use was identified), was intercepted in the Israeli airspace on July 17. According to the Israeli military intelligence department, a drone intercepted over the Golan Heights is a Russian-made “Forpost” type, designed for reconnaissance.

These drones are assembled in Russia under the Israeli

UAV Mk2 Searcher license of the Israeli company IAI. Russia’s cooperation with the IAI started in 2009, when the first Searchers were bought under $ 100 million direct purchase contract. In 2012, $ 400 million contract for the assembly of IAA-designed UAVs was signed, $ 300 million of which accounted for 10 Forpost complexes. The products are produced by the Ural Works of Civil Aviation JSC (UWCA, Yekaterinburg, a part of Oboronprom Corporation JSC, a Rostec State Corporation company). These UAVs are actively used by the RF Armed Forces in Ukraine, Syria, and also in the North Caucasus.

Forpost’s appearance over the Golan Heights accentuates the resumption of joint intelligence activities between Russia and Syria in regard to the Northern Military District of the Israeli Armed Forces.


18

In July 2016, the evidence of Russia supplying drones to Hezbollah, pro-Iranian Lebanese group, and conducting technical reconnaissance against Israel was obtained

“

“

On October 5, 2014, the FSA (Free Syrian Army) took control the joint Russian-Syrian radio and radio technical intelligence center (the so-called Center-C OSNAZ (special operations)), located on Tal Al-Gharam Mount near Daraa in southern Syria, near the Syrian-Israeli demarcation line. This center performed electronic reconnaissance in the northern part of Israel, though the Israeli Second TV Channel claimed control over Tel Aviv, northern Jordan and western Iraq. Iran and Hezbollah were also highly probable to use the Center-C intelligence.

Some sources reported that in 2012, the center was modernized, thus expanding the visibility zone of the entire territory of Israel and Jordan, the Gulf of Aqaba and the north of the KSA. However, the operational map captured in the FSA survey indicates

a much smaller control zone, limited to 100 km east of Amman. In January 2016, the governmental troops, supported by the Russian Air Force and Hezbollah units, took control of Daraa, but there is no precise data on the actual control over the former Center-C infrastructure.

Arms sales to Hezbollah and the renewed reconnaissance activity within the territory of Israel indicate that Kremlin facilitates Israel’s mitigation and creates conditions for Tel Aviv to give up on offensive actions both against Syria and against Hezbollah. This fact flags Kremlin’s military and technical cooperation with Hezbollah.

After Israeli Prime Minister B. Netanyahu’s address to the Russian President Vladimir Putin, demanding to explain how Russian arms made it through to Hezbollah, the Russian leadership paused

for several weeks, and then responded they had not found evidence that this group had got Russian weapons. However, a year ago, on July 1, 2015, Sheikh Naim Kassem, one of the Shiite group leaders, claimed that Russia’s viewpoint had coincided with Hezbollah’s for the last ten years. In particular, Russia began to move away from the US- the West-Israel axis. Kassem also emphasized that Russia and Hezbollah had a common view of the Syrian conflict and the inadmissibility of overthrowing the country’s leader Bashar Assad. He confirmed that there were contacts between Hezbollah and the Russian Federation in all areas. Kassem’s interview to the pro-Kremlin edition made it obvious that Russian embassy in Lebanon was in constant contact with the leadership of Hezbollah17.

The school bus was struck by Hezbollah’s 9M133 Kornet anti-tank missile on Apr. 7, 2011. Photo by Rina Castelnuovo / The New York Times.

OSINT Report 19

Analysis of photo and video content from the territory of Syria shows that, as of today, Hezbollah units on squadron level deployed in Syria and Lebanon are mainly equipped with Russian weapons, including ATGMs and ADMSes.

Israeli military circles are of opinion that Russian weaponry can fall into the hands of Hezbollah as a result of the lack of Russian control over the use of weapons in the Syrian

government army. However, the Hezbollah leadership’s statements speak of the direct supplies of weapons to this organization through bases in Latakia. For example, in July 2015, Naim Kassem expressed the opinion that Russia and Hezbollah could act as a united front in the international field, as well as cooperate in economic domain and arms supplies. He added that Hezbollah received Russian weapons for the war in Syria. “Yes, we get Russian weapons, but it does not matter which

way,” Kassem said. Thus, Kassem refuted the response of the Russian military-political leadership to the Israeli prime minister. In addition, according to AMAN, several weaponry convoys heading for Lebanon from the territory of Syria were destroyed by Israeli air fleet, which also implies the existence of arms delivery channel to Hezbollah.

Kremlin’s support of Hezbollah in the region focuses on

intensifying the work of this organization in Iraq, Yemen and Bahrain. Russia is interested in dismantling the monarchial regimes of the Gulf countries. This scenario gives Moscow broad economic advantages. Tactically, this goal coincides with the interests of Iran, thus allowing Russia to strengthen its own positions in the region in the triangle of Hezbollah—Iran—Russia. There are also indirect indicators that Russia gained official support of Beijing in its focus on Hezbollah.


20

TALIBANIn December 2016, Kasım Jangalbagh, Kunduz police chief, claimed that a large number of Russian-made weapons seized in combat, unidentified helicopters, found in border areas, were the most reliable evidence of Russia’s assistance18. Jangalbai says that, Molla Abdülkasım, the Taliban governor in this area, is in constant contact with the Russians. “If the Taliban gets their hands on anti-aircraft guns provided, for example, by Russia, then it is a game-changer, and forget about peace,” said Afghan security official.

Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid stated: “Russia supports us in the fight against the US and its allies, and we are very happy about that. For the US, DAISH can not be a solution. “We had a common enemy,” one other senior Taliban official told Reuters. “We needed support to get rid of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan and Russia wanted all foreign troops to leave Afghanistan as quickly as possible”19.

Russia diffuses false allegations that the Taliban movement is helping in the fight against the “Islamic State” jihadist group, banned in Russia and other countries. A Taliban official told Reuters on December 8, 2016: “In early 2008, when Russia began supporting us, ISIS (Islamic State) didn’t even exist anywhere in the world. Their

sole purpose was to strengthen us against the U.S. and its allies”20. Thus, the contacts with the Taliban movement had started six years before the territories in Iraq and Syria were seized. Status and positions of Mutayibeen Coalition and the Islamic State of Iraq under the leadership of Emir Abu Omar al-Baghdadi in 2006 were not sufficiently threatining to spill over to Afghanistan at that time. Consequently, the development of communication channels with the Taliban took place before ISIS gained influence in Afghanistan and took control over the territories in Iraq and Syria.

The use of the Taliban as a counterweight to ISIS in Afghanistan is being questioned in Kabul. Afghan Ambassador to Russia Abdul Kayum Kochai at a meeting with Ilyas Umakhanov, the deputy chairman of the Federation Council, said: “If your state thinks that the Taliban (movement) is better, you need to contact him, talk to him, then, it does not work (from the point of view of the settlement process in Afghanistan)”. Thus, any assumptions that Russia is dealing with the Taliban in the context of the fight against the ISIS influence are not true. In fact, a majority of the ISIS fighters in Afghanistan were Taliban members in the past.

Former Taliban commander Khan Mohammad Cherik, who joined the government’s

peace process with 200 of his soldiers, said Russia was providing military and financial help. “Russian weapons were brought to us through many channels in the last one-to-two years,” he said21.

The governor of Afghanistan’s southern Farah province, Mohammad Asif Nang, claimed that Russia provided Taliban insurgents with sophisticated weaponry, Shamshad TV reported on Jan. 16, 2017. These weapons included 82mm mortars, night-vision devices and missiles (ATGM). Nang added that it is unclear whether these weapons reached the Taliban via Pakistan or Iran. Nang’s comments are the latest and most specific indicators that Afghan officials increasingly believe that Russia has begun militarily backing the jihadist movement.

On March 28, 2017, the Times of Islamabad, the Pakistani edition, released the report on the visit of Colonel-General Sergei Istrakov, Deputy Chief of Russian General Staff, to northern Waziristan (Pakistan), invited by General Zubair Mahmood Hayat, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the Joint Staff Headquarters. At the same time, there are data on Russian delegation’s visits to several Taliban training centers in the tribal zone (South Waziristan) near the Durand Line. “They [the Russian delegation] have been seen at

OSINT Report 21


22

Russian delegation visited North Waziristan. PHOTO by ISPR.

Said Omar Bajawry with Russian AK-74M a complete kit for the Russian forces that was not exported by Russia.

Taliban training centers along with the Pakistani military,” said General Assadullah Sherzad, commander of 303 Police Zone, overseeing the entire police force in eastern Afghan provinces.

There is unconfirmed information about the contacts of the delegation with Mulla Habatulla, the leader of one of the Taliban groups. There are doubts that the meeting occurred precisely with him, since he left Quatta and was sighted in Lahor in October 2016, according to Afghan intelligence.

At the same time, Said Omar Bajawry is in the picture, the warlord stands with Russian AK-74M a complete kit for the Russian forces that was not exported by Russia.

At the end of March 2017, Afghan senators expressed concern about the lack of inspection of trucks crossing the Durand Line. Thus, this site is in fact ideal for carrying weapons to Afghanistan.

According to Asif Maruf, editor of the BBC Afghan service, now in Afghanistan they say that the Taliban has been divided into three groups: pro-Russian, pro-Iranian and pro-Pakistani. Presence of pro-Russian group indicates a stable and constant channel of communication at a high level in the leadership of the Russian Federation. The Afghan official said Russian intelligence agents held meetings with Taliban representatives in Tajikistan and Moscow, and occasionally

entered Afghan territory in border provinces like Kunduz. He added that Russians were serving as “creative minds and strategists for the Taliban” at a kind of academy in Iran. Northern Afghanistan, particularly Kunduz, is of particular interest to Russia because Kabul’s control in the area is limited and the province borders Tajikistan, a Russian ally that has helped mediate contacts with the Taliban22.

In the opinion of Curtis Scaparotti, Commander-in-Chief of the Joint NATO Forces in Europe, Moscow supports and legitimizes the grouping. “Recently, I have been observing the influence of Russia — the increased influence — of Russia’s association with the Taliban and, possibly, even Russian support for the group, — he said on March 23 at a hearing in the Senate Committee on Armed Forces.

Evidence is emerging of Russian and Taliban high-level contacts and possible armaments like shoulder-fired RPGs and night-vision equipment23.

According to our estimations, there are several channels of communication with the Taliban:

• Through Pakistan;

• Through intermediaries in Tajikistan;

• Through Iran.

Zamir Kabulov, the special representative of the Russian President for Afghanistan,

Taliban’s top leader.

Afghani MP, representative of Kandahar Province in Afghanistan’s Wolesi Jirga. He believed that some of Taliban’s weapons have been provided by the Russians through Iran.

Mulla Habatulla

MP Khalid Pashton

OSINT Report 23

who allegedly has connections with Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, is most likely one of those who is in charge of the line. It is notable that Viktor Bout, convicted of arms trafficking, was a member of Russian diplomatic delegation lead by Kabulov, releasing the IL-76 crew captured by the Taliban in 1995. He visited Kandahar 7 times as member of delegations. As journalists Douglas Farah and Stafen Brown asserted in their book “The Death Merchant”, Bout, after the pilots’ escape, allegedly made a deal with the Taliban to supply arms and started implementing it.

On February 28, 2017, security sources told a 1TV reporter, Sajad Mohammadi in Kunduz that Russia provides weapons and military equipment for Taliban fighters in Dasht-e-Archi, Imam Sahib, Qalai Zal and Kalbat districts of Kunduz province via Tajikistan24.

Another Afghan claimed that Kremlin gave the Taliban a mobile clinic and medicine to patch up their wounded soldiers in Helmand province. Several lawmakers in Kabul claimed that a Russian military group crossed the border into the tribal regions of Pakistan to treat wounded Taliban.


24

Now the Taliban already have plenty of weapons — small arms, rocket-propelled grenades, but the Russians could potentially provide even more sophisticated arms and equipment, maybe missiles or night vision goggles, the types of things that could make the Taliban even more lethal.

“Just a day before I met the minister of interior, hundreds of BM4025 missiles entered the country through Nimroz border and the missiles have been delivered to the Taliban in Helmand, Kandahar, Uruzgan and some western provinces. It is believed that these weapons have been provided by the Russians through Iran,” said MP Khalid Pashton (represent Kandahar Province in Afghanistan’s Wolesi Jirga). MP Abdul Jabbar Qahraman said that “the majority of weapons in Iran are made in Russia; they have signed contracts with the Russians in this respect; the Iranians have a lot of Russian made weapons; if sometimes these weapons are delivered to the Taliban, then we can confirm that these weapons are provided to the Taliban by the Russians”.

In spring of 2017, the number of reports concerning Russian weaponry supplies to the Taliban increased. At the same time, in connection with the same geographical regions of Afghanistan (Kunduz, Uruzgan), the information on Russian groups’ activity, accompanied by Taliban militants, has appeared. On April 12, 2017,

it was reported that Russian mentors had been seen with Taliban militants operating just 10 kilometres from Tirinkot, the capital of central Uruzgan province. Police chief Brig. Gen. Ghulam Farooq Sangari told Pajhwok Afghan News Russian trainers had been spotted in Taliban ranks recently26. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Afghanistan did not confirm the information.

At the same time tribal elders in the region — which sits in the central part of Afghanistan and is far away from the Islamic State activity on the eastern border — confirmed the reports. Russian military advisers have been spotted twice recently near Tirinkot, the Uruzgan capital, Haji Abdul Bari, a tribal elder in the province, told VOA27. The governor of Kunduz told reporters that the Taliban asked Moscow for weapons and training. Provincial Council head Amir Mohammad Barakzai confirmed Sangari’s claim and said the Russian trainers had been previously seen in Darfeshan area a few months earlier.

Despite the fact that the signs of Russians’ work with the Taliban are indirect, it is interesting to analyze the data, overlapping the activity of Russian groups, reported in open sources, on the map of the area. It correspondes with the largest Taliban control area in the country.

According to our estimations, Gulmurod Khalimov (Colonel of

Afghani MP, The presidential envoy for Helmand’s security affairs.

Afghani, Police chief Brig. Gen.

Tajik, ex-Colonel of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan, who headed the IS after al-Shishani’s death in 2015. Photo / Furat Agency.

Abdul Jabbar Qahraman

Ghulam Farooq Sangari

Gulmurod Khalimov

OSINT Report 25

the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Tajikistan), who headed the IS after al-Shishani’s death in 2015, was recruited by Russian security agencies during his internship in Russia. In May 2015, a video of Furat media

center appeared in social networks, with Khalimov’s appeal in Russian, stating he had sided with the IS. He accused the Tajik authorities of denigrating and oppressing Muslims. He also urged labor migrants in Russia not to be the “slaves

of Kaafirs”, but to become “slaves of Allah”, join the jihad and move to the IS. Khalimov promised to return to Tajikistan and establish the sharia laws there. Kremlin is actively using the threat from ISIS in foreign policy pressure on the leadership of Central Asian states in order to maintain a military and political presence in their territories.

Khalimov’s appeal to move to the IS corresponds entirely to Russian security agencies’ technology of radical elements’ expultion from the territory of the Russian Federation, carried out against radical Islamists in the North Caucasus. Time-wise, it coincided with the tightening of Russian migration rules with regard to Tajik migrant workers. According to the FMS, as of May 11, 2015, there were 990,275 Tajik citizens in the Russian Federation.

Among them, in the age-sex composition, the young able-bodied men aged between 18 and 29, — 411,615 — are the largest category. The actual number of Tajiks working in Russia is significantly higher than the official statistics presents, since the FMS data does not cover all categories of foreigners, in particular, those who have entered and are staying in Russia illegally.

Indirect signs of Russian security agencies’ recruitment exist in relation to Nusrat Nazarov — another leader of the Tajik unit under the Khorasan group emir’s command . Nusrat Nazarov worked in Moscow between 1993 and 1999, and between 2005 and 2010, Nusrat travelled to Moscow five times.

The “Islamic State” recruits most of the new militants from among migrant workers in Moscow and St. Petersburg through Chechen recruiters among migrants working in groups of 3-4 people. According to rough estimates, such a recruitment channel ensured the departure of two to four thousand people from Central Asia to Syria as of 2015.

Recruiters convince them it is necessary to leave Moscow, because “one can not live like a slave”, “you are not respected here”; and explain that it is not necessary to fight with the IS — you can live in prosperity and work without humiliation. On arrival, they offer from


26

5 to 15 thousand dollars as arrangement costs. If case of departure with the family, the amount increases to 10-30 thousand dollars.

In the majority of the analyzed cases of identified migrants who left for Syria to join ISIS, their recruitment took place in Moscow. This is confirmed by the statement of Yusuf Rakhmon, the Prosecutor General of Tajikistan, claiming that 85% of Tajik citizens participating in military operations abroad are former labor migrants who worked in Russia.

People recruited for IS are channeled through the territory of Turkey, then through the

settlement of Gaziantep and Mursitpinar border point.

There are doubts that the deliveries to the Taliban pass through the “Syrian” scheme, worked out in Palmira (the transfer of weapons under the guise of seizing government bases and warehouses). In particular, small arms delivered to Kabul by the RF are different from those recorded in militants’ photographs .

Qurghonteppa airfield (Tajikistan) could be one of the possible arms supply channels to the Taliban. It is also used to receive transport military aircraft to supply the 201st Russian base in Tajikistan. The satellite photographs of the

airfield show the presence of transport aircraft.

Starting from December 2016, the work on extending the runway for 165 meters and its reinforcement with 3 layers of asphalt has been in progress at the airfield. The airfield is in close vicinity to Qurghonteppa — Dusti — Kunduz route and passes through mountain areas.

Nevertheless, there is no direct evidence that the airfield is used to supply weapons to the Taliban, and it is determined by indirect indicators on the ground of an integrated baseline review.

OSINT Report 27

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The base was located not far from the ibn Maan castle on the Jebel Cassidy mountain (34° 33’46.0“ N 38° 15’26.0” E).

BM-21 Grad

FOOTNOTES

1 2 3 4 5

11 12 13 14 15

21 22 23 24 25

6 7 8 9 10

16 17 18 19 20

26 27 28


30

Confidential and Personal Annual Performance EvaluationGeneral Information

Employee name:Sami Rakhi MohammadJasim al-MansouriJob title: EmployeeEducation level and specialization:BS in PhysicsParty position: Lieutenant GeneralSocial status: MarriedBirth: 1957Birth place: BasraManagement level assigned to himFirst — DivisionTechnical divisionSecond — Branch(no answer)Third — ManagementThe intelligence management for the southern area Fourth — General ManagementThe general management for counter intelligenceDate of appointment in the departmentMay 1, 1981Length of service in the governmental departments NoneLanguage proficiencyFirst — WritingArabic / writing — reading-speakingSecond — ReadingEnglish / writing — reading

The Certificate

“This is to certify that MOHAMMAD S. RADHI entered in Sept. 2, 2002, and graduated from the advanced training course of the Special Training Center in Sept. 15, 2002 in speciality ‘Acoustic surveillance means.’ The studying program has been fulfilled completely and successfully.”

29

OSINT Report 31

Documents

FOREWORD - CEAS Serbia · 2019. 2. 9. · This is the target of Russian state security agencies. Dagestani, in 2012 Russian intelligence gave him new passport, new name and ticket