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An examination of the complications, issues, and dilemmas which have been faced by the "Smartwood" accredited certifying team.It covers a number of case studies which all illustrate different pitfalls
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New York, NY 10003 Emerging Trends in Social Innovation and Investment
Individual Assignment
The New School
April 8th 2014
Jonathan Leonard
FSC & SMARTWOOD: SPEEDBUMPS, PITFALLS, AND ADJUSTMENTS IN FOREST CERTIFICATION
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The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) commands one of the most widely recognized certification seals in the world.
The Players
Another major success in various certifications is the Rainforest Alliance and their iconic frog.
The FSC created a revolutionary set of rules for forest management, and applied them to the world’s forests via accredited groups. These groups’ abilities are verified by another organization: Accreditation Services International (ASI) - a component of the FSC.
FSC/ASI’s largest accredited certifier is SmartWood; a component of the Rainforest Alliance.
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What happens when two leading NGOs become bedfellows in the name of forestry management certification? Great things can be accomplished, but also grave mistakes can lead to epic blunders. This research paper focuses on the latter, and investigates a series of missteps in an attempt to learn the lessons of historical error.
When pursuing a complex certification process, we sometimes learn more from when things go wrong than when they go right. With the idea of forging forward by looking backwards and using observations to make concrete policy adjustments, we examine four instances involving FSC/ASI & Rainforest Alliance/SmartWood where things didn’t go to plan.
The Premise
Table of Contents
Case 1: Forestal Venao – Peru – August 2007 PG 4 (Forestry Practices and the Environment)
Case 2: Gibson Guitars Fiasco – Tennessee – 2009 to 2011 PG 6 (Gifts, Donors, and Conflicts of Interest)
Case 3: FSC vs. SmartLogging PG 7 (Competition or Complementary?)
Case 4: SIFORCO & SODEFOR – 2011 - Democratic Republic of the Congo PG 9 (Human rights abuses)
Conclusions Drawn and Lessons Learned: PG 11
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Case 1: Forestal Venao – Peru – August 2007 (Forestry Practices and the Environment) A Peruvian logging company, Forestal Venao, was called into question in 2007 by a number of indigenous groups and local scientists for suspected illegal logging practices; illegal logging is common along the Peruvian/Brazilian border. What is not common about the situation, was that Venao had two separate timber certifications: a general Smartwood certification, and a Chain of Custody (CoC) certification.1 Things were further complicated when WWF Peru became implicated due to the involvement of its Certification and Development of the Forest Sector (CEDEFOR) programme. When the possibly illegal actions of a certified organization are bright to light, the implications are far reaching. Much more significant than just the forest in question, the entire seal and certification process is cast into doubt, and issues of trustworthiness surface in earnest. In this case, attention was first signaled by Brazil's Federal Environmental Agency (IBAMA) which suspected a transnational logging operation that was in violation of Brazil's sovereignty. (Certification issue: Certified forests along porous border regions) Venao was further accused by researcher Dr. Davd Salisbury of the Amazon Frontiers Research Center of the illegal construction and use of numerous roads through the Amazon, totaling more than 100K in length. (Certification issue: Illegal road construction of a certified group). Salisbury went on to describe Venao as “infamous in Ucayali, Peru for their indifference to laws, indigenous people, and the rainforest environment... this is exactly the type of company that Smartwood and the Forest Stewardship Council should be blacklisting, not certifying.”2 This powerful quotation from Dr. Salisbury begs us ask the question: How did Venao get certified in the first place? How could a company that has a poor environmental reputation with local scientists and indigenous groups be performing to Smartwood/FSC standards? This scenario evoked a host of reactions from civil society and government actors. Whistleblower NGO FSC-‐Watch stated, “We call on the FSC Secretariat to cancel Venao's certificate(s), and to de-‐accredit SmartWood.”3 WWF Peru completely denied affiliation with Venao in a statement which included, “we carred out a 'pre-‐scoping' mission to Foestal Venao.... from which we concluded it would not be in the best interests of WWF to support or provide technical
1 Manejo Forestal, Certificacion y Cadena de Custodia. January 2010. Pg 9 & 12. http://www.trazabilidadforestal.com/documentos/exposicionguiomar_bsd.pdf 2 Dr. David Salisbury’s email to Rainforest Alliance cited in Round River Conservation Studies. The Race for Peru’s Last Mahogany Trees: Illegal Logging and the Alto Purús National Park, March 2007, p43 3 FSC Watch. Certification of Forestal Venao, Peru: another FSC Credibility disaster, courtesy of SmartWood and WWF. July 20 2007. http://www.fsc-watch.org/archives/2007/07/20/Certification_of_Forestal_Venao__Peru__another_FSC_credibility_disaster__courtesy_of_SmartWood_and_WWF
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assistance.... WWF expressed its concerns to SmartWood in an official letter.”4 The FSC accreditation program formally requested that SmartWood investigate the situation on the ground. At this point, the FSC certification itself has been compromised because of this precarious position and the organization stands to get a lot of mud on its face. But it's not just the certification seal or the FSC's reputation which is at stake, but also the reputation of SmartWood's parent organization The Rainforest Alliance, The World Wildlife Fund, and USAID (for providing technical assistance to Venao). In October of 2007, SmartWood took the advice of the FSC and launched an investigation into four major complaint issues.
1. Venao is illegally logging in Brazilian territory. Results: The SmartWood investigation team received rassurement from Peru’s national forestry management organization (IRENA) that Venao’s operations remained on the Peruvian side of the border. However, the team was unable to get Brazilian verification, and IRENA hardly has a clear and trustworthy record in the forest sector.
2. Venao constructed illegal roads. Results: although unregistered, the majority of these roads were constructed by oil companies in the 1980s. Since then, numerous logging groups have expanded and used the roads. Roads going through indigenous territory we created with the permission and assistance of those groups -‐ legally. Not enough evidence to accuse Venao directly.
3. Venao logs illegally in a protected watershed. Results: SmartWood’s research team conducted local interviews and decided that this logging activity was attributed to other logging groups, and that Venao has no part in it.
4. Venao’s logging causes serious damages to local Brazilian ecosystems. Results: The SmartWood investigation team discovered that indigenous leaders onhte Brazilian side had a negative view of Venao’s activities. However, the group was unable to do an EIA on the Brazilian side. On the Peruvian side, they verified that all of Venao’s operations follow technical norms and have properly trained personnel on site.
Regardless of whether we believe that SmartWood was negligent, or whether Venao is
criminal, one thing’s for certain: debacles like this harm the credibility of all organizations involved. It could be more tactful for a certifying organization to use more caution, listen to more indigenous views, and be more conservative with its issuing of certificates to avoid the hassle, headache, and expenses of retroactively re-‐establishing the certification’s legitimacy.
4 World Wildlife Fund. WWF Statement on FSC certification of Forestal Venao in Peru. August 13, 2007. http://peru.panda.org/?111100/WWF-statement-on-FSC-certification-of-Forestal-Venao-in-Peru
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Case 2: Gibson Guitars Fiasco -‐ Tennessee -‐ 2009 to 2011 (Gifts, Donors, and Conflicts of Interest)
The Gibson guitars fiasco takes place on the polar opposite end of the market chain from the Venao issue. In this case a Tennessee guitar manufacturing company, Gibson Guitars, was raided by US Federal Fish and Wildlife officials for suspected violations of the Lacey Act – a new piece of US legislation which forbids US companies from importing wood obtained from illegal sources.5 What makes this case particularly noteworthy is that Gibson was the holder of a SmartWood/FSC “Controlled Wood” certification – specifically designed to ensure the legality of wood's origin. (Certification Issue: Failure to identify illegal factors) Things became more scandalous when the public learned that Gibson CEO Henry Juszkiewicz was a board member at the Rainforest Alliance (the parent organization of SmartWood). An article in the local 'Tennessean' newspaper further asserted that Gibson gave annual gifts to the Rainforest Alliance for up $390,000 per year.6 (Certification issue: Clientelism and conflict of interest)
Conflicts of interest are an inherent danger to certification processes. On the one hand, it’s easy to see how a certification program would encourage its partners and associates to undergo the certification process and to assist them along the way. But how close is too close? And when does an accredited auditor cross the line between assistance and favoritism? Although the Rainforest Alliance firmly asserts that it keeps its SmartWood certification team out of reach of its fundraising apparatus, the organization took further precaution by giving Henry Juszkiewicz a “leave of absence” from the Rainforest Alliance board until the investigations were completed, and suspending any donations from Gibson. The Controlled Wood certification has been criticized for only requiring the presentation of appropriate documents and not requiring any kind of independently controlled checks or verification. It has been called a “self certification” by its critics, said to be lacking in due-‐diligence, and has become the center of negative attention in quite a few instances. So what can an organization like SmartWood do to prevent fiasco’s like this from occurring in the future? Because the Controlled Wood certification is based on FSC standards, SmartWood cannot fundamentally alter it. Altering the standards would also delegitimize organizations which hold the original Controlled Wood certification. One strategy the Rainforest Alliance used to circumnavigate these sensitivities is to create a new certification scheme which incorporates and strengthens the Controlled Wood certification. However, even a progressive solution such as this has its own pitfalls which are illustrated in case 3.
5 Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA). The U.S. Lacey Act. 2008. http://eia-global.org/lacey/ 6 The Tennessean. Gibson Presses for the Return of Ebony Wood. November 26, 2011. http://archive.tennessean.com/article/20111126/BUSINESS06/311260016/Gibson-presses-return-ebony-wood
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Case 3: FSC vs. Smartlogging: competition or complementary? When numerous organizations are feeling out the certification process, they can attempt to build upon one another’s work and improve it in specific ways. However, these potential improvements can also be perceived as potentially threatening to the group whose work is being improved upon. In 2007 SmartWood/Rainforest Alliance announced their own new certification process (not using FSC standards) called “SmartLogging.” The move left many forest experts scratching their heads about whether this was an attempt to undermine and overtake the FSC system, or a genuine attempt to address some of the inadequacies of the FSC in the name of the greater good. In certain ways the SmartLogging certificate is complementary -‐ mainly for its accessibility to small companies or individual tree cutters; largely overlooked by the FSC standards.7 However, in other ways it is perceived as being in direct competition with the FSC’s existing system -‐ of which SmartWood is the largest accredited audit group. (Certification Issue: Partners becoming competitors) Thus far the Rainforest Alliance insists that the certification is geared towards small or medium sized landowners who have no forestry management plans, and despite being an independent performance driven 3rd party certification system, does not directly compete for certification with any of the FSC certified forests. In rebuttal to an accusation that SmartLogging was poised to compete directly with the FSC, Richard Donovan of the Rainforest Alliance said that, “we are implementing SmartLogging in places like the eastern United States where small landowners have no management plans, and cannot qualify for FSC. We are also incorporating the FSC Controlled Wood policy into our SmartLogging work.”8 As of 2014, seven years after this statement was made, the vast majority of SmartLogging certifications are held in the Eastern United states by companies with no management plan who could not apply for FSC certification.9 So, what’s worth noting is, that even though the new SmartLogging certification was not entering into competition with the FSC for forests, it was perceived by some actors as doing so. This could be because it was a competitor on the market end of forest products -‐ something which likely made the FSC marketing teams raise an eyebrow. The perception of competition or disrespect from a partner organization in the certification process can create substantial rifts -‐ despite the operational realities and possible operational complementarity of the new process. On the other end of the spectrum are certifications which actually are in direct certification competition, but through a lack of communication or capacity have not divided
7 Rainforest Alliance - SmarWood. SmartLogging: Independent, Performance-based Certification for Responsible Loggers. July 2007. Page 7. http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/sites/default/files/site-documents/forestry/documents/smartlogging_overview.pdf 8 FSC Watch. Rainforest Alliance to launch new certification scheme to rival FSC. November 2007. http://www.fsc-watch.org/archives/2007/11/13/Rainforest_Alliance_ 9 Rainforest Allance. List of SmartLogging certification clients. March 2014. http://www.rainforest-alliance.org/forestry/certification/transparency/smartlogging-clients
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responsibilities clearly or coordinated their actions. (Certification Issue: Miscommunication and overlaps/gaps between certifications)
The rapid introduction of multiple certification seals can also serve to confuse consumers and oversaturate the certification market. (Certification issue: flooding the market with seals) Many think that the monopolization of certification seals is the most effective way to get uniform public recognition and trust for a certification process -‐ it’s easier to trust fewer brands than to wade through many.10
10 Food Navigator. Too many eco-labels could hinder uptake. Jan 10, 2013. http://www.foodnavigator.com/Market-Trends/Too-many-eco-labels-could-hinder-uptake-says-Organic-Monitor
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Case 4: SIFORCO & SODEFOR – 2011 – DRC Congo Basin (Human Rights Abuses)
In 2011, the only two SmartWood/FSC certified forestry companies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo were both accused of human rights violations. These abuses stemmed from protests staged by local residents complaining about the companies’ operating procedures. In May 2011, protests against the company SODEFOR turned ugly and resulted in the death of at least one protester. According to Greenpeace, SODEFOR is “one of the largest and highly controversial logging companies in the [DRC] which has a track record of social conflicts that have resulted in violence, arbitrary arrests and human rights violations.”11
In April of 2011 protests erupted against the other Congolese FSC certified company SIFORCO for a failure to deliver on its local investment promises of a school and health clinic. In response to the protest, SIFORCO called in local security forces who beat protestors, raped 6 women (including 3 minors), made arrests, and burned property. SIFORCO can be considered an accomplice to this human rights violation because the soldiers were transported in SIFORCO trucks, and were paid by the company after the protest was dispersed.12 (Certification Issue: Certified companies participating in human rights abuses)
Greenpeace was the first organization to lodge a comprehensive complaint; and raised numerous grievances. The issue most relevant to our case study is their investigation into the due diligence practiced by the SmartWood accreditation group in their certification of SODEFOR. Greenpeace’s Complaints Panel reported that the original certification audit performed by SmartWood didn’t properly address Congolese political complexities and state dysfunctions.13
Prior to the reports of these violations, SmartWood had granted two certifications to these companies -‐ Controlled Wood and Chain of Custody (CoC). Controlled Wood certification calls for the “publicly available written policy commitment” on a number of key issues, including “wood harvested in violation of traditional and civil rights.” The Greenpeace investigative panel could not find any public policy documents matching this description. This issue, along with a lack of documentation toward employee training towards FSC goals, were adequate grounds for SmartWood to withhold certification. (Certification Issue: The certification of companies that do not actually meet standards)
11 Monga Bay. Locals clash with ‘sustainable’ FSC logging company in the Congo. May 22, 2011 http://news.mongabay.com/2011/0522-hance_congo_conflict.html 12 Global Witness. Criminal complaint accuses senior manager of Danzer Group of responsibility over human rights abuses on Congolese community. April 25, 2013. http://www.globalwitness.org/library/criminal-complaint-accuses-senior-manager-danzer-group-responsibility-over-human-rights 13 Greenpeace. Complaints Panel Report: Formal Complaint by Greenpeace against SODEFOR’s association with FSC. January 2012. http://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/Crisis_for_FSC_in_the_Congo_Basin_0.pdf
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The Greenpeace panel further discovered that the original SmartWood audits showed a general lack of understanding of the complex social and political circumstances of the Congo Basin, and didn’t recognize the clear absence of a functioning state apparatus. (Certification Issue: certification is especially challenging in failed or dysfunctional states) Smartwood’s original audit documents suggest that it focused on speed over accuracy, and the documents failed to convince the Greenpeace panel of the audit’s scope and quality. (Certification Issue: Awarding certificates without due diligence having been performed).
One strong response to these human rights violations came from the FSC when its Board of Directors decided that Danzer was in clear violation of the FSC’s Policy for Association. Kim Carstensen, Director General of FSC added that "The way Danzer acted on the ground clearly put FSC’s reputation at risk"14 14 Informacje Zlecone. Forest Stewardship Council disassociates from the Danzer Group. May 21, 2103 http://zlecone.pap.pl/palio/html.run?_Instance=cms_siz.pap.pl&_PageID=5&depID=185838&_CheckSum=270054276
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Conclusions Drawn and Lessons Learned
It should be duly noted that although this research points out a few of Smartwood and FSC’s less-‐than-‐brilliant moments, it is no way intended to suggest that they are illegitimate or lack a genuine concern over the health of the forest. In many ways, they are the pioneers of a new era of certification and have blazed a new trail -‐ and fallen into all its pitfalls. In retrospect, we have the advantage of investigating and learning from each of these instances which went awry. Many lessons can be gleaned from these negative experiences; both for the organizations involved and for any incoming organization or group which hopes to contribute to the world of forestry certification. Many of these lessons are also applicable to certification processes in general, and can serve as issues to plan around when moving towards successful certification.
With the help of our 4 case studies we have identified a number of potentially dangerous situations which can crop while pursuing an effective certification outcome. These situations have included: border region policies, illegal road construction, clientelism & conflict of interest, failure to identify illegal activities, certification brand competitions & market flooding, human rights abuses by certified companies, certification of poor performance companies, challenges in dysfunctional states or regions, abusive interactions with indigenous people living in forestry concessions, and performing due diligence before granting a certification. It is this researcher’s sincere hope that the FSC/ASI and the Rainforest Alliance/SmartWood both learn from these misadventures, and that they encounter no such similar unfortunate events in the future. As for anyone else entering into a certification process, I encourage them to use caution while moving forward. It’s easy to get overzealous with the proliferation of a certification seal; and become hasty with its auditing process. But, to avoid serious mishaps, certifiers must balance the benefits of being widespread with upholding the integrity of their seal. I further encourage any certification body to incorporate solid policy statements regarding any relevant certification issues identified by the case studies above. Despite criticisms and mishaps, I do sincerely believe that these certifications are beneficial to the world’s forests at large, and that the Rainforest Alliance and the FSC both deserve credit for their enormous efforts towards ensuring the future existence of the earth’s forests.