FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNTIL RELEASED BY THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

STATEMENT OF

ADMIRAL DENNIS C. BLAIR, U.S. NAVY

COMMANDER IN CHIEF

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

ON FISCAL YEAR 2002 POSTURE STATEMENT

27 MARCH 2001

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNTIL RELEASED BY THE

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

2

INTRODUCTION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee:

On behalf of the men and women of the United States Pacific

Command, thank you for this opportunity to present my

perspective on security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Having served as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific

Command (USCINCPAC) for over two years, I continue to believe,

as we enter into this century, that a secure, peaceful and

prosperous Asia-Pacific region is very much in the interests of

America, and the world. Alternatively, an uncertain Asia may

present only crises and dangers. We base our power and

influence on our values, our economic vibrancy, our desire to be

a partner in this critical region, and the forward-stationed and

forward-deployed forces of the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION

Since I last testified before you, developments in the

region have offered promise and continuing challenges.

Japan

Japan remains our most important ally in the Asia-Pacific.

Although the economy is virtually stagnant, Japan remains the

second largest economy in the world and continues to have a

strong economic impact on the Asia-Pacific region. Japan hosts

nearly 41,000 U.S. armed forces personnel and serves as a

forward-deployed site for about 14,000 additional U.S. naval

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personnel. Japan also contributes $4.86B in host-nation

support, the most of any U.S. ally. These forward-stationed and

forward-deployed forces are key for the United States to meet

commitments and defend American interests throughout the Asia-

Pacific region. The U.S.-Japan alliance is the cornerstone of

U.S. security interests in Asia, and it is fundamental to

regional security and peaceful development.

Over the past year, we made steady progress in

strengthening our alliance with Japan. The two countries signed

a new 5-year Special Measures Agreement (SMA) that will take

effect on April 1, 2001. While the utilities cost-sharing

levels are down slightly from the previous SMA, the new

agreement provides for the same levels of labor cost-sharing and

training relocation costs as those of the previous SMA.

Over the past year, working groups took the first steps to

implement the Defense Guidelines. In addition, Japan’s Diet

passed the final piece of Defense Guidelines related

legislation: a law authorizing the Japanese Self-Defense Forces

(JSDF) to conduct ship inspections to enforce UN sanctions. Now

that a site for the replacement facility for Marine Corps Air

Station Futenma has been selected in northern Okinawa, detailed

discussions have begun over the type and scale of the facility.

U.S. and Japan ballistic missile defense cooperation continued

on Navy Theater Wide research.

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On February 9, 2001, USS GREENVILLE collided with the

fishing vessel Ehime Maru, resulting in the loss of the ship and

nine lives, including students. The U.S. Government and Navy

have apologized to the Government of Japan and the families of

the victims, are evaluating the feasibility of raising the

vessel, and will provide compensation to the victims. The Navy

has convened a Court of Inquiry to examine the events

contributing to the incident and accountability. The U.S. and

Japan have a strong bilateral relationship whose enduring

strength has benefited both sides for close to half a century.

We believe we will be able to move forward from this tragedy in

the interests of both nations and our peoples.

The roles and capabilities of the JSDF are slowly evolving

to meet future challenges. The Japanese Ground Self-Defense

Force provided a 45-man transportation unit as part of the Golan

Heights UN Disengagement Observer Force. The JSDF has also

worked closely with USPACOM components to restructure bilateral

exercises to develop skills for humanitarian assistance, search-

and-rescue, non-combatant evacuation, consequence management for

chemical, biological and nuclear incidents, and complex

contingency operations that are likely to occur in the future.

JSDF is sending observers to TEAM CHALLENGE, a linked series of

exercises addressing these missions and involving several Asia-

Pacific nations. I am also encouraged by the increased

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attention that the JSDF is giving to cooperating with regional

armed forces – the Republic of Korea in particular.

I remain deeply concerned about the Shinkampo private

industrial waste incinerator abutting Naval Air Facility Atsugi.

While dioxin levels have fallen significantly since Shinkampo

completed the installation of bag house filters last May,

construction has not started on a 100-meter smokestack that the

Prime Minister of Japan committed to building by March 2001.

This situation continues to be a serious health risk to our

service members and their families.

We must solve individual local issues arising from our

forces based in Japan. As important, however, is that the U.S.

Pacific Command and the JSDF maintain the capability to defend

Japan and build the capability to operate together in order to

face the common regional challenges of the future – peace

operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, humanitarian

relief and dealing with transnational concerns. The Defense

Guidelines show the way to the future for the U.S.-Japanese

alliance and we must proceed in that direction.

South and North Korea

Last year, the U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) began the

commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the Korean War. About

37,000 U.S. troops remain stationed in the ROK to deter North

Korean aggression.

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Political developments in Korea have been breathtaking,

highlighted by the June 2000 summit between President Kim Dae-

jung and his North Korean counterpart Kim Jong-il. Other North-

South reconciliation activities included reunions between

selected families separated by the war, increased aid, and

agreements to increase economic links including a road and

railway passing through the demilitarized zone.

At the same time, North Korea’s military training cycle in

the winter and summer of 2000 was the most extensive ever, and

the ongoing winter training cycle remains robust. North Korea

continues to maintain 60 percent of its forces within 100km of

the DMZ.

Given North Korea’s continuing significant military

capabilities, the Republic of Korea and the United States must

maintain the deterrent power of the Combined Forces Command

(CFC). Any changes to the CFC posture must come through mutual

and verifiable confidence-building measures that increase

warning times for aggression.

I remain concerned about the lack of frequency clearances

granted by the ROK government to U.S. forces for planning and

training. For example, there are no frequencies cleared to

support UAV training on the peninsula. Likewise, we are

currently limited to only 126 VHF/FM frequencies for planning

purposes, far short of the over 1,000 frequencies we would

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expect in an operational scenario. We will continue to work to

resolve this deficiency.

Whatever the future holds, it remains in the interests of

both the Republic of Korea and the United States to have a

continued U.S. forward presence on the Korean Peninsula. Recent

developments have been encouraging. The recent renewal of our

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the conclusion of the No Gun

Ri investigation, and the agreement on missile guidelines

reflect the mature relationship between the United States and

South Korea and provide a strong foundation for future

cooperation on the Korean Peninsula. The Commander in Chief of

U.S. Forces Korea has also proposed a Land Partnership Plan

that, once enacted by Korea, will make U.S. force presence less

burdensome while enhancing training and combined warfighting

capability. We also will begin negotiations for a new Special

Measures Agreement that we hope would increase South Korea’s

financial support for the stationing of U.S. troops in the

country.

The Republic of Korea increasingly contributes to meeting

regional security challenges by contributing 419 troops to

peacekeeping in East Timor, consulting and cooperating with the

JSDF, participating in exercises such as RIMPAC (a major,

multilateral naval exercise) and PACIFIC REACH (a submarine

rescue exercise also involving naval forces from Japan,

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Singapore and the United States), and participating as observers

in TEAM CHALLENGE.

China

During the past year, military developments in China have

been mixed. A White Paper issued in February 2000 emphasized

China’s commitment to peacefully resolving its differences with

Taiwan, but also specified conditions that could trigger the use

of force against Taiwan. Chinese military spending increased,

and Beijing continued to acquire advanced weapon systems from

Russia.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is modernizing and

making organizational changes in all branches of service to

strengthen homeland defense, expand regional influence and

support sovereignty claims to Taiwan and the South China Sea.

China continues to increase its modern combat aircraft inventory

and improve air defenses, particularly across the Taiwan Strait.

The PLA navy conducted sea trials for eventually fielding

additional surface ships and submarines, continued testing of

anti-ship missiles, and received its second modern Russian

guided missile destroyer. PLA ground forces continued

downsizing to reduce force structure and increase mobility. The

PLA missile force continued testing and fielding of newer inter-

continental and short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and is

building additional SRBM launch sites within range of Taiwan.

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China’s exercise program, while extensive, was not explicitly

threatening to Taiwan.

Over the past year, we have reinitiated military relations

with China on a realistic foundation. We have fashioned

policies that offer China areas for productive relations, while

ensuring that we can deal with a more confrontational posture,

should it be necessary. We emphasize areas of mutual interest

and encourage Chinese participation in regional security

cooperation while maintaining that diplomacy, not armed force,

should settle disputes.

We have exchanged visits between senior PLA delegations and

U.S. counterparts, and ships have conducted reciprocal port

visits. PLA forces participated in a search-and-rescue exercise

in the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong, and four

Chinese officials (two from the PLA and two from the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs) attended the Asia-Pacific Center for Security

Studies in Honolulu. We have invited the PLA to participate in

more multinational conferences on topics involving regional

security cooperation than it has chosen to attend. We carefully

vet our engagement in accordance with the National Defense

Authorization Act.

The Taiwan armed forces also continue their restructuring

and force modernization. A civilian Defense Minister now

oversees the armed forces. The Taiwan military relies heavily

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on the United States to modernize its forces. Through last

year’s arms sales, Taiwan’s armed forces increased surveillance

capabilities and modernized air-to-air, air-to-ground and air-

to-surface weapons. Taiwan is looking forward in its

modernization plans by improving a number of bases and

infrastructure to support acquisition of future weapons.

As Taiwan modernizes its armed forces to ensure a

sufficient defense, training, inter-service interoperability and

logistics support become even more important. The Taiwan armed

forces will have to put resources and attention into these areas

to retain the qualitative edge.

Based upon our assessments, I conclude that the changes in

PLA and Taiwan military forces have not significantly altered

the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's

military maintains a qualitative edge over the PLA, and the PLA

still lacks the capability to invade and hold Taiwan. China

maintains a quantitative edge in all branches of service, but

does not have adequate power projection to quickly overcome

Taiwan’s more modern air force and inherent geographical

advantages, which favor defense. Beijing’s military forces,

however, have the ability to inflict significant damage to

Taiwan.

We expect China to accelerate military modernization, but

pressing economic and social issues will temper this effort.

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Military modernization will not decisively alter the military

situation across the Strait in the next several years. The

continuing buildup of Chinese Ballistic missiles, combined with

increases in accuracy, will increasingly pressure the

sufficiency of Taiwan's defenses. The U.S. - China - Taiwan

relationship will continue to be a critical factor in our

regional engagement strategy.

India

U.S. military relations with India have been restricted

since India’s nuclear weapons tests in 1998. Areas for military

cooperation exist, however. Peacekeeping is the most promising.

We have also agreed to discuss search-and-rescue, humanitarian

assistance, and environmental security. The U.S. and India have

also set up a working group to address counter-terrorism

cooperation. The response to India’s recent earthquake

demonstrated the value of cooperation, both civilian and

military. We are pursuing opportunities to build a foundation

for closer relations. I believe a gradual strengthening of

military interaction is in the interests of both countries. The

more we work with India and Pakistan, the better we can defuse

tensions by supporting productive relations between those two

nuclear-armed countries.

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Insurgents and Communal Violence

Beyond Kashmir, which remains a flash point of tension

between India and Pakistan, insurgents and communal violence

affect many states in the Asia-Pacific Region.

Indonesia faces violent separatist movements in Aceh and

Irian Jaya (West Papua) and sectarian violence in the Maluku

Islands and Kalimantan. Intense fighting on the Jaffna

Peninsula between the Tamil Tigers and Sri Lankan armed forces

continues without significant gains by either side. Nepal faces

an increasingly troublesome Maoist insurgency. For much of the

year, the Philippine armed forces have battled the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front (MILF) and operated against hostage takers,

including the Abu Sayyaf, which took American Jeffrey Schilling

hostage. Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and the Philippines are

still searching for the right combination of political, economic

development, and military/police measures to effectively address

these insurgencies and sectarian strife.

In Fiji, a coup overthrew the democratically elected

government, and the Solomon Islands have experienced separatist

violence that caused a change in government and the evacuation

of foreign nationals. Also, fighting among various ethnic

groups on Burma’s borders, much of it connected to illegal drug

trafficking, has spilled into Thailand.

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Communal violence not only causes suffering and slows the

political, social and economic development of countries in the

region; violence also fosters terrorism, causes refugees to

migrate, and creates humanitarian disasters that spill across

national borders.

Indonesia

Indonesia is still undergoing major political, social and

economic changes after 40 years of authoritarian rule.

The Armed Forces of Indonesia, or TNI, began reforms in

1999 that they have yet to complete. The reforms call for the

TNI to become a professional, modern armed force, focused on

external defense and divorced from political practices. The

number of TNI seats in parliament has been reduced and the

police force separated from the TNI. However, elements of the

TNI have been reluctant to continue reforms. The TNI remains a

major political force, particularly on the local level, and

retains the major role in internal security. It has not

brought under control the militias in West Timor, resulting in

the deaths of three UN workers and a continuing security threat

to East Timor, nor has it yet brought to justice any of those

who orchestrated or engaged on atrocities in East or West Timor.

TNI reform is an important aspect of restoring order in

Indonesia in a manner that promotes democratic development and

regional security.

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Most interactions between U.S. and Indonesian armed forces

have been suspended until there is credible progress toward

accountability for East Timor human rights abuses and the return

or resettlement of refugees. During the past year, limited

interaction with the TNI involved a Navy humanitarian exercise

and Indonesian Air Force observers at Exercise COBRA GOLD. The

objectives of interaction with the TNI are to favor reform and

build capability for coalition operations.

Under the protection of International peacekeepers, East

Timor today is generally secure from the militias, but the work

has just begun to establish a fully functioning society. Our

Australian allies did a great job in leading this UN-mandated

peace operation and remain the backbone of the security forces.

The Philippines and Thailand have stepped forward to assume

leadership of the peacekeeping forces since it became a UN

operation. The U.S. armed forces continue to conduct operations

in East Timor by providing liaison officers, engineers and

humanitarian assistance during ship visits.

Philippines

The Philippines experienced a peaceful transition of power

from former President Estrada to former Vice President Gloria

Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA). Throughout the period of the

impeachment hearings and transfer of authority, the Armed Forces

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of the Philippines (AFP) acted with restraint and used

constitutional precepts as guiding principles.

Following the ratification of the Visiting Forces Agreement

(VFA) in May 1999, the frequency and quality of interactions

between U.S. and Philippine armed forces has also improved.

The AFP has actively participated in initiatives to enhance

regional cooperation and promote regional security. It deserves

credit for taking a leading and responsible role in East Timor,

contributing ground forces to the International Force in East

Timor (INTERFET) coalition, providing the first force commander

for the peacekeeping force of the UN Transition Authority for

East Timor (UNTAET).

The United States maintains its Mutual Defense Treaty with

the Philippines, and our defense relations have steadily

improved over the past year. The Defense Experts Exchange, a

consultative group established between OSD and the Philippines

Department of National Defense in 1999, has made progress in

identifying the Philippines’ national security and force

structure needs. The talks address ways to help the Philippines

increase readiness and become a more active contributor to

regional security. Operations with, and assistance from, the

United States cannot substitute for adequately funded armed

forces, and the Philippines has not yet made the necessary

investments.

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The Philippines continues to face significant internal

security challenges from organizations such as the MILF, the

Communist New People’s Army (NPA) and the Abu Sayyaf Group.

This past year, the United States initiated a $2M program using

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related (NADR)

Program funds to train and equip a counter-terrorist unit that

will improve the AFP’s capability to deal with hostage taking

and other terrorist incidents.

Thailand

A strategic ally, strongly oriented to U.S. military

training and equipment, Thailand aspires to adopt force

modernization and "jointness" along U.S. models. Thailand

consistently responds positively to U.S. requests for access,

training, and transit. Thailand is one of the nations in Asia

most committed to building regional approaches to future

challenges – peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and

transnational concerns. Exercise COBRA GOLD in Thailand is

developing into a multilateral training event to improve

participating countries’ capabilities to cooperate in

peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

Thailand has taken a leading Southeast Asian regional role

in support of peacekeeping by maintaining battalion strength

forces in East Timor. The current military commander in East

Timor is Thai LTG Boonsrang Niumpradit. We support humanitarian

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demining in Thailand and will transfer that program over to

Thailand by FY02. Joint Task Force Full Accounting Detachment-1

in Bangkok logistically anchors our POW/MIA recovery efforts

throughout Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.

Within the last year, Thailand has requested U.S.

assistance to the Royal Thai Army in combating drug traffic

across the Burma-Thai border. U.S. Pacific Command is in the

early stages of establishing a modest program of assistance

against this common threat. Joint Interagency Task Force West

(JIATF-WEST) is the standing task force for all counterdrug (CD)

issues in the theater and has the lead to work training,

equipment, and organizational coordination initiatives to assist

the Thais with their CD mission.

Australia

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the ANZUS treaty,

and Australia remains America’s closest ally in the Asia-Pacific

region. Australian armed forces not only took the lead in East

Timor operations, but they remain the largest part of the UN

security force there. They also evacuated civilians and

provided peace monitors in Bougainville and the Solomon Islands.

The Australian government has been active in promoting the

return of democracy in Fiji and in promoting security and

peaceful development throughout the archipelagic states of

Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. Australia has also

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constructively engaged in dialogue with China and North Korea to

promote peace in Northeast Asia.

In recognition of our special relationship, we have pursued

an agreement to exempt qualified Australian firms from U.S.

International Traffic in Arms Regulations controlling

unclassified military technology.

Australia recently completed an extensive Australia Defence

2000 White Paper that clearly lays out its future defense

requirements. The White Paper achieved broad national support

and general bipartisan consensus through a unique consultation

process that involved the public and all government agencies.

The product is a plan to acquire the skills and equipment

Australia will need to succeed across the full range of defense

tasks, along with required funding.

Singapore

Completion of the deep draft pier at Changi Naval Base

signifies Singapore's contribution and desire for continued U.S.

presence in the region. Though not an ally, Singapore is a

solid security partner in the Asia-Pacific region, a vocal

proponent for U.S. access, and supports and hosts multilateral

activities. Singapore hosted PACIFIC REACH, a multi-lateral

submarine rescue exercise; participated in COBRA GOLD and in

numerous anti-piracy regional conferences; and is planning a

regional Mine Counter-Mine exercise in May 2001.

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Singapore seeks greater interoperability with the U.S.

Armed Forces. It views high technology and advanced hardware as

a deterrent and is increasing its cooperation with the U.S. in

Joint Experimentation. Singapore participates with the

Extension of the Littoral Battlespace Advanced Concept

Technology Demonstration (ACTD) and is active in other

experiments such as the Joint Mission Force and Asia Pacific

Area Network.

POW/MIA Efforts in Southeast Asia

Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF-FA) continues to make

progress on achieving the fullest possible accounting of

Americans unaccounted for as a result of the conflict in

Southeast Asia. JTF-FA conducted ten joint field activities

(JFAs) in FY00 -- four in Vietnam, five in Laos, and one in

Cambodia. During these JFAs, the JTF-FA field teams

investigated 219 cases and excavated 44 sites. JTF-FA will

continue to maintain its robust pace of operations in FY01, with

ten JFAs scheduled – four in Vietnam, five in Laos, and one in

Cambodia. Each JFA is about 30 days in duration.

In calendar year 2000, 40 sets of remains previously

recovered in JTF-FA operations were successfully identified and

returned to their loved ones. As of January 31, 2001, Americans

unaccounted for total 1,900. In the same period, JTF-FA

recovered and repatriated 24 remains we believe to be those of

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unaccounted-for Americans from Southeast Asia (17 from Vietnam

and 7 from Laos).

Achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans is a

U.S. Pacific Command priority, and we will continue to devote

the necessary personnel and resources to obtain the answers the

POW/MIA families so richly deserve.

U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND PRIORITIES

The challenges to security and peaceful development in the

Asia-Pacific region require regional cooperation to address

effectively. They include:

- Unresolved wars in Korea, across the Taiwan Strait, and in

Kashmir that have flared, on occasion, but have been

restrained for over 50 years.

- Conflicting territorial claims such as the Spratly Islands,

the Kuril Islands, and the Senkaku Islands.

- Major powers – China, India, and Russia – that seek greater

roles in regional security.

- Communal violence driven by separatist movements and

historic grievances.

- And transnational concerns – including terrorism, illegal

drug trafficking, piracy, and weapons proliferation.

Our objective is an economically prosperous and

interdependent region that shares dependable expectations of

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peaceful change. To achieve this objective, the strategy of the

U.S. Pacific Command involves:

- Deterring aggression in Korea;

- Determining the future of Taiwan by peaceful means;

- Encouraging responsible development of growing powers;

- Developing multilateral capabilities to handle complex

contingencies and transnational challenges;

- Planning for transition as security challenges evolve;

- And transforming our armed forces to increase their

warfighting edge.

The priorities for the U.S. Pacific Command in executing

this strategy continue to be readiness, regional engagement,

transformation, and resources.

(1) Readiness

During my comments today, I will discuss the status of many

programs. I should note, however, that the programs I will

discuss, and the associated funding levels may change as a

result of the Secretary’s strategy review which will guide

future decisions on military spending. The Administration will

determine final 2002 and outyear funding levels only when the

review is complete. I ask that you consider my comments in that

light.

U.S. Pacific Command forces must be fully ready to execute

any assigned mission. Readiness revolves around people. If we

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are to recruit and retain the quality personnel that we need,

service must be professionally rewarding to the members of our

armed forces and must meet their personal and family needs. If

we do not meet their basic professional and personal needs, they

have many, often more lucrative, alternatives to a life of

service to their Nation.

Professionally and personally rewarding service involves

confidence that financial compensation is fair, that educational

opportunities are available to prepare for a world that values

knowledge, and that healthcare is adequate. It also involves

the provision and maintenance of suitable housing and facilities

in which to live and work. It involves confidence that we fill

personnel billets to match the tasking and that we are properly

trained to conduct the full spectrum of operations expected of

us. It involves having the resources to maintain equipment in a

high state of readiness both during and between deployments, and

adequate munitions to train and fight. It involves adequately

protecting our forces on and off duty.

Pay, Education, and Healthcare. First, let me thank you

for all the positive quality of life initiatives in the FY01

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The pay raise of 3.7

percent, targeted Pay Table reform for mid-grade non-

commissioned officers, Basic Allowance for Housing amendments,

partial reimbursement for mandatory pet quarantine fees, impact

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aid to help civilian schools educate military dependents, and

Tuition Assistance up to 100 percent for off-duty education are

all outstanding efforts that servicemen and women appreciate.

Also, thanks to your support, the performance of DoD schools is

second to none, though we need help in funding operating

expenses and maintaining infrastructure.

We greatly appreciate the initiatives of the 106th Congress

to enhance the TRICARE benefit and its coverage to include our

retirees over the age of 65. This is the right thing to do --

such Quality of Life enhancements favorably impact recruitment

and retention and ultimately force readiness. And yet,

challenges remain in establishing consistent, adequate funding

of the healthcare benefit in a way that does not compromise

other essential programs. We must ensure health services

support functions organic to our operating forces, which are not

in the Defense Health Program, receive adequate funding and

attention within the Service POMs.

Real Property Maintenance. Real property maintenance (RPM)

continues to reveal the combined effects of aging facilities and

under funding. The current and accumulating RPM backlog for

U.S. Pacific Command components will amount to $7.1B over the

next five years, assuming no fundamental changes emerge from the

Secretary of Defense’s ongoing strategy review. Funding

intended for facilities repair and maintenance often goes to

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more immediate operational needs, and the backlog grows. The

result is that our camps, posts and stations across the U.S.

Pacific Command are shabby and deteriorating. This shortfall in

real property maintenance affects readiness, quality of life,

retention, and force protection that we can no longer ignore.

Our people deserve to live and work in a quality environment.

Housing. Good top rate housing that meets family housing

goals of 2010 remains one of my top quality of life concerns.

Projects are underway, ranging from whole barracks renewals at

Fort Richardson, Alaska, and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to new

family housing at Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii.

Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), Pacific Air

Forces (PACAF), and Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) expect to

meet the 2010 housing goal if funding continues at current

levels for their programs. U.S. Army Pacific (USARPAC)

anticipates adequate housing for Hawaii by 2010 if their

Residential Community Initiative is successful. However,

housing in Alaska and Japan will remain inadequate until

substantial MILCON funding is allocated to their revitalization

programs. U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) and U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ)

also face shortages, forcing service members to live off base in

Korea and Japan, often in inadequate housing. Lack of available

real estate acquisition for new housing is the biggest obstacle

in Japan and Korea. When additional real estate is procured, we

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will need additional MILCON Housing funding to meet requirements

above what Host Nation Funded Construction can provide in Japan

and Korea.

Munitions. Although we are beginning to procure additional

munitions, because they have just recently entered full-rate

production, or have yet to do so, a number of preferred munitions

are available only in limited quantities and do not support

training and operational requirements. Such already limited

quantities have been drawn down as a result of expenditures in

Kosovo and ongoing consumption in Operation SOUTHERN WATCH and

NORTHERN WATCH. Alternative munitions will get the job done, but

with greater combat risk and losses. Funding to further increase

stock levels of preferred and precision munitions is a top

priority.

Force Protection. Before the terrorist bombing of the USS

COLE, U.S. Pacific Command’s Force Protection Program had

expanded over the last year to include rear-area protection

program during increased hostilities and critical infrastructure

protection. The COLE bombing resulted in a command-wide, top-

to-bottom review of our antiterrorism policies and procedures.

Funding obtained through the Combating Terrorism Readiness

Initiative Fund (CBT RIF) has helped with critical emergent

requirements, but the U.S. Pacific Command still has $110M in

unfunded requirements. Joint Staff Integrated Vulnerability

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Assessments (JSIVA) play a significant role in assessing our

program and identifying requirements.

Following the COLE bombing, the Command began a full

reassessment of vulnerabilities at ports and airfields not under

U.S. control. Negotiating force protection memoranda of

understanding with foreign countries is an ongoing process to

ensure clearly delineated responsibilities.

A major challenge is to prevent increased effort from

becoming a bureaucratic drill rather than a routine way of

operating. Instructions and checklists help, but they are not

enough. Our commanders must think tactically about force

protection. On every deployment, every exercise and even at

home stations, we must ingrain force protection in the very

fabric of our forces. Having said that, terrorists can choose

their time and place of attack. That gives them an advantage.

As long as we are engaged around the world, there will be

further attacks. Our goal is to minimize the impact to our

forces.

Staffing, Training, and Operations. As we exploit

information technology and revise our organizations, the

character of combatant command headquarters is changing.

Increasingly, headquarters staffs perform operational functions

that forward forces used to do. As examples, my staff in Hawaii

provided many logistics, communications and intelligence support

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functions for our operations in East Timor that allowed us to

keep the number of U.S. personnel in country to a minimum. This

further reduced requirements for force protection and living

support. Also, PACAF is establishing a Joint Air Operations

Center at Hickam Air Force Base. This center will similarly

perform many functions of the Joint Forces Air Component

Coordinator, reducing the number of personnel that must forward

deploy to conduct operations.

As our headquarters staffs become more involved in

supporting operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in addition

to their administrative functions, we are finding our staffs

working harder than before, even as they downsize. We have

turned to the Reserve Components for help, and they have done a

splendid job. But our shortfalls are growing, and we are just

beginning to exploit the capability that information technology

gives us to allow forward forces to reach back to staffs.

Increasingly, the measure of staffs to deployed forces is

shifting from “tooth to tail” toward “brain to brawn.” While

the FY01 NDAA provides some relief from the FY98 and FY00 NDAAs,

there is still a requirement for OSD designated activities to

reduce personnel by 7.5 percent. These additional headquarters

cuts will hinder our ability to provide effective management and

oversight of command readiness and operations. It will be

difficult to execute these reductions in a way that does not

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impact our operational readiness. In the U.S. Pacific Command

our staffs are fully engaged in operations forward.

We are experiencing shortfalls not only in available

billets, but also in the funds needed to train, exercise and

operate our forces. Particular areas affecting readiness are

funding for flight hours, ship depot maintenance, joint

exercises, and reserve support.

The funds allocated to component flying hour programs (FHP)

are increasing, but not fast enough to cover escalating costs.

The rising costs of fuel and spare parts for aging aircraft

appear to be driving the escalation. These costs may increase

even faster in the years ahead as DoD aircraft and avionics fall

further behind commercial standards. The Navy FHP is growing 15

percent annually. PACFLT is facing a $317M shortfall this FY

(FY01). This figure includes a MARFORPAC shortfall of $94M.

Both PACFLT and MARFORPAC would exhaust their FY01 FHP funding

by August without reprogramming funds. USARPAC’s and PACAF’s

programs also have shortfalls. The Services increasingly rely

upon supplemental appropriations to avert the consequences of

unprogrammed escalation in operations and maintenance program

costs.

PACFLT’s Ship Depot Maintenance Program continues to be

underfunded relative to the full requirement. Growing deferred

maintenance backlogs have been kept in check largely through

29

execution year supplemental funding from Congress. This affects

battle group inter-deployment training readiness, which

continues to decline as training resources are continually

sacrificed to maintain deployed readiness. Forces enter

training cycles at low state of readiness, fall to lower levels

and then "recover" rapidly right before deployment. The

resultant “spikes” in our readiness curves could become

vulnerabilities if asked to respond to unforeseen contingencies.

The ability of U.S. joint forces to fight in a seamless

battle space and to conduct combined operations with our

coalition partners will provide the greatest gains in U.S.

warfighting capability over the coming decade. Joint training

represents 5 percent of the operations tempo (OPTEMPO) of forces

assigned to U.S. Pacific Command. Currently, we are well within

the congressionally mandated joint exercise man-days reduction

directives. Our USPACOM-wide man-day reduction through FY00 was

32 percent, 7 percent below the objective of 25 percent.

Simultaneously, we have shaped a solid Joint Training Program.

This program provides us confidence that our Joint Task Forces

(JTFs) are ready to fight. Further fiscal reductions to the

Joint Exercise Program put our JTF and joint warfighting

readiness at risk. We need full funding of the currently

planned minimum exercise program. This includes Service

Incremental Funding and the Strategic Lift (STRATLIFT) provided

30

through the Chairman’s Exercise Program. Inflation of flying

hour costs has increased exponentially over recent years,

significantly eroding our STRATLIFT buying power. This impacts

us greatly in USPACOM where STRATLIFT is our lifeblood due to

our vast area of responsibility (AOR). We need full funding to

ensure we get the right forces, to the right place, to exercise

with the right joint and coalition partners, so we can indeed

remain ready.

Shortfalls also exist in funding designed to employ reserve

and National Guard personnel. U.S. Pacific Command’s reserve

billets are based upon a single major theater war. Reservists'

two week training period is sufficient for them to support one

major exercise per year, which leaves the command short of

personnel to support several other major exercises in the joint

training plan. Defense plans include provisions for Reserve

personnel to volunteer to support exercises, but funds are

inadequate to accommodate the volunteers.

Summary. Overall, the majority of readiness concerns of a

year ago remain today. While making progress in some areas, we

are declining in others. I continue to have no reservations

about the U.S. Pacific Command’s ability to do its job today.

However, I do have doubts about its ability to do so in the

future unless we make more progress in addressing structural

readiness issues.

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(2) Regional Engagement

While readiness prepares us to respond, through regional

engagement we shape the region to promote security and peaceful

development. Current circumstances provide the opportunity and

the necessity to develop more mature security arrangements among

the nations of the region. Opportunities derive from dynamic

regional security developments and a new generation of leaders

willing to reexamine what policies are genuinely in their

national interest. Necessity derives from strong nationalism,

ethnic and religious rivalry, and historic grievances that drive

desires to settle old scores prevalent throughout the region.

Steady and focused efforts ensure the region develops in ways

favorable to American interests.

Engagement is a process to achieve national objectives, not

an end in itself. Our efforts improves the ability of regional

partners to defend themselves, deters potential aggressors,

strengthens security alliances and partnerships, increases

regional readiness for combined operations, promotes access for

American forces to facilities in the region, and promotes

security arrangements better suited to the challenges of the 21st

century.

Enhanced Regional Cooperation. Over the past year, the

U.S. Pacific Command has worked closely with the Joint Staff,

Office of the Secretary of Defense and the interagency community

32

to develop enhanced regional cooperation. The objectives of

enhancing regional cooperation have been to improve regional

readiness for combined operations and to expand the set of

states in the region that share dependable expectations of

peaceful change.

Transnational concerns affect all states in the region in

varying degrees. Many of the states in the region contribute

armed forces and police to UN peacekeeping operations.

Terrorism, weapons proliferation, illegal drug trafficking,

illegal migration, piracy, and other transnational criminal

activities represent problems that require regional cooperation.

Some of this is police work, and some of it is military work.

Different countries organize differently. Since adversaries

operate freely without regard for borders, seeking support,

bases of operation, and weak points to attack throughout our

region, the only way to win against them is international

cooperation.

By developing capabilities to work effectively as

coalitions in complex contingencies (such as East Timor); as

partners in countering terrorism, illegal drug trafficking, and

piracy; in managing the consequences of chemical, biological or

nuclear attacks, natural disasters and accidents; in evacuating

citizens caught in the path of violence; in search-and-rescue of

mariners in distress; and in providing humanitarian assistance,

33

the armed forces of the region improve their readiness to

contribute to combined operations. Working side-by-side on

these missions builds confidence and trust among the

participants as it improves operational capabilities. It

provides a way for states that want to exert more influence in

the region to do so in constructive ways that contribute to

regional security. And, it provides the United States with

competent coalition partners so that our armed forces need not

shoulder the entire load.

The U.S. Pacific Command’s efforts to enhance regional

security include expanding dialogue among the armed forces of

the region, developing standard procedures and training staffs

to use them, and exercising to hone our capabilities and learn

where to improve.

In addition to my visits around the region and those of my

component commanders, U.S. Pacific Command sponsors a wide range

of activities to promote regional security dialogue. The Asia-

Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS -- see Appendix A)

brings together military officers from around the region at the

colonel/brigadier level and government officials of equivalent

grades for a 12-week course. APCSS also conducts a one-week

course for more senior officers and officials, and hosts about

five conferences each year. The U.S. Pacific Command also hosts

annual conferences on military operational law and logistics,

34

and for the past three years has held a conference for Chiefs of

Defense from around the region. These conferences have been

very effective in promoting military cooperation against common

threats.

At the Chiefs’ conference, we also demonstrated our new

Asia-Pacific Area Network (APAN). APAN is a non-secure web

portal, which provides an internet-based communications and

collaboration ability for the armed forces of the region and

civilian organizations that participate in complex contingencies

to share sensitive, but unclassified, information. On it, we

have begun web-based collaboration by posting standard

procedures for combined operations. These web pages have

mechanisms so that anyone can suggest improvements. Like many

things on the web, no government signs up to use these

procedures, but they are available for those who need them.

Web-based planning and distributed simulations are also possible

to add new, affordable means to build regional capacity.

Additionally, the APAN concept provides a simple and economical

means to provide a networking of institutions and training

centers with this new form of collaboration and information

exchange. These networks will be the building blocks for Asia-

Pacific Security Communities that were previously unaffordable.

We also have held Multinational Planning Augmentation Team

(MPAT) conferences to refine procedures, and conducted workshops

35

to train staff officers from around the region as a cadre of

Asia-Pacific military planners ready to reinforce a

multinational force headquarters. We rely on lessons learned in

East Timor and other peacekeeping operations to improve the

region’s capability to conduct combined operations. In

November, the Philippines hosted an MPAT Staff Planning workshop

attended by eighteen nations, non-governmental organizations and

UN representatives. Many armed forces in the region want to

improve their abilities to work together, and use APAN to

continue their MPAT dialogue between workshops.

TEAM CHALLENGE links bilateral exercises COBRA GOLD with

Thailand, BALIKITAN with the Philippines, and TANDEM THRUST with

Australia to address bilateral training objectives and to

improve the readiness of regional armed forces to contribute to

multilateral operations. This year Singapore will participate

and other nations, such as Japan and Korea, will observe with an

eye toward participating in future years. In TEAM CHALLENGE we

will exercise elements from the full spectrum of missions that

our combined forces may be called upon to do together, from

complex contingencies to humanitarian assistance.

These are examples of efforts to enhance regional security

cooperation. As we progress, we find many requirements to

coordinate better on logistics, intelligence and other aspects

of our operations, and take steps such as developing a

36

coalition-wide area network (successfully employed in RIMPAC,

our multinational naval exercise). With cooperation from the

nations of the region, and the initiative that my staff and my

components have demonstrated, enhanced regional cooperation and

security communities have grown from a concept to a substantial

approach for promoting security and peaceful development over

the past year.

The reactions to the U.S. Pacific Command’s efforts have

been largely positive, with some reservations. Some allies have

expressed concern that multinational efforts will dilute the

quality of our bilateral relations. For enhanced regional

cooperation to succeed, we must strengthen our traditional

bilateral relations, focusing our efforts on capabilities to

pursue common interests, and then reach out to other nations in

the region. The TEAM CHALLENGE planning efforts have

demonstrated our commitment to meeting bilateral training

objectives and enhancing them with skills required for coalition

operations.

Other nations have expressed concerns that this is a

precursor to the United States reducing its involvement in the

region. Quite the contrary! By improving our capabilities to

work together, the nations of this critical region can more

effectively address the broad range of security challenges that

none can solve alone.

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Also, some nations fear that it is a scheme for containing

China. Instead, it is a way to encourage China to contribute to

regional security in constructive ways. We welcome the fact

that China has sent 15 police officers as part of the CIVPOL

contingent to East Timor. We would welcome greater Chinese

involvement in peacekeeping such as they provided in Cambodia in

1994. The last class at APCSS included two Peoples Liberation

Army (PLA) officers and two officials from the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs. They learned that many nations in the region

share American security concerns and that cooperation in many

areas is in China’s interest. The way ahead in U.S. Pacific

Command’s relations with the PLA is, with the support of other

armed forces, to encourage cooperation in areas where our

nations genuinely share mutual interests, while maintaining that

disputes must be resolved peacefully. As with many nations in

the region, we must work to transform PLA leadership mindsets

from measuring differences in military power to measuring

progress in regional security.

The $10M in Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI) funds

provided by Congress in FY00 and $24.6M provided in FY01 have

been essential to the initiatives to enhance regional

cooperation. The dollars we invest in these regional activities

pay huge dividends in U.S. security.

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Currently, U.S. Pacific Command interactions with armed

forces of 14 of the 43 nations in the region are restricted in

some form. Some of these restrictions are in the U.S. interest.

Others, I question. I encourage the close review of

restrictions to ensure we have drawn the lines at the right

places. The objective is to build relationships and influence

for the long term as we exact penalties in the short term.

Foreign Military Officer Education (FMOE). One area where

I would recommend eliminating restrictions is in foreign

military officer education. The experience of American officers

who have attended foreign military colleges provides an

unparalleled understanding of how foreign armed forces see their

role and approach operations. Similarly, foreign officers who

attend American military colleges develop an understanding of

the value of professional armed forces, removed from politics

and subordinate to civilian government authority. They come to

appreciate that reliance on force to resolve internal disputes,

rather than political accommodation and economic development,

stokes the fires of rebellion and drives away investments needed

for national growth. They also acquire a deeper appreciation of

America’s interest in maintaining international security so all

may prosper. The contacts they develop with Americans and

officers from their region establish a network for dialogue and

39

become particularly valuable as they assume leadership roles

within their armed forces.

International Military Education and Training (IMET). We

should also examine restrictions on many aspects of our IMET

program. Education is a long-term investment and the IMET

program, a main source of funding for FMOE, is our primary tool

in this effort. I believe unrestricted IMET programs are

fundamentally in the national interest. Some say military

education is a reward for countries that behave according to

international standards. On the contrary, military education is

a valuable tool we use to gain influence with foreign

militaries. Military training – teaching tactical skills and

equipment maintenance – should be carefully tailored and

controlled. However, military education – study at Command and

Staff Colleges – introduces the ideals of democracy, civilian

control of the military, and respect for human rights, and

should be available to all. Many reform-minded, pro-U.S.

military leaders in the Asia-Pacific region today are IMET

graduates who strongly advocate a continued U.S. presence and

engagement in Asia.

IMET is a modest, long-term investment to help build a

secure, peacefully developing Asia-Pacific region. Following a

declining trend, with your help U.S. Pacific Command’s funding

for IMET is now on the right path. In FY00 we received $6.659M

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for 17 countries, and in FY01 our budget is about $7.2M for 19

countries. Further increases would yield real benefits to U.S.

security.

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. U.S. ratification of

the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is another

action that would enhance regional security cooperation. Many

Asia-Pacific countries assert excessive maritime claims that

challenge navigation rights. Over the past few years, parties

disputing territory in the South China Sea have shifted their

approach from occupying reefs to negotiating over a Code of

Conduct. In this and other disputes, the U.S. position is that

agreements should be in accordance with UNCLOS. Ratification

will strengthen our hand in demanding compliance with UNCLOS

requirements and in countering excessive maritime claims.

Summary. We have continued to make significant progress

this year in better structuring our engagement programs in the

Asia-Pacific region to advance U.S. interests. Through

continued emphasis on education, dialogue, standard procedures,

staff training, improved communications, exercises and

coordination on matters of common interest, we will continue to

expand the set of nations in the Asia-Pacific region that share

dependable expectations of peaceful change. We will enhance

regional cooperation and access of U.S. forces to facilities in

41

the region, strengthen alliances and security partnerships, and

deter aggression.

(3) Transformation

Transformation involves changes in operational concepts and

organizational schemes that take advantage of technology to

provide decisive advantages in warfare. The Armed Forces of the

United States are committed to leading that change in the 21st

century. At U.S. Pacific Command, our Transformation strategy is

based on two parallel initiatives--technology insertion efforts

such as the Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD)

program run out of OSD and the Joint Experimentation program

that is led by U.S. Joint Forces Command.

Since I last spoke with you, U.S. Pacific Command has been

rewarded for its aggressive pursuit of ACTDs with three FY01 new

start ACTDs and a fourth ACTD-like project, bringing the total

number of ACTDs we are involved in today to thirteen.

The Tactical Missile Systems-Penetrator ACTD will provide a

penetrator weapon designed to deal with specific high threat

targets in Korea within three years. The Coalition Theater

Logistics ACTD will provide vital logistics command and control

capabilities for coalition forces operating in campaigns similar

to that in East Timor. The Hunter Standoff Killer Team ACTD

will provide vital joint C4I capabilities to engage time

critical targets and massed armor. The Coalition Rear Area

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Security Operations Command and Control (CRASOC2) is an ACTD-

like project in that it will have streamlined management and

early operator involvement. CRASOC2 will develop force

protection C4I capabilities to improve coordination between U.S.

security forces and host nation police and military agencies for

improved protection of our forces stationed overseas.

The Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration program is

serving U.S. Pacific Command well. We need such programs

designed to get advanced technology rapidly into the field for

evaluation and experimentation.

The pace of joint experimentation in the U.S. Pacific

Command has increased since I last testified before you. Over

the past year, U.S. Pacific Command has supported U.S. Joint

Forces Command in the Unified Vision and Millennium Challenge

series of experiments and planning conferences. We participated

in Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID) 2000 as a

primary demonstration site and the Combined Task Force

Commander’s headquarters in the Pacific Scenario. We have

agreed to team, as host CINC, with the Joint Staff and U.S.

Marine Corps in the execution of JWID 2002-2003 and have already

stepped forward to influence the C4ISR interoperability

challenges that will be addressed. We continue efforts to

develop joint interoperability at the tactical level through the

Expanding the Littoral Battlespace (ELB) ACTD. With the support

43

of U.S. Joint Forces Command and the Services, we have made

significant progress in developing the Joint Mission Force (JMF)

concept into a capability.

A Joint Mission Force is a seamless Joint/Combined Pacific

Theater response force capable of accomplishing the full

spectrum of missions from a complex contingency through

humanitarian assistance and of serving as the leading edge of a

major war. This force will execute operations more effectively,

rapidly and efficiently than we can today. This transformation

effort has moved from its infancy into wargames and exercises

that enhance our ability to rapidly form and deploy a Joint Task

Force. We have identified the top 10 challenges to more

effective Joint Task Force operations and have made significant

progress in developing procedures to address them. We also have

incorporated JMF and other mature experimentation into our

exercise program.

We have concentrated our efforts over the past year on the

improvements we need to establish a relevant, common operational

picture and communicate tasking and information among the

headquarters of components of a Joint Task Force. Our JMF

Command and Control exercise program, or C2X, is identifying

clear requirements to enable a JTF and assess where specific

deficiencies exist, with the intent of fixing deficiencies by

2003. We are receiving strong support from the Services in

44

rectifying these deficiencies that are basic to our joint

warfighting capability. The greatest gains in warfighting

capability that we will see over the coming decade will come

from our ability to eliminate seams in the battlespace and let

all units assigned to a Joint Task Force exploit their full

potential. We have received significant financial and staff

support from U.S. Joint Forces Command in taking the JMF concept

from its infancy to a near-term capability. By including our

allies and close security partners in our wargames, we ensure

that our JMF efforts are in harmony with our other efforts to

improve regional readiness for combined operations.

Australia, Japan, Korea, and Singapore all have the

technological resources to work with the United States in

developing advanced warfare capabilities. We share information

on our efforts with these countries, and work together to

improve coalition interoperability at the high end of military

technology.

Some have expressed concerns that by strengthening

coalition capabilities and working with potential adversaries on

skills required for peacekeeping operations and complex

contingencies, we are jeopardizing our warfighting edge. The

reverse is true. We are continuing to widen the gap in

warfighting capabilities between the United States, its allies

and partners, and potential adversaries. As we experiment, we

45

improve our readiness, enhance regional cooperation, and

transform our forces to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Indeed, U.S. Pacific Command’s priorities of readiness,

regional engagement, and Transformation are not wholly distinct

activities. Let me try to bring this idea alive by describing a

visionary Western Pacific deployment of a carrier battle group

(CVBG) on its way to the Arabian Gulf.

During workups, the battle group acts as the Navy component

of a joint task force under a realistic exercise scenario. The

battle group maintains a common operating picture with a JTF

commander’s headquarters and subordinate Service components.

During that time, it experiments with a new C4 system being

developed by the Army – for example a new version of the

Coalition Wide Area Network -- holding Common Operational

Picture checks with brigade headquarters in Australia, Singapore

and the Philippines.

- As the battle group approaches Japan, it forms a two-carrier

task force, and conducts an area access exercise involving

Japanese and ROK forces in both coalition and opposition force

roles. The battle group joins the Japanese Global Command and

Control System (GCCS).

- It then integrates into the Korean area air defense and

conducts experiments integrating joint and combined fires,

including live ordnance fire on ranges.

46

- The task force then transits from Korea down to the South

China Sea.

- It exercises operational deception, employing information from

national technical means to evaluate effectiveness;

- It conducts Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) exercises, working the

seams between CVBG and area ASW in littoral regions,

developing new concepts and establishing C4SIR requirements.

- It exercises area air and missile defense with an Air Force

component out of Okinawa and Guam, working Air Tasking Order

improvements and experiments with information operations, and

routinely operating with Global Hawk to hone new joint

concepts.

- The transit culminates with a dissimilar air engagement

exercise with Singapore and port calls in South East Asia.

During the port calls, battle group officers hold seminars

with counterparts in host countries to improve coalition

interoperability at the tactical level.

All of this could be done in 10-14 days. And what would we have

accomplished?

- Increased readiness of all forces involved, to respond to

contingencies;

- Conducted regional engagement that both reassured allies, and

deterred those who would use aggression to impose their will;

47

- Made progress in transforming the way we operate, both to take

advantage of emerging technology and to address emerging

challenges.

This vignette illustrates that readiness, regional

engagement, and the transformation of our armed forces are not

distinct efforts, accomplished by separate organizations at

separate times. We do them together, with operational units.

If we experiment and adapt, we are increasing our readiness,

while we make the evolutionary changes in technology and

concepts which will lead to the transformation of warfighting.

If we do them with our allies and security partners, we have the

most effective kind of military engagement.

Transforming our armed forces to maintain their leading

edge and interoperability with coalition partners is essential

to protecting American security interests in the 21st century.

Several members of Congress have been active in pushing us to

pursue this program, and we need your continued support and

leadership.

(4) Resources

The U.S. Pacific Command’s ability to execute its strategy

rests on its ability to command ready, forward-deployed and

forward-stationed forces, to move them where they need to be in

the theater, and to reinforce them in the event of a major war.

Ultimately this depends on the resources Congress and the

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American taxpayers provide us. In this section, I will discuss

resources in several key areas that are important to the Pacific

Command’s strategy.

Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (C4)

Capabilities

Information technology is changing every aspect of warfare

in an evolutionary way and warfare as a whole in a revolutionary

way. From my perspective, C4 support fits into three main

categories: 1) an end-to-end infrastructure; 2) the capability

to integrate and process data into usable information and make

it available when needed; and 3) the protection of information.

First, the end-to-end enterprise enhances the ability to

command and control forces and consists of a space segment, a

downlink capability and the ground segment.

The U.S. Pacific Command’s vast area of operations,

covering 52 percent of the earth’s surface, requires forces to

rely heavily on strategic satellite communications (SATCOM).

Since my testimony to you last year, we’ve made great strides in

many of the SATCOM programs. For example, we accelerated the

Advanced Extremely High Frequency program to compensate for a

Milstar launch failure; agreed to launch a third Wideband

Gapfiller System satellite to complete global coverage as the

Defense Satellite Communications System constellation

replacement; and scheduled the launches of the three Milstar

49

satellites. The challenge is to keep these critical satellite

programs on track.

As I also stated last year, my Joint Task Force commanders

and deployed units must have access to the strategic defense

information infrastructure, the Global Information Grid, or GIG.

This capability is critical to providing them with vital

command, control, and intelligence information. I strongly

supported the DoD Teleport program, as did many of my fellow

CINCs, and I am now satisfied that this program is on course.

Advances in the space segment and downlink capability

provide little value if we cannot push the information out to

the user. The base, post, camp, and station infrastructures

must keep pace. Since we still have antiquated cable plants,

network wiring, and end-user equipment, we must attack this

ground infrastructure as aggressively as we have the space

segment. The recent decision that injected significant funding

into the U.S. Army’s European and Pacific theaters is a

tremendous boost in our fight to keep pace with technology, and

I applaud your and OSD’s efforts in directing that funding to

us. However, requirements go beyond the U.S. Army. The U.S.

Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps are also encountering the same

problems and require much-needed funding support if we are to

modernize entire theaters. While single-Service efforts

significantly help in the modernization battle, we realize

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maximum payoffs when we collectively raise all Services to the

same capability level.

Not to be overlooked in the end-to-end infrastructure is

the frequency spectrum. We must proceed cautiously with the

sell-off of DoD frequencies since that loss directly translates

into potential operational risks. Once we sell them, they are

forever unavailable for military use.

The second C4 category involves converting data into useful

information that will optimize synchronous planning and

execution, and improve decision support. At the heart of this

requirement is interoperability and accessibility.

Interoperability allows all parties to share the same

capabilities and information, while accessibility allows them to

get the information they require when and where they need it.

The Global Command and Control System (GCCS) is the

backbone of the joint and combined command and control

capability. Yet, Service variants of GCCS are not fully

interoperable with the Joint version. For example, the GCCS

Integrated Imagery and Intelligence application being developed

for the Joint version of GCCS is falling behind, while the

Services continue to modernize their individual intelligence

applications. To fix this, we must mandate new C4 systems be

Joint 'from cradle to grave.'

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There are also GCCS incompatibilities in combined

operations; for example, GCCS Joint and GCCS-Korea. These two

systems share some common operational picture data, but do not

share information via files, e-mail, and other web service

tools. Obstacles to combined interoperability lie in

information release restrictions. Our allies understandably

restrict release of their classified information. Likewise, we

want to control release of U.S. classified information. To

achieve effective combined interoperability, we must develop

much more capable security procedures and sophisticated tools to

allow information exchange while protecting our national and

allied data.

Technology is changing the way the warfighter prepares,

trains, and executes the mission. We must develop a mindset

promoting innovation and technology insertion. It is through

continued support of Advanced Concept Technology Demonstrations,

experimentation programs, and exercises with our coalition

partners, that we find ways to improve interoperability and

enhance capabilities. We must put more emphasis on acquisition

by adaptation, put proven prototypes into a joint field

environment, and mature them through a tight spiral development

cycle. Information is power, and a fully interoperable

infosphere allows us to collaborate with coalition partners,

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share operational pictures, increase the speed of command, and

ultimately, win the day.

Obviously, sharing information among Services, sub-unified

commands, and coalition partners is a complex security

challenge. That leads me to the third category, Information

Assurance (IA). How do we provide access to, and share

information with, Asia-Pacific countries while protecting U.S.

and coalition-sensitive data from potential adversaries?

To improve IA in the U.S. Pacific Command, we are taking

several measures. We are evaluating the Automated Intrusion

Detection Environment. Our Theater C4ISR Coordination Center is

building a theater IA common operational picture (COP) (similar

to the COP we use in the command and control arena) and tracking

intrusion attempts and methods. We also are working closely

with the Defense Information Systems Agency on an improved

configuration that will provide full coverage of external

connections to our Pacific networks.

Yes, we can improve IA in the theater; however, to do so

requires a heavy investment in people and additional hardware.

The payback is not always as easily recognizable as with the

production of new airplanes, ships, or tanks. You cannot touch

and feel information protection, but a loss of critical or time-

sensitive information or a denial of service can be far more

detrimental to national security than a single weapon system. I

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request your continued support as we implement IA into our daily

operations.

As you can see, C4 is a major concern in the Pacific and my

top resource priority. While we have made great strides

recently in addressing satellite communications shortfalls, we

still have a long way to go. We must now focus on modernizing

the ground infrastructures and ensuring the protection of our

networks and the information that traverses them.

Intelligence

Intelligence is essential to monitor potential adversary

developments and preparations so that we can train our forces

for the threats that they face and move them into position in a

timely fashion. Shortages of airborne intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) assets – U-2s, RC-135s,

EP-3s significantly impact USPACOM’s readiness ratings. These

shortfalls diminish our situational awareness, early indications

and warning (I&W), and deep knowledge of the capabilities, plans

and intentions of key theaters in our area of responsibility.

Although Joint Staff planned allocation of airborne

reconnaissance assets is adequate for routine operations in the

Pacific Theater, we do not have the surge capability to monitor

crises or cyclical increases of potential adversary activities.

Other chronic shortfalls in high priority intelligence include

linguists, tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT) systems,

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intelligence specialists, and intelligence interoperability.

The core of intelligence analysis and dissemination in the

theater is the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC),

located near Pearl Harbor. JICPAC's operational efficiency and

impact suffers because almost 100 JICPAC personnel must work in

a revamped hangar at Hickam AFB, due to space limitations in the

main JICPAC facility. These split-based operations cost almost

$300,000 per year for the separate facility, as well as lost

time and efficiency. In addition, JICPAC’s building, in a

vulnerable location near a major highway, presents a serious

force protection issue. At the same time, the Kunia Regional

SIGINT Operations Center (RSOC) occupies an aging facility,

built in 1945, renovated for cryptologic operations in 1979, and

then updated throughout the last twenty years. Collocating the

RSOC with the new JICPAC facility on an intelligence “campus”

would improve intelligence exchange, analytical dialogue, and

efficiencies in infrastructure.

Advances in global telecommunications technology continue

to place enormous pressure on the need to modernize both

national and tactical cryptologic capabilities. USPACOM

supports the National Security Agency/Central Security Service's

(NSA/CSS’s) strategic transformation actions and changes

undertaken in the last year. NSA must transform to address the

global net, but warfighters’ knowledge of adversary battlefield

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communications will also continue to be a high USPACOM priority.

NSA must be funded to continue modernizing tactical SIGINT

collection capabilities, operations of the RSOC and accompanying

land-based collection architecture, addressing ELINT collection

shortfalls, and operations of the Information Operations

Technology Center (IOTC).

Specifically, NSA needs more capable, joint tactical

cryptologic systems. Rapid advances in widely available

communication technology have rendered obsolete much of the

current inventory of tactical cryptologic systems. At the same

time, the Services’ R&D funding has declined. NSA and the

Services must continue to aggressively pursue standards and

common architectures, such as the Joint Tactical SIGINT

Architecture.

Increased HUMINT capabilities are critical to support

collection against strategic and operational requirements in the

Pacific. Improvements are needed to enhance collection against

key USPACOM indications and warning requirements and hard-target

organizations and countries. Continuing investment in theater-

based HUMINT resources, specifically computers and

communications capabilities, is essential to improve collection

against hard targets. Any further Defense HUMINT Service (DHS)

reductions will adversely impact USPACOM-based U.S. Defense

Attaché Offices (USDAOs), Field Operating Bases, and DHS support

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to key USPACOM collection requirements and contingency

operations. The USDAO system, in particular, already is

experiencing serious resource constraints in the USPACOM AOR.

The Nation’s future imagery and geo-spatial architecture

will deliver unmatched capability, including enhanced imagery

collection provided by unmanned aerial vehicles and the Future

Imagery Architecture. However, USPACOM warfighters will not

reap the full benefits of this capability without full tasking,

processing, exploitation, and dissemination (TPED) investment.

A robust TPED architecture is essential to ensure that

dynamically tasked national, airborne, and commercial imagery

and geo-spatial products connect the sensors to the analysts

and, ultimately, to the tactical consumers. Services and

agencies must institutionalize the need to properly program

resources that incorporate TPED capabilities. Progress is

occurring and CINC interests are being addressed. However, we

will work to identify outyear funds to meet substantial portions

of Senior Warfighting Forum priority requirements.

Specifically, the Services must work with National Imagery and

Mapping Agency to fund the capabilities needed to make Joint

Vision 2010/2020 a reality. These include required technical

enhancements to theater digital infrastructure, advanced

analytical exploitation tools, and improved imagery analyst

training (especially for advanced sensor products).

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Asian linguist deficiencies are acute and a documented

USPACOM readiness concern. Despite additional student slots at

the Defense Language Institute, there are recurring and

persistent shortages of Asian linguists to meet Operation Plan

(OPLAN) and Contingency Plan (CONPLAN) requirements. Also,

resources for low-density linguists in support of probable

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) continue to be

problematic. Service recruiting and retention shortfalls,

coupled with the inherent difficulty of Asian languages and the

longer training periods required, aggravate these deficiencies.

Mobility Infrastructure and Strategic Lift

With congressional and Service support, we have made solid

progress in correcting deficiencies in our mobility

infrastructure. A total of 15 MILCON projects are either in work

or programmed through FY04. We will apply supplemental MILCON

funding for FY01 to critical en route and currently unfunded

infrastructure projects, such as those at Wake Island.

We support the FY01 MILCON language that would restore

MILCON contingency funding. While we are making headway with

some near-term MILCON projects, sustained funding is still

required. The continued appropriation of resources is

absolutely essential to maintain an upward trend and complete

the necessary repairs of our aging mobility infrastructure.

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In addition to a well-maintained mobility infrastructure,

contingency throughput in our theater largely depends on

strategic lift. As identified in the recently released Mobility

Requirements Study 2005 (MRS-05), there are “areas where

improvements are needed in mobility programs… An airlift fleet

of 49.7 million-ton-miles per day, (the previous established

level), is not adequate to meet the full range of requirements.”

I fully support the MRS-05 recommendation that “DoD should

develop a program to provide [additional] airlift capacity.”

Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4)

A key logistics and sustainment shortfall remains in Army

Prepositioned Stocks (APS-4) in Korea. Sustainment shortfalls

limit ability to reconstitute the force and sustain missions,

resulting in increased risk. Major end item shortages include

M1A1/A2 tanks, MLRS, HEMTT fuelers, and some chemical defense

equipment. Equipment shortages currently total about $450M.

Lack of repair parts and major assemblies within the APS-4

sustainment stockpile will directly impact the ability to return

battle-damaged equipment to the fight. The Army’s current plans

are to cascade additional equipment into the APS-4 sustainment

stocks over the next couple of years, thus reducing this

shortfall.

Infrastructure in Japan and Korea

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The Host Nation Funded Construction (HNFC) programs in

Japan and Korea provide almost $1B annually in new construction

to support U.S. Forces. However, the United States must fund

the initial project planning and design (P&D) effort. For FY01,

the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers allocated $20.5M for the HNFC

program. This is a return on investment of 46:1. Continued

congressional support for the planning and design funding is

critical.

One provision of the latest Special Measures Agreement is

that Japanese Facilities Improvement Program (JFIP) funds can no

longer be used for “revenue producing” projects. Examples of

projects disallowed in the FY01 program were Army and Air Force

Exchange Service warehouses, exchanges, commissaries, and

gymnasiums. The effect of this provision is that additional

MILCON funding will be required for the Services, Defense

Logistics Agency, Army and Air Force Exchange Service, Navy

Exchange, Defense Commissary Agency, and DoD Schools to support

Quality of Life initiatives for our service members in Japan.

We will need strong congressional support for these MILCON

projects when programmed. There has not been a MILCON project

completed in Japan since 1989.

New Headquarters Building

I would like to offer my thanks again for your support for

the new U.S. Pacific Command Headquarters building. We held the

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groundbreaking ceremony in February and are on track to provide

a facility designed to support the 21st century.

Security Assistance

Security Assistance Funding in the Pacific Theater is an

important component of my Theater Engagement Strategy.

Foreign Military Financing (FMF). For FY01, two U.S.

Pacific Command countries will each receive about $2 million in

FMF; Mongolia, to increase its border security capabilities; and

the Philippines, for critical aircraft and patrol boat spare

parts. State Department has allocated FMF for East Timor, as

those funds meet legislative requirements.

Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC).

The Asia-Pacific region needs better capabilities to respond

collectively when the United Nations or the nations of the

region determine that an international response is required.

Approximately $2.2 million in FY01 EIPC funds have been

requested for five Pacific Command countries, to either enhance

existing or establish new peacekeeping operation (PKO) training

centers. These well-spent dollars are helping our neighbors

share the PKO burden around the world.

Nonproliferation, Antiterrorism, Demining and Related

Program (NADR), and Overseas Humanitarian Disaster and Civic Aid

(OHDACA). NADR funding has helped the Philippines improve its

ability to deal with terrorists, and, in combination with DoD

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OHDACA money, has done much to reduce the threat of unexploded

ordnance in Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Anticipated

FY01 funding will expand demining operations in those countries.

These Security Assistance programs, along with IMET, are

crucial to our continued engagement in the Asia-Pacific region,

and I request your continued support in their funding.

Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and

Humanitarian Assistance (COE).

Since its beginning in 1994, the Center of Excellence in

Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance has bridged the

gap between civil and military activities related to

humanitarian emergencies. Historically an annual increase to

DoD appropriations has funded the COE. Collaborating the

resources and strengths of governmental and non-governmental

organizations, the Center of Excellence has participated in

relief efforts following floods in Vietnam and Venezuela,

earthquakes in Turkey and Taiwan, and population displacement in

Kosovo and East Timor. The Center's approach to response,

education and training, research, and consulting for disaster

relief has become the model for successful interaction between

the military and private humanitarian organizations.

CONCLUSION

In summary, Asia-Pacific issues are growing in importance

on the American security agenda. Our people are the foundation

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for everything that we do, and providing professionally

rewarding service must be our first concern. Next must be our

strategy, and ensuring that we have the capability to sustain

our forward basing, support increasingly information-rich

operations, and the mobility to move our forces across this vast

theater and across the globe. The coming year will continue to

present challenges for the United States in the Asia-Pacific

region. We neglect developments in the region at our peril, but

with sustained attention we can help build a region which will

support American interests over the long term.

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APPENDIX A

Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

The Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) is a

regional studies, conference, and research center in Honolulu.

Established in September 1995 as a preventive defense and

confidence-building measure, its mission is to enhance

cooperation and build relationships through mutual understanding

and study of comprehensive security issues among military and

civilian representatives of the United States and other Asia-

Pacific nations. The cornerstone of the Center’s program is the

College of Security Studies, which provides a forum where future

military and government civilian leaders from the region can

explore pressing security issues at the national policy level

within a multilateral setting of mutual respect and transparency

to build trust and encourage openness. Central to the College’s

effectiveness is the relationships forged between participants

that bridge cultures and nationalities. Full and unobstructed

participation by all nations in the region, to include such

countries as Indonesia and Cambodia, is essential to achieving

this. Complementing the College is a robust conference and

seminar program that brings together current leaders from the

region to examine topical regional security concerns, including

peacekeeping, arms proliferation and the role of nuclear weapons

in the region, and energy and water security.

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The Center directly serves to further our regional

engagement goals in several ways. First, it serves as a

resource for identifying and communicating emerging regional

security issues, within the constraints of non-attribution.

Secondly, the Center functions as an extremely effective

“unofficial” engagement tool to continue critical dialog in

cases where official mil-to-mil relations are curtailed. Recent

conferences and regional travel involving contact with, or

participation by, prominent representatives from China highlight

this role. Additionally, the Center frequently coordinates or

hosts conferences addressing topical issues of interest to the

U.S. Pacific Command or the region. Finally, the Center serves

as a forum for articulating U.S. defense policy to

representatives from the region. Authorization to waive certain

expenses as an incentive for participation, and expanded

authority to accept domestic and foreign donations to help

defray costs are crucial to the continued success of the Center.