FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - documents.worldbank.orgdocuments.worldbank.org/curated/pt/548831468915009931/pdf/62430...Institut de Recherches et de Biologie Applique6 Nene Khally Condetto

Document of

The World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

R e p o r t No. 6 2 4 3

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT

GUINEA

LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 1063-GUI)

J u n e 1 3 , 1 9 8 6

O p e r a t i o n s E v a l u a t i o n D e p a r t m e n t

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance o f their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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Currency E q u i v a l e n t

Cur r e ncy Uni t - - S y l i (S)

A p p r a i s a l Implementa t ion

Weights and Measures

1 k i l o m e t e r (km) = 0.621 mi les 1' h e c t a r e ( h a ) = 2.47 1 a c r e s 1 k i logram (kg) = 2.205 pounds 1 m e t r i c t o n ( t ) = 0.984 long t o n

F i s c a l Year of Borrower

January 1 s t - December 31s t

ABBREVIATIONS

BDE - BGCE -

DGE -

DREP -

ENCOBE -

I D A - IRBANK -

OBETAIL -

OED - PCR - PDG -

PPAR - RMWA - SDR -

Bureau d l E t u d e s ( M i n i s t r y Planning U n i t ) Banque Guin6enne pour l e commerce E x t e r i e u r (Guinea Bank f o r E x t e r n a l Trade) D i r e c t i o n - G Q n 6 r a l e de 1 'E levage ( L i v e s t o c k D i r e c t o r a t e Genera l ) D i r e c t i o n R6gionale de l l E l e v a g e e t de l a P6che ( L i v e s t o c k and F i s h e r i e s Regional D i r e c t o r a t e ) E n t e r p r i s e de Commerc ia l i sa t ion du B Q t a i l (Regional L ives tock Marketing Agency) I n t e r n a t i o n a l Development A s s o c i a t i o n I n s t i t u t de Recherches e t de B i o l o g i e Applique6 Nene Khal ly Condet to (Research and Applied Biology I n s t i t u t e ) M i n i s t 6 r e de 1 'Elevage e t de l a P6che ( M i n i s t r y of L ives tock and F i s h e r i e s ) O f f i c e de Commercia l isa t ion du B 6 t a i l (L ives tock Marketing Agency) Opera t ions E v a l u a t i o n Department P r o j e c t Completion Report Le P a r t i Dgmocratique de G u i d e (The Democratic P a r t y of Guinea) P r o j e c t Performance Audit Report Regional Miss ion f o r Western A f r i c a S p e c i a l Drawing Rights

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK

Wash~ngton. D.C. 20433 U.S.A.

June 13 , 1986

MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT

Subject : Pro jec t Performance Audit Report Guinea Livestock Development P ro jec t (Credi t 1063-GUI)

Attached, f o r information i s a copy of a r epor t e n t i t l e d "Project Performance Audit Report on Guinea Livestock Development P ro jec t (Credi t 106 3-GUI) I ' prepared by t h e Operations Evaluat ion Department.

Attachment

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY


GUINEA

LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No . Preface i ............................................................ Basic Data Sheet ................................................... ii Evaluation Summary ................................................. iii

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

I . PROJECT S'IJMMARY ........................................... 1

Introduction ............................................ 1 Project Objectives ...................................... 2 Implementation .......................................... 3 Follow-up ............................................... 3

I1 . MAIN ISSUES ............................................... 4

A . Reasons for the Project's Failure ..................... 4 R . The Rank's Role in Preparation ........................ 5 C . Project Conditions and Assurances ..................... 6 D . Cancellation of the Credit ............................ 7

Annex 1 ............................................................ 9

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I . Background ........................................... 13 ......................... I1 . Project Formulation and Appraisal 16 111 . Implementation ........................................... 19 IV . Impact of the Project ..................................... 23 V . Institutional Performance ................................. 23 VI . IDA Performance .......................................... 25 ............................ . VII Conclusions and Lessons Learnt 26

Map

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their oficial duties . Itr contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization .


GUINEA


PREFACE

This i s a performance a u d i t of t h e Livestock Development P ro jec t i n Guinea, f o r which Credi t 1063-GUI i n the amount of SDR 13.3 m i l l i o n was approved i n September, 1980. The p ro jec t encountered cons iderable implemen- t a t i o n problems and most of t h e c r e d i t , SDR 11.7 mi l l i on , was cancel led i n September 1983.

The a u d i t r epor t c o n s i s t s of an a u d i t memorandum prepared by t h e Operat ions Evaluat ion Department (OED), and a P ro jec t Completion Report (PCR), da ted December 31, 1984, prepared by t h e West Africa Regional Office. Government was not i n v i t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n prepara t ion of t h e PCR.

An OED mission v i s i t e d Guinea i n January 1985. The mission held d i scuss ions with o f f i c i a l s of t h e Borrower, inc luding s t a f f d i r e c t l y involved wi th t h e p ro jec t . The information obtained dur ing t h e mission was used t o t e s t t h e v a l i d i t y of the a n a l y s i s and conclusions of t h e PCR.

The a u d i t memorandum i s based on these d i scuss ions , on in terv iews wi th Bank s t a f f a s soc ia t ed wi th t h e p r o j e c t , and on%-reme? of t h T P a , t h e S taf f Appraisal Report (No. 2959a-GUI of August 19, 1980), t h e P r e s i d e n t ' s Report (No. P-2855a-GUI a l s o of August 19, 1980), t h e Credi t Agreement of November 21, 1980, correspondence with the Borrower, and i n t e r n a l Bank memoranda on p ro jec t i s s u e s a s contained i n r e l evan t Bank f i l e s .

The d r a f t r e p o r t was s e n t t o t h e Borrower f o r comments on Apr i l 14, 1986. However, none have been received.

The a u d i t f i n d s t h e PCR comprehensive and accura t e with respec t t o t h e p r o j e c t ' s p r i n c i p a l achievements and shortcomings and has no reason t o ques t ion i t s conclusions.

The va luable a s s i s t a n c e of t h e Minis t ry of Rural Development during t h e a u d i t mission i s g r a t e f u l l y acknowledged.

~ C I nwonuau AUDIT m m n ~

CUIW - LIVLSTOU DEVELOPMENT PIOJECI (CREDIT 1063-CUI)

BASIC MIA SUET

Total Project Cout (US$ mil l ion) Credit h u n t (US$ mil l ion) Date Phyeical Component# Completed

Proportion Ihen completed (X) Economic Pate of Return (2) Ina t i tu t lona l Pcrforunc. Number of Direct Banaficiar iea

KEY PROJECT MIA

Appraisal Lacimt.

Actual or Acturl w 1 of Current ~ t l u t e Appraisal E m t i u ~ . ~

n.a. 1 .8 n.a.

Inalgnif icant ne.qative poor

n...

STMt INPUT

Ident if icatlon/Prep.r.rion 3.8 .5 9.3 15.2 17.5 11.2 Appraisal 55.4 .2 Negotiatiana 10.7 Superviaion 11.4 14.6 13.8 2.7 4.2

Total

Appraisal e a t i u t e (US$ mil l ion) Actual (US$ mil l ion) Actual M 2 of Appraiaal Ba t imte Amount Cancelled (US$ mil l ion) Data of Pinal Diaburaemnt:

22 13 15 12 11 I5.llb (on 09/12/83)

03/21/83-

P i ra t Ilsntion i n Pilaa Negotiatioru Board Approval Credit Signlng Eff ectivenear Cloaing Date

Origioal Plan

UISSION MIA

Date No. of bndaya Special isat iooa Pe r fo runce Type# of )(iaaion (Wo./Yr.) Peraona i n Field %preaen tedL Rating & Trend& Prob leMK --- --

Raconnaiaaaoce T e r u of Bcfarcocc Iden t i f i ca t ion Preparmtion Preparation Preparation Prmparation Preparation Updating Appraiaal Con. Appraiaal

Superviaion I 10180 I E 2 2 U Superviaion 11 03/81 2 E.L 2 3 P Superviaion 111 10181 I 2 3 U Supcrvi.ion 1 V 02/82 I L 2 3 p.P.H Supervlaioo V 06/82 2 L.E 3 2 p , ? , ~ Superviaion VI 12/82 I L 3 2 P.P.H Superviaion VII 03/83 2 L.g 3 2 PnP

OMBP PIWECT DATA

borrower Executing Agency

Follow-on Project : Ham: Credi t : Credi t h u n t : Data of Board Approval:

Republic of (*linaa Wiuiatry of Llveatock and Pieharioe

Livestock Sactor habilitation IroJoct (not yet negotieted)

/a Approved i n the amount of SDP 13.3 million. - I b The S equivalent of JDP 11.7 million.

L-Llvemtock E m r t ; I-Econoriat; Tr-Training Erpert; Lab-Laboratory Expert - /d I-problam-Erae or minor problam; Z w d e r a t e p r o b l e u ; m d k J o r problem.

1-improving; 2-mtarionary; and h J e t c r i o r a t i n g . P-Pinancinl; W b n a d c r i a l ; P-Policy p rob leu . -


GUINEA


EVALUATION SUMMARY

In t roduc t ion

This was t h e Bank Group's f i r s t l i v e s t o c k p r o j e c t i n Guinea and t h e t h i r d i n t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . Guinea's r i c h n a t u r a l r e sou rces provided a favorable s t a r t i n g po in t f o r t h e p r o j e c t , but i t was recognized a t a p p r a i s a l t h a t t h e po l i cy and i n s t i t u t i o n a l contex t f o r p r o j e c t implementation was d i f f i c u l t . P a r t i c u l a r r i s k s t o t he p r o j e c t were posed by t h e o b l i g a t i o n on ca t t leowners t o se l l 10% of t h e i r herds annual ly ( i n e f f e c t almost a l l t h e s u s t a i n a b l e o f f t ake ) t o p a r a s t a t a l agencies a t p r i c e s about 20% of those on t h e p a r a l l e l market and by t h e weakness of t h e Livestock Department. During n e g o t i a t i o n s , Government gave assurances t h a t dur ing implementation e f f e c t i v e s t e p s would be taken t o remedy these and o t h e r o b s t a c l e s t o t h e p ro j ec t .

P r o j e c t Obi e c t i v e s

The major o b j e c t i v e of t h e p r o j e c t was t o i n c r e a s e t h e p roduc t iv i ty of t h e n a t i o n a l herd, thereby augmenting milk and meat product ion, and a l s o r a i s i n g t h e s tandard of l i v i n g of cattle-owning f ami l i e s . This was t o be achieved through t e c h n i c a l l y s t r a igh t fo rward measures: vacc ina t ion a g a i n s t common d i s e a s e s of c a t t l e ; supplying i n p u t s t o producers; and upgrading t h e v e t e r i n a r y support s e r v i c e s through t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e ( inc lud ing a planning o f f i c e ) , bu i ld ings , and s t a f f t r a i n i n g . The p r o j e c t had an est imated cos t a t a p p r a i s a l of USS21.0 mi l l i on , of which USS17.5 m i l l i o n represented an I D A Cred i t approved i n t h e amount of SDR 13.3 mi l l i on . Overa l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e p r o j e c t was given t o t h e Research and Planning Off ice (Bureau d lEtudes - RDE) e s t a b l i s h e d under t h e p r o j e c t , w i th impkernentation i n t h e f i e l d t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e Livestock D i r e c t o r a t e General (Di rec t ion Ggngrale de l tE levage - DGE).

The p r o j e c t became e f f e c t i v e i n J u l y 1981, a f t e r a de l ay of some s ix months occasioned by d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Government's meeting t h e cond i t i ons of e f f ec t iveness . Almost immediately, t h e p r o j e c t m e t s e r i o u s l o c a l c o s t and implementation c o n s t r a i n t s . Livestock owners were unwi l l ing t o coopera te wi th government o f f i c i a l s who were as soc ia t ed w i t h t h e l i v e s t o c k census t h a t underpinned t h e ob l iga to ry s a l e s and t h e c a t t l e t ax ; t h e DGE was no t performing a s had been expected; and Government counterpar t funding was inadequate and delayed. I n t h e absence of vigorous a c t i o n by Government t o remedy t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s t h e r e was l i t t l e chance t h a t t h e p r o j e c t could be implemented succes s fu l ly . I D A s p e c i f i e d t h e remedial a c t i o n s t o be taken i n

l i n e w i th Government's assurances a t t h e t i m e of nego t i a t i ons , p a r t i c u l a r l y wi th r e spec t t o reform of t h e marketing pol icy. In t h e event , t h e requi red changes were not forthcoming and t h e Credi t wae accord ingly suspended i n April 1983 and t h e undisbursed bal ance, SDR 11.7 m i 3 l i o n , was cancel3 ed i n September, 1983. Disbursements amounted t o SDR 1.43 m i l l i o n , of which some 80% was u t i l i zed f o r technical a s s i s t a n c e . Undisbursed funds t o t a l 3 ing SDR 0.15 m i l l i o n were l a t e r used f o r t h e p repa ra t ion of t h e follow-on p ro j ec t .

Resul t e

Very l i t t l e had been achieved of t h e p r o j e c t ' s ob jec t ives : t h e vacc ine l abo ra to ry was equipped, some vaccine was produced, and t h e f i r s t phase of t h e 1982183 vacc ina t ion campaign was c a r r i e d out . Other cons t ruc t ion and t r a i n i n g remained incomplete. The p r o j e c t d i d , however, have a bene f i c i a l e f f e c t on t h e evolu t ion of po l i cy i n Guinea: i t had focuseed a t t e n t i o n on t h e c r i t i c a l i s euee cons t r a in ing t h e l i v e e t o c k s e c t o r , and many Guineans agreed t h a t t h e pol icy and i n s t i t u t i o n a l changes sought under t h e p ro j ec t were necessary. This c l imate of opinion was a major reason why obl i g a t o r y I i ves tock s a l e s were abol i shed wi th in 15 daye of t h e access ion t o power of t h e present Government, i n April 1984.

Findings and Lessons

Reasons f o r t h e p ro j ec t ' 8 f a i l u r e . As foreseen a t appra isa l , t h e main r i s k s t o t h e p r o j e c t were i n s t i t u t i o n a l and pol icy- re la ted r a t h e r than technica l . Individual l y t h e c o n s t r a i n t s t o t h e p r o j e c t -- pr inc ipa l I y t h e marketing pol icy , t h e c a t t l e t a x , l a c k of support from t h e DGE, and t h e inadequacy o f counterpar t funding -- might not have proved f a t a l , but t h e i r e f f e c t w a s cumulative and they removed any l i ke l ihood t h a t i n t h e absence of e f f e c t i v e remedial a c t i o n t h e p ro j ec t could be implemented. But over and above t h e s p e c i f i c obetac' les, t h e p r o j e c t was a v i c t i m of t h e p o l i t i c a l and economic context of i t s period which prevented t h e necessary reforms being undertaken.

Pro jec t condi t ions and assurances. The main c o n s t r a i n t e t o t h e p r o j e c t were, with t h e except ion of t h e l a c k of counterpar t funds, c l e a r l y foreseen and f u l l y d iscussed before and dur ing negot ia t ions . I n each case , I D A accepted Government's assurances t h a t e f f e c t i v e s t e p s would be taken t o remove them dur ing t h e course of p r o j e c t implementation, aeeurances t h a t were f o r t h e moet p a r t not f u l f i l l e d . This experience sugges ts t h a t , depending on circumstances, t h e Bank should be more prepared t o r e so lve outs tanding po l i cy and i n s t i t u t i o n a l queet ione before e f f ec t ivenees , a s is c u r r e n t l y being done p r i o r t o t h e proposed second phase l i v e s t o c k p ro j ec t .

Cancel I a t i o n of t h e Credi t . Faced by non-compl iance wi th p r o j e c t Covenants and wi th 3 ittl e prospect of successfu l implementation, IDA was c o r r e c t i n i t s dec i s ion t o suspend and then cancel t h e Credi t . The cour tesy and cons is tency wi th which the Bank d e a l t w i th t he d i f f i c u l t i e s a f t e r e f f e c t i v e n e s s has cont r ibu ted e i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e improved p rospec t s f o r t h e proposed second phase p r o j e c t and t o t h e p re sen t good r e l a t i o n e h i p between Government and t h e Bank.

PROJECT PERFORMANCE AUDIT MEMORANDUM

GUINEA

LIVE STOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI)

I. PROJECT SUMMARY

In t roduc t ion

1. This was t h e Rank Group's f i r s t l i v e s t o c k p r o j e c t i n Guinea. It was one of fou r p o t e n t i a l p r o j e c t s i d e n t i f i e d i n a l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r s tudy conducted by consu l t an t s i n 1976 and f inanced under an e a r l i e r Bank-supported p r o j e c t l / . The c o n s u l t a n t s subsequent ly a l s o prepared t h e p r o j e c t i n 1977, but t h e r e p o r t was considered u n s a t i s f a c t o r y and f u r t h e r p repa ra t ion was undertaken by the Bank's Regional Mission i n Western Af r i ca (RMWA) i n e a r l y 1978. Following cont inuing d i scuss ions between I D A and Government, and one postponement of t h e a p p r a i s a l mission, t h e p repa ra t ion document was updated by RMWA i n September-October 1979, and the p r o j e c t was appraised by I D A i n October-November 1979 (see PCR, paras. 2.01-2.10). Negotiat ions, sometimes c o n t r o v e r s i a l , took place i n J u l y 1980, t h e Credi t was approved i n September, and t h e Cred i t Agreement was s igned the fol lowing November ( s e e PCR, paras . 2.11-2.12).

2. In important r e s p e c t s , t he prospects f o r the p r o j e c t were favorable . Guinea has cons iderable economic p o t e n t i a l i n terms of d i v e r s e and abundant n a t u r a l resources inc luding graz ing and a g r i c u l t u r a l by-products. The p r i n c i p a l n a t u r a l c o n s t r a i n t t o development of the l i v e s t o c k subsec tor has been t h e poor s t a t u s of animal h e a l t h r a t h e r than a s c a r c i t y of feed o r water. Despite t hese advantages, however, i t was recognized a t a p p r a i s a l t h a t t he p r o j e c t would be implemented under d i f f i c u l t circumstances. A t the time of a p p r a i s a l , t h e r e were cont inuing s u b s t a n t i a l po l i cy and i n s t i t u t i o n a l o b s t a c l e s t o progress which had cont r ibu ted t o t he very d isappoin t ing performance of t h e l i v e s t o c k subsec tor and indeed of t h e economy a s a whole. These shortcomings were both macro-economic and s e c t o r a l and included s t r u c t u r a l budget imbalances and the o f t e n u n s a t i s f a c t o r y performance of c o l l e c t i v e product ion e n t e r p r i s e s , p a r a s t a t a l agenc ie s , and t h e c i v i l s e rv i ce . Of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e l i v e s t o c k subsec tor a t t h e time of a p p r a i s a l was a l e g a l o b l i g a t i o n on c a t t l e owners t o s e l l 10% of t h e i r herd annual ly t o t h e s t a t e a t p r i c e s t h a t were only about 20% of those on t h e p a r a l l e l market ( f o r more d e t a i l s on the l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r s ee PCR paras . 1.05-1.09).

3. The Development Credi t Agreement, i n r ecogn i t i on of t h e s e c o n s t r a i n t s , included condi t ions t o t he e f f e c t t h a t Government would, w i th in one yea r , reform both t h e l i v e s t o c k marketing system and t a x a t i o n on s tock

11 The Pineapple Development P ro j ec t (Cred i t 569-GUI). See i t s P r o j e c t - Performance Audit r e p o r t , OED Report No. 3960 da ted June 9 , 1982.

owners, and would t ake s t e p s t o add re s s t h e s e r i o u s o v e r s t a f f i n g of t h e Livestock D i r e c t o r a t e General ( D i r e c t i o n Gengrale de 1 'Elevage - DGE).

P r o j e c t Ob jec t i ve s

4 . The major o b j e c t i v e of t h e p r o j e c t was t o i n c r e a s e t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y of t h e n a t i o n a l c a t t l e herd , t he r eby augmenting meat and mi lk p roduc t ion and improving n u t r i t i o n , and a l s o r a i s i n g t h e s t anda rd of l i v i n g of c a t t l e - he rd ing f a m i l i e s . Th is was t o be achieved through t e c h n i c a l l y s t r a i g h t - forward measures: vacc ina t i on a g a i n s t common d i s e a s e s of c a t t l e ; p rov i s i on of d rugs , medicines and minera l l i c k s ; and upgrading of t h e l i v e s t o c k husbandry and v e t e r i n a r y suppor t s e r v i c e s . The main focus of t h e p r o j e c t was on c a t t l e , but o t h e r s p e c i e s of l i v e s t o c k were expected a l s o t o b e n e f i t from t h e measures taken. The p r o j e c t was expected t o s u b s t a n t i a l l y s t r e n g t h e n s e c t o r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g p lann ing c a p a c i t y , and i t provided f o r t r a i n i n g e x i s t i n g l i v e s t o c k s t a f f .

5. The p r o j e c t was t o i nc lude t h e fo l lowing components:

( a ) suppo r t i ng animal h e a l t h and husbandry s e r v i c e s through:

- upgrading r e g i o n a l l i v e s t o c k s e r v i c e s ;

- s a l e s of p roduc t ion i n p u t s t o herdsmen;

- suppo r t i ng a n a t i o n a l v a c c i n a t i o n campaign;

- r e i n f o r c i n g t h e c e n t r a l v e t e r i n a r y l a b o r a t o r y ;

- a p i l o t c r e d i t program t o encourage animal d r a f t ;

( b ) s t r eng then ing i n s t i t u t i o n s through:

- b u i l d i n g s and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e L ives tock D i r e c t o r a t e Generale (DGE);

- e s t ab l i shmen t of a Research and Planning O f f i c e (Bureau

d lE tudes - BDE); and

( c ) s t a f f t r a i n i n g through:

- s e t t i n g up a t r a i n i n g c e n t e r f o r l i v e s t o c k personne l ;

- f e l l owsh ip s and s t udy tours .

6. The BDE, which was t o r e p o r t d i r e c t l y t o t h e Min i s t ry of Livestock and F i s h e r i e s (Minis te re de 1'Elevage e t de l a PCche - MEP), was charged with o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p r o j e c t execut ion. T)GE was r e spons ib l e f o r implementation i n the f i e l d . /

7. To ta l es t imated p r o j e c t c o s t a t a p p r a i s a l was USS21.0 m i l l i o n ( inc lud ing t axes ) of which Government would provide USS2.4 m i l l i o n , herdsmen USSl.1 m i l l i o n , and USS17.5 m i l l i o n represented an I D A Credi t i n the amount of SDR 13.3 mi l l i on .

Implementation

8. Af te r two postponements t h e Cred i t became e f f e c t i v e J u l y 31, 1981 (PCR, paras . 3.01-3.02). Within a very s h o r t period of i t s e f f e c t i v e n e s s , t h e p r o j e c t encountered severe implementation problems. These a rose pr in- c i p a l l y from: unwil l ingness of t he s tock owners t o c o l l a b o r a t e with government o f f i c i a l s , i nc lud ing those r e spons ib l e f o r t h e p r o j e c t , which r e s u l t e d from Government's f a i l u r e t o reform t h e c a t t l e t a x o r t h e system of ob l iga to ry s a l e s ; t h e d i f f i c u l t y encountered by Government i n making a v a i l a b l e coun te rpa r t funds; and l a c k of a c t i v e support f o r t h e p r o j e c t from t h e DGE. These i s s u e s were t h e s u b j e c t of i n t e n s i v e d i s c u s s i o n s between the Government and success ive supe rv i s ion missions, but i n t he event , Government did not f u l f i l l c r i t i c a l cond i t i ons , most impor tan t ly t h a t concerning l i v e s t o c k marketing, and i n the absence of o t h e r e f f e c t i v e remedial measures, Government and I D A agreed t o t he suspension of disbursements i n A p r i l 1983 and the Credi t was u l t i m a t e l y cance l led i n September 1983 (PCR, paras . 3.03-3.04). A smal l remaining balance was l a t e r used f o r p repa ra t ion of t h e follow-on p ro j ec t . To ta l c o s t of t h e p r o j e c t amounted t o SDR 1.43 m i l l i o n of I D A funds, mainly f o r t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , and some S y l i s 7 m i l l i o n of l o c a l funds (PCR, para. 3.13).

9. Severa l of t he p r o j e c t ' s a c t i v i t i e s were s t a r t e d but could not be completed ( d e t a i l e d i n PCR, paras . 3.05-3.12). The vaccine l abo ra to ry was equipped, some vaccine was produced, and t h e f i r s t phase of t h e 1982/83 vacc ina t ion campaign was c a r r i e d out . Tra in ing remained a l s o incomplete. To ta l c o s t of t he p r o j e c t amounted t o SDR 1.43 mi l l i on i n I D A funds, mainly f o r t echn ica l a s s i s t a n c e , and some S y l i s 7 m i l l i o n i n l o c a l funds (PCR, para. 3.13).

10. An i n d i r e c t but s i g n i f i c a n t b e n e f i t of t h e p r o j e c t was t h a t i t provided a forum f o r d i scuss ions and improved u n d e r s t a n d i n g wi th in t h e country of t he c r i t i c a l po l i cy i s sues . By t h e t i m e of c a n c e l l a t i o n , a sub- s t a n t i a l body of opinion wi th in the Guinean p u b l i c s e r v i c e favored the po l i cy changes a t i s s u e , but t h i s view was not accepted a t t he h ighes t policy-making

2/ This d i v i s i o n of func t ions between BDE and DGE d id n o t correspond t o t h e - r e l a t i o n s h i p between them i n t h e M i n i s t r y ' s S t r u c t u r e , and l e d t o confusion dur ing implementation. The PCR d e t a i l s success ive changes t o t h e proposa ls f o r p r o j e c t o rgan iza t ion (PCR, para . 2.12).

l e v e l s . Nevertheless , t h e ex i s t ence of t h i s c l imate of opinion was an important con t r ibu to ry f a c t o r i n t he new Government adopting the recommended changes t o l i v e s t o c k marketing wi th in 15 days of t ak ing o f f i c e i n A p r i l 1984, some e i g h t months a f t e r c a n c e l l a t i o n of t h e Credi t .

11. Despi te t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s a s soc i a t ed wi th t h e implementation of t h e p r o j e c t and the cance l l a t i on of t he c r e d i t , a proper and courteous r e l a t i o n s h i p was maintained throughout between t h e Government and t h e Bank. In consequence, t h e r e was a minimum of de l ay i n i n i t i a t i n g p repa ra t ion f o r a second p ro j ec t i n 1984, hased upon the wi l l i ngness of t h e new Government t o remedy the o b s t a c l e s t h a t had prevented e f f e c t i v e implementation of t h e f i r s t p ro j ec t . I n p a r t , t he present c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between Government and t h e Bank can be ascr ibed t o t h e cons is tency and s k i l l w i th which t h e Bank d e a l t with t he d i f f i c u l t i e s of t he l i v e s t o c k p r o j e c t ,

11. MAIN ISSUES

A. Reasons f o r the P r o j e c t ' s F a i l u r e

12. Soon a f t e r e f f e c t i v e n e s s , i t became c l e a r t h a t t h e p r o j e c t could not be implemented a s appraised. The p r i n c i p a l reasons f o r t h i s were i n s t i - t u t i o n a l and pol icy- re la ted r a t h e r than t echn ica l :

( a ) t he unwil l ingness of t h e l i v e s t o c k owners t o t r u s t o f f i c i a l s of t h e DGE a s t he l a t t e r were a s soc i a t ed wi th enforc ing ob l iga to ry s a l e s and c o l l e c t i o n of the misnamed vacc ina t ion t a x ( i n e f f e c t a t ax pe r head of c a t t l e ) ;

( b ) the l ack of support f o r t h e p ro j ec t on the p a r t of t h e Direc tor -Genera l of Livestock, a s reported by supe rv i s ion missions and confirmed by t h e a u d i t mission;

( c ) inadequate counterpar t funding and very cumbersome procedures f o r r e l e a s i n g approved funds, which p e r i o d i c a l l y s t a l l e d p ro j ec t a c t i v i t i e s ; and

(d ) the weak performance of t h e DGE f o r reasons t h a t were u n l i k e l y t o be s a t i s f a c t o r i l y addressed (e.g., t h e continued recru i tment by t h e Department of a l l those t r a i n e d i n v e t e r i n a r y sc i ence and animal husbandry).

The e f f e c t of t h e s e d i f f i c u l t i e s was cumulative: though each was s e r i o u s , i n d i v i d u a l l y they might no t have been f a t a l t o t h e p ro j ec t . But i n con- j unc t ion , they removed any l i ke l ihood t h a t t he p ro j ec t could be e f f e c t i v e l y implemented.

13 I n two r e spec t s , p r o j e c t des ign exacerbated these problems. In t he f i r s t p lace , t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s wi th counterpar t funds could have been reduced though not e l imina ted had a l o c a l fund account been e s t ab l i shed from t h e

o u t s e t ( a s was done f o r foreign exchange) from which the projec t could make payments d i rec t ly . Such an account was subsequently created during implemen- t a t ion . Lengthy clearance procedures fo r withdrawals nevertheless remained only p a r t l y improving the general problem of inadequate and l a t e contribu- t i o n s by Government. I n the second place, the organizat ion of the p ro jec t , under which overa l l r e spons ib i l i ty was vested i n BDE while f i e l d implementa- t i o n was done by DGE, was a complicating f a c t o r and contributed t o the poor re la t ionsh ip between the two services. Aa the PCR notes (para. 2-12), t h i s i s sue was in tens ively discussed a t negot ia t ions , and, i n the end, the solu- t i o n adopted was t h a t proposed a t appraisal . I n re t rospect it turned out t o be the wrong decision. However, the background t o t h i s arrangement was tha t a key f igure wi th in DGE did not enjoy the confidence of e i t h e r the Bank o r of senior colleagues, but by v i r t u e of powerful p o l i t i c a l support could not be t ransferred t o a less c r u c i a l post. The judgment a t the time was that i f he had overa l l r e spons ib i l i ty f o r the projec t i t would not be successful , a judgment re f l ec ted i n the p ro jec t ' s s t ructure . It was recognized a t the time t h a t t o change the p ro jec t ' s s t r u c t u r e f o r t h i s reason was unsat is fac tory , but the move was expected t o improve the p ro jec t ' s chance of succees. The lesson from t h i s aspect of the p ro jec t , i n p a r a l l e l with the policy i s sues de ta i l ed elsewhere, is tha t the e a r l i e r i n the projec t cycle po ten t i a l obs tac les can be iden t i f i ed and d e a l t with, the better.

14. But over and above the s p e c i f i c reasons why the projec t could not be implemented, i t was the vict im of the p o l i t i c a l and economic context of i t s period. The Guinean economy had been performing very poorly f o r some years, i n good measure because of a development s t r a tegy tha t r e l i e d on mechanized and co l l ec t iv ized agr icu l tu re and on extensive s t a t e pa r t i c ipa t ion i n production, processing and d i s t r i b u t i o n , as w e l l as requiring the s t a t e t o take a lead r o l e i n d i r e c t l y providing employment f o r l a rge numbers of poorly-trained personnel. The implications of t h i s s i t u a t i o n fo r the p ro jec t were: a worsening s t r u c t u r a l budgetary c r i s i s ; gross and worsening over- s t a f f i n g i n implementing departments; and the unfavorable marketing policy. Under these circumstances, i t may be possible t o implement an enclave projec t e f f e c t i v e l y , but it is more d i f f i c u l t t o implement one such as t h i s whose l inkages with the rest of the economy and with the public sec tor a r e funda- mental t o i t s success.

The Bank's Role i n Preparat ion

15 . One of the reasons f o r the long period tha t elapsed between t h e s t a r t of projec t preparation and appraisa l (1976 t o October 1979) was tha t the f i r s t preparat ion repor t , wr i t t en by consultants , was deemed unsatisfac- tory, a f a c t t h a t necessi tated fu r the r work by the Bank (PCR, para. 2.01). The problem resul ted i n pa r t from i n s u f f i c i e n t support being provided t o the consul tants by Government. It was a l s o a r e f l e c t i o n of the f a c t t h a t the Bank's involvement with the l ives tock sector i n Guinea was only j u s t beginning. I n a d i f f i c u l t policy environment, there were many uncer ta in t i e s as t o p r i o r i t i e s and approaches; under these circumstances, firmer guidance and c lose r involvement by the Bank a t an e a r l i e r s tage of preparat ion might have saved time and money. This would, i n r e t rospec t , have been even more impor- t a n t during the preceding sec to r review and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n stage. Consultant s tud ies a r e no s u b s t i t u t e f o r build up of sec tor understanding and dialogue.

C. P r o j e c t Condi t ions and Assurances

16. The p r i n c i p a l p o l i c y and i n s t i t u t i o n a l o b s t a c l e s t o implementat ion ( t h e l i v e s t o c k market ing p o l i c y , t h e v a c c i n a t i o n t a x and t h e weakness o f DGE) were c l e a r l y f o r e seen by I D A a s p o t e n t i a l r i s k s ( a l t hough t h e d i f f i c u l t y w i t h c o u n t e r p a r t funds was no t f o r e seen ) . I n each c a s e , I D A ob t a ined a s su rances from Government t h a t measures would be t aken by December 31, 1981, t o remedy t h e problem. I n r e s p e c t of market ing, Government agreed t o remove t h e con- s t r a i n t s t h a t e x i s t i n g p o l i c y imposed on f u r t h e r development o f t h e s u b s e c t o r and t o en su re t h a t p r i c e s provided adequate i n c e n t i v e s t o p roducers ; measures would a l s o be t aken t o phase o u t t h e v a c c i n a t i o n t a x ; and a system of man- power management would be i n i t i a t e d c o n s i s t e n t w i th s t a f f needs and budgetary c o n s t r a i n t s .

17. I n t h e e v e n t , Government d i d no t f u l f i l l any of t h e s e a s su r ances and t h e p r o j e c t was c losed . With t h e b e n e f i t of h i n d s i g h t , i t i s c l e a r t h a t more should have been done a t an e a r l i e r s t a g e t o f i n d s o l u t i o n s t o t h e s e problems and t h a t t h e p r o j e c t should no t have gone ahead wi thout more pro- g r e s s having been made beforehand t o r e s o l v e them?/. The q u e s t i o n a r i s e s of whether e r r o r s of judgement were made i n dec id ing t o a l l ow t h e p r o j e c t t o go ahead w i t h t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i c y c o n s t r a i n t s s t i l l i n p l ace .

18. I n r e s p e c t of t h e o v e r s t a f f i n g of DGE, t h i s was t h e f i r s t p r o j e c t t o have r a i s e d t h i s impor tan t , but g e n e r a l , i s s u e . Ove r s t a f f i ng a f f e c t e d eve ry department of t h e Government and was n o t r e s t r i c t e d t o MEP, t h e M i n i s t r y concerned w i th t h i s p r o j e c t . It was, and remains , a n a t i o n a l problem t h a t i s u n l i k e l y t o be s u s c e p t i b l e t o s o l u t i o n w i t h i n t h e framework of a s i n g l e p r o j e c t . Under t h e c i rcumstances p r e v a i l i n g a t t h e t ime of a p p r a i s a l , i t would have been unreasonable f o r t h e Bank t o have i n s i s t e d t h a t t h e o v e r s t a f f i n g i s s u e was f u l l y reso lved p r i o r t o p r o j e c t e f f e c t i v e n e s s ; what t h e Bank's a c t u a l course of a c t i o n d i d ach i eve , however, was t o pu t t h e i s s u e on to t h e agenda of reform. The i s s u e i s now being a c t i v e l y pursued a s p a r t of t h e n e g o t i a t i n g p roce s s f o r t h e follow-up p r o j e c t .

19. I n r e s p e c t of t h e v a c c i n a t i o n t a x t h a t was bo th unpopular and i ne f - f i c i e n t , and c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e s u s p i c i o n between h e r d e r s and v e t e r i n a r y s t a f f , aga in i t was r ea sonab l e t o g i v e t h e Government t i m e t o c o n s i d e r t h e a l t e r n a t i v e s and t o phase t h e t a x ou t i n a n o r d e r l y manner. The Bank would n o t have been j u s t i f i e d i n ho ld ing up p r o j e c t e f f e c t i v e n e s s pending c o n c r e t e s t e p s t o remove t h e t a x , e s p e c i a l l y a s i t d i d n o t c o n s t i t u t e t h e most s e r i o u s o b s t a c l e t o t h e succe s s of t h e p r o j e c t .

20. The a u d i t miss ion f i n d s more d i f f i c u l t y i n judging whether t h e Bank w a s j u s t i f i e d , w i th t h e exper ience and in format ion a v a i l a b l e t o i t a t t h e t i m e , i n ag r ee ing t o t h e p r o j e c t becoming e f f e c t i v e p r i o r t o s i g n i f i c a n t reform of t h e l i v e s t o c k market ing po l i cy . The ques t i on i s whether t h e Bank was r i g h t , on s o c r u c i a l a m a t t e r , t o a ccep t Government's a s su r ances t h a t reform would be forthcoming dur ing t h e cou r se of p r o j e c t implementation. The

31 For t h e follow-on p r o j e c t , i n s t i t u t i o n a l and p o l i c y i s s u e s have been - addressed i n e a r l i e r s t a g e s of t h e p r o j e c t c y c l e t han was t h e c a s e w i t h t h i s p r o j e c t .

policy was known to represent a serious risk to the project's chances; moreover, the policy of obligatory deliveries was not specific just to the livestock subsector, but was basic to Government's development strategy, affect- ing agricultural producers as well, a fact that would appear to make radical reform less likely. On the other hand, the policy was not applied consis- tently throughout the country, falling most heavily on producers within easy reach of the capital, and there had been in practice a significant liberal- ization of trading since 1977. Further, many Guineans, including some Ministers and most technicians in MEP, are said to have expected the policy to be abolished in line with Government's assurances. In the event, this did not occur, reportedly because of objections at the highest levels.

2 1. IDA was thus faced with a difficult decision. The issues were recognized, and they were fully debated. In the event, the wrong decision was taken, but the audit mission cannot conclude that it was wrong in the light of the information then available. Government had given the assurances required, and the Bank had no solid grounds for rejecting them. In this respect, the project suffered from being the first in the livestock sub- sector; with the experience so painfully gained, the policy and institutional issues involved in the follow-up project are being much more fully addressed prior to effectiveness than had been the case with the first.

2 2. Nevertheless, this is yet another project where conditionality could not be translated into action. This adds to the mounting evidence that "macro" conditionality does not work, and that strategic issues should be resolved prior to project implementation and not be downqraded to assurances unless the Rank is prepared to take firm action in case of non-adherence. In this case, contrary to many other experiences, the Bank took the non-adherence seriously ./ D. Cancellation of the Credit

2 3. Whatever the merits of proceeding with the project before steps had been taken to reduce the main risks to implementation, IDA was correct in its decision to suspend and then cancel the credit. The project was subject to multiple constraints, and in the absence of vigorous action by Government to address the critical issues, there was little hope of satisfactorily implementing the project.

24. Equally, IDA cannot be faulted on its handling of Government's non-implementation of project conditions, and the events leading up to the suspension and then cancellation of the credit. At Government's request, IDA agreed to extend the final date for compliance with the relevant assurances from December 1981 to June 1982, in view of the initial delay in project effectiveness. But IDA remained consistent in its insistence that the necessary changes should be made. Government was throughout fully aware of the likely results of non-compliance, and suspension of the credit in April 1983 and its cancellation in September therefore came as no surprise.

41 For a much wider review of conditionality in Bank projects see: - Conditionality in Bank Projects: Agricultural Price Policies - OED report under preparation.

25. I D A d e a l t wi th these i s s u e s wi th s k i l l and cons is tency . Its ac t ions were taken a t a measured pace and c l e a r l y explained beforehand; t h e r e was widespread agreement among government o f f i c i a l s t h a t t h e grounds f o r cance l l a t ion were both well-founded l e g a l l y and i n terms of t he p r o j e c t ' s poor prospects ; IDA gave Government p l en ty of time t o undertake t h e des i r ed reforms; and complete cour tesy was maintained throughout. This combination of f i rmness and cour tesy has provided a sound b a s i s f o r t h e follow-up p r o j e c t and i t has cont r ibuted t o the present good r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e Government and t h e Bank. This case , t he re f ore , convincingly shows t h a t firmness i s not necessa r i ly harmful t o good r e l a t i o n s . I n f a c t , i n t h i s case one can probably specula te t h a t i t improved t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p .

Annex I Page 1 of 2


GUINEA - LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1063-GUI )

Follow-on P r o j e c t

1 Following t h e change ofGovernment i n Apr i l 1984, t h e Government of Guinea requested continued I D A a s s i s t a n c e i n t he development of t h e l i v e s t o c k subsec tor . I n view of t h e p o s i t i v e po l i cy developments t h a t had taken p l ace , I D A agreed and a p r o j e c t - "Guinea: Livestock Sec tor R e h a b i l i t a t i o n P r o j e c t " has been proposed and appraised. Subject t o t h e outcome of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s (expected t o t ake p l ace dur ing t h e f i r s t ha l f of 19861, t h e main f e a t u r e s of t h e proposed p r o j e c t a r e l i k e l y t o inc lude t h e following:

ob jec t ives1 / 2.

The major o b j e c t i v e of t h e p r o j e c t would be t o i nc rease t h e p r o d u c t i v i t y of t h e Guinean l i v e s t o c k populat ion thereby augmenting n a t i o n a l meat and milk product ion and improving n u t r i t i o n , and a l s o , r a i s i n g the s t anda rd of l i v i n g of livestock-owning f ami l i e s . This would be achieved through s imple measures: vacc ina t ions a g a i n s t common c a t t l e d i s e a s e s ; p rov i s ion of medicines, f eeds , and minera l l i c k s ; and upgrading of t h e l i v e s t o c k husbandry and v e t e r i n a r y suppor t s e rv i ce . The p r o j e c t would a l s o a t tempt t o c r e a t e an environment conducive t o p r i v a t i z a t i o n of l i v e s t o c k s e r v i c e s and provis ion of i npu t s . I f succes s fu l , t h i s could be adopted on a wider scale under f u t u r e p ro j e c t s .

Sunnaary Descr ip t ion

3. The proposed p r o j e c t would have a country wide-coverage. It would be implemented over f i v e years and would include:

( a ) Support f o r t he p r i v a t i z a t i o n process through:

( i ) t h e es tab l i shment of about 45 herdsmen's a s s o c i a t i o n s t o enable them t o employ t h e i r own agents f o r simple animal h e a l t h t rea tments and s a l e s of l i v e s t o c k medicines and inputs . To provide i n c e n t i v e s f o r t h e formation of a s s o c i a t i o n s , t h e p r o j e c t would provide f o r t r a i n i n g of t h e a s s o c i a t i o n s ' nominated agen t s , and support f o r t h e a s s o c i a t i o n s ' i n i t i a l s t ock of l i v e s t o c k inpu t s ;

1/ Paras. 2 and 3 verbat im from d r a f t SAR, Guinea Lives tock R e h a b i l i t a t i o n - P r o j e c t , Report No. 5701-GUI da ted November 21, 1985 (paras . 4.01 and 4.02).

Annex I Page 2 of 2

(ii) the creation of an Input Supply center ("Centrale dlApprovisionnement" - CA) at Conakry for the production, purchase, distribution and sale of livestock inputs such as vaccines, medicines, feeds and mineral licks. As the private sector initial interest in the supply of livestock inputs is limited, the State would be mainly responsible for the CA's operations in the beginning of the project. However, the participation of the private sector, particularly that of the herdsmen's associations in CA would be permitted; and

(111) the provision of a small pilot credit component for the establishment of private veterinarians throughout the country, for setting up animal production farms, for herder groups, and for distributing livestock inputs.

(b) Strengthening of a reduced public livestock service through:

(1) the construction and renovation of building for the central department in Conakry ("Direction de 1'ElevageU - DE) including the Diagnostic Laboratory, 22 Prefectoral Directorates ("Direction Pr fectorale de llElevage - DPE), and provision of equipment, vehicles and basic materials to DE, 33 DPEs and 320 livestock posts ("Poste dlElevage" - PE) ;

(11) the establishment of a training center in Lab with a capacity for 40 trainees for recycling training of about 240 livestock staff during project implementation period; training of livestock agents nominated by herdsmen's associations; and training of representatives of herdsmen's associations on group development;

(iii) provision of fellowships for external training of high level staff; and

(iv) provision of equipment and vehicles for annual national vaccination campaigns against common cattle diseases.

(c) Provision of about 19 staff-years of internationally recruited resident specialists; and about 39 staff-months of short-term consultants to assist in project implementation, carry out studies related to the sector, and prepare a possible follow-up project.

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(Credit 1063-GUI)

PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

December 31, 1984

Projects Department Western Africa Regional Office Agriculture A Division

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA LIVESTOCK DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

(CREDIT 106 3-GUI) PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT

I. BACKGROUND

The Economy

1.01 Guinea has an area of 245,900 km2 and a population of 5.6 million, with a growth rate of 2.8% per year (1981). The country has very considerable agricultural, forestry and livestock development potential, as well as water resources for irrigation and electrical energy. Its fisheries potential, estimated at 500,000 tons per year, is among the highest in West Africa. It is the largest exporter of bauxite of which it possesses 19% of known reserves in the world, and also exports large quantities of alumina; it has a substantial deposit of high grade iron ore. Yet, at the beginning of the eighties, the gross national product per capita was only US$ 299 (1983), one of the lowest in the world.

1.02 ~uinea's economic performance since independence (1958) has been disappointing. Before independence, Guinea was an exporter of agricultural commodities and was practically self-sufficient in food. Since then and up to 1983, Guinea tried to build a socialist economy with a centralized political and economic system dominated by the Party-State, the Democratic Party of Guinea (PDG). The public service sector became characterised by gross overstaffing, relatively low wages and difficult working conditions leading to low morale and poor work habits; few funds were available for operating costs. The development of collective ownership of the factors of production, in both urban and rural areas, establishment of state enterprises, and instituting a monopoly in the marketing of agricultural commodities, very rapidly absorbed the state's resources and eroded its capacity to borrow from the Central Bank and external sources. During this period, agricultural production, which provides livelihood for 80% of the population, stagnated and then declined, while commodity exports diminished until they became insignificant. Guinea became a net importer of primary goods.

1.03 Increasingly serious shortagesof foreign exchange and the attendant reduction of imports of consumer goods, galloping inflation, overvaluation of the currency and the development of a non-official market have been the outcome of this Government policy. In 1973, Guinea established two very large mining ventures which restored a modest growth of its per capita gross national product. Export earnings generated by the mining sector were used for mining requirements, importation of primary food products, equipment for the public sector and the collective system of production. They were insufficient to permit the acquisition of consumer goods in sufficient quantities to supply the official trade and provide incentives for production. 1977 witnessed some liberalisation and private trade came to be tolerated and since then the non-official market continued to expand. However, since the change of Government in April 1984, the Government has continued to encourage this trend.

1.04 The Agr i cu l tu ra l Sec tor Review Report (GUI 4672) dated A p r i l 15, 1984 s t a t e s t h a t t h e p r i n c i p a l causes of t h e d isappoin t ing a g r i c u l t u r a l performance i n Guinea have been: ( i ) o f f i c i a l p r i c e s which a r e too low t o encourage production; ( i i ) t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o d e l i v e r a l a r g e p a r t of production t o t h e o f f i c i a l marketing system; ( i i i ) l a ck of t h e requi red i n p u t s f o r production; ( i v ) a l imi t ed non-of f ic ia l marketing and (v) l ack of a s u i t a b l e development and investment po l i cy a p a r t from t h e c o l l e c t i v e product ion systems.

Livestock Sec to r

1.05 I n t h i s economic s i t u a t i o n , stock-keeping which is mainly p rac t i s ed on smal l t r a d i t i o n a l farms cons td tu t e s an e s s e n t i a l element of t h e r u r a l economy. It comprises about 1,250,000 c a t t l e of t h e N'Dama breed which adapt e a s i l y t o t h e c l i m a t i c condi t ions i n Guinea, 550,000 sheep and goats , 60,000 p igs and 1,000,000 poul t ry . The l i v e s t o c k belongs t o about 160,000 f a m i l i e s which represent 30% of t h e r u r a l populat ion. This l i v e s t o c k is very unevenly d i s t r i b u t e d : 45% i n t h e Fouta D ja l lon i n Fula country, 27% i n Upper Guinea inhabi ted by t h e Malinkg, 18% i n Maritime Guinea and 10% i n t h e f o r e s t b e l t . The l i v e s t o c k produce milk, meat, h ides and sk ins and c a t t l e a r e a l s o used f o r animal draught (about 100,000 draught c a t t l e ) . The c a t t l e populat ion is threa tened by d i f f e r e n t d i seases , e s p e c i a l l y contagious bovine pleuropneumonia which is enzoot ic i n Upper Guinea, and r inde rpes t , p a r t i c u l a r l y s i n c e t h e reappearance of many c e n t r e s of i n f e c t i o n i n West Afr ica .

1.06 The marketing of l i v e s t o c k was na t iona l i zed i n 1974 and s i n c e then has been governed by the " tenth rule" , meaning t h a t t h e stock-owner should d e l i v e r t o t he S t a t e Livestock Marketing Agency (ENCOBE), a t t h e o f f i c i a l p r i c e of S 11 per k i l o ( t h a t i s less than a s i x t h of t he u n o f f i c i a l p r i c e i n 1980), a number of l i v e animals equiva len t t o a t en th of h i s herd, t h e number of which was determined each year through a Government census. This t e n t h p a r t represented almost t h e e n t i r e product ion which has never exceeded 11%. This scheme was complemented by another S t a t e Marketing Agency which bought beef c a t t l e from ENCOBEs, s laughtered them and so ld t h e meat a t a low p r i c e i n Conakry t o a l imi t ed number of consumers. Consequently, t h e owner always t r i e d t o dodge the o f f i c i a l market by f a l s i f y i n g t h e number of h i s herd and by d e l i v e r i n g immature animals t o ENCOBEs, whi le a t t h e same time supplying c a t t l e t o t he non-o f f i c i a l market and f o r c l andes t ine expor t . In t h i s s i t u a t i o n which p reva i l ed mainly i n t h e a r eas supplying Conakry and involved i n 1980 about 10% of t h e herd, mutual confidence could not be e s t a b l i s h e d between stock-owners and t h e s t a f f of t h e Livestock Department who a r e Government agents . This rendered owner's p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e p r o j e c t ' s a c t i v i t i e s extremely un l ike ly because they feared t h a t t h e r e a l s i z e of t h e i r herd, t h e b a s i s of t h e imposi t ion, would be known. On A p r i l 18, 1984, t h e new Government published an announcement abo l i sh ing t h e ENCOBEs and l i b e r a l i z i n g c a t t l e t r a d e .

1.07 Under t h e previous regime, t h e stock-owner a l s o had t o pay a vacc ina t ion f e e which c o n s t i t u t e d a c a t t l e t a x , t h e amount of which was a l s o based on t h e Government's annual census. This t ax , which was included i n t h e r eg iona l budgets, procured about ha l f t h e t o t a l amount expected, but i t a l s o helped t o f a n t h e owner's d i s t r u s t of t h e Livestock Department.

1.08 The Lives tock General D i r e c t o r a t e (DGE) i s i n charge of t h e L ives tock sub-sector under t h e a e g i s of t h e Min i s t r y of L ives tock and F i s h e r i e s (MEP) e s t a b l i s h e d i n 1979. The DGE is cons ide r ab ly ove r s t a f f ed . There i s a l s o an imbalance between t h e s e n i o r s t a f f and o p e r a t i v e s and p r o f e s s i o n a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s a r e o f t e n inadequate . S t a f f s a l a r i e s a r e r e l a t i v e l y low and many s t a f f have o t h e r a c t i v i t i e s t o supplement t h e i r inadequa te salaries. T h i s s i t u a t i o n con t i nues t o d e t e r i o r a t e as t h e DGE keeps on r e c r u i t i n g each year and t h e t o t a l amount of s a l a r i e s heav i l y burdens t h e n a t i o n a l budget, t hus making i t imposs ib le f o r Government t o p rov ide t h e DGE w i t h o p e r a t i n g funds.

1.09 The t r a i n i n g of L ives tock Department s t a f f i s t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h r e e m i n i s t r i e s i n charge of educa t ion . U n t i l 1983-84, admiss ion i n t o a t r a i n i n g e s t ab l i shmen t assured t h e e n t r a n t an au tomat ic pos t i n t h e pub l i c s e r v i c e at t h e end of h i s t r a i n i n g . The t r a i n i n g g iven i n t h e v a r i o u s e s t ab l i shmen t s was however of ve ry poor q u a l i t y . Moreover, t h e number of admiss ions , a lmost 500 each y e a r , was i n no way r e l a t e d t o t h e r e a l need of t h e L ives tock Department i n terms of t o t a l number of s t a f f and ba l ance between t h e s e n i o r s t a f f and o p e r a t i v e s . Th i s problem is no t r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e MEP, bu t a f f e c t s a l l Government o r g a n i z a t i o n s i n Guinea.

S e c t o r Lending S t r a t e g y and Bank's Role

1.10 IDA ha s f inanced t h r e e p r o j e c t s i n t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r . The P ineapple Development and Technica l Ass i s t ance (Daboya) P r o j e c t (Cred i t G U I 569, FY 1975) w a s designed t o promote f r e s h p ineapple p roduc t ion f o r t h e expo r t market t o a nuc leus e s t a t e of about 500 ha and about 150 ha of outgrowers. The p r o j e c t w a s chosen as i t was thought t o be a manageable, l i m i t e d f i r s t s t e p i n t h e a g r i c u l t u r a l s e c t o r no t r e q u i r i n g s u b s t a n t i a l changes i nvo lv ing Guinea 's i n s t i t u t i o n a l and economic regime. The p r o j e c t , completed i n 1981, w a s implemented s a t i s f a c t o r i l y from a t e c h n i c a l s t a n d p o i n t . A f t e r p r o j e c t complet ion however, p roduc t ion dec l i ned due t o Government's monopoly i n marke t ing and l a c k of f o r e i g n exchange t o import f e r t i l i z e r s and s p a r e p a r t s . The Rice P r o j e c t , (C red i t GUI-952, FY 1980) had a broader focuk a l though t h i s a l s o was an "enclave" t ype p r o j e c t l i m i t e d t o a s p e c i s i c a r e a and embracing a management s t r u c t u r e e s p e c i a l l y c r e a t e d f o r i t s . e x e c u t i o n . It w a s designed as a p i l o t p r o j e c t and s e t o u t w i t h a combination of r e s ea r ch , ex t ens ion and o t h e r suppor t s e r v i c e s t o develop low c o s t , r e p l i c a b l e t echn iques of smal lho lder r i c e p roduc t ion u s ing improved seed , f e r t i l i z e r and b e t t e r husbandry. Yie ld impact has been s i g n i f i c a n t and farmer response is e n t h u s i a s t i c s e t t i n g t h e s t a g e f o r e v e n t u a l widespread adopt ion . A second phase is now be ing appra i sed . The i h i r d p r o j e c t w a s t h e L ives tock P r o j e c t , t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s r e p o r t .

1.11 ' The new Government which came t o power i n A p r i l 1984 ha s expressed a d e s i r e t o g ive p r i o r i t y t o a g r i c u l t u r e development and t o remove o r r e cons ide r p a s t o b s t a c l e s . Given a change i n po l i cy , t h e Bank's f u t u r e l end ing s t r a t e g y w i l l be o r i e n t e d towards i n c r e a s i n g p r o d u c t i v i t y of i n d i v i d u a l l andho lde r s and l i v e s t o c k owners. The Bank w i l l con t inue t o pursue d i a logues on both macro-economic p o l i c i e s t o p rov ide i n c e n t i v e s f o r a g r i c u l t u r a l import s u b s t i t u t i o n and e x p o r t s i n l i n e wi th ou r A g r i c u l t u r e S e c t o r Review Report ( p a r a 1 .04) . Lending a c t i v i t i e s w i l l f ocus on proven technology t o be a p p l i e d t o adap t ab l e a r e a s on one hand, and s t r eng then ing

t h e admin i s t r a t i ve and t echn ica l c a p a b i l i t y of t h e M i n i s t r i e s of Agr i cu l tu ra l and Livestock and F i s h e r i e s on t h e o t h e r hand. Improvements of extension, research and input de l ive ry programs would be t h e medium-term goal and would be implemented gradual ly.

11. PROJECT FORMULATION AND APPRAISAL

2.01 Prepara t ion During t h e a p p r a i s a l of t h e Pineapple Development P r o j e c t (Loan 569 G U I , FY 1975) t he Bank and Government agreed t o inc lude i n t h e p r o j e c t t he f inanc ing of a s tudy of t h e l i v e s t o c k sub-sector and t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and prepara t ion of one o r s e v e r a l l i v e s t o c k development p r o j e c t s . This study was executed at t h e end of 1976 by a Consul t ing f i r m under t h e superv is ion of W A . The r e p o r t prepared by t h e f i rm included a s tudy of t h e l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r and i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of four l i v e s t o c k p ro j ec t s . The Government and t h e Consul tant , wi th t h e a s s i s t a n c e of RMWA, e s t ab l i shed at t h e beginning of 1977 t h e components of a p r o j e c t and t h e prepara t ion s t a r t e d soon a f t e r . During t h e prepara t ion , t he Consul tant had d i f f i c u l t y i n obta in ing t h e Government's support . The prepara t ion of t h e p r o j e c t w a s accordingly a f f e c t e d and the Consul tan t ' s f i n a l r epo r t was deemed inadequate. I n October 1977, t h e Government and I D A agreed t o have a modified p ro j ec t and i t s prepara t ion was undertaken by RMWA a t t h e beginning of 1978. The prepara t ion r e p o r t was discussed with t h e Government i n t he middle of 1978 and i t asked IDA t o app ra i se t h e p r o j e c t on t h e b a s i s of t h e r epo r t .

2.02 The p r o j e c t prepared aimed mainly t o i nc rease t h e production of meat as w e l l a s owners' incomes and t o prepare t h e b a s i s f o r t h e expor t a t ion of N'Dama c a t t l e . To t h i s end, t h e p r o j e c t which was t o b e implemented over a period of f i v e years , comprised : a ) s t rengthening and inc reas ing t h e medical and zootechnica l a c t i v i t i e s of t h e Livestock Department throughout t h e country, b) s t rengthening of i t s s tudy and planning capac i ty ; c ) p i l o t and prepara tory a c t i v i t i e s inc luding N'Dama c a t t l e expor t promotion and d) t r a i n i n g a c t i v i t i e s .

2.03 Appraisal Following t h e postponement of t h e p r o j e c t ' s a p p r a i s a l due t o s t a f f c o n s t r a i n t s and a t t h e Government's reques t , RMWA undertook t h e updating of t h e Prepara t ion Report i n September-October 1979. IDA c a r r i e d out t h e a p p r a i s a l of t h e p r o j e c t i n October-November 1979. The a p p r a i s a l mission was made up of t h r e e members with two o t h e r s p a r t i c i p a t i n g f o r p a r t of t h e mission. They were a l l permanent Bank S t a f f members. W A d i d not p a r t i c i p a t e i n t h e a p p r a i s a l which, on t h e whole, maintained t h e p ro j ec t as prepared, with t h e except ion of a few modif ica t ions made wi th t h e consent of t h e Government.

P ro j ec t Descr ip t ion The appraised p r o j e c t included :

a ) Strengthening of t h e i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework : i ) cons t ruc t ion of a bu i ld ing f o r t h e DGE, i ts equipment

and t echn ica l a s s i s t ance ; i i ) es tabl ishment of a S tudies Unit (BDE) wi th in MPE, i ts

equipment and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e , and s p e c i f i c a l l y

en t rus t ed with p r o j e c t monitoring and evaluat ion;

b) Strengthening of animal h e a l t h and zootechnical s e rv ices throughout the country by means of : i ) t h e cons t ruc t ion o r r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and equipping of 27

Regional D i rec to ra t e s (DREP) and two bases f o r annual vacc ina t ion campaigns;

i i ) f inancing of a h e a l t h and zootechnical a s s i s t a n c e program inc luding t h e sale of drugs and mineral l i c k s t o stock-owners;

i i i ) f inancing of annual vacc ina t ion campaigns t o be implemented under t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of t h e two reg iona l bases ;

i v ) l o g i s t i c support f o r t h e c e n t r a l vaccine and d iagnos is labora tory ;

v) funding f o r a j o i n t l i ves tock and animal draught propagation program;

c) A t r a i n i n g component comprising : i ) t h e cons t ruc t ion and opera t ion of a t r a i n i n g cen t r e ;

i i ) s cho la r sh ips f o r t r a i n i n g and study tours .

2.05 The changes made during a p p r a i s a l were t h e exclusion of a p i l o t l i v e s t o c k f a t t e n i n g component and a l i v e s t o c k f i e l d s t a f f t r a i n i n g col lege , t h e review of a prepara tory s e l e c t i o n component and modif icat ion of t h e l i v e s t o c k d i f f u s i o n component by adding animal t r a c t i o n .

2.06 The c o s t of t h e p r o j e c t w a s es t imated a t US$ 21 m i l l i o n ( t h a t is S 399 mi l l i on ) out of which US$ 17.5 m i l l i o n (SDR 13.3 mi l l i on ) represented t h e fo re ign exchange por t ion financed by I D A and US$ 3.5 m i l l i o n i n l o c a l currency of which US$ 0.6 m i l l i o n represented taxes. The t o t a l cos t of t h e p r o j e c t included t h e i n i t i a l and supplementary s tocks of medicine and mineral l i c k s amounting t o US$ 4.4 m i l l i o n , and t h e fo re ign exchange c o s t s of US$ 1.3 m i l l i o n f o r a d d i t i o n a l suppl ies . The p r o j e c t had est imated t h a t t he owners would buy chemicals worth US$ 9.2 m i l l i o n over f i v e years . The t o t a l cos t of t h e p r o j e c t a l s o included the cos t of t echn ica l a s s i s t a n c e est imated at US$ 2.9 mi l l i on .

2.07 The p r o j e c t ' s i n s t i t u t i o n a l organiza t ion proposed by t h e a p p r a i s a l mission, and by t h e Government a t t i m e of a p p r a i s a l , placed t h e p r o j e c t under t h e supervis ion of BDE which i s a t tached t o t h e MEP o f f i c e , with DGE being r e spons ib le f o r i t s execution i n t h e f i e l d .

2.08 With regard t o t h e p r o j e c t ' s f inancing terms, t h e appra i sa l mission had proposed a working c a p i t a l i n fo re ign exchange i n a BGCE account with an i n i t i a l depos i t of US$ 100,000 t o be re leased by IDA, but a s i m i l a r f inancing mechanism was not provided f o r l o c a l expenditures by Government, which l a t e r made p r o j e c t implementation d i f f i c u l t .

2.09 The a p p r a i s a l mission confirmed t h e major problems f ac ing t h e l i ves tock s e c t o r which had a l ready been pointed out and discussed during t h e prepara t ion phase; (a) compulsory s e l l i n g of l i v e c a t t l e a t t h e very low p r i c e of S 11 p e r kg, (b) c a t t l e tax , and (c) ove r s t a f f ing of DGE and

imbalance between t h e s i z e of t h e var ious s t a f f ca t egor i e s , most of whom were not we l l qua l i f i ed . I t a l s o recognized t h a t t h i s s i t u a t i o n was worsening each year because of t h e automatic recrui tment by Government of graduates from t h i s extremely inadequate t r a i n i n g system where annual admissions, which have f o r t u n a t e l y been stopped by t h e new regime, were not r e l a t e d t o requirements. The s o l u t i o n t o t h i s problem, although highly d e s i r a b l e f o r t h e e n t i r e s e c t o r , was not seen by t h e a p p r a i s a l mission a s a f a c t o r t h a t could impede t h e execution of t h e p r o j e c t , never the less a s o l u t i o n was t o be proposed and c a r r i e d out during p ro jec t implementation.

2.10 The a p p r a i s a l mission (and prepara t ion mission beforehand) had presented t h e t h r e e problems and t h e i r consequences e x p l i c i t l y . A judgement was requi red a s t o whether Governments changing views were s u f f i c i e n t and could be fos tered . The mat te r was the re fo re discussed i n d e t a i l before p resen ta t ion t o t h e Loan Committee. Af ter c a r e f u l cons idera t ion it was f e l t t h a t Government was tak ing a more p o s i t i v e a t t i t u d e towards these ques t ions and, i n l i n e with a p p r a i s a l mission views, t h a t t h e r e was j u s t i f i c a t i o n t o move forward with t h e p ro jec t , accept ing assurances t h a t t h e problems would be d e a l t with during implementation. With regard t o t h e problems of compulsory marketing and c a t t l e p r i c e , which involved only a smal l a r ea , i t had been noted t h a t Government was becoming inc reas ing ly aware of t h e need f o r change and had i n f a c t f i n a l l y agreed e a r l i e r , during nego t i a t ions on t h e r i c e p r o j e c t (Credi t 952-GUI), t h a t a genera l s tudy of t h e problem of a g r i c u l t u r a l p r i c e s be f inanced under t h e l a t t e r p ro jec t . It was the re fo re proposed t o al low Government time t o e f f e c t t h e necessary changes. It was a l s o agreed t o ob ta in Government's undertaking t o abo l i sh t h e vacc ina t ion tax . Government was becoming more aware of t h e s t a f f i n g problems. It was however a n a t i o n a l problem and t h i s was t h e f i r s t p ro jec t where t h e i s s u e was being s e r i o u s l y r a i sed . It was ques t ionable whether t h e p r o j e c t could so lve t h e i s s u e immediately and whether i t should be delayed because of it. Government was aware and a dialogue had been s t a r t e d i n t h e context of t h e pro jec t . BDE would c a r r y out a s tudy and i t was proposed a t t h i s s t a g e t o ob ta in an undertaking t h a t c o r r e c t i v e measures, based on t h e needs t o be met and budgetary provis ions , would be taken during t h e p ro jec t t o reduce t h e number of s t a f f .

2.11 Negotiat ions During t h e nego t i a t ions , which were held a t Headquarters from July , 22 t o 29 1980, t h e above poin ts of view were accepted and t h e r e l evan t condi t ions were included i n t h e Loan Agreement. Supplementary l e t t e r s No 2 and 3 d e t a i l e d t h e s t e p s t o be taken i n order t o remove c a t t l e marketing c o n s t r a i n t s and t o determine s t a f f i n g requirements. These condit ions were t o be f u l f i l l e d before December 31, 1981. Af t e r s igning , a t ~ove rnmen t ' s reques t , t h i s d a t e was l a t e r extended t o June 30th, 1982 because of a delay i n c r e d i t e f f ec t iveness .

2.12 A t negot ia t ions , t he re was controversy about t h e pos i t i on and t h e r o l e of t h e Ministry of Livestock 's S tudies Unit (BDE). The Bank made i ts proposal t h a t o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e p ro jec t would rest with BDE but f i e l d implementation would rest with DGE (para.2.07). The Guinean de legat ion l e d by t h e Vice-Governor of t h e Cen t ra l Bank and advised by t h e Direc tor General of Livestock, t h e only r ep resen ta t ive of t h e Ministry of Livestock, put forward an a l t e r n a t i v e proposal t h a t t h e DGE should have f u l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r a l l p r o j e c t a c t i v i t i e s . This represented a change i n Government's previous p o s i t i o n discussed and agreed during appra i sa l .

Following extensive discussion, IDA agreed with the delegation's proposal: that the DGE would have prime responsibility for the project but that a special and substantially autonomous research and planning office would be established in the DGE reporting directly to the Minister and with responsibility for overall planning for the Livestock Sector and for monitoring and evaluation activities. All project documents were subsequently adjusted to reflect this change. The day before the project documents were due to be circulated to the Board a cable was received (on August 29) from the Minister of Livestock advising that he wanted to return to the organisational structure previously agreed at appraisal. The Credit Agreement was accordingly changed but insufficient time was available to change the SAR and President's Report. The Board was advised of this change during the oral presentation. A mission in October 1980 advised the Minister that a clear understanding of responsibilities of the BDE and DGE was highly desirable and it was agreed that a written statement would be prepared with an attached organigram and this would be sent to the Bank and used as a corrigendum to the SAR. The Minister's signed statement dated November 8 was received. It specified that the BDE (which reported directly to the Minister) would be the Ministry of Livestock's, Planning and Studies office and would be responsible for the overall planning and supervision of all project activities and listed several specific activities for which it would be responsible (collection and analysis of data, analysis of project costs and project monitoring and evaluation). The detailed execution of the field activities of the project would be handled by the DGE and its specialieed services. The Minister's letter specifically mentioned that the DGE would be in charge of the administrative, financial and accounting services of the project, input supply, the Regional Service, DREPS, Vaccination Program, training center and Kankan laboratory. IDA accepted this proposal in its reply of November 20, 1980.

I I I . IMPLEMENTAT ION

A. Effectiveness and Start-up

3 .O1 The Credit Agreement included three conditions of effectiveness : (a) the opening of a working capital account in foreign exchange with BGCE; (b) the appointment of the Director General of Livestock and of the Director of BDE subject to approval by IDA and (c) the signing of a technical assistance contract subject to approval by IDA.

3.02 Initially scheduled for February 23, 1981, the effective date of the credit was first postponed to May 27, 1981 and again to July 31, 1981. One of the three conditions stipulated in the Credit Agreement, the signing of the technical assistance contract, did not take place before July 24, 1981. Meanwhile, the second supervision mission in February 1981 reported: (a) the suspension, due to lack of local funds in sylis, of the vaccination campaign financed by the UNDP/FAO project which IDA was to continue and (b) the assignment by the Government of four new vehicles procured by the UNDP/FAO project for the campaign for other purposes. In accordance with section 3.09 of the Credit Agreement, IDA informed the Government by telex dated March 23,1981, that it considered the rectification of this situation

a s a supplementary condi t ion f o r t h e e f f ec t iveness of t h e Cred i t . The Government took a c t i o n and f i n a l l y , on J u l y 27, 1981 t h e FA0 o f f i c e i n Conakry asked UNDP t o inform IDA of t h e r e t u r n of t he two remaining veh ic l e s , thereby f u l f i l l i n g t h e supplementary condi t ion ; t h i s enabled IDA t o announce by t e l e x dated August 6 t h a t t h e Cred i t would become e f f e c t i v e on J u l y 31, 1981.

B. General Implementation of t h e P ro j ec t

3.03 It should be s a i d a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t t h e p r o j e c t was a n a t i o n a l p r o j e c t which was t o be implemented under very d i f f i c u l t macro-economic and condi t ions . Methods of g e t t i n g th ings done i n Guinea were very d i f f i c u l t . Although t h e r e were management problems, it was probably t h e macro-economic c l ima te which a f f ec t ed the implementation of some of t he main condi t ions and thus t h e outcome of t h e p ro j ec t . I n t h e event , implementation of t h e p r o j e c t was pursued f o r a very s h o r t per iod; i n f a c t t h e p r o j e c t was executed without r e s t r i c t i o n f o r only seven months. The f i r s t t h r e e superv is ions i n October 1980, March 1981 and October 1981 concentrated on the a r c h i t e c t work, s e l e c t i o n of Technical Assis tance, a condi t ion of e f f ec t iveness , and t r y i n g t o g e t t h e p r o j e c t underway. The f o u r t h superv is ion i n February 1982, continued t o f i n d d i f f i c u l t i e s descr ibed i n e a r l i e r superv is ions not ing t h r e e i n p a r t i c u l a r which requi red s o l u t i o n s i f t h e p r o j e c t was t o progress , namely : a ) l ack of counterpar t funds and d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered i n g e t t i n g even t h e smal l quan t i t y of funds a v a i l a b l e ; b) d i f f e r e n c e s of opinion on a number of important ma t t e r s implemented by t h e DGE (such a s s a l e of drugs) were apparent ly causing implementation t o be slow. It was a l s o proving d i f f i c u l t t o g e t t h e DGE and t h e a r c h i t e c t toge ther with t h e IDA mission t o review t h e bu i ld ing program; c ) cooperat ion between t h e BDE and t h e DGE was inadequate (para 5.01). A s f a r a s c o n d i t i o n a l i t y was concerned, t h e mission focused on t h e need f o r Government t o t ake measures t o remove c o n s t r a i n t s on c a t t l e marketing and o f f e r adequate i ncen t ives t o herdsmen f o r t h e s a l e of t h e i r c a t t l e (Sect ion 3.13). A c l ause which was supposed t o have a c t i o n commenced by December 31, 1981, was extended t o June 30, 1982. A s a r e s u l t , IDA, i n i t s l e t t e r of Apr i l 28, 1982 r a i s e d these po in t s and asked Government t o de lay t h e s igning of t h e con t r ac t f o r cons t ruc t ion works and the f i r s t o rder f o r medicines and minera l l i c k s u n t i l l o c a l funds had been made a v a i l a b l e and bui ld ings had been reviewed by t h e DGE and a r c h i t e c t , and t h e problem of t h e c a t t l e marketing had been solved. However, t h e Technical Assis tance remained i n pos t (although they had almost no l o c a l opera t ing funds) and t h e labora tory continued t o work and produce vaccines.

3.04 In order t o r e so lve t h e problem of l o c a l funds, t h e Government re leased t o t h e p ro j ec t an amount of S 7 m i l l i o n in s t ead of t h e S 35 m i l l i o n requi red , but t he success ive cumbersome procedures f o r t h e mobi l iza t ion of t h e s e funds d id not permit normal func t ioning of t he p ro j ec t . Following t h e f o u r t h superv is ion , on August 31, 1982 a genera l reminder was te lexed t o t h e Government aga in demanding t h e l i b e r a l i z a t i o n of c a t t l e marketing. On October lst, 1982, a let ter s e n t by IDA d e t a i l e d the d i f f e r e n t measures t o be taken success ive ly before December 31, 1982 and J u l y ls t , 1983, i n order t o f i n a l l y l i b e r a l i z e t h e c a t t l e t r a d e by December 31, 1983 s o a s t o avoid the stoppage of t he p r o j e c t . The Government gave a v e r b a l response t o an IDA mission a t t h e beginning of

December 1982, announcing its intention to abolish the ENCOBES by February 1983 at the latest. On January 27, 1983, as it had not received written confirmation, IDA sent a telex restating the measures to be taken and the deadlines to be observed in order to avoid the suspension of disbursement by March 15, 1983. By telex dated February 23, 1983 the Government responded by announcing a number of measures taken or to be taken, but these answers did not tackle the core of the problem. IDA however decided to discuss the problem once again on the spot and sent a seventh supervision mission that was carried out by end of March 1983. The solution adopted by the mission with the consent of the Minister of Livestock and confirmed by IDA in a telex addressed to the Government on April 15, was the suspension of disbursements for the project by April 19, 1983. After this date, if the measures demanded were not taken, the cancellation of the undisbursed balance of the credit would be announced, except for the activities of the Kindia laboratory. On June 4 the Government informedhn IDA mission that it was willing to request the cancellation of the credit, but at the s'ame time requested assistance to enable it continue the manufacture of vaccines and the vaccination campaign. IDA decided that it could not accede to this request and since there was no new development, it informed the Government by a telex dated July 29 that disbursements had been suspended for the Kindia laboratory. Finally, by a telex dated September 12, 1983 IDA informed the Government of the cancellation on the same day, of the undisbursed balance of the credit, that is SDR 11.7 million leaving SDR 170,098 to cover late disbursements.

C. Project Activities

3.05 The activities of the project that were started but not completed are : (a) the construction programme for the strengthening of the Central and Regional livestock departments, (b) the establishment and functioning of BDE, (c) logistic support for the Kindia laboratory, (d) logistic support for the vaccination campaign, (e) pilot propagation of livestock breeding and animal draught through the granting of loans, and (f) staff training. The establishment and operation of an inputs sales system did not start.

3.06 Project building Architectural designs, tendering and preparation of contracts for the buildings to be renovated and constructed were all that was done before the project was suspended. This work was financed with an advance of funds under PPF which was requested by the Government and granted by IDA in March 1980. The architect was selected and his contract signed on June 20th, 1980 with the approval of IDA. Competitive bidding was launched in August 1981 and tenders were opened on December 8 the same year. The contractor was chosen by the Government which finally accepted, rather reluctantly, IDA'S explanations regarding the maximum permitted ceiling for the preference that could be accorded to local contractors and informed IDA of its decision on June 16, 1982. Apart from the old buildings to be renovated, the volume of new construction works proposed by Government largely exceeded the appraisal estimates both in volume and in cost. The latter exceeded appraisal estimates by 69% because of the extension of the work volume and secondly due to some questionable additions. IDA therefore asked for a reduction in the total

program. This r e v i s i o n was p a r t i c u l a r l y necessary because, a t t h e same t i m e , by a le t ter dated A p r i l 28, 1982, IDA had confirmed i t s approval f o r t h e cons t ruc t ion of a bu i ld ing t h a t was t o house t h e DGE and BDE and a l s o f o r t h e MEP whose o ld bui ld ing was t o be demolished t o make room f o r OAU conference bui ld ings . The s i t i n g of t h e Minis t ry i n a new bu i ld ing helped t o r e so lve the long-standing problem of l o c a t i n g DGE and BDE o f f i c e r s i n town, i n f a c t , an acceptab le l o c a t i o n near t he Cen t r a l Pos t Of f i ce was proposed f o r t h e Minis t ry where DGE and BDE were t o be housed.

3.07 The cons t ruc t ion program f i n a l l y agreed upon included: (a ) t h e MEP bu i ld ing a t Conakry comprising MEP, DGE and BDE, (b) t h e DGE annexes comprising a c l i n i c , s t o r e s , a shed f o r observa t ion cages and t h r e e houses, (c) a t r a i n i n g c e n t e r and two houses a t IRBANK i n Kindia, (d) a r eg iona l base a t Labe and (e) t h i r t e e n DREPs o u t of t he 16 i n i t i a l l y planned. Apart from these works, t h e program included t h e r e p a i r of only t h e Kankan Regional Base, while i n i t i a l l y 11 DREPs were t o be renovated. This program was t o absorb a l l t h e funds i n t h e cons t ruc t ion ca tegory a s w e l l a s t h e una l loca ted . The c o n t r a c t wi th the s e l e c t e d c o n t r a c t o r was f i n a l l y never s igned, s i n c e IDA requested i n A p r i l 1982 t h a t i t should be delayed pending t h e s o l u t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t ' s problems.

3.08 The Establishment and Funct ioning of BDE. The BDE which was a c t u a l l y respons ib le f o r t h e management of t he p r o j e c t a l s o conducted some - -

s p e c i f i c s t u d i e s . BDE undertook ;he monitoring of t he p ro j ec t , but a p a r t from t h e f i n a n c i a l r e p o r t s , i t d id not prepare t he requi red implementation r epor t s . ' e

3.09 The Kindia l abo ra to ry (Prepara t ion of vacc ines and d iagnos is ) . The Kindia l abo ra to ry , d e s p i t e a number of problems, prepared with p r o j e c t f inance i n 1982 over 400,000 doses of c a t t l e vaccines of which 340,000 doses were f o r r i nde rpes t and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, (manufactured f o r t he f i r s t t i m e i n Guinea), 5,600 doses of vaccine a g a i n s t r ab i e s , and 535,000 doses of pou l t ry vaccines. I n 1983 a s a r e s u l t of b e t t e r coord ina t ion , DGE vaccine requirements were determined i n good t i m e and the Kindia l abo ra to ry should have been a b l e t o provide them. However t h e p r o j e c t only suppl ied a small q u a n t i t y s i n c e i t d i d not have time, before stoppage, t o so lve long s tanding problems of t h e Kindia l abo ra to ry namely water supply, e l e c t r i c i t y , funds f o r sundry d a i l y expenses ( c r e a t i o n of a revolving fund) and the need t o s e p a r a t e t h e vaccine prepara t ion f a c i l i t i e s from t h e d iagnos is labora tory . The d iagnos is l abo ra to ry mainly received samples from Conakry f o r t he d i agnos i s of r a b i e s and samples f o r p a r a s i t o l o g i c a l tests s e n t by s tuden t s a t t he nearby Foulaya Facul ty f o r t he prepara t ion of graduate d i s s e r t a t i o n s .

3.10 The vacc ina t ion campaign i n t h e Eas t was t h e p r o j e c t ' s f i r s t a c t i v i t y i n t h e f i e l d involv ing c a t t l e owners. Having s t a r t e d very la te i n December, 1982, t h e campaign ended i n t h e North e a r l y i n March 1983 (where t h e Kankan base had d i r e c t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e implementation of t he campaign) with only 85,000 animals vaccinated, an i n s u f f i c i e n t number which the p r o j e c t ' s management a t t r i b u t e d l a r g e l y t o poor organiza t ion ( see para 5.02).

3.11 A l i v e s t o c k and animal draught propagat ion Program i n t h e Kissidougou Region was i n i t i a l l y prepared by a reconnaissance mission and a t meetings he ld i n Conakry, but no concre te a c t i o n was taken.

3.12 Pre l iminary a c t i o n was taken on s t a f f t r a i n i n g wi th t h e a r r i v a l of t h e two expe r t s i n Guinea i n May and November 1982. A f i r s t consignment of equipment w a s rece ived and s l i d e s were prepared. The i n s t a l l a t i o n of a temporary t r a i n i n g c e n t e r was s t a r t e d a t Kindia pending t h e cons t ruc t ion of a permanent c e n t e r and s t a f f t r a i n i n g commenced i n 1982 with a course on l abo ra to ry techniques. I n 1983, t h e program prepared could not be implemented.

D. P r o j e c t Costs

3.13 The p r o j e c t cos t SDR 1.43 m i l l i o n of IDA funds and about 7 m i l l i o n s y l i s of l o c a l funds (US$ 350,000). The SDR 1.43 m i l l i o n was d isbursed t o cover ( a ) t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e (comprising s i x expe r t s ) c o s t i n g SDR 1.14 m i l l i o n , (b) advance f o r prepara t ion , t h a t is SDR 101,300 which was used mainly f o r a r c h i t e c t ' s f e e s , ( c ) equipment f o r t he Kindia l abo ra to ry and procurement of v e h i c l e s f o r SDR 101,600 and (d) t he advance of SDR 88,774 o r US$ 100,000 f o r t h e p r o j e c t ' s f o r e i g n exchange expenses paid i n t o a s p e c i a l account opened a t BGCE, ou t of which an amount of US$ 74,648.82 remained when t h e p ro j ec t was stopped. Out of t h e advance paid t o t h e consu l t i ng f i rm t o cover lump sum payments, a balance of FF 723,314.50 which should normally be deducted from subsequent payments, a l s o remained. These amounts were not u t i l i z e d by t h e Government and a r e being used f o r t h e p repa ra t ion of t h e second p ro j ec t .

I V . IMPACT OF THE PROJECT

4.01 Since the p r o j e c t ba re ly s t a r t e d , it has had no impact on l i v e s t o c k product ion and owners' income. It has however made Government more aware of l i v e s t o c k problems and t h e importance of economic i s s u e s , s i n c e i t was only f i f t e e n days a f t e r t h e new Government came t o power t h a t t h e M i l i t a r y Nat iona l Redemption Committee took s t e p s t o d e a l with t h e problem of l i v e s t o c k marketing. It published i n t h e l o c a l newspaper HOROYA, on Apr i l 18, an announcement abo l i sh ing t h e ENCOBES and t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o s e l l a t t h e o f f i c i a l p r i c e and requested t h e Bank t o reopen t h e p r o j e c t .

V. INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

5.01 The P r o j e c t ' s Management and MEP. Under t h e p r o j e c t proposal , BDE, which is i n t h e Cabinet of t h e Minis te r , had o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e p r o j e c t and, i n p a r t i c u l a r f o r t h e forward planning, s t u d i e s ,

- monitor ing and eva lua t ion and gene ra l po l i cy i n t h e l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r . The DGE had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e ope ra t ion of a l l v e t e r i n a r y s e r v i c e s i n t h e f i e l d inc luding t h e Kankan bases and t h e DREP's t h a t a r e i n d i r e c t contac t wi th s tock owners and a r e r e spons ib l e f o r ca r ry ing out medical and zootechnica l opera t ions . By v i r t u e of t h e s e func t ions DGE had t h e day t o day r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of implementing t h e p r o j e c t i n t h e f i e l d . However because of BDEs o v e r a l l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e p r o j e c t t h e DGE was, according t o t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , subord ina te t o t h e BDE f o r

p r o j e c t opera t ions al though i n normal func t ions t h e DGE r e p o r t s d i r e c t l y t o t h e Minis te r . Performance of BDE was genera l ly acceptable b u t superv is ion missions repea ted ly informed t h e Minis te r t h a t implementation of t h e p a r t of t h e p ro j ec t c a r r i e d ou t by t h e DGE w a s inadequate. A t one poin t BDE was t r y i n g t o do more of t h e implementation than was o r i g i n a l l y intended. I t seems i n r e t r o s p e c t t h a t a d i f f e r e n t organiza t ion might have f i t t e d t h e Min i s t ry ' s ongoing ope ra t iona l s t r u c t u r e b e t t e r whereby r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r , and management of v e t e r i n a r y and zootechnica l ope ra t ions would have been en t rus t ed s o l e l y t o t h e DGE. I n p a r a l l e l , BDE would have had r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r development planning, and p r o j e c t eva lua t ion . Respons ib i l i t y would then be shared between DGE and BDE and al though t h e p r o j e c t ' s f i n a n c i a l management would d e a l wi th t h e two departments, i t could have been a t tached t o one of them.

5.02 During t h e organiza t ion of DGE's f i e l d u n i t s , i t was considered p re fe rab le t o e n t r u s t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h e vacc ina t ion campaign i n each reg ion t o t h e l o c a l DREP, r a t h e r than t o t h e campaign base, which was too f a r from t h e a c t i o n t o be a b l e t o undertake d a i l y superv is ion of t h e teams. The campaign base was t o become a coord ina t ing u n i t respons ib le f o r preparing and c o n t r o l l i n g wi th t h e DREPS t h e r eg iona l vacc ina t ion program, and a l o g i s t i c support u n i t t h a t would provide t h e DREPS wi th t h e equipment and s t a f f requi red t o c a r r y out t h e campaign.

5.03 On t h e whole, the Government and t h e Minis te r of Livestock and F i s h e r i e s i n p a r t i c u l a r showed a keen i n t e r e s t i n t h e p r o j e c t . The Minis te r however was not a b l e t o improve DGE performance and d e s p i t e h i s concern f o r t h e p r o j e c t t h e balance of p o l i t i c a l reason ou t s ide t h e Minis t ry seemed t o preclude an e a r l y f u l f i l l m e n t of t h e condi t ions mentioned i n paragraph 2.09 (compulsory c a t t l e s a l e , c a t t l e t a x and o v e r s t a f f i n g ) . The shor tage of l o c a l resources exp la ins t h e de lay i n r e l e a s i n g l o c a l currency funds t o t h e p r o j e c t , thus para lys ing it f o r many months. A l o c a l currency account should have been e s t a b l i s h e d s i m i l a r t o t h a t e s t ab l i shed f o r t he Rice P ro j ec t .

5.04 Technical Assis tance. S i x t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n t s were f inanced under t h e p r o j e c t inc luding a TA Team l eade r ( l i v e s t o c k s p e c i a l i s t ) , head of t h e vaccine labora tory , an a g r i c u l t u r a l t r a i n e r , an a g r i c u l t u r a l t r a ine r / ex t ens ion s p e c i a l i s t and a f i n a n c i a l d i r e c t o r who a l l worked i n t h e DGE and an economist with BDE. The t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e c o n t r a c t was signed i n J u l y 1981. Af t e r s ign ing t h e con t r ac t , t he o r i g i n a l team l eade r nomination was changed by t h e consul tan t company. The new team l eade r d id not s e t t l e i n we l l and was rep laced soon a f t e r a r r i v a l . I n t h e r e l a t i v e l y s h o r t time they were the re , t h e team developed t h e vaccine product ion and vacc ina t ion campaigns a s w e l l a s preparing t h e t r a i n i n g program and undertaking a l imi t ed amount of t r a i n i n g and s t u d i e s . They were however s eve re ly handicapped by t h e l ack of l o c a l funds t o do t h e i r work.

V I . I D A PERFORMANCE

6.01 For t h i s p r o j e c t , IDA mainta ined a c e r t a i n measure of s t a f f i n g c o n t i n u i t y . I t would have been a d v i s a b l e f o r RMWA, which had prepared t h e p r o j e c t , t o have p a r t i c i p a t e d i n i t s a p p r a i s a l , bu t a f t e r t h a t s a t i s f a c t o r y c o n t i n u i t y was a s su r ed s i n c e two persons from I D A were r e spons ib l e f o r t h e a p p r a i s a l and seven s u p e r v i s i o n miss ions . The supe rv i s i on miss ions , which were numer ica l ly s u f f i c i e n t , would have perhaps been more e f f e c t i v e i f they had been l onge r , s o t h a t they could have followed-up on a l l p r o j e c t c o n d i t i o n s and d e a l t w i th t h e d i f f e r e n t implementat ion problems and monitored t h e l aunch ing of t h e p r o j e c t ' s a c t i v i t i e s . On t h e o t h e r hand t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n d i t i o n s i n Guinea were such t h a t i t is c l e a r now t h a t no amount of d i s c u s s i o n w a s l i k e l y t o persuade Government t o a c t u a l l y make a l l t h e changes nece s sa ry t o have a good p r o j e c t i n t h e t ime frame envisaged. With regard t o t h e c o n d i t i o n s , I D A pursued mainly t h e removal of r e s t r i c t i o n s on c a t t l e market ing. A t t h e beginning, i n 1979, t h i s i s s u e was regarded by I D A as impor tan t f o r t h e sub-sector bu t accepted it would t a k e some t i m e t o s e t t l e . IDA a t t h e t ime cons idered t h a t i t was n o t l i k e l y t o have any d i r e c t impact on t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of t h e p r o j e c t . However w i th no apparen t p rog re s s by 1983 I D A f e l t t h a t Government had been g iven enough t i m e t o make t h e change. Market ing was impor tan t t o encourage fa rmers t o p a r t i c i p a t e f u l l y i n t h e p r o j e c t and i f a f t e r t h i s t ime t h e problem remained, fa rmers i n f u t u r e would n o t a v a i l themselves of t h e s e r v i c e s provided and s o b e n e f i t s would be very much reduced. I t was i n f a c t t h e Government's p o s i t i o n on t h i s i s s u e t h a t f i n a l l y l e d t o t h e s toppage of t h e p r o j e c t . A s f a r as t h e o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s s t i p u l a t e d i n s e c t i o n s 3.08 and 3.12 of t h e C r e d i t Agreement were concerned, t h e o v e r s t a f f i n g d e t e r i o r a t e d f u r t h e r and t h e c a t t l e t a x con t inued .

6.02 Bes ides , whereas t h e market ing problem was t h e on ly reason g iven by I D A f o r t h e suspens ion of t h e p r o j e c t , i t s implementat ion was encounte r ing s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r r e a sons t h a t were no t f o r e s e e n a t t h e o u t s e t ( t h e performance of t h e DGE and l a c k of l o c a l funds and d i f f i c u l t i e s i n mobi l i z ing t h e funds) . These implementat ion problems were a l r e a d y de l ay ing p r o j e c t execu t i on even though t h e p r o j e c t had n o t embarked on a l l of i t s a c t i v i t i e s nor had i t reso lved a l l i t s p o t e n t i a l problems, e s p e c i a l l y t hose invo lv ing t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of new s u p p l i e s of i n p u t s . The p r o j e c t ' s seven th and f i n a l s u p e r v i s i o n miss ion concluded t h a t even i f t h e Government had f u l f i l l e d t h e cond i t i ons r e l a t i n g t o c a t t l e market ing, t h e s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s o l u t i o n of t h e o t h e r problems would have been ve ry d i f f i c u l t . Th i s unde r l i ne s t h e ve ry d i f f i c u l t coun t ry c o n d i t i o n s a t t h e t i m e w i t h which t h e p r o j e c t had t o contend and a g a i n s t which d e c i s i o n s t o l end have t o be made.

6.03 I n i t s a t t empt t o f i n d s o l u t i o n s t o t h e p r o j e c t ' s problems, I D A was both p a t i e n t and f i rm ; i t a l s o ensured t h a t d i s c u s s i o n s w i t h t h e Government were both f r a n k and c o r d i a l , and always l e f t t h e door open f o r t h e resumption of t h e d ia logue .

V I I . CONCLUSION AND LESSONS LEARNT

7.01 Conclusions . P r o j e c t p r e p a r a t i o n s t a r t e d i n 1975 and took u n t i l 1979 be fo r e an accep t ab l e r e p o r t was produced. It w a s app ra i s ed a t t h e end of 1979, went t o t h e Board i n September 1980 and dec l a r ed e f f e c t i v e i n J u l y 1981. Before i t s c a n c e l l a t i o n i n September 1983, a few a c t i v i t i e s were s t a r t e d but they had minimal impact. I t f inanced t h e equipment of t h e Kindia l a b o r a t o r y and t h e v a c c i n a t i o n campaign i n t h e Eas t of t h e count ry i n 1983 and provided some exper ience which may be used by a f u t u r e p r o j e c t . The p r o j e c t s u f f e r e d from a number of s e r i o u s implementation problems which r e t a rded i t s progress . Implementation of s e v e r a l important po l i cy changes were delayed p a r t i c u l a r l y market ing which was c r u c i a l f o r t h e P r o j e c t ' s long term success . A f t e r l eng thy d i s c u s s i o n s , f a i l u r e t o f u l f i l l t h e market ing covenant caused IDA t o c ance l t h e p r o j e c t . During t h e s h o r t implementation per iod , t h e p r o j e c t c o s t Guinea SDR 1.4 m i l l i o n and coun t e rpa r t funds of about 7 m i l l i o n s y l i s . Of t h i s amount, t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r t h e p r o j e c t absorbed about 80%.

7.02 The p r o j e c t was no t d i f f i c u l t i n concept but was fo r e seen as being d i f f i c u l t t o implement g iven t h e count ry cond i t i ons and t h e importance of s o l v i n g key p o l i c y ques t i ons t o en su re t h e f u t u r e of t h e program. I n t h e even t t h e p r o j e c t foundered because one element r e s p o n s i b l e f o r implementing t h e p r o j e c t d id no t f u n c t i o n a s we l l a s a n t i c i p a t e d and, more c r i t i c a l l y , government d i d no t implement at l e a s t one of t h e t h r e e key p o l i c y changes t h a t were needed t o ensure t h e growth of t h e s e c t o r and t h e f i n a n c i a l v i a b i l i t y of t h e s e r v i c e s .

7.03 A s f a r a s IDA is concerned, i t is p o s s i b l e wi th h i n d s i g h t t o draw f o u r conc lus ions of where improvements might have been made which would have reduced problems l a t e r . However i t is n o t c l e a r t h a t t h e judgements made at t h e t ime were obviously wrong s i n c e they were w e l l debated.

( a ) Tack l ing t h e fo r ced market ing problem more d i r e c t l y b e f o r e n e g o t i a t i o n s would have removed t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t e v e n t u a l l y l e d t o c a n c e l l a t i o n .

(b) The p r o j e c t ' s o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e proposed by t h e M i n i s t e r and a p p r a i s a l miss ion had c e r t a i n weaknesses. However t o what e x t e n t was t h e performance of t h e DGE a r e f l e c t i o n of a s t r u c t u r a l problem o r w a s t h e r e ano the r cause? Miss ions r a i s e d t h e problem f r e q u e n t l y w i th t h e M i n i s t e r who w a s aware of t h e s h o r t f a l l s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s f o r implementation were c l e a r .

( c ) H e s i t a t i o n t o g r app l e w i t h t h e MEP o v e r s t a f f i n g i s s u e which would have become i n c r e a s i n g l y a p r o j e c t s u s t a i n a b i l i t y i s s u e a s t he p r o j e c t progressed.

(d) The need f o r a l o c a l currency fund.

7.04 A s f a r a s t h e p o l i c y i s s u e s a r e concerned t h e Bank had accep ted Government's assurances on t h e b a s i s t h a t some p r epa ra to ry ad jus tments might be needed i f t h e Government market ing appara tus was t o be changed and a l t e r n a t i v e sou rce s of f i n a n c e found f o r t h e t axe s . I t must remain a ma t t e r f o r deba t e a s t o whether a t t h e t ime t h e p r o j e c t should have been delayed u n t i l Government had a c t u a l l y so lved t h e s e problems which would have impl ied a l a c k of conf idence , a l though h i n d s i g h t suppo r t s t h a t p o s i t i o n . The s t a f f i n g q u e s t i o n i s a l i t t l e more d i f f i c u l t and remains today (and i s n o t p a r t i c u l a r t o Guinea 's l i v e s t o c k s e c t o r , o r indeed t o Guinea). There

are many f a c e t s t o t h e i s s u e bo th p o l i t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l . A w e l l thought through program which h a s a p p l i c a t i o n t o more t han one s e c t o r is d e s i r a b l e . Sho r t of Government t a k i n g s t r o n g measures, which some governments have done, a phased approach u s ing s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t mechanism i s almost i n e v i t a b l e . It remains t o be seen whether one can be worked ou t f o r a s i n g l e s e c t o r i gno r ing a l l t h e o t h e r s . Recognising Governments l i m i t e d f i n a n c i a l c a p a c i t y t h e main o b j e c t i v e of reducing s t a f f numbers is t o f r e e funds f o r o p e r a t i n g c o s t s . Money being fung ib l e , i f on ly one o r g a n i s a t i o n reduces s t a f f , t h e r e must be some gua ran t ee t h a t t h e f i n a n c i a l b e n e f i t s a cc ru ing b e n e f i t t h a t o r g a n i s a t i o n and a r e n o t consumed elsewhere . The p r e s e n t L ives tock Department h a s s topped f u r t h e r t r a i n i n g and r ec ru i tmen t of new s t a f f and i s now examining i t s p r e sen t and f u t u r e needs t o g e t h e r w i th ways of reduc ing numbers where necessa ry .

7.05 S i n c e t h e change i n Government, t h e new regime, a f t e r having s a t i s f i e d t h e c o n d i t i o n t h a t l e d t o t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t , h a s asked t h a t t h e p r o j e c t be r e s t a r t e d . A new p r o j e c t is t h e r e f o r e be ing prepared. More emphasis i s be ing placed on developing t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r and g e t t i n g s t o c k owners more d i r e c t l y involved. The market ing problem appears t o be so lved and t h e r e a r e i n d i c a t i o n s Government w i l l a b o l i s h t h e t a x . The l o c a l c o s t s i s s u e w i l l be d e a l t w i th through a s p e c i a l fund. There remain however i s s u e s concerning t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e p r o j e c t , t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of f o r e i g n exchange f o r renewing s t o c k s of i n p u t s , and t h e exces s ive s t a f f l e v e l s of t h e L ives tock s e r v i c e .

Lessons Learn t

7.06 Some of t h e l e s s o n s which may be drawn from t h e p r o j e c t inc lude :

- depending on t h e s i t u a t i o n , be more prepared t o s o l v e and implement key p o l i c y i s s u e s p e r t i n e n t t o t h e p r o j e c t s f u t u r e be fo r e p r o j e c t implementation. ( p a r a s 2.10 and 7.04)

- t a k e c a r e f u l account of t h e Government o r g a n i s a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e when i n c o r p o r a t i n g a p r o j e c t . (pa ras . 2.12 and 5.01)

- where l o c a l f i nanc ing is l i k e l y t o be a problem, cons ide r t h e e s t ab l i shmen t of a l o c a l cur rency fund at t h e o u t s e t . ( p a r a 5.03)

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