Foner Socialism in USA

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Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?Author(s): Eric FonerSource: History Workshop, No. 17 (Spring, 1984), pp. 57-80Published by: Oxford University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4288545

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Why is there no Socialismin the United States?by Eric Foner

It is now nearly eighty years since the German sociologist Werner Sombart raisedthe question, 'why is there no socialism in the United States?' In the ensuingdecades, the problem has been a source of apparently endless debate amonghistorians examining the distinctive qualities of the American experience,American radicals seeking an explanation for their political weakness, and Euro-peans alternately fascinated and repelled by the capitalist colossus to their west.Indeed, long before Sombart, the exceptional economic and political history ofthe United States commanded attention on both sides of the Atlantic.Marx and Engels themselves occasionally sought to solve the riddle ofAmerica, the land where, as Marx once put it, capitalism had developed more'shamelessly' than in any other country. They could never quite decide, however,whether the unique qualities of nineteenth-century American life boded well orill for the future development of socialism. Would the early achievement ofpolitical democracy prove an impediment to class consciousness in the UnitedStates or encourage it by making economic inequalities appear all the more illegit-imate? Was the absence of a feudal tradition a barrier to the development of classideologies, or did it make possible the early emergence of a modern, socialistpolitical culture? If America was, in so many ways, the most capitalist nation onearth, should it not also become the most socialist? Marx and Engels could neverquite answer such questions to their own satisfaction, and subsequent writers who


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58 HistoryWorkshop ournalhaveenteredinto the 'whyis there no socialism'quagmirehaverarelybeen moresuccessful.'In the end, MarxandEngelsremainedoptimisticaboutprospectsorsocialismin the United States (Engelseven advising he 'backward'workersof Britaintolearn from the example of the Knightsof Labor.) Other observers, however,believed that the natureof Americansociety precluded he emergenceof class-based political ideologies on the Europeanmodel. In 1867 E. L. Godkin, theIrish-born ditorof TheNation, soughtto explainwhy, despitea waveof strikesin the United States, the 'intense classfeeling'so evident in GreatBritaincouldnot exist in America:

There [in Europe]the workingman n a strike is not simplya laborerwhowantsmore wages:he is a memberof a distinctorder in society, engaged na sort of legal war with the other orders.... His employer s not simplyacapitalist n whoseprofitshe is seekinga largershare: he is the memberof ahostile class, which. . . it is consideredmean or traitorous or him to hopeto enter. This feeling, we need hardly say, does not exist in America.Thesocial line between the laborer and the capitalisthere is very faintlydrawn.Most successfulemployersof labor havebegunby beinglaborers hemselves;most laborershope . . . to become employers.Moreover,there are . . . fewbarriersof habit, manners or traditionbetween the artisan and those forwhom he works, so that he does not considerhimself the memberof an'order.'Strikes,therefore,are in the United States more amatterof business,andless a matterof sentiment,thanin Europe.... Should the worstcometo the worst[the Americanworker]hasthe prairiesbehindhim, a fact which... diffuses hrougheveryworkshopanindependence f feeling,a confidencein the future, of which the European knows nothing. Besides this, theAmericanworkingclass are in the enjoymentof politicalpower.2

I have quoted Godkin at some length, because the 'whyis there no socialism'debatehas not advancedveryfarbeyondthe answershe proposedover a centuryago. Godkintoucheduponnearlyall the elementsfromwhich modem responsesto the question are generally forged: American ideology, social mobility, thenatureof the unionmovement,the politicalstructure. n this essay, I propose toexaminethe most recenttrends n thisseemingly imelessdebate. The essay is notmeant as a historyof socialism n the United States, or as an exhaustivesurveyof the immense body of literature hat now exists on the subject(since nearlyeveryworkon Americanradicalism nd laborexplicitlyor implicitlyproposes ananswer o the question, why s there no socialism'). twillnot examineexpressionsof Americanradicalism, uch as abolitionismand feminism, whose impact uponAmerican ife has been far moreprofound hansocialism.I hope, however, bothto draw attention to the most recent contributions o this debate, and to raisequestions about both the adequacyof specificexplanations,and the underlyingpremisesupon which the entire discussionappears o rest. It mightwell be worthraisingat the outset thequestionwhether he experienceof socialism n the UnitedStates is, in reality,exceptional,or whether t representsan extremeexample ofthe dilemmaof socialism hroughoutwesternsociety.To some extent, the 'whyis thereno socialism'debate remains nconclusivebecausethe participants efinesocialism n diverse,sometimescontradictoryways.


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Socialismand the UnitedStates 59It is often unclearpreciselywhat it is whose absence is to be explained.WhenSombartwrote, in the period before WorldWar I, there existed a reasonablyunifiedbody of socialisttheoryand politicalpractice.But since the shatteringofthe international abor and socialist movementsby World War I, the RussianRevolution, the riseof socialist andcommunistpartiesand, indeed, governmentshostile to one anotherbutallclaiming hemantleof 'socialism',and the emergenceof new forms of socialismin the ThirdWorld, it is impossibleto contendthat'socialism' etainsa coherentmeaning.Socialism tselfpossessesa history,buttoooften, contributorso the debatetreat it as an ahistoricalabstraction.Nevertheless,by commonconsent, the extremely mpreciseproblem,'whyisthere no socialismin the United States' has been reduced to a discrete set ofquestions. It does not mean, 'whyhas the United States not become a socialistnation?', or even, 'whyis there no revolutionaryaboror political movement?'Rather,the problem s generallydefined as the absence n the United Statesof alargeavowedlysocial democraticpoliticalpartylike the Labourpartyof Britain,the FrenchSocialistparty,and the Communistpartyof Italy. From the strengthof suchparties,moreover,Americanwritersgenerally nfer a masssocialistconsci-ousness among the working classes of these countries.Thus, 'why is there nosocialism?'really means, why is the United States the only advancedcapitalistnation whose political system lacks a social democraticpresence and whoseworkingclasslacks socialistclassconsciousness?

Posed this way, the question does seem to have a primafacie plausibility,although,as I willsuggest, t maywell rest on assumptions boutwesternEuropeanpolitics and class relations that are out of date today and may never have beenfully accurate. One must, in otherwords, be wary of explanations or Americanexceptionalismbasedupontrends andphenomenaequallyevidentin other coun-tries. But this is only one of the pitfalls that characterizemany analysesof theproblem. Too often, it is assumed hat a fairlysimple,directconnectionought toexist between the social structure,class ideologies, and political parties. Manyexplanationsof the connectionexist, some, it is true, mutuallyexclusive.Povertyis sometimesseen as a barrierto radicalism,sometimesas its most powerfulspur; social mobilitysometimes is said to increase, sometimes to decrease classawareness;ethniccohesiveness s seen as an impediment o classsolidarity,or asthe springboard rom which it emerges. But whatever the specific argument,disproportionatenfluence s too often assignedto a single element of the socialstructure,and politicsandideology are too often viewed as simplereflectionsofeconomicrelationships.Particularlyn the case of the United States, the conflationof class, societyand politicshas unfortunateconsequences.One cannotassumethat the absenceof a powerfulsocialdemocraticpartyimpliesthat Americanworkers ully acceptthe statusquo (although, as we shall see, such an assumption s often made.)Actually,what needs to be explainedis the coexistence in Americanhistory ofworkplacemilitancyanda politicsorganizedaroundnon-ideological artiesappea-ling to broad coalitions, rather than the interests of a particularclass. DavidMontgomeryhas expressed the problemsuccinctly:'Americanworkersin thenineteenthcenturyengaged n economicconflictswith theiremployersas fierce asanyknownto the industrialworld;yet in theirpoliticalbehavior heyconsistentlyfailedto exhibit a classconsciousness.'Whywasmilitancy n the factoryso rarelytranslated nto the politics of class? Labor and socialist parties have emerged


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60 HistoryWorkshop ournalin the United States, (indeed, Americans, in the late 1820s, created the first'Workingmen's arties' n the world)but they have tendedto be locally-orientedand short-lived. As Montgomeryobserves,the American form of socialismhascenteredon controlof theworkplace,rather hancreatingaworking-classresencein politics.3 'Why s thereno socialism' thus becomesa problemof explalning hedisjuncture f industrial elationsandpoliticalpractice n the United States.Finally, there is the problemof proposed answers that simplyexplain toomuch. Descriptionsof an unchangingAmerican deology, or timelessaspectsofthe Americansocial order such as mobility, leave little room for understandingthe powerfulAmericanradicaltraditionbased upon cross-classmovements andappeals to moral sentiment ratherthan economicinterest. Nor can they explainthose periodswhen socialistpoliticsdid attractwidespread upport.It is too littlenoted that at the time Sombartwrotethere was, in fact, socialism n the UnitedStates. In the first fifteen years of this century, the American Socialist partyappeared to rival those in Europe, except the German, in mass supportandprospects for future growth. Around 1910, the American Socialist party hadelected more officialsthan its Englishcounterpart; ertainly,Sombart'squestionmightas readilyhave been asked about Britainas the United Statesbefore WorldWar I. Thus,what must be explained s not simply why socialism s todayabsentfrom Americanpolitics, but why it once rose and fell. Such a definitionof thequestion, I will argue, requiresthat we 'historicize' he problemof Americansocialism.Rather thanassumingan unchangingpatternof Americanexceptiona-lism, we need to examinethe key periodswhenAmericandevelopmentdivergedmostmarkedly rom that of Europe.With these admonitions n mind, let us reviewsome of the most prominentexplanations or theweaknessof socialism n the United States.Probably he moststraight-forward pproach s the contention that the failure of socialismresultsfromthe successof Americancapitalism.Variousaspects of the Americansocialorder,accordingo thisargument,have led workers o identify heirinterestswiththe socio-economicstatus quo. This, indeed, was the burden of Sombart'sownanalysis.The economicconditionof workers n the UnitedStates,he insisted,wasfarbetter than that of Europeans n terms of wages, housing, and diet. Socially,moreover, heywerefarless sharplydistinguishedromthe middleclassthan theirEuropeancounterparts.And finally,they were conscious of being able to movewest if dissatisfiedwith theirpresentconditions.The successof capitalism,Sombartbelieved, made the Americanworker 'a sober, calculatingbusinessman,withoutideals.' 'On the reefs of roast beef and applepie,' he added, 'socialisticutopiasof everysort are sent to their doom.'4FromFrederickJacksonTurner's frontier hesis,' whichsaw in the westwardmovementthe key to Americandistinctiveness, o more recentstudiesattributingthe failure of socialismto high rates of geographicaland social mobilityand theabilityof Americanworkers o acquireproperty, he successof capitalismhas beenseen as makingthe Americanworkingclasscomplacentand rendering ocialismirrelevant o American politics. As anyone who has lived in both America andWesternEuropecan testify, extremely high rates of geographicalmobility are adistinctive feature of American life. In the nineteenth century, each decadewitnessed a wholesale turnover of populationin working-classneighborhoods,presumablywith adverse effects on the possibility of creatingpermanentclassinstitutions.5Eventoday,the lure of the Sunbeltdrawsworkers romthedepressed


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Socialismand the UnitedStates 61industrialheartland,an exampleof the individual safety-valve' hat Turner den-tified as the alternative o classconflict n the United States.A recent variantonthe themewas the contention, popularduring he 1960's,that the whiteworkingclasshadexchangedmaterial ecurityand a privileged tatus n relation o minori-ties at home and workersabroad,for a renunciationof economicand politicalradicalism.Socialism,accordingo thisview, couldcometo the UnitedStatesonlyas the indirectresultof revolutionsn the thirdworld,or the activityof marginalsocialgroups ike migrantworkersand welfaremothers,notyet absorbedntotheAmericanmainstream.Plausibleas theyappear,the 'successof capitalism' nd'mobility'approachesraise as manyquestions as they answer.First, they rest upon assumptionsaboutthe standardof livingof Americanworkers hat arerarelysubjected o empiricalverification.Have thewagelevelsand ratesof socialmobilityof Americanworkersalwaysbeen significantly igher han in WesternEurope?Vaguereferences o the'scarcityof labor' in the United States do not suffice to answerthat question.6Many mmigrants omplained hat certainaspectsof their lives--the lengthof thework day, the pace of factorylabor- comparedunfavorablywith conditions athome.More importantly, he preciseimplicationsof the ability to acquirepropertyfor class consciousnessand socialism are far more problematical han is oftenassumed. A venerabletraditionof analysis,datingback at least as far as Alexisde Tocqueville,insiststhat far frompromotingpoliticalstability, social mobilityis a destabilizing orce, raisingexpectations asterthan they can be satisfiedandthus encouragingdemands for furtherchange. Certainly,recent American andEuropeanstudiesof laborhistorysuggestthat the better off workers artisanlsnthe nineteenthcentury,skilledfactoryworkers n the twentieth,were most likelyto take the lead in union organizingand radicalpolitics.7As for geographicalmobility, until historiansare able to generalizeabout the success or failure ofthosemillionswhohave, over thedecades, eftAmerican armsandcities in searchof economicopportunity, he implicationsof the extraordinaryurbulenceof theAmericanpopulationmustremainanopen question.8But in any case, thehistorianmust beware of the temptationsimply to deduce political ideology from socialstatistics or to assign disproportionatenfluence to a single aspect of the socialstructure.And finally, the 'successof capitalism' ormulacan hardlyexplaintherelative weakness of socialism during the Great Depression, which failed toproducea mass-based ocialistmovement,or the radicalism f the 1960's,whicharose in a period of unparalleledaffluence.Even morepopular han the 'socialmobility' hesisis the contention hattheveryethos of American ife is inherentlyhostile to classconsciousness, ocialisnm,and radicalismof any kind. Probably he best knownexpressionof this point ofview is Louis Hartz'sThe LiberalTradition n America. To summarizeHartz'sargumentvery briefly,Americanswere 'bornequal', neverhavinghad to launcha revolutionto obtainpoliticaldemocracyor social equality,with the resultthatAmerican ideology has been dominatedby a Lockean, individualisticoutlookagainstwhichneithersocialismon the left nor seriousconservatismon the rightcan make any headway.A thoroughlybourgeois'fragment' pun off by Europe,Americapossessedonly one part of the Europeansocialorder.Lackinga heredi-taryaristocracy nda dispossessedworking lass,it hadno needforclass deologiesand politics.


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62 HistoryWorkshop ournalNo feudalism, no socialism. This oft-repeated aphorismsums up Hartz'scontention that socialismarises from a vision, inheritedfrom the feudalpast, ofa society based upon a structureof fixed orders and classes. Withouta feudal

tradition, and a sense of class oppression n the present, Americansare simplyunable to think in classterms. Indeed, in its ideals of social mobility,individualfulfilment, and materialacquisitiveness,Americanideology produceda utopiamorecompelling hananything ocialism ouldoffer.Socialists alledfor a classlesssociety;Americans,accordingo Hartz,were convinced heyalreadyived in one.9Dominant in the 1950's,the 'consensus'school of Americanhistoriographyexemplified by Hartz has lately been supplantedby an interpretationof theAmericanpast marked ess by ideologicalagreementthan by persistentconflictamongvariousracialand ethnicgroupsandclasses.The rise of the newsocialandlaborhistory,and a new sensitivity o the historical xperienceof blacks,women,and others ignoredin Hartz'sformulation,have madehistoriansextremelywaryof broadgeneralizations bouta unitary American deology.'The work of Hartz,RichardHofstadterand others appearsto a generationof historianswho cameof age in the turmoil of the 1960'sas excessivelycelebratoryof the Americanexperience.Actually, like Hofstadter'sTheAmericanPoliticalTradition, he firstmajorexpressionof the consensus nterpretation,TheLiberalTraditionwas not a celebr-ation of Americandistinctivenessat all, but a devastatingcritiqueof a politicalculture ncapableof producinganythingapproaching n original dea. There wasa right-wingbias in muchconsensuswriting represented, or example, by DanielBoorstin, who gloried in the native pragmatism hat, he contended, enabledAmericans o escapethe disruptivepolitical deologies of Europe).But HartzandHofstadter, who sharedMarxistbackgrounds,believed America's mprisonmentwithinthe confinesof liberal deologyrendered t incapableof understandinghesocialrealitiesof the modernworld.Theywereconcerned ess withsocialismandits failure than with affirming he underlyingunities on which the Americanexperiencewas girded,and with supplyinga correctiveto older interpretationsthat hadmistaken he familyquarrelsof Americanpoliticalparties or ideologicalstrugglesover the natureof Americansociety.'0The work of the new laborandsocialhistory,as I haveindicated,hasbatteredtheconsensus nterpretation.ncontrast o theuniversaldiffusionof liberalvalues,students of working-class ulturehave stressedthe developmentof semi-auton-omous working-class nd ethnic culturesrestingon an ethic of communityandmutuality,rather than individualism nd competition.11The idea of an unchal-lenged bourgeoishegemonyis also weakenedwhen one considersthat until theCivilWar,the mostpowerfulpoliticalclassin the United Stateswascomposedofsouthernslaveholdingplanters, a groupbourgeois in neither its relationship olabor nor its social ideology.Although the Old Southwashardly feudal' (a termHartz invokes without providingany precise definition), it was certainlypre-bourgeoisin manyrespects. One mightalmost suggestthat with its aristocraticsocial orderanddisfranchisedaboringclass, the Southshould, if Hartz s correct,haveprovidedfertile soil for socialism.12Hartz'sthesis has also been weakenedfrom an entirelydifferentdirection:intellectualhistory.Recentwritingon eighteenth-centuryAmerican deologyhasnot simplydethronedLocke from the pivotal ideological role accordedhim byHartz, but has virtuallyexpelled him from the pantheon of early American


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Socialismand the UnitedStates 63thought.The politicalrhetoricof the AmericanRevolution,according o recentstudies, owed less to Lockean liberalism than to classical republicanism,anideology that definedthe pursuitof individual elf-interestas a repudiation f that'virtue' (devotion to the public good) indispensable n a republicancitizenry.Eventually, liberalism riumphedas the dominantrhetoricof Americanpoliticalculture, but not until well into the nineteenthcentury, and as the result of ahistoricalprocesswhose outlines remainunclear. But if Hartz's iberalconsensusdid not characterize ll of Americanhistory,then other elementsof his argument,such as the absenceof a feudalpast, lose muchof theirexplanatorypower.Thenotion of an overarching iberal consensus went far towardunderstandinghecontext within which Hartzwrote - America of the 1950's- but has provedoflittle value in explaining he strengthof challenges o the capitalistorderrangingfrom the classviolence of 1877to the Knightsof Labor, Populism,and the oldSocialistParty.13Nonetheless, Hartz's contention that even American radicalshave beentrappedwithin a liberal ideology devoted to the defense of individualismandprivate propertyis not entirely incompatiblewith recent studies of the radicaltradition.FromTom Paine's studieddistinctionbetweensocietyandgovernment(the former an unmixed blessing, the latter a necessary evil) to abolitionists'critique of all social and political relationships embodying coercion, to theAmerican anarchistswhose individualistoutlook differed so markedly rom theclass-orientedanarchistmovementsof Europe,a potent strandof the Americanradical raditionhas restedupon hostilityto the state and the defenseof the freeindividual.The ideologies of nineteenth-centuryabor and farmers'movements,and even earlytwentieth-centuryocialism tself, owed more to traditional epub-licannotions of the equal citizen andthe independent mallproducer, han to thecoherentanalysisof class-divided ociety.Pre-capitalist ulture, it appears,was the incubatorof resistance o capitalistdevelopmentin the United States. The world of the artisan and small farmerpersisted in some parts of the United States into the twentieth century, andpowerfully nfluencedAmericanradicalmovements.The hallmarks f labor andPopulistrhetoric were demandsfor 'equal rights,' anti-monopoly, and reform,and an end to the exploitationof producersby non-producers.These movementsinheritedan olderrepublican raditionhostile to largeaccumulations f property,but viewing small propertyas the foundationof economic and civic autonomy.Perhapswe ought to standHartzon hishead. Not theabsenceof non-liberal deas,but the persistenceof a radicalvisionrestingon smallproperty nhibited he riseof socialist deologies. Recent studies of Americansocialism tself, indeed, stressthe contrast between native-born ocialists,whose outlook relied heavily on theolder republican tradition, and more class-conscious immigrant socialists.Accordingto Nick Salvatore, Americansocialists like Eugene V. Debs viewedcorporatecapitalism,not socialism, as the revolutionary orce in American ife,disrupting ocal communities,undermininghe ideal of the independentcitizen,andintroducing lassdivisions nto a previouslyhomogenoussocial order.14Salvatoreand other recent writers are not reverting o a consensusview ofAmericanhistory, though their work explores the values native-bornsocialistssharedwith otherAmericans.But ironically,at the same time that one group ofhistorians trongly nfluencedby the radicalismof the 1960swas dismantling heconsensusview of the Americanpast, anotherwas resurrectingt, as a theory of


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64 HistoryWorkshop ournalthe 'hegemony'of middle-classor capitalistvalues in the United States. In oneversionof the consensus/hegemonypproach, aborand capitalwere seen as unitedby an ideology of 'corporate iberalism' hat, beneath an anti-businessveneer,served the interestsof the existingorder. Government egulationof the economy,hailed by Americanreformersas a meansof bluntingcapitalist apaciousness, ndseen by manyradicalsas a steppingstone to a fully plannedeconomyandperhapseven socialism tself, was now interpretedas the vehiclethroughwhichcapitalistswere able to control the politicaleconomywithoutappearing o do so. Becauseof the resiliencyof corporate iberalism,virtuallyall popularprotestmovementshadbeen incorporatedwithinthe expanding apitalistorder.15A somewhatdifferentversionof the 'hegemony'argument mphasizes ulturerather than political ideology. The rise of mass culture, the mass media, andmassconsumptionn twentieth-century merica,according o thisview, not onlyrenderedobsolete the socialistgoalof buildingan alternative ulturewithincapi-talistsociety,but shapedthe aspirations f workers,making eisure andconsump-tion, rather than work or politics, the yardsticksof personalfulfilment.Recentstudies of nineteenth-and early twentieth-centuryAmericanradicalmovementshave focusednot on such traditional oncernsas political deologyandorganiza-tional history,but on the creationof 'countercultures'withinthe largersociety.Obviouslynfluencedby the theoryof hegemony(andin somecases, by a perhapsidealizedunderstanding f the much-publicizedulturalactivitiesof the modernItalianCommunistParty), these works have impliedthat the seedbed of socialistpoliticsis a counter-hegemonic et of cultural nstitutions,ratherthan the polityor the workplace.But studies of the modernworkingclasshave emphasized hedisintegration f 'working-class ulture.' 'Sociallife,' contendsone suchanalysis,'is no longer organizedaroundthe common relationto the productionof bothcultureandcommodities.The workingclasspublicsphereis dead.'16Unfortunately, he consensus nterpretationn its radical hegemony'variantsstill suffers from the problem of homogenizing he Americanpast and present.Indeed, in adopting he notion of hegemonyfromGramsci,Americanhistorianshave often transformedt from a subtle mode of exploring he waysclass struggleis mutedand channeled nmodern ociety, nto a substitute or it. Thesophisticatedanalysisof a writer ike RaymondWilliams,who observeshow diverse deologiescan surviveeven in the face of apparenthegemony', s conspicuously bsentfromAmericanwriting.'7The notion that mass culture and mass society render anykind of resistance mpossible,moreover, can hardly explain the dissatisfactionsreflected n the radicalism f the 1960s.In the end, the 'hegemony'argument oooften endsup beingcircular.Ratherthan beingdemonstrated, he 'hegemony'ofmass cultureandliberalvalues is inferred romthe 'absence'of protest, and thenthis absenceis attributed o the self-same hegemony.'An entirelydifferent et of answers o the 'why s thereno socialism'questionderivesfromthe sociologyof the workingclassitself, and examinesaspectsof theAmericansocial orderthat make it difficult or workers o organizesuccessfully.The assumption s that socialistpolitics is unlikelyto emerge in the face of aninternallydividedworking lass.The traditional ssumption hatcapitalistdevelop-ment must producean increasinglyhomogenousproletariatwith a single set ofinterests, representedby unions and a politicalparty, has given way before arecognitionof themanykindsof divisionsandstratifications uilt ntothe capitalistlaborprocess tself.Divisionsbetweenthe skilledandunskilled,craftand ndustrial


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:'L*efti

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Industrial Worker, August 25, 1917


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66 HistoryWorkshop ournalworkers,often reinforcedby divisionsalong lines of race, ethnicityand gender,belie the notion of a unifiedworkingclass. It is doubtful,however, that suchdivisions are very useful in explainingthe unique features of American laborhistory,for it appears hatsimilar egmentation xistsin other advancedcapitalistsocieties. The United Statesis hardlythe only countrywherecapitalistdevelop-ment has failedto producea homogenousworkingclass.18Even more common than labormarketsegmentationas an explanation orthe distinctivehistory of the Americanworking class, is its racial and ethnicheterogeneity.Thecomplexwebof backgroundsromwhich he Americanproleta-riatemergedis often seen as renderingunityalongclass lines all but impossible.Althoughapparently traight-forward,he notionthat the exceptionaldiversityofthe Americanworkingclass has inhibitedboth class consciousnessand socialistpolitics,actuallyencompassesa numberof distinctapproaches o American aborhistory.On the simplest evel, it is easyto pointto the criticalrole racismandethnicprejudiceshave played in shapingthe historyof American abor. For most ofAmericanhistory, black workers were systematically xcludedby most unions.On the West Coast, prejudiceagainstthe Chineseshapedthe labor movement,helping o solidify he domination f conservative killedcraftworkersover a less-skilledmajority.The racismof many abororganizationsn turnfosteredprejudiceagainstunionsamongminorityworkers.19And even in the case of white ethnicgroups,differencesof language,culture and traditionclearlymade organizationdifficult arly n thiscentury,when massive mmigrationromsouthernandeasternEuropecoincidedwith the rapid expansionandconsolidationof monopolycapi-talism.The constantredefinition nd recreationof American abor(a process hatcontinuestoday with new waves of immigration),also meant that working-classinstitutionsand traditionshad to be rebuilt and battlesrefought over and overagain. 'The makingof the Americanworkingclass' (a subject yet to find itshistorian)was a process thatoccurredmanytimes, rather hanonce.The diversebackgroundsromwhichthe Americanworkingclass wasforgedis sometimes seen as affectingclass consciousnessn otherways as well. Racialand ethnic loyaltiesoften drewmen and womeninto cross-classalliances,whileracism,nativism,and ethnic hostilities inheritedfrom Europe all inhibitedthedevelopmentof a consciousness f workers' ollective nterests.Immigrant roupscreated a complexnetworkof ethnic social, religiousand political institutions,divertingworking-class nergies from institutions ike unionsandradicalpoliticalparties hatexplicitly oughtto unite men and womenacrossethnic ines.20Otherscontendthatthe culturalheritageof Catholic mmigrants,who comprised o largea portionof the industrialworkingclass, made them unreceptive o anyformofpolitical radicalism.In his pioneeringstudy of Irishimmigrants n nineteenth-centuryBoston, OscarHandlinportrayeda religiouscommunityhat saw effortsto changethe worldas at best futile and atworstsacreligious.Handlin'sargumenthassometimesbeen generalized o the proposition hatex-peasant mmigrants reinherently ndifferentor hostile to radicalmovements.(This contentionbegs thequestionof why,for instance,groups ike Italian mmigrants layed so prominenta role in the creation of the labor and socialistmovements n Argentina,whileallegedlyeschewingradicalism n the United States.) Another line of argumentderivesfromthe largenumbersof earlytwentieth-centurynewimmigrants'Ital-ians, Poles, Greeks, etc.) who were actuallymigrant aborers,planningonly a


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Socialismand the UnitedStates 67brief stay in the United States. In 1910, for example, threequartersas manyItaliansleft for home as entered the United States. Not intendingto make theUnited States a permanenthaven, GeraldRosenblumargues,these new immig-rantsreinforced henarrow business' rientation f Americanabororganizations:higherwages, not effortsat socialchange,werewhatattracted hemto unions.21Despite the popularityof whatmightbe called the 'ethnic' nterpretation fthe weaknessof American ocialism, t is by no meansclear that culturaldivisionswere an insuperablebarrier o class consciousnessor political socialism.Racismand ethnic prejudice are not, as they are sometimestreated, 'transhistorical'phenomena that exists independentof historical ime and place. Whatneeds tobe studiedis what kind of organizingand whatconditionshave allowedunionstoovercome pre-existingprejudices.Unions organizedon an industrialbasis haveundercertaincircumstanceseen able to bringblack andwhite workers ogether.The IndustrialWorkersof the Worldmanaged o lead successful,militantstrikesearly n thiscenturybyrecognizinghatethnicitycan,undercertaincircumstances,generatedistinctive ormsof radicalprotest.Thisis especially rue whereclass andethnic lines coincide,as in turn-of-the-century merican ndustrial ommunities.Ethnicgroupsolidarity,Victor Greene has argued,actually ncreasedmilitancyduring strikes by immigrantworkers in the Pennsylvaniacoal fields, and theIWW's acticof establishing trikecommittees omposedof democratically-electedrepresentatives romeach ethnic group,broughtto its strikes all the strengthofthe pre-existingnetworkof immigrantnstitutions.So long as eachgroupbelievedno one groupwas receiving avoredtreatment,the bonds of ethnicity n no waycontradicted willingness o work withothers.Likemany 'global'explanations fthe failure of socialism,in other words, the ethnic approachproves too much:ratherthaninvestigating he specificcircumstances nderwhichracialandethnicdivisions nhibitclasssolidarity, t assumes hata diverseworkingclasscanneverachieveunityin economic or politicalaction.22From the recentemphasisupon the resiliencyof immigrantub-cultureshasemerged the latest explanationfor the failure of American socialism. In TheRadicalPersuasionAileen Kraditor,a formerradicalhistorianwhohasrepudiatedher earlierwritingsand takena prominentrole in a new conservativehistorians'crganization,arguesthat the very strengthof ethnic culturesrenderedpoliticalradicalism rrelevant to the immigrantproletariat. In early twentieth-centuryAmerica,according o Kraditor,workerswere able to createculturalenclaves soself-sufficient hat they saw no need for far-reachingpolitical change: all theywantedwas to be left alone, enjoyingrelative ocalautonomy.Thoseradicalswhodid try to organizein lower-classcommunitieswere perceivedeither as misfitswhohadrejectedtheirculturalnheritance rasrepresentatives f a hostileoutsideenvironment. In a sense, Kraditor'sbook representsa rightward,but in someways logical, extensionof the new social and laborhistory.Her emphasisuponthe culturalresiliencyof immigrantworkers'ethniccommunities eflectsa majorpreoccupationof recenthistoricalwriting, as does her subordination f politicaland ideological considerations o ones of culture. Correctlycriticizingan olderstereotypeof the unifiedclass-conscious roletariat,Kraditor ubstitutesanotherequally ahistoricalconstruct,the self-satisfied,community-orientedworker, forwhomthe privatesphere s sufficientunto itself and who is thereforeuninterestedin radical deologies or politicalchange.23Related to the compositionof the Americanworkingclass, of course,is the


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68 History Workshop ournaldistinctivecharacterof American rade unionism tself. Why, despitea historyoflaborviolence unparalleledn Europe,does organizedabor in the United Statesappearso much more conservativeandapolitical han its Europeancounterparts?Sometimes,attention s drawn o theexclusionary oliciesof AmericanFederationof Laborunions,whose craftbasis of organization einforcedpre-existingdivisionsbetween skilledandunskilledworkers,and excluded argenumbersof workersblacks, women, new immigrants, tc., fromthe labormovement.Indeed, it hasbeen arguedbyJamesO'Connor hat, in a nation n whichno more than a quarterof the workforcehas everbelongedto tradeunions,the higherwagesof unionizedworkersare, in effect, subsidizedby lower-paidnon-unionworkersvia inflation.Otherwriterscontendthat the problem s not the natureand role of unionsperse, but the fact that labor eadershaveconstantly oughtto undercut he militancyof the rank and file, preferringaccommodationswith capitalto prolongedclassstruggle.Whether his is a questionof the perfidyof individual misleaders' r thegrowthof bureaucratic tructuressolatingofficialsfrom their membership, heresult has been a unionmovementuninterested n posinga politicalchallengetocapital.No one, however, has satisfactorily xplainedhow and why a presumablymilitant rank and file constantlychooses moderate'misleaders' o represent t.And it should be noted that the implicit portrait of class-consciousworkersbetrayedagain and againby a corruptor moderateleadershipassumes a unityand militancyamongAmericanworkersthat other approaches o the 'failureofsocialism'question have discounted.One might, in fact, argue that at a numberof points n Americanhistory, heimageof a moderate eadership urbinga radicalrankand file oughtto be reversed. In the 1930s,for example,it is now clear thatsocialistand communistorganizersplayeda pivotal role in galvanizingworking-classprotestandcreating he CIO industrialunions.24Thus far, we have consideredapproaches o the questionof socialismthatfocusuponon the societyor the workplace.An alternativepoint of view lookstothe nature of the Americanpolitical system since it is a politicalparty whoseabsence s to be explained.Variousaspectsof Americanpolitics, t is argued,havemade it difficult or laboror socialist parties to establishthemselveseffectively.First, there is the earlyachievementof politicaldemocracy n the United States,the 'free gift of the ballot' as Selig Perlmantermed it. Unlike the situationinEurope, the vast majorityof male Americanworkersenjoyed the suffragewellbeforethe adventof the industrial evolution.In England,classconsciousnesswasgalvanized,at least in part, by the strugglefor the vote and the exclusion ofworkersfrom the suffrageparalleledand reinforced he sense of a class-dividedsocietylearned at the workplace.In the United States,however, the 'lessons'ofthe polity were the opposite of those of the economy. In the latter, the workeroften perceivedhimself as a memberof a distinctclass; n the former,he thoughtof himselfas an equal citizen of the republic.Alan Dawley, indeed, writes that'the ballot box was the coffin of class consciousness' in nineteenth-centuryAmerica. Not only were the majorpartiesremarkably dept at absorbing aborleaders into political office, but the early achievement of political democracygave workersa vested interest in the existingpoliticalorder.Americanworkers,accordingo thisargument,developeda strongsense of their'rights' n bothpolityand workplace, but were not convincedof the necessity of launchinga directnationalpoliticalchallenge o capital.Perhapsaborpartiesneveradvancedbeyond


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Socialismand the UnitedStates 69the local level in the United Statesbecauseworkersdid not see the nationalstateas being under the control of a hostile class. And even on the local level, IraKatznelsonargues,workers raditionally llocatedeconomic ssuestounions,whilepolitics revolved not aroundquestionsof class, but rather the distributionofpatronageamongcompetingethnicgroupsby urbanpoliticalmachines.25The unusualstructureof Americanpoliticshas also affected the possibilitiesfor socialistparties.The electoralcollege method of choosingthe presidenthelpsentrench he two-party ystem(sincevotes cast for a third candidatewho cannotachievea majorityare 'wasted').The size and regionaldiversityof the countryhasmadeit difficult o translate ocallaborstrength ntonationalpower.Americanpoliticalpartieshaveprovenremarkably deptat absorbingprotest,adopting hedemands of reformers n watered down form, and forcingradicals o choose inelections between the lesser of two evils. The contrastbetween the American1930's,when FranklinD. Roosevelt'sNew Deal madebroadconcessions o laborandtherebycemented an alliancewiththe unionmovement,and the conservativepoliciesof Depression-eraBritishgovernments,s onlyone exampleof theremark-able flexibilityof Americanparties.To liberalhistorians,such actionsvindicatethe receptivityof the Americanpoliticalorderto demands or reform; o radicalsthey often appearas frustrating arriers o trulyradicalchange.26Other political factors have also inhibited the rise of labor and socialistpolitics.Americanhistorianshaveyet to assessthe full implications f the disfran-chisement of southernblacksfrom the late nineteenthcenturyuntil the 1960's.Here was a groupcomprisinga significantportion of the Americanworkingclassthat, when given the opportunity,provedreceptive to parties like the Populistswhichsoughtfar-reachinghanges n American ife. Theirexclusion rompoliticalparticipation hiftedAmericanpolitics to the rightwhile entrenchingwithintheDemocraticpartya powerful bloc of Southernreactionaries.At varioustimes,immigrants nd most migrant aborershave also been barred romvoting.Indus-trialworkers,moreover,have never formedanythingapproaching majorityofthe Americanelectorate.In a vastnation,predominantly uraluntilwell into thiscentury, partiesrestingexclusively upon labor could not hope to win nationalpower. In 1900, the United States was alreadythe world'sforemostinduistrialpower, yet a majorityof the populationstill lived in places withfewerthan 2500residents.A final 'political'considerationoften stressedby historianssympathetic oAmericansocialismbut minimizedby those who are not, is outrightrepression.ThePopulistsweredeprivedof electoralvictories hroughout he Southby blatantfraud n the 1890's.Violence by federalandstate troopsandprivatepoliceforcessuppressed trikeson manyoccasions,andcourt njunctionsdefeatedmanyothers.The first Red Scareof 1919-20,whichjailed anddeportedradical eaders,devas-tatedboth the SocialistPartyandIWW. The second,afterWorldWarII, effecti-vely destroyedthe CommunistParty.27Each of these 'political'approachescontainsan element of plausibility,butmany suffer from a shortcoming hared by other explanations or the failure ofsocialism: hey invokeaspectsof Americanpoliticscommon to othercountries oexplainAmericanexceptionalism.To takeone example,virtually veryEuropeansocialistmovementsufferedgovernmental epressionat one timeor another n itshistory, sometimesfar more severe repression han anythingexperienced n theUnited States (very few Americanradicals,after all, were ever executed by the


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70 HistoryWorkshop ournalstate.) The Spanish abor and communistmovementssufferedunderFranco,theItalianunderMussolini;Germansocialists aced Bismark'santi-socialistaws.Yetallmanaged o survive,and someemergedstronger han ever. The 1919 andpost-WorldWar II Red Scareswere not confined o the United States.Why, one mayask, has repressionproved more effective againstradicals n the United Statesthan elsewhere?Of course, one mightarguethat the veryopennessof Americanpolitics, the normalityof democraticprocedures,makes it difficultfor radicalmovements to deal with repressionwhen it does appear. American radicals,becauseof the democraticpoliticalculturefromwhichthey have emerged,havelacked the traditionof underground rganization hat mighthave enabledthemto survive repressivegovernments.Of course, one might also ask why, if thestate has been unusuallyrepressive n the United States,Americanworkershavepersisted in viewing the national governmentas somehow being above classpolitics.Otherpoliticalexplanationsalso leave importantquestionsunanswered.Theelectoralcollege systembiasesAmericanpoliticstowardsa two-party ystem,butdoes not explainwhy socialistshave been unable to replacethe RepublicansorDemocratswith a socialistor laborparty (as the Republicans eplaced he Whigsin the 1850's.) The fact that industrialworkersform a minorityof the totalpopulation is hardlyunique to the United States. Socialist and labor partieseverywherehave come to powerby appealing o middle-classandruralvotersaswell as industrialaborers. In every industrial ountry,moreover,a considerableminorityof workershasalwaysvotedfornon-socialist arties.Theimplicitcompar-ison between a class-consciousEuropeanworkingclass and the politicallyfrag-mentedAmericanproletariatmay not standup to carefulscrutinyof Europeanpoliticalhistory.Thusfar, the answers o the socialismproblemhavebeen largely external'theyhavefocuseduponaspectsof American ocietyandpolitics hathaveinhibitedthe growthof socialistpolitics and working-class onsciousness.There are alsoexplanations hatmightbe describedas 'internal' those thatfocuson the natureand presumederrors of radicalmovementsthemselves.Such an approachhasan obviousappeal for more optimistic eft-orientedhistorians.For if essentiallyunchanging spectsof American ociety socialmobility, he 'Americandeology,'the nature of the politicalsystem- are responsible or the failure of socialism,there appears o be little reason to hope for a futurerevivalof socialistfortunes.If, however, tactical, strategicor ideologicalerrorssabotagedprevioussocialistmovements, then perhapsfuture radicalscan learn from past mistakes, avoidrepeating hem, andrebuildAmericansocialism.The 'internal'approachalso hasthe virtueof directingattention o the actualhistoriesofpast socialistmovementsand the specificcircumstanceshatcontributedto theirriseandfall. Afterall, if one acceptsassufficientan'external' xplanation,one need not study in any detail the historyof particularattempts to create asocialist politics in the United States. The 'internal'approach, n other words,tends to 'historicize' he socialismquestion,forcingthe historian o examine thespecific contingencies that affected the failure of socialist parties, rather thanfocusingon generalizations boutAmerican ociety so sweepingas almostto standoutsidehistoryitself. Not surprisingly,he two periods of Americanhistory thathave attractedmost attentionfromthose interested n tracing he historyof pastsocialisms,are the first two decadesof this century,and the 1930's and 1940's.


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Socialismand the UnitedStates 71Both standout as eraswhen the trajectoryof socialistmovements n the UnitedStates divergedmost markedly rom that of their Europeancounterparts.Whydid the Socialist and Communistparties fail to build upon their undoubtedsuccesses and establish themselves as permanentparts of the Americanbodypolitic?One kind of internalapproach,associatedmostprominentlywithDanielBell,arguesthat Americansocialists and communists ailed to attract broad supportbecauseof their sectarianorientationand concernwith ideologicalpurityratherthanthe give and take essential to success n Americanpolitics. 'Inthe worldbutnot of it,' they eschewedreforms n favor of a preoccupationwith socialistrevolu-tion, thereby solatingthemselvesmore or less by choice. A somewhatanalogousarguments that of JamesWeinstein,who beginsby challengingBell's portraitofthe Socialistparty, insisting hat between 1900 and 1919it acted as a traditionalreformistparty, takingideology less seriouslythan the winningof votes. In theend, however, according o Weinstein,the party succumbed o the kindof ideo-logical rigiditydescribedby Bell, the attempt of one faction, allied with theComintern, to impose the Soviet model of a highly-disciplined,deologicallycorrectpartyuponwhat hadbeen a broadcoalition n themainstream f Americanpolitics.28Despite its success n winning ocalelections(the Socialistpartyby 1912hadelected some twelve hundred ocal officialsandthirty-three tate legislators,andcontrolledmunicipalgovernments n such cities as Schenectady,MilwaukeeandBerkeley)and attractinga respectablevote for Eugene V. Debs for president n1912(900,000ballots,or sixpercent of the electorate),the Socialistpartysufferedfrom a numberof internalweaknesses.PaulBuhlestresses the nativismof manySocialistpartyleadersand theirunwillingnesso reachout to the new immigrantproletariat.The party'selectoralobsession,which led it to measurethe advanceof socialismalmostsolely in terms of the ballot box, led it to neglect organizingwhen votes were not at stake. Preoccupiedwith electoral strategies, the partyfailed to respond to the massive upheaval of the unskilledimmigrant actoryworkersbetween1909and1919.Wherewasthe Socialistpartyat McKee'sRocks,Lawrenceor the great steel strike of 1919?The IndustrialWorkersof the Worlddemonstrated hat it was possibleto organize he new immigrantproletariat,butdespitesympathy or the IWWon the part of Debs andotherleft-wingsocialists,the two organizationswenttheirseparateways.Here, indeed,wasthe underlyingtragedyof those years: the militancyexpressed n the IWWwasneverchanneledfor political purposes while socialist politics ignored the immigrantworkers.Indeed, the Socialistparty'sstrengthlay not amongfactoryworkersbut in anunusualamalgamof native-born mallfarmers,skilledworkers n certaincities,ethnic groupsfrom the RussianEmpire like Finns and Jews, and professionalsand intellectuals.Leon Trotskywas perhapsunkindwhen he remarked hat theAmericanSocialistswere 'apartyof dentists.'Butits thinnessamong he industrialworkingclasswascertainlyamongthe party'smost debilitatingweaknesses.29Another explanationfor the decline of Americansocialismfocuses on thecrisis broughtabout by World War I. The Socialists'principledopposition toAmerica'sparticipationn the warfundamentallyransformedhe party,alienatingmanynative-bornmembersandintellectuals,while attractinga new constituencyamong immigrantworkers. Ironically, at the moment of its final collapse, the


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72 HistoryWorkshop ournalSocialist party for the first time accuratelyreflected the compositionof theAmericanproletariat.Opposition o the war laid the partyopen to the massiverepression hatwas,at least in part, responsiblefor its demise. One may speculatewhether, hadAmerican Socialists, like their Europeancounterparts, upportedthe war andperhapseven entered a coalition wartimegovernmentas juniorpartners,as theLabourparty n Britaindid, they mighthave shieldedthemselves romrepressionandestablished heir political egitimacy. Of course, giventhe experienceof ourown times, one may well ask whetherparticipationn governingan imperialistnation involves a socialistpartyin an inevitablesacrificeof principle,at least sofar as foreignpolicyis concerned.)What s clear is an outcomefraughtwithirony,in view of the assumption hat Americansocialism s so much weaker than thatof Europe.Of the two great'isms'createdby the nineteenthcentury socialismand nationalism the latter in westernEuropeprovedfar the stronger n 1914.Socialist nternationalism ascrucified n the cross of socialist upport or the wareffort.Was the Americanparty'sopposition o the waracourageous ct of suicide?At least, historyought to record that the AmericanSocialistpartywent to itsdeath not because there was less socialism n the United States than in Europe,butbecause, apart rom the RussianBolsheviks, he Americanwas the partythatremainedmost trueto socialistprinciples.If theperiodbefore WorldWarI represented ne opportunityorthedevelop-ment of a masssocialistparty n the UnitedStates,the 1930'sappears o representanother. By the mid-thirties, he Communistpartyhad established tself as themajor force on the socialist left. The achievementsof the communists,recentresearchhasmadeclear,were indeedimpressive.Moving arbeyondthe electoralemphasisof the old Socialistparty,they understood hatstruggle,on a varietyoffronts s the mosteffectivemeansof massmobilization nd education.In contrastto the socialists' solation romthe militant trugglesof thepre-WorldWarI years,the communists ook the lead in a remarkable rrayof activities union-building,demonstrations f the unemployed,civilrightsagitation,aidto republicanSpain,etc. Indeed, the wide varietyof their activitiesbecomes all the more amazingwhen it is remembered hat the partyat its pre-warpeak numberedwell under100,000 members.30Given the massmilitancyof the CIOandrangeof partyconcerns,why did alargersocialistor laborpoliticalpresencenot emergefrom the GreatDepression?Someaccounts tressthe resiliencyof the politicalsystem tself, the wayPresidentRoosevelt managed o absorb labormilitancy nto a redefinedDemocraticpartycoalition.Otherspointto the internecinewarfarebetweenAFL andCIO unionsas sabotaging efforts toward the creation of an independentlabor party. Stillothersblame the Communistparty'squest for legitimacy,especially n its PopularFront period. The party'sdetermination o forge an allianceof all anti-fascistelements, includingthe Democratic party, and its ideological emphasisuponAmericannationalism('Communism s twentieth-centuryAmericanism'as themid-thirties loganwent), foreclosedthe possibilityof independent ocialistpoli-tics. Accordingto JamesWeinstein, here also lay a cardinaldifferencebetweenthe old socialists,who at least had made socialisma partof Americanpoliticaldiscourse,and the 1930scommunists,who sawthemselvesas the left wing of theNew Deal coalition.3'Butlike the oldSocialistparty,thecommunistswereunable o cutthegordian


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Socialismand the UnitedStates 73knot of the relationshipbetweennationalism ndsocialism.On the one hand, thepartyachievedprimacyon the Left partiallyby virtueof its relationshipwiththeUSSR, the onlyexistingsocialiststate. On the other,the Soviet connectionproveda point of vulnerability,openingthe partyto repressionas 'un-American' fterWorld WarII, and leadingto inevitablequestionsas to whetherspecificpoliciesreflectedAmericanor Soviet interestsandrealities.It is not clear,however,howmuchemphasisoughtto be puton the Soviet connection or the party's ailuretogrowin size. After all, everyCommunistpartyin the worldhad to deal withtheComintern.What is certain is that the CP was most successfulpreciselywhen itwas most American. As Maurice Isserman'srecent study demonstrates,thePopularFront, whatever its relationship o socialist ideology, was exactly thepolicy that most Americancommunistsdesired,and the party'smembershipwashighestin the mid-1930sand againtoward the end of World War II, preciselywhensocialismandnationalism oincided.Indeed, recent studiesof the waryearscriticizethe partyfor subordinatingabormilitancy o the war effort anda questfornationalist egitimacy,via the no-strikepledge.32Theimplicitassumptionhatcalls forgreatereffortsto winthe war alienatedAmericanworkers oncernedonlywiththeirpaychecksmay, however,be open to question.)Through the no-strikepledge, subordinationof criticismof the Rooseveltadministration, nd the decision to transformtself from a partyinto a 'politicalassociation' he Communistparty sought'legitimacy' a permanent ootholdinAmericanpolitics duringWorldWarII. Theexperienceof war andthe resistancemovementsdid legitimize European Communistparties as defenders of theirnations(no one, whatever his politicaloutlook, could call the French or ItalianCommunistparties 'un-French' r 'un-Italian' fter the experienceof WorldWarII). But Americancommunists ndedup with the worstof both worlds. The no-strike pledge alienated shop-floormilitants,withoutwinning'legitimacy' romthose withthe powerto dispense t, the price,perhaps,of trying o exist at all atthe very focal point of worldimperialism.The partyremainedvulnerable o thewaveof repression hatbeganwiththe onset of the Cold War.Thebasecommun-ists hadlaboriously reated n the labormovementwaseffectivelydestroyed,withdisastrous onsequences or the entiredirectionof the post-war abormovement.Let usreturn, nconclusion, o ouroriginalquestion.Why s therenosocialismin the United States? As we have seen, all the explanationsthat have beenproposed- the internaland the external, the social, ideological,economic,andcultural have a certainmerit,and all seem to haveweaknessesas well. Nor canwe simply add them all togetherin a kindof mixedsalad and feel satisfiedwiththe result. Perhaps the debate has gone on for so long and so inconclusivelybecausethe question tself is fundamentallylawed.Perhapsbeginningourinvesti-gationwith a negativequestion nevitably nvitesahistoricalanswers.Like a kindredquestionthat has bedeviledthe study of Americanslavery'whywere there no slaverebellions n the United States?' the socialismquestionrests on a numberof assumptionshatmaynot survivecarefulanalysis.The riseof socialism,or the outbreakof slaverebellions,aredefinedasnormaloccurrences,whose absence needs to be explained. In the case of slavery, the question ispremiseduponthe conviction hat the 'normal'humanresponseto severe repres-sion is armedrebellion, an assumption or which humanhistory,unfortunately,does not offer muchsupport.In the case of socialism,the premise is that undercapitalism, he workingclass willdevelopclassconsciousness, xpressed n unions


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74 History Workshop Journalanda laboror socialistpoliticalparty,and thatconsequently he failureof eitherto emerge must be the result of some outside interference. No one asks, forexanmple,why is there no feminism in Europe?' (a legitimate question wheneither ndependent eministmovementsor the historicalparticipation f womeninsocialistparties n Europeand the United States arecompared)becausesocialismis heldto be aninevitable,universaldevelopmentundercapitalismwhile feminismis assumed o emergefromlocal, contingencies hatvaryfromcountry o country.In the end, of course, 'why s thereno socialism'restsuponan interpretationof historythat accordssocialisma privilegedpositionamongradicalmovementsbecause it arisesinexorablyout of the innerlogic of capitalistdevelopment,andholds out the promiseof a far-reachingocialrevolution.To the Marxistparadigmthat underliesthis vision, I have no objection. But it does seem to me that theempiricalevidence that justifies the question - the existence of mass Labour,Socialistand Communistparties n westernEuropeand not in the United States- fundamentally ontradicts he Marxist oundationof the question.A Marxistquestion, n otherwords,arisesfroma non-Marxist utcome,for the 'absence' obe explained s not socialism(a revolutionaryransformation f society) but theexistence of politicalpartiesof a decidedlysocialdemocraticbent that aimat nosuch transformation.The Left parties of WesternEurope have without doubtimproved he conditionsof life of theirconstituents,but they haveproved ncap-able of usingtheir impressivepoliticalstrengthto reshapefundamentally heirsocieties.They have, one mightsay, promoted iberalism ndegalitarianismmoresuccessfullyhansocialism,andpresented hemselvesas theproponents f modern-ization and social rationalization ather than class rule, thus operating n waysmoreanalogous o Americanpoliticalparties haneitherAmericansor Europeanswould care to admit. The issue for Western Europeansocialist partiesis notpreciselysocialism,but the equitabledistribution f the productsof capitalism. nother words, one might well ask not 'why is there no socialismin the UnitedStates,' but, 'why has there been no socialist transformationn any advancedcapitalist ociety?'To put the questionthis way challengesanotherunderlyingpremiseof thesocialismquestion:Americanexceptionalism.Too often in Americanhistoricalwriting, Europe' s posited as an unchanging lass-consciousmonolith n contrastto the liberal, bourgeois United States. In much Americanwriting, 'Europe'equalsFrance,and'France'equalsthe FrenchRevolution.TheheroicstrugglesofEuropeanworkersand socialistsare highlightedand the more recenterosion ofworking-class onsciousnessand socialist deologyignored.Too often, Americanhistorians quate the officialdoctrineof 'revolutionary'abormovements,suchasthe French earlier in this century, or political platformscalling for collectiveownershipof the means of production,with a pervasivesocialistconsciousnessamonga majorityof workers.They ignorethefactthatlargenumbersof Europeanworkershave alwaysvoted for 'bourgeois'parties.Americancommentators ftencite the historyof British labor as one exampleof class-conscious European'working-class evelopment,unawareof the debates amongBritishwritersaboutwhatsome see as anexceptionalabsenceof socialism omparedwiththecontinent.Certainly, recent events demonstrate that 'the containment of . . . working-classmovementswithin the limits of trade union economismand social democraticreformism' s hardlyuniqueto the United States.33To abandonAmerican xceptionalism s anorganizingheme isnot, of course,


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One Big Union Monthly, July 1920


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76 HistoryWorkshop ournalto assertthat the historyof every capitalistnation is identical.The historyof theUnited States is, in importantways, unique, as is that of England, France,Germany, and every other country. But a preoccupationwith the exceptionalelements of the American experience obscures those common patterns andprocesses hat transcendnationalboundaries,mostnotably heglobalexpansionofcapitalismn the nineteenthandtwentiethcenturiesand itspoliticalandideologicalramifications.It also diverts attention from the 'Americanizing' nfluencessoprominentin Western Europe duringthe past generation.America, Sombartwrote, was 'the land of our future.' Are not the economies, and the workingclasses, of both America and Europetoday beingtransformedby the decline ofold basic industries,the backboneof traditionalunionism and socialism?Is notEuropean politics, like European popularculture, becoming more and more'American,'withsingle-issuemovements ising o prominence ndpoliticalparties,even those calling themselves socialist, emphasizing he personalities of theirleadersand theirappeal o the entireelectorate,rather hana carefully-delineatedideology representinghe interestsof a particularocial class?WesternEuropeanSocialist and Communistparties today occupy points on the political spectrumrangingfrom distinctlymoderate (the Italian, Danish and PortugueseSocialistparties) to variousshades of left and some, like the British Labour party, arebitterlydividedagainstthemselves. In such a situation t is not at all clear that'socialism'retainsanyclearly-defined oliticalcontent.

Perhaps,becausemass politics, massculture,andmassconsumption ame toAmerica before it did to Europe, Americansocialistswere the first to face thedilemmaof how to define socialist politicsin a capitalistdemocracy.Perhaps, nthe dissipationof class ideologies, Europe is now catchingup with a historicalprocess alreadyexperienced n the United States.34Perhaps uture expressionsofradicalism n Europe will embody less a traditionalsocialist ideology than an'American'appealto libertarianand moral values and resistanceto disabilitiesbaseduponrace andgender.Or, perhapsa continuingworldeconomiccrisiswillpropel politicsin both WesternEuropeand Americadown a more class-orientedpath. Onlv time will tell whetherthe United States has been behind Europe inthe developmentof socialism,or ahead of it, in socialism'sdecline.

NOTESAn earlierversionof thispaperwasdeliveredattheconferenceon 'Why s thereno socialismin the United States' in May 1983,organizedby the Centred'EtudesNord-Americaines,EcoledesHautesEtudesen SciencesSociales,Paris,andwillbe published ntheproceedingsof the conference.

1 Among the manyreviews of the 'why is there no socialism?'debate, two of thebetterrecentsurveysare:SeymourMartinLipset, WhyNo Socialism n theUnitedStates?',in Sourcesof Contemporary adicalism,SewerynBialerandSophiaSluzer,ed., New York1977,31-149, whichcontainsan interesting ectionon how Marx,Engels,andotherEuro-peansocialistsviewedtheproblem,andJeromeKarabel, TheFailureof AmericanSocialismReconsidered,'SocialistRegister,1979, 204-27. See also R. LaurenceMoore, EuropeanSocialistsand the AmericanPromisedLand, New York 1970. An excellentcollectionofdiscussionsof the historyof Americansocialismand introductiono the Sombartquestionis JohnH. M. LaslettandSeymourM. Lipset,ed. Failureof a Dream?:Essays n theHistoryof AmericanSocialism,GardenCity, N.Y., 1974. Still indispensable or the historyofsocialism n the United States is DonaldD. Egbert and StowPersons,ed., Socialismand


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Socialism and the United States 77AmericanLife,2 vols., Princeton,1952, he secondvolumeof whichconsistsof anexhaustivebibliography.2 E. L. Godkin, The LaborCrisis,'NorthAmericanReview,CX (July,1867),177-79.3 David Montgomery, The Shuttle and the Cross: Weaversand Artisansin theKensington"Riots" of 1844,'Journalof SocialHistory,V (Summer,1972);Montgomery,WorkersControl n America,New York 1979.James R. Green, The Worldof theWorker,New York 1980, also stresses the predominance f 'control' ssues in laborstruggles.Anexcellent recentstudyof the rise and fall of local laborparties n the 1880's s Leon Fink,Workingmen's emocracy:TheKnightsof LaborandAmericanPolitics,Urbana1983.4 WernerSombart'soriginalessayhas recentlybeen printed,for the first time in itsentirety,in Englishtranslation:WhyIs ThereNo Socialism n the UnitedStates?,WhitePlains 1976.5 The view that the acquisitionof propertyand high ratesof geographicalmobilityexplain he failureof socialism sexpressed, orexample, n StephanThernstrom'snfluentialPoverty and Progress, Cambridge1964. Peter Knights, The Plain People of Boston,1830-1860,New York 1971, exemplifiesa host of studies of the high rate of populationturnover n nineteenth-centurymerican ities. See also theself-congratulatoryonservativeversionof the 'successof capitalism' rgumentn JamesNuechterlein,RadicalHistorians,'Commentary,October,1980.6 A recent nvestigation,PeterShergold,Working-Classife:The American tandard'in Comparative erspective, 899-1913,Pittsburgh1982,concludes hat skilled workers nPittsburgh idenjoyhigherwagesthan theirEnglishcounterparts, ut that the unskilleddidnot.7 For an interesting ecentexample, see RonaldSchatz,'UnionPioneers:The Foun-ders of LocalUnionsat GeneralElectricandWestinghouse, 933-37,'Journalof AmericanHistory,LXVI (December,1979), 586-602.

8 The idea that the West functionedas an effectivesafetyvalve for eastern aborwasdisprovennearly iftyyearsagoin CarterG. GoodirchandSolDavidson, TheWageEarnerin the WestwardMovement,'PoliticalScienceQuarterly,L (1935), 161-85and LI (1936),61-116. Quantitativemethodshavebecome far moresophisticated ince then, but studentsof geographicalmobilityare stillgenerallyunableto ascertainwhethermen andwomenwhomoved in searchof economicopportunity ctually ucceeded n bettering heirconditionsoflife. The essentialrawmaterial or suchstudies s themanuscript ensusreturns,usingwhichit is easy to discover hat an extremelyhighpercentageof urbanworking-class opulationshad 'disappeared' rom one census to the next (a period of ten years). But not knowingwheretheseindividualswent, it is impossible o locatethem in the nextcensus,to determinetheiroccupation,wealth, etc.9 Louis Hartz, TheLiberalTraditionn America,New York, 1955.The 'fragment'arguments expanded n Hartz'sTheFoundingof NewSocieties,New York1964. One maywonder, however,why Australia,another'bourgeois ragment' ociety did give rise to apowerfulLabourparty.10 RichardHofstadter,TheAmericanPolitical Tradition,New York 1948; DanielBoorstin, TheGeniusof AmericanPolitics,Chicago1953.11 The 'pre-bourgeois'haracterof the Old South is arguedeffectively n the worksof EugeneD. Genovese.See ThePoliticalEconomyof Slavery,New York1965;TheWorldtheSlaveholdersMade, New York 1969;andRoll, Jordan,Roll, New York 1974.12 Muchof thisworkwasinspiredbyHerbertG. Gutman,Work,Culture ndSocietyin Industrializing merica,New York 1976.13 The mostsignificant evisionistworkson the ideologyof the AmericanRevolutionare J. G. A. Pocock, TheMachiavellianMoment,Princeton1975,whichsees republicanismextendingwell into the nineteenthcenturyas an organizingparadigm f Americanpoliticalthought,andGordonS. Wood, TheCreation f theAmericanRepublic,1776-1787,ChapelHill 1969,whichdates the 'end of classicalpolitics'and the triumphof liberalism romtheadoptionof the federalConstitutionn 1788.JoyceApplebyhasrecently ought o resurrectthe idea of a dominant iberal deology, in a moresophisticatedormulationhanHertz's.See her 'CommercialFarmingand the 'AgrarianMyth' n the EarlyRepublic,'JournalofAmericanHistory,LXVIII(March,1982).14 Forthe individualisttrain n Americanradicalism,ee EricFoner, TomPaineandRevolutionaryAmerica, New York 1976;YehoshuaArieli, Individualism nd Nationalism


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78 History Workshop Journalin American deology,Cambridge1964;StaughtonLynd,IntellectualOriginsof AmericanRadicalism,New York 1968;DavidDeLeon, TheAmericanAs Anarchist,Baltimore1978.Forthe 'smallproducer' adicaldeology,see LawrenceGoodwyn,DemocraticPromise:ThePopulistMomentnAmerica,New York1976;ChesterMcA. Destler,AmericanRadicalism,1865-1901,New London1946.For socialist hought,MariJo Buhle, WomenandAmericanSocialism1870-1920, Urbana1979;Nick Salvatore,Citizenand Socialist:EugeneV. Debs,Urbana1982.15 JamesWeinstein,TheCorporatedeal n the LiberalState1900-1918,Boston1968;GabrielKolko, The Triumph f Conservatism,New York 1963.HowardZinn,A People'sHistoryof the UnitedStates,New York 1980,portraysradicalmovementsas alwaysbeingsuppressed r absorbedwithinthe liberal ramework.16 Worksexaminingradicalismas the expressionof an alternativecultureincludeGoodwyn, DemocraticPromise;CharlesLeinenweber,Socialists n the Streets:The NewYork City SocialistParty n WorkingClassNeighborhoods, 908-1918,'ScienceandSociety,XLI (Summer,1977), 152-71; and 'The Originsof Left Culture in the United States:1880-1940,'a special ssue of CulturalCorrespondence,pring,1978.The quotation s fromStanleyAronowitz,'Cracks n the Bloc: AmericanLabor'sHistoricCompromiseand thePresentCrisis,'SocialText,V (Spring,1982),45-51. See alsoJohnAlt, 'BeyondClass:TheDecline of IndustrialLaborandLeisure,'Telos,XXVIII(Summer,1976), 55-80.17 RaymondWilliams, Base and Superstructuren MarxistCulturalTheory,'NewLeftReview, 82 (November-December,1973),3-16. For less sophisticatedAmericanusesof the idea of hegemony to explain the weaknessof radicalism,see Aileen Kraditor,'AmericanRadicalHistorianson Their Heritage,'Past and Present,56 (August, 1972),136-52;MiltonCantor,The DividedLeft,New York 1979.18 RichardC. Edwards,Michael Reich, David M. Gordon, eds., Labor MarketSegmentation,Lexington1975; David M. Gordon, RichardC. Edwards,MichaelReich,SegmentedWork,DividedWorkers:TheHistoricalTransformationf Labor in the UnitedStates, New York 1982;AlistairReid, 'Politicsand Economics in the Formationof theBritishWorkingClass: A Responseto H. F. Moorhouse,'Social History,III (October,1978), 347-62.19 PhilipS. Foner, OrganizedLaborand the Black Worker,New York 1974;Alex-anderSaxton,TheIndispensable nemy,Berkeley,1971.20 This is the argumentof MikeDavis, 'Whythe U.S. WorkingClass is Different,'New LeftReview,123(September-October, 980),3-46. It is alsoemphasized n the latestevaluationof the Sombartquestion,John H. M. Laslett,ReluctantProletarians:A ShortComparativeHistoryof AmericanSocialism,Westport1984.21 OscarHandlin,Boston'sImmigrants,Cambridge1941;StanleyAronowitz,FalsePromises:TheShapingof AmericanWorkingClassConsciousness,New York 1973,whosethirdchapter,an excellentsurveyof the formationof the Americanworkingclass, seemstoaccept the notion that Catholic mmigrants f peasantbackground re inevitablyconserv-ative;GeraldRosenblum, mmigrantWorkers:Their mpactonAmericanLaborRadicalism,New York 1973.22 VictorGreene, TheSlavicCommunity n Strike,Notre Dame 1968;Eric Foner,'Class,EthnicityandRadicalism n the GildedAge: The LandLeague andIrishAmerica,'MarxistPerspectives, (Summer,1978), 6-55; MelvinDubofsky, We Shall Be All, NewYork 1969. The phrase'transhistorical's taken from the importantessay by BarbaraJ.Fields, 'Ideologyand Race in AmericanHistory,' in Region, Race, and Reconstruction:Essays n Honorof C. VannWoodward, . MorganKousserand JamesM. McPherson, d.,New York 1982,144.For an exampleof the overcomingof racismby one industrialunion,see Gutman,Work,Culture ndSociety,ch. 3.23 AileenKraditor,TheRadicalPersuasion, 890-1917,BatonRouge 1981.Kraditor'searlierwork, which she now claims was written underthe influenceof 'liberal deology,'includesMeansand Ends in AmericanAbolitionism,New York 1969,and TheIdeas of theWomen'sSuffrageMovement,New York 1965. She is now a memberof the editorialboardof Continuity, conservativehistorians'ournal.24 JamesO'Connor,TheFiscalCrisisof theState, New York 1973;JeremyBrecher,Strike,San Francisco1972, whichstressesspontaneousabormilitancy,dampenedby unionorganizationtself; Philip S. Foner'smulti-volumeHistoryof the LaborMovement n theUnitedStates,NewYork, 1947- ), emphasizingheconservativeendenciesof labor eaders,


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Socialism and the United States 79especiallythose of the AmericanFederationof Labor. For the 1930's,see Schatz,'UnionPioneers,'andBertCochran,LaborandCommunism, rinceton,1977,which,whileunsym-pathetic o communist nionists,provides onvincing videnceof theirpivotalroleincreatingCIO unions. MelvynDubofsky questionsthe extent of rank-and-filemilitancyduringtheDepression in 'Not So "TurbulentYears": Another Look at the American 1930's,'Amerikstudien,XXIV (1980), 12-20.25 Selig Perlman,A Theoryof the Labor Movement,New York 1928, 167; AlanDawley, Class and Community:The IndustrialRevolution n Lynn, Cambridge1976, esp.ch. 8; IraKatznelson,CityTrenches:UrbanPoliticsandthePatterning f Class nAmerica,New York 1981. DavidMontgomery,BeyondEquality,New York 1967,also stresseshowpoliticsserved as a 'safety-valve'or labor discontent.26 For Roosevelt'sflexibility,see Mike Davis, 'The BarrenMarriageof AmericanLabour and the DemocraticParty,'New Left Review, 124, (November-December,1980),43-83. Allan Brinkley,Voicesof Protest,New York 1982,demonstrates he hold of FDRon votersotherwiseattracted o radicalism.ChristopherLasch,'The Decline of Populism,'in TheAgony of theAmericanLeft,New York1969, sexcellenton howapparent oncessionsto radicalgroupsrarely nvolve fundamental ocialchange.The electoralcollege system, nwhich the party carryinga state wins the state's entireelectoral vote for its presidentialcandidate,penalizes hirdpartieswhosestrengths widelydispersed,whileallowingregion-ally-concentratedhirdpartiesto carryenoughstates to disrupta presidential lectionbythrowingthe contest into the House of Representatives as happenswhen no candidatereceives a majorityof the electoralvote.)27 A recentstudyof the Socialistpartystressing epression s JamesR. Green,Grass-Roots Socialism:RadicalMovements n the Southwest 895-1943,Baton Rouge 1978.Forthe first Red Scare, see WilliamPreston,Jr., Aliens and Dissenters:FederalSuppression fRadicals,1903-1933,Cambridge1963;for the second, David Caute, TheGreatFear, NewYork 1978.28 DanielBell, MarxianSocialism n America,Princeton1967;JamesWeinstein,TheDeclineof Socialism n America1912-1925,New York 1967. Of course, every EuropeanSocialistpartyexperiencedhe samesplitbetweenthoseadopting he Bolshevikmodel,andthose preferring raditional ocialdemocraticpolitics. See AlbertS. Lindemann,The 'RedYears':EuropeanSocialismversusBolshevism,1919-21,Berkeley,1974.29 Paul Buhle, 'Debsian Socialismand the "New ImmigrantWorker",' n WilliamO'Neill, ed., InsightsandParallels,Minneapolis,1973,249-304. John H. M. Laslett,LaborandtheLeft, NewYork,1970,relates he declineof socialismn the unions.The best historyof the SocialistpartyremainsDavid Shannon,TheSocialistParty of America,New York1955.

30 The astonishing arietyof partyactivitiescomesthrougheven in hostile accountslikeCochran,LaborandCommunism. ee also MarkNaison, CommunistsnHarlemDuringthe Depression,Urbana1983, and RadicalHistoryReview,23 (1980), an issue devoted tothe historyof Communist arties n Europe andthe UnitedStates.31 Davis, 'The BarrenMarriage'; ames Weinstein,AmbiguousLegacy: The Left inAmericanPolitics,New York 1975.32 MauriceIsserman, Which Side Were You On?, Middletown,Ct., 1981;NelsonLichtenstein,Labor's Warat Home: The CIO in WorldWarII, New York 1982). A moresympathetic ccount s Roger Keeran, TheCommunist artyand the Auto WorkersUnion,Bloomington nd., 1980).See also RadicalAmerica,IX (July-August1975), a special ssueon American abor n the 1940's.33 Reid, 'PoliticsandEconomics.'MarianneDebouzy,'La classouvriereAmericaine:rechercheset problemes,' MouvementSocial, 102 (January-March, 978), 3, notes thetendencyof American historians o make unwarranted ssumptionsabout the Europeanworking class. PerryAnderson summarizes he 1960'sdebates on 'the whole tragedy ofEnglish abourhistory' n ArgumentsWithinEnglishMarxism London,1980), 44 46. Forgeneral problemsof SocialDemocraticparties, see Adam Przeworski,Social Democracyas a HistoricalPhenomenon,'New LeftReview, 122(July-August,1980),27-58. Bruce M.Stave,ed. Socialism nd theCities,PortWashington, 975,discusseshowAmerican ocialistsacted in those communitieswherethey achieved ocalpower.34 Thiswas the arresting hesisof LewisCorey,an Americancommunistwho wroteduringthe 1930'sunder the name Louis Fraina. He argued that classicalsocialismwas a


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80 History Workshop Journalstage in the developmentof capitalism,a stage the United States,becauseof the extremelyrapidexpansionof capitalismn the late nineteenthand twentiethcenturies, n effectleapedover. In Europe, classicalsocialismof the SecondInternational arietyassistedthe bour-geoisie in completing he bourgeois-democraticevolution,a historical ask unnecessarynthe United States. HarveyKlehr, 'Leninism,Lewis Corey, and the Failureof AmericanSocialism,'LaborHistory, VIII (Spring1977),249-56.

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