FOCUS - Ministry of Defence...20 Fokker-50 At the Gulf of Aden RSAF Safety Magazine Issue 70 | January 2012 FOCUS FOREWORD 2 This issue of FOCUS celebrates the 70th Platinum Edition

RSAF Safety Magazine Issue 70 | January 2012

FOCUS

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FOCUSRepublic of Singapore Air Force Safety Magazine

Issue 70Janu

ary

2012

>> Stress >> Distraction >> Project Management and The Dirty Dozen >> Fokker-50 At Gulf of Aden

The Dirty Dozen

Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success

Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success Safety Always - Mission Success

Inside:


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EDITORIAL BOARD

ChairmanCOL Aw Kwee Siong

MembersLTC Danny KohLTC Alex CorneliusME6 Lee Lip KeeMAJ Peter HoMAJ Macus WooCPT Khoo Pak SynCPT (DR) Jocelyn Ong SiyuMs Audrey Siah

Production Crew

MAJ Mike Chua Kim SaiEditor

Assistant / Photographer

Graphic / Layout Design

2WO Steven Goh

2WO Steven Goh

Printed By99 Degree Communications LLP

FOCUS is published by Air Force Inspectorate, HQ RSAF, for accident prevention purpose. Use of in-formation contained herein for purposes other than accident prevention, requires prior authori-sation from AFI. The content of FOCUS are of an informative nature and should not be considered as directive or regulatory unless so stated. The opinions and views in this magazine are those ex-pressed by the writers and do not reflect the offi-cial views of the RSAF. The contents should not be discussed with the press or anyone outside armed services establishment. Contributuons by way of articles, cartoons, sketches and photographs are welcome as are comments and criticisms.

FOCUS magazine is available on these sites:

http://webhosting.intranet.defence.gov.sg/web/AirForce/AFI/index.htm (intranet)

http://www.mindef.gov.sg/rsaf (internet)

ISO 9001:2008 BS OHSAS 18001:2007

Front Cover Image: A showcase of the RSAF’s 12 safety posters on The Dirty Dozen.

2 ForewordBy COL Aw Kwee Siong

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FOCUS Issue 70 - January 2012

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Project Managementand The Dirty Dozen

Safety ActivitiesWorkshops

What Our People Think?

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CAF QuarterlySafety Forum

Cross Word Puzzle$30 Popular Voucher to be won

The Dirty DozenThe beginning3

4 COPING WITH STRESS

10 Distraction

20 Fokker-50At the Gulf of Aden


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This issue of FOCUS celebrates the 70th Platinum Edition of the magazine. We have come a long way from the 1st edition's free hand drawings and type-written layouts 33 years ago, to the current high resolution pictures and fanciful digital layouts. It is only apt that we launch this milestone FOCUS with a new look and feel as the RSAF propels through its second spiral transformation. I would like to take this opportunity to extend my deep appreciation to all the people who had contributed the great articles, photos and illustrations; to all our readers for their many years of support and feedback; and to all past and present editorial board members who have been instrumental in the magazine's success!

About three quarters of aviation accidents were caused by human errors. As such, this platinum issue looks at the “The Dirty Dozen”. Since its first introduction in the RSAF in 1998, Dirty Dozen has played and will continue to play a vital role in managing Human Factors in the RSAF. The articles discuss on the various aspects of the Dirty Dozen that we are likely to encounter. They will provide some understand-ing of how these factors affect us and what are the measures that we as individuals and/or command-ers can introduce to mitigate their effects. We have also included an article on the RSAF's successful deployment of a F-50 Maritime Patrol Aircraft to the Gulf of Aden as part of the international anti-piracy operations. Strong understanding of Human Factors and the Dirty Dozen have played an important role in the implementation of numerous proactive measures that have directly contributed to the very successfully deployment in a totally unfamiliar and harsh environment without any safety incidents.

My congratulations to all for achieving this milestone Platinum Edition!

Foreword

COL Aw Kwee SiongHead Air Force Inspectorate


The Dirty Dozen

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During the late 1980s and early 1990s, there were a spate of maintenance related aviation incidents in Canada. These incidents spurred Transport Canada to launch an initiative that would aid aviation companies in their fight to prevent unnecessary accidents. Gordon Du-pont, who was a Special Program Coordinator at Transport Canada at the time, was credited with the introduction of “The Dirty Dozen” which was the identification of 12 human fac-tor elements highly likely to “degrade people’s ability to perform effectively and safely, lead-ing to maintenance errors”. Today, the ubiquity of this term, in both the flying and mainte-nance communities is testament to the suc-cess of the campaign. The RSAF adopted the Dirty Dozen concept in 1998 to complement

the Human Error Accident Reduction Training (HEART) and Human Error Analysis Tool (HEAT) for our operations and logistics communities respectively.

The Dirty Dozen consists of 12 identified human factors. They are:

• Lack of Communication : A Lack of clear direct statements and good, active listening skills

• Complacency : Self-satisfaction accompanied by loss of awareness of the potential dangers

• Lack of Knowledge : Lack of experience or training in the task at hand

• Distraction : Drawing one’s attention away from a task

• Lack of teamwork : Lack of working together to achieve a common goal

• Fatigue : Weariness from labor or exertion, nervous exhaustion or the temporary loss of power to respond • Lack of Resources : Failure to use or acquire the appropriate tools, equipment, information and procedures for the task at hand

• Pressure : Pushing for something in spite of opposing odds, creating a sense of urgen- cy or hassle

• Lack of Assertiveness : A lack of positive communication of one’s ideas, wants and needs

• Stress : Mental, emotional or physical tension, strain or distress

• Lack of Awareness : Failure to be alert or vigilant in observing

• Norms : Commonly accepted practices where assumptions are made that the course of action or procedure is correct based on history without re- validating or verifying the current procedures


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LTC (DR) Benjamin Tan Boon Chuan, ARMC

LTC (DR) Tan is currently Head, Crew Safety and Flight Environment in ARMC, overseeing the development of 3rd generation Aviation Physiol-ogy Training for pilots and aircrew amongst several other projects. He is concurrently a Researcher-Clinician at the Vision Performance Centre and a Registrar in the Department of Ophthalmology, National University Hospital. His previous postings include staff positions in Certification and Standards Branch, ARMC as well as Performance Maximization Branch, ARMC. His last appointment was Commanding Officer of 1 Medical Squadron. He has a keen interest in vision performance, organizational safety and training matters.

In this article, we will focus on one of the Dirty Dozen factors, Stress. Stress is unique as a Human Factor in that it directly affects the physical and mental well-being of the individual. While stress is an easily acknowledged and often mentioned Human Factor (much more than, say, Norms), it is probably the most difficult to fully com-prehend and manage. Interestingly, it is very often neglected when it comes to identification in open reporting systems but appears as a prominent feature in accident investigations! And because stress is often not identified early, it is not adequately managed by the individual and prone to oversight by the management. This article will attempt to define what stress really is, identify the sources of it and explore how to better mitigate and manage stress at the respective workplaces – not only applicable to the aircraft maintenance community but the flying community at large.

Coping With Stress

STRESS

DEFINITION OF STRESSFrom a physiological standpoint, stress can be defined as any bodily response to a stimulus that disturbs or interferes with the normal physiological equilibrium of a per-son. From an operational standpoint, we define stress as a reaction that is initiated when a situation or event is evaluated as a threat and requires actions beyond an indi-vidual’s normal operational intensity level. An interesting concept is expounded in this definition in that stress is defined as a reac-tion mounted by an individual and not the perceived threat itself; what this means is that when caught in an identical situation, 2 different people can have 2 different reac-tions to it. One person may find the situation stressful, while the other is able to take it in his stride and manage the situation in a calm manner. In this respect, personality and

character as well as perceived ability in man-aging the threat have key roles to play in the development of stress.

This definition of stress is derived from the transactional model of stress developed by Lazarus and Folkman (see Fig 1). In this model, it is hypothesized that the first thing a person automatically does when encountering what could be a stressful event is to appraise the situation (termed primary appraisal).

This is done to assess the level of danger, the potential loss or discomfort and the amount of effort that have to be exerted to handle the situation. If no threat is perceived, then potentially no stress is felt. However, it is impor-tant to note that while this outcome appears ideal in most situations, it sets up a highly dangerous disposition when the primary appraisal is not properly done, either through inexperience or disregard. The former is often termed lack of knowledge/training while the latter is commonly known as complacency.

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Figure 1 - The transactional model of stress developed by Lazarus and Folk-man.


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SSHowever if a threat is perceived, the individual then un-dergoes a secondary appraisal whereby he or she will ex-amine his or her own resources and ability to cope with the threat. How a person copes with the perceived threat is a function of many interacting elements, which include his or her personality, confidence and perceived ability to handle the situation as well as mental models of simi-lar situations and outcomes based on past experiences. Hence, an individual’s level of stress is really an interaction between the extent of the situation or threat and the indi-vidual’s perceived ability to cope with it. It is important to note that when an individual perceives he or she is able to cope with the situation, it generates positive stress; when he perceives an inability to do so or that the situation is overwhelming, it invariably results in negative stress.

TYPES OF STRESS We can classify stress based what has just been discussed – eustress (positive stress) and distress (negative stress). Eustress generally motivates an individual to handle the situation well and often leads to increased performance while distress results in a degradation of performance. When the perceived inability to cope with the situation escalates in a vicious cycle, many anticipatory emotions and negative behavior will start to set in, including fear, worry, anxiety and panic. These will further degrade performance and jeopardize an individual’s ability to handle the situation. Stress can also be classified based on its duration. Acute stress is usually of a short duration which the individual is able to resolve and return the physical and mental states to normalcy. When such stress is overcome, this generates positive stress. However, when the acute situation overwhelms the coping abilities of an individual, over-stimulation may oc-cur, resulting in negative stress. And when the body or mind is made to undergo repeatedly these over-stimulations, chronic stress will develop – slowly but surely. Chronic stress hence is a result of expo-sure to a constant stream of demands, threats and risks over a prolonged period. Very often, chronic stress drains the mental and physical resources of an individual, resulting in lower motivation and confidence as well as chronic health problems. Due to its prolonged nature and gradual decline in per-formance, it may go unnoticed by the individual or colleagues for a period of time.

SOURCES OF STRESS

Stress can come from many sources. Any activity, event or stimulus that causes stress is termed a stressor. Stres-sors can be classified as external or internal to the individual; the former include environmental stressors while latter can either be cognitive or physical in nature.

In general, stressors come from 3 large sources – namely physiological stress, work-related stress and personal stress.

Night flying using night vision devices can pose a different level of stress to the flight crew.

Mental preparation before flight can help to relief some level of stress.


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Physiological Psychological

Cardiovascular: increased pulse rate, high blood pressure, chest pains

Emotional: anger, guilt, mood swings and low self-esteem, depression

Respiratory: shortness of breath, hyperventi-lation, dizziness

Pessimism

Gastrointestinal: loss of appetite, gas pains, indigestion, diarrhea, nausea

Irritable temper

Others: headaches, muscular tension, sleep disturbances, general weakness

Loss of interest

Loss of control

Table 1: Physiological and Psychological Effects of Stress

STRESSPhysiological stress can occur when the job at hand is en-cumbered with numerous physiological stressors, both physi-cally and mentally– and the epitome of this is when flying in the cockpit of a fighter aircraft; this would invariably expose the pilot to a myriad of physical stressors, which include G-ac-celeration forces, risk of hypoxia, positive pressure breathing, motion sickness, loud radio communications, vibration, fa-tigue arising from use of night vision goggle (NVG) and many others. These physical stressors are in addition to the all-im-portant task of executing the mission safely and successfully, which requires high cognitive functioning and psychomotor skills. Hence, the impact of physiological stressors cannot be underestimated; pilots and aircrew are routinely reminded of these hazards during their Aviation Physiology Training (APT) refresher courses. In addition to the acute form of physiologi-cal stress, a chronic type can develop from fatigue, which may be a result of sleep deprivation and/or circadian disruption due to crossing of time-zones. This usually results in chronic stress when exposed over prolonged periods; ensuring proper sleep hygiene and pharmacological inter-vention are but some ways to counter such stressors.

Work-related stress is often derived from the amount of workload itself. Work underload or, more often, overload may lead to increased stress levels. It is generally viewed that persistent high tempo work without adequate time for rest can result in chronic stress and fatigue. Organizations which use pressure to ensure on-time performance with little regard for the workers’ stress and fatigue levels can be caught in a situation whereby low morale and motivation is prevalent. Low morale and motivation may lead to high numbers reporting sick or declaring poor health, which adds further stress onto the reduced workforce sustaining on-going operations. All these can build up toward the inevitable accident over time. In addition to workload, stress can arise in a workplace via poor group dynamics and tense working relationships. Lack of communication and high levels of distrust are often features in such workplaces. All these can lead to stress at individual and management levels, the former resulting from negative emotions while the latter occurs when time and effort are consumed to manage it.

Personal stressors refer to events arising outside the workplace that can affect an individual’s performance at work. Examples of personal stressors include loss of a close relative, financial problems, family-related problems, health and illness as well as injuries. Depending on the magnitude of the problem, personal stressors can cause inadvertent pre-occupation of the problem with consumption of mental resources and energy. This invariably leads to distraction at work, which often allows mistakes to creep in especially when performing routine tasks.

Flying a fighter jet subjects the individual to numerous physiological and cognitive stressors

Photo courtesy of CPT Khoo Pak Syn

MANIFESTATIONS OF STRESS AND ITS EFFECTS OF PERFORMANCE

Stress can lead to a myriad of physiological and psychological effects (see Table 1). As mentioned earlier, stress is in actual fact, a physiological phenomenon. What happens when a body is under stress is that stress hormones called adrenaline are released into the blood circulation. One of the main effects of the increased adrenaline is that it ex-cites the nervous system, resulting in a heightened alertness state. Other effects include stimulating the heart, in-creasing the blood pressure, increasing glucose in the body as well as increasing the metabolic rate. This prepares the body for a ‘fight or flight’ response. Hence, from a physiological standpoint, stress is an adaptive process in al-lowing the body to cope with demanding situa-tions.

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Figure 2. The Yerkes Dodson Law, 1908

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However, when the situation is perceived more demanding than it is or when coping mechanisms are exceeded by de-mands of the situation, the resulting over-stimulation of the body and mind can result in the body feeling overwhelmed. At the height of this over-stimulation, panic and anxiety ensue. Actions are very often haphazard in a panic situation and do not translate to meaningful outcomes in handling the situation. Hence, performance will start to drop once over-stimulation sets in and degrades further with increasing stress, or arousal. This phenomenon is clearly explained via the Yerkes Dodson Law (see Figure 2).

Hence, up to a certain point, with increasing amounts of stress, degradation of performance will follow. The negative effects of stress on performance can be found in Table 2.

Table 2 - Negative Effects of Stress on Performance

How Can We Manage Stress?

At the individual level

The first strategy in trying to cope with individual stress is to first identify it, and to identify it early. One should be cognizant of the sources of stressors which may potentially arise, whether it is work-related or personal. Some symptoms signal the onset of stress and these include the following:

• Physical signs: cold, sweaty hands, headache, tension.• Behavioral changes: irritability, anger, hurriedness, fixation.• Speech patterns: fast, irregular, non-standard phrases, noise tone or loudness.

While the above symptoms may herald the onset of acute stress, the symptoms of chronic stress are often more subtle and are closely linked with fatigue. These symptoms include slower mentation and speech, poor short term memory, inattention, increasing error rates in routine tasks and even daytime somnolence (sleepiness).

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• Difficulty concentrating and reduced vigilance - easily distracted

• Errors, omissions, mistakes, incorrect actions, poor judgment and memory

• Tendency to cut corners, skip items and look for the easiest way out

• Either slowness (due to lack of interest) or hyperactivity (due to adrenaline)

• Focusing on easily manageable details while ignoring serious threats

• Tendency to pass responsibility on to others

• Fixation on single issues or even a mental block

• Unwillingness to make decisions - decisions are postponed or take longer to make

• Fewer plans and backup plans are made

• Increase in risk-taking leading to an increase in the number of violations, especially when frustrated with

failures

• Excessively hurried actions - Due to adrenaline and alertness level, there is a tendency to act very quickly even

when there is no time pressure. Hurried actions increase the chance of errors.

The body therefore needs to mount this cascade of stress reaction to be able to cope with it, and with that, per-formance improves with an increasing heightened state of alertness.


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The second strategy to managing stress is to understand that both preventive and reactive approaches are re-quired to tackle stress. A simple way to reduce stress levels in actual operations is in fact through adequate prepa-ration and practice – the preventive approach. This means shifting more unexpected events into the realm of the expected, by both building up a broad knowledge base as well as to rehearse important bold-face actions in the event of emergency. A pre-flight brief consisting of a thorough risk analysis of the upcoming sortie and detailed contingency planning is a good example of adopting a good preventive approach to tackling stress. The reactive approach comes in when individuals learn how to manage the negative emotions that come with unexpected events. In such situations, it is vital to maintain composure, execute the necessary tasks or bold-face actions as re-hearsed (for time-critical situations) and to continuously maintain a heightened state of alertness and situational awareness in managing the follow-on outcomes. It is therefore important to learn how to control all negative emotions that usually come with stress, which includes irritation, nervousness and anxiety. These emotions have the potential to cut off access to a rational mind. Hence, as long as the emotive component can be controlled, most difficult situations and threats are by and large manageable with a sound mind and nimble body; actions would be rational and logical based on the good training received and experience garnered over the years.

In addition to the above 2 strategies, the management of chronic stress entail the following components:

• Ensuring optimal health and fitness. This includes getting enough rest and sleep, eating regular meals and exercising regu-larly. Exercise, for example, is well-established in helping to re-duce stress levels. It is important to incorporate some form of exercise in one’s weekly schedule.

• Ensuring adequacy of knowledge and currency of training. Having a lack of knowledge but being put on a job not only creates undue stress at the outset, but grows into a bigger prob-lem in which acts are repeatedly performed without validation, termed norms. Having adequate knowledge and up-to-date training is therefore important in imbibing competence and confidence at one’s job, reducing the day to day negative stress which may accumulate over time.

• Knowing one’s ability in undertaking more tasks. For some of us who cannot say “no”, it is important to not take on too many tasks and responsibilities to the extent that it causes work overload. This problem of work overload may be amplified when personal stressors come into play. Watch out for symptoms of chronic stress and alarm bells should ring when these symptoms start to occur. A time-out may be necessary to recharge the body and mind.

• Social interaction and communication. It is vital not to keep all problems to oneself and communication can often “vent” off some of the stress that is accumulating. Maintaining a healthy social life is also important in keeping a good work-life balance.

Having an exercise regime and family bond-ing are some of the ways to reduce stress

At the management level

At the management level, it is important to adequately manage the stress levels of one’s subordinates. Some individuals get more stressed than others while some might have personal stressors at home which might be er-roneously judged as poor work performance. The management of stress at a management level hence is a highly complex art from which requires a multitude of skills, honed by experience. This can range from being able to utilize available resources optimally, to prioritizing work for subordinates adequately, to thinking of innovative ways to further create capacity.

Training is another important area which the management must emphasize on. How to teach, what to teach, how to motivate, how to bring out the best in the individual. In general, good training will result in a knowledgeable and competent workforce and this will go a long way in reducing the day to day stress at work as well as in man-aging contingencies. Other than training, the process of mentoring and coaching must be pursued – this means imparting knowledge and experience as well as inspiring the younger ones to reach their full potential.

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SSWhile the above mentioned are the more recognizable ways of managing stress at the management level, it is of-ten forgotten that social interaction and bonding is also an important piece to the jigsaw puzzle, and this may require dedicated time and effort. The impact of social cohesion on strengthening ties and bonds, improving communications and fostering teamwork as well as allowing the chance to know your subordinates at a personal level cannot be under-estimated. Sometimes, it is only through informal events that one gets to peek into the personal stressors affecting one’s subordinates and that may change entirely the approach and management of many issues at hand.

It is also crucial to always “keep active one’s sensors” in trying to assess the amount of stress that is shouldered by subordi-nates, both at an individual and group level. While this ability

to sense and perceive the “latent” negative stress in the workforce will require some level of experience, the need to constantly measure and titrate stress levels should not be entirely neglected in the sole pursuit of targets and achievements. Hence, there is a need to routinely “feel the pulse” to see if the demands placed on the team are overwhelming and whether morale and performance standards are starting to dwindle with small errors pepper-ing throughout the team. These may indicate that a potential accident is brewing ahead! A “time-check” will need to be objectively assessed based on the true capability and capacity of the workforce and not judged based on one’s ability or desire. Once that is done, it is then important to identify the source of stressors and to tackle the issue at its source where possible.

In summary, it is well established that the best leaders inspire and motivate their men to constantly perform at their peak under an environment of positive stress; how to always engage the entire team in an environment of positive stress and not tipping over to the territory of negative stress or chronic stress is truly a fine art which distinguishes a great leader from a mere task master. Hence, it may be timely to re-think about existing strategies of managing stress so as to bring out the best in the team – both in achieving mission success and enhancing operational safety.

Engaging people in an environment of positive stress to produce a highly motivated and capable workforce is an

art of a great leader

CONCLUSION

Stress is part and parcel of everyday living – whether at work or at home – and is something that everyone needs to learn how to cope with. With a better understanding of what it really is and how it can affect the mind and body, better stress management techniques can be employed in combating it. With continued efforts to manage it at the individual and management levels, I am sure the dividends it pays back to morale, mission success and safety will exceed expectation. As it is, we have managed to touch on almost all the Dirty Dozen Human Factors in this single article on Stress (see all words in bold) – highlighting its unassuming importance in the world of safety. In short, below are the take home points on the Human Factor Stress:

• Stress is a physiological and cognitive response to a stressor which generates alertness.

• In excess, stress results in numerous physical and mental side effects.

• Positive stress results in increased performance while negative stress degrades performance. The aim is to maintain a level of positive stress so that performance improves over time, bearing in mind not to generate negative stress.

• Stress can be acute or chronic. Chronic stress may go unnoticed and it important to look out for its signs and symptoms.

• Strategies to reduce individual stress entail first being able to recognize it and secondly adopting the preventive and reactive approaches to handling it. The preventive approach includes having a good training programme and ensuring adequate preparation for all tasks while the latter deals with managing one’s emotions. Keeping a fit and healthy body and mind as well as maintaining good social interaction also help to reduce stress at an individual level.

• At the management level, it is important to note that stress management is not merely an individual responsibility. It has roles to play in the areas of resource management, quality of training and capacity creation. In addition, the importance of social interaction and team dynamics should not be neglected. “Sensors” should be sent out to feel the pulse of the team, and workload titrated accordingly.

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Distraction

DISTRA

CTIONDISTRACTION

Distraction - it has earned the ignominy of belonging to the ‘Dirty Dozen’. The Oxford Dictionary defines it as “a thing that prevents someone from concentrating on something else”. In the field of work within the RSAF, we find that distraction is ubiquitous, affecting virtually everyone. Depending on circumstances, it may affect us to differ-ent degrees. How much do we understand distraction? Is it all bad as it is?

DISTRACTION - IN PERSPECTIVE

Let us first take a look at the all too familiar ‘Dirty Dozen’. The ‘Dirty Dozen’ concept is well understood in the RSAF. As part of safety education, safety posters were distributed in the RSAF to provide information in identifying each of the Dirty Dozen factors and preventing accidents that may be caused by them. The caption to the Dirty Dozen poster on ‘Distraction’ reads, “Hey, your wife is on the phone”. It depicts how matters such as a call from one’s spouse can draw one’s focus away from his work, and potentially lead to errors.

Distractions can come in different forms and can affect anyone, especially in the RSAF's work setting. From crew-men on the ground to pilots in the air, distractions cause us to omit work tasks, when our attention is diverted to other things. This may in turn lead to minor accidents, or in the worse case, catastrophic ac-cidents.

Closer to home, on 31 Dec 2009, a landrover was damaged during a routine detail transporting troops. En route, a loud metallic banging noise was heard from the vehicle’s rear compartment. The loud noise distracted both the driver and the vehicle commander, and the former accidental-ly steered the vehicle off road and into a fence. Thankfully, no injury was sustained. However, there were damages to the vehicle and to the fence.

In the same year, another Ground Accident/In-cident report (GAIR) was filed on an incident that occurred during an aircraft towing task. An Apache helicopter was being towed to another location for maintenance when it veered off the taxiway. One of its wheels sank into a muddy grass patch. The personnel were required to follow a specific route on the taxiway that was marked out by designated points. As it was their first time on that particular towing route, they were overly cautious and too focused on locating the new checkpoints. This distracted them.

Thankfully, both these incidents did not result in any injuries.

However, we were not that fortunate on 19 Aug 2009 when a routine morning brief was interrupted by a false fire alarm in a RSAF facility. Besides the alarm, the building’s fire protection system was activated, and the fire retardant chemical, FM 200, was discharged in the briefing room. All the personnel were immediately evacuated. However, in the process of evacuation, a servicewoman tripped and fell, sustaining a stress fracture in one of her

A seemingly harmless call can draw one’s focus away from his work, and potentially lead to errors.

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508 SQN, CAB (W) and Flight Test Centre

ME5 Phua Kian Sean is currently Officer Commanding and Unit Safety Officer in 508 SQN, CAB(W). He holds a Diploma in Civil Engineering from Singapore Polytechnic.

Jointly Contributed by:

MAJ Andrew Keong is currently a Trial Pilot in the RSAF Flight Test Centre. He is a graduate of the United States Naval Test Pilot School and has a Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering from Nanyang Technological University.


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N knees. The contractor had accidentally triggered the fire alarm and FM200 fire protection system when he was attempting to disable them before proceeding on some maintenance works.

According to the investigation, the contractor who triggered the alarm was distracted by his thoughts on his up-coming daily work schedule. As he was distracted, he failed to perform a vital step in the disabling process, and hence triggered the alarm as well as the fire protection system.

The cases mentioned were only a few of the many incidents and accidents involving distractions; some of which were much more dire. They are, nonetheless, sufficient to show how costly and detrimental the effects of dis-traction can be. Equipment and facilities were damaged, and resources such as time and manpower have to be expended to restore and repair the damages. Even worse, accidents resulting from distraction could potentially cause harm and injury to personnel - a costly price that must be avoided by all means.

DISTRACTION - A CLOSER LOOK

The cases discussed earlier provide insights into some of the detrimental consequences of distraction. However, it is difficult for us to fully quantify dis-traction and understand it succinctly.

Distraction manifests itself both inter-nally and externally with respect to the individual. External stimuli are things in our surroundings that are able to draw our attention. These include innocu-ous things such as a phone call from a loved one or a favourite song being played on the radio. Other more potent forms of distraction exist, such as the loud noise from an aircraft engine or unexpected thunder.

On the other hand, internal stimuli are very often linked to an individual’s emotions, feeling and thoughts. Every-day personal issues from interpersonal relationships, problems in the workplace, to financial woes, would bring certain amount of distraction. When these preoccupy a person's attention, they may interfere with his focus on his work. He is unable to devote his focus on the task at hand.

DEALING WITH DISTRACTION

Distraction is a Human Factor, and that means no one is im-mune to it. Hence, everyone must take active measures to over-come the problems that distraction may cause.

When it comes to dealing with the problem of distraction, we can tackle it with a 2-pronged approach – Mitigation and Pre-vention.

The first prong is mitigation. This involves employing measures to correct the situation such that it does not lead to further complications. The second is to prevent distraction from occur-ring in the first place.

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Sterile Flight Deck Periods of Restricted Com-munications (Qantas Flight Safety, Issue 4,

Summer 2002)

Mitigation

There are various methods to mitigate the effects of distraction. An example is the '3-steps-back’ approach. Tech-nician A is tasked to service a mobile generator, and part of his task involves securing conductive cables to the generator set. As he is tightening a bolt in place, Technician A is momentarily distracted by a vehicle cruising by. Complications can arise as result of his attention being drawn away from his work. Technician A can momentarily forget that he is in the midst of fully tightening the particular bolt in place, and hence fails to complete his re-quired task. To mitigate the situation, Technician A should refer to his checklist or Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), to retrace 3 steps prior to the one in which he was interrupted. In so doing, he ensures that the 3 prior steps have been completed, before continuing to complete the task.

Prevention

It is often said that prevention is better than a cure. If one should think about it, ‘curing’ distraction is an incredu-lous, even impossible task. It is however, more feasible to prevent it instead. Let us consider some means in which distraction can be prevented.

Distraction has not only been a bane to the RSAF, but also to the commercial aviation industry. As such, commer-cial airlines have implemented measures such as the ‘Sterile Cockpit Rule’. The Sterile Cockpit Rule implemented by the American Federal Aviation Authority specifically prohibits crew member performance of “any duties dur-ing a critical phase of flight except those duties required for the safe operations of the aircraft... (nor) any activ-ity... which could distract any flight crew member from the performance of his or her duties” below 10,000 feet.

One notorious form of distraction is the extraneous conversation between cockpit crew members, which may arise from poor pre-flight co-ordination of in-flight responsibilities during critical phases of flight. This leads to an unnecessary and distracting increase in verbal interaction between pilot and co-pilot. Extraneous conversation, however benign as it may sound, has led to flight crews committing considerable errors of omission such as fail-ure to complete checklists in their entirety or even landing without an air traffic control clearance.

In the RSAF, operators of dual cockpit fighter aircraft such as the F-16D+ aircraft, attest to the need for a sterile cockpit during critical phases of flight. It is therefore an ingrained practice for the pilot and weapon system of-ficer to establish crew responsibilities via the use of a tactical crew co-ordination checklist. The tactical crew co-ordination checklist assigns specific crew responsibilities during all pertinent phases of flight, ranging from administrative aspects such as departure and recovery, to tactical portions of the flight such as during air-to-air intercepts and air-to-ground attacks. The specific, unambiguous assignment of intra-cockpit tasks and responsi-bilities significantly eliminates the impetus for extraneous intra-cockpit chatter, thereby reducing the potential for distraction.

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We have examined the measures that some organizations have implemented in their fight against the problems that distraction can cause. Now, how can a serviceman in the RSAF play a part in dealing with distraction?

Besides diligently adhering to the policies promulgated by the organization, it is important for service-men to “micro-manage” distractions. This would mean that servicemen should exercise their own individ-ual responsibility in overcoming the problems of distraction. This would require taking measures to create a “distraction free work environment”.

A good way to achieve such an environment is to be organized when it comes to work. This could include organ-izing one’s workspace (e.g. office, workshop, hangar, etc.) and setting it up in a way which is convenient and con-ducive for one to work in. In a messy workspace, an individual has to spend time constantly rummaging through piles of disorganized document or equipment in order to obtain the one that is needed. This can be avoided when one is organized, such that all the document or equipment are packed and arranged in some order.

One could also organize the tools that one needs to go about his work. Organization of one’s workspace and tools ensures that the working environment is optimized for its purpose. When a workspace has all that is required for one’s work prepared beforehand, it reduces interruptions at work. Distractions are therefore minimized.

CONCLUSION

It is irrevocably important to manage distraction. This is critical to achieve zero accidents and optimise opera-tional capability. We have discussed about the detrimental effects of distraction, and how it is important for us to manage distraction to prevent costly accidents from occurring.

The field of medical healthcare has also started to deal with the problems of distraction as well. In hospitals, patients who are warded in hospital receive the medication they need from the nursing staff. However, research has shown that distraction is a prominent cause of nurses distributing the wrong medicine to their patients by mistake. One contributing factor is the interrup-tion of the nursing staff while they are in the midst of their rounds. To combat such a problem, the medical staff in NHS Lanarkshire have introduced the practice of donning special red tabards, with the words “Drug round in progress, please do not disturb” embla-zoned on them. These tabards help nurses to warn colleagues not to interrupt them when they are on a medication round in a hos-pital. Nurses wearing these tabards are not to be interrupted from their rounds, except when there are medical emergencies that re-quire their attention. This practice has significantly reduced errors in medicine distribution by nursing staff.

Reference:

- Aviation Knowledge. The "Dirty Dozen" in Aviation Maintenance. http://aviationknowledge.wikidot.com/aviation:dirty-dozen

- SKYbrary. Sterile Flight Deck (OGHFA BN): Operator’s Guide to Factors in Aviation Sterile Flight Deck. http://www.skybrary.aero/index.php/Sterile_Flight_Deck_%28OGHFA_BN%29

- Do not disturb!” The Pulse. News for NHS Lanarkshire Staff. May/June 2009. http://www. nhslanarkshire.org.uk/publications/Documents/The%20Pulse%20May%20june%202009_wrap.pdf

- Personal Development Training with Sid Savara. 13 Ways to Improve Your Concentration With a Distraction Free Work Environ-ment. http://sidsavara.com/personal-development/ improve-concentration-distraction-free-work-environment

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Project Management and The Dirty Dozen

Mr Ang Yin Zhong, DSTA Engineer, ALS ADOC

Mr Ang Yin Zhong is currently Dy OC in ALS ADOC, and is also the Unit Welfare Officer. He graduated from the National University of Singapore with B.Eng (Electrical), and Masters of Science in Management of Technology. He was an Equipment Engineer and Project Engineer in the Semi-Conductor Industry, before joining DSTA. He is currently seconded to ALS ADOC.

“Therefore, the General who knows the advantages of the nine changes knows how to use the troops. If the General does not know the advantages of the nine changes, even if he knows the way of the land, he will not be able to take advantage of the ground. He who commands an army but does not know the principles of the nine changes, even if he is familiar with the five advantages, will not be able to best use his troops.”

SunZi's Art of War

Introduction

Harnessing advanced technologies and renewal of weapon systems are key change areas in developing and forging ahead towards a 3rd Generation RSAF. In Air Defence and Operations Command (ADOC), we are currently in the proc-ess of phasing in new air defence systems to enhance the RSAF's capabilities to deal with a wider spectrum of aerial threats. The matured RAPIER surface-to-air missile system and 35mm Guns system are being replaced by new systems like the Surface-to-air PYthon-5 and DERby-Short-Range (SPYDER-SR) ground based air defence system. The SPYDER-SR will form part of the 3rd Generation RSAF Networked Air Defence capability that builds upon the existing multi-lay-ered air defence system to further strengthen Singapore's air defences.1

As the RSAF goes about phasing in new air defence systems, there will be interactions and work involved between project teams and the new systems' Original Equipment Manufac-turers (OEMs). Before the project teams start interacting and working with the OEMs, the project teams have to be con-scious of potential Dirty Dozen (human causal factors that can set a serviceman up to make an error) and tackle them. These potential Dirty Dozen can either be from within the project teams or from the OEMs who have different cultures and working systems. In this article, two of the potential Dirty Dozen of project teams and two of the potential Dirty Dozen of OEMs will be discussed and shared, for greater awareness.

1 Fact sheet – SPYDER-SR found in MINDEF Website

RAPIER Surface-to-Air Missile System

The 35mm Oerlikon Gun


“Dirty Dozen” of Project Teams and OEMs

“If you know your enemies and know yourself, you will not be imperiled in a hundred battles.”

SunZi's Art of War

Knowing the potential Dirty Dozen of our project teams and po-tential Dirty Dozen of OEMs will help prevent errors, especially safety errors, from occurring when the project teams and OEMs come together. Four of the Dirty Dozen, namely Lack of Knowl-edge, Lack of Assertiveness, Lack of Communications and Norms, are common in the working dynamics between project teams and OEMs. These four potential human causal factors and pos-sible mitigating measures will be discussed in this article.

Two of the potential Dirty Dozen which are common in our project teams are Lack of Knowledge and Lack of As-sertiveness.

• Lack of Knowledge: More often than not, project teams do not have prior experiences and deep knowledge of the new systems, especially for developmental projects. There will also be new technology which are unfamiliar to the project teams. Due to a lack of knowledge, project teams are inclined to wholly accept information given by the OEMs who are deemed experts of the new systems. Project teams have the tendency to accept information and technical manuals given by the OEMs as the ‘gospel truth’. However, the OEMs may not be right all the time.

For example, years ago, an intermittent defect failure was found on the upgraded Improved Homing-All-the-Way-Killer (I-HAWK) missile system. The OEM attributed the failure to a non-upgraded portion of the equip-ment. The I-HAWK team accepted the OEM’s judegment wholly, and proceeded with regression testing on the non-upgraded portion, which unfortunately led to further technical complications on the equipment. It was only after 3 years of detailed investigation that the project team found that the defect was actually the result of a design deficiency in a newly-introduced component, contrary to the OEM’s claim. The OEM finally acknowledged the design deficiency of the upgraded system2.

Therefore, project teams must always remind themselves not to accept all the information given by the OEMs at face value. Project teams should always critically review information obtained from the OEMs. Technical manuals given by the OEMs should be scrutinized by the project team too. Also, prior to interacting and work-ing with the OEMs, project teams should carry out research and studies on the new systems which the RSAF will be phasing in. Reading up on the new systems from the OEMs’ website, and gathering information from open sources are just some ways to raise the initial knowledge level of the project teams on the new systems.

2 Safety Transformation: Personal Perspective by ME3 Lim Koon Bin in ‘Safety Focus Issue 60’.

Photo Source from Internet: I-Hawk system conducting a live firing exercise.

• Lack of Assertiveness: Project teams have the tendency of following the OEMs' instructions with little doubt on the reliability or factuality of the information and technical instructions. Project teams, hoping to build good rapport with the OEMs, may feel that questioning the OEMs might affect the working relationship. Such mentality prevents the project teams to be assertive.

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When there is any doubt on instructions or pro-cedures, project teams should be assertive and post questions to the OEMs, especially when safety may be compromised. As the saying goes, “the customer is always right”, project teams al-ways reserve the right to be assertive and de-mand for clarifications and improvements when-ever and wherever necessary. This is especially important for new system projects, where there


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are even more questions and doubts on reliability or factuality of information from the OEMs. Project teams have to be inquisitive and pursue answers from the OEMs for any questions they have on the new systems. All doubts have to be cleared to prevent errors from occurring.

• Lack of Communication: OEMs are normally from other countries and their main language for commu-nication may not be English. Language can be a barrier to communication and it may prevent crucial safety-related information from being communicated to the project team. This lack of communication can be in verbal form and in written form such as the technical manuals. Impor-tant safety procedures and technical information may not be adequately translated when the teams work with the OEMs. Communication styles of the OEMs also vary. Some OEMs prefer to communicate verbally while others prefer to communicate via written means. Whether it is verbal or written, there will always be the issue of misinterpretation, and the possibility that the OEMs may have missed out steps or indicated wrong steps.

For example, the OEM for a recently acquired system was trying to explain a technical procedure to the project team, but the project team was having difficulty understanding the actual intended information due to the OEM's poor command of English. They had to observe the OEM carry out the actual intended steps before they realised that there were missing and wrong steps stated in the technical manuals. The sequence of the procedural steps in the manuals was also different from the sequence of steps actually carried out by the OEM. Initially the project team misinterpreted the intended information of the technical procedure, and only after clarifying and re-clarifying several times did the project team fully understood the intended steps of the procedure.

Therefore, to counter the lack of communication from the OEMs, either in verbal or written forms, what-ever information and instructions from the OEMs should be clarified and re-clarified by the project teams to eliminate any misinterpretations of the contents. When necessary, project teams must insist that the OEMs demonstrate the written instructions, so as to verify that the written instructions are correct. The OEM should be requested to assign instructors with better command of the English language, for pairing with engineers from the project teams who have strong technical knowledge. This will ensure that crucial information, espe-cially safety-related technical information, will be communicated effectively to the project teams.

• Norms: OEMs have worked on the new systems for years and are considered the experts on the systems. However, norms may have been formed based on the differ-ent working culture and different priorities of the OEMs.

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We will now discuss two of the potential Dirty Dozen common in the OEMs. They are Lack of Communications and Norms.

The Surface-to-air PYthon-5 and DERby-Short-Range (SPYDER-SR) Ground Based Air Defence System


For example, OEMs are profit-driven companies, and they may not emphasize on personnel safety as much as the RSAF does. Their priority is to deliver functional effective equipment systems for customers, but their culture may not produce equipment that are reliable or designed with sufficient safety emphasis. The design of the equipment may be suitable for foreigners’ body-build and size, but not suitable for Singaporeans. Their written procedures may not be concise and clear enough for our servicemen to follow. As long as the systems are effective and functionable for operations, the OEMs will feel that they have delivered their products.

Therefore, we have to be aware of the OEM's norms and be careful not to take their norms applied on the new systems as acceptable. We have to leverage on our RSAF's strong Safety Culture to review the practices of the OEMs to prevent their unsafe norms from affecting us. Be ready to insist that the OEMs change and modify their equipment and procedures to meet our operational and safety standards.

Also, to better deal with the different cultures and norms of the OEMs, the project teams could get people who have previously worked with the OEMs to be part of the team. Alternatively, project teams could talk to people who have worked with the same OEMs on other systems to better understand the OEMs' norms and cultures.

Let me illustrate the above-mentioned points by sharing a recent encounter between a RSAF project team and the OEM.

The RSAF project core team was having hands-on training on a new system under the guidance and supervision of the OEM instructors. The core team found that the OEM instructors were having difficulty using English to ex-plain and answer questions raised by the core team. This is a case of lack of communication and poor communica-tion from the OEM. As the team was going through the battery replacement task listed in the technical manuals, they realized that the safety instructions were too generic and not task-specific. In the task list, steps like ensuring that the battery switch is OFF and that de-energizing of the system is done were not included in the technical manuals. These steps were also not mentioned by the OEM during the hands-on training. Furthermore, the core team also observed that the OEM instructors had a norm of going straight into maintenance tasks without prior proper safety checks. When the project team raised their safety concerns, the OEM engineering instructors sim-ply told them that it was safe without much explanation and assurance. The core team was still in a dilemma on whether to carry on and follow the technical manual’s steps or stop. Fortunately, the core team was assertive and called for a safety “time-out”. After several rounds of clarifying the procedures with the OEM instructors, the team confirmed that the safety procedures were inadequate. If the core team had carried out the battery replacement task as per the OEM's instructions and technical manual, someone could have suffered an electric shock, because the system has not been de-energized for the battery replacement task. The team went on to further insist that the OEM revise all the tasks in the technical manuals. The OEM eventually acknowledged that the original pro-cedures and task steps did pose some safety concerns, and agreed to revise all the instructions in their technical manuals to incorporate the necessary safety precautionary steps and to make them more task-specific.

Conclusion

Through this article, two Dirty Dozen of project teams and another two of the OEMs have been discussed and shared. They are the Lack of Knowledge, Lack of Assertiveness, Lack of Communications and Norm. As we develop and forge ahead towards a 3rd Generation RSAF by harnessing advanced technologies and phasing in new weapon sys-tems, our project teams must emphasize our strong RSAF Safety Culture to the OEMs, do their best to learn as much as possible about the new system, improve communica-tions with the OEMs and be assertive at all times to pre-vent norms and unsafe practices from forming.

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At A Glance

Safety ActivitiesSA

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The 3rd CAF Quarterly Safety Forum was held at Changi Air Base (West) on 10 Oct 2011. The forum aims to promote safety awareness in the RSAF with the highest command empha-sis. The theme for the forum was “Strong Fundamentals and Teamwork for Mission Success”.

The forum began with Head AFI, COL Aw Kwee Siong, updating on the RSAF’s safety trends and statistics for the past quarter. MAJ Teo Mun Tiong, an instructor from 124 SQN then shared his experience from his recent EC-120B engine-off landing in-cident. This was followed by a café style discussion on several case studies to draw the relevant safety lessons.

CAF, MG Ng Chee Meng, presented the CAF Safety Awards to MAJ Teo Mun Tiong and LTA Nathaniel Goh Wen Keng for their professional handling of the EC-120B engine failure emergen-cy.

CAF then closed the forum by commending all the participants for a job well done in the past quarter and reminded all to be on guard against complacency.

3rd CAF Quarterly Safety Forum


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2nd WHIP Workshop

AFI’s Accident Prevention Branch (APB) conducted the 2nd Wildlife Hazards Intervention Programme (WHIP) Workshop on 18th November 2011 at the Inno Room, AFTC. The workshop gathered the WHIP Officers and Squadron Unit Safety Officers from various commands to promote awareness on wildlife hazards through education, dissemination and interaction. A bird con-trol specialist company, MasterMark Pte Ltd was also invited to share on her experience in the control of aerodrome wildlife hazards. APB shared on the lat-est development in wildlife hazard control measures in the RSAF. A case study on bird strikes in Elmendorf Air Force Base, Alaska was also conducted. Overall, the workshop refreshed the 20 participants' knowledge of bird hazards and enhanced their understanding and awareness of the various WHIP programmes.

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Counter Piracy Operations -Fokker 50 MPA in the Gulf of Aden

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MAJ Clement Wee, OC, 121 SQN

MAJ Clement is a Fokker-50 pilot who is currently undergoing the command and staff course in Goh Keng Swee Command Staff College. He held the appointment as an Officer Commanding in 121 SQN during the MPA deployment to the Gulf of Aden in 2011.

As part of Singapore's contribution to the international counter piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden (GoA), a Fokker 50 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (F-50 MPA) detachment was deployed to Djibouti in the Horn of Africa from April to July 2011 to conduct mari-time air counter piracy operations. The Detachment comprised mission crew from 121 SQN, logistics person-nel from the Singapore Technologies Aerospace (STAe) F-50 Programme, ground security troopers from vari-ous Field Defence Squadrons and ground support staff. This was the RSAF's very first maritime air counter piracy mission to the GoA and the first deployment for many detach-ment personnel to the African conti-nent.

During this three month deployment, the detachment contributed in niche areas and played a significant part in the multinational effort to counter piracy in the GoA. The F-50 MPA successfully flew 58 maritime air counter-piracy missions in support of the Combined Maritime Force (CMF) and CTF 151. We investigated 3642 vessels ranging from small fishing and cargo vessels such as skiffs and dhows to large merchant vessels (MVs) includ-ing MVs on the Vulnerable Shipping List and MVs that did not conform to the promulgated counter-piracy Best Management Practices (BMPs). On 13 separate occasions, the F-50 MPA was also dynamically tasked in-flight to investigate distress calls by merchant vessels and to perform coordinated search with coalition surface forces. Besides marking our presence through a high mission rate of close to 20 missions a month, the Detachment also established its standing as a credible, competent and dependable partner in multinational counter piracy operations. This was testified by regular commendations by the CMF on the quality of the Detachment's post mission products as well as accolades offered by visiting senior coalition officials. In this deployment, the F-50 MPA detachment achieved mission success, showcased the RSAF's professionalism.

These achievements were not without its accompanying set of challenges and uncertainties. Our key challenges were in dealing with the harsh semi-desert environment and the unfamiliar operating environment as well as executing an unprecedented1 extended range operational deployment of the F-50 MPA over 4000nm and across continents. Uncertainties were also abound in-theatre with real time developments in our operating conditions including the eruption of Volcano Nabro 140km away in neighbouring Erithrea and ground security develop-ments. These challenges and uncertainties potentially threatened our mission success and compromised safety.

1 The last deployment of the RSAF F-50 aircraft over such extended distances was during the ferry of the aircraft from Holland to Singapore in 1993.

A RSAF Fokker 50 Maritime Patrol Aircraft


A Fokker 50 prepares for an early morning flight operation.

Unfamiliar Operating Airfield and Environment. In addition to these elements of nature, the other major set of challenges revolved around the unfamiliar operating environment. Operating for the first time in Djibouti and the Gulf of Aden, the Detachment was relatively unfamiliar with the air traffic environment over Djibouti and the characteristics of our area of operations in the GoA. While the SAF had previously operated in the GoA and transited Djibouti through the deployment of the RSN's Landing Ship Tank (LST) and the RSAF's Super Puma helicopters, the operating context for our Detachment was different. Based out of Djibouti Ambouli International Airport, the non-radar controlled terminal area was of a particular concern due to the complexity of operations aggravated by high air traffic density and military-civilian mixed operations. Proximity to international airways and unfamiliar Danger NOTAM areas were the other watch areas. The ground operating environment also posed its own set of challenges in terms of ground security and movement safety.

Logistics Supportability. The extended deployment of the F-50 MPA from Singapore to Djibouti entailed a signifi-cant amount of coordination. It was a logistical and admin-istrative challenge deploying the aircraft over the vast In-dian Ocean and Arabian Sea, across the intricate Indian air-space and through multiple stops. It was critical that the Detachment harmonised the many moving parts to ensure the smooth and safe execu-tion of the deployment for a timely arrival of the F-50 MPA in Djibouti.

The aforementioned challeng-es represented known “unknowns” for the Detachment. However, there remained a set of unknown “unknowns” which presented a level of uncertainty. These “unknowns” were elements which were not pre-empted in spite of our best effort in preparing for the mission. The eruption of Volcano Nabro was a good example of such unknown “unknowns” which the Detachment had to address while in theatre. Such developments, if not handled compe-tently, could pose a significant safety hazard and compromise mission success.

SIZING UP THE CHALLENGES & UNCERTAINTIES

High Temperatures, Sandy Environment and Strong Winds. The harsh semi-desert environment was charac-terised by high temperatures, a sandy environment and strong seasonal winds marked by the Khamsin2 wind phenomenon. The Apr to Jul deployment window coincided with summer in Djibouti with temperatures soaring into the mid-40oc range. Many detachment personnel were exposed for the first time to operations under high temperature. The need to sustain operations had to be balanced against the physiological limitations of our personnel particularly the logistics crew and ground security troopers who spent a higher proportion of their working hours in the exposed aircraft dispersal. The high temperature also affected operations in the area of air-craft performance. The harshness of the semi-desert environment was compounded by sandy conditions which presented challenges in regard to aircraft maintenance and reduced flight visibility. Strong winds were also fore-casted as part of the annual Khamsin phenomenon in the Jun to Jul period. This raised concerns over the safety of the parked aircraft particularly after similar strong winds had reportedly tipped aircraft and damaged hangars at Djibouti Ambouli Airport around the same time a year ago.

2 Khamsin refers to a dry, hot and dusty local wind blowing in North Africa and the Arabian Peninsula. These dry, dust-filled windstorms often blow sporadically over fifty days.

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ROBUST PREPARATION PROCESS

Comprehensive PDSS. A robust preparation process was executed by the Detachment in collaboration with HQ RSAF and Campaign HQ. The pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) conducted by key stakeholders prior to the deployment provided the Detachment with an appreciation of the in-theatre operating environment and details regarding potential challenges. Besides walking the ground for administrative and logistics coordination, the PDSS team visited the various coalition force detachments based in Djibouti for a first hand account of their operations. The PDSS team also spoke at length with the coalition forces and local Djiboutian officials about the challenges posed by the harsh semi-desert environment and the operating environment. This helped to bridge the Detachment's knowledge gap and addressed the challenge of AO unfamiliarity.

Robust Pre-Departure Preparations. Armed with better knowledge and awareness of our chal-lenges, the Detachment set out to finalise its prepa-ration for the deployment. In addressing the harsh semi-desert environment, a heat management ma-trix for aircraft maintenance crew and ground secu-rity troopers was promulgated. Cooling vests were also acquired to complement this matrix. With re-gard to the sandy environment, a launch and recov-ery matrix was promulgated to address minimum visibility conditions. In addition, the STAe F-50 pro-gram actively solicited inputs from the KC-135 pro-gramme and Fokker Services and worked with ALD to promulgate in-theatre desert maintenance pro-cedures. Protective covers were designed and fab-ricated to protect critical aircraft components such

as the engine-intake, propellers, landing gears and cockpit window against sand ingestion, sand-pitting and material degradation.

Innovation for Enhanced Effectiveness and Safety. The Detachment identified ways to modify the aircraft and to improve its piracy surveillance and photo-imageries. This led to the installation of camera windows and the acquisition of a Maritime Automatic Identification System (MAIS). These enhancements significantly levelled up the F-50 MPA's ability to conduct close-in surveillance and produce high quality imagery of vessels from safe distances. These changes improved the mission effectiveness of the F-50 MPA in counter piracy surveillance and, more importantly, enhanced the safety of the aircraft.

Detailed Contingency Plans. Taking the preparation process one level higher, the Detachment worked closely with HQ RSAF and Campaign HQ to promulgate drawer plans for various contingency scenarios. This process helped sharpened the Detachment's planning and decision making mechanism against potentially disruptive contingencies. Squaring away these known “unknowns” with higher HQ raised our preparedness and bolstered our confidence for the deployment.

The rigour of the Detachment's preparations facilitated the commencement of counter piracy operations just 3 days after arriving in Djibouti. This was an achieve-ment and a measure of the Detachment's operational readiness.

A Fokker 50 departs from the airfield to the area of operations.

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Notwithstanding the challenges and uncertainties, the Detachment successfully and safely accomplished its mis-sion. This was made possible by a robust preparation process, deep competencies of our people and a strong safety culture.


A Loadmaster conducting surveillance over suspicious vessels

DEEP COMPETENCIES OF OUR PEOPLE

The key to the Detachment's mission success laid in the deep com-petencies of our people. No amount of preparation would be mean-ingful without having competent people drive the detachment. The high standards that the RSAF had enforced in the professional and personal development of her people had translated into deep com-petencies which came to play during the Detachment. This was un-derpinned by a firm grounding in core values particularly in the areas of professionalism, discipline and fighting spirit.

Building on this strong baseline of deep competencies and core val-ues, the detachment customised its training for counter piracy opera-tions and successfully integrated the F-50 MPA enhancements into its concept of operations. This enabled the Detachment to level up the competency of the mission crew to further localise tripwires and pi-racy indicators such as ropes, ladders and weapons to positively pros-ecute pirates.

It was also the deep competencies of our people that ensured effec-tive and safe operations in the face of uncertainties. When Volcano NABRO erupted, the Detachment, in consultation with higher HQ, promptly assessed the situation and promulgated a Volcanic Ash Matrix. This matrix considered factors ranging from flight operations to aircraft maintenance. The matrix served as an important decision making tool in achieving mission success without compromising safety. The expedient response to the volcano eruption bears testimony to the deep competencies of our people and the difference it made to the manage-ment of challenges and uncertainties.

STRONG SAFETY CULTURE

A strong safety culture underpinned the Detachment's robust preparation process and the deep competencies of her people. This safety culture steered the Detachment in the management of operations in-theatre. Safety management tools were used in the conduct of daily operations. The “Dirty Dozen” Human Factors method was one useful framework which the Detachment used, focusing on Teamwork, Knowledge, Resources, Communica-tion, Fatigue, Pressure and Stress.

Teamwork, Knowledge, Resources

The Detachment consolidated on the linkages that were established with coalition partners during the PDSS and opened the door to a wealth of knowledge and resources. This teamwork levelled up the Detachment on the peculiarity of the local area of operations and enhanced our operational knowledge as well as safety awareness. When Volcano NABRO erupted, the Detachment worked closely with coalition partners to better understand their operational and safety considerations. This facilitated the promulgation of the Detachment's Volcanic Ash matrix which ensured sound decision making for the safe and effective conduct of our missions.

Teamwork with coalition partners was also instrumental in the conduct of counter piracy operations. Having established a good understanding on the mission capabilities of other coalition maritime patrol operators, the Detachment worked closely with these operators to optimise the surveillance coverage over the vast expanse of the Gulf of Aden. This prevented a duplication of surveillance effort and maximised the efforts of the coalition force. This teamwork created capacity and generated extra resource for the Detachment.

With detachment personnel hailing from different segments of the SAF and defence industry, teamwork also played an important part in harmonising the roles of the mission crew, logistics crew, ground security troopers and ground support staff. This facilitated a unity of effort towards the common goal of mission success and the safe conduct of operations.

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Communication was critical to the safe conduct of operations particularly in a “see-and-be-seen” environment. During the conduct of surveillance opera-tions in the Gulf of Aden, the F-50 MPA communicated with various platforms ranging from warships, ship-based helicopters to other maritime patrol aircraft. This helped to enhance the air and sea situational awareness and played an important role in airspace de-confliction in the non-radar con-trolled environment. While there were some initial challenges in adapting to the various foreign accents, this was overcome through adherence to communications discipline and procedures.

Communication could not have been more emphasised in the terminal area over Djibouti Ambouli International Airport. In this non-radar controlled terminal area, ATC controllers relied on the reporting of aircraft position to ensure separation. This reliance on voice communications had a tendency to result in cluttered comms. To enhance our flight safety in the terminal area, the Detachment listened out closely on the ATC frequencies, main-tained good lookout and leveraged on the F-50 MPA onboard systems to provide a recognised air situation pic-ture. This was augmented by the Squadron’s Executive Officer who helped to monitor the ATC frequencies from the detachment’s Ops Room for timely CRM.

Communication featured prominently in the Detachment's daily operations. Daily detachment briefs served as useful platforms for detachment personnel to share lessons and information on their respective areas of re-sponsibilities. These briefs also enabled the detachment leadership to regularly communicate the commander’s intent and to solicit ground feedback. Key lessons learnt were diligently captured by personnel and communi-cated to their counterparts in Singapore, thereby facilitating a seamless transition during personnel change over. This communication between in-theatre personnel and across the two frames enriched the learning experience of the Detachment. This served to enhance our operational effectiveness and the safe conduct of operations.

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Communication also included collaboration with other foreign forces and platforms


DEP

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Fatigue was a key watch area, particularly af-ter the take-off timing for our counter piracy patrols was brought forward to coincide with the early morning high piracy threat window in the GoA. Logistics personnel and mission crew had to wake up at wee hours of the morning to support this arrangement. Proper crew scheduling helped guard detachment personnel against fatigue and ensured suffi-cient rest for all. Heat fatigue was another area of concern. With the mounting temperatures in summer, the Detachment ensured that heat management measures which were earlier identified were diligently followed through.

The pressure and stress of an extended deployment o n personnel were not discounted. The Detachment regularly organised social interactions and professional ex-changes with coalition partners to take the load off work pressure and to de-stress. This helped to upkeep the morale and psychological well-being of detachment personnel.

CONCLUSION

The F-50 MPA detachment achieved a 100% mission launch rate with zero safety incidents and maintenance de-viations. This helped to showcase the RSAF's professionalism. The successful conduct of operations in the Gulf of Aden, in spite of challenges and uncertainties, testifies to the importance of having a robust preparation process, deep competencies of our people and a strong safety culture.

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Flight line crew turning round the aircraft after flight.

The GoA deployment crew posing for a group photo with senior MINDEF and SAF personnel during the OSM Presentation Ceremony


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Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety Conference and the Safeskies 2011 Aviation Safety Conference

The Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) conducted its Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety Conference in Canberra, Australia from 24 to 25 Oct 2011. The theme for the conference was “Leadership in Safety” and served as an avenue to strengthen the information sharing and exchange between the RAAF and other Air Forces. The highlights of the conference included information on the 2012 Workplace Health and Safety Legislation and case studies on leadership in safety and topics related to aviation and ground safety.

Following the Defence Aviation and Air Force Safety Conference, was the Safeskies 2011 Aviation Safety Confer-ence from 26 to 27 Oct 2011 at the same location. This was a biennial international event with the primary objec-tive of promoting and facilitating the exchange of information and opinions between agencies and organisations involved in aviation safety. The theme for this year’s conference was “Future Growth: Future Challenges”. The con-ference brought together operational personnel from the airlines, defence, government, training organisations, charter operators, air traffic managers as well as experts from aviation-related fields to facilitate sharing of knowl-edge and experience in aviation safety.

LTC Alex Cornelius, Head Accident Prevention Branch, in Air Force Inspectorate, represented the RSAF at both the conferences.

2011 SAFE Symposium

The 2011 SAFE Symposium was held at Reno, NV, USA from 24 to 26 Oct 11. This was an annual international event with the primary objective of promoting research and development and the exchange of information in the fields of flight safety, survival and life-support. Participants were kept abreast with the latest developments and innovations in aircrew protection, personal worn safety and life support survival equipment.

The discussions held during the conference allowed the participants to better understand the issues pertaining to current aircrew life support and survival equipment issues.

LTC (DR) Benjamin Tan, Head Crew Safety and Flight Environment (CSAFE) Branch in Aeromedical Centre, CPT Khoo Pak Syn, Staff Officer from Accident Prevention Branch in Air Force Inspectorate, and Mr Chan Beow Koon, Staff Officer from Life Support Safety Section in Air Logistics Department, represented the RSAF in the sympo-sium.

They were updated on the latest performance and safety issues pertaining to the RSAF in-service life support equipment. They also learnt about new life support technologies and equipment applicable to the RSAF which may be procured in the future.

Safety Conferences


What Our People Think?

Editor’s Note:

Commencing from this issue, servicemen and women on the ground will be asked about their thoughts on the theme and the articles in the FOCUS Magazine. Some of their thoughts and feedback are edited and published here for sharing. Some of them have chosen to remain anonymous.

“To me, the dirty dozen serves as an analysis tool to identify, investigate and internalise (the 3”I”s) HF related causal factors or issues. It allows my SQN safety office to better analyse the HF causal factors in line with AFI’s HFAM model.

The Dirty Dozen can also be used as a safety mechanism for the prevention of HF errors. Personnel can use the Dirty Dozen during their daily work cycles to look out and prevent themselves or others from being victims of HF Errors.

Some examples are follows: Am I equipped to carry out the mission? Do I have the sufficient resources and knowledge? (Using Lack of Knowledge and Lack of Resources) Am I felling tired today? Am I in the right frame of mind to fly? (Using Fatigue or Stress or Pressure)”

CPT Ashley Jude PetersonUSO, 112 SQN

“Coming from a unit where 70% are full-time National Servicemen, the concept of ‘Dirty Dozen’ is applica-ble in every part of our work. It was observed that most of the discussions and presentation topics we had on the unit’s safety day were surrounding the ‘Dirty Dozen’. Since most of our incidents/accidents occured dur-ing Motor Transport (MT) vehicular movements, especially during administrative phases, the ‘Dirty Dozen’ is often highlighted, especially on the ‘Lack of Situational Awareness’, ‘Complacency’ and ‘Lack of Communica-tion’.

The ‘Dirty Dozen’ is a list of factors/reasons related to human factors which lead to incidents or accidents.

Lacking situational awareness for drivers and vehicle commanders often lead to MT incidents/accidents. Our unit recently had one due to both the driver and vehicle commander not having the situational awareness.

Communication is also emphasied to all when the crew is carrying heavy equipment for deployment train-ing. This is because the lack of communication will lead to injuries to personnel.

As most of the case studies from outside the unit were related to aircraft maintenance, extra effort is often needed to link the lessons learnt back to our day-to-day taskings. Hence, I find the ‘Dirty Dozen’ to be easier and more useful.”

CPT XXX XXX XXX18 DA Bn

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“Dirty Dozen is one of the tools the RSAF uses to identify, investigate and analyse HF related incidents/ac-cidents. We have incorporated the Dirty Dozen in our Continuous Trade Learning to help us identify the les-sons learnt from the past incidents/accidents so as not to repeat the same mistake. “Always learn from others’ mistake and not your own mistake”.”

ME2 XXX XXX XXXHQ APGC

“Dirty Dozen is one of the first few safety tools or phrases introducted to me when I signed on a decade ago. Everyone, including me, in the aviation line know and is familiar with it but how many people actually remem-ber or apply it? Personally, I feel that if our people remind themselves subconsciously every time when they are doing their job it will definitely reduce Human Factor related errors. It may seem to be a simple slogan/tool but it certainly helps us even in our daily life in reminding us that we are always subjected to one if not many of the “Dirty Dozen”. It is just like driving on an expressway without cars, we tend to speed and forget about the speed limit as it is a ‘norm’.”

ME2 Ken Ong Ti ChingCSS, PC

“As we know, the Dirty Dozen is about the 12 common human factors that contribute to most of the ac-cidents in the aviation world. Most of us will assume that we will not fall prey to the Dirty Dozen. If we turn the pages of aviation accident history, we will be surprised to learn that, in fact, the most experienced and most qualified personnel have committed simple mistakes that had led to devastating accidents. Therefore, these human factors have to be dealt with seriously. Proper training emphasizing these effects of the human factors has to be conducted to prevent accidents. Although the RSAF has a strong safety culture, with numer-ous safety nets in our system that is complete with established processes and procedures, we should not be complacent.”

ME2 Ramesh KumarSafety Spec, 201 SQN

“Frankly, remembering or memorising the dirty dozen is not easy as there are 12 of them. However, it helps to know that the word “dirty” reminds us that these things can creep in without us knowing and eventually, the consequences hit us really hard. The monthly case studies on the dirty dozen provide good food for thought and also remind us that we cannot be nonchalant when going about our daily duties even though we’ve done it umpteen times.

I’ve never applied the “Dirty Dozen” in my daily course of work but rather more of the RSAF Core Value - “SAFETY”. Safety must be internalised in everyone as we need to work safely for ourselves and our comrades. Imbuing SAFETY will eventually lead us to not fall into the “DIRTY” hole of the “DOZEN”.“

2WO Subramaniam S/O Thaburan RangasamyOps Warrant, HQ DAG


* Answers can be found in this issue of FOCUS

Email your answers with your Rank/Name, NRIC, Unit and Contact details to 2WO Steven Goh be-fore 02 March 2012.

All correct entries will be balloted and 3 winners will receive a $30 Popular Voucher each.

The crossword puzzle is open to all RSAF per-sonnel except personnel from AFI and the FO-CUS Editorial Board.

FOCUS #69 Quiz Winners1. PTE Teoh Yi Chao ATD

2. ME3 Loh Lan Mee 203 SQN

3. CPL Michael Alexander Chee AMD

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.... Changes Over The YearsFOCUS

Our first edition of FOCUS magazine was printed in 1978 by the then Accident Prevention Office. At that time, FOCUS was published on an adhoc basis only.

1978 - 1986

First change in our front cover design. The magazine was published regularly on a quarterly basis. However, its cover and contents took on differnt and various styles and layouts.

1986 - 1990

Second change in our front cover design. The magazine began to adopt a consistent layout and style. A running issue number was also used to keep track of the magazine.

1990 - 1994

Third change in our front cover design. The overall design of the magazine also moved from the newsletter format to a more maga-zine format and style.

1994 - 2002

Fourth change in our front cover design. The layout of the magazine has also became more colourful and vibrant. Specific safety theme was also adopted for each issue.

2003 - 2011

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