FO B4 Commission Meeting 3-2-04 Fdr- Minutes of the February 10 2004 Meeting (Redacted on Top- Unredacted Tab 1) 157

8/14/2019 FO B4 Commission Meeting 3-2-04 Fdr- Minutes of the February 10 2004 Meeting (Redacted on Top- Unredacted T

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V ;9/ll Classified Information; ; N A T I O N A L C O M M I S S IO N O NT E R R O R I S T A T T A C K S O N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S

Miniites o f < t h e February 10, 2004 MeetingThe Chair called th e Commission to order at 9:10 a.m. A ll Comm issioners were inattendance. I \ ,Minutes. Commissioner BeniVeniste,moved to approve the m inutes. The Vice Chairseconded the motion. The/minutes were approved, ,PDBs. As the Comm ission awaited delivery of the 17-page PDB summary drafted by theCom mission R eview Team , Comm issioner Gorelick described the histo ry of the T eam'snegotiations with the White House. ,\ , ,Commissioner Gorelick/reported that the exchange of letters last Novem ber hadapparently no t produced a meeting of the rriihds with the, W hite House on the terms ofreference so there was a prolonged negotiation leadin g to the approval of the summ arymemo. The four-persori Review Teamconsisting of the C hair:. Vice Chair.Commissioner Gorelick, andjthe Executive Directorstudie


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report, in cluding m atters l ike naming particular officials who asked questions. So insteadthe report might refer to a "senior administration official." But in all such casescommissioners need only ask who the person is, and the review team will answer.Commissioner Gorelick added that th e Com mission would receive th e August 6 PDBverbatim during the briefing by the E xecutive D irector reading from th e team's memoan d interlinea ting the SEIB, which the Comm ission has. She and the Executive Directorstated that the text of the A ugust 6 PDB could be recreated; Com missioner Ben-Venistesaid that this should be done in physical form. Commissioner Gorelick stated that th ereport also does not itself list all the other strident threat headlines from th e summer of2001, but the materials that would be provided w ould allow that to be recreated. Sheconcluded by stating that there were no disagreements among the m embe rs of the R eviewTeam as to how the report was drafted.The Chair thanked Com mission er Gorelick and the Exe cutive Director for their hardwork . The V ice Chair stated that he and the Comm ission owed a huge debt of gratitude tothem for their efforts. He added that the White House lawyers had been helpful, butultimately Judge Go nzales was the only one dealing with the Presiden t, wh o b ecameincreasingly involved in this process.Com missioner G orelick suggested that, since the President conveyed on Meet the Pressthat the Chair and Vice had access to all of the PDBs, the Chair and Vice Chair shouldseek such access.The Executive D irector urged th e Commission not to be misled by the amount ofattention given to PDBs by the public, press, and the Commission itself. He added thatthe PDB s were just one tributary in a river of information to the presidents. He discussedsome of the other sources flow ing to top officials in each adm inistration.Com missioner Ben-V eniste asked w ho else would receive this briefing beside theCom mission. The Executive D irector stated that senior staff and designated team leaderswould l ikely have access to the PDB summary, but that th e issue was not resolved in t imefo r the briefing that morning .Commission Lehman asked about the imp act of the recent Newsweek article on thenegotiations. The Vice Chair stated that the article nearly blew the negotiations apart. TheJudge showed th e article to the President, w ho reportedly exploded. The Vice Chairurged the Judge to keep his eye on the future; i t was of mutual be nefit to reachagreement. The Vice Chair convinced the Judge to hold the briefing at the Com mission'soffices; but they just didn't have time to work out the staff access issue.Commissioner Ben-Veniste asked what th e Commission's recourse would be if it wantedmore access. The General Counsel stated that the Commission can do what it wants, butnoted that this is the process the Com mission agreed to pursue. Com missioner G orelicksaid that it wo uld seem inc onsistent with th e agreement with th e Wh ite House for the



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Commission to issue a subpoena if it didn't like th e briefing. The Vice Chair noted thatth e Commission is not precluded from asking fo r more m ater ial on a case-by-case basis.Commissioner Roemer thanked the Review Team for their diligence and hard work. Hedescribed th e process as one of a four-level strainer, whereby information about th e P D B shad been filtered through four levels and eventually reached the Commission. He statedthat he had been in support of a subpoena several months before, and that now he was insupport of a subpoena fo r both th e PDBs and the Review Team's notes. He disagreedwith both th e agreement and its implementa t ion . In his view, all ten Commissionersshould have access to the PDBs.Commissioner Kerrey stated that he needs to get to the point at which he will feelcomfortable with the material. At this point, he didn't feel comfortable with the puzzleapproach. The families are looking for a vote on a subpoena and responding to them isimportant .The Vice Chair suggested that the Commission review the document before they addressthese questions.A t 10:00 a.m., Commissioner Gorelick and the Executive Director presented theclassified PDB report in executive session. The Commission resumed a discussion aboutth e PDB process at approxim ately 12:45 p .m.The General Counsel explained the process of a subpoena and its likelihood of success.He reported that the Com miss ion 's outside lawyers contend that th e Commission has apretty good argument on the PDB issue. However, th e White House, they believe, wouldtake the case all the way to the Supreme Court , thereby preventing the Com mission fromgetting a timely decision. Moreover, outside counsel based their analysis on a situation inwhich implementation of the agreem ent had collapsed. N ow that the W hite House hasimplemented th e agreement to the satisfaction of the Review Team, th e Commission 'sposition in subpoenaing th e PDBs would be weaker . The Vice Chair stated hisassumption that th e White House would fight any subpoena hard. He anticipated that th eWhite House would run out the clock, and let the Commission go out of business.Com missioner Kerrey e xpressed his need to see the or iginal report , adding that theagreement, as implemented, obscures too much. The General Counsel stated that, forbetter or worse, th e Commission delegated th e responsibility to the Review Team.Comm issioner Ben-Veniste expressed his belief that th e Review Team was notempowered to negotiate with th e White House.The Chair stated that reading what Commission Gorelick and the Executive Directorproduced enables the Com mission to do i ts job. Comm issioner Gorton agreed and saidthat he was satisfied w ith th e report . H e outlined four options:

1) File a subpoena for all the PDB s.2) File a subpoena for a few PD Bs.

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C O M M I S S I O N SENSITIVE3) File a subpoena for the Review Team's notes.4) Reply to the Gonzales cover letter.

Commiss ioner Gorton stated his preference fo r Option #4. He added that th e Commiss ionhad seen through the process, but that it raised questions. The Commission should stateprecisely w hat would satisfy it and make the letter public, thereby inviting pressure onth e White House.Commissioner Roemer moved to subpoena th e PDBs. Commissioner Lehman secondedth e mot ion so that he could vote against it . Commissioners agreed to subm it theirarguments in favor or opposition to the motion subsequent to the meeting.

Comm issioner Roemer offered th e following views in support of the motion subsequentto th e meet ing :1) The summaries did show some new information. The Commission should try to

understand th e full texture an d context of the documents.2) If the Com missio n doe s not get mo re complete access, it reduce s its abil ity andcredibility to make tactical and strategic recommendations.3) If the Bush administration continues to assert that there was not warning, accessto the PDBs will enable Commissioners to prove or disprove that assertion. TheComm ission should be able to m ake a judgm ent .4) The C om mission has a solid legal case with a reasonable chance of preva iling.PDB s are not deliberative documents, not an EO P product, and are shared withother officials besides the president.

Com missioner Kerrey offered th e following views in support of the motion subsequent toth e meet ing :1) The value of having al l Commissioner read th e PDBs is that collectively th eCommission is much more likely to take notice of the facts it needs to get the fulland complete accounting the law requires.2) The Commission Review Team, which did work long hours and did superb work,no only was not given "wide la titude" as the White House pro mised , but also w as

give very restrictive instructions on what their report could contain. A s aconsequence, the report was confu sing and incomplete, and does not give allCommissioners what they need to make informed decisions.3) Even in its intentionally confusing state, the report of the PDBs brought back tothe Commission discloses key facts that are enormously important in severalways, an d will affect who the Commission invites as witnesses as well as thedetails of the questions th e Commission will ask. It must be clear to mostCommissioners from a brief reading of the summary that th e Commission willneed to recall some w ho have p reviously testified.4) For these reasons, Comm issioner Kerrey voted to subpoena these docum ents.

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The Vice Chair offered the following views in opposition to the motion subsequent to themeeting:1) What C om missioners Roemer and Kerrey argue for is desirable and a soundway to proceed, the question is , however, how does the Com mission achieveit? The Commission has tried hard to reach that outcom e and has achieved th e

agreement implem ented by the review team.2) The Com mission established a Review Team, including C omm iss ionerGo relick, that reviewed all Presidential Daily Briefs responsive to theCommission 's document requests. The team did a superb job and prepared adetailed report for Co mm issioners. The Comm ission now has a goodunderstanding of information prov ided to the President on al Qaeda and theevents leading to September 11.3) He believes strongly that th e Commission needs to support th e work th eReview Team did . He wants to be on record in support of the work ofCommissioner Gorelick.4) The Com missio n reached an agreement with the W hite Ho use three mo nthsago. Tod ay, the Comm ission completed implementat ion of that agreement .Yo u don't ever get everything you want in an agreement, but the Commissiongo t access to every PDB it asked f or, and the full Commission received areport on nearly 100 of them. The C ommiss ion has gotten the access it needs.5) A subpoena wo uld not advance the Co mm ission 's in terests.

First , th e agreement th e Commission just reached provides it theaccess it needed to fulfill it s mandate, in his j u dg me n t ;

Second, a subpoena would be contrary to that agreement; Third , he is doubtful that a subpoenawhich the White House wouldf ightwill produce any outcome that advances the interests of theCommission during th e life of the C ommiss ion .

Com missioners B en-Veniste , Kerrey, and Roemer voted in favor of the motion. TheChair, Vice Chair, and Com missioners Fielding, Gorton, Lehman, and Thompson votedagainst the motion. Commissioner Gorelick abstained.The motion failed by a vote of 3-6-1.Commiss ioner Gorton suggested that the Com mission send a thoro ugh and sharplyworded letter to the Judg e. The Co mm ission agreed.Extension. The Chair reviewed the history and status of the Commission's request for anextension. The Com mission requested an extension on January 27 of at least 60 days.Bills introd uced in the House and Senate called for a six-month extension. The WhiteHouse came out in support of a two-month extension of the final report 's due date, butSpeaker Hastert had stated his opposition to any extension.Com missioner Fielding noted that th e answer to the extension question lies with th eSpeaker. Commissioner Thompson stated that Hastert w as unl ike ly to support more than



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a two-mon th extension. Com missioner Kerrey expressed his belief that th e Commissionshould not worry about the Speaker. He added that the Commission has created confusionby not requesting a six-month extension. The Vice Chair agreed that there w as confusionon th e Hill as to what the Co mm ission 's position is. He and the Chair supported 60 days,bu t other Commissioners had lobbied for more time. He noted that both positions areconsistent with the motion passed at the last Commission meeting.Commissioner Roemer agreed that Hastert is the key, an d stated that it is imperative thatthe White House communicate to the congressional leadership, including Hastert, what itwants. The Vice Chair reported that Judge Gonzales had told th e Commission not toworry about th e Speaker. N ow that th e White House supports an extension,Commissioner Thompson recommended that th e Com mission call Hastert and ask if itca n count on support for a 60-day extension in the House if the Senate were to pass a billby unanim ous consent. Com missioner Gorton added that th e bill would not be brought upby Senator Frist without unanimous consent.Commissioner Gorelick stated that sh e compared th e Commission schedules with andwithout the extension. She noted that the Commission is not getting substantially moretime for its work from th e extension, and that th e extension only translates into 20addit ional days fo r Commission work . The Exec utive Director noted that th e Commissionhad never publicly acknowledged its intentions to disregard the May 27 deadline.Commissioner Gorelick stated that th e Commission did not ask for the time it neededwhen it agreed to accept a 60-day extension for the report deadline but only a 30-dayextension of its statutory life. She added that she did not fully appreciate at the lastmeeting that the Commission was not intending to seek a true 60-day extension andsuggested that the Commission do so.Commissioner Ben-Veniste was likewise concerned that the revised calendar onlyrestored ten of the 15 previously scheduled hearing days. He stated that th e Commissionhad voted on a 60-day statutory extension while th e White House has proposed a 30-dayextension. Com missioner Roeme r concurred with this assessment. The Vice Chairclarified that the Commission had voted for a 60-day extension of the reporting date andreferred the Commission to the approved minutes and public statement by the Chair andVice Chair. Commissioner Ben-Veniste stated that, notwithstanding the minutes, it washis clear understanding th e vote had been on a 60-day statutory extension fo r both th edate of the report and the life of the Commission. Commissioners Gorton an d Roemerconcurred.The Vice Chair reported that the White House had conveyed its view to congressionalleaders. The White House had spoken to Frist and McConnell, and both agreed to a 60-day extension. M cCain said that he wanted to think about it. Com missioner Gortonconfirmed that this was the case based on his conversations with McConnell.The Vice Chair stated that th e White House opposes a six-month extension because theydo not believe th e Commission can hold th e report between th e t ime it is completed andth e t ime it is re leased .

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The Ch air urged the Com mission to ad opt a practical approach, stating that this was not aquestion of which extension was better or worse, but rather which extension theCommission ca n get. The Chair reported that he was to meet with th e families th efollowing day, and that he will need to explain the Comm ission's position on theextension.The Chair confirmed that th e White House had stated it s objection to extendingCom mission ac tivity past Labor D ay. He stated that the Com mission cannot put anadditional 30 days on the table and expect to reach an agreement with the Preside nt andCongress. He believed that the Com mission should p ursue what it has been offered orrisk receiving no extension at all. The Vice C hair agreed. The Chair urged theCommission to be unified on the extension question. Commissioner Fielding agreed,stating that the C omm ission w ill not improve its situation if is public position on theextension is inconsis tent.Commissioner Ben-Veniste expressed concern about th e pre-publicat ion review process.The Vice Chair suggested that the report be drafted as soon as possible. CommissionFielding agreed. Commissioner Gorelick urged th e Commission to reconsider publishingth e report as a book on July 26 due to time constraints, but rather submit the report forpre-publicat ion review on that date. The Chair stated that it was im portant to have thebook in order to disseminate th e Com miss ion 's work to the American people .Commiss ioner Gorelick proposed that th e Com mission revise it s internal calendar andsubmit the report to the President and Co ngress on July 26. The Cha ir agreed that thiswas an option and extended discussion ensued. Com mission Gorelick added that th eCommission cannot adhere to the calendar based on the PD B experience and othersimilar delays. The Executive Director recommended that th e Commission secure th e"60-30" extension and suggested that th e quest ion of how to revise th e internal schedulewas a separate issue.Commissioner Thompson stated that there were reasons why the White House might nottrust th e Commission if it reversed its position on several agreements such as the PDBsand the extension.The Vice Chair observed that there comes a point in every investigation in which one hasto accept that you won't get everything you would like. The Commission still has astatutory mandate to fulfill, and he believes th e Commission will produce a strong andcredible report. He expressed his desire that the Com missioners state their views in a waythat does not undermine the credibility of the report.The Chair advised that the Commission maintain the following position: We continue toneed and want more time. The Com miss ion would l ike th e extension fo r which it askedan d will accept a 60-day extension of time in which to subm it a report.PO T U S and VP Meetings. The Executive Director reported that th e Commission hadinitiated conversations with the respective staffs of the four principals: Bush, Clinton,



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Cheney, an d Gore. Commissioner Roemer suggested that th e Commission send letters toal l four, requesting that they meet with th e Comm ission privately as well as testifypubl icly . Com missioner B en-V eniste agreed that the Com mission should establish awritten record requesting a private meeting and po li tely invi t ing them to appear at apublic hearing.The Vice Chair stated that written requests made sense to him. He reported that th e Judgehad spoken to the President, an d that, at the time, th e President was not ready to make adecision. The Judge believed that th e President would meet with th e Commission. DavidAddington, Counsel to the Vice President, conveyed that the Vice President would meetwith the Chair, the Vice Chair, and a notetaker.Commissioner Gorelick stated that this arrangement was not tenable. She believed that,given the complexity of the interview, staff needed to attend. The Chair, CommissionerThompson, and Com missioner Gorton agreed.The Commission agreed to send letters to both presidents and vice presidents. The Chairnoted that the Commission wil l have to accept the date provided by their respectiveoffices, and it must be ready for these meetings once a date is chosen.Additional M eetings. The Commission agreed to accept invitations to meet withSecretary Rum sfeld and Director Mueller.Presentations from Teams 2 and 4 were postponed until the February 24 meeting.Commissioner Gorelick commended th e work of both teams an d urged th eCommissioners to review their respective materials.The Chair adjourned the meeting at 3:52 p.m.



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N A T I O N A L C O M M I S S I O N O NT E R R O R I S T A T T A C K S O N T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S

Minutes of the February 10, 2004 MeetingThe Chair called the Commission to order at 9:10 a.m. All Commissioners were inattendance.Minutes. Commissioner Ben-Veniste moved to approve the minutes. The Vice Chairseconded the motion. The minutes were approved.PDBs. As the Commission awaited delivery of the 17-page PDB summary drafted by theCommission Review Team, Commissioner Gorelick described the history of the Team'snegotiations with the White House.Commissioner Gorelick reported that the exchange of letters last November hadapparently not produced a meeting of the minds with the White House on the terms ofreference so there was a prolonged negotiation leading to the approval of the summarymemo. The four-person Review Teamconsisting of the Chair, Vice Chair,Commissioner Gorelick, and the Executive Directorstudied the core group of 24 PDBs.Commissioner Gorelick and the Executive Director reviewed and evaluated about 340additional PD B items. They initially identified 51 from this group as critical to theCommission's investigation.There were discussions about the summaries of the 24 articles in the Core Group thatwere resolved through changes in form that did not affect the substance of the summaries.The White House also disagreed with the Review Team's selection of the 51 items fortransfer to the core group. The Review Team didn't ask for the PDB if the neededinformation was available in the SEIB. The White House supported the transfer of 11,an d then 15, items, but there remained a large gap.With both Commissioner Gorelick and the Executive Director having taken their ownsets of reference notes for all of the articles, they also drafted a memo arguing for thetransfer of the 51, making separate arguments fo r each. Efforts to resolve the controversywere unsuccessful. Finally the problem was resolved by changing the approach. Ratherthan transferring 51 articles to the core group and then doing an itemized summary, theteam stepped back and tried to do a narrative overview of the flow of critical informationthrough the PDB for the entire universe of documents, including individual summaries ofsome articles and references to scores of others. That narrative could refer to informationthat was also circulated in the National Intelligence Daily or its successor, the SeniorExecutive Intelligence Brief.The White House finally and reluctantly agreed to accept this approach. It refused toincorporate NID/SEIB information directly in a memo summarizing PDBs. The reviewteam therefore prepared a 'SEIB Companion,' cued to the PDB report and compilinginformation to supplement it. There were other arguments about the form of the PDB



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COMMISSION SENSITIVEreport, including m atters like naming particular officials who asked questions. So insteadthe report might refer to a "senior administration official." But in all such casescommissioners need only ask who the person is, and the review team will answer.Comm issioner Gorelick added that the Com mission would receive the August 6 PDBverbatim during the briefing by the Executive Director reading from the team's memoand interlineating the SEIB, which the C omm ission has. She and the Executive Directorstated that the text of the August 6 PDB could be recreated; Com missioner Ben-Venistesaid that this should be done in physical form. Com missioner Gorelick stated that thereport also does not itself list all the other strident threat headlines from the summer of2001, but the m aterials that would be provided would allow that to be recreated. Sheconcluded by stating that there w ere no disagreements am ong the mem bers of the ReviewTeam as to how the report was drafted.The Chair thanked Com missioner Gorelick and the Executive Director for their hardwork. Th e Vice Chair stated that he and the Comm ission owed a huge debt of gratitude tothem fo r their efforts. He added that the W hite House lawyers had been helpful, bu tultimately Judge Gonzales was the only one dealing with the President, who becameincreasingly involved in this process.Commissioner Gorelick suggested that, since the President conveyed onMeet thePressthat the Chair and Vice had access to all of the PDBs, the Chair and Vice Chair shouldseek such access.The Execu tive Director urged the Com mission not to be misled by the amou nt ofattention given to PDBs by the public, press, and the Commission itself. He added thatthe PDBs were just one tributary in a river of information to the presidents. He discussedsome of the other sources flowing to top officials in each administration.Comm issioner Ben-Veniste asked who else would receive this briefing beside theCommission. The Executive Director stated that senior staff and designated team leaderswould likely have access to the PD B sum mary, but that the issue was not resolved in timefor the briefing that morning.Commission Lehman asked about the impact of the recent Newsweek article on thenegotiations. The Vice Chair stated that the article nearly blew the negotiations apart. TheJudge showed the article to the President, who reportedly exploded. The Vice Chairurged the Judge to keep his eye on the future; it was of mutual benefit to reachagreement. The Vice C hair convinced the Judge to hold the briefing at the Commission'soffices; but they just didn't have time to work out the staff access issue.Com missioner Ben-Veniste asked what the Commission's recourse wou ld be if it wan tedmore access. The General Counsel stated that the Com mission can do what it wants, butnoted that this is the process the Com mission agreed to pursue. Com missioner Gorelicksaid that it would seem inconsistent with the agreement with the White House for the



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Commission to issue a subpoena if it didn't like thebriefing. The Vice Chair noted thatthe Commission is not precluded from asking for more material on a case-by-case basis.Commissioner Roemer thanked the Review Team for their diligence and hard work. Hedescribed the process as one of a four-level strainer, whereby information about the PDBshad been filtered through four levels and eventually reached the Commission. He statedthat he had been in support of a subpoena several months before, and that now he was insupport of a subpoena for both the PDBs and the Review Team's notes. He disagreedwith both the agreement and its implementation. In his view, all ten Commissionersshould have access to the PDBs.Commissioner Kerrey stated that he needs to get to the point at which he will feelcomfortable with the material. At this point, he didn't feel comfortable with the puzzleapproach. The families are looking for a vote on a subpoena and responding to them isimportant.The Vice Chair suggested that the Commission review the document before they addressthese questions.At 10:00 a.m., Commissioner Gorelick and the Executive Director presented theclassified PDB report in executive session. The Commission resumed a discussion aboutthe PDB process at approximately 12:45 p.m.The General Counsel explained the process of a subpoena and its likelihood of success.He reported that the Commission's outside lawyers contend that the Commission has apretty good argument on the PDB issue. However, the White House, they believe, wouldtake the case all the way to the Supreme Court, thereby preventing the Commission fromgetting a timely decision. Moreover, outside counsel based their analysis on a situation inwhich implementation of the agreement had collapsed. Now that the White House hasimplemented the agreement to the satisfaction of the Review Team, the Commission'sposition in subpoenaing the PDBs would be weaker. The Vice Chair stated hisassumption that the White House would fight any subpoena hard. He anticipated that theWhite House would run out the clock, and let the Commission go out of business.Commissioner Kerrey expressed his need to see the original report, adding that theagreement, as implemented, obscures too much. The General Counsel stated that, forbetter or worse, the Commission delegated the responsibility to the Review Team.Commissioner Ben-Veniste expressed his belief that the Review Team was notempowered to negotiate with the White House.The Chair stated that reading what Commission Gorelick and the Executive Directorproduced enables the Commission to do its job. Commissioner Gorton agreed and saidthat he was satisfied with the report. He outlined four options:

1) File a subpoena for all the PDBs.2) File a subpoena for a few PDBs.



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3) File a subpoena for the Review Team's notes.4) Reply to the Gonzales cover letter.

Commissioner Gorton stated his preference for Option #4. He added that the Commissionhad seen through the process, but that it raised questions. The Commission should stateprecisely what would satisfy it and make the letter public, thereby inviting pressure onthe White House.Commissioner Roemer moved to subpoena the PDBs. Commissioner Lehman secondedthe motion so that he could vote against it. Commissioners agreed to submit theirarguments in favor or opposition to the motion subsequent to the meeting.

Commissioner Roemer offered the following views in support of the motion subsequentto the meeting:

1) The summaries did show some new information. The Commission should try tounderstand the full texture and context of the documents.2) If the Commission does not get more complete access, it reduces its ability andcredibility to make tactical and strategic recommendations.

3) If the Bush administration continues to assert that there was not warning, accessto the PDBs will enable Commissioners to prove or disprove that assertion. TheCommission should be able to make a judgment.

4) The Commission has a solid legal case with a reasonable chance of prevailing.PDBs are not deliberative documents, not an EOF product, and are shared withother officials besides the president.

Commissioner Kerrey offered the following views in support of the motion subsequent tothe meeting:1) The value of having all Commissioner read the PDBs is that collectively the

Commission is much more likely to take notice of the facts it needs to get the fulland complete accounting the law requires.2) The Commission Review Team, which did work long hours and did superb work,no only was not given "wide latitude" as the White House promised, but also was

give very restrictive instructions on what their report could contain. As aconsequence, the report was confusing and incomplete, and does not give allCommissioners what they need to make informed decisions.

3) Even in its intentionally confusing state, the report of the PDBs brought back tothe Commission discloses key facts that are enormously important in severalways, and will affect who the Commission invites as witnesses as well as thedetails of the questions the Commission will ask. It must be clear to mostCommissioners from a brief reading of the summary that the Commission willneed to recall some who have previously testified.

4) For these reasons, Commissioner Kerrey voted to subpoena these documents.



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The Vice Chair offered the following views in opposition to the motion subsequent to themeeting:

1) What Commissioners Roemer and Kerrey argue for is desirable and a soundway to proceed, the question is, however, how does the Commission achieveit? The Commission has tried hard to reach that outcome and has achieved theagreement implemented by the review team.2) The Commission established a Review Team, including CommissionerGorelick, that reviewed all Presidential Daily Briefs responsive to theCommission's document requests. The team did a superb job and prepared adetailed report for Commissioners. The Commission now has a goodunderstanding of information provided to the President on al Qaeda and theevents leading to September 11.

3) He believes strongly that the Commission needs to support the work theReview Team did. He wants to be on record in support of the work ofCommissioner Gorelick.4) The Commission reached an agreement with the White House three monthsago. Today, the Commission completed implementation of that agreement.You don't ever get everything you want in an agreement, but the Commissiongot access to every PDB it asked for, and the full Commission received areport on nearly 100 of them. The Commission has gotten the access it needs.

5) A subpoena would not advance the Commission's interests. First, theagreement the Commission just reached provides it the

access it needed to fulfill its mandate, in his judgment; Second, a subpoena would be contrary to that agreement; Third, he is doubtful that a subpoenawhich theWhite House would

fightwill produce any outcome that advances the interests of theCommission during the life of the Commission.

Commissioners Ben-Veniste, Kerrey, and Roemer voted in favor of the motion. TheChair, Vice Chair, and Commissioners Fielding, Gorton, Lehman, and Thompson votedagainst the motion. Commissioner Gorelick abstained.The motion failed by a vote of 3-6-1.Commissioner Gorton suggested that the Commission send a thorough and sharplyworded letter to the Judge. The Commission agreed.Extension. The Chair reviewed the history and status of the Commission's request for anextension. The Commission requested an extension on January 27 of at least 60 days.Bills introduced in the House and Senate called for a six-month extension. The WhiteHouse came out in support of a two-month extension of the final report's due date, butSpeaker Hastert had stated his opposition to any extension.Commissioner Fielding noted that the answer to the extension question lies with theSpeaker. Commissioner Thompson stated that Hastert was unlikely to support more than



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COMMISSION SENSITIVEa two-month extension. Commissioner Kerrey expressed his belief that the Commissionshould not w orry about the Speaker. He added that the Com mission has created confusionby not requesting a six-month extension. The Vice Chair agreed that there was confusionon the Hill as to what the Comm ission's position is. He and the Chair supported 60 days,but other Commissioners had lobbied for more time. He noted that both positions areconsistent with the motion passed at the last C omm ission meeting.Com missioner Roem er agreed that Hastert is the key, and stated that it is imperative thatthe Wh ite Hou se comm unicate to the congressional leadership, including H astert, what itwants. The V ice C hair reported that Judge Gonzales had told the Com mission not toworry about the S peaker. Now that the White House supports an extension,Comm issioner T hompson recommended that the Com mission call Hastert and ask if itcan count on support for a 60-day extension in the House if the S enate were to pass a billby unanimous consent. Commissioner Gorton added that the bill would not be brought upby Senator Frist witho ut unan imou s consent.Com missioner Gorelick stated that she compared the Com mission schedules w ith andwithout the extension. She noted that the Com mission is not getting substantially moretime for its work from the extension, and that the extension only translates into 20additional days for Comm ission wo rk. The Executive Director noted that the C omm issionhad never pu blicly acknowledged its intentions to disregard the M ay 27 deadline.Com missioner Gorelick stated that the Commission did not ask for the time it neededwhen it agreed to accept a 60-day extension for the report deadline but only a 30-dayextension of its statutory life. She added that she did not fully appreciate at the lastmeeting that the Com mission was not intending to seek a true 60-day extension andsuggested that the C omm ission do so.Commissioner Ben-Veniste was likewise concerned that the revised calendar onlyrestored ten of the 15previously scheduled hearing days. He stated tha t the Commissionhad voted on a 60-day statutory extension while the Wh ite House has proposed a 30-dayextension. C omm issioner Roemer concurred with this assessment. The Vice Chairclarified that the Commission had voted for a 60-day extension of the reporting date andreferred the Commission to the approved minutes and public statement by the Chair andVice C hair. Com missioner Ben-Veniste stated that, notwithstanding the minutes, it washis clear unde rstanding the vote had been o n a 60-day statutory extension for both thedate of the report and the life of the Commission. Comm issioners G orton and Roemerconcurred.The Vice Chair reported that the W hite House had conveyed its view to congressionalleaders. The White House had spoken to Frist and McConnell, and both agreed to a 60-day extension. M cCain said that he wanted to think about it. Comm issioner Gortonconfirmed that this was the case based on his conversations with McConnell.The Vice C hair stated that the W hite House opposes a six-month extension because th eydo not believe the Com mission can hold the report between the time it is comp leted andthe time it is released.



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The Chair urged the Commission to adopt a practical approach, stating that this was not aquestion of which extension was better or worse, but rather which extension theCommission can get. The Chair reported that he was to meet with the families thefollowing day, and that he will need to explain the Commission's position on theextension.The Chair confirmed that the White House had stated its objection to extendingCommission activity past Labor Day. He stated that the Commission cannot put anadditional 30 days on the table and expect to reach an agreement with the President andCongress. He believed that the Commission should pursue what it has been offered orrisk receiving no extension at all. The Vice Chair agreed. The Chair urged theCommission to be unified on the extension question. Commissioner Fielding agreed,stating that the Commission will not improve its situation if is public position on theextension is inconsistent.Commissioner Ben-Veniste expressed concern about the pre-publication review process.The Vice Chair suggested that the report be drafted as soon as possible. CommissionFielding agreed. Commissioner Gorelick urged the Commission to reconsider publishingthe report as a book on July 26 due to time constraints, but rather submit the report forpre-publication review on that date. The Chair stated that it was important to have thebook in order to disseminate the Commission's work to the American people.Commissioner Gorelick proposed that the Commission revise its internal calendar andsubmit the report to the President and Congress on July 26. The Chair agreed that thiswas an option and extended discussion ensued. Commission Gorelick added that theCommission cannot adhere to the calendar based on the PDB experience and othersimilar delays. The Executive Director recommended that the Commission secure the"60-30" extension and suggested that the question of how to revise the internal schedulewas a separate issue.Commissioner Thompson stated that there were reasons why the White House might nottrust the Commission if it reversed its position on several agreements such as the PDBsand the extension.The Vice Chair observed that there comes a point in every investigation in which one hasto accept that you won't get everything you would like. The Commission still has astatutory mandate to fulfill, and he believes the Commission will produce a strong andcredible report. He expressed his desire that the Commissioners state their views in a waythat does not undermine the credibility of the report.The Chair advised that the Commission maintain the following position: We continue toneed and want more time. The Commission would like the extension for which it askedand will accept a 60-day extension of time in which to submit a report.POTUS and VP Meetings. The Executive Director reported that the Commission hadinitiated conversations with the respective staffs of the four principals: Bush, Clinton,



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COMMISSION SENSITIVECheney, and Gore. Comm issioner Roemer suggested that the Commission send letters toall four, requesting that they meet with the Commission privately as well as testifypublicly. Commissioner Ben-Veniste agreed that the C omm ission should establish awritten record requesting a private meeting and politely inviting them to appear at apublic hearing.The Vice C hair stated that written requests made sense to him. He reported that the Judgehad spoken to the President, and that, at the time, the President was not ready to make adecision. The Judge believed that the President would meet with the Commission. DavidAddington, Counsel to the Vice President, conveyed that the Vice President would meetwith the Chair, the Vice Chair, and a notetaker.Commissioner Gorelick stated that this arrangem ent was not tenable. She believed that,given the complexity of the interview, staff needed to attend. The Chair, CommissionerThompson, and Com missioner Gorton agreed.The Commission agreed to send letters to both presidents and vice presidents. The Chairnoted that the Commission will have to accept the date provided by their respectiveoffices, and it must be ready for these meetings once a date is chosen.Additional Meetings. The Commission agreed to accept invitations to meet withSecretary Rumsfeld and Director M ueller.Presentations from Teams 2 and 4 were postponed until the February 24 meeting.Comm issioner Gorelick com mended the work of both teams and urged theCommissioners to review their respective materials.The Chair adjourned the meeting at 3:52 p.m.


Documents

FO B4 Commission Meeting 3-2-04 Fdr- Minutes of the February 10 2004 Meeting (Redacted on Top- Unredacted Tab 1) 157