FMSMUN 9

SECURITY COUNCIL

THE SITUATION IN HAITI

Author: Brian D. Sutliff

Introduction

The most important security situation, at least for the UN Security Council, in the

Caribbean remains the instability and profound lack of development in Haiti. Haiti

remains the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere and has suffered from political

violence and instability for many decades; according to recent statistics, 76% of all

Haitians live on less than $2 USD per day and Haiti ranked 163 out of 188 states in the

UN Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) for 2014.1

Elements of gradual progress that were previously visible have been reversed in recent

months, particularly as a result of the January 12, 2010 earthquake that devastated Port-

au-Prince and its aftermath; the destruction and misery of Hurricane Matthew in early

October 2016 have tragically reinforced many of the challenges and problems

confronting Haiti.2 In the most recent ranking of Fragile States by Foreign Policy and the

Fund for Peace, Haiti was ranked as the 10th most politically fragile country in the world.3

Haiti has, however, been severely affected by escalating food and fuel prices and Interim

President Jocelerme Privert’s government, as well as his eventual successor’s

government, must work closely with the international community, donor nations, and

international financial institutions (IFIs) to address these key issues4; with the previously

scheduled October 2015 presidential election postponed for a full year after allegations of

widespread fraud, Haitians voted in the aftermath of Hurricane Matthew.5 With the

devastating January 12, 2010 earthquake that destroyed much of the capital Port-au-

Prince and killed over 230,000 people, Haiti’s myriad problems were both multiplied and

exacerbated. The subsequent cholera outbreak caused by UN peacekeepers from Nepal,

and the legal and political wrangling over responsibility for the cholera outbreak, only

compounded the disasters afflicting Haiti and severely damaged the UN’s credibility and

1 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “Key to HDI countries and ranks” 2015. Found at:

http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ranking.pdf 2 Azam Ahmed, “After Hurricane, Haiti Confronts Scars From 2010 Earthquake Recovery” New York

Times October 21, 2016. 3 Foreign Policy and the Fund for Peace, “The Fragile States Index 2016” 2016. The full index may be

found at: http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/ 4 Colum Lynch, “Growing Food Crisis Strains UN” The Washington Post May 25, 2008. 5 BBC, “Haiti starts counting votes in long delayed election” November 21, 2016.

authority in Haiti. It is critical that the Security Council along with the international

community, Haitian civil society, and Haitians living abroad capitalize on the

aforementioned recent progress to devise and implement comprehensive and lasting

solutions to Haiti’s security and development problems.

Background

Haiti’s recent history is replete with episodes of extreme violence and

considerable foreign intervention. As France’s cornerstone colony in the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries, Haiti provided France with tremendous revenues from its sugar

plantations, worked overwhelmingly by slaves imported from Africa. After a successful

slave rebellion, Haiti declared its independence in 1804 and established itself as the

second independent country in the Western Hemisphere. Relations between the newly

emergent Haiti and its hemispheric neighbors have been consistently volatile, and far too

often, violent. Haiti invaded its immediate neighbor, the Dominican Republic, with

whom it shares the island of Hispaniola several times and the Dominican Republic’s

security forces have massacred large numbers of Haitians seeking to cross into the

Dominican Republic for work, particularly during the reign of the Dominican dictator,

Rafael Leonidas Trujillo.

Haiti’s relationship with the United States has been problematic as well. The US

refused to recognize Haiti as an independent country until 1862 and has invaded and

occupied Haiti several times, including from 1915-1934. The US invasion and

subsequent occupation of Haiti from 1915-1934 was motivated by US security concerns

about German naval influence in the Caribbean during World War I, demands by US

banks and firms for repayment of debts and protection of commercial interests, and

concerns about political instability in Haiti that could affect the Dominican Republic,

Cuba, and the recently acquired US territory of Puerto Rico.

Haiti’s domestic politics have been quite volatile, too. For the past 50 years, the

dominant political figures in Haiti have been François Duvalier, the notorious “Papa

Doc”, his son Jean-Claude Duvalier, “Baby Doc”, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, Rene Préval,

and most recently, entertainer turned president Michel Martelly. The oppression of the

Papa Doc era was exemplified by his use of the terrifying security forces known as the

Tonton Macoutes. The brutality of these oppressive security forces internally created

large numbers of refugees and also delayed the creation of effective civil society

institutions and the implementation of the rule of law. These institutions remain weak and

only partially developed. As a result, corruption is deeply entrenched within Haitian

society, including within the Haitian National Police (HNP). In 2007, Haiti ranked tied

for 158th out of 167 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception

Index (CPI), meaning it was ranked as the 9th worst country in the world for how deeply

corruption is already perceived to be embedded.6

6 Transparency International, “Corruption Perception Index 2015” 2015. Found at:

http://www.transparency.org/cpi2015

Jean-Bertrand Aristide and Lavalas

Throughout the 29 years of the Duvalier family reign, the Duvalier family

counted on the support of the Haitian elite, the military, foreign allies, including the

United States and France, and at least the tacit support of the Catholic Church. While

many priests and nuns worked with the poor and vulnerable in Haiti throughout this time,

the Church itself rarely criticized the regime openly; one crucial exception to this was

when the Pope excommunicated Papa Doc for appointing his own chosen priests in

Haiti.7 By the early 1980s, however, a new generation of priests, steeped in liberation

theology, began to openly criticize the Duvalier regime and call for mass demonstrations

against the government and the Tonton Macoutes. Predictably, the government responded

with further repression but the demonstrations and strikes continued. Foreign sponsors of

the regime also tired of the constant repression and in February 1986 Jean-Claude

Duvalier left Haiti with his family to live in a luxurious villa in the south of France.

While the economic elites and the military sought to control the transition from the

Duvalier era, Haiti’s first sustained mass participatory political movement since the

rebellion against France pushed for more profound change beyond merely the expulsion

of the Duvalier family. Despite considerable political violence and attempts at

intimidation by paramilitaries, Tonton Macoute agents, and supporters of the exiled

Duvalier family, the most popular of the liberation theology priests, Jean-Bertrand

Aristide, won a two thirds majority in the 1990 elections.

Aristide’s election suggested the beginning of a new and better era in Haitian

politics for many of Haiti’s poorer citizens, especially from slums such as Cité Soleil in

Port-au-Prince, but his first administration was overthrown in a violent coup after only 7

months. Led by Raoul Cédras and Michel François, “at least 300 people were killed in

the first night of the coup, probably many more; the Washington Post reported that 250

people died in Cité Soleil alone.”8 The military junta created by Cédras, François, and

Toto Constant would brutalize Haiti for the next 3 years, killing at least 3,000 of

Aristide’s Lavalas supporters as well as imprisoning and torturing thousands more. The

United States and the Organization of American States (OAS) imposed an embargo

against the regime but enforcement of that embargo was haphazard. As the violence

drove thousands of Haitians to flee, frequently headed for the Bahamas and the United

States, the US Coast Guard began intercepting and returning Haitians to Haiti, causing a

number of international jurists to argue that the US was guilty of refoulement, the illegal

return of refugees to a country where they faced imminent danger. After the UN and the

OAS sponsored the 1993 Governor’s Island Agreement, the Haitian military junta

continued its brutal practices until a US-led peacekeeping mission was sent to Haiti in

October 1994.9 Aristide was restored to power at the end of 1994 but he had had to agree

to conclude his term in 1995, notwithstanding his 3 years of exile as a result of the 1991

coup.

7 The excommunication would be lifted in 1966. 8 Peter Hallward, Damning the Flood: Haiti, Aristide, and the Politics of Containment Verso New York

2007 p. 40. 9 The UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was established by Security resolution 940 (S/RES/940) of July 31,

1994.

Aristide’s short tenure as president of Haiti did not mean that his popularity

waned, however. His political ally and initial Prime Minister, Rene Préval, won the 1995

presidential elections with 88% of the vote; Aristide’s departure in favor of his then ally

and friend marked the first peaceful electoral transition of power in Haitian politics.

Aristide would break with Préval over disagreements regarding a new International

Monetary Fund (IMF) structural adjustment plan and his political allies would achieve a

parliamentary majority in the 2000 elections. Aristide himself would be reelected

president the following year, although many of the elections were boycotted by

opposition parties. Before the full results were announced, international observers,

including a contingent from the Organization of American States (OAS), declared the

2000 elections as the “best” in Haiti’s history.10 Within a few weeks of the announcement

of the results, the US, France, and domestic Haitian and international organizations

opposed to Aristide’s government denounced the elections as deeply flawed and

characterized by massive fraud and irregularities. As Haiti became increasingly polarized,

Aristide found himself relying more on political supporters from Cité Soleil, some of

whom maintained close ties to street gangs. These Aristide supporters would eventually

be known as the chimeres, or ghosts, and Haiti would be wracked by violence between

former Duvalierists, ex-Tonton Macoutes, and supporters of Cédras, including their allies

in the military and the police as well as in commerce and politics, and Aristide’s

supporters and the chimeres.

Aristide’s international standing would decline precipitously in the early 2000’s,

particularly incurring the wrath of the US and France. Peter Hallward notes that “Haiti’s

profound dependency on foreign assistance gives its donors massive if not irresistible

leverage.”11 Aristide’s government would face chronic budget crises as a result of the

freezing of international aid, particularly by the US Agency for International

Development (USAID) and the IMF. Aristide and his Lavalas allies would also confront

internal opposition from former military and Tonton Macoute leaders, including the

notorious Guy Philippe. In February 2004, Aristide would again flee Haiti in advance of

US and UN peacekeepers, this time going into exile in the Central African Republic and

ultimately onto South Africa. Aristide has maintained that the United States government

forced him to leave Haiti.12 The UN would then create its latest Haitian peacekeeping

mission, the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), with Security Council

resolution 1542 (S/RES/1542). Préval would be reelected president in 2006 but political

instability and violence would continue. In January and February 2007, MINUSTAH

peacekeepers would begin patrolling Cité Soleil in an attempt to stem the flow of both

drugs and illegal weapons.13 MINUSTAH’s more vigorous patrols of Cité Soleil have

produced positive results as gang violence has declined in recent years. This progress is

certainly in danger of being undone by the damage done to the Haitian economy and

political arena by the recent increases in food and fuel prices. The decline in gang

10 Henry Carey, “Not Perfect, But Improving” Miami Herald June 12, 2000. 11 Peter Hallward, Damning the Flood 2007 p. 82. 12 BBC News, “Aristide: US forced me to leave” March 2, 2004. 13 BBC News, “UN soldiers move into Haiti slum” January 25, 2007.

violence may also be reversed by the escapes of many gang members as Haiti’s prisons

were severely damaged in the January 2010 earthquake.14

MINUSTAH

When the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) deployed in Port-au-

Prince in 2004, it was certainly unclear as to how long the mission would last.

Peacekeeping missions were originally intended to be temporary measures but many of

them have extended for decades. The previous UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) lasted only

3 years and the initial hopes were that MINUSTAH would not need to be deployed for an

extended time. MINUSTAH has already lasted longer than UNMIH and the current

thinking is that it may well be needed through the next presidential election in 2011; in

October 2009, the Security Council extended MINUSTAH’s mandate through October

15, 2010 and all indications point to a further extension.15 The peacekeepers and police

officers in MINUSTAH are increasingly being called upon to play multiple roles,

including creating and training an effective Haitian National Police (HNP), reducing

violence within local communities such as Cité Soleil, working with the UN

Development Programme (UNDP) to create a weapons registry system, improving the

human rights situation for prisoners, improving the status and treatment of women and

children, and providing Haiti’s volatile political actors enough breathing space to

negotiate without resorting to the use of violence and intimidation. As was mentioned

before, even the best efforts of MINUSTAH’s dedicated men and women may not be

enough if poverty, unemployment, and food security issues remain unresolved. “The

consolidation of stability in Haiti will require – in parallel to the peacekeeping efforts

under way – some measurable advances with regard to socioeconomic concerns. The

close link between security and development was particularly evident in the context of

the rising public discontent at the high cost of living.”16

Violence between the various militias, gangs, and the UN peacekeepers in Haiti

has created a tense environment at times, particularly given that civilians and

peacekeepers have been killed during these exchanges.17 While MINUSTAH’s efforts in

conjunction with the Haitian governing authorities, including the Haitian National Police

(HNP), have been focused on “urban gangs, armed groups and self-defense groups in the

capital and other big city slums,” a serious concern is that “less attention has been given

to ex-military outside Port-au-Prince who have not retained large, organized structures.

Armed groups have recently emerged as destabilizing factors, however, especially

following Préval’s speech on corruption.”18 “Violence will not be definitively reduced

until urban youths have jobs that are more attractive than gang money.”19

Comprehensively addressing the sources of violence, criminal and political, in Haiti is an

essential first step in the process of political reconciliation and sustainable development.

14 Mark Doyle, “Haiti jail reveals chaos behind quake breakout” BBC News March 17, 2010. 15 S/RES/1892 October 13, 2009. 16 Ban Ki-moon, S/2008/202 March 26, 2008 p. 11. 17 BBC News, “UN peacekeepers killed in Haiti” March 21, 2005. 18 ICG, “Consolidating Stability in Haiti” July 18, 2007 p. 10. 19 ICG, “Consolidating Stability in Haiti” July 18, 2007 p. 12.

MINUSTAH has also been actively engaged with the Haitian authorities and the

international community, including the Caribbean Community and Common Market

(CARICOM), to improve regional security efforts aimed at preventing drug trafficking as

well as improving the administration of justice within Haiti itself. The ICG noted that

“the process of consolidating stability also depends on the perception that the government

is reducing impunity and strengthening the rule of law through prison and justice

reform.”20

MINUSTAH’s ultimate success will depend upon its ability to consolidate

security gains, including accelerating disarmament efforts. Secretary-General Ban Ki-

moon and the Security Council, in consultation with President Privert and the Haitian

National Police, are emphasizing community violence reduction efforts in coordination

with the National Commission on Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration.21

MINUSTAH’s personnel must also improve its own conduct. Allegations of serious

misconduct, including sexual assault and rape, by MINUSTAH peacekeepers and police

officers have compromised MINUSTAH’s overall effectiveness at times. In 2007, the

Office of Internal Oversight Services ordered the repatriation of 124 MINUSTAH

peacekeepers for disciplinary issues, with 111 of those repatriated peacekeepers coming

from Sri Lanka. With 8 of the current 15 Security Council members contributing to

MINUSTAH, the Security Council has a direct interest in improving the performance of

MINUSTAH personnel; negative headlines about soldiers and police officers engaging in

misconduct on UN peacekeeping missions can prove rather embarrassing in world

capitals. Demands for the removal of MINUSTAH staff, such as occurred in Les Cayes

and other sites of rioting and unrest in April 200822, will only increase if food and fuel

price increases as well as misconduct by peacekeepers continue. MINUSTAH’s

effectiveness is also being compromised by the slow pace of contributions from member

states23 as well as the rapidly escalating costs of fuel.

The Earthquake and its Aftermath

January 12, 2010 is a day that will forever haunt the historical memories of

Haitians. Port-au-Prince and other major urban areas in Haiti were torn asunder by a 7.0

magnitude earthquake and the misery for hundreds of thousands of ordinary Haitians has

not been significantly redressed in the more than 6 months since the earthquake struck. In

the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon named

former US President Bill Clinton as the UN Special Envoy to Haiti in the hopes that Mr.

Clinton’s visibility and diplomatic connections and experience would bolster ongoing

relief efforts. The UN System, Haiti’s neighbors, especially the Dominican Republic, the

United States, Canada, and the European Union (EU) responded swiftly with shipments

of emergency humanitarian relief as well as financial commitments to improve Haiti’s

ability to respond to this emergency. In March 2010, international donors committed

20 ICG, “Consolidating Stability in Haiti” July 18, 2007 p. 28. 21 Ban Ki-moon, S/2008/202 March 26, 2008 p. 5. 22 Reed Lindsay, “Haiti on the ‘Death Plan’” The Nation May 15, 2008. 23 As of November 30, 2007, outstanding contributions to MINUSTAH for the 2007-08 funding cycle

totaled $418.8 million USD out of an overall budget of $535.4 million USD. S/2008/202 March 26, 2008.

nearly $10 billion USD for Haitian relief and reconstruction and in July 2010 the

International Monetary Fund (IMF) canceled Haiti’s $268 million USD debt as well as to

lend Haiti an additional $60 million USD.24 While these pledges of financial assistance

and debt relief were welcomed, Haiti’s needs are profound and many Haitian and

international observers worry about donor fatigue setting in, particularly if the pace of

reconstruction remains slow.

MINUSTAH’s effectiveness was, for at least several months, severely

compromised by the devastating January 12 earthquake that killed 101 UN personnel, the

Special Representative and Deputy Special Representative to the Secretary-General, and

destroyed MINUSTAH headquarters.25 Even though subsequent Security Council

resolutions have authorized an increased contingent of police personnel, the demands for

humanitarian relief and security have mounted in the 6 months since the earthquake

struck. The devastation of wide swathes of Port-au-Prince and the deaths of

approximately one quarter of all of Haiti’s civil servants has added to the burdens

imposed on MINUSTAH and related UN agencies and bodies. Imogen Wall, a UN aid

coordinator, noted in July 2010 that “The UN has had to provide basic desks and

computers to help the government function again.”26 Six months after the earthquake,

progress in clearing rubble, rebuilding destroyed areas and buildings, and returning

nearly 1.5 million displaced people to their homes remains stalled.27 On June 18, 2010,

MINUSTAH and Haitian National Police (HNP) officers arrested 30 people amidst

reports of assault and sexual violence in displaced persons’ camps in Port-au-Prince.28 If

conditions in the displaced persons’ camps are not rapidly improved, more outbreaks of

violence will become increasingly likely.

Haitian politics are often colorful and the November 2010 presidential election

was no exception. The international media has frequently chosen to focus on issues

related to celebrity rather than serious policy questions, particularly the candidacy of

former Fugees singer Wyclef Jean; Wyclef Jean was ultimately ruled ineligible for the

Haitian presidency but a local singer and celebrity, Michel “Sweet Mickey” Martelly,

would be elected and would take office in May 201l. The election of 2010/2011 occurred

within highly disruptive circumstances and Martelly’s term in office would certainly

feature additional instances of political strife and tension. More critically, these elections

were frequently portrayed as vital for the success of Haitian reconstruction efforts. Nick

Caistor recently asserted that “donors have been reluctant to disburse the $5.3bn (3.2bn)

pledged to help relief and reconstruction efforts in Haiti until President Rene Preval has

24 International Monetary Fund (IMF), “IMF Executive Board Cancels Haiti’s Debt and Approves New

Three-Year Program to Support Reconstruction and Economic Growth” Press Release No. 10/299 July 21,

2010.

25 Ban Ki-moon, “Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti”

S/2010/200 April 22, 2010 p. 2. 26 Mark Doyle, “Quake-stricken Haiti bears scars six months on” BBC News July 12, 2010. 27 Deborah Sontag, “In Haiti, the Displaced Are Left Clinging to the Edge” New York Times

July 10, 2010. 28 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Crisiswatch” July 1, 2010.

left office.”29 MINUSTAH and its domestic and international partners assisted Haiti’s

electoral officials, particularly in light of the fact that nearly one fifth of Haiti’s election

workers and officials were killed in the January 12, 2010 earthquake.

The Haitian Diaspora and its effects in the Caribbean and North America

Approximately one quarter of all Haitians live abroad, with the largest numbers

settling in the United States. Haitians have typically migrated abroad seeking both

economic advancement and personal security. During the dictatorships of François and

Jean-Claude Duvalier as well as the military junta led by Raoul Cédras from 1991-94,

large numbers of Haitians fled to avoid political repression. Haitian migration to the

Bahamas, Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, France, and the United States has

created considerable political tensions, surfacing directly in the 1994 mid-term election

season in the United States and serving as a continuing source of tension in the Bahamas

and the Dominican Republic. Regardless of the legal status of Haitian migrants, they

have frequently been the targets of discrimination and racism, especially those seeking

employment in low skill industries, agriculture, and the informal sector. “Discrimination

against the Haitian community has attracted the attention of local and international civil

society and the international community.”30 As the international community and various

non-governmental organizations (NGOs) investigate the discrimination and violence

committed against Haitian immigrants and refugees, these same Haitian immigrants and

refugees contribute approximately 35% of Haiti’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP)

through the remittances they send back to Haiti.31

The UN System and Haiti

MINUSTAH is also responsible for coordinating with other UN agencies and

regional organizations. The list of UN agencies currently operating in Haiti include:

UNDP, the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), the UN Division for the

Advancement of Women, the UN Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN Educational,

Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF),

the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Program (WFP), and the

World Health Organization (WHO). Regional organizations that are working in Haiti,

and in conjunction with the UN System agencies and MINUSTAH, include the

Organization of American States (OAS), the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO),

the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Inter-American Development

Bank (IABD).

While the work of these agencies is generally well-regarded in Haiti, the efforts of

international financial institutions (IFIs), including the International Monetary Fund

(IMF), have been far more controversial, requiring as they do the elimination of tariffs

29 Nick Caistor, “Crowded race for Haiti presidency” BBC News August 8, 2010. 30 International Crisis Group (ICG), “Peacebuilding in Haiti: Including Haitians from Abroad”

December 14, 2007 p. 7. 31 ICG, “Peacebuilding in Haiti: Including Haitians from Abroad” December 14, 2007 p. 9. In 2006, these

remittances totaled $1.65 billion USD.

and capital controls, the selling off of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the severance of

government subsidies for social spending, and frequently reductions in the minimum

wage. The austerity measures that typically comprise vital elements of IMF assistance

packages may affect countries like Haiti adversely. Haiti’s per capita annual health

spending was a mere $21 USD in 1999, compared with an average of $38 USD in sub-

Saharan Africa.32 At the same time that Haiti’s economic and development statistics

firmly establish it as one of the world’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs), its debt

service obligations continue to escalate. Mark Schuller of the Americas Program at the

Center for International Policy recently noted that “Debt drains resources that could

otherwise be invested in national production. For example, in 2003, Haiti's scheduled

debt service was $57.4 million, whereas total foreign pledges for education, health care,

environment, and transportation added up to $39.21 million.”33 Creating a sustainable

Haitian economy is a necessary condition for long-term peace, stability, and

development.

Peacekeeping and Reconstruction … in the time of cholera34

Within nine months of the beginning of post-earthquake reconstruction, Haitians

began complaining about the inappropriate disposal of waste by MINUSTAH

peacekeepers and the subsequent outbreak of cholera that killed thousands only

intensified the outrage and anger of Haitians and many in the development community.

For over 6 years, too, UN officials argued that the source of the cholera outbreak was not

definitively proven but in August 2016, a spokesperson for Secretary-General Ban Ki-

moon acknowledged that the UN shared in the responsibility for the outbreak of cholera

in Haiti.35 On October 24, 2016, the annual celebration of UN Day and in the midst of a

reignited cholera outbreak in the wake of Hurricane Matthew, the UN announced that it

would pay a total of $400 million USD in restitution to Haitian victims of the UN cholera

outbreak as well as for cholera eradication initiatives.36 In December 2016, the

MINUSTAH inaugurated a new water capture and distribution system to assist 60,000

people in the city of Merger, just outside Port-au-Prince through the Quick Impacts

Project (QIP).37 Delegates to the Security Council may wish to examine the UN System’s

own internal report from the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights,

Philip Alston38, that pointed to the overwhelming scientific evidence that the 9,000+

people who died and 780,000+ people who were infected suffered from a preventable

cholera outbreak that originated in the MINUSTAH camp of Nepalese peacekeepers.

32 Peter Hallward, Damning the Flood 2007 p. 7. 33 Mark Schuller, “Haitian Food Riots Unnerving But Not Surprising” worldpress.org April 29, 2008. 34 With all due respect to Gabriel Garcia Márquez, Love in the Time of Cholera. 35 Jonathan M. Katz, “The UN’s Cholera Admission and What Comes Next” The New York Times August

19, 2016. 36 Somini Sengupta and Jonathan M. Katz, “UN Plans to Pay Victims of Cholera Outbreak It Caused in

Haiti” New York Times October 24, 2016. 37 UN News Centre, “UN inaugurates water project in Haiti benefiting 60,000 people as part of fight

against cholera” December 12, 2016. Found at:

http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55787#.WFmMqRF-vIU 38 The Alston Report may be accessed at: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/3031511-Alston-

Haiti-Cholera-Report.html

Conclusion: Proving that the international community cares about Haiti

Haiti’s tenuous situation is not solely Haiti’s or the Caribbean’s concern. State

failure is a serious concern for the international community because of the ever-present

concerns about economic contagion, refugee outflows, and the likelihood that criminal

and terrorist organizations will use failed states as havens and sanctuaries. The Security

Council will likely extend MINUSTAH’s mandate past its current October 15, 2016

expiration and will need to examine if that mandate is sufficient. As the international

community considers new aid packages and assistance for Haiti, it must examine the

reasons for the deep-seated mistrust of many international organizations, especially the

IMF. Haiti’s current buffeting by the global food and fuel price shocks means that the

most vulnerable segments of the Haitian population will require greater domestic and

international assistance. In April 2008, riots sparked by anger over rapidly escalating

food and fuel prices killed at least 7 people and forced the resignation of the prime

minister; political disagreements prevented President Préval from naming a replacement.

When Préval’s government announced that fuel subsidies would be cut in June 2008,

prices soared to $6.14 USD per gallon, “further burdening an impoverished people as the

government redirected money to other programs.”39 The World Food Programme (WFP)

announced at the beginning of July 2008 that it would expand its efforts in Haiti by

providing extra meals to school children “to prevent them from joining street gangs or

searching for work.”40 President Préval also alarmed the United States, Canada, France,

and the IMF by continuing Aristide’s policies of accepting assistance from both Cuba and

Venezuela. While these governments and the IMF may disagree with Haiti’s decision to

accept this aid, their strongest positive arguments for discontinuing this policy may well

be to increase their own assistance to Haiti as well as loosening the conditionality of that

aid. The international community will have a tremendous opportunity to prove that its

concern for Haiti is genuine by continuing to provide financial, legal, security, and

technical assistance after the television crews and reporters have turned to the latest

international emergency or natural disaster.

Guiding Questions:

Does your country contribute soldiers and/or police officers to the UN Stabilization

Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)? Is MINUSTAH’s force composition appropriate and

sufficient to allow it to fulfill its mandate? Does MINUSTAH’s mandate need to further

evolve in the aftermath of the January 12, 2010 earthquake, the October 2010 cholera

outbreak and subsequent events in Haiti? How have the impacts of Hurricane Matthew

impacted relief and reconstruction efforts in Haiti as well as relief and reconstruction aid

from donor countries?

How might MINUSTAH improve its efforts, in coordination with local, national, and

international authorities and organizations, at disarmament, dismantlement, and

reintegration? What steps might MINUSTAH and Haiti’s government and security forces

take to quell violence and stabilize the country?

39 Jonathan M. Katz, “Haiti halts gasoline subsidy; prices soar” The Washington Post June 27, 2008. 40 UN News Service, “UN agency steps up efforts to help Haitians cope with food crisis” July 2, 2008.

What are the UN’s responsibilities to the Haitian people in light of the August 2016

admission of responsibility for the deadly cholera outbreak as well as subsequent denials

of responsibility? How might the UN System enact effective reforms to prevent similar

situations from occurring in the future?

What constructive roles can Haiti’s Caribbean neighbors play? How might governments,

international organizations, and civil society representatives more effectively contribute

to ongoing development initiatives in Haiti? How can the talents and resources of Haiti’s

diaspora community be most effectively harnessed to accelerate and enhance existing

domestic and international development initiatives?

Resolutions:

United Nations Security Council resolution 2313 (S/RES/2313) “The question

concerning Haiti” October 13, 2016.

United Nations Security Council resolution 2243, (S/RES/2243) “Haiti” October 14,

2015.

United Nations Security Council resolution 2180, (S/RES/2180) “Haiti” October 14,

2014.

United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/161 (A/RES/71/161) “A new approach

to cholera in Haiti” December 12, 2016.

Reports of the Secretary-General:

Ban Ki-moon, “A new approach to Cholera in Haiti: Report of the Secretary-General”,

A/71/620 November 25, 2016.

Ban Ki-moon, “Report on the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti” S/2016/753 August

31, 2016.