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Owned by a Yemeni Company Managed by a Norwegian Shipping Company 12 Crew: Polish Filipino Sri Lankan Bulk Carrier Flying a Liberian Flag 01 SCENARIO FLAG/COASTAL/PORT STATE JURISDICTION AND THE INTERPLAY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS Original Work by: Human Rights at Sea & Human Rights Implementation Centre, University of Bristol, UK, Dr. Sofia Galani, University of Bristol & David Hammond Esq, Human Rights at Sea VESSEL PASSAGE ROUTE 04 PIRACY Due to a spike in piracy and criminal activities in South East Asia & off the Somali Coast, the owners employ armed guards on the vessel. 05 FINANCIAL CHALLENGES During the voyage the Yemeni Company faces financial difficulties which results in failing to pay the crew’s salaries. 06 CREW TRY TO DISEMBARK Two Polish & two Filipino members of the crew announce decision to disembark at the next port of call, Singapore, in search of alternative employment. 07 ARMED GUARDS The Master unlawfully orders the armed guards to dissuade the crew from leaving. 08 ARMED GUARDS A heated confrontation between the armed guards & the four crew members occurs. The armed guards threaten and physically assault the four crew. 09 ARMED GUARDS The armed guards lock the four crew in a two-berth cabin without toilet facilities or proper ventilation & temporarily deprive them of their liberty. 10 SINGAPORE The crew cannot disembark & sign off in Singapore. They remain on board. FEARFUL CREW In fear for their safety and losing their jobs, the remaining crew hide the incident from the pilot, port authorities and agents when they come on-board in Singapore. The Master does not inform the owner or the ship-manager of the incidents. The Chinese guards fail to report the incident, or their actions as instructed by the Master, to their Canadian employers. FORCED WORK For the rest of the voyage, the four crew are forced by the armed guards to undertake excessive work, while subject to beatings, as well as being locked in the two-berth cabin when not at work. 12 LACK OF WELFARE The remainder of the crew provide fresh food, changes of clothing, reading materials, and tries to alert welfare organisations in respect of the four crew who have had their liberty temporarily deprived. Contact with welfare organisations are unsuccessful. SHANGHAI SINGAPORE BEIRUT PIRAEUS ROTTERDAM GREEK PORT INSPECTION At Piraeus Port during the vessel inspection, Greek port authorities: a) become indirectly aware of the crew’s suffering; b) decide not to investigate further as the vessel was otherwise in compliance with the requisite safety, security and environmental standards; c) note that the weapons are lawfully held in the vessel's armoury. 20 SUPPRESSION The crew’s health, state of well-being & the deprivation of liberty conditions on- board remains suppressed. 21 CREW MEMBER KILLED A Polish crew member is killed by a Chinese guard with a weapon removed from the ship’s armoury after the eruption of violence on board, before the vessel’s arrival at Rotterdam in the English Channel. 11 COMMUNICATION DENIED Internet and satellite connections are deliberately restricted, otherwsie closely monitored and vetted by the armed guards. Crew personal laptops and phones are confiscated on the orders of the Master. 14 VESSEL DETAINED The Indian Coastguard with express Liberian Flag permission in the Indian Contiguous Zone (24 Nautical Miles off the coast) and due to unverified intelligence that the vessel may carry unregistered weapons to Lebanon - stops, searches and temporarily detains the vessel at sea. WEAPON DATA Personal Weapons of the Chinese armed guards: a) lawfully purchased in Canada; b) shipped and registered to Djibouti before transfer to the Shanghai office. 16 LICENSES WITHHELD All relevant end-user licenses and certifications are lawfully held by the Chinese security contractors. 17 ABUSED CREW DISCOVERED Abused crew are located and identified on board during the search by the Indian Coastguard, but no action is taken. 18 VESSEL RELEASED The vessel is released as no unregistered weapons, ammunition, other illegal materials are found during the search. 19 15 22 INCIDENT REPORTED The incident is reported to the Dutch Port and Polish State authorities. 23 CRIMINAL CASE OPENS Dutch port and Polish State authorities respectively open criminal investigations to which the Liberian Flag initially objects over jurisdiction. 24 4 Chinese Armed Guards: Employed by Canadian (PMSC), Registered in Djibouti 02 12 CREW Polish | Filipino | Sri Lankan 4 ARMED GUARDS Chinese Guards | Canadian Employers | Djibouti Registered 03 VESSEL ROUTE MAP - PORTS Start End © 2019 Human Rights at Sea All Rights Reserved. WEAPON DATA Personal Weapons of the Chinese Security Contractors. Weapons lawfully purchased in Canada Shipped and registered in Djbouti Weapons transferred to Shanghai Office 13 Rotterdam Piraeus Beirut Singapore Shanghai Chinese contractors hold all relevant end-user licences and certification. Updated June 2020

FLAG/COASTAL/PORT STATE JURISDICTION AND THE ......FLAG/COASTAL/PORT STATE JURISDICTION AND THE INTERPLAY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS Original Work by: Human Rights at Sea & Human Rights Implementation

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Page 1: FLAG/COASTAL/PORT STATE JURISDICTION AND THE ......FLAG/COASTAL/PORT STATE JURISDICTION AND THE INTERPLAY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS Original Work by: Human Rights at Sea & Human Rights Implementation

Owned by a Yemeni Company

Managed by a Norwegian Shipping Company

12 Crew: PolishFilipino Sri Lankan

Bulk Carrier Flying a Liberian Flag

01 SCENARIO

FLAG/COASTAL/PORT STATE JURISDICTION AND THE INTERPLAY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

Original Work by: Human Rights at Sea & Human Rights Implementation Centre, University of Bristol, UK, Dr. Sofia Galani, University of Bristol & David Hammond Esq, Human Rights at Sea

VESSEL PASSAGE ROUTE

04 PIRACYDue to a spike in piracy and criminal activities in South East Asia & off the Somali Coast, the owners employ armed guards on the vessel.

05 FINANCIAL CHALLENGESDuring the voyage the Yemeni Company faces financial difficulties which results in failing to pay the crew’s salaries.

06 CREW TRY TO DISEMBARKTwo Polish & two Filipino members of the crew announce decision to disembark at the next port of call, Singapore, in search of alternative employment.

07 ARMED GUARDSThe Master unlawfully orders the armed guards to dissuade the crew from leaving.

08 ARMED GUARDSA heated confrontation between the armed guards & the four crew members occurs. The armed guards threaten and physically assault the four crew.

09 ARMED GUARDSThe armed guards lock the four crew in a two-berth cabin without toilet facilities or proper ventilation & temporarily deprive them of their liberty.

10 SINGAPOREThe crew cannot disembark & sign off in Singapore. They remain on board.

FEARFUL CREW

In fear for their safety and losing their jobs, the remaining crew hide the incident from the pilot, port authorities and agents when they come on-board in Singapore.

The Master does not inform the owner or the ship-manager of the incidents.

The Chinese guards fail to report the incident, or their actions as instructed by the Master, to their Canadian employers.

FORCED WORKFor the rest of the voyage, the four crew are forced by the armed guards to undertake excessive work, while subject to beatings, as well as being locked in the two-berth cabin when not at work.

12

LACK OF WELFARE

The remainder of the crew provide fresh food, changes of clothing, reading materials, and tries to alert welfare organisations in respect of the four crew who have had their liberty temporarily deprived. Contact with welfare organisations are unsuccessful.

SHANGHAI SINGAPORE BEIRUT PIRAEUS ROTTERDAM

GREEK PORT INSPECTIONAt Piraeus Port during the vessel inspection, Greek port authorities:

a) become indirectly aware of the crew’s suffering;b) decide not to investigate further as the vessel was otherwise in compliance with the requisite safety, security and environmental standards;c) note that the weapons are lawfully held in the vessel's armoury.

20

SUPPRESSIONThe crew’s health, state of well-being & the deprivation of liberty conditions on-board remains suppressed.

21

CREW MEMBER KILLEDA Polish crew member is killed by a Chinese guard with a weapon removed from the ship’s armoury after the eruption of violence on board, before the vessel’s arrival at Rotterdam in the English Channel.

11

COMMUNICATION DENIEDInternet and satellite connections are deliberately restricted, otherwsie closely monitored and vetted by the armed guards. Crew personal laptops and phones are confiscated on the orders of the Master.

14

VESSEL DETAINED

The Indian Coastguard with express Liberian Flag permission in the Indian Contiguous Zone (24 Nautical Miles off the coast) and due to unverified intelligence that the vessel may carry unregistered weapons to Lebanon - stops, searches and temporarily detains the vessel at sea.

WEAPON DATAPersonal Weapons of the Chinese armed guards:a) lawfully purchased in Canada;b) shipped and registered to Djibouti before transfer to the Shanghai office.

16

LICENSES WITHHELDAll relevant end-user licenses and certifications are lawfully held by the Chinese security contractors.

17

ABUSED CREW DISCOVEREDAbused crew are located and identified on board during the search by the Indian Coastguard, but no action is taken.

18

VESSEL RELEASEDThe vessel is released as no unregistered weapons, ammunition, other illegal materials are found during the search.

19

15

22

INCIDENT REPORTEDThe incident is reported to the Dutch Port and Polish State authorities.

23

CRIMINAL CASE OPENSDutch port and Polish State authorities respectively open criminal investigations to which the Liberian Flag initially objects over jurisdiction.

24

4 Chinese Armed Guards: Employed by Canadian (PMSC), Registered in Djibouti

0212 CREWPolish | Filipino | Sri Lankan

4 ARMED GUARDSChineseGuards |Canadian

Employers | DjiboutiRegistered

03 VESSEL ROUTE MAP - PORTS

Start

End

© 2019 Human Rights at Sea All Rights Reserved.

WEAPON DATAPersonal Weapons of the Chinese Security Contractors.

Weapons lawfullypurchased in Canada

Shipped and registeredin Djbouti

Weapons transferred to Shanghai Office

13

Rotterdam

Piraeus

Beirut

Singapore

Shanghai

Chinese contractors hold all relevant end-user licences and certification.

Updated June 2020

Page 2: FLAG/COASTAL/PORT STATE JURISDICTION AND THE ......FLAG/COASTAL/PORT STATE JURISDICTION AND THE INTERPLAY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS Original Work by: Human Rights at Sea & Human Rights Implementation

FLAG/COASTAL/PORT STATE JURISDICTION AND THE INTERPLAY WITH HUMAN RIGHTS

25 JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

This hypothetical scenario illustrates the complex jurisdictional framework upon which the regulation of activities at sea is based and the queries raised in the circumstances presented. More importantly, it gives an example of the potential for violations of human rights that could take place at sea away from immediate constabulary intervention, and raises the challenging question of which State can exercise jurisdiction over a vessel for the purposes of effectively protecting the human rights of persons on board vessels.

26 STATES AND TERRITORIAL WATERS INVOLVED

Canada

South East Asia

CoastSTATES WITH INVOLVEMENT

TERRITORIAL WATERS WITH INVOLVEMENT

PORTS INVOLVED

COAST GUARDS/PORT AUTHORITIES INVOLVED

STATES INVOLVED WITH THE USE/SUPPLY OF WEAPONS

LOCATION OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE

Norway

Poland

China

Sri LankaPhilippines

Liberia

YemenIndia

ShanghaiBeirut

Singapore

China

Canada

Djibouti

SomaliCoast

Djibouti

GreecePiraeus

English Channel

TheNetherlands

Rotterdam

Poland

SouthEast Asia

Coast

Indian Ocean

MediterraneanSea

Can a flag State exercise prescriptive and /or enforcement jurisdiction on board these vessels?

C

27 ISSUES RAISED

What are the obligations of all 198 flag States when human rights violations take place on board vessels flying their flags?

A B

What are the obligations of coastal States /archipelagic states in relation to persons subjected to human rights violations on board vessels navigating or operating within their territorial seas or contiguous zones?

Do the obligations differ when vessels carrying persons whose human rights are being violated enter a port in distress?Can port States exercise jurisdiction over vessels that carry, or employ persons who are, or have been subjected to human rights violations?

DE

What are the obligations of port States in relation to persons subjected to human rights violations on board vessels that voluntarily enter their ports?

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