FischerGalati

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Nationalism and Kaisertreue Author(s): Stephen Fischer-Galati Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 22, No. 1 (Mar., 1963), pp. 31-36Published by: Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian StudiesStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3000384Accessed: 04-09-2015 18:34 UTC

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NATIONALISM AND KAISERTREUE

BY STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI

In his complex and far-reaching study Professor Sugar has raised certain fundamental questions regarding the Habsburg state system, nationality problems, and the possibilities of reconciliation of conflicting national and political interests within the framework of a democratic federal empire. The greatest significance of his paper lies not so much in his basic conclusion that the dissolution of the empire could not have been prevented as in his method of analyzing the intricate problems of this heterogeneous polity. Dissecting "nationalism" as mani- fested in the several national groups, he reveals its diverse nature and meaning to the various socio-economic classes comprised therein, and forcefully brings out the profound conflicts prevailing among Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Croats, and other nationalities by relating them to the broader problems of coexistence within the mnultinational empire. This approach is indeed admirably suited for examining the major historical problems of Eastern Europe. Professor Sugar is commend- ably concerned with assessing the role of the peasantry, bourgeoisie, landed aristocracy, church, intelligentsia, and working class in relation to their class interests within the national groups themselves and vis- a-vis other nationalities and, ultimately, the emperor. Free from the distortions of Marxist historians who have tried to emphasize class conflict through essentially similar approaches,' the author has seriously troubled the waters of the "Blue Danube school" of analysts of the reasons for the decline and fall of the Habsburg Empire.

Professor Sugar has been unable here to investigate the problems of the several component nationalities with equal intensity but has charted the course for future detailed studies of nationality problems both within and outside the Habsburg monarchy. It is therefore in- tended that this commentary raise certain questions applicable both to the history of the Habsburg Empire and, by extension, to those of the Ottoman Empire as well.

MR. FISCHER-GALATI is associate Professor of history at TTWayne Slate Universit.y. 1 Typical of more respectable Marxist studies are V. iern', Fran ti4ek August Brauner,

vykon avatel odzaku selskych rebelili (Prague, 1948); V. Bogdanov, "Historijska uloga drustvenih klasa u historiji nase borbe za oslobodjenje," Racd jugoslave72ske akadeinije znaoosti i unijetnosti: Odjel filozofiju i dcruRtvene nauke (Zagreb, 1954), pp. 5 ff.; C. Daico- viciu, L. Bainyai, V. Chereste?iu, V. Liveanu, "Lupta revolutionarq a maselor: Factor hotari- tor in tinirea Transilvaniei cu Rominia," Studii, XI (1958), No. 6, 21 if.



32 Slavic Review

One of Professor Sugar's fundamental concepts is essential to the understandiing of the predicaments of the politically underdeveloped empire: the all-encompassing Kaiscrtrcue precluded democratic reform and the reorganization of the empire on the basis of etlhnic or individual sovereignty. For not only did Kaisertrecue transcncid nlationalistic identification (except for political extrelmists) but also, and more significantly, it was exploited both by the politically active miin-orities to further their own programs and by Vienna to prevent significant alterations of the status quo. As long as the masses were faithful to the emperor and the several political leaders either regarded the monarch as benevolent to their interests or were unable or unwilling to offer political programs that would undermine the Kaisertrecue of the population, the chances for democratic reform were quite negligible. As Professor Sugar points out, the imperial house AwTas neither democratic nor anxious to reconcile the conflicting aims of political spokesmen of the multiparticularistic empire.

The strength of the Habsburgs ultimately rested in the Kaisetreutc, the cornerstone of the Hausmacht. The continuity of the empire was dependent on the maintenance of both. It would be naive to assume that Francis Joseph and his predecessors were unaware of the nature and political significance of the demands of the leaders of the Magyar, Czech, Slovak, Rumanian, Croat, Polish, and other national groups.2 It was this very awareness and the realization that concessiolns to one group or another would merely aggravate the political problems of the state complex that explained either imperial inaction or general support or toleration of the policies of the conservative landed aristocracy, whose interests were most closely identified wvith those of tlhe monarchy. For evidently the empire was essentially a "feudal" empire, the emperor a "feudal" monarch, and the masses, economically dependent on the landed aristocracy, if free in theory were in a state of "neo-serfdom" in practice.3 "Democracy" having been extendecd to the masses in the form of emancipation of the peasantry had then to be contained by guaranteeing the rights of the landlords. Thus the emperor, commanding the Kaisertreue of the masses-which if necessary could be used as an instrument for controlling the privileged aristocracy-chose to ignore "radical" political demands voiced by intellectual, middle-class, or socialist spokesmen or parties of national groups. The views of a Hodza, Hlinka, Vaida-Voevod, Goga, or even a Masaryk carried little weight, since Vienna was confident that they wvere not representative of the wishes of the population and could not alienate

2 In this respect the Habsburgs differed greatly from the sultans, who never uinderstood fully the plans for reform voiced by Balkan leaders. On tbis point see A. OteteaI's pelnwtrat- ing analysis of Ottoman policies in Tudor Vlaadimirescu ,i rniycarea ete)risto i Tn T 'rile Rornd7neti 1821-1822 (Bucharest, 1945), pp. 239 ff.

3 Dobrogeanu-Gherea's termninology appears applicable as suggested by L. PAtr5jica111u, Un veac de frdindintdIri sociale, 1821-1907 (Bucharest, 1945), pp. 197 if.



Nationalism and Kaisertreue 33

the Kaisertrete of the peasantry, bourgeoisie, or the infinitesimal working class.4 If any recognition was given to such demands or concessions made in the area of cultural and linguistic autonomny, such action was taken primarily because it was regarded as politically safe or expcdient. As long as Vienna was able to satisfy the socio-economic demancds of the aristocracy and middle classes and hold out the prospect of imnprovement of the lot of the peasantry, all under the umbrella of Kaisertreue, the ernpire was secure and reform unniecessary anid undesirable. These considerations emphasize the essentially politically innocuous nature of nationalism and nlationalistic m-anifestation as such in the Habsburg state system.

It is evident that after the Autsgleich neither of these phenomena by themselves posed a serious threat to the stability of the monarchy. It might even be argued that they actually strengthened the imperial position by making the emperor the ultimate adjudicator of disputes and the ultimate source of decision and reconciliation of conflicting interests. In national disunity indeed lay much of the strength of the moniarchy. Professor Sugar has perceptively delineated the serious internal conflicts permeating all national groups and the resultant weakness of nationalist movements as such. The only possible anlld partial exception might be that of the dominant Magyar nationality.5 However, the Compromise of 1867 was an ultraconservative document which assured the stability of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Hungarians could never aspire to gain more than limnited control of the empire and were sufficiently realistic not to seek the establishment of a Hungarian state without a Habsburg emperor. The Magyar aristocracy and its political formations were handicapped in that, unlike the emperor, they enjoyed no Kaisertrete; alliance with the imperial house sharing their socio-economic views was thus essential. The Magyar leadership was secure in the knowledge that Vienna would not alter the status quo for fear that concessions to less privileged nationalities mlight encourage the formulation of programs of social and economic reform that would demand alteration of the nature of the essentially agrarian-feudal empire.

It is, however, indicative of the weakness of nationalism in the monarchy that no underprivileged national group ever formulated a truly comprehensive program of reform that would cut across national lines or, even more significantly, for their own people alone. Indeed,

4 The political ineptness of the leadership, including that of the working class, is dis- cussed at length in L. Fodor and L. Vajda, Contributie la istoria rnisc&rii sindicale din Transilvania (1848-1917) (Bucharest, 1957); R. Perovic, GradIja za istoriju srpskog pokreta t Vojvodini 1848-1849 godine (Belgrade, 1952); V. A. Varga, "Contributions a l'histoire dil mouvemient ouvrier de Transylvanie a la fin du XIXe siele," Nouvelles etudes d'histoi're (Bucharest, 1960), pp. 477 ff.

5 Pending further investigation of matters related to Hungarian nationalismi, wve accept Professor Suigar's viewvs on this con-itroversial topic as eminently sound.



34 Slavic Review

tlie several leaders of the several nationalities represented narrow class interests; they themselves and their aspirations were generally not identified with or supported by the masses.6 As Professor Sugar indicates, the Prague Pan-Slav Congress and the Kremsier Reichstag could not formulate common programs because tlhe particularistic interests of the leaders of the various delegations conflicted beyond superficial declarations on behalf of Slavic unity. And, remarkably indeed, this situation did not change significantly after 1867. Yet hlow dangerous a Slavic union transcending parochial interests and advocat- ing a major program of social and economic reform could have been to the Austro-Hungarian empire. This raises the fundamental question whether any social or political group might have formulated a generally acceptable course of action and policies that couLld have upset the balance of power established in 1867 and resulted in drastic transforma- tion of the socio-economic and political bases of the nationality group itself or the empire as a whole. In our opinion, presented to underscore Professor Sugar's views, the internecine class conflict, aggravated by the ni-,arrow views of inexperienced, inept, yet ambitious political leaders parading under the convenient banner of nationalism, precluded such a possibility and consequently tended to perpetuate the staticity of the imperial order. Even those rare men who did offer programs of general social reform did not speak the lanLguage of the masses either loudly enough or clearly enough and were in turn not understood by them. For ultimately the changing of the existing order and the establishment of a basis for democratic federalism required alteration of the socio- economic structure, a redistribution of the national wealth to satisfy first the needs of the peasantry and, second, those of the rising middle class.7 Such programs, however desirable, are acknowledged by Profes- sor Sugar to be clearly unrealizable within the self-imposed nationalistic ghettos of the Habsburg monarchy short of either political revolution by the masses or the development of reform programs that would tran- scend particularist interests, offer alternatives to and thus overcome the Kaisertreue, and eventually transform the empire into a supranational ionfeudal entity. As long as Kaisertreue remained a more powerful political instrument than national political programs, inaction or minor concessions by Francis Joseph and the ruling oligarchy sufficed. These considerations must also be taken into account in evaluating the significance of external contacts between national groups in the empire and independent political formations of conationals or related nationality groups beyond the borders of the Habsburg monarchy.

6 On the applicability and extension of these generalizations to problems of Balkan hlis- tory, consult the writer's "The Peasantry as a Revolutionary Force in the Balkans" in the forthcoming issue of the Journal of Central European Affairs.

7 Inter-estillg Marxist analyses of these problemns are conitainecd in Daicoviciu, Banyai, Chereste?iu, Livean i, "Lupta revolutionarl ...," pp. 91 f.; V. Zacek, Ceclhove a Poldci r. IS-S (Praguie, 1947-48), Vols. I an-d II.



Nationalism and Kaisertreue 35

Professor Sugar, limited in space and concentrating on other significant aspects of the history of the Habsburg state complex, has devoted but passing attention to this problem. It seems worth pointing out, however, that contacts between leaders of the empire's Southern Slav groups and the Serbian kingdom or between the Rumanians of Trai- sylvania and the Old Kingdom did not in themselves constitute a source of danger to the Habsburg monarchy any more than the aspirations for independence of the Polish nobility. Surely the interests and policies of the Radich brothers, for instance, were but superficially identified with those of the Karageorgevich state and its politicians. Moreover, the possibility of political union with the Serbian kingdom did not attract the empire's Southern Slavs for many reasons, not the least of which was the failure of the Serbian dynasty and government to satisfy the socio- economic demands of its own subjects. Similarly, Maniu, Goga, Vaida- Voevod, and other leaders of the Rumanian peasantry of Transylvania were themselves unsympathetic toward the pro-German policies of King Carol I and the Conservative Party of the Old Kingdom and, in anv event, could hardly have aroused mass support for a unionist policy, considering the neo-serf status of the peasant in Walachia and Moldavia and the brutal repression of the peasant revolt of 1907 in these prov- inces.8 Indeed, in the case of both the Southern Slav and the Rumanian peasantry of the Habsburg Empire, union with their "brethren" of independent Serbia and Rumania would have meant lowering their living standards to a thoroughly undesirable level. The masses did not support the unionistic proclivities of their self-styled leaders, who, in effect, we-re pursuing policies aimed at justifying and safeguarding their owvn pre- carious existence. The activities of Southern Slav and Rum-anian politicians as such did not alarm Vienna. The monarchy's apprehensioin stemmed from the possibilit-y of interinational, primarily Russian, support of ill-defined and conflict-ridden nationalistic manifestations inside and outside the empire; in other words, the extension of imethods that had contributed to the gradual dissolution of the Ottoman Empire tco the Habsburg Empire itself. The internationalization of the control- lable nationality problems of the empire and resulting intervention by inimical powers in the internal affairs of the monarchy either through collaboration with nationality groups in the empire itself or conationals outside the confines of the JHabsburg state system could not be tolerated.

In short, only twvo phenomena could undermine the stability of the empire beyond imperial control: social revolution by or with the par- ticipation of the peasant masses or intervention by outside powers acting primarily as supporters of the nationalistic, unionistic aspirations of Rumanian and Southern Slav politicians outside and inside the empire.

8 Much new information on these topics may be found in M. lonescu, "Despre inseiml- niitatea ?i urmarile rascoalei din 1907," Studii, X (1957), No. 9, 7 f.; V. MacleIa, Al/ada Bosnia (Belgrade, 1946).



36 Slavic Review

In Vienna's judgment the former possibility was precluded by dissension within and among national groups and lack of political programs that could upset the Kaisertree, the latter by the alliance with Germany. The Habsburgs were correct in refusing to undertake significant re- forms at home, as reform would have destroyed the tradition on which their Hausmacht was based. Moreover, their estimate of the strength of the political parties of the multinational empire was vindicated by the history of the succession states. Time proved them right in opposing internationalization of nationality problems.

Thus, as Professor Sugar contends, analyses in terms of possible democratic-federal solutions shed little light on the problems of the non-Germanic societies under Habsburg rule and of the empire itself. More deserving of attention are systematic studies of the several national groups, particularly in terms of the political attitudes and aspirations of their various social classes and of their intranational and international views and relations. Such studies would permit drastic revisions of tra- ditional interpretations, not only of the history of the Habsburg Empire but also of that of Eastern Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.



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