First BalticŒGerman Dialogue - SWP · 2015-11-27 · First BalticŒGerman Dialogue Berlin, November 2Œ4, 2001 Mai 2002 Berlin SWP Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Riga/Bonn Estonian

First Baltic�German DialogueBerlin, November 2�4, 2001

Mai 2002Berlin

SSSSWPWPWPWP

Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Riga/Bonn

Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, TallinnInstitute of International Affairs, Riga

Institute of International Relationsand Political Science, Vilnius

Stiftung Wissenschaft und PolitikGerman Institute for International and

Security Affairs, Berlin

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Inhalt

Foreword I 5Wulf Lapins, FES representative in the Baltic states

Foreword II 7Heinz Kramer, SWP

Politico-strategic Aspects of NATO Enlargementtowards the Baltic Region: A View from Germany 8Peter Schmidt, SWP

Politico-Strategic Aspects of NATO Enlargementtowards the Baltic Region: A View from Lithuania 12Evaldas Nekra�as, Institute of International Relations and PoliticalScience, Vilnius University

Military Aspects of NATO Enlargement towards theBaltic Region 16Janis Sarts, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Riga

The Accession of the Baltic States to the European Union 20Lauri Lepik, Research Fellow Estonian Foreign Policy Institute

General Report 24Detlev Kraa, Berlin

Program 34

List of Participants 35

Wulf Lapins, FES representative in the Baltic states

SWP-BerlinFirst Baltic�German DialogueMai 2002

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Foreword IWulf Lapins, FES representative in the Baltic states

Ten years after regaining sovereignty and independence the constructionof civil societies in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania has made large progress.A clear commitment to democracy and rule of law has shown that theBaltic countries share the values of the Western world. Their integrationinto the political and economic structures of the West will definitively givethem a guarantee to develop according to their priorities and capabilities.

The three Baltic states and Germany are neighbouring countries of theBaltic Sea and thus have numerous contacts on different levels. Integratingthe Baltic countries into the organisations of the West will enhancestability and security in the entire Baltic Sea region. Therefore, it is also inGerman interest to continue support for political, social and economictransformation and to deepen all forms of consultation and communi-cation serving the development of democracy and economic prosperity.

The Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation and the German Institute for Inter-national and Security Affairs try to make a contribution to this process inthe shape of a common German�Baltic policy forum, which provides theframework for a series of annual conferences. In 2001, both institutionsand Foreign Policy Institutes from Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania met forthe first time to discuss questions concerning European integration andsecurity in Europe, with a particularly focus on the Baltic Sea region.

The first German�Baltic dialogue took place in Berlin from November2nd to 4th 2001. Scholars, politicians and high ranking officials from thethree Baltic countries and Germany discussed security�political andpolitical-economic implications of the double extension to the East for theBaltic region: the Baltic countries� efforts to join NATO and the EuropeanUnion.

It is no surprise that the terrorist attacks of September 11th ran like ared thread through lectures and discussions. At present, it is not clearwhether a change of the co-ordinates of the present world security systemcan be expected from the American-Russian-Chinese alliance againstinternational terrorism. The motives of these three powers involved aretoo linear and different. That is one of the reasons why the strategicdimension of NATO�s enlargement has not lost its basis on September11th. Agreement over this point prevailed among the participants.

Successfully integrating the Baltic countries into the Euro-Atlanticframework requires that substantial problems be settled. Particularly therelations with Russia are of outstanding importance. Russia is accepted byNATO as a strategic partner. But does that mean that there is a durablestrategic compatibility of interests between both sides at the presentmoment? With the entry of the Baltic countries into NATO and the Euro-pean Union all Baltic Sea neighbours with the exception of Russia will bemember states of the European Union and � except for Finland andSweden � NATO. How will this affect the future of the Königsberg/Kalinin-

Foreword I

SWP-BerlinFirst Baltic�German Dialogue

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grad region? This topic will be on the agenda of the next German�Balticdialogue.

Whereas NATO membership is approved by a clear majority of about 60percent of the population in all three Baltic countries, support for acces-sion to the European Union is only at a level of around 50 percent. Suchfigures show that governments and media in the Baltic countries have toimprove their efforts to show the benefits of EU membership. It would bedisastrous if accession negotiations were concluded according to theschedule, whereas accession would fail due to a lack of public support.

Taking into account the latest developments and possible new prospectsthe main topics of the Berlin conference will also be part of the agendaduring the second German�Baltic forum which is to be held in Tallinnfrom May 31st to June 2nd.

Heinz Kramer, SWP


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Foreword IIHeinz Kramer, SWP

The EU enlargement toward central and eastern Europe does not only posea challenge to the Union and its member states. Think tanks and politics-oriented civil society organisations alike are offered new perspectives fortheir work. It is in this perspective that the Berlin-based Stiftung Wissen-schaft und Politik is happy to take up a proposal from Baltic partnerinstitutes to establish a multi-annual Baltic�German Dialogue on issues ofcommon interest.

The choice of the Baltic republics as a counterpart region is significantfor various reasons. The new enlargement will bring mostly medium tosmall states as new members of the EU. Inter-EU political balances will beredressed accordingly. Therefore, it is important to broaden the inter-institution network to representatives of small EU member states in orderto establish a meaningful mix in our work which is related to theenvironment of political decision-making.

The Baltic region has manifold historic links with Germany which hadbeen interrupted by the period of Communist rule in these states.Nevertheless, it would be politically unwise and socially unjust to totallyabandon this history. Germany has to and will play an important politicalrole in the enlarged EU and this includes also to recognize the heritage ofpast relations. Re-establishing links of communication is, however, notonly advisable with regard to the past but even more so with respect toshaping the common future in the European Union. What would be moreadvisable in that perspective than to establish strong links between thoseinstitutions in our countries that are endowed with the task of analysingpolitical and security developments in the new Europe.

The Baltic states are located in a region of special strategic importancefor the enlarged EU and NATO. They directly border the �new easternneighbours�, Russia and Belarus. Lithuania has a common border with theemerging Russian enclave of Kaliningrad. The EU�s common policy onRussia will be of strong interest for the Baltic states and will be influencedby them as will be, to a certain extent, NATO-Russian relations. The EU�s�northern dimension� will be considerably upgraded after the Balticentries. The Baltic Sea will almost become an EU sea.

All these issues justify the establishment of our Baltic�German dialoguewhich will not only address the topic of the Baltic states� integration intothe broader process of European political, security and economic inte-gration but also deal with the various problems of the EU�s commonforeign and security policy in the region.

The first meeting of representatives from the four partner instituteswith the generous support and participation of Friedrich-Ebert-Foundationin Berlin on November 2�4, 2001, which is documented in the followingpages, has been an encouraging confirmation of the general idea of estab-lishing such a dialogue.

Politico-strategic Aspects of NATO Enlargement towards the Baltic Region: A View from Germany


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Politico-strategic Aspectsof NATO Enlargement towards theBaltic Region: A View from GermanyPeter Schmidt, SWP

1. There is not an obvious link, but I think the topics of education at schooland NATO enlargement have something in common. In both casesalmost everybody sees himself as an expert. I feel sometimes quite alonewith an amateur feeling regardless of the fact that I have done a studyon the question of NATO�s enlargement.

2. Indeed, from the point of view of NATO, there is no perfect solution, noKönigsweg for NATO. Enlargement will inevitably transform NATO intoan even bigger tanker, more difficult to steer through the stormy watersof international politics than in former times. Nevertheless, a decisionhas to be taken and I think, NATO has already moved ahead so far withthe enlargement that a non-decision or negative decision � and this in-cludes the Baltic region � would harm NATO�s reputation significantly.

3. Therefore, I would like to give you my assessment of the politico-strategic aspects of NATO enlargement towards the Baltic region by onlyfour short points.� The first refers to the question of German interests in enlargement,� the second refers to the question of the outreach of NATO member-

ship, in other words under which basic conditions NATO membershipshould be a reasonable prospect.

� The third is about the relationship between NATO- and EU enlarge-ment and

� the forth is about the question, whether the 11th of September haschanged the picture and especially downgraded the importance ofNATO enlargement by Russian support for the fight against terrorism.

First point. The stabilization and economic recovery as well as themaintenance and development of democratic states in central Europe is avital interest of Germany. I believe that NATO�s enlargement is not aperfect choice but one important factor in our policy towards greaterstability. It provides a security framework within which political andeconomic developments have a better chance to progress than without.EU�s enlargement will follow later, I think, and round up the policy ofstabilization.

Second point. I think, NATO�s criteria for enlargement are well taken.They include political, economic and certainly military aspects. The Balticstates fulfill most of these criteria and I think that there is no other waythan to admit at least one Baltic country with a clear perspective ofmembership for the others.

Peter Schmidt, SWP


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Third point. During the last enlargement round I argued, that NATO�senlargement serves as a good and quick first step to bring Central andSouth Eastern European countries into the club. I regarded this as a � so tosay � preparatory step for the further development of those countriestowards Western Europe and the EU. This time, the question is moredifficult. I still think that NATO�s greater scope will be achieved morequickly than EU�s enlargement. But it looks like not too many countrieswhich will become new NATO members will not be part of EU after 2004.The big questions will not come up with regard to the Baltic region, butwith regard to Romania and Bulgaria. They do not fulfil either NATO�s orEU�s accession criteria and NATO should not have a too great willingnessto compromise. But NATO will keep the question on the agenda and willopen up the door a bit more than today for these two countries.

Fourth and last point. The alliance against terrorism, NATO�s enlargementand the question of Russia.

Basically, I think, Russian support for America�s war against terrorism hasnot changed the necessity for enlargement. Russia remains a DIFFERENTANIMAL. The free choice of alliances and political organizations is an out-standing feature of the developing new political order in Europe. In thisregard there is not something like a Russian veto. Certainly, Russia haslowered its anti-enlargement voice. But this should certainly not lead us tothe assessment that enlargement is no longer necessary.

There are important voices arguing for � at least in the long term � aRussian membership in NATO. Even the Polish Prime Minister recentlyuttered this view. It is a difficult issue, I think. Nevertheless, one importantpoint should raise our utmost caution: President Putin mentioned aprecondition for Russian membership: the development of NATO into apolitical organization. My view is that by this, NATO would become a �more or less � almost meaningless café de commerce, a chat room. Icannot see that this is in the interest of the Baltic countries, and I cannotsee yet, that this is in the interest of Germany.

Politico-strategic Aspects of NATO Enlargement towards the Baltic Region: A View from Germany


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Aims and Functions Consequences for the Criteria for Expansion

Stabilisation and Democratisation Emphasis on the �soft factors� (civil control of the military,

democratisation), no pressure to raise defence expenditure

considerably; priority admission for states which are

strategically prominent.

Complementarity of EU-

and NATO-expansion

Seek convergence of the member states (Sweden, Austria,

Finland plus new EU members); in particular those states which

will not be present at this round are to be admitted.

Protection from Russia Rapid expansion, and as comprehensive as possible. Capability

of NATO to protect these countries on their territory in the case

of a serious attack is in the short and medium term of secondary

importance.

More potential for the Alliance Of those states wishing to join, Romania and Bulgaria would

have priority. They are the only ones with a significant military

potential. A gradual expansion is preferable so that these states

can carry out the necessary substantial reforms of their armed

forces.

Conditions for the realisation

Control over the process Must be retained (no group approach), in order to steer the

process better; NATO must keep decisions open for

compromises.

Integrate Russia Options in accordance with the priority list for taking Russian

criticism into account: no expansion, expansion without the

Baltic states, �big deal�, closer integration of Russia in the

decision making processes of the Alliance, appropriate shaping

of the conditions for expansion, as at the previous round of talks

on expansion.

Maintenance of NATO�s

ability to act

From a political point of view the new members will probably be

able to fit in well. The accession of a large number of states

would, however, entail practical problems in the decision

making process. Thus proceeding gradually would be preferable.

The same is valid for the military area.

Peter Schmidt, SWP


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Status of NATO- and EU-Candidates

NATO-

applicant

EU-

applicant

Comments on state of application

for NATO and EUa

Freedom in the

World Country

Ratingsb

Albania X Currently not a serious NATO-candidate 4,5 (partly free)

Bulgaria X X In the group of countries at the bottom

of the priority list in the EU negotiations

2,3 (free)

Estonia X X In 2nd group of EU-negotiations 1,2 (free)

Lithuania X X In 3rd group of EU-negotiations 1,2 (free)

Latvia X X In 3rd group of EU-negotiations 1,2 (free)

Romania X X In the group of countries at the bottom

of the priority list in the EU negotiations

2,2 (free)

Slovenia X X In 2nd group of EU-negotiations 1,2 (free)

Slovakia X X In 2nd group of EU-negotiations 1,2 (free)

Macedonia X Currently no serious NATO-candidate 4,3 (partly free)

Poland NATO-Member X Currently in third last position in

front of Rumania and Bulgaria

Hungary NATO-Member X Currently in top priority group for the EU

Czech Republic NATO-Member X In 2nd group of EU-negotiations

Cyprus X Currently in top priority group for the EU

Malta X In 3rd group of EU-negotiations

Turkey NATO-Member X The only applicant to the EU which does

not fulfil the political criteria

a Source for state of negotiations of EU-expansion: Annual Report of Commission

(November 2000) and FAZ, 28 June 2001, p. 6.

b The numbers represent (from left to right) the degree of political rights and civil liberties.

They are measured on a one-to-seven scale, with one representing the highest and seven the

lowest degree of freedom. They are subsumed in the third column to �Freedom-Status�

(http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings).

Politico-Strategic Aspects of NATO Enlargement towards the Baltic Region: A View from Lithuania


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Politico-Strategic Aspectsof NATO Enlargement towards theBaltic Region: A View from LithuaniaEvaldas Nekra�as,Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University

The decision on NATO enlargement will be made at the NATO Summit inPrague in November, 2002. There is little doubt that if not all then at leastsome aspiring Central and Eastern European countries will be invited tojoin NATO. It is well known that the most strong candidates are Sloveniaand Slovakia. An open issue today is wether Baltic countries � Lithuania,Latvia and Estonia � will be invited to join the Alliance or preference willbe given to Balkan countries: Romania and Bulgaria. Baltic countries and,especially, Lithuania are better prepared militarily, their economicsituation is healthier and politically they are more stable. But there is a lotof other arguments and considerations which will be taken into accountwhen taking decision in Prague. Of course, an informal decision as to theBaltic countries� (or at least of one Baltic country�s) admission to NATO willbe taken, a bit earlier.

Below I will try to examine briefly some of those arguments and con-siderations. I could enumerate them as follows: (1) alleged indefensibilityof the Baltic countries, (2) relative strategic importance of the Baltics andthe Balkans, (3) Russia�s position towards NATO�s expansion, and (4) theinfluence of the war against international terrorism on the prospects ofBaltic states� membership in NATO.

Let us start from the alleged indefensibility. I do not think that theargument about indefensibility of the Baltic states holds water. Theindefensibility of West Berlin or northern Norway during the cold Warnever became an acute problem because of uncertainty on the part of apossible aggressor about the Alliance�s response. As Dietrich Genschel,German Member to the International Defense Advisory Board for the Balticstates, noted �defensibility is primarily a question of the political will ofindividual states or Alliances and appropriate preparation�.1 Moreover, itseems that instead of defensibility it is more appropriate to speak aboutprotectability. There is no doubt that the Alliance is able to protect theBaltic states. And if we will take into account changes in Russia�s attitudetowards the West and its new strategic reorientation, the argument ofindefensibility will become even more irrelevant.

The second argument boils down to the thesis that the Balkans is muchmore important from a strategic point of view than the Baltics. Thisargument is more serious than the previous one. The Balkans were astrategically important region of Europe for centuries. Control of theBosporus and the Dardanelles straits was a serious issue of European

1 Dietrich Genschel, �How Can Security for the Three Baltic States be Best Achieved,�

Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review, No. 2, 1998, pp. 30�44 (p. 37).

Evaldas Nekra�as, Vilnius University


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politics. With Turkey in NATO this is not a present-day problem. Howeverthe Balkans cause many troubles even at the beginning of the 21st century.Yugoslavia did not dissolve as peacefully as the Soviet Union, and Bosnia,Kosovo and Macedonia remain Europe�s great concern. With admission ofRomania and Bulgaria into NATO, the organization�s ability of crisesmanagement and peacekeeping in the Balkans should increase. That is thereason why some NATO military planners are very interested to have bothcountries in NATO as soon as possible.

The Baltics, some would say, are strategically less important. But theBaltics have strategic value for NATO, albeit of a different kind. Member-ship of the Baltic states in the Alliance would substantially increase thesecurity in the Baltic Sea region and in Northern Europe. The Baltic sea iscloser to the heart of Europe than Kosovo and Macedonia and the Balticstates managed to create a stable situation on the Eastern shore of theBaltic Sea. For example, Lithuania managed to transform its relations withPoland which were extremely tense in the early nineties into a strategicpartnership. The Baltic states do not deserve to be punished for theirrather successful efforts to meet NATO�s political requirements andmilitary standards by adjourning their membership precisely because theywere too good in meeting them.

The third argument used frequently sounds as follows: Russia objectsheavily to Baltic states� membership in the Alliance and because goodrelations with Russia are more important for NATO than the security ofthe Baltic states, their membership must be postponed. I am convincedthat this argument is not more valid than the first one. First of all havingthree Baltic countries in NATO will increase and not decrease Russia�ssecurity. Russia�s security has not suffered after Poland, the Czech Republicand Hungary joined NATO. Moreover, Russia�s relations with thosecountries and especially with Poland improved substantially after 1999. Ofcourse, feeling secure and being secure are different things. It seems thatfor quite a long time Russians did not want to come to terms with NATO�senlargement being convinced that is directed against Russia. But thingsare changing and recently Putin�s words that he does not consider NATO tobe a hostile organization and that he would not object its further enlarge-ment in case NATO would move further on the road leading from amilitary organization to a political one, confirm that Russia�s position haschanged significantly. Being in Moscow in March of this year, at the timewhen Lithuania�s President Valdas Adamkus met Putin, I got the clearimpression that most of influential politicians and analysts tookLithuania�s future membership in NATO as granted and even not worth ofan elaborated discussion. Of course, free access to Kaliningrad is animportant matter to them, but I would like to recall that few months agoAdmiral Vladimir Jegorov, former commander-in-chief and presentgovernor of the Kaliningrad region, declared with admirable openness thatnothing has changed in Kaliningrad after Poland joined NATO andnothing will change when Lithuania will do the same.

Politico-Strategic Aspects of NATO Enlargement towards the Baltic Region: A View from Lithuania


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And now, drawing nearer to the end, I intend to examine briefly theinfluence of the most recent events on the prospects of Lithuania�s and theother Baltic states� membership in the Alliance There is little doubt thatthe problem of NATO�s eastward expansion must be seen today, inNovember 2001, from a rather different perspective than three monthsago. I mean of course the terrorist attack on the USA on September 11, andthe strike back which followed that attack.

In the late summer of 2001, many analysts believed that Russia�sinfluence on world affairs is very limited. In post-Cold War years itspolitical, economic, and military power decreased substantially. Its officialposition on NATO�s eastward expansion was still negative, but, as I alreadymentioned, its opposition to it was rather for show only. Thus it seemedthat the issue of which Central and Eastern European country will joinNATO and when will be decided by the USA, Canada and their Europeanallies alone taking into account mainly European problems (first of allthose of the Balkans) and relations between the USA and Europe, whichbecame a bit more complicated because of American plans to build up itsanti-missile defense and European plans to create an autonomous EU rapidreaction force. Some European NATO members, especially those who werereally interested in the development of the purely European militarypotential and in transforming Market-Europe into Power-Europe,2 fearedthat NATO�s eastward expansion may make American influence in Europeeven stronger than it is today and will block European efforts to becomeone of the most important players on the world scene They were con-cerned with the fact that, at present, many Eastern European states aremore pro-American than most Western European countries. I think thatsympathies and attitudes of Eastern Europeans may change in the futurebut the reluctance of Germany and other major European countries andtheir lack of enthusiasm as to further enlargement of NATO inevitably hasled to a strengthening of Eastern European countries� ties with America. Atthat time Russia�s stance towards NATO expansion was regarded as a factorof rather secondary importance although, it seems, Germany took Russia�sobjections more seriously than the USA..

Today the tension between the USA and EU has eased considerably. Bothface a new and dangerous common enemy and, as everybody knows, theexistence of an enemy is always conducive to the cohesion of any alliance.Even more important for us is the fact that Russia comes back to theforefront of world affairs in its new capacity of an extremely valuable allyof the USA and Europe in the fight against international terrorism Thatmeans that Russia�s views concerning issues of international politicsincluding that of NATO�s expansion become much more important thanthey used to be recently. Yet, I do not think that the latest developmentsare diminishing the Baltic states� chances to become NATO members in thenear future. On the contrary, it seems that Russia decided finally that

2 See Gilles Andreani, Christoph Bertram, and Charles Grant, Europe�s Military Revolution,

London: Centre for European Reform, 2001.

Evaldas Nekra�as, Vilnius University


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neither the USA, nor NATO are its enemies. The West (NATO and EU)becomes its strategic partner in countering radically new threats to theworld�s and Russia�s own security. These threats differ substantially fromthose which the world faced in the 20th century. Russia, whose possiblemembership in NATO has become, for the first time, the subject ofdiscussions has no reasons to oppose an expansion of the Alliance to theBaltic region. On the other hand, NATO needs new members to become astronger center of a worldwide coalition in the fight against internationalterrorism. In the new international situation, the old quarrels as to what isbetter � to have a wider or a more cohesive Alliance � seem to me ratherirrelevant. And, last but not least, already now we, the Balts, are securityproviders and not just security consumers. We provide NATO with the dataon the movements and identities of every aircraft in or near the Balticsand our soldiers are serving as peacekeepers in the Balkans. Our futurerole in the Alliance � small as it may be � should not be a negligible one.

Military Aspects of NATO Enlargement towards the Baltic Region


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Military Aspects of NATO Enlargementtowards the Baltic RegionJanis SartsDeputy State Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Riga

In assessing the importance of the military aspects for NATO�s enlarge-ment one has to take into account a number of factors. First, when oneremembers the summit that took place in Washington in 1999 celebratingNATO�s 50th anniversary, many people stated that NATO has proven to bethe most successful alliance in world history. The question was why is itso? What has made NATO distinctive from many other endeavors in thatarea that have been taken both in the 20th century and before? There are anumber of reasons for that. One is the actual military capability behindthe political structure and, another one is the fact that the politicalstructure is based on values. These are key points that made NATO anorganization that so many states regarded as their life insurance and stilldo that way.

Second, there is the question of where the events of September, 11 willlead NATO as an organization? What does it mean that NATO now is moreor less on the fringes of the operation in Afghanistan and what does itmean for the development of military aspects of NATO? It would be anexaggeration to say that NATO, especially militarily, is on the fringes ofthat operation. First of all, one sees that AWACS, more or less for the firsttime, are on a military mission in the United States, and that is a NATOasset. Second, there is a standing force in the Mediterranean. These are twoimportant components to the ongoing operation if one looks at thatoperation in a wider scale. Third, a lot of coordination takes place on thisissue through NATO, probably not in a formal context but certainlyinformally. Fourth, the more the operation proceeds, the more countrieswould start to send forces and there have been political declarations fromsome of the NATO countries on the willingness to do that. The US is alsoexploring the capabilities that would be required for a prolongedoperation. And fifth, the cooperation among the countries that areinvolved in the concrete operations would not be possible without havingNATO for 50 years, that is, without having the common planningmechanisms, having the common interoperability standards and havingthe common exercises. Even though NATO as a decision makingmechanism is not directly involved, the military capabilities that NATOpossess and that have made NATO a successfull organization are employed.Therefore, one should not look at NATO as something that would fadeaway in the wake of a new world. It might change slightly but itsimportance will still be there. All this indicates that the military aspect isstill relevant for NATO�s enlargement because, also in the future, NATOwill have this aspect as one of the key elements of the organization�scapabilitiy and capacity to act and to decide.

Janis Sarts, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Riga


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The experience of the last wave of enlargement where the decisionswere made primarily on political assumptions and were not made on avery broad analysis of the current capabilities of those that were invitedhas added an additional element to the new NATO enlargement debate vis-à-vis this military aspect: NATO has to know much better what is thecapability and the status of military readiness and the general status of themilitary in the countries that are lining up for membership.

What are the points with respect to these military aspects that would berelevant? There are four more or less interrelated elements. First, there isdefensibility. Even though the risks and the threats change, having Article5 immediately requires to look at this defensibility issue from whateverperspective. That not only applies to the Baltics, it also applies to Bulgaria,Romania, to whatever country that is in line. The second element refers toany country�s capabilities which it can contribute for operations some-where outside its own territory, i. e. like in the Balkans or like whateverother operation NATO might take. This is the question of potential benefitto the overall case, cause and capability. Third, which is more or less inter-related with the first two, is interoperability, i.e. the capability to operatetogether with other forces as a general parameter. And fourth, which isalso very, important, is the ability to develop capabilities. This addresses acountry�s ability to develop its capabilities in a certain time frame.

Speaking about military aspects one also has to address risks becausemilitary capabilities have to be developed against certain risk scenarios.First, one recognizes that the Baltic states do have the same risk scenariosas the rest of Europe: criminal activity, potential terrorism, illegal immi-gration et cetera. The risks and all the problems that arise in other areas ofEurope have impact on their risk environment and their security environ-ment. That is something they share with the rest of Europe although whatis rather distinctive of that is the geostrategic environment which is stillrather unpredictable in a medium to long term. This means, that withrespect to risks the Baltic states cannot rule out also a quite traditionalmilitary risk among the possible scenarios.

This remark, of course, refers to the development of Russia. Even todayone cannot really be sure of where does Russia go. It is not clear whether itwill not significantly change its policies in five to ten years from now.Therefore, this risk cannot be ruled out for the Baltic states which makesan impact on the way they address the military issues they have to dealwith.

Having established this background, one can now more preciselyaddress the four points mentioned above with respect to the Baltic statesproper. The first is defensibility. There is a more or less common agree-ment that if there is a military threat that is not immediate but is middleto long-term if it is any. That means that one should not look at the Balticstates� current military capability but take into account the plannedcapability within a certain time frame and the capability to develop thatability. Under such perspective, the Baltic�s military capability will bequite different from the present one. At least the plans that have been

Military Aspects of NATO Enlargement towards the Baltic Region


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drawn-up by the three Baltic states foresee that, within some years� time,there might be a military force of slightly less than 100.000 men which arewell-trained and well-equipped. These plans are not unlikely to be fulfilledbecause there is a growing military competence to be gained by partici-pation in the MAP process and there is a growing economy that cansustain the development of these capabilities. Therefore, it would be mis-leading to say that the military capacities of the Baltic states are totallyirrelevant.

With respect to the capabilities of NATO, the new strategic concept thathas been adopted in Washington in 1999 is actually also answering thatquestion from the NATO�s part. It stresses that the forces that aredevelopped by NATO are deployable and sustainable not in a one singleentity or a single land mass. This makes it rather possible for a quite quickresponse from the military side to also take into account that there is arather small land connection with other NATO countries. Moreover, onehas to see that the Baltic states do not join the alliance to have a war butrather to be protected and after having become a part of NATO it would behardly foreseeable to expect any military operation against the Baltics.

Second, as regards the Baltic states� military capabilities, in an inter-mediate time frame, they are able to provide more information on theirarea. That includes aerial pictures through the Baltic air surveillancenetwork that has been asked to be linked to the NATO system. However,there is already all possibility for NATO to plug-in and see the pictures.Then there is the possibility to use Baltron as a standing NATO naval forcein the Baltics. Beyond that, the possible Baltic input in a normal militaryoperation is quite small. With respect to military units it is of a battalionsize which, probably, could be brought to brigade size sometime in thefuture. They can, however, work on specialized capabilities and it is verywell in line with the new strategic concept that they developped somespecial capabilities like explosive ordnance disposal, like mine clearance atsea, like proper military engineer capabilities. These capabilities areprobably not big given what the countries can really financially afford butif one takes into account the operational environment within which NATOhas to work, these are important capabilities.

Third, with regard to to Baltic states� ability to achieve what they havestated they are in the favourable situation that they have no establishedold system that has to be reformed. They can develop from scratch and thepeople have a very open mind-set. Therefore, the Baltic�s have becomemore or less successfull MAP participants. They can show that they have allthe required systems to produce the capabilities and all systems functionaccording to NATO specifications.

An important aspect of all this is the financial aspect. Although it hasbeen quite hotly debated if the �2 percent of GDP� is a bench mark to bemet or if it is not, it is very good to have it because that makes one to con-centrate on this very important part of development of military aspectsand capabilities. All of the Baltic countries would reach soon or havealready reached the 2 percent and the growing economies of all Baltic

Janis Sarts, Deputy State Secretary, Ministry of Defense, Riga


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states, whatever the exact rate of growth may be, mean that it might besustained.

All these considerations lead to the point that, in comparison with theprevious enlargement, military factors are considered more cautiouslythan in the case of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary. The Baltic stateshave the MAP process which is a very good process to go through becauseit prepares these countries for membership. At the same time it allows forthe allies to see where they are, how they are and how they perform. Overthree years� time the allies have been able to see the progress made and thecapability to meet the self-established criteria. The importance of thatpractical aspect of capability to develop systems and military capabilitiesworks well for the Baltics because they can present good results.

As a conclusion, it should be repeated that the military aspect of NATO�senlargement is an important one. Of course, it is not a final and the mostdecisive one. The political arguments are the most decisive ones but themilitary aspect is certainly more important than it was in 1997.

The Accession of the Baltic States to the European Union


Mai 2002

20

The Accession of the Baltic Statesto the European UnionLauri Lepik, Research Fellow,Estonian Foreign Policy Institute

Despite the title of this presentation, I have no intention of analyzing why,whether and when Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania should join the EuropeanUnion. The answers are obvious to everyone. There is also no point inwasting time analyzing which states have provisionally closed how manychapters, or what sort of transition periods or exemptions a state has askedfor or managed to negotiate.

Instead, I would attempt to view the accession of Estonia, Latvia andLithuania in a wider and more nuanced context, and to draw participants�attention to some potential political problems that may arise in the shortand medium term. I would start making three observations.

First, an understanding of the Baltic states as a political grouping isonce again current, and this time is even justified.

Second, the progress of the Baltic states during the last couple of yearshas been rapid, so rapid that we may well begin to see signs of fatigue.

And third, the Baltic states are not just objectives of developments in therest of Europe, rather, that events in the Baltic states have an impact uponEuropean-wide processes as well.

Allow me to take each of these in turn, and at a greater length,beginning with the idea that the Baltics once again comprise a politicalgrouping of states.

From the time that independence was restored, a kind of identityquestion has been floating in the Baltic air. The problem was not that theBalts did not perceive themselves as being Europeans, or a part of Europe.They certainly did. Rather, the problem was how others saw us � that inthe international arena, Latvia would not be confused with Lithuania,Estonia with Latvia and so forth. This was only natural, given that thethree states chose differing methods to implement economic and otherreforms, and that differing methods brought about differing degrees ofsuccess.

For some time, Estonia had the most successful reform record amongthe Baltic states, and as a consequence launched accession negotiationswith the European Union before the others, in 1998.

For many years, however, Lithuania was widely believed to be thefurthest along of the three on the path to joining NATO. Latvia, for its part,was the first Baltic state to join WTO.

As one would expect of healthy competition, the success of one Balticstate in particular area drove the others to achieve. Lithuania and Latviahave made a quantitative leap in their talks with the European Union,having reached the level of Estonia and Poland in their number of pro-visionally closed chapters. At the same time, military reforms in Estoniaand Latvia have closed the gap on Lithuania�s prior headway.

Lauri Lepik, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute


21

The external environment has also played a vital role in these develop-ments. As a means of accelerating progress, all three Baltic states haveutilized the existing instruments � NATO�s Membership Action Plan andthe EU�s Road Map � with skill and in an exemplary manner,

At present, we can claim with certainty that Estonia, Latvia�s andLithuania�s levels of development have largely evened out. At least withinthe context of Estonia�s, Latvia�s and Lithuania�s two major foreign policypriorities (accession to the European Union and NATO), the Baltic statesform a unified group, the basis of which, moreover, makes sense to every-one. I would submit that this time, (perhaps for the first time,) thisgrouping is a justified way of thinking about the three states simplybecause the grouping reflects objective realities.

My second observation is this: reforms in the Baltic states have beenextremely fast; thus, it is natural, if unavoidable and unfortunate, that thisspeed has come with a social price.

Despite rapid economic growth, unemployment is high, in some placescomparable with that in Germany. It is getting harder and harder toexplain to voters, that these reforms are being carried out not in order tojoin the European Union, but rather to raise the quality of living. Liberaleconomic models are less and less popular � for instance, Estonia�s SocialDemocrat Foreign Minister Ilves recently launched a public debate overwhether to introduce a proportional income tax, itself an avant-garde ideafor a society accustomed to flat 26 percent income tax. The big win bySocial Democrats in Lithuania, as well as the election of left-wing Soviet �era politician Arnold Rüütel to be Estonia�s president both illustrate themood of the electorate. Latvia holds its elections next year...

Lithuanian Deputy Foreign Minister Rytis Martikonis spoke aloud thatwhich, until recently, was unspeakable in the Baltic states. At a Riga con-ference last month entitled �The Social Dimension of the EU Enlargement�he said: �We, in Lithuania, have been telling different interest groups andsociety at large that it is we who need reforms more that the Union or�Brussels� But many around this table can perhaps agree that this messageis not easy to get across to people�s minds. There is a perception in thecandidate countries that they are carrying a double burden: economic andsocial transition and adaptation of the entire EU legal acquis.�

The hypothesis that the speed of reform seems linked to social fatigueand, in turn to o souring attitude toward the EU, is held up in theempirical research.

In its March 2001 EU Enlargement brief, using data from the year 2000,Deutche Bank Research reports an interesting correlation in the candidatecountries between the projected results of a hypothetical Euro-referendumand the speed of reforms. In states where reforms have perhaps not goneso quickly, for instance in Romania and Bulgaria, support for joining theEuropean Union is stronger � 72 percent and 60 percent, respectively, ofthe population would say �Yes� in a referendum on accession.

In the states where reforms have been faster, for instance the Balticstates, the result is the opposite: 45 percent of those polls in Estonia would

The Accession of the Baltic States to the European Union


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vote for accession, 44 percent in Latvia and 40 percent in Lithuania. Inspring of this year in Estonia, for instance, support for joining the EUdropped to an all-time low of 32 percent -- this figure set off alarm bells allover the Government. One could argue, of course, that the long, dark andcold winter was responsible for the low numbers � six month of Estonianwinter would render even the most optimistic of nations completelyhopeless. But the real reasons for the low support obviously lie elsewhere.

My third observation consists of a conventional piece of wisdom, turnedon its head: the Baltic states are clearly affected by what goes on in the restof Europe. But I would submit that developments in the Baltic states alsoinfluence European-wide processes.

In many respects, the year 2002 will go down in history as a pivotal forthe Baltic states as well as Europe as a whole. Negotiations to enlarge theEuropean Union are in a decisive, and their most difficult, phase- oneneeds only to think of structural funds, agriculture, and institutionalreform. At the same time, both the European Union and the Baltic stateshave set the goal of concluding talks by end of 2002.

And who could forget that Germany and France � both key EU states- arescheduled to hold parliamentary elections next year, the results of whichwill almost certainly, in some way, affect the enlargement process. Thatthe elections will have an effect is something nobody doubts � a goodexample was Germany�s and later the EU�s proposal to impose a 7-yeartransition period for new members on free movement of labor. It iseveryone�s sincere hope that in 2002, Germany will clarify its stance onPoland�s readiness, and that Ireland will ratify the Treaty of Nice.

Next year will bear witness to another event that has long been on theBaltics� radar screen � NATO�s summit meeting in Prague. There is muchuncertainty in today�s new world. But the current state of affairs stronglysuggests that all Baltic states will, indeed, receive an invitation in Pragueto join NATO.

An invitation would resolve the most fundamental problem the Balticstates face � the security question. Support in the Baltics for joining NATOhas always enjoyed a 15�20 percent lead on that for the EU.

It is no secret that for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, one importantmotivation for accession to the EU is the security element. This should beneither surprising nor a reason for reproach. Finland had the same inter-est when it joined the EU in 1995. The only difference, as Max Jakobson haspointed out, is that at the time, the Finnish leadership actively covered upthe security element in the fear that the Euro-referendum would fail.

The idea that EU membership will lessen the security risk to the Balticstates is a popular one among certain well known, accomplished andwidely respected German politicians, Volker Rühe and Klaus Kinkel toname just a couple. The difference with stance of the Baltic politicians issimply in tactics � to reach the same goal.

Some might argue that if the Baltic states achieve their highest priority-of assured security � through an invitation to NATO, then accession to theEuropean Union a priori becomes a lesser issue. This is, of course a purely

Lauri Lepik, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute


23

hypothetical argument. But as we all know, politicians capitalize on gains.Estonia�s next national elections are scheduled for March 2003.

If this scenario were to come to pass, then an important raison d�etre forenlarging the European Union would also seem to lose credibility. Andwith that loss of credibility could come a tragic loss of momentum infinally creating a new Weltanschauung, �a Europe whole and free�.

It is up to all of us to make sure this does not happen.

General Report


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General ReportDetlev Kraa, Berlin

The meeting gathered about 30 participants from the Baltic republics andGermany who came from the fields of academia, think tanks and politicallife. Three broad topics were discussed: (a) politico-strategic aspects ofNato�s enlargement toward the Baltic region, (b) military aspects of thatenlargement, and (c) aspects of the Baltic states� envisaged accession to theEuropean Union.

Political and strategic aspects of NATO�s enlargementtoward the Baltic region

The events of 11th of September 2001 had a significant influence on theinternational security system. The discussion about the strategic effects ofNATO�s enlargement which took place during the first Baltic-GermanDialogue meeting also took note of this event. Although some revisions offormer analysis and evaluations seemed to be necessary, the participantsoverwhelmingly agreed that there was no reason to generally put intoquestion the process of enlargement. It has by no means lost its strategicimportance and has already proceeded too far to be cut off.

Consequently, participants welcomed the Baltic NATO enlargement forvarious reasons. Especially Baltic participants stressed the continuousfeeling of insecurity prevailing in their countries. This feeling constitutes astrong impetus for joining NATO in order to get an insurance againstpossible future risks.

The significance of joining NATO

For the Baltic states joining NATO would mean the definite end of theSecond World War and, therefore, also be of an extremely moral signifi-cance. Like the Western European states, they value NATO as a first rateanchor, a kind of life-insurance. This holds especially true for small coun-tries which would feel extremely uneasy in an isolated position outside ofthe alliance. Furthermore, NATO membership would contribute tostability in a broader sense via the inclusion of the Baltic states in an areaof common values. This, in turn, would stimulate development andpositive change in these countries, thus enhancing the basis for collectivesecurity and mutual trust.

Arguments against Baltic accession to the effect that these states couldnot be effectively defended in case of a military emergency were rejected. Itwas stressed that military arguments had played no role with regard toBerlin during the time of the Cold War nor with regard to the defensibilityof northern Norway. It was argued that defence, first of all, was a questionof political will. If this will was present, the alliance would also be able todefend the Baltic states.

Political and strategic aspects of NATO�s enlargement toward the Baltic region


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Some speakers warned against a possible discrimination of the Balticstates in comparison to some south-east European states during the nextround of NATO enlargement. Although the problematic security situationin the Balkans was recognised, this was not accepted as justification of aprivileged situation of, say, Slovenia or Slovakia in terms of NATOaccession. The Baltic Sea due to its proximity to the central European areawhere NATO security already prevails, should also become part of the Euro-pean security core area. In addition, the Baltic states are much betterprepared for NATO accession than the south-east European candidatessuch as Romania and Bulgaria.

NATO�s role for new members

The possible consequences of the September, 11 events are likely to affectthe future character of NATO. This will not remain without consequencesfor new members which will have to cope with the realities of a changedalliance in comparison to that which they initially intended to join.

Some participants envisaged a loss of importance of NATO due to thefact that the alliance, after this date, has been active only on the fringes ofinternational efforts at combatting terrorism. Especially, NATO has noobvious co-ordination role in military terms. The USA keeps to a single-handed leadership and chooses its partners according to its needs. TheAmerican position may be strongly influenced by the frustratingexperiences during the war on Kosovo with �warfare by committee�. Theactual experience forebodes negatively on NATO�s ability to cope with aserious security threat even in Europe. Thus, the Baltic states� reliance onNATO�s automatic security guarantee might be misleading.

Opposing views, however, stated that the situation on the fringes is anatural state for NATO under the given circumstances. The battle againstterrorism cannot be regarded as a �real� article 5 issue despite its invo-cation. This, from the very beginning, has been more of a political thanmilitary-related character. Moreover, NATO has been active after the 11thof September. There has been a lot of informal coordination within NATO;AWACS-systems were sent to the USA and naval forces into the EasternMediterranean. Further displacements could follow. In addition, one has todifferentiate between NATO�s tasks and abilities with regard to such a faraway military theatre like Afghanistan and NATO�s role and capabilities inthe European theatre. Contrary to ESDP in its actual shape, NATO is, for along time to come, indispensable for coping with security threats in theBalkans and all over Europe as well.

It was, however, mentioned that the EU security dimension could beregarded as a complement to NATO�s security tasks in Europe. As long asthe EU member states were reluctant to considerably raise their militaryspending, ESDP would, however, have to rely on NATO assistance,especially with regard to command and control capabilities. Nevertheless,there could be a division of tasks between both organisations as it is

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already taking shape in the Balkans. In the longer term, this could lead toa reduced US military engagement in Europe.

As a consequence, NATO would become more of a political organisationalthough it would still keep its military capabilities. Whereas some of theparticipants apprehended that under such circumstances a far reachingenlargement would carry the danger of diminishing NATO�s internalcohesion, others rejected that possibility. They argued that a broader mem-bership would automatically lead to a broader institutionalised �allianceagainst terrorism�. Rising organisational complexity and more difficultdecision making due to a substantial rise in the number of members couldbe dealt with if the will to reach a consensus would be kept.

Nevertheless, the question was raised if there was a lasting need to forma much broader coalition in order to fight international terrorism, a taskthat NATO could not perform sufficiently well. If so, the Americanattention could be deviated from NATO thus severely undermining thecoherence of the alliance in the longer term.

Russia and NATO

Russia�s relation with NATO and her reaction to enlargement was regardedas a crucial factor with regard to the enlargement decision-makingprocess. Several Baltic participants were of the opinion that their coun-tries� membership would be beneficial for NATO and for Russia as well.Having NATO member states at its borders would reduce the risk of apossible power vacuum or grey zone in its immediate neighbourhood,both of which would be regarded with unease by Moscow.

Some German participants argued that after September, 11 the chanceshave been increased, to include the Baltic countries without antagonisingRussia. The NATO-Russia relationship has become more relaxed, eventhough the future political development of Russia still remained unclear.However, Russian flirtation with alternative strategic orientations such asan upgrading of relations with China, have become much less likely.Russia�s future has been more closely tied to Europe.

The upgrading of Russia as a strategic partner for NATO and the UnitedStates has, for the first time, made possible to speculate about an eventualRussian membership of NATO. This would, however, be a very long-termperspective and would require a very substantial process of change inRussia. Nevertheless, under the new circumstances, NATO will have tospecify further its relations with Moscow. The NATO summit in Prague, infall 2002, will not only decide about enlargement, it will also have to saysomething about the future role of Russia within the alliance�s context.

Other participants, however, argued that Russia would still remain verydistinct from normal NATO members. It will continue to have greatdifficulties in solving its problems, especially with regard to its democraticdeficiencies. Thus, Russia, for a long time to come, could only be perceivedas remaining outside of the alliance. Furthermore, one cannot detect anychanges in Russia�s military doctrine which would point to a fundamental

Political and strategic aspects of NATO�s enlargement toward the Baltic region


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revision of its strategic outlook. NATO still is and will continue to beregarded as a main threat to Russia. Thus, it would be premature to offerMoscow a far-reaching special relationship with NATO, not to speak of aneventual membership. That would result in a completely different alliance,which could not be in a well-defined Baltic or German interest. Putin�sideas of the construction and role of the alliance are not acceptable,especially for the Baltic states. He is interested in having more influenceon NATO�s policy without undergoing the obligations of membership.What Putin wants, is to keep his freedom of choice while reducing theimpact of NATO.

In addition, as some participants argued, Putin�s alleged changes after11th of September in the direction of greater pragmatism and co-operationare based on wrong western evaluations. Such a view would not take intoaccount contradictory actions such as Putin�s attempts at neutralisingGeorgia or tightening control over Ukraine. Russia still has not recognisedthat its empire does not exist any longer and that its status � with theexception of its nuclear capabilities � is that of a Third-World-country.

Another argument against the likelihood of a change in Russia�sstrategic perception is its continuing emphasis on the Islamic and demo-graphic threat emanating from the situation in Central Asia. Although, atpresent, Moscow could be interested in a stronger co-operation with theWest, the real test would come if, for instance, the situation in CentralAsia would sour and would turn into a security threat of Russia�s borderregions. The experience with the �new� Putin were too short to predict hisreaction to such a development although, most likely, he would react uni-laterally, without giving much concern to possible positions of NATO.

However, one conclusion of this discussion was not to pay too muchattention to the issue of Putin�s trustworthiness or to possible changes ofRussia�s military doctrine. Under the new circumstances after September,11, there is a need for strategic co-operation with Russia, even thoughthere is not yet much progress to be seen in that respect.

Russia�s attitude towards NATO enlargement

The discussion about Russia�s attitude towards NATO was also an indicatorof a more positive expectation with regard to the question of the Balticstates� accession to NATO. However, some participants still expected aharsh Russian reaction. This could influence the attitudes of some Euro-pean NATO members towards the issue of Baltic membership. EspeciallyGermany seems to value relations with Russia higher than the Baltic mem-bership issue. Thus, hesitation could prevail in Germany. If this Germanattitude would last new NATO members in central and eastern Europecould opt for a stronger American role in the alliance, which would drivekind of a rift among the European allies.

Finally, much would depend on Russia�s domestic politics. For Putinhimself, the issue of Baltic NATO membership does no longer seem to be offirst priority. For him, no red line would be transgressed by that event. He

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has already accepted that the Baltic states will belong to the next round ofenlargement. However, Baltic accession could be used against Putin by hisdomestic critics and by the military which does not yet show a change inits negative attitude concerning NATO�s enlargement. Thus, Putin�sreactions will be determined as much by domestic politics considerationsas they are influenced by security considerations.

It was argued that Russia�s security would grow with the Baltic statesjoining NATO as after the accession of the Czech Republic and Polandthere has not been less security for Russia than before. Neither wouldNATO�s enlargement endanger Russia�s accession to the Kaliningrad area.NATO can simply no longer be regarded as a hostile organisation by Russia.Thus, it should be expected that the other applicants for membershipwould also no longer meet extensive Russian resistance. However, thepsychological difference of being secure and feeling secure continues toplay a role in defining Russia�s attitude. The West will have to take intoconsideration this problem and will have to develop some politicalanswers to it that would meet Russian concerns.

Military aspects of NATO�s enlargement toward the Baltic region

For the Baltic states, NATO�s military capabilities are an important elementin their decision to join. As a military alliance NATO is an impressivesuccess story especially with regard to its deterrent capabilities. Hence,membership would first of all mean to be better protected in the future. Itwould much less mean an improvement of one�s own war fightingabilities. But even under this perspective, any new member would have tomeet the military obligations that derive from membership: participationin the common planning mechanisms, fulfilling the standards of inter-operability and participation in allied exercises, to mention just the mostimportant ones. In order to fulfil these requirements, the new memberswould have to prove a certain amount of defensibility, of ability to operateoutside the country, sufficient interoperability of equipment and, mostimportant, the ability, to further develop their capabilities.

As traditional military risks in Europe, such as the Russian threat havebeen considerably reduced and are no longer of imminent concern, themilitary contribution of the new members should be evaluated in a longerterm perspective: Are they able and ready to develop the necessary capa-bilities in some years� time? Do they have a sound and reliable politicalplanning in that respect?

The Baltic countries would add almost 100,000 men to NATO forces andwould provide growing military competence and economic development.They would enable better intelligence concerning the wider Baltic regionand could offer facilities for improved air reconaissance. Furthermore,they have fairly well-developed capabilities in mine sweeping and otherengineering tasks. Perspectives of further development are good given theeconomic outlook of the three states which expect an average economicgrowth rate of between 5 and 8 percent per annum. This development

Military aspects of NATO�s enlargement toward the Baltic region


29

would be much sustained by NATO membership which would furtheradaptation to Western standards and thinking, thus bolstering thepolitical will to succeed in meeting the military requirements of NATOmembership.

With regard to some concerns about the Baltic countries� economicperformance under global economic recession it was argued that therewould be no difficulties in meeting the requirements established in theMAP process. All Baltic states would fulfil the margin of 2 percent of GNPas the relevant standard for military spending. Latvia would provide 2percent up to 2003 and thus get more credibility. Estonia, due mainly toelection reasons, only foresees a share of 1 percent, as one has to take intoaccount opposing demands on budgetary lines during election time.Lithuania has no problems in meeting the 2 percent guideline. As therewould be no need for the acquisition of new battle tanks or expensiveships, the foreseen money should be enough to meet the military require-ments of NATO membership. In addition, the accession to the EuropeanUnion would strengthen the economic basis of all three countries thusenabling them to make the required contributions to NATO in future.

Military co-operation among the Baltic states would be expandedbeyond its actual already well-developed level, for instance in the frame-work of institutions like Baltbat. After accession, Lithuania could expandmilitary co-operation with Poland. In general, soldiers from the Balticstates are not without experience in multinational co-operation due totheir participation in various international peacekeeping operations.

As regards the necessity and demands of enhancing interoperability,NATO�s own failure in improving co-operation in the field of militaryindustry and procurement was mentioned as a major flaw and as a certaindisincentive for new members to undertake more efforts in that respect.Furthermore, established NATO members have a certain advantage abovenewcomers in securing orders for military procurement as could be seenby Lithuania�s defeat against Denmark concerning the procurement ofcertain heavy weapons for other NATO members.

Concerns about the role of large ethnic minorities in some Baltic stateswith regard to national defence were dismissed as unjustified. There is nodiscrimination against ethnic minorities in military affairs. To thecontrary, members of minorities are generally fairly eager to do militaryservice as they are, in general, very much interested in becoming inte-grated into the national society. There could be no doubt that the vastmajority of the ethnic minorities would become loyal and fully integratedcitizens over time. For instance, 75 percent of the ethnic minority willhave finished Latvian schools in the near future and thereby will havemuch improved their ability to integrate into the societal mainstream ofthe country in every respect. One could even raise the question, if the EU-induced policy of granting special minority rights would not become dys-functional for the social and political integration process of these groups.

With regard to problems of training and personnel-development in theBaltic armies it was argued that special consideration was given to the

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training of normal personnel. There are already well-functioning traininginstitutions for officers and commissioned officers such as, for instance,the Baltic Defence College in Estonia. Curricula are under evaluation andhave already been reformed to a certain extent. Issues that would berelevant for a smooth coupling of Baltic forces with other NATO forceshave got a special emphasis in military as well as civilian training courses.

The personnel drain has been stopped for the time being. A certainimprovement in the quality of life and an adequate remuneration are themost important factors for this result. Nevertheless, as in many otherNATO member states, the Baltic armies have to compete with the civiliansector for the best manpower.

EU Enlargement and the Baltic republics

Crucial issues of the enlargement process

The speed of the enlargement process would be determined by themanagement of three difficult dossiers in the accession negotiations in2002: the future of the structural funds, the common agricultural policyand financial regulations. All of these issues are directly related to thelonger-term question of EU reform in the light of enlargement. This couldcomplicate accession negotiations. Furthermore, elections in France andGermany could also have an impact on the further negotiation process;especially in the field of common agricultural policy the final Frenchposition would hardly be established before the elections.

Another factor that may impact on accession negotiations could be theworld-wide economic recession. Economic difficulties could enhance theEU�s readiness for reforms. But, more likely it would lead to a moreinward-looking attitude concentrating on problems of rising unemploy-ment and rising social spending thus reducing the EU�s generosity towardsthe applicant countries. In general, support for enlargement coulddecrease and the principle of solidarity which has been a driving forcebehind the whole enlargement process, could be damaged. If all this wouldlead to a delay of EU enlargement, the ratification process of NATOenlargement might also be negatively influenced.

A view on the Baltic applicants

It was argued that viewing the Baltic applicants as a firm unit would bemisleading. They do not form a block in any formal sense but a groupingin a political sense. They could sometimes have specific interests, whichwould lead to one Baltic voice in EU deliberations and which may also leadto a certain pooling of votes. Such a pooling would give them a greaterweight in the EU Council�s voting procedure: they would represent 4.3 per-cent of total votes in the Council whereas their share in EU population isonly 1.5 percent.

Each of the Baltic states has made a lot of progress in closing the gap tothe EU: Very early, Estonia could have been regarded as an economic



31

success story, but also Lithuania and Latvia have made much economicprogress with Latvia becoming the first Baltic member of WTO. This devel-opment has been supported from the outside by processes such as thenecessity to meet the NATO-MAP requirements or EU timetables of approxi-mation of policies to EU standards.

Economic reforms, however, have been accompanied by risingunemployment rates causing social problems. Consequently, there is acertain reluctance in parts of the Baltic societies with respect to liberalreform models. The social dimension of enlargement gains in importanceunder these conditions.

The old �new� neighbourhood

Although accession negotiations mainly focus on internal aspects of EUpolicy, external relations are of special importance for the Baltic states.After enlargement, the existing borders in the region would becomeexternal borders of the EU with a replacement of existing national borderregimes by the common border regime of the Union. This could lead tosome problems: What would these �new borders� mean for Russia, Belarusand Ukraine? What kind of border regulations will be established? Howcould a breakdown of cross-border economic activities in border regions beprevented? What would be the influence of the events of September 11 onthe EU policy concerning internal and external security?

The existing EU border regime works on a high technical level. Its basicaim is to stop illegal activities without impeding cross-border co-operationin the economic or political field. Moreover, one should remember thateven within the Schengen system of the EU there are still border controlsby certain member states. Border controls between the old and newmember states of the EU would continue to exist at least until the newmembers would be able to effectively implement the Schengen Infor-mation System II, the introduction of which even among the old membersis not foreseen before the year 2005.

A special case concerning the border regime will be the region ofKaliningrad. However, the Lithuanian participants were convinced thateven under the new border regime the actual situation would improve.Much would depend on Moscow�s reaction to the new visa regime thatwould be introduced next year. Then would it also be possible to judgehow far actual concerns by small cross-border traders were justified. It is,however, interesting to note that Russia in dealing with the EU enlarge-ment no longer puts a strong emphasis on the Kaliningrad issue.

Public opinion and enlargement

Besides all considerations concerning substantial issues of Baltic member-ship public opinion is another important factor to be taken into accountbecause, in the very end, there will be a referendum on the treaty ofaccession in each of the Baltic states. All Baltic governments will be facedwith the task of convincing their public that acceptance of the negotia-

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tion�s result would be in the country�s favour and well-defined long-terminterest. For this to happen, public trust in governments is a crucialelement. Unpopular governments would reduce the chances of acceptancein the referendum on the treaty of accession. Another important questionwould be, how far the political opposition would try to exploit a generaldissatisfaction with the government during referendum time for itsparochial interests or if the opposition would act with regard to EU-membership on the basis of a more general and state-oriented outlook.

Actual public support for EU-membership is decreasing in the Balticstates. This could be a result of the tremendous and rather speedy struc-tural change and its social implications that has been created by theprocess of approximation to EU standards so far. People start feelingexhausted by the amount and speed of change. As opinion polls show, inEstonia, public support has declined from 40 percent in February to 32 per-cent at the end of October. The trend is confirmed in the other Baltic statesas well although the figures are not as dramatic as the Estonian ones.

Concerning the economic and social change it would be important tomake the public understand that the EU is not the driving force behindeconomic globalisation and its results which would impact on the Balticstates anyway. Nor is the EU about to abolish the free movement of personsamong itself and the candidate countries; what is under discussion is thetemporary postponement of the free circulation of labour force.

It should, however, made clear to the general public that EU member-ship would not come without costs; there would be winners and losers. Avery important issue in that respect would be the definition of ways andmeans for compensating the losers. This would be of special importancewith regard to the agrarian population who, with few exceptions, wouldbe among the losers of enlargement. The intelligent transfer of EU regu-lations for socially cushioning the structural change in agriculture wouldbe an important element in creating the necessary public support forenlargement. Such measures would be supported by EU regulations thatwould contribute to the creation of a generally positive business climate.

The practice of enlargement negotiations is also of a certain importancewith respect to the public acceptance of EU membership. Accession shouldnot look like an unfriendly take-over. To this end, transitional measuresshould be applied whenever and wherever necessary. The EU could proveits sensitivity towards special problems of the Baltic states, for instance inthe fields of fishery and environmental affairs.

Public opinion, however is rather volatile and can be influenced byvarious factors. Thus, the outcome of a referendum on EU membershipwould among other factors depend on the general economic and politicalsituation of the time, the general performance of the government, thepolitical strategy of the opposition and so forth. If the referendum wouldbe held in 2003 which would not be totally unlikely, the coincidence withthe parliamentary elections would also be of importance for the outcomein Estonia.



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The issue of NATO membership finds a much larger public acceptance �figures reveal up to 20 points more consent � because the issue of nationalsecurity seems to be regarded much more important than EU membershipwhich seems to be more linked to issues such as economic and social well-being. This being so raises the danger of another loss in support for EUmembership once accession to NATO has been secured. Thus, it would bevery important to convince the public that NATO membership and EUentry are two sides of the same coin and that both processes wouldreinforce each other.

Another element to be taken into account would be the simultaneous-ness of the referenda in all three Baltic states. Was it conceivable thatpeople would vote differently in different states, thus creating the possi-bility of erecting new external EU borders among some of the Baltic states?In this respect, much would depend on how far the people in each state doview themselves as part of a Baltic grouping or more of a distinct nationwhich is different from its neighbours.

With regard to the latter aspect, the abandonment of national sovereign-ty, the transfer of decision-making competencies also in domestic affairs toBrussels, would be a crucial issue which could and, most likely, would beexploited by opposition groups. People in the Baltic states may be inclinedto view this as a serious political loss. It will be necessary to convince themthat abandoning national sovereignty for the EU would also mean poolingsovereignty within the EU, thus enhancing the common political weight ininternational affairs.

It was argued that the general public in the Baltic states should beconvinced of the advantages of EU membership more by stressing itspolitical implications than by putting too much emphasis on the eco-nomic effects. The latter would always be ambiguous whereas nobodycould deny the positive political effects of the larger European re-unifi-cation for long-term stability and peace on the continent. Although, in thepast, the EU contributed also much to the economic well-being of itsmember states the political effect of the EU on the change of the Europeanpolitical landscape was far more important. Aiming at EU membershipshould, therefore, be regarded by the applicant countries as a contributionto the further accomplishment of this process.

Rejecting accession to the EU would mean to be left out of the commoncreation of stability and peace. Especially for the Baltic states, it wouldmean to be left in an uncomfortable situation between the EU and Russia.Eventual NATO membership would be the only safety-belt available to theBaltic people. Its concrete meaning would very much depend on thefurther development of NATO as a security providing organisation. Even inthat case, the EU-Russia relationship would be defined without the Balticstates. Thus, the more comfortable place in the family of the Europeanpeople is to be found within the EU.

Program


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Program

First Baltic�German Dialogue,Berlin, November 2�4, 2001

Friday, November 2, 2001

until 17:00 h Arrival of foreign participantscheck-in at theHotel Avalon,Emser Str. 6,10719 Berlin

19:30 h Welcome DinnerRestaurant im LogenhausEmserstrasse 12�1310719 Berlin

Saturday, 3 NovemberVenueSWP, Ludwigkirchplatz 3�4, 10719 Berlin

9:30 h First SessionPolitico-strategic aspects of NATO enlargementtowards the Baltic regionA View from Germany

Dr. Peter Schmidt, SWP, head of research group onSecurity policy

A View from LithuaniaProf. Evaldas Nekra�as, Institute of InternationalRelations and Political Science, Vilnius

11:00 h Tea/Coffee Break

11:30 h Second SessionMilitary aspects of NATO enlargement towards theBaltic regionIntroductory statement: Janis Sarts, Deputy State Secretary,Ministry of Defense, Riga

13:00 h Lunch at SWP-Casino

14:30 h Third SessionEU enlargement towards the Baltic republicsIntroductory statementLauri Lepik, non-residential fellow, Estonian Foreign PolicyInstitute, Berlin

16:00 h End of conference

List of Participants


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ESTONIAEstonian Foreign Policy Institute

Dr. Andres KasekampDirectorEstonian Foreign Policy Institute,Tallinn

Mr. Harri TiidoDeputy Permanent UndersecretaryMinistry of Foreign Affairs, Tallinn

Ms. Mari TomingasNational SecurityAdvisor to the PresidentTallinn

Mr. Lauri LepikNon-residential research fellowEstonian Foreign Policy Institute,Berlin

Mr. Arti HilpusFirst Secretary, Political AffairsEstonian Embassy, Berlin

LATVIAInstitute ofInternational Affairs

Atis LejinsDirectorInstitute of International Affairs, Riga

Janis SartsDeputy State SecretaryMinistry of Defense, Riga

Nils JansonsDirectorSecurity Policy Department,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Riga

Grigorijs KrupnikovsChairmanRiga Jewish CommunityRiga

Andris TeikmanisLatvian ambassador to GermanyBerlin

Ms. Daina KrievaFirst SecretaryLatvian embassy, Berlin



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LITHUANIAInstitute of International Relationsand Political Science

Dr. Raimundas LopataDirectorInstitute of International Relationsand Political Science,Vilnius University

Prof. Evaldas Nekra�asInstitute of International Relationsand Political Science,Vilnius University

Mr. Kestutis KrisciunasMember of ParliamentDefense Policy Committee

Darius ZeruolisEuropean Committee,Government of the Republic ofLithuania, Vilnius

Mr. Vytautas GudaviciusFirst SecretaryLithuanian Embassy, Berlin

Mr. Vytautas GudaitisMinister PlenipotentiaryLithuanian Embassy, Berlin

SWP

Dr. Christoph BertramDirector

Dr. Heinz KramerHead of Research Unit�EU Enlargement�

Kai-Olaf LangResearch Unit �EU Enlargement�

Dr. Peter SchmidtHead of Research Unit�Security Policy�

FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG

Dr. Wulf LapinsFriedrich-Ebert-Stiftung,Coordinator Baltic states, Riga

Dr. Detlev KraaRapporteur, Berlin

Other participants:

Johannes von AhlefeldtGerman BundestagSPD Group

Dr. Dietrich GenschelMajor General (ret.)Bonn

Hans-Jürgen HeimsoethDirectorDepartment for Central and NorthEuropean States and Baltic SeaCooperation, Ministry of ForeignAffairs, Berlin

Andreas KünneDepartment for Security Policy andNATO AffairsDesk officer NATO enlargement,Ministry of Foreign Affairs,Berlin

Frank-Ulrich KupferschmidtCaptainMinistry of Defense, Berlin/Bonn

Peter PtassekDepartment for EU EnlargementDesk officer for Baltic region,Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Berlin

Documents

First BalticŒGerman Dialogue - SWP · 2015-11-27 · First BalticŒGerman Dialogue Berlin, November 2Œ4, 2001 Mai 2002 Berlin SWP Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Riga/Bonn Estonian