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Thailand in The Cold War:  An Era of American Presence and Dealing with Changes  

Pat Chirathivat  HIST: The Global Cold War  

Spring 2015    

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1.Introduction  

The Cold War, spanning from 1947 until 1991, was arguably one of the most influential,

but also arduous periods of strong political tension in the modern world. Its effects reverberated

far and wide, changing not only international relationships but also reaching deep into the

domestic structures of all those involved. One such country of interest, Thailand, underwent

profound transformative change during this era.  

Thailand’s central position in Southeast Asia, with Bangkok as its focal point at the head

of the Gulf of Thailand, facilitates the movement of trade. This strategic geographic location

makes Thailand an important partner for developed countries. Because of this geo-political and

economic interest, Western superpowers had strong incentives to quell the spread of communism

into Thailand. Driven by their fear of communism, the U.S. became a strategic player in Thai

politics in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The U.S. closely collaborated with the military regime

that dominated Thailand from 1947-1973, who relied on the U.S.’ resources to spur economic

growth, protect their borders, and strengthen their military.  

The rampant economic progress and increases in industrial production that resulted from

this relationship drove large populations into Thailand’s manufacturing and service industries in

the early-1960s. With more workers, technology advanced and expanded, and the economy grew

from a limited agricultural economy to one that was industrial, simultaneously relying less on

exporting raw materials and more so on the assembling of finished goods. With this boom in the

economy, the country underwent significant infrastructural modification in bringing workers to

locations that desperately needed their labor, and also to facilitate domestic trade. New roads

connected rural areas straight into the hearts of urban centers, allowing modernization to reach

even the farthest, most impoverished and previously closed off regions.  

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2.Conceptual/Analytical/Historiographical Framework  

Earlier historiography of the Cold War in Southeast Asia, for example Sean Randolph’s

The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics 1950-1985, oversimplified the position of

Thailand as an unequivocal ally of the United States.1 I argue that the situation was complicated

by domestic politics in Thailand. As Amitav Acharya says, “in the ultimate analysis, Southeast

Asia is what its peoples and societies have made it to be.”2  

Some aspects of this paper will be rooted in a conceptual framework similar to that of E.P.

Thompson. While he sought to do justice for the English working class, this paper attempts to

represent the emergence of social tensions in Thailand from below. He writes, “common

experiences (inherited or shared), feel and articulate the identity of their interests as between

themselves, and as against other men whose interests are different from (and usually opposed to)

theirs.”3 Those who rallied against the U.S. presence in Thailand shared similar values and

backgrounds, allowing them to use this common experience both felt and articulated to band

together against others whose interests were opposite to theirs. In other words, the U.S. and Thai

elites who benefited from the U.S. presence.  

As the U.S. became more involved in Thailand, they brought with them not only military

and economic assistance, but also western values and ideology. These western values contradicted

the traditional Thai values that were being promoted by the military regime. A number of

interesting ironies emerged from the twin interests of the U.S. and Thailand. Namely, the U.S.’

stipulations on aid and space for international organizations to enter (the World Bank) represent a

top-down framework of governance and control. However, the western values that they imported

                                                                                                               1 Sean R Randolph, The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986), 221. 2 Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013),16. 2 Amitav Acharya, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013),16. 3 Edward P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 9.

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opened up democratic space from the bottom up, which resulted in increased instability.

Paradoxically, while the military regime wanted to increase control through U.S. intervention, the

seemingly symbiotic relationship led to various social and political tensions. I argue that the

bottom-up values that the U.S. introduced at the invitation of the top-down regime led to the

eventual disintegration of both U.S. presence and military power in Thailand. In the process of

advancing my argument I will examine the sectors of Thai society where the U.S. presence was

most visibly found, the impact of these effects, and the tensions and ironies that emerged from the

relationship between Thailand and the U.S.  

 Methodology: The Matrix Approach  

In understanding U.S. presence and its effects on Thailand, it would be helpful to interpret

this through a matrix approach. This approach is widely used to compare the positive and negative

effects of the top-down and bottom-up system of governance.4 To start with, the U.S., coming in

as a foreign, highly regarded western superpower imposed many means of change that Thailand

was coerced into accepting. However, at the same time, there were other changes that were

welcomed by the military regime. U.S. presence followed a top-down rule of governance in which

most power and commands were conducted at the top, and strongly enforced, with the help of

Thai military government a tier below in the bureaucratic system. This top down rule can be

grouped into two categories: positive and negative top-down effect from the American presence.

The positive includes secure peace and order against communism with the full cooperation of the

Thai military regime and an expansion of the local economy as well as the assistance in building

of extensive infrastructure to connect rural and urban growth. Negative effects include war

                                                                                                               4 Ar, Tamer, and Geert Jan Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, (London: Academic Press, 1982), 1-3.

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casualties such as deaths or injuries, as well as the boom in the sex industry that brought

controversy in the realm of public morality.  

In response to these changes, Thailand’s public, especially masses of youth congregated in

voicing their concerns and seeking remedies to the social problems they faced daily. This

phenomenon, in which the assembling of common people was the main trigger for higher up,

broader social change, can be summed up as the bottom-up effects. This too, can be grouped into

two categories: positive and negative bottom-up effects. The positive includes an increase in

student movements, labor movements, stronger monarchy role in public services, and the end of

military rule and rise of democratic sentiments within the people. Negative effects, on the other

hand, witnessed a surprising strengthening of internal security and military dictatorship,

overpopulation within cities due to increasing migration from the countryside, resulting in the

creation of a new class of the urban poor that experienced unprecedented social inequalities.

Hence, with this matrix in mind: positive and negative top-down effects from the American

presence, and positive and negative bottom-up effects from Thailand’s own reactions, it is now

possible to delve into deeper analysis of how these effects may have played out in real time,

affecting the two countries’ interrelationship and Thailand’s domestic and foreign policies.  

 3. Start of the Cold War and the Advent of the American Influence, 1947-1957  

Phibun’s Rule and the Beginning of American Influence against Communism  

Given that Thailand was an ally of Japan during World War II, it is ironic that during the

decade following the war Thailand became a strategic ally of the U.S. Interestingly, U.S. Secretary

Byrnes made a statement that “regarded Thailand not as enemy but as a country to be liberated

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from the enemy.”5 Washington wanted strong anti-communist leaders who would both repress

domestic communism and join American-led strategies for the containment of Asian communism.

The first threat of communism to the region was when Mao Zedong’s People's Republic of China

overran the Kuomintang, causing the U.S. to become increasingly concerned and thus needing to

find a partner. To secure Thailand as its partner in recognizing the military government’s “support

to the three states against communist-inspired and led rebellion, the U.S. began sending abundant

economic and military aid.”6 The U.S. economic aid program was designed to support the

military.7 It enabled massive social and economic development, notably in communications,

infrastructure and social welfare projects, while also bolstering military and police power. In this,

its objectives were in public health, transportation, and harbor development and irrigation.8  

At the same time, Phibun needed the U.S.’s support for his military rule. By siding with

the U.S., Phibun “won for the military large commitments of weapons aid,” and secured his own

power by earning for himself “the invaluable position as foreign aid rainmaker.”9 To demonstrate

Thailand’s willingness to align with the U.S., Phibun recognized the French puppet government of

Emperor Bao Dai of Vietnam in 1950, and sent Thai troops to the Korean War, being the first

country in Asia to do so.10 Some of these actions may not have been entirely genuine, as they were

largely motivated by Phibun’s dire need to secure the good favor of the U.S. for aid. Therefore,

Phibun’s decisions foreshadowed the ways in which domestic and foreign politics were to be

shaped by U.S. influences for decades to come.  

                                                                                                               5 Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi Democracy: The Evolution of the Thai Political System, (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992), 126. 6 National Security Council Staff, “United States Objectives and Courses of Action with Respect to Communist Aggression in Southeast Asia,” February 13, 1952, accessed May 15, 2015, Digital National Security Archive (ProQuest). 7 Ibid,. 14. 8 Ibid., 14. 9 Christopher E. Goscha, Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 275. 10 Ibid,. 275.  

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With the introduction of U.S. presence and the regime’s governance, internal conflicts

unquestionably arose. In Thailand, military coups were common during the post-war years. The

continuing reports of these threatened coups strongly “reflect rather the internal strivings for

individual power.”11. Overall, people did not approve of Phibun’s regime and closeness to the

American government.12 The royalist conservatives within Thailand, for example, publicly

accused American ambassadors of meddling with Thai politics and asserted that Thailand should

not rely so much on the help of the U.S. Student leaders across universities, when prevented from

attending educational trips to Moscow, were also upset and reported in newspapers that American

pressures influenced the government’s stand. Given this, it is clear that the domestic changes made

by the regime coupled with U.S. presence had already begun to instigate social instability.  

 End of Phibun’s Rule despite the American Assistance  

Phibun’s popularity plummeted only after the 1957 election, otherwise known as the “dirty

election.” Public outcries were fierce, as fraudulent voting known as paifai and polrom were used.

In response, the government declared a state of emergency to quell the public criticism. This,

however, did not work as well as Phibun hoped, as over 2,000 students of Chulalongkorn

University put up a determined fight against the government. They demanded a re-election and

publicly denounced both Phibun’s rule and also General Phao’s abuse of power. Phibun, who had

promoted “New Democracy” inspired by his visits to the United States and Great Britain had

opened up the democratic space that would ironically removed him from power. In face of the

bloody coup staged by Sarit on September 17, 1957, Phibun fled the country and Phao was exiled

as well. Ultimately, the trajectory of Phibun’s dictatorial career had been shaped by both his visits

                                                                                                               11 NSC Staff, “United States Objectives,” 13. 12 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2007) 86.

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to the West and the American presence in Thailand, resulting in a more politically conscious

audience, which would be important in the later decades.  

 4. The American Presence and Its Impact on Thailand, 1958-1973  

In response to politico-military change in Thailand, the U.S. was quick to express a neutral

position, which would be surprising if not for the fact that the U.S. was clearly protecting its own

interests. Specifically on the international front, “the U.S. State Department immediately issued a

statement that the political changes in Thailand would not affect Thailand-United States

relations.”13 For the U.S., it mattered very little who was in power, as long as those in power

would align with U.S. interests and allow their continuing presence in Thailand.14 Yet at the same

time, the U.S. had hoped to maintain peace and abstain from being involved in tensions between

Thailand and other Southeast Asian countries, as in the case of the Laos crisis.15 President

Kennedy was quoted, “U.S. will not allow itself to be driven into a war in Laos,” despite President

Johnson’s later full immersion in conflicts of the region.16

Sarit’s  Fundemental  Ideology,  Character,  and  Politics  

Sarit, who had always claimed to be acting in accordance with the will of the Thai people

abolished the constitution on October 20, 1958 and declared martial law. With the birth of Sarit’s

new regime, traditional and paternalistic ideas grew. Sarit portrayed himself as the “father of the

nation”17 and installed a new form of dictatorship, different from that of Phibun’s. Sarit hoped to

maintain a conservative lifestyle for the Thai people. Sarit sought to correct the mistakes of the

                                                                                                               13 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 97. 14 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 270. 15 “The Laos Crisis, 1960-1963,” Last modified October 31, 2013, https://history.state.gov/milestones/1961-1968/laos-crisis, accessed May 22, 2015. 16 “Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State,” https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1961-63v23/d23#fnref3, access May 22, 2015

17 This new dictatorship, according to Thak Chaleomtiarana, as a “[a] benevolent despoticism, and as military rule,” Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 92  

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past by abolishing democratic ideas from the West and “[to] build a democratic system that

would be appropriate to the special characteristics and realities of the Thai.”18 Therefore, in

Sarit’s eyes, he was simply building a new type of democracy, a “Thai way of democracy.”19 In

building this system, modernization was necessary. Sarit defined modernization as a country that

is marked by dignity, resourcefulness, and discipline, which aimed to increase national well-

being.20

Sarit implemented a strict top-down approach in which he hoped everyone would be

assured enough to eat, a place to live, work to do, and other basic necessities. Sarit’s philosophy

was divided into three strata of democracy—government nation, bureaucracy, and people—a

very traditional approach that Thai monarchs had once followed. In this, the role of the

government was to represent popular will and provide political stability. The bureaucracy would

serve the government in their duties and follow the benevolent demands of the government and

its political leader. Lastly, according to Sarit, the people should be more agrarian, and leave the

government to take care of their needs. Paradoxically, this top-down approach and the old-

fashioned Thai values that Sarit was promoting clashed with the new order of things stemming

from U.S. influence.

Sarit believed that placing himself as the paternalistic authoritarian would allow him to

efficiently provide the maximum amount of social benefit for the people, even if the “democracy”

was dictatorial. However, at the same time, while Sarit placed himself highly, he still respected the

monarch, Bhumibol Adulyadej, in a manner than Phibun had ignored. For him, even though other

institutions must be changed, “one institution that the Revolutionary Council will never allow to

                                                                                                               18 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 101. 19 Ibid,. 101. 20 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 108.  

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be altered is the institution of the monarchy representing the nation as a whole.”21 However,

despite respecting the monarch, Sarit continued with his top-down approach to governance.  

Changes in Policies from Within: Domestic Top Down  

Given Sarit’s political ideals, he used three main approaches in his governance.22 All of

which can be characterized as top down, as they were strictly enforced upon the people through

various domestic policies enacted by the central government. To begin, he strongly believed that

communism was harmful and should be kept out of the country as much as possible. Secondly, he

believed that they needed a system where the bureaucracy would not abuse their position of power

as they had during Phibun’s rule. In this, he hoped to use the country’s resources specifically for

modernization purposes and building the economy as well as other development within the

country. Thirdly, he wished for a return to traditional Thai values and therefore pushed to be less

reliant on U.S. aid and not to align Thailand so closely to their interests.  

As for this third component, it was strongly supported by Sarit’s belief that political

instability was inherently caused by the “sudden transplantation of alien institutions on to [Thai]

soil …with the result that their functioning has been haphazard and ever chaotic.”23 Given this

view, it is unsurprising that Sarit’s approach to foreign policy was one of free agency. For

instance, while Thailand was open to receive aid from the U.S., he was careful not to be too

                                                                                                               21 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 97. 22 In closer detail, there were three objectives in this development plan, all of which were criticized for aligning with U.S. interests. The first of which was to raise the standard of living of the people, allowing them to live more creative and happier lives. The second is that there should be an increase in the total per capita output of goods and services and that this increased output should be equitably distributed to all citizens. Thirdly, it is believed that Thailand’s increased output will be most readily secured through spontaneous efforts of individual citizens. For example an increase in the construction of irrigation works and roads and other means of transport was enacted. While these goals may seem in line with accepted theories of development, one will easily then notice that none of these goals can actually be achieved. There are no clear and distinctive concrete plans. For example, industry was left for the private sector to grow, while government participated in little actual involvement. Thus, it becomes clear that while these objectives are seemingly on the surface beneficial for the people, it was in reality merely a reinstatement of the World Bank’s advice for development, and published as to show the U.S. that Thailand was making an attempt to modernize, separating themselves from communist influences, and secure continuous foreign aid. Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 98. 23 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 100.  

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openly involved in the U.S.’s initiatives and policies. In fact, Sarit tried to overtly steer Thailand

away from an over reliance on U.S. aid by promoting the “normalization” reform in which

Thailand was to return to a more sovereign stance.24 While these intentions were well constructed,

the end result was actually the exact opposite.  

Ironically, although Sarit’s rule was authoritarian, most of his administration consisted of

capable technocrats with western-educated individuals who were much more sympathetic to

American values.25 Sarit employed these ministers and high-ranking officials in many important

positions in order to push forward his modernization agenda. They include Thanat Khoman for

foreign affairs, Puey Ungpakorn for macroeconomics and banking, Amnuay Wirawan for finance

and taxation, and Snoh Unakul for national economic and social planning.26 In the 1960s,

policymakers worked as a team and some held multiple positions in organizations that were

responsible for economic development and management. This allowed Sarit to develop a much

more coherent policy.27 American influence was increasingly conspicuous among policymakers

which can be linked to the trend in foreign education: “By 1974, one quarter of the top 26,000

officials in the civil service had received some foreign training under the U.S. aid program

alone.”28 Not only were the technocrats often western-educated themselves, but also they

consulted with outside agencies such as the World Bank, USAID, and foreign policy advisers. As

a result of this foreign influence, the 1960s were a time of economic change in Thailand leading to

more domestic and foreign private investment and essentially a market economy.29 Given this,

while Sarit had hoped to impose a top-down approach with centralized power, realistically, the

                                                                                                               24 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 109. 25 Robert J Muscat, The Fifth Tiger: A Study of Thai Development Policy, (Helsinki, Finland: United Nations University Press, 1994), 132-133. 26 Robert J Muscat, The Fifth Tiger: A Study of Thai Development Policy, 132-133. 27 Ibid,. 133. 28 Ibid,. 133-134.  29 Ibid,. 88.

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power was much more diffused amongst the technocrats who each held different perspectives and

goals. Therefore, although the structure resembled a traditional Thai monarchy, the personnel

within in that structure maintained a sense of western ideology. Ironically, by hoping to promote

Thai traditional forms of governance, it ultimately led to increasing American presence in

Thailand.  

 Changes in Policies from the Outside: American Top Down Framework  

Effects of American Monetary Aid on Thailand  

The US influence in Thailand was most palpable in the form of aid. With the growing

influence of American money and technical advice, there was a strong skewing of development

programs toward objectives centered on “security,” most likely against communism. Construction

of roads and irrigation was due to “official recommendations from the U.S. and not needs of the

local people...priority was given to areas that posed security problems.”30 Moreover, the first

national economic and social development plan, first instituted in 1961, “strongly echoed the

World Bank’s and International Monetary Fund’s push for economic growth through economic

liberalization.”31 The entire country was opened up to foreign investment, trade unions were

banned, limits on land ownership were abolished, and low wages were enforced.32 These actions

allowed the U.S. to further infiltrate the Thai economy and have a stronger role in Thai politics. In

some sense, this is contradictory, as “economic liberalization” actually led to an oppression of the

people’s interests with lower wages and worsened work conditions, all in the name of

modernization and development.  

                                                                                                               30 Thak Chaloemtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, 154-155. 31 Ann L. Jeffrey, Sex and Borders Gender, National Identity, and Prostitution Policy in Thailand, (Vancouver, B.C: UBC Press, 2002), 33. 32 Ann L. Jeffrey, Sex and Borders Gender, National Identity, and Prostitution Policy in Thailand, 34.  

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However, given this, it is not to say that the foreign aid did not produce any tangible

benefits for the country. It did, in fact, between 1960 and 1970, the number of people classified as

“administrative, executive, and managerial expanded almost ten times (from 26,000 to nearly

250,000), and “professional and technical” personnel more than doubled.”33 Moreover, the income

of these educated, middle-class groups grew accordingly. By 1969, average urban incomes were

two and one-half times rural income levels” whilst the size of the cities, specifically Bangkok,

grew from 2.6 million in 1960 to 4.6 million in 1970. Therefore, the effect of U.S aid on Thailand

can be seen both socially as well as economically.  

 Effects of American Military Presence on Thailand  

The other form of U.S’ top down influence in Thailand was its military presence. In

particular, in the second half of the 1960s, when President Johnson decided to escalate war with

Vietnam, America’s presence in Thailand increased dramatically. From that point on, there was

no longer any question about sending American soldiers to Vietnam, but rather when to send

them and how many.i 34 At the same time, American troops in Thailand increased from only a

few hundreds before 1965 to reach the peak of 48,000 soldiers in 1969.35 Thailand ceded its own

territory to the American presence for its bases, air and maritime, in many regions and provinces.

Of course, this had to be included as well for other physical activities to support the recreation

and other related activities of American troops during their retreat of days, weeks, or months

long. Obviously, as shown by the work of Ungpakorn, the military expenses of American

presence started to climb up clearly in the second half of 1960s while the social, wealth and other

kinds of American aids were already important since the beginning of the 1960s.ii Distinctive

                                                                                                               33 Ibid,. 34. 34 McNamara, Robert S. In retrospect: The tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. (Vintage Books, 1996), 319-335. 35 Ibid,. 45.  

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changes in Thai society with the ongoing military presence include the construction of

infrastructure to ease transportation between military bases and the booming entertainment and

tourism industries.36 Economic development in Thailand represented a deepening entrenchment

of the capitalist market economy. The spread of capitalism led to a wide range of social-

economic changes, especially rapid urbanization, shifting employment patterns, population

growth, land pressure in rural areas, and growing income disparities.37  

In the 1960s the number of prostitutes began to expand, from approximately 20,000

women working in the trade in the late 1950s to 171,000 people in 1964.38 The contribution to the

economy from prostitution was great however, as spending rose from US$5 million in 1967 to an

estimated US$20 million in 1970. This is unsurprising, as the number of U.S. troops in Thailand

had reached a high of 48,000 in 1969.39  

The government’s response, on the other hand, angered the public. For example, The

Entertainment Act of 1966 allowed women to be entertainers (even though they were performing

sexual services) and American forces in Vietnam to come into Thailand to enjoy the

entertainment, largely expanding the tourism industry. With this, the people became enraged that

Thai policies and acts would align strictly with U.S. interests, even at the expense of losing Thai

culture. For one, the 1966 act clearly showed that the Thai government supported the “use of

women as entertainment attractions.”40 To justify its promotion tourism officials argued,

“prostitution was merely an unfortunate side-effect of poverty.”41 Slowly, people began citing the

growth of the entertainment industry as proof of “the demoralizing effect of American military

                                                                                                               36 Puey Ungphakorn, "Thailand's Economic Prospects," (Journal of the Siam Society 58, no. 2), 139. 37 Ibid,. 177-186. 38 Ann L. Jeffrey, Sex and Borders Gender, National Identity, and Prostitution Policy in Thailand, (Vancouver, B.C: UBC Press, 2002), 37. 39 Ibid,. 45. 40 Ibid,. 40. 41 Ibid,. 40.  

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presence.”42 To some, this intrusion came at a high cost and was very much unwelcomed. Yet

what angered the people more was that Thai authorities allowed them, as they often even handed

offenders back over to base authorities without laying charges.43  

Resistance began to build among the people, not only in the countryside, but also among

urban elites. The growth of a well-educated and economically ascendant middle class spawned

impatience with the current rule and quickly turned into disgust of American behavior.44 The Thai

people — especially the educated young — became more assertive and less deferential. In

particular, the youth, who were educated with the Western curriculum under the rapid university

expansion in the 1960s, began to question the status quo and the supposed benevolence of the

regime's paternalism. These harsh criticisms of the American influence slowly began to gain

traction. In this way, American education backfired, as those who were educated with it were the

ones who led the movement against American military presence.

This anti-U.S. sentiment only increased after the Nixon Doctrine had been published. The

Nixon Doctrine proclaimed that the Southeast Asian countries were to defend themselves and that

the U.S. would merely be a nuclear umbrella upon request. In face of this, Thanat, the foreign

minister of Thailand at the time expressed that

“regional cooperation or regionalism is the only means of salvation for the nations of this part of the world, and Thailand, together with like-minded partners, will continue to play a useful role in promoting regional solidarity and cohesiveness for no other purpose than to help consolidate the national independence of the nations of this region and to help foil any attempt to subjugate one by one, the weaker and less-organized newly emerging states through subversion or overt conquest.”45

 

Later in 1973, Thanat had once again expressed similar viewpoints in supporting

American withdrawal by stating that foreign troops do not actually strengthen national security,                                                                                                                42 Ibid,. 45. 43 Ibid,. 43. 44 Ibid,. 43. 45 “‘Regionalism’ Seen as Necessary,” Bangkok World, March 3, 1971, accessed May 20, 2015, FBIS (Readex).  

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but rather makes the state a target for anti-American countries. Even the economic aid that the

U.S. claims is being dumped annually into the country, it remained a mystery whether it was spent

for mutual benefits. For Thanat, Thailand has historically existed without troops, and therefore, the

more troops there are, the less stable and secure this embattled country will be. By the late 1960s

and early 1970s, there was growing pressure for political participation from below. This pressure

stemmed from economic development under military tutelage and American aid. Nevertheless,

despite growing tensions among the Thai public, after Sarit's death in 1963, his co-

successors, Thanom and Praphat, continued ruling with the "Sarit system". However, the

"Sarit system" without Sarit was quite different, as will be shown. As the theory predicts, it is the

strongman-ruler who governed with a top down approach, rather than the system, that is pivotal.  

 

5. Decline of the American Role and Military Dictatorship and Rise of the Bottom-up

Movements, 1973-1976  

The American presence in Thailand began to wane with increased military, social, and

economic instabilities. For one, the Thanom-Praphart regime collapsed in October 14, 1973,

upheld by a student-led mass uprising and a royal intervention by King Bhumibol Adulyadej to

stop the bloodshed. When the Thanom-Praphart military-authoritarian regime was toppled in

1973, the military lost much of its political cohesion due to the absence of an effective

authoritarian strongman. After 1973, there was a protracted period of transition and

struggle. This period was marked by a series of rather ineffectual military interventions, violence,

and intense conflicts involving military factions, civilian elite groups, subordinate forces, palace

factions, and the King. For the first time in the modern Thai history, political elites and student

leaders, both conservative and radical, attempted to mobilize the masses and win their support.  

  17  

The King, whose goal was to reign his land for the good deeds of his subjects, the Thai

people, proved to be widely popular. In the October uprising of 1973, the king intervened directly.

Then in 1976, the King intervened again in another bloodshed led by the military and the police,

both instances that immensely bolstered his stature, rendering him as the country’s savior.

Previously in the 1960s, the King defined his own role for Thailand by visiting multiple nations

abroad and representing the country on the international stage. At home, he used the same strategy

by visiting rural villages and connecting with locals in supporting them for a better living.

Moreover, he also acted in his role as the defense of peace and order. This is ironic as it was Sarit

who had first proposed a greater role for the King in Thai society, yet it was the King who had

asked Thanom-Praphart to exile themselves. Thus, it is important to note that the monarch role,

although symbolic, nonetheless held political implications as the King himself has used the

bottom-up approach to garner support to reign the Kingdom of Thailand.  

Rise of Bottom-Up: Students  

With deeper involvement in Thailand, the U.S. began imposing various changes on Thai

society that were once thought impossible. Dissident organizations denounced the U.S. presence

by stating that they have “propagandized their reactionary thoughts and rotten culture into our

society.”46 Some went further as to state that the Americans, who were imperialists had “sucked

out people’s blood and each year take away tremendous amounts of wealth from our natural

resource; at the same time they spread the rotten and poisonous American culture among our

youths.”47 The strong diction in these public announcements stirred up stronger reactions within

the Thai public than ever before.  

                                                                                                               46 Ann L. Jeffrey, Sex and Borders Gender, National Identity, and Prostitution Policy in Thailand, 42. 47 Ibid,. 42-43

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The strongest opposition and grass root organization came from the students. This was

aided in part by Sarit’s own education policy that aimed to serve economic development plans that

were designed and pushed by the United States and the World Bank. Aiming at greater market

competition, private investment, and the development of modern service and industrial sectors,

policymakers assumed that Thailand needed a more educated workforce. Thus, the new education

policy increased the number of students from fifteen thousand to one hundred thousand between

1961 and 1972 and universities increased from five to seventeen during the same period.48  

With the expansion of institutions for higher learner, the greater power the students gained

in their attempt to transform society. Their main campaign was against the U.S. imperialist

military presence in Thailand by stressing the goal of national sovereignty and subsequently

blaming the regime for exposing the country in the Indochina war. They also pointed to systematic

censorship of public knowledge, as they themselves were exposed flow of news from the western

world that contradicted what was presented to the rest of the masses. These translated documents

caused sensations in Thailand and woke the people up to what was happening in their own

country.  

Importantly, the student movements were strongly aided by the students’ exposures of

study abroad and imported publications. Through these sources, the students fought against

hierarchy, order and conformities, being largely influenced by student protests in France, the U.S.,

and other western countries. Moreover, those who studied abroad were more fully aware of the

extent of American involvement and its use of Thailand as a military base. In this, the students

spoke on behalf of Thai who supposedly regarded westerners as superior beings.49  

                                                                                                               48 Leigh Meredith Weiss and Edward Aspinall, Student activism in Asia: between protest and powerlessness, (U of Minnesota Press, 2012), 241.  49 Leigh Meredith Weiss and Edward Aspinall, Student activism in Asia: between protest and powerlessness, 241.

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To show how strong the view was within the radical student movement, one magazine in

particular from Thammasat University, Phai Khoa (White Peril), published writings inundated

with strong anti-American sentiments.50 The newspaper supported that students should be the

rightful leaders of society and that the general populace would follow close behind. The students

criticized the U.S.’ role in every aspect of life, including social, economic, political, and military,

all of which has produced a “half bred” style that does not bode well with Thai characteristics. The

students also point out that the U.S. had advertised themselves as helping developing nations to

battle communism when their true intentions were to protect their own rights for other countries’

resources. Statistically, as reported by Phichit Jongstitwhatana, a freshman economics major at

Thammasat University, “the U.S controlled 60% of the world’s resources when they constituted

merely 6% of the world’s population, and with 3,300 military bases that allow them to infiltrate

into these foreign countries.” 51 Economically, the less developed countries have slowly become

colonial states of the U.S., losing their own sense of character, selling both their soul and body,

something that the students feared would happen to Thailand. Not only this, but the U.S. has

immense power to infiltrate the politics of another country as well through covert actions carried

out by the CIA. A junior international relations major at Thammasat University described the CIA

as those “who are trained specifically to instigate or quiet conflicts where needed, as long as it is

in U.S. interests.”52 Bangkok the Nation described an account on January 7th 1974 that 15

members of the National Student Centre of Thailand staged a “wreath laying” protest in front of

the U.S. Embassy, the banner attached to it read “Go Home Dreadful CIA.”53 This was the first

ever-public reaction against CIA intervention in Thai national affairs. A day later, Bangkok the

                                                                                                               50 Chongsathitwatthana, Phichit, and Kamon Kamontrakun, eds. Phai Khāo. (Phranakhon: Akson Samphan, 1971), 1-91. I translated this student protest magazine against American presence in Thailand. 51 Phichit and Kamontrakun, Phai Khāo, 4-5. 52 Phichit and Kamontrakun, Phai Khāo, 49. 53 “Protesters Lay Wreath at Embassy,” Bangkok the Nation, January 7th, 1974, accessed May 18, 2015, FBIS (Readex)

  20  

Nation reported similar events with The Thammasat University’s students sending protest notes to

President Richard Nixon himself in opposing CIA interference with local affairs.54 This was

followed up by other news sources as well, as Voice of the People of Thailand reported on January

9th 1974 that the students demanded the following:  

“1.Disclose all CIA activities in Thailand  2.Take drastic measures to present further interference in Thailand by the CIA, the U.S. Embassy

and the U.S. government”  3. Disclose all Thailand’s commitments to the U.S., such as the hiring of troops to fight in Laos.  

4. Official protest this CIA activity on behalf of the Thai people”55    

In expressing their dissatisfaction with other issues, the students cite an instance of the

King’s visit to the U.S. as extremely disrespectful to the Thai people. The King, who is highly

regarded in Thai society, had shockingly received the same accommodation as commoners on his

visit, having to go through security and complete other mundane activities unfit for his royal

status. Yet conversely, the average U.S. soldier in Thailand is able to receive the best of

treatments, being regarded as superior beings.56

The students also took a stance against the U.S military presence. Bangkok the Nation

reported on Jan 15th 1974 that “over 2000 Udon students staged a demonstration yesterday to

demand the ouster of the U.S. Air Force from the province, accusing the U.S. of using Thai bases

as a takeoff point to launch ‘wars of aggression’ against neighboring countries.” Thai students

used the case of Vietnam, claiming that U.S. was acting like “a barbarian who ruthlessly killed all

the innocent civilians.”57 Therefore, the students felt that they “cannot stand back and do nothing

while innocent lives in Vietnam are being bombed relentlessly by Napalm and suffering from the

U.S.’ depraved actions, including setting neighboring Southeast Asian countries against each

other.”                                                                                                                    54 “Student Protest to Nixon,” Bangkok the Nation, January 8th, 1974, accessed May 23, 2015, FBIS (Readex) 55 “Anti-CIA Activities, Protest,” Voice of the People of Thailand, January 9th, 1974, FBIS (Readex) 56 Phichit and Kamontrakun, Phai Khāo, 60-61. 57 Phichit and Kamontrakun, Phai Khāo, 49-50.

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The student’s movement did not go unnoticed. In fact, the kind made public comments on

political issues starting in the late 1960s and mentioned student protests as a way of giving them

support for campaigning against corruption and the abuse of power.58 For the monarch, he

generally endorsed student movements, and encouraged the students to take part in the fight as the

new leaders of the country.59  

 Rise of Bottom-Up: Laborers  

Besides the students, the workers population was the other main source of momentum for

the bottom-up movement. Whilst most workers were timid and remained inactive in their unions

before 1973, having lived under the martial law and remembering vividly the arrests of those

active in the movement, it all changed after the 1973 uprising. Most of these strikes moreover,

were politically backed, and the workers formed alliances with the most active political group: the

students. For example, when workers initiated a protest, rally, demonstration, or strike, the

students participated as well, giving them more strength. For instance, when laborers had protested

against Japanese products coming into Thailand, the students hard stormed Japanese department

stores on behalf of the workers. The protest had gotten out of hand when Bangkok the Nation

reported on Jan 10th 1974 that “four glass windows were broken and a telephone was ripped off

the wall when a band of students stormed the place.”60 On June 12th 1974, Bangkok Post reported

another case of labor-student joint uprising, which “the 400,000-strong organized labor force,

represented by the 34 workers associations, yesterday threw their full support behind the

protesting textile workers as student and activist groups denounced ‘blood-sucking foreign

capitalists’.”61 Three days prior to this protest, “thousands of textile workers from Samut Prakan

                                                                                                               58 Ibid,. 243. 59 Likhit Dhiravegin, Demi Democracy: The Evolution of the Thai Political System, 67. 60 “Japanese Store Raided,” Bangkok The Nation, January 10th, 1974, accessed May 23, 2015, FBIS (Readex). 61 “Strikers Gain Support, ”Bangkok Post, June 12, 1974, accessed May 28, 2015, FBIS (Readex)

  22  

and Samut Sakhon massed in a huge rally…[and] agreed to submit a list of five demands to the

labor department.” They were as following:    

“1.Any textiles workers dismissed earlier be reinstated. 2.The labor law should be amended and labor leaders should be allowed to sit in the panel

discussing the amendments 3. All workers should be hired on a monthly basis instead of daily or by piece rates

4. The minimum wage be increased from 16 to 25 bath per day 5. All workers taking part in this protest would not suffer any “reprisals” from the employers.”62

 In response to these strikes, the government agreed to raise the minimum wage and agreed

that workers will be paid when they have been out on strike. Clearly, the strikes upheld by the

teamwork of both students and workers were largely effective, and their bottom up approach to

policy change was recognized. The government, in face of this bottom up insurgence, was forced

to comply with the people’s demands and needs in order to quell the public outcries. For one of

the first times in Thai history, the people were given agency to provoke change.

Indeed, labor protests became part of the Thai society from the beginning of 1970s

onwards. Thailand was now subject to open strikes by labor, as never seen before under the

military dictatorial regime. The union between students and workers is highly significant, as it

implies a sweeping sentiment across the country of average citizens organizing and seeking social

change and thereby military and economic change as well. By gaining power from the bottom up,

the groups grasped great attention from the public and were joined by many others who had

similar interests. While previously a top-down framework had largely governed Thailand with the

government imposing regulations, it is now starting from within the people, hence bottom-up.  

   6. Conclusion  

                                                                                                               62 “‘New Wave’ Of National Strife Breaks Out,” Bangkok Post, June 9, 1974, accessed May 30, 2015, FBIS (Readex).

  23  

During the Cold War in Thailand, the relationship between Thailand and the U.S. was full

of tensions and ironies. While both countries had suffered some harms, with the U.S. physical

presence and spending large sums of money in support of Thailand policies, some of which did

not result in practices that the U.S. had been pressing for; and Thailand, due to this long

involvement with the U.S., losing some of its traditional values as well as price paid during the

war. However, both countries had also reached, in the end, goals against communism with

maintaining peace and order between them that were beneficial to and consistent with their initial

interests.  

For the U.S., it had been to contain communism within Thailand and being able to

infiltrate the Thai economy as to manipulate and extract its resources. This goal was achieved as

Thailand had steered clear of communism in all years of the U.S. presence and even thereafter the

end of the Vietnam War. The U.S. was also able to use Thailand and its resources for its own

economic gains and trade within the Southeast Asian region. Specifically, President Eisenhower

has explicitly stated the economic significance of Southeast Asian countries by claiming the

immense “value of a locality in its production of materials that the world needs (materials such as

rubber, jute, and suphur).”63 What is more, the U.S. had been able to use Thailand as an important

military base, particularly, air and maritime, for their military endeavors, and this was able to

provide massive convenience for the U.S. in many of their actions during the Cold War.  

On the flip side for Thailand, without American influence and presence, it would not have

ben able to develop and transform as rapidly into the modern state it is today. Furthermore, the

U.S. brought in Western values, as shown in the 1960s onward, of unintended bottom up

sentiment that greatly aided the Thai people’s own movements in seeking social changes. This

                                                                                                               63 “Eisenhower gives famous ‘domino theory’ speech,” Last modified May, 2009, http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/eisenhower-gives-famous-domino-theory-speech, accessed May 25, 2015.

  24  

contrasts with traditional Thai values, which endorsed obedience and submissiveness.

Furthermore, Thailand was also major benefactor in that it was able to avoid communism, which

would have slowed down its modernization process. Thus, it becomes clear that while there were

many instances of wrongdoings being committed in Thailand during the Cold War period, the

country still benefited from the U.S. presence overall. In this, Thailand was able to grow

economically at unprecedented rates, and to gain ground as a strategic and noteworthy nation not

only within Southeast Asia, but on the world stage as well.  

Thailand’s alliance with the U.S. had certainly been problematic at times, and even ironic,

given that they had hoped to avoid the U.S. influence since the very beginning. Despite this goal

not being reached, Thailand as a whole did not “lose out” on any benefits, the country was able to

secure both foreign aid that would open up its economy and society, good or bad, but also retain

their own identity and to an extent, their sovereignty. And whilst the military heads’ interests often

did not align with that of the people’s sentiments, the power nevertheless lied with the public,

evidenced by the bottom-up movements. Therefore, while the top-down approach was effective,

the bottom-up governance gave more voice to the people, as they so righteously deserve. Knowing

this, it can be concluded that while Thailand’s domestic and foreign policies have drastically

altered within this time frame, these changes were necessary for the building of modern Thailand.  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

  25  

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Bangkok Post

“‘New Wave’ Of National Strife Breaks Out,” Bangkok Post, January 9, 1974.

“Strikers Gain Support,” Bangkok Post, June 12, 1974.

Bangkok The Nation

“Protesters Lay Wreath at Embassy,” Bangkok the Nation, January 7th, 1974.

“Student Protest to Nixon,” Bangkok the Nation, January 8th, 1974.

“Japanese Store Raided,” Bangkok The Nation, January 10th, 1974.

Bangkok World

“‘Regionalism’ Seen as Necessary,” Bangkok World, March 3, 1971.

Phai Khao (White Peril) Translated by myself

Chongsathitwatthana, Phichit, and Kamon Kamontrakun, eds. Phai Khāo. (Phranakhon: Akson

Samphan, 1971).

Voice of the People of Thailand

“Anti-CIA Activities, Protest,” Voice of the People of Thailand, January 9th, 1974.

Secondary Sources

Acharya, Amitav, The Making of Southeast Asia: International Relations of a Region. (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2013). Ar, Tamer, and Geert Jan Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, (London: Academic Press, 1982), 1-3. Chaloemtiarana, Thak, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 2007). Dhiravegin, Likhit, Demi Democracy: The Evolution of the Thai Political System, (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1992).

  26  

Goscha, Christopher, Connecting Histories: Decolonization and the Cold War in Southeast Asia, 1945-1962, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2009), 275. Randolph, Sean, The United States and Thailand: Alliance Dynamics, 1950-1985 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1986). Jeffrey, Ann, Sex and Borders Gender, National Identity, and Prostitution Policy in Thailand, (Vancouver, B.C: UBC Press, 2002). McNamara, Robert S. In retrospect: The tragedy and lessons of Vietnam. (Vintage Books, 1996). Muscat, Robert, The Fifth Tiger: A Study of Thai Development Policy, (Helsinki, Finland: United Nations University Press, 1994). Thompson, Edward, The Making of the English Working Class (New York: Pantheon Books, 1964), 9. Ungphakorn, Puey. "Thailand's Economic Prospects." (Journal of the Siam Society 58, no. 2).

Weiss, Meredith and Edward Aspinall, Student activism in Asia: between protest and powerlessness, (U of Minnesota Press, 2012).  

 

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i    Robert S. McNamara, In retrospect: The tragedy and lessons of Vietnam, (Vintage Books, 1996), 320.  ii

 Puey Ungphakorn, "Thailand's Economic Prospects," (Journal of the Siam Society 58, no. 2), 139.