Final Report HHF Reduced

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1 THE NATIONAL RECOVERY STRATEGY: A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS, RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED

THE NATIONAL

RECOVERY STRATEGY:A REVIEW OF THE PROCESS,

RESULTS AND LESSONS LEARNED


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Copyright 2012 by the Ministry of Social Solidarity

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or

transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or

otherwise, without prior permission.

Published:

Editor: Jo-Anne Bishop, Independent Consultant

Layout: Thaiza Castilho/UNDP

Photos: UNMIT/IOM/UNDP SERC and Dialogue Projects

MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY 2


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Strategy, aims to assess the political motivation, processes, moral and financial costs, methods,

integrated gender approach, sensitivity to children's rights, avoiding the complexity of social envy

in the breasts of the communities, returnees and residents of neighborhoods and the lessons

learned here. The Ministry of Social Solidarity of the IV Constitutional Government, in partnership

with national and international agencies that have worked hard with the highest spirit of

SOLIDARITY, has offered to provide and share these experiences with political leaders, people of

Timor-Leste in particular, and people of the world and the contemporary leaders of the world in

general.

The Ministry of Social Solidarity of the IV Constitutional Government led by Prime Minister Kay

Hala Xanana Gusmo presented a final report on the process of reintegration of internally

displaced persons on 18 February 2011, after the termination of proceedings on 30 December

2010. This document was sent to various institutions and civil society, including the Prosecutors

Office, Ombudsman for Human Rights and Justice, the Anti-Corruption Commission and other

national and international agencies.

Reflecting on the complexity of the process, the Ministry of Social Solidarity and the IV

Constitutional Government have asked UNDP to carry out a process evaluation of the National

Recovery Strategy by an independent international consultant, allowing the preparation of a fair,

honest, credible report with appropriate recommendations for the future.

From this perspective, we intend to launch this report, almost at the end of the mandate of the IV

Constitutional Government and as part of celebrations of 10 years of Restoration of

Independence, 100 years of the Manufahi Revolution and 500 years of the arrival of thePortuguese.

So I want to highlight the vital support from the UNDP. Also I want to thank all those who were

interviewed, either individuals or institutions, which contributed to bring light upon this

experience for a lasting reintegration in line with universal standards of international rights for

displaced persons as promoted by IOM.

It is necessary and also very appropriate to give a word of appreciation and thanks to all State

entities. His Excellency, the President of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Dr. Jos Ramos

Horta, Nobel Peace Laureate, for his patience and perseverance in the dialogue processes, the

Prime Minister of the IV Constitutional Government, the charismatic Kay Rala Xanana Gusmo

for his politics and architecture as leader and head of government, the President of the National

Parliament, Mr Fernando Lasama and all the distinguished Members of Parliament for their

decision making to make this process possible. To my colleagues in Government, I highlight the

Deputy Prime Minister, Dr Jose Luis Guterres committed as coordinator of this process, as well

as relevant ministries such as Finance, State Administration and Territorial Management, Justice,

Education, Health, Economy and Development, SEFOPE, SEPI, the Secretary of State for Defense

and Security, the F-FDTL and PNTL and their leaders. Finally, thanks to the UNPOL and national

and international agencies such as UNDP by Mr. Finn Reske-Nielsen, Ms. Mikiko Tanaka, and IOM,

through Mr Luiz Vieira and Mr Norberto Celestino that while partners were able to align and

respond to policies and options of the State, and as might be expected, our brothers and sisters



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"displaced" by their willingness to cooperate in the process.

Finally, the growing recognition of the tireless work of the Secretary of State for Social Assistance

and Natural Disasters, Jacinto Rigoberto de Deus, the National Director of Social Assistance, Mr

Amandio Freitas do Amaral, the entire MSS Dialogue Team, the National Director Administration

and Finance, Mr Rogrio Nelson Alves and his team, the Media Office, the Office of Inspection and

Audit, the Legal Unit, employees, national and international advisors to the MSS for giving all your

efforts.

All my thanks.

Maria Domingas Fernandes Alves

MINISTER OF SOCIAL SOLIDARITY



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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This report is based on interviews and focus group discussions with 75 persons including

Government officials, representatives of the United Nations Country Team and international

organizations, national and international non-governmental partners, local community leaders and

former Internally Displaced Persons (IDP). The consultant is indebted to all of these persons

whose views and comments helped to inform the content and findings of this report.

The consultant would like to express her deep appreciation to the Ministry of Social Solidarity, in

particular to Minister Maria Domingas Fernandes Alves, Secretary of State Jacinto Rigoberto Gomes,

and Director Amandio Amaral Freitas, and to all the current and past advisors and staff of the DPBCS,

who shared their valuable institutional knowledge and frank reflections about the implementation ofthe National Recovery Strategy.

The consultant also appreciates the extensive support she received from staff of the UNDP Crisis

Prevention and Recovery Unit (CPRU) who provided important organizational and logistical

assistance, as well as significant substantive input, during the review and documentation process.

Without the support and participation of all those involved in the consultation process, this

Report would not have been possible.



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ACRONYMS AND GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Aldeia A territorial demarcation of community, smaller than a Suco (hamlet)

Chefe Aldeia Elected chefe or leader of theAldeia

Chefe Suco Elected chefe or leader of the Suco

CPRU Crisis Prevention and Recovery Unit

CRS Catholic Relief Services

DPBSC Department of Peace-Building and Social Cohesion

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization

F-FDTL Defence Force of Timor-Leste

HHE Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade/Together Building Stability

HHES Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia Sosial/Together Building Social EconomicDevelopment

HHF Hamutuk Harii Futuru/Building Our Future Together

HHK Hamutuk Hari'i Konfiansa/Together Building Trust

HHPS Hamutuk Harii Protesaun Sosial/Together Building Social Protection

HHU Hamutuk Harii Uma/Together Building Housing

IDP Internally Displaced Person

ILO International Labour Organization

IOM International Organization for Migration

JPC Justice Peace Commission

JRS Jesuit Relief Service

MoU Memorandum of Understanding

MSS Ministrio da Solidaridade Social/Ministry of Social Solidarity

NDLP National Directorate for Land and Property

NDSA National Directorate for Social Assistance

NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NRC Norwegian Refugee Council

NRS National Recovery Strategy

OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights

OTFOperational Task Force

PDHJ Provedor dos Direitos Humanos e Justica/Provedor for Human Rights and Justice

PNTL National Police for Timor-Leste

SERC Strengthening Early Recovery for Comprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration

of IDPs

Suco Territorial demarcation of community, typically encompassing severalAldeia

(village)

ToR Terms of Reference

TWG Technical Working Group

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNFPA United Nations Population FundUNICEF United Nations Children's Fund

UNIFEM United Nations Development Fund for Women



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UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste

UNPOL United Nations Police

WeCo Womens Committees

WFP World Food Programme

WHO World Health Organization



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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface...................................................................................................................................3

Acknowledgments................................................................................................................6

Acronyms and Glossary of Terms.......................................................................................7

Executive Summary...........................................................................................................10

Rezumu Exekutivu.............................................................................................................18

Introduction........................................................................................................................26

Scope and Methodology of Review...................................................................................28

Background and Context of the NRS...............................................................................30

Review of NRS Implementation........................................................................................37

General Overview..............................................................................................................................................37

Review of the Five Pillars..................................................................................................................................40

.Housing Pillar ........................................................................................................................................40

.Protection Pillar ....................................................................................................................................52

Security Pillar..........................................................................................................................................56

Socio-Economic Pillar...........................................................................................................................59

.Trust-Building Pillar ..............................................................................................................................63

Strategic Partnerships........................................................................................................................................67

Main Findings......................................................................................................................70

General.................................................................................................................................................................70Achievement of Strategy Objectives..............................................................................................................72

Effectiveness of Coordination Mechanisms and Strategic Partnerships.................................................74

Sustainability of NRS Results...........................................................................................................................76

Potential for Replicability of the NRS Approach in Other Countries....................................................77

Lessons Learned.................................................................................................................79

Recommendations..............................................................................................................82

Annexes...............................................................................................................................86

Annex 1: List of Interviewees..........................................................................................................................86

Annex 2: List of Interview Questions............................................................................................................89

Annex 3: Terms of Reference...........................................................................................................................90

Annex 4: List of Sources...................................................................................................................................94

Annex 5: Overview of Dialogue Initiatives...................................................................................................97

Annex 6: Map of SERC projects.....................................................................................................................99

Figures

Figure 1: Overview of NRS Implementation Responsibilities...................................................................38

Figure 2: Summary of Recovery Support Benefits Programme under the NRS Housing Pillar........41

Figure 3: HHU Pillar Process Flow Chat.......................................................................................................43



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

As a result of the 2006 crisis, more than 150,000 people fled their homes and took refuge in 65

IDP camps in Dili and the districts. Moreover, a number of houses and buildings were damaged or

destroyed. Finding a sustainable resettlement and reintegration solution was a high priority for the

IV Constitutional Government. In response, in December 2007, the Government adopted the

National Recovery Strategy (NRS), known in Tetum as Hamutuk Harii Futuru (HHF), in order to

establish a concerted Government response to the needs of IDPs and affected communities

throughout the country. The NRS consisted of five pillars: 1) Hamutuk Harii Uma (Housing); 2)

Hamutuk Harii Protesaun (Social Protection); 3) Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade (Stability); 4) Hamutuk

Harii Ekonomia (Socio-Economic Development) 5) Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa (Trust-Building) and

was guided by three overarching objectives:

1) To adopt a new vision toward national recovery, one that not only promotes mutual

acceptance but strengthens communities, local economies, stability and the relationship

between Government and the people of Timor-Leste, whom they serve.

2) To establish a concerted All of Government approach to address the range of issues,

including, social, physical, legal, economic, security and political that combine to create

obstacles to the resettlement of those who have been displaced.

3) To meet both the needs of those who have been displaced and the wider needs of

affected communities throughout the country.1

Given the key role of MSS in the implementation of the NRS and in overseeing the successful

return, resettlement and reintegration of more than 150,000 IDPs, extensive knowledge and

experience has been accumulated. In order to document the implementation process of the NRS,

review results achieved and identify lessons learned/recommendations for future efforts in the area

of peace-building, this Report has been commissioned at the request of MSS and with financial

support from UNDP.

Summary of Key Findings:

General:

Overall, implementation of the NRS was a major success and the speed in

which the return process took place was unprecedented as well as the

absence of major conflict in communities following the return and

reintegration process. In just over two and a half years after the launch of the NRS, all

of the 65 IDP camps were closed, and in less than four years after the outbreak of the

2006 crisis, the vast majority of the estimated 150,000 IDPs were able to successfully


1 Office of the Vice Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Hamutuk Harii Futuru: ANational Recovery Strategy, 19 December 2007.


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return and reintegrate with no major security incidents or significant escalations of

violence reported and with a settlement rate of less than two percent.

The NRS worked because it set out to address the immediate impact of the

crisis as well as pre-existing community-level vulnerabilities.The Strategy was

focused on broader recovery issues, rather than the mere closure of camps and return

of IDPs; therefore, through its comprehensive and cross-cutting approach across the five

pillar areas (housing, protection, social economic development, security and trust-

building) the NRS acknowledged the importance of addressing both the immediate

humanitarian needs as well as the underlying causes of tension in communities.

The IV Constitutional Government demonstrated strong political leadership

and will in working towards the resolution of the IDP issue . In its national

programme, the Government promised the implementation of the return process by the

end of 2007 and in his budget speech to Parliament on 18 December 2008, the Prime

Minister listed three priorities for the year including resolution of the IDP, Reinado and

petitioners problems. This speech was matched with a proposed allocation of $15

million to deal with IDP return and reintegration.

The NRS worked because it was introduced at the right time. After spending

more than a year and a half in IDP camps and enduring difficult conditions, the majority

of the IDPs were ready to return home but simply needed the means to do so, including

the provision of security and resources to repair and reconstruct their homes. The

culmination of different developments including the decision of the Government toreduce blanket food distribution to IDPs and the death of Major Reinado created an

enabling environment for return and an important window of opportunity for the

Government to implement the NRS.

MSS leadership was critical to the success of the return and recovery

process.All stakeholders consulted during the NRS review process agreed that without

the involvement of MSS, implementation of the NRS would not have been possible. MSS

successfully led the closure of the 65 camps and served as the lead ministry for three of

the five pillars. The implementation of the Cash Recovery Grants scheme proved to be

an enormous undertaking for MSS and despite the immense challenges faced by the

Minister and her staff, the housing pillar was successfully closed on 31 December 2010.

The use of dialogue to facilitate IDP return and reintegration was critical to

the success of the NRS. The large volume of dialogue meetings and mediations

between IDPs and their communities of return facilitated by the MSS Dialogue Teams

from June 2008 to October 2010 played a key role in helping communities to resolve

return-related problems and in supporting the reconciliation process.

Although the NRS was envisaged as a comprehensive response, across the five

pillar areas of housing, protection, security, socio-economic development and

trust-building, the Cash Recovery Grant scheme under the housing pillar



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overshadowed the other components of the NRS. While efforts were made to

inform the public and IDP community about all pillars of the Strategy, most IDPs,

Government officials, civil society partners and the general public saw the Strategy as being

about the Cash Recovery Grants. Meetings of the Inter-Ministerial Commission focused

mainly on the housing pillar, in particular issues related to the payment of the Cash

Recovery Grants. Even while conducting interviews about NRS implementation, many of

the interviewees were only familiar with and able to speak about the recovery packages.

Although most of the results achieved under the NRS were within the

housing, protection and trust-building pillars, results were also indirectly

achieved in the other two pillar areas . A large number of initiatives contributed to

security-related reforms and increased employment opportunities which were

implemented separate from the security and socio-economic pillars, but which

contributed to progress and achievements towards the objectives of both pillars.

While the National Recovery Strategy was envisaged as an All-of-

Government approach to recovery, the ability of the Government to

operationalize this approach was limited.While the first two Government retreats

on the NRS were well-attended by key ministries responsible for implementation of the

Strategy, by the third retreat, the participation of these ministries declined significantly

and in some instances never fully materialized. While the housing, protection and trust-

pillar working groups met regularly, there were few meetings of the security working

group and the social-economic working group only convened once. Some ministries with

key responsibilities under the NRS also never engaged in the manner required to achievesome of the key actions set out under the NRS.

Important efforts were made by the Government to ensure that that NRS

corresponded to the needs of IDPs. The Government undertook direct

consultations with IDPs, including more than 50 IDP camp managers in order to identify

the needs of IDPs and identify the main obstacles to their return. The input from these

consultations directly informed the final approach and content of the NRS.

The remarkable progress that was made in closing the IDP camps and in

facilitating the peaceful return and resettlement of IDPs was due to the

concerted efforts by the Government and its international and national

partners. In direct partnership with the Government, the UN, together with international

and national NGOs played an integral role in supporting the initial humanitarian response

to the crisis and in addressing the protection needs of IDPs in the camps. the Government

allocated $15 million to the cash recovery component of HHF Program, HHU. In April

2008, during the Oramento Rectificativo (budget review) of 2008, the government

allocated a further $20 million to MSS for HHU, and in 2009 the Government allocated

another $30 million for Phase I and Phase II of HHU, bring the overall budget to USD65

million. The total amount of expenditure for Recovery Packages and associated

operational costs was $56.8 million. The remaining approximately $9 million was

returned to the Ministry of Finance. Important strategic partnerships were also formed



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with IOM and UNDP which involved the provision of technical assistance early on in the

conceptualization and drafting of the NRS and in the implementation of the Strategy

through the design and development of several key projects. Additionally, approximately

$70 million was provided by the International Community through the Flash, Consolidated

and Transitional Strategy and Appeals between 2007 and 2009 to address the

humanitarian needs of IDPs, returnees and vulnerable populations (including in the areas of

food assistance, shelter and non-food items, water and sanitation, security, education,

economic recovery and infrastructure) as well as to support implementation of the five

pillars of the NRS. to support implementation of the NRS.

The degree of coordination at a high and operational level that was required

under the Strategy posed a significant challenge for the Government given its

limited institutional capacity.Although the Inter-Ministerial Commission was initially

envisaged as a mechanism for coordinating the implementation of the Strategy, this

function was never fully realized due to the fact that the limited number of meetings

held, focused predominantly on issues related to the housing pillar such as camp

closures, the establishment and closure of transitional shelters and the recovery

packages. In the absence of an effective Inter-Ministerial Commission, coordination

between the five pillar working groups was inherently weak which hindered the

development of cross-pillar cooperation and synergies.

The limited number of meetings convened by socio-economic and security

pillar working groups directly hampered the overall coordination of NRS.

Although many initiatives were implemented by the Ministry of Economic Developmentand the Ministry of Defence and Security, because these initiatives were not

implemented as specific components of the NRS, the Government was unable to track

and link these back to the NRS. Without regular working group meetings, important

opportunities for cross-pillar cooperation were also missed.

Recommendations

General:

1. The sudden outbreak of the crisis in 2006, and the immediate need for a comprehensive

response to the crisis, underlined the important function of coordination mechanisms at a

national level in order to engage and ensure the participation of relevant ministries. Given

the cross-cutting dimensions of man-made and natural disasters (in terms of housing,

security, socio-economic and protection needs), a coordination mechanism should be

established under the Office of the Prime Minister to support an immediate all-of-

government response to future man-made and national disasters.

2. Ensuring accountability for criminal acts committed during the 2006 crisis will be critical

in order to sustain the return and reintegration results achieved through the NRS over

the longer term. Individuals who committed crimes and human rights violations during



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the 2006 crisis should be held accountable in accordance with the recommendations of

the Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste.

3. The HHU programme provided sufficient opportunities to ensure that pending cases and

complaints related to the HHU Cash Recovery Grants programme were fairly and

comprehensively addressed through efforts of MSS to receive, review and re-evaluate

pending cases and complaints. In cases where complaints still exist, persons should be

informed about the possibility to appeal the MSS decisions and to address their complaint

to legal institutions. In order to avoid raising expectations about the possibility of re-

opening the HHU programme, it is important that such avenues for redress are

consistently communicated by the Government and national institutions to all persons

wishing to file complaints.

4. Historically, political discourse has had a powerful impact in Timor-Leste in contributing to

both the incitement and resolution of conflict. The high-level political dialogues and peace

ceremonies convened in 2008 under the auspices of the former Presidents Dialogue

Commission set a positive example for communities about political reconciliation. The 21

August 2010 Maubisse meeting, where historical leaders came together to discuss the

issue of possible new leaders from the next generations to carry out the process of

national development and state building into the future is another positive example. With

the upcoming elections, it will be important for all political parties and leaders to continue

to send messages of reconciliation and tolerance in order to ensure that their discourse

does not serve to further inflame pre-existing tensions and divisions.

5. Following the closure of the NRS in December 2010, some persons have remained

without homes (with some continuing to illegally reside in former transitional shelters)

due to unresolved property issues or the fact that they did not own property prior to

2006 and have since become vulnerable. Alternative housing is needed for vulnerable

persons that remain without durable solutions following the 2006 crisis as well as for

those persons who are living in homes but are not the original owner of the house and

who will require alternative accommodation once the new Land and Property Law is

adopted and implemented. Under the Millennium Development Goals Suco Programme,

five houses will be built in each of the 2,228 aldeias every year for vulnerable persons,

resulting in more than 55,000 houses being built by 2015.2 This Programme could offer

important solutions for vulnerable persons who remain without adequate housing as

well as for future cases of displacement that will be encountered following the adoption

of the land and property legislation.

6. Land and property disputes remain a contentious issue for communities. The resolution

of land and property issues, through the finalization, adoption and implementation of the

Land and Property Law is therefore critical in order to ensure that long withstanding

issues related to occupancy rights are finally addressed and prevented from serving as a

trigger for future conflict.


2 Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, Constitutional Government IV, Timor-Leste Strategic Development Plan2011-2030, p. 111.


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7. One of the root causes of the 2006 crisis was the sense of perceived social and regional

inequalities which were exacerbated by high unemployment, poverty, food insecurity and

a housing shortage. The Governments Strategic Development Plan for 2011-2030

acknowledges that urban-rural imbalances and inter-regional imbalances are inevitable in

a fast-changing economy.3 In order to ensure that future development does not

contribute to the further widening of real and perceived social and regional inequalities,

increased efforts will be needed by the Government, International Community and civil

society to support equitable future development.

8. Although the NRS provided IDPs with the means to repair and reconstruct their homes,

there are still homes which remain destroyed or severely damaged. In order to assess

future housing needs and ensure effective urban-rural planning and budgeting, a

comprehensive mapping of homes destroyed and reconstructed should be conducted.

9. Based on the experience of the NRS Cash Recovery Grants, important mechanisms are

needed to ensure that recipients of the different social protection schemes under MSS

are not receiving double payments across the schemes. In order to track payments and

benefits given, it is recommended that an integrated database be established within MSS

to cross-check the distribution and payment of social protection benefits.

10. Security proved to be a major challenge for MSS during the estimation and verification

process for the Cash Recovery Grants awarded under the NRS. Given the significant

number of compensation payments now being made to veterans and other groups, it is

recommended that MSS undertake a comprehensive security review in order to ensurethe safety and security of staff and prevent outside interference in internal processes to

determine and administer such payments.

Peace-building:

11. Through the work of the former MSS Dialogue Teams during the IDP return and

reintegration process, MSS has developed significant institutional capacity to support the

resolution of community level tensions and conflicts. The recent establishment of the

new Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion (DPBSC), will ensure that this

important capacity is not lost and that practical knowledge and experience of former

Dialogue Team staff (many of whom are now staff members of the new Department)

continues to enhance national and community capacity to respond to, and mitigate

sources of tension and conflict through dialogue and mediation. In order to sustain the

work of the new Department (which is now funded under a UNDP project until 2013),

it is recommended that funds be allocated for permanent civil servant positions and an

operational budget after 2013.

12. With the upcoming Presidential elections and anticipated adoption of the land law, the

DPBSC will have an important preventative role over the next year. As a conflict-prevention


3 Ibid, p. 116.


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measure to respond to tensions related to further land disputes and increased politicization,

it is recommended that the Department ramp up its dialogue and training efforts this year

and also consider the organization of a national/district-level peace-building workshop in

order to socialize the role of the DPBSC and increase awareness about the dialogue process.

13. There is a need to consolidate and coordinate efforts and programmes around peace-

building and conflict prevention in order to avoid duplication of efforts. At the

Government-level, there is a need for further coordination and clarification of roles and

responsibilities between the DPBSC, the National Directorate for the Prevention of

Community Conflicts under the Secretary of State for Security and the National

Directorate for Land and Property under the Ministry of Justice. This is particularly

important in order to ensure coordination in the mediation and resolution of community

conflict (including those related to land and property disputes) since mediation teams will

be established under all three offices. At the level of civil society, there are also a number of

international and national NGOs involved in conflict resolution and peace-building. In

order to ensure effective coordination within Government ministries and between civil

society and the Government, it is recommended that a Government-led and chaired

coordination body be established. Given MSS past experience as the lead Ministry for the

Trust-Building pillar of the NRS, and its accumulated expertise and practical experience in

the resolution of conflict and promotion of social cohesion, the new DPBSC would be

well-positioned to lead such coordination efforts.

14. Given the accumulated knowledge of MSS DPBSC about the causes and dynamics of

conflict in communities throughout the country, the Department is well-placed to play asupportive and coordination role within the Government in ensuring that processes and

approaches instituted during the implementation of the Strategic Development are

conflict-sensitive. In this regard, the Department should work with other ministries to

support the mainstreaming of a conflict-sensitive approach in the planning and

implementation of national development processes.

15. In order to ensure meaningful participation of women in dialogue and peace processes, in

line with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and

Security, the DPBSC, in coordination with the Secretary of State for the Promotion of

Equality, should support the organization of specific peace-building and conflict resolution

trainings for leaders of womens networks and NGOs in order to increase their capacity

to actively participate in the resolution of conflicts. Technical support could also be given

to support the development of womens peace networks.

16. The MSS DPBSC, in collaboration with networks of the National Directorate for the

Prevention of Community Conflict and Beluns Early Warning and Early Response

System, should undertake a mapping and assessment of communities with a past history

of conflict and which are facing current tensions related to areas such as youth gang

violence, higher rates of violent crime and political animosities. In areas determined to be

high risk, the DPBSC should support an increased number of dialogue meetings and

mediations as a preventive measure, particularly in the lead up to the 2012 elections, and



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also coordinate with the Ministry of Defense and Security so that an increased security

presence can be deployed, where necessary, in order to deter and respond to potential

acts of violence.

17. The MSS DPBSC should cooperate with the Ministry for State Administration and

Territorial Planning, in order to ensure that training and support for Chefe Suco in the

areas of mediation and conflict resolution are institutionalized within support

programmes and initiatives and provided on an annual basis.

18. The DPBSCs Training, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit should focus its time and

resources on the development of training seminars for areas that have not yet had any

form of training. Participants of such trainings should include an increased number of

youth and martial arts groups, representatives of religious communities and political

parties. It is also recommended that the Unit provide follow-up/refresher trainings for

community leaders who attended past trainings in order to deepen their knowledge and

address challenges they face in mediating conflict in their communities.

19. The MSS DPBSC should advocate for the inclusion of civic education and peace

education into the curriculum and training for new civil servants. Such training would

ensure that Government officials, particularly those based in the districts, are well-

equipped with knowledge about how to facilitate and support community-based

resolution processes.



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REZUMU EZEKUTIVU

Tan krize 2006, ema liu nain 150.000 mak halai husik hela sira-nia uma hodi b hela iha kampu

dezlokadu internu hamutuk 65 iha Dili no distritu-sira. S-tan, uma no edifsiu lubuk ida mak

hetan estragu ka destrusaun. Hodi buka solusaun realokasaun no reintegrasaun sustentbel mak

sai hanesan prioridade aas ida b Governu Konstitusionl Dahaak. Nunee, iha Dezembru 2007,

Governu adopta Estratjia Rekuperasaun Nasionl (National Recovery Strategy - NRS), koesidu

iha Ttun hanesan Hamutuk Harii Futuru (HHF), atu bele estabelese resposta ida konsertida hosi

parte Governu-nian b nesesidade oioin hosi ema-sira dezlokadu internu hamutuk ho

komunidade-sira neeb afetadu iha rai-laran nee. NRS nee iha ai-riin lima: 1) Hamutuk Harii Uma

(Horik-fatin); 2) Hamutuk Harii Protesaun (Protesaun Sosil); 3) Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade; 4)

Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia (Dezenvolvimentu Ssio-Ekonmiku) no 5) Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa

(Harii-Fiar) neeb hetan orientasaun hosi objetivu jerl tolu:

1) Atu adopta vizaun foun ida b rekuperasaun nasionl, ida neeb laos deit promove

simu-malu maib fortifika komunidade-sira, ekonomia lokl, estabilidade no relasaun

entre Governu no povu Timor-Leste, neeb mak sira serv.

2) Atu estabelese aproximasaun konsertida ida hosi Governu Hothotu hodi responde

b asuntu oioin, inkluindu asuntu sosil, fzikl, legl, ekonmiku, seguransa no poltika

neeb hamutuk bele kria obstkulu oioin b re-estabelesementu hosi ema-sira neeb

sai dezlokadu.

3) Atu prienxe nesesidade oioin hosi ema-sira neeb dezlokadu no nesesidade jerl hosi

komunidade-sira neeb afetadu iha territriu nee tomak.

Tan-nee papl MSS-nian iha implementasaun NRS no iha supervizaun b retornu neeb susesu,

re-estabelesementu no reintegrasaun hosi ema-sira dezlokadu internu hamutuk liu nain 150.000,

akumula ona koesementu estensivu no esperinsia. Atu dokumenta prosesu implementasaun

NRS, revee rezultadu-sira neeb atinji ona no identifika lisaun-sira neeb aprende ona/

rekomendasaun oioin b futuru iha rea harii-dame, Relatriu ida-nee komisionadu ho pedidu

hosi MSS no ho apoiu finanseiru hosi PNUD.

Sumriu hosi Deskoberta-sira Prinsipl:

Jerl:

Jerlmente, implementasaun hosi NRS sai hanesan susesu boot ida no prosesu retornu

neeb akontese lalais nee la-ho presedente nunee ms auznsia hosi konflitu boot

iha komunidade-sira leet depois prosesu retornu no reintegrasaun. Iha deit tinan rua

ho balu depois lansamentu hosi NRS nee, konsege taka ona kampu hothotu b ema-

sira dezlokadu internu neeb hamutuk 65, no la too tinan haat depois krize 2006

nakfera, maioria hosi nmeru ema-sira dezlokadu internu neeb tuir estimative



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Mask prevee ona NRS nuudr resposta abranjente ida, hosi pilr lima neeb iha

(horik-fatin, protesaun, seguransa, dezenvolvimentu ssio-ekonmiku, no harii-

konfiansa), eskema Osan Subsdiu b Rekuperasaun (Cash Recovery Grant) neeb

tama iha pilr horik-fatin nian mak domina tebes komponente-sira seluk hosi NRS.

Mask iha duni esforsu oioin hodi informa pbliku no komunidade IDP-sira kona-b

pilr hothotu hosi Estratjia nee, maioria IDP-sira, ofisil-sira Governu nian, parseiru-

sira hosi sosiedade sivl, no pbliku jerl haree Estratjia nee mak Osan Subsdiu b

Rekuperasaun deit. Enkontru-sira hosi Komisaun Inter-Ministeril prinsiplmente foka

deit b pilr horik-fatin nian, partikulrmente kona-b asuntu-sira neeb relasionadu

ho pagamentu hosi Osan Rekuperasaun nian. Nunee ms bainhira halo hela entrevista

kona-b implementasaun NRS nian, ema-barak hosi sira neeb hetan entrevista hatene

no bele koalioa deit kona-b pakote rekuperasaun.

Mask rezultadu-sira neeb atinji iha NRS-nia okos mak iha pilr horik-fatin, protesaun

no harii-konfiansa nia laran, rea pilr rua seluk ms indiretamente atinji rezultadu-

hirak nee. Inisiativa lubuk ida kontribui b reforma oioin neeb liga ho seguransa no

oportunidade aumentadu b impregu neeb mak pilr seguransa no dezenvolvimentu

ssio-ekonmiku implementa ketak, maibe kontribui nafatin b progresu no alkansu b

objetivu oioin hosi pilr rua nee.

Mask prevee Estratjia Rekuperasaun Nasionl nee hanesan aproximasaun ida hosi

Governu Tomak nian b rekuperasaun, kapasidade Governu nian hodi operasionaliza

aproximasaun nee limitadu. Mask retiru rua dahuluk hosi Governu nian kona-b NRS

hetan atendimentu neeb diak hosi ministriu-sira prinsipl neeb responsvel bimplementasaun hosi Estratjia nee, too iha retiru datoluk, partisipasaun hosi ministriu-

sira nee tuun makaas tebes no iha kazu balu nunka bele materializa ho kompletu.

Maske grupu traballu hosi pilr kona-b horik-fatin, protesaun no harii-konfiansa halo

enkontru regulr, grupu traballu pilr seguransa nian halo deit enkontru neeb oitoan

no grupu traballu pilr dezenvolvimentu ssiu-ekonmiku nian konvoka deit enkontru

dala ida. Ministriu balu neeb asumi responsabilidade prinsipl tuir NRS ms nunka

involve lols atu atinji asaun-sira prinsipl neeb estabelese ona iha NRS-nia okos.

Governu halo duni esforsu importante lubuk ida hodi garante katak NRS responde

duni b nesesidade oioin hosi IDPs. Governu halo konsulta direta ho IDPs, inkluindu

konsulta ho jerente kampu IDP liu 50 hodi nunee bele identifika nesesidade oioin hosi

IDPs no atu identifika obstkulu prinsipl b sira-nia prosesu retornu. Informasaun

oioin neeb mai hosi konsulta-hirak nee diretamente informa aproximasaun finl no

kontedu hosi NRS.

Progresu notvel neeb halo hodi taka kampu IDP nian no hodi fasilita retornu neeb

pasfiku no re-estabelesementu hosi IDP-sira bele akontese tan esforsu konsertidu

oioin hosi parte Governu no ninian parseiru-sira internasionl no nasionl. Iha parseria

direta ho Governu, ONU, hamutuk ho ONG-sira internasionl no nasionl halao papl

ida integrl hodi apoia resposta umanitria inisil b krize no responde b nesesidade

protesaun b IDP-sira iha kampu dezlokadu oioin. Parseria estratjika importante ms



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forma ho OMI no PNUD neeb involve iha fornesementu asistnsia tknika inisil iha

NRS nian konseptualizasaun no ezbosu no durante implementasaun hosi Estratjia

nee liu-hosi dezeu no dezenvolvimentu hosi projetu-sira importante balu. S-tan,

Komunidade Internasionl fornese aproximadamente $70 millaun liu-hosi Flash,

Consolidate and Transitional Strategy and Appeals entre 2007 no 2009 hodi apoia

implementasaun hosi NRS.

Grau koordenasaun iha nvel aas no operasionl neeb mak nesesita tuir Estratjia

nee hamosu dezafiu ida signifikativu b Governu tan ninian kapasidade institusionl

neeb limitadu. Mask Komisaun Inter-Ministeril nee inisilmente prevee hanesan

mekanizmu ida b koordenasaun implementasaun hosi Estratejia nee, funsaun ida-nee

nunka realiza kompletamente tan faktu katak nmeru enkontru neeb oitoan, foka

makaas liu b kestaun-hirak neeb relasionadu ho pilr horik-fatin nian hanesan taka

kampu, estabelesementu no taka uma provizriu no pakote oioin kona-b

rekuperasaun. Bainhira la iha Komisaun Inter-Ministeril ida neeb efikz,

koordenasaun entre grupu traballu pilr lima nee sai fraku neeb mak impede

dezenvolvimentu kooperasaun inter-pilr no sinerjia oioin.

Nmeru enkontru limitadu neebe mak grupu traballu hosi pilr ssio-ekonmika no

seguransa diretamente f impaktu b koordenasaun jerl NRS nian. Mask inisiativa

barak mak Ministriu Dezenvolvimentu Ekonomia no Ministriu Defeza no Seguransa

implementa, tan implementasaun hosi inisiativa-hirak nee laos komponente espesfika

NRS nian, Governu hetan susar hodi buka-tuir no liga fali inisiativa-hirak nee ho NRS.

Hodi la iha enkontru grupu neeb regulr, lakon ms oportunidade-sira importante bkooperasaun inter-pilr.

Rekomendasaun

Jerl:

1. Tan surtu derepenti hosi krize iha 2006, no nesesidade imediata b resposta ida neeb

abranjente, sublia ona funsaun importante hosi mekanizmu koordenasaun iha nvelnasionl ida atu involve no garante partisipasaun hosi ministriu-sira relevante. Tan

dimensaun oioin neeb liga-malu hosi dezastre-sira neeb ema-mak-halo (kona-b

nesesidade b horik-fatin, seguransa, ssio-ekonmiku no protesaun), mekanizmu

koordenasaun ida tenke estabelesida iha Gabinete Primeiru Ministru nia okon atu apoia

resposta imediata hosi governu-tomak (all-of-government) b dezastre-sira neeb ema

mak halo ka dezastre-sira nasionl iha futuru.

2. Garanti responsabilidade b aktu-sira kriminl neeb komete durante krize 2006 sei sai

krtiku atu sustenta rezultadu retornu no reintegrasaun neeb alkansa ona liu-hosi NRS iha

longu termu. Ema-sira neeb komete krime no violasaun direitu-sira ema-nian durante

krize 2006 tenke toma responsabilidade tuir rekomendasaun hosi Report of the United

Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste.



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3. Programa HHU fornese oportunidade sufisiente hodi garante katak kazu-sira pendente no

keixa-sira neeb relasionadu ho progrorama HHU-nia Cash Recovery Grants nee

responde duni iha maneira ida justa no abranjente liu-hosi esforsu oioin hosi MSS atu simu,

revee, no re-avalia kazu-sira neeb pendente no keixa-sira. Bainhira sei iha nafatin keixa-

sira, presiza informa b ema kona-b posibilidade atu halo rekursu b MSS-nia desizaun-sira

no atu hatoo sira-nia keixa-sira b instituisaun-sira neeb legl. Atu evita espetativa-sira

neeb aas kona-b posibilidade atu loke-fali programa HHU, importante katak medida-sira

atu rekompensa nee Governu no instituisaun-sira nasionl komunika iha maneira ida

konsistente b ema-sira neeb hakarak atu hatoo sira-nia keixa oioin.

4. Istorikamente, diskursu poltika f ona impaktu ida makaas tebes iha Timor-Leste hodi

kontribui b instigasaun no rezolusaun konflitu. Dilogu poltika nvel-aas no serimnia

oioin kona-b dame neeb konvoka iha 2008 iha auspsiu Komisaun Dilogu hosi antigun

Prezidente nian f ezemplu pozitivu ida b komunidade-sira kona-b rekonsiliasaun

poltika. Enkontru Maubisse iha 21 Agostu 2010, bainhira lder-sira istrika halibur malu

hodi koalia kona-b asuntu lder-sira foun neeb posvel hosi jerasaun foun atu halao

prosesu dezenvolvimentu nasionl no harii estadu iha futuru nee sai hanesan ezemplu

pozitivu seluk-ida. Ho eleisaun neeb mai dadaun, importante b partidu poltiku no lder

poltiku hothotu atu nafatin haruka lia-menon rekonsiliasaun no tolernsia atu garante

katak sira-nia diskursu la serve tan atu sunu tensaun no divizaun neeb iha-nanis ona.

5. Depois taka NRS iha Dezembru 2010, ema balu sei sai nafatin uma-laek (hodi nafatin hela

ileglmente iha hela-fatin temporriu uluk) tan seidauk iha solusaun b kestaun propriedade

ka faktu katak sira la sai nain b propriedade molok 2006 no hosi tempu neeb kedas saiona vulnervel. Presiza iha horik-fatin alternativa b ema-sira vulnervel neeb mak

seidauk hetan solusaun-sira durvel depois krize 2006 nunee ms b ema-sira neeb hela

iha horik-fatin-sira maib sira laos nain b uma-hirak nee no sira nee sei presiza

alojamentu alternativu bainhira adopta no implementa ona Lei Rai no Propriedade neeb

foun. Iha Programa Suku nian hosi Objetivu Dezenvolvimentu Milniu, sei harii uma lima

iha aldeia ididak neeb hamutuk 2.228 tintinan b ema-sira vulnervel, hodi nunee sei harii

uma liu 55.000 iha 2015. Programa ida-nee bele oferese solusaun-sira importante b ema-

sira vulnervel neeb la iha nafatin horik-fatin neeb adekuadu no mos kazu

dezlokamentu oioin neeb sei mosu depois adopta lejislasaun kona-ba rai no propriedade.

6. Disputa oioin kona-b rai no propriedade sei sai nafatin asuntu ida kontensioza b

komunidade-sira. Tanb-nee, solusaun b asuntu-sira relasionadu ho rai no propriedade, liu-

hosi finalizasaun, adopsaun no implementasaun Lei Rai no Propriedade sai krtiku atu

garante katak asuntu-sira pendende relasionadu ho direitu okupasaun nian finlmente hetan

resposta no prevene hodi sai fali hanesan kauza b konflitu iha futuru.

7. Kauza prinsipl ida hosi krize 2006 mak sentimentu persebidu dezigualdade sosil no

rejionl neeb hetook aat liu tan ho dezempregu neeb aas, pobreza, inseguransa

alimentr no falta hela-fatin. Governu-nia Planu Dezenvolvimentu Estratjiku b 2011-2030

rekoese katak dezekilbriu urbana-rurl no dezekilbriu inter-rejionl mak inevitvel iha

ekonomia ida neeb muda-lalais. Atu bele garante katak dezenvolvimentu iha futuru la



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kontribui b dezekilbriu sosil no rejionl real no persevida neeb hetook luan, Governu,

Komunidade Internasionl no sosiedade sivl sei presiza esforsu-sira neeb hetook barak

hodi apoia dezenvolvimentu futuru neeb ekitvel.

8. Mask NRS f duni meius b IDP-sira hodi hadiak no harii-hikas sira-nia uma, sei iha uma-

sira neeb hetan destroisaun ka estragu makaas. Atu avalia nesesidade b uma nian iha

futuru no atu garante planu urbanu-rurl no orsamentu neeb efetivu, tenke halao

mapeamentu ida abranjente b uma-sira neebe mak hetan destroisaun no rekonstrusaun.

9. Bazea b esperinsia hosi NRS-nia Cash Recovery Grants, presiza mekanizmu importante oioin

atu garante katak resepiente-sira hosi eskema protesaun sosil oioin neeb diferente hosi MSS

la simu pagamentu dupla iha eskema-hirak nee. Atu haree-tuir pagamentu no benefsiu oioin

neeb f ona, rekomenda atu estabelese baze-de-dadus ida integrada iha MSS-nia laran atu

cross-check distribuisaun no pagamentu hosi benefsiu oioin protesaun sosil nian.

10. Seguransa sai duni hanesan dezafiu ida prinsipl b MSS durante prosesu estimasaun no

verifikasaun b Osan Subsdu b Rekuperasaun (Cash Recovery Grants) nian neeb mak NRS

haraik. Tan nmeru kompensasaun pagamentu nian neeb signifikativu nee halao dadaun b

veteranu no grupu-sira seluk, rekomenda atu MSS halao revizaun seguransa abranjente ida atu

garante salvasaun no seguransa b funsionriu-sira no prevene interfernsia esterna iha prosesu

interna atu determina no administra pagamentu-sira hanesan nee.

Harii-ps:

11. Liu-hosi servisu antigu Ekipa Dilogu MSS-nian durante prosesu retornu no reintegrasaun IDP,

MSS dezenvolve ona kapasidade institusionl neeb signifikativu hodi apoia rezolusaun b

tensaun no konflitu iha nvel komunidade. Estabelesementu foin lalais b Departamentu Harii-

Dame no Koezaun Sosil (Department of Peace Building and Social Cohesion - DPBSC)

neeb foun, sei garante katak kapasidade importante ida-nee sei la lakon no esperinsia hosi

funsionriu-sira iha Ekipa Dilogu antigu (barak mak ohin-loron sai nuudr funsionriu b

Departamentu foun nee) kontinua atu eleva kapasidade nasionl no komunidade atu responde

b, no mitiga fonte oioin b tensaun no konflitu liu-hosi dilogu no mediasaun. Atu bele

sustenta servisu hosi Departamentu foun nee (neeb mak dadaun nee hetan fundu hosi

projetu PNUD nian too 2013), rekomenda atu aloka fundu b pozisaun funsionriu

permanente no orsamentu operasionl ida depois 2013.

12. Ho eleisaun Prezidensil neeb mai dadaun no adopsaun antesipada hosi lei b rai, DPBSC sei

asumi papl preventative ida importante iha tinan oin. Nuudr medida prevensaun ida atu

responde b tensaun oioin neeb relasionadu ho disputa oioin kona-b rai neeb mosu

barbarak no politizasaun neeb aumentu, rekomenda atu prepara didiak ninian esforsu

dilogu no formasaun tinan nee no ms konsidera atu organiza kolkiu kona-b harii-dame

iha nvel nasionl/distritu atu sosializa papl hosi DPBSC no hasae sensibilizasaun kona-b

prosesu dilogu



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13. Iha nesesidade atu konsolida no koordena esforsu no programa oioin kona-b harii-dame no

prevensaun konflitu atu evita duplikasaun hosi esforsu-sira. Iha nvel-Governu, iha nesesidade

ida atu kontinua koordenasaun no klarifikasaun kona-b funsaun no responsabilidade entre

DPBSC, Diresaun Nasionl b Prevensaun Konflitu-sira iha Komunidade iha Sekretariadu

Estadu b Seguransa no Diresaun Nasionl b Rai no Propriedade iha Ministriu Justisa. Ida-

nee partikularmente importante atu garante koordenasaun iha mediasaun no rezolusaun iha

konflitu komunidade nian (inkluindu hirak neeb relasionadu ho disputa rai no propriedade

nian) tan ekipa mediasaun nian sei estabelese iha gabinete tolu nee hotu. Iha nvel sosiedade

sivl, iha ms ONG-sira internasionl no nasionl lubuk ida neeb mak involve iha rezolusaun

konflitu no harii-dame. Atu garante koordenasaun neeb efetivu entre ministriu-sira iha

Governu-nia laran no entre sosiedade sivl no Governu, rekomenda atu estabele rgaun

koordenasaun ida neeb Governu mak lidera no xefia. Tan MSS-nia esperinsia pasada nuudr

Ministriu koordenadr pilr Harii-Konfiansa hosi NRS, no ninian persia akumulada no

esperinsia prttika iha rezolusaun konflitu no promosaun koezaun sosil, DPBSC foun nee

iha pozisaun-diak atu lidera esforsu koordenasaun hanesan nee.

14. Tan koesementu akumuladu hosi MSS-nia DPBSC kona-b kauza no dinmika oioin hosi

konflitu iha komunidade-sira iha nasaun nee, Departamentu nee iha pozisaun ida diak atu

asumi papl apoiu no koordenasaun iha Governu-nia laran hodi garante prosesu no

aproximasaun-sira neeb institui ona durante implementasaun Dezenvolvimentu Estratjiku

nee sensvel b konflitu. Tan-nee, Departamentu nee tenke servisu hamutuk ho ministriu-

sira seluk atu apoia abordjen hosi aproximasaun neeb sensvel b konflitu iha planifikasaun

no implementasaun hosi prosesu dezenvolvimentu nasionl.

15. Atu bele garante partisipasaun signifikativu b feto-sira iha prosesu dilogu no paz, tuir

Rezolusaun 1325 hosi Konsellu Seguransa Nasoens Unidas nian kona-b Feto, Paz no

Seguransa, DPBSC, hodi koordena hamutuk ho Sekretariadu Estadu b Promosaun Igualdade,

tenke apoia organiza formasaun espesfika kona-b harii-dame no rezolusaun konflitu b lder-

sira hosi rede feto nian no ONG-sira hodi eleva sira-nia kapasidade atu partisipa ativamente

iha rezolusaun konflitu. Presiza fornese ms apoiu tkniku b feto-sira iha dezenvolvimentu

rede b dame.

16. MSS-nia DPBSC, hodi servisu hamutuk ho rede-sira hosi Diresaun Nasional ba Prevensaun

Konflitu Komunidade no Belun-nia Aviza Antesipada no Sistema Resposta Antesipada, tenke

halo mapeamentu no avaliasaun ba komunidade-sira ne'ebe iha istoria konflitu iha pasadu no

ne'ebe mak dadaun ne'e infrenta hela tensaun oioin ne'ebe relasionadu ho area-sira hanesan

violensia entre grupu joventude, taxa krimi violensia ne'ebe aas no animozidade politika. Iha

area-hirak ne'ebe determina ho risku aas, DPBSC tenke apoia aumenta numeru enkontru

dialogu no mediasaun hanesan medida preventiva, partikularmente molok atu tama ba eleisaun

jeral 2012, no mos atu koordena ho Ministeriu Defeza no Seguransa atu nune'e bele koloka

prezensa seguransa ida ne'ebe maka'as, bainhira nesesita, atu nune'e bele hatauk no responde

ba aktu potensial violensia nian.

17. MSS-nia DPBSC di'ak-liu koopera ho Ministeriu Administrasaun Estatal no Ordenamentu

Territorial, atu bele garante katak formasaun no apoiu ba Xefe Suku-sira iha area mediasaun



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no rezolusaun konflitu ne'e institusionaliza iha programa apoiu-sira no inisiativa-sira nia laran

no fornese tuir formasaun ne'e tintinan.

18. DPBSC-nia Unidade ba Formasaun, Monitorizasaun no Avaliasaun di'ak-liu aloka ninian tempu

no rekursu oioin ba iha dezenvolvimentu formasaun kolokiu ba area-sira ne'ebe seidauk hetan

tipu formasaun ruma. Partisipante-sira ba formasaun hanesan ne'e di'ak-liu inklui grupu joven-

sira no grupu arte marsial ho numeru ne'ebe boot, reprezentante hosi komunidade relijioza

no partidu politika. Rekomenda mos atu Unidade ne'e fornese formasaun tuir-mai/resiklajen

ba lider komunitariu sira ne'ebe mak atende ona formasaun uluk atu nune'e aprofunda sira-nia

matenek no responde ba dezafiu oioin ne'ebe sira hasoru bainhira halo mediasaun ba konflitu

iha sira-nia komunidade.

19. MSS-nia DPBSC tenke advoka b inkluzaun edukasaun svika no edukasaun paz nian iha

kurrkulu no formasaun b funsionriu-sira pbliku. Formasaun hanesan nee sei garante katak

ofisil-sira Governu nian, partikulrmente sira neeb hela iha distritu-sira, iha koesementu

neeb diak kona-b oins atu fasilita no apoia prosesu rezolusaun bazeadu iha komunidade.



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INTRODUCTION

The impact of the April-May 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste was devastating for the country. As a newly

independent nation, the crisis triggered the collapse of fragile state institutions built up in the

short time since the countrys independence in 2002 and large-scale displacement of

approximately 150,000 internally displaced persons. As a result, the attention and priorities of the

Government of Timor-Leste and the International Community rapidly turned to addressing the

urgent humanitarian situation and responding to the volatile security situation.

Finding a sustainable return solution was a high priority for the IV Constitutional Government

and, in response, in December 2007, the Government adopted the NRS. The aim of the Strategy

was to establish a concerted Government response that would meet both the needs of the IDPs

and the affected communities throughout the country. The Strategy acknowledged that in order

to ensure sustainable return of IDPs, the root causes of the crisis would need to be addressed in

a comprehensive manner. As a result, the NRS was comprised of five pillars:

1. Hamutuk Harii Uma (Housing)

2. Hamutuk Harii Protesaun (Social Protection)

3. Hamutuk Harii Estabilidade (Stability)

4. Hamutuk Harii Ekonomia Sosial(Socio-Economic Development)

5. Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa (Trust-Building)

In implementing the Strategy, the Government established strategic partnerships with

international and national partners who provided important technical and logistical support and

strategic advice to the Government in its efforts to achieve national recovery and ensure the

sustainable return and reintegration of IDPs.

Almost four years after the adoption of the NRS, and following the official closure of the HHF

Programme in February 20104, the Ministry of Social Solidarity, as the lead ministry responsible

for the implementation of the Strategy is now interested to assess the results, impact and lessons

learned that have emerged. The International Community has also expressed interest in having a

further analysis of the NRS as a case study for other countries recovering from crisis.

With these aims in mind, the overall objective of the MSS-led review and documentation of the

NRS is to review progress towards the NRS objectives and document the process, results, and

main lessons learned and to develop a Final Report which will serve as a reference to be shared

with a wide audience such as civil society, international agencies, and Government institutions.5


4 The National Recovery Strategy/HHF Programme was officially closed on 18 February 2010 under GovernmentResolution No. 8/2010.

5 MSS/UNDP Timor-Leste, Terms of Reference for a Consultant for the Review and Documentation of the NationalRecovery Strategy.


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In pursuit of this objective, the focus of this review and documentation is:

1. To assess the extent to which the NRS has achieved its overall objectives;

2. To review results achieved in the various pillars of the NRS;

3. To describe and assess the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms and strategic partnerships

established to support of the implementation of the NRS;

4. To identify key factors that will require attention in order to improve prospects for

sustainability of the results and the potential for replication of the approach in other

countries;

5. To describe the main lessons that have emerged; and

6. To provide a set of recommendations, including for future efforts related to peace-building, in

order to consolidate the gains achieved by the NRS.

This review concludes with a set of recommendations including specific recommendations related to

future initiatives needed in the area of peace-building to consolidate the gains achieved by the NRS.



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SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY OF REVIEW

Scope

Given the breadth and depth of the NRS as a comprehensive and cross-sectoral strategy, this

documentation and review focuses only on the implementation of the Strategy including the

period from when it was adopted in December 2007 until when it officially closed in December

2010. This report does not therefore include a comprehensive overview of the humanitarian

response to the 2006 crisis which has already been addressed in other reports.6

Methodology

In documenting and reviewing the NRS, the views and opinions of a wide range of relevant

national authorities, community beneficiaries and other relevant stakeholders/partners involved

in, and affected by implementation of the Strategy, were actively sought and included within the

overall findings of this report. Between 22 September 19 October 2011, the consultant met

with a total of 75 persons (52 men and 23 women) including 29 government officials from seven

different ministries/secretaries of state, 18 officials from the UN Country Team, 15 representatives

from international and national non-governmental organizations (NGOs), one representative of a

national institution, seven local leaders from three districts and IDP representatives.

When examining the results and impact of the strategy, gender considerations, were taken into

account and mainstreamed into the methodology and findings. Efforts were also made to include

an equal number of both women and men in the consultation meetings and interviews. For a full

list of interviewees, see Annex 1.

In the original evaluation proposal submitted to the CPR Unit, a comprehensive list of evaluation

questions was developed (see Annex 2) which were used as the basis for the interviews. Questions

were then asked according to the relevant role/involvement of each interviewee in the NRS

implementation process.

Finally, the review and findings were informed by a comprehensive document review that was

conducted prior to, and during, the documentation and review process. A list of key documents

reviewed is included in Annex 4.


6 In 2009, the international humanitarian and recovery community in Timor-Leste (UN and INGOs) led by

OXFAM and with the support of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator, commissioned an evaluation of itshumanitarian response to the 2006 crisis. The purpose of the evaluation was to consider the nature of thehumanitarian emergency generated by the 2006 crisis in Timor-Leste and assess the appropriateness of theinteragency response from April 2006 to mid-2008. Source: UNMIT, The Humanitarian and RecoveryUpdate, Issue No. 2, December 2009, p. 3.


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Limitations

In conducting the consultations for this report, the consultant was informed that many of the key

staff and stakeholders who were directly involved in the implementation of the NRS were no

longer in their posts. In cases where these persons were still in Dili, the consultant was able to

reach these persons and interview them. In cases where staff and stakeholders were no longer in

Dili, efforts were made to conduct interviews by telephone and to send out questionnaires

electronically. In some cases, where it was not possible to meet with key stakeholders, the

consultant relied on information received through past interviews she conducted as part of the

evaluation of two UNDP/MSS projects under the Hamutuk Harii Konfiansa/Trust-Building pillar of

the NRS.7 In spite of these attempts, there remained instances where important stakeholder

feedback was not possible due to the fact that new staff were not present during the

implementation of the NRS and therefore lacked the institutional knowledge necessary to provide

relevant information.

Another limitation the consultant encountered was in meeting former IDPs. Due to the volume

of consultations required and time limitations, it was not possible to undertake a comprehensive

and systematic consultation process with former IDPs. Instead, the consultant chose to rely on

finding from the Return Monitoring Project Final Report recently completed by the International

Organization for Migration (IOM).8

A final limitation was the discrepancy in available information related to the work and progress of

the five pillar areas of the NRS. While some pillars (such as the Housing and Trust-Building pillars)

were extremely well-documented, information about the other three pillar areas was much more

limited. This, combined with the unavailability of many of the key informants, made it difficult for the

consultant to undertake a comprehensive documentation of the implementation progress and final

results of all five pillars.


7 Between March-June 2011, the consultant conducted external evaluations of the MSS/UNDP projects,Strengthening Institutional Structures and Mechanisms for Dialogue and Strengthening Early Recovery forComprehensive and Sustainable Reintegration of IDPs.

8 The consultant is extremely grateful to IOM for agreeing to provide her with a preliminary copy of thisreport so that the findings and consultations from it could be used in order to provide useful informationabout the perceptions and views of IDPs and community leaders.


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BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

The social, economic and political impact of the 2006-2007 crises in Timor-Leste was significant in

that it further compounded past sources of conflict and tension. While the dismissal of the

petitioners, and subsequent violence and destruction of property that followed, may have served

as a trigger for the displacement of more than 150,000 persons, the cause of the instability and

displacement are deep-rooted and complex. In assessing the effectiveness of the Government of

Timor-Lestes NRS in dealing with the consequence and causes of protracted displacement, it is

therefore important to first examine the historical, political, economic, social and cultural factors

that contributed to the crisis.

Displacement is, unfortunately, not a new phenomenon for Timor-Leste. The first occurrence wasreported during the Portuguese colonial era when many families lost their land as a result of

commercial interests and were forced to resettle internally.9 During the 1974-1975 civil war, in

which thousands of people were killed in combat and hundreds of political prisoners executed,

tens of thousands of civilians were displaced to West Timor.10

The most significant displacement occurred during Indonesian occupation between1975-1999

when state-sponsored forced displacement programmes resulted in entire villages being


9 Bugalski, Natalie, Post Conflict Housing Reconstruction and the Right to Adequate Housing in Timor-Leste: AnAnalysis of the Response to the Crisis of 2006 and 2007, 27 July 2010, p.3.

10 United Nations, Report of the United Nations Independent Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste,Geneva, October 2006, para. 16.


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resettled.11 In the months leading up to the UN-sponsored popular consultation to determine

whether the country would remain an autonomous region of Indonesia or become an

independent state, an estimated 60,000 people were displaced from their villages to urban centres

when pro-integrationist militias supported by the Indonesian army, waged a campaign of violence,

destruction and illegal mass deportations.12

Following the positive vote for independence, wide-scale human rights abuses, burning and looting

by the militias resulted in the destruction of much of the countrys infrastructure and housing

stock13, the collapse of the economy and state institutions and the forced displacement of the

majority of the population.14 Among the displaced were hundreds of thousands of Timorese who

were pushed out of Dili into West Timor as refugees.

The initial returnees to Dili, IDPs who had fled eastwards, rapidly and illegally occupied most of

the few houses that were not destroyed; therefore, upon the return of many of the IDPs from

West Timor, they found their homes occupied by mainly easterners. Due to the fact that land and

housing records were destroyed by the pro-integrationist militias, returnees were unable to prove

ownership of their occupied homes and unable to file claims to their property due the absence of

a land claims process.15 The problems of returnees were further compounded by critical housing

shortages and high housing prices due to the large number of persons choosing to stay in Dili

given the lack of economic activity in the districts.16

As a newly independent state, apart from the challenges posed by displacement, Timor-Lestes

development and prosperity was hampered by a range of other factors including high

unemployment rates, historical political division dating back to the civil war, regional economicdisparities, increasing perceptions of east-west cleavages, fragile state institutions and weak rule of

law. The majority of the countrys population was affected by poverty and chronic deprivation with

one fifth living on less than one United States dollar per day. Timor-Leste was ranked 142 nd out of

the 177 countries included in the UNDP Human Development Report 2006. It was against this

backdrop, the crisis of 2006 emerged.

Outbreak of the 2006 Crisis

On 9 January 2006, members of the Timor-Leste armed forces (F-FDTL) submitted a petition to

the President and Chief of Defense concerning alleged discrimination against members from the


11 In its 2005 report, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) observed thatbetween 1975 to 1999, almost all persons in Timor-Leste have experienced at least one period ofdisplacement, CAVR. 2005. Chega!., Final Report of the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation, s7.3.7. (www.cavrtimorleste.org/en/chegaReport.htm).

12 Lopes, Ibere, Land and Displacement in Timor-Leste, Humanitarian Exchange Magazine, Issue 43 June 2009,http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3007.

13 Militia were reported to have damaged up to 30% of houses in Dili and an estimated 80% of houses acrossthe country. Harrington, Andrew, Ethnicity, Violence and Land and Property Disputes in Timor-Leste, EastTimor Law Journal, 2007, http://www.eastimorlawjournal.org. p. 59.

14 Bulgalski, p.3.

15 In an attempt to regulate occupations of homes, Law No 1/2003 was adopted which enabled more than6,000 illegal occupants to submit applications for regularization of their occupation in exchange for leaseswith DTLP. As a result of this Law, 50% of houses in Dili became occupied illegally (Harrington, p. 74).

16 Ibid.


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western areas of the country. Following the decision of the petitioners to abandon their barracks

on 17 February, on 16 March, the Chief of Defense announced the mass dismissal of 594 soldiers,

representing almost 40 percent of the armed forced.

On 24 April, the petitioners, held demonstrations in front of the Government Palace which

became increasingly critical towards the Government, particularly as outside parties joined the

demonstration including youth and political elements. On 28 April, the last day of demonstrations,

violence erupted when a group of the demonstrators started to throw stones and attack the

Government offices. The violence, which then spread quickly to other parts of Dili, included the

burning of more than 100 homes owned mainly by easterners in Rai Kotu.17 As a result of the

violent riots, five persons were killed, at least 60 injured and a significant number of properties

were damaged including the total destruction of 45 homes and the damage of 116.18 Additionally,

the physical damage and psychological impact of the violence, caused an estimated 10,000 to

15,000 Dili residents (out of a total population of around 180,000) to become displaced. While

most fled to surrounding mountains and outer districts, at least 5,000 sought refuge in churches

and other public buildings throughout Dili.19

On 25-26 May 2006, the security situation again deteriorated when renewed fighting broke out

between the pro-government troops and disaffected Falintil soldiers. This outbreak of violence

lasted for several days and included communal fighting between easterners and westerners as well

as further lootings and burnings of houses and government buildings. This violence resulted in the

death of 40 people and a significant rise in the number of displaced persons with the population

of IDP camps increasing by 300% in 24 hours with more than 20,000 residents fleeing their homes

to camps outside the city.20

The overall impact of the April-May 2006 crisis was devastating for Timor-Leste. At least 37

persons were killed and approximately 150,000 persons were displaced (with an estimated 73,000

persons in IDP camps in and around Dili and 78,000 who moved to districts outside Dili).21 More

than 2,200 houses were destroyed and more than 1,600 damaged, which rendered more than

20,000 persons without a home to return to.22

As concluded by the UN Special Commission of Inquiry for Timor-Leste, the violent events of

April/May 2006 were an expression of deep-rooted problems inherent in fragile State institutions

and a weak rule of law.23 One of the key factors underpinning the crisis was secondary land



18 Statement of Sukehiro Hasegawa, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Timor-Leste andHead of Mission of the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste. United Nations Security Council, 5432ndMeeting, 5 May 2006, New York.

19 Ibid.



22 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission inTimor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007), 1 February 2007, para. 52.



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occupation issues dating back to 1999 which were re-awakened during the population

displacement in 2006. For past IDPs from West Timor whose homes were illegally occupied by

easterners, some saw the crisis of 2006 as an opportunity to take back their property. Perceived

social cleavages and discrimination between easterners and westerners, especially when fanned by

political elements also contributed to upheaval in 2006.

Initial Response to the Crisis

Following the crisis, immediate humanitarian relief efforts to the estimated 150,000 IDPs were

mobilised by the Government of Timor-Leste and the international community. A Flash Appeal

outlining priority rapid response activities aimed at mitigating the humanitarian consequences of

the crisis and outlining a multi-sectoral relief operation to be undertaken over a three month

period was launched for USD 19 million and was 114 percent funded.24

In close collaboration with international partners, the Government took significant measures to

address the humanitarian needs of the IDPs. Several United Nations agencies,25 together with

international and local non-governmental organizations26, provided food assistance, protection,

shelter, camp management and camp coordination, water and sanitation services, education and

emergency health interventions.

IOM, through its camp management teams, partnered with MSS to ensure that the daily basic

assistance and protection needs of IDPs were met including water and sanitation upgrades and

tent replacements; coordination and logistics for food distribution; provision of information on

Government policies; support to intra and inter-camp and community dialogues and other conflict

mitigation activities, support to camp leadership structures; and daily monitoring of camp

services, including those for health, security, education, protection, child friendly activities as well

as water and sanitation.27

The UN Food and Agricultural Organization, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

and the International Labour Organization (ILO), provided support for the development of livelihoods

and cash-for-work projects, particularly aimed at neighbourhoods of Dili affected by the crisis.

All activities related to humanitarian assistance were coordinated by the former Minister ofLabour and Community Reinsertion and the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator, with

support of the Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.28


24 United Nations, Timor-Leste Crisis: June-September Flash Appeal, June 2006.

25 These included the World Food Programme (WFP), the International Organization for Migration (IOM),the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the World HealthOrganization (WHO), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) and the United Nations ChildrensFund (UNICEF).

26 These included Austcare, Belun, CARE International, Concern Worldwide, Catholic Relief Services (CRS),

Jesuit Relief Service (JRS), Norwegian Refugee Council, Oxfam and Plan International27 Ministry of Social Solidarity, Annual Report: Words of Solidarity, 30 August 2007 30 August 2008, p. 18.

28 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Integrated Mission inTimor-Leste (for the period from 9 August 2006 to 26 January 2007), 1 February 2007, para. 50.


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In order to assess property damages and immediate housing needs, UNDP, under its Urgent

Damage Assessment and Recovery Planning Project, conducted assessment surveys of damaged

houses in order to better plan the rehabilitation and reconstruction phase between October

2006 and April 2007.29

Initiatives to foster national dialogue and political reconciliation at a national level were also given

an elevated importance in November 2006. Under the auspices of the Presidents Dialogue

Commission, a series of mid-level dialogue events between political parties and civil society took

place and was followed by a high-level political dialogue and traditional peace ceremony which

included state officials, political party leaders and commanders of the F-FDTL and PNTL.30 These

initiatives helped to renew political cooperation and reconciliation at a high level and served as

the beginning of a process to overcome the political impasse that existed following the crisis.

Initiatives were also undertaken to support community-level dialogue under the Government-led

Simu-Malu (Accept Each Other) programme, established under the Ministry of Labour andCommunity Reinsertion, which aimed at facilitating the reintegration of IDPs and addressing social

cleavages and tensions in various neighbourhoods, particularly around the IDP camps.31 While this

programme helped to address reduce violent incidents between some sections of IDP camps and

surrounding neighbourhood gangs, it was less successful in supporting IDP reintegration and in

providing solutions to overcome obstacles to IDP return such as resolution of land and property

issues and support for rebuilding homes damaged or destroyed during the 2006 crisis.32


29 United Nations Development Programme,Urgent Damage Assessment and Recovery Planning Project, ProgressReport, January-February 2007.

30 Ibid, paras 3-4.31 Ibid, para. 6.

32 The International Crisis Group asserted that neither programme worked because of insufficient staff andresources and because the problem required more than just dialogue.


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The Imperative to Resolve the IDP Crisis

At the time the IV Constitutional Government took office in August 2007, more than 100,000

persons still remained displaced in Dili and the districts.

[Prime Minister] Gusmo and other political leaders were conscious of the highly visible

evidence of the recent crisis and the failure of the Government and to restore confidence,

stability and normalcy in the capital, more than a year and a half since the conflict broke

out. The camps were in plain sight throughout Dili, situated at locations such as the

airport and hospital grounds and in front of an upmarket hotel in the city centre.33

In response to this protracted situation of displacement, and in recognition of the increasing

urgency to provide durable solutions to IDPs to facilitate their return, relocation and

reintegration, the newly elected Government made resolving the displacement crisis one of itsmain priorities. In its national programme, the Government promised the implementation of the

return process by the end of 2007.34

In an effort to translate these words into action, an inter-ministerial retreat, chaired by the Vice

Prime-Minister, was held on September

2007 and attended by relevant ministers,

UN agencies, NGOs and other

stakeholders. The objective of the retreat

was to reflect on experiences a

Documents

Final Report HHF Reduced