Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

  • View
    219

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Text of Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    1/27

    BP Gulf Of Mexico Oil Spill Authors : Komal TotlaniSarthak Shah

    1

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    2/27

    MACONDO FIELD

    COUNTRY : UNITED STATES REGION : GULF OF MEXICO LOCATION : MISSISSIPPI CANYON

    BLOCK : 252 OFFSHORE/ONSHORE : OFFSHORE OPERATOR : BRITISH PETROLEUM PARTNERS : BP (65%)

    ANADARKO (25%)MOEXOFFSHORE2007(10%)

    DISCOVERY : 2010 ESTIMATED OIL IN PLACE : 50 MILLIONS OF BARRELS

    2

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    3/27

    The Fatal Incident

    The Deepw ater Horizon Drilling Rig was a 9-year old semi-submersible mobile offshore drilling unit, a massive floating thatcould operate in waters up to 8,000 feet deep and drill down to30,000 feet.

    At approximately 9:45 pm on April 20, 2010, high pressure methanegas from the well expanded into the drilling riser and was releasedonto the drilling rig, where it ignited and exploded, engulfing thedrilling rig.

    Efforts by multiple ships to douse the flames were unsuccessful. After burning for approximately 36 hours, the Deepw ater Horizon sank on the morning of April 22, 2010.

    3

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    4/27

    The Fatal Incident

    An oil leak was discovered on the afternoon of April 22 when a largeoil slick began to spread at the former rig site. According to the FlowRate Technical Group, the leak amounted to about 4.9 millionbarrels (780,000 m3) of oil, exceeding the 1989 Exxon Valdez oilspill as the largest ever to originate in U.S.-controlled waters and the1979 Ixtoc I oil spill as the largest spill in the Gulf of Mexico.

    4

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    5/27

    EIGHT CATASTROPHIC FAILURES THATLED TO THE ACCIDENT

    Annulus cement barrier did not isolate hydrocarbons

    Shoe track barriers did not isolate hydrocarbons

    Negative pressure test was accepted although well integrity had notbeen established

    Influx was not recognized until hydrocarbons were in riser

    Well control response actions failed to regain control of well

    Diversion to mud gas separator resulted in gas venting onto rig

    Fire and gas system did not prevent hydrocarbon ignition

    Blowout preventer (BOP) emergency mode did not seal well 5

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    6/27

    Important failures from my perspective

    THE CEMENT FAILEDCement is supposed to protect the outside of the well pipe and is used toseal off a well when needed.

    PROBLEM:Either the primary or secondary cementing failed, pushing a huge column of

    natural gas in and through the casing.

    Primary and Secondary Cementing Process. 6

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    7/27

    The Negative Pressure Test was acceptedalthough well integrity had not been established

    Prior to temporarily abandoning the well, a negative-pressure test was conducted to verify the integrity ofthe mechanical barriers. The test involved replacing heavy drilling mud withlighter seawater to place the well in a controlledunder balanced condition. The Transoceanic rig crew and BP well site leaders

    reached the incorrect view that the test wassuccessful and that well integrity had beenestablished.

    7

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    8/27

    THE BLOWOUTPREVENTER FAILED

    The BOP stack is a 450-tonseries ofvalves developed to prevent agusher if the mud control isoverwhelmed.

    PROBLEM:With only seconds to react, rigoperators fired off the shearram, but it only partiallysheared the drill pipe. A joint

    may have been in the way, orthe ram was fouled by piecesof casing or cement from theblowout. For days, remotelyoperated robots tried to fire offthe ram manually, but failed.

    8

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    9/27

    THE BOP EMERGENCY MODE DID NOT SEALTHE WELL

    Three methods for operating the BOP in the emergency mode wereunsuccessful in sealing the well.

    The explosions and fire very likely disabled the emergencydisconnect sequence, the primary emergency method available tothe rig personnel, which was designed to seal the well bore anddisconnect the marine riser from the well.

    The automatic mode function (AMF), which was designed to seal thewell without rig personnel intervention upon loss of hydraulicpressure, electric power and communications from the rig to theBOP .There was a fault in a critical solenoid valve and AMF batterieshad insufficient charge.

    Evidence indicated that BSR closed 33 hours after the explosionwhen a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) activated the auto shearfunction.

    9

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    10/27Source: BP Deepwater Investigation Report, 2010 10

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    11/27

    ECOSYSTEM DISTURBED/HEAVILY DAMAGED !!

    Hermit crabs struggle to cross a patchof oil from the the Deepwater Horizon

    spill on a barrier island near East GrandTerre Island, La, Sunday, June 6, 2010.(AP Photo/Charlie Riedel)

    Spreading Stain

    The slick has spread from thewetlands of Louisiana to thebeaches of Alabama, above, and asfar away as Florida.

    11

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    12/27

    Many rescued birds fail to survive anoiling, even if they get cleaned,especially since they are returned to ahabitat that is still badlycontaminated .

    Shoreline heavily eroded, withthe lush marsh grass andmangrove trees mostly dead ordying.

    12

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    13/27

    STEPS TAKEN

    Immediately after the Exxon Valdez blow in Alaska came upthe OIL PROTECTION ACT (OPA) in 1990 which got testifiedby this disaster.

    And as a result of the 4.4 million barrels of oil discharged thegovernment had estimated that BP had removed

    1. A quarter by recovering of burning the oil.2. Another quarter had evaporated.

    3. The third quarter had dispersed in the watercolumn.4. The last quarter remained as slicks on the surface

    or had washed up on the shore.

    13

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    14/27

    Hence Nano sponge A nano wire membrane that sops up oil while repelling water couldbe used for cleaning up oil spills. A thin membranes made from aweb of nano wires might become a promising tool for cleaning up oil

    spills and removing toxic contaminants from groundwater. The newmembrane absorbs oil and solvents and is super hydrophobic, whichmeans it strongly repels water .

    The long term concern for the scientists is the dispersed oil in waterwhich has adverse effects on the marine life.

    Also the deep waters of the gulf show oxygen depleted zonesshowed and hence a significant depletion of the plankton andcopepods which scientists attribute to the spill.

    14

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    15/27

    15

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    16/27

    Industrial Solutions

    To assure human safety and environmental protection, regulatoryoversight of leasing, energy exploration, and production requirereforms even beyond those significant reforms already initiatedsince the Deepwater Horizon disaster.

    On January 11, 2011 The National Commission on the BPDeepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling released the finalreport on its investigation into the Deepwater Horizon Oil spill.

    16

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    17/27

    Key CommissionRecommendations

    Congress and the Administration should create an independentsafety agency within the Department of the Interior, headed by anofficial shielded from political interference by a fixed term.

    Spill response planning by both government and industry mustimprove. Industry spill response plans must provide realisticassessments of response capability, including well containment.Government review of those plans must be rigorous and involve allfederal agencies with responsibilities for oil spill response.

    The federal government must do a better job of integrating state andlocal officials into spill planning and training exercises. Industryneeds to develop, and government needs to incentivize, the nextgeneration of more effective response technologies.

    17

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    18/27

    Key CommissionRecommendations

    Greater attention should be given to new tools, like coastal andmarine spatial planning and ocean observation systems, to improveenvironmental protection, management of OCS activities, andecosystem restoration efforts in marine environments.

    The oil and gas industry must adopt a culture of safety. Today, eachcompany has its own view of what constitutes safe operations. Muchas the aviation, chemical, and nuclear power industries have done inresponse to disasters, the oil and gas industry must move towardsdeveloping a notion of safety as a collective responsibility, with afocused commitment to continuous improvement and a zero failurerate.The penalties paid by BP and other parties responsible for the oilspill should be primarily devoted to Gulf restoration. The Gulf willcontinue to be under stress as energy development continues.

    18

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    19/27

    Other Possible Recommendations: -

    Relief wells : We require drilling companies to drill their relief wellsfirst, before they strike oil. Then, if there is a problem with the mainwell, the relief wells are already in place and can be activated in afew hours rather than a few months. If there is some technological orproduction reason that means you dont want relief wells penetratinginto the main well bore if no emergency arises, then there is an easysolution. Drill 99% of the relief well, and leave the last bit undrilled.Then, if there is an emergency, 99% of the work to create a reliefwell is already complete. It takes days to finish the relief well ratherthan months.

    On September 19, 2010, the relief well process was successfullycompleted by the Development driller III and the federal governmentdeclared the well "effectively dead".

    19

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    20/27

    How The Relief Well operates to intersect the faulty main well and stop the flow ofhydrocarbons

    20

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    21/27

    The Development Driller III has increased the recovery of oil by drilling relief wells at the fatal accident site.21

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    22/27

    A preferred alternative in high-pressure deepwater is a "liner" design inwhich drillers install and then cement in place a short string of casing in the

    lower reaches of the well before casing the rest of the well. This designenables the driller to watch for leaks while the cement is setting.

    Other Alternative :

    22

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    23/27

    Cement design and testing should be done properly

    Appropriate number of centralizers should be used

    Well integrity should be monitored at all times

    Care should be taken while performing simultaneousactivities

    Conduct periodic assessments of competency that includetesting of knowledge and demonstration of the practicalapplication of skills

    BEST POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

    23

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    24/27

    Developing a certification process to assure and maintainproficiency.

    Require hazard and operability (HAZOP) reviews of the surface gasand drilling fluid systems

    Develop a clear plan for ROV intervention (independent of the rig-based ROV) as part of the emergency BOP operations

    Require drilling contractors to implement a qualification process toverify that shearing performance capability of BSRs is compatiblewith the inherent variations in wall thickness, material strength andtoughness of the rig drill pipe inventory .

    Eliminate human judgment as much as possible where mistake couldhave huge consequences.

    There should be proper communications among BP, Transocean, andHalliburton employees regarding the risks associated with decisions

    being made. 24

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    25/27

    Improved ROV Technologies as part of the emergency BOP operations. 25

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    26/27

    Deepwater Horizon Accident Investigation Report, BP Investigation 2010,BP Website:www. bp.com/.../bp.../Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report.pdf

    The Gulf Oil Disaster National Commission on the BP DeepwaterHorizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Cheif Counsels Report (2011)

    Macondo Well Incident Transocean Investigation Report, Volume 1, June2011, Transocean website: http://www.deepwater.com/fw/main/Public-Report-1076.html.

    Sustainability Review 2010 BP website:bp.com/sustainability

    REFERENCES

    26

  • 8/10/2019 Final Presentation- BP Oil Spill

    27/27

    URL: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deepwater_Horizon_oil_spill

    URL:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oil_spill

    27