Final Causality in Avicenna

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Avicenna on final causality

Wisnovsky, Robert, Ph.D. Princeton University, 1994

Copyright 1994 by W isnovsky, Robert. All rights reserved.

U M I300 N. ZeebRd.Ann Arbor, MI 48106


AVICENNA ON FINAL CAUSALITY

Robert Wisnovsky

A DISSERTATION

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

RECOMMENDED FOR ACCEPTANCE

BY THE DEPARTMENT OF NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

January 1994


A b s t r a c t

"Avicenna on final causality"

Robert Wisnovsky

Avicennas theory of final causality stands out as one of the most profound and original

achievements of Islamic philosophy. Writing mainly in Arabic in various cities of Persia

from the end of the 4th/10th to the beginning of the 5th/l 1th centuries AH/AD, Avicenna

extended the range of Aristotelian teleology to encompass not only motion but also

existence; he did so by dividing the final cause into an extrinsic, kinetic end (gaya), and an

intrinsic, static perfection (tamam).

My dissertation is organized to test Avicenna's hypothesis that the final cause thus extended

was applicable to every subject of every science. I begin by examining how the final cause

behaves in the relations between logical entities-terms, premises, definitions, quiddities

and then argue that Avicenna saw the final cause as a bridge between that world of logical

entities and the sensible world, whose own relations logic is supposed to systematize. I go

on to explain how Avicenna used the twin aspects of Aristotle's notion of natureone an

extrinsic agent keeping the world of natural things in order, the other an intrinsic form

serving as the natural thing s source of motionas a basis for his division of final causes

into ends and perfections; I also examine how this division helped Avicenna attempt a

reconciliation of chance and natural necessity. I then assess how Avicenna's medical

experience-specifically his close observation of the complex teleological processes that

cause an organism to exist and functionprovided empirical support for his distinction

between ends and perfections. Finally I argue that Avicenna viewed the relation between


final and efficient causes as one of reciprocal necessitation, based on the premise that each

was both cause and effect of the other; here Aristotle's notions of limit and actuality provide

some of the metaphysical background to Avicenna's teleology.

Previous studies of Avicenna's theory of causality have focused almost entirely on the

efficient cause; my intention here is to prove that an understanding of Avicenna's teleology

should be a prerequisite to any future such study.


A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s

Many people have helped me complete this dissertation. I would like to thank in particular

my supervisor, Hossein Modarressi, who first suggested die topic to me, and who experdy

and patiently guided me through Avicenna's texts; Dimitri Gutas, who read drafts of four of

the five chapters, and who helped me refine my translation of Sifa/Ilahlyat VI, 5; and

Fritz Zimmermann, who first interested me in the problem of causality when we were

reading GazaH's Tahafut in the Medieval Arabic Thought program at Oxford

Several philosophers also helped me: Sarah Waterlow Broadie, my Second Reader, who

straightened me out about a number of controversial and confusing issues in Aristotle;

Pierre Pellegrin, whose graduate seminar on Aristotle's natural philosophy helped me

understand the positions of various commentators on Aristotelian teleology, and who read

drafts of four of the five chapters; Allan Gotthelf, who read a draft of the biology chapter,

and who helped me in particular with the problem of hypothetical and simple necessity; and

Stephen Menn, who gave me my General Examination in methodology, and who identified

the questions I should try to answer in my dissertation.

I would also like to thank my friend and fellow graduate student Will Robins, who read a

draft chapter and helped me with a problem about the Sifa*s Latin translation; and Mary


Alice McCormick, the Graduate Secretary of my department, whose kindness, patience,

and efficiency helped ease the logistical burdens of submission and defense.

Most of all, I want to thank my family: my brother Peter, for buying me the computer on

which this dissertation was written; my parents-in-law Tony and Sheila Parsons, for their

generosity and good humor; my three-year-old son Simon, for spurring me on by asking

every day "Have you finished your book yet Daddy?;" and my beloved wife, Laila, for

everything.

I am dedicating this dissertation, the culmination of twenty-four years' education, to my

parents Mary and Joe Wisnovsky, for all their love and support


PREFACE: ANSWERING WHY

Consider the following questions:

* Do we help an elderly friend get out of the car for the sake of being kind to him, or

is our behavior the necessary result of electrochemical impulses forcing us to act in a certain

way?

Do we have children for the sake of perpetuating our species and thus partaking in

immortality, or is reproduction the necessary result of a hormonal triggering of our sexual

impulses?

* Do we grow for the sake of being mature adults, or is maturity the genetically

preprogrammed set of dimensions at which growth ceases necessarily?

* Does the heart exist in order to pump blood, or is it the necessary result of the

combination of certain tissues and chemicals?

Is fruit delicious so that animals will eat it and then spread the digested seed (along

with a neat pile of manure), or is fruit the necessary result of a distant ancestor's material

mutation into a more successful form of plant life?

Does water freeze at a certain temperature for the sake of fulfilling an essential

property of being water, or because at a certain temperature molecules in water necessarily

interact in such a way as to solidify?


* Does a stone fall to the ground for the sake of fulfilling an essential property of

earthy matter, or because the force of gravity acts upon it in such a way as to make it

necessarily descend?

As you can see, the questions listed above run from those concerning human intentional

action (where we assume the final, purposive explanation to be most viable) to physics

(where we assume the necessitating, material explanation to be the most viable).

Philosophers and scientists, particularly those in the Aristotelian tradition, have tried to

determine the precise dividing line between the finality that operates in final and formal

causation (contained in the first answer to each of the questions above) and the necessity

that operates in efficient and material causation (contained in the second answer to each

question). Are these two brands of causation mutually exclusive? Does one type of cause

cease to be effective at a certain point, and the other type begin? Can the two typa. of cause

operate in tandem?

This dissertation is about where the Persian philosopher and physician Abu 4 AH al-IJusayn

ibn cAbd Allah ibn al-IJasan ibn All ibn Sina (370-428 AH/980-1038 AD), known in the

West as Avicenna, drew the line between finality and necessity. Using Aristotle as a model,

Avicenna created a system of causes in which both types of causation were employed

equally in order to give a complete causal account of a thing, event, or process; in other

words, to give a complete answer to the question "why?"

Before we jump into the dissertation we must first put ourselves in Avicenna's

philosophical shoes, so to speak, and try to imagine his assumptions about causation and

teleology. First of all, Avicenna (as well as Aristotle) thought that answering the question

"why?" involved both finality and necessity; necessity was as much included in the

province of "why?" as finality. The reason we must bear this in mind is that when we call


philosophers like Avicenna and Aristotle "scientists," we often assume that their concerns

were similar or even identical to those of modem scientists who, to put it very generally, are

more concerned with "how?" than with "why?" We should therefore avoid assigning

finality exclusive domain over answering "why?" and necessity exclusive domain over

answering "how?"

We must also note that Avicenna (and Aristotle) wanted, when answering why, to isolate

the essential cause of a thing, event, or process, from its concomitant, accidental causes.

With this epistemological goal-providing the essential cause in an answer to the question

"why?"it is unsurprising that in Avicenna's and Aristotle's philosophies the final and

formal causes rose as the cream of causality, both because of the apparent unchangingness

of forms and because of the simple observational difficulty of knowing when to stop

splitting the thing, event, or process into ever more minute material and efficient causal

processes.

I have organized the dissertation in the following way: in the Introduction, I set out the

method with which I approached the subject of Avicenna's teleology, and I list the most

important sources and terms to be examined. Chapter 1 concerns logic and is primarily

introductory rather than technical; my purpose is to show how the final cause's behavior in

explanations serves as a model for the behavior of final causes in the real world. In

Chapters 2 and 3 I study how the final cause operates in nature, even in apparently

purposeless phenomena. Chapter 4 examines how Avicenna extended finality to cover pure

being. Chapter 5 is a translation of die only chapter in the Avicennian corpus exclusively

devoted to the problem of final causation. Finally, I give in the Conclusion a brief synopsis

of how Avicenna changed the notion of the final cause.


XTABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract iii

Acknowledgments v

Preface vii

Table of Contents x

In tro ductio n 1-15

0.1 Scope and methodology 2-6

0.2 Sources and Terminology 7-15

CHAPTER 1: LOGIC AND EPISTEMOLOGY 16-65

1.1 THE DEFINITION OF FINAL CAUSE: MIDDLE TERMS 19-25

1.2 CAUSATION AND DEMONSTRATIVE QUESTIONS 26-34

1.3 CAUSAL RECIPROCITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY 35-43

1.4 PERFECTION AND NECESSITY 44-57

1.5 THE FINAL CAUSE OF DEFINITION 58-65


c h a pt e r 2: Ph y s ic s 66-109

2. l The definition of final cause: natures and forms 70-77

2.2 Nature: immanent or transcendent? 78-84

2.3 Material disposition and formation 85-91

2.4 Motion and inclination 92-99

2.5 Chance, finality, and natural necessity 100-109

CHAPTER 3: BIOLOGY 110-134

3.1 Humors, parts, and functions 113-120

3.2 Reproduction and growth 121-128

3.3 Perfection and life 129-134

CHAPTER 4: METAPHYSICS 135-195

4.1 The definition of final cause: beings and things 139-155

4.2 Actualization, actuality, and perfection 156-163

4.3 Good, evil, and generosity 164-172

4.4 Celestial motion, perpetuity, and providence 173-179

4.5 God knows 180-187

4.6 For God 's sake 188-195

CHAPTER 5: THE CURE/METAPHYSICS VI,5 196-217

Co n c lusio n 218-219

B iblio g raph y 220-232


1In tr o d u c tio n

This Introduction is divided into two sections. In Section 0.1, "Scope and Methodology," I

set the limits of and describe my approach to the subject. Section 0.2, "Sources and

Terminology," catalogues both the texts and the technical vocabulary used in the

dissertation.


2SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 0.1

I hope to answer a series of questions in this dissertation: 1) How does Avicenna define the

final cause, and how does he apply it? 2) How does the final cause differ from Avicenna's

other causes? 3) What sources did Avicenna use to come up with his theory of final

causation? 4) What was original about Avicenna's theory of final causation?

The answers to these questions are embedded throughout the dissertation; for now, let us

briefly state that: 1) Avicenna divided the final cause into extrinsic ends and intrinsic

perfections, and maintained that the final cause was architectonic; 2) Avicenna viewed the

final cause as essentially prior but existentially posterior to the other causes; 3) Aristotle's

notions of form, essence, limit, and actuality, were the most likely sources of Avicenna's

theory; and 4) Avicenna made original contributions to several topics, including a) the

connection between logic and ontology, b) causal directionality and reciprocity, and c)

chance, necessity, and teleological mechanism.

I have not organized the dissertation in such a way as to treat each of these questions in

order, however. Instead, I took as a starting point Avicenna's statement that the final cause

may be applied to the subjects of every science, and organized the dissertation so that the

final cause's role in each science may be examined in turn. The result is that my approach is

mainly textual rather than thematic or developmental. There are a number of problems with

the textual approach which make the dissertation occasionally repetitive, when a topic is


3treated the same way in different texts, and paraphrastic, when a particularly difficult topic

is being examined.

I felt, on the other hand, that the thematic and developmental approaches both suffer from

potentially severer weaknesses. By imposing a thematic framework and then selecting and

isolating passages from different contexts, I feared I might inadvertently stray from the

texts and thereby blur the dividing line between my own ideas about teleology and

Avicenna's. The problem with the developmental approach is that by positing a strict

chronology of Avicenna's works (about which there is still no absolute consensus), I might

also stray from the texts and begin operating under the facile assumption that because

Avicenna wrote a certain work after another, the later work is ipso facto more definitive

and "truly Avicennian." Given these advantages and disadvantages, I decided that the

textual approach was safest.

As for the problem of how to read these texts, I have applied Ockham's Razor and common

sense. Therefore I have followed Leaman's advice and accepted Avicenna's philosophical

statements at face value, as philosophy rather than mysticism, as exoteric rather than

esoteric literature. 1 This approach is slightly controversial because, surprisingly, much

scholarship in Islamic philosophy (and Avicennian studies in particular) has been premised

on the opposite assumption.^ However, I hope to show in die dissertation that Avicenna's

theory of final causation is philosophically coherent, and stands on its own without any

need for constant recourse to mystico-religious suppositions. When the discussion does

Icf. Leaman's criticism of Strauss and Butterworth in O. Leaman, Does the interpretation of Islamic philosophy rest on a mistake?," International Journal o f Middle East Studies 12/4 (1980), pp.525-538/reprinted, with some changes, in Chapter 6 ("How to read Islamic philosophy") of his An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy (Cambridge: 1985), pp.182-201. cp. Gutas's criticism of Butterworth in his review of Butterworth's Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics, in On translating Averroes' commentaries," Journal o f the American Oriental Society 110/1 (1990), pp.92-101.

2Leaman has in fact been vilified for this suggestion; cf. C. Butterworth, "The study of Arabic philosophy today," Middle East Studies Bulletin 17/2 (1983), pp. 173-74/reprinted in T.-A. Druart, ed., Arabic Philosophy and the West (Washington, D.C.:1988), pp.96-98.


4focus on religious topics, such as God's final causation of the world, the religious

influences will be obvious. However, it is my opinion that religious concerns, while

certainly influential, did not motivate or frame Avicenna's discussion of final causation. As

Leaman puts it:

"The argument throughout this study is not opposed to the esoteric interpretation as such, but is rather opposed to an assumption which is crucial to it, namely, that the conflict between religion and philosophy is of overriding importance to the construction of Islamic philosophy and all the arguments within that philosophy...The first questions I should ask about a text of Islamic philosophy are philosophical questions, e.g. are the arguments valid? Do they cohere with other arguments produced by the author? Do they increase my understanding of the concepts involved? Are they interesting? If I cannot make any progress with these sorts of questions then it may well be appropriate to ask other kinds of questions about the way in which the text is written, and what the author may have tried to conceal." 3

I, too, maintain that the burden of proof is on those who would posit such overriding

importance to mystico-religious concerns in a subject (such as final causation) where other

more purely philosophical motivations are immediate and obvious.

I also decided that it was safest to apply Ockham's Razor to the problem of selecting pre-

Avicennian sources. The result is that of two possible sources for an Avicennian idea, one

a text of Aristotle and die other the text of another philosopher, the Aristotelian source will

be selected as providing the most likely background. This is because Avicenna felt himself

to be writing in, and indeed completing, the Aristotelian tradition, and because Aristotle's

works were more widely disseminated and discussed in medieval Islamic philosophy than

those of any other philosopher.4 In addition, there are methodological weaknesses inherent

in hunting for non-obvious sources; these include diverting the historian of philosophy

from what should be his major focus, namely understanding and explaining what the

philosopher in question says about a particular subject Mahdi puts it starkly:

3 Leaman, Introduction, pp. 186,201.4On this crucial point and on Avicenna's access to Aristotelian texts, cf. D. Gutas, Avicenna and

the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna's Philosophical Works (Leiden: 1988), pp. 15-78,149-159,199-218.


5"The source-hunter's argument here, as everywhere else it is employed, seems to absolve the commentator of having to wonder about the one thing die author and his readers did care about: the subject matter of the book...Source hunting is not the innocent game it appears to be. It tends to turn the commentator away from his primary task of analyzing and explaining the work's structure, method, problems, and point of view. Excessive concern with source-hunting, especially when it is so uncertain as to require many levels of hypothetical construction, is liable to distract the commentator's attention from even the salient characteristics of the work on which he is supposed to be commentating." 5

In addition, it is my opinion that if one looks hard enough, precursors could be found for

almost any philosophical notion; it is therefore somewhat nihilistic to speak, as

Zimmermann does, of the "worn coins" of Hellenistic thought jangling dully in the purse of

medieval Islamic philosophy. While I do not discount the possibility that some more

obscure sources may have influenced Avicenna, I feel that the burden of proof, at least in

die topic under consideration, is on those proposing the less obvious precursor.

My final methodological point concerns what I have not done in this dissertation, rather

than what I have done. I have been careful to limit my examination of post-Avicennian

commentaries and interpretations for a seemingly obvious reason: I wanted to approach

each topic as much as possible from Avicenna's own standpoint This approach necessarily

involves seeing the history of philosophy as ending at Avicenna, who had little idea how

his philosophical works would be used and interpreted. In other words, just as we make a

distinction between Aristotle and Aristotelianism, we must likewise distinguish between

Avicenna and Avicennism. Of course I do not mean to imply by this that neither the

Avicenna that was transmitted (via Gazali, Averroes, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas

Aquinas) to the Latin West, nor the Avicenna that was transmitted (via Suhrawardl, Josl*

Sabzivari, and Mulla $adra) to the Persian East, bore no relation to the historical Avicenna

^cf. Mahdi's criticism of Walzer and the "charmed circle of source-hunters," (p. 700) in his review article of Walzer's Al-Farabi on the Perfect State: M. Mahdi, "Al-Farabi's imperfect state," Journal o f the American Oriental Society 110/4 (1990), pp.691-726 passim, esp. pp.701- 704.

^Butterworth also takes Zimmermann to task for this approach: Butterworth, "Study," pp. 172- 73/(Druart) pp.95-96.


6Nor do I wish to belittle the achievements of these philosophers, each of whose notions of

final causation deserves to be examined individually.

Instead, I felt that because the traditions in which these philosophers operated sometimes

focused on questions and problems which were alien to Avicenna himself, the study of

Avicenna s philosophy should concentrate on Avicenna's past, not on Avicenna's future; in

this way we avoid imposing on Avicenna the concerns and suppositions of philosophers

who followed him. In short, my dissertation approaches Avicenna's philosophy as the

culmination of Aristotelianism rather than as the beginning of Avicennism.


7S o u r c e s a n d t e r m i n o l o g y 0.2

This section consists of two lists. The first is a list of the main primary sources I have

consulted in the course of writing the dissertation; it includes works of Avicenna in Arabic,

and the corresponding works of Aristotle in Greek and Arabic, each with the shortened

form I use in the citations. The second is a list of die technical vocabulary of final causation

used by Avicenna, including Greek antecedents and their Arabic versions.

This first catalogue lists those works of Aristotle that correspond to the sections of

Avicenna's Kitab al-Sifa3 (The Cure) that I cite most frequently; other works I have

consulted are listed in the footnotes as they come up.

So u r c es

Aristotle (Greek)_________ Aristotle (Arabic) Avicenna (Arabic)

1) Categories (C atfl Categories (Ar.Maqalatfi Categories (Maqdlatft

2) Prior Analytics (A.Pr.)l Prior Analytics (Tajflilat Syllogism

ola fll (Q iyas)^

^L. Minio-Paluello, ed., Aristotclis: Categorise et Liber de Inteipretationc (Oxford: 1949).8A. Badawi, ed., Manjtiq Arista I (Beirut: 1980), pp.33-133.^G. Qanawatl, M.M. Hu

8ARISTQILE (Greek)__________ Aristotle (Arabic) Avicenna (Arabic)

3) Posterior Analytics

(A.Po.fi 3

4) Topics (Top.fi^

5) Physics (Phys.fi 9

6) On the Heavens (D.C.fi2

7) Generation and Corruption

(G.C.fi5

8) Meteorology (Meteor.fi*

9) On the Soul (D A .p l

Posterior Analytics

(Tajflilat tanlyafi 4

Topics (Toplkafil

Nature (al-Tabl'a)2

On the Heavens (FI

sama3) 2 5

[Generation and

CorruptionflG

Celestial Effects

(FI ajar)29

On the Soul (Fl'l-nafsfi2

Demonstration

(Burhanfi5

Dialectic (Jadalfi

Physics (Samae fablci)2 1

Heaven and Earth (Sama3

wa-'alam)2^

Generation and Corruption

(Kawn wa-fasadfil

Celestial Effects (Atar

culw1yafi 0

Soul (Nafsfi2

l^W.D. Ross, ed. and comm., Aristotle's Prior and Posterior Analytics (Oxford: 1949).14*A. Badawi, ed., ManfiqArispl II, (Beirut: 1980), pp.329-485.l^A. Afifl, ed., al-Sifa3/Manfiq (5): al-Burhan (Cairo: 1956).l^E.D. Forster, ed. and trans., Aristotle II: Topica (Cambridge, Mass.:1989).

A. Badawi, ed., Maitfiq Arista ZZj (Beirut: 1980), pp.487-695.18 A. F. al-Ahwanl, ed., al-Sifa3/Man.tiq (6): al-Jadal (Cairo: 1965). l^W.D. Ross, ed. and comm., Aristotle's Physics (Oxford: 1955).20A. Badawi, ed., Aristufalls: Al-fabica (Cairo:1964).21s. Zayid, ed., al-Sifa/TabWyat (1): al-Samac al-fabW (Cairo: 1983).22D.J. Allan, ed., Aristotelis: De Caelo (Oxford:1936).25

9Aristotle (Greek)________

10) Parts o f Animals (P .A .fi^

11) Generation o f Animals

(G A .fil

12) Metaphysics (Meta.fi 9

A r isto tle (Ar a b ic )

Parts o f Animals (FI

aetfa3f i $

Generation o f Animals

(FI kawnfiS

Metaphysics (Ma bacd

al-fab1ea fi 0

Ay l c e m a XAb a b ic )

Animals (Hayawanfi^it

Divine Things (UahlyatfiI

^L Tonaca, ed., Aristotele: Le Parti degli Animali (Padova: 1961).3 'R . Kruk, ed., Aristoteles Semitico-Latinus: The Arabic Version o f Aristotle's Parts o f

Animals (Amsterdam: 19 79).3**A. Muntair, S. Zayid, A. Ismail, eds., al-Sifa/Tabl'lyat (8): al-Hayawan (Cairo: 1970). 3?A.L. Peck, ed., Aristotle: Generation o f Animals (Cambridge, Mass.: 1953).38j. Brugmann and H.J. Drossaart Lulofs, eds., Aristotle: Generation o f Animals; The Arabic

Translation Commonly Ascribed to Yafrya ibn al-Bipiq (Leiden: 1971).39\V.B. Ross, ed. and comm., Aristotle: Metaphysics I and II (Oxford: 1958).40m. Bouyges, ed., Averroes: Tafsir ma baed at-tabicat (Beirut: 1938).41g. Qanawati and S. Zayid, eds., al-Sifar/Iiahlyat (1) (Cairo: 1960) and M.Y. Musa, S. Dunya,

and S. Zayid, eds., al-$ifa3/Hablyat (2) (Cairo: 1960).


10

Terminology .

The second catalogue is a brief index of the Arabic terms used most often by Avicenna to

describe final causation; the Greek terms that these Arabic terms were used to translate; and

their basic meaning in Avicenna's philosophy.

t m m

1) tamam-telos: "perfection"

Fi sama.3, p.347 [D.C. 306al5,16].

Ft a'

11

3) tamam=teleiosis: "perfection"

FI sama3 {Oxford: Ms. Hatton (Or.) 98rl5} [Meteor. 379bl8].45

Fikawn, p.106 [G.A. 753al0]; p. 117 [757a33]; p. 167 [776b2] 46

4) gayr tamm=ateles: "imperfect"

Tabi'a U, p.566 [Phys. 228b 14]; U, p.856 [257b7].

FI kawn, p.3 [G.A. 715bl6]; p .l l [718b7]; p.54 [733a29]; p.102 [751a26]; p . l l l

[755a8,10]; p.114 [755b32]; p.115 [756a23]; p.117 [757a35]; p.163 [774b5,7]; p.163

[774bl 1,28,361; P-164 [775al]; p.174 [778b22] .47

5) tamma=teleo: "to become perfect"

Fikawn, p.105 [G.A. 752b21J; p.117 [757a29,34]; p.118 [757b2 6 ] .48

infilaSIya allati hiya tamam-entelecheia: FI nafs, p.33 [D.A.413bl8]; al-intilaSiya wa- huwa al-fi'l al-tamm-entelecbeia: FI nafs, p.43 [DA. 417b5].

45cp. eala 7-tamammteleios: Maqulat, p.67 [ Cat 13a26,29]; tamam-tcleiotes: Tabi'a I, p.260 [Phys. 207a21]; istitmamapergasasthai: Tabi'a I, p. 149 [Phys. 199al6].

46iq pi lawn, teleiosis is also translated as tamam wa-kamal; cf. FI kawn, p. 171 [G A 777b28]; cp. tamammteleutes: FI kawn, p. 171 [GA. 777b31]; 'adam al-tamam-ateleia: FI kawn, p.121 [GA. 758b21]; tamam-telesiourgos: FI kawn, p .ll [GA. 718bll]; 'inda tamam wa-kamaImtete!eiomenos: FI kawn p. 159 [G.A. 773al4[; 'a li tamam wa- kamal-teleioo: FI kawn, p.166 [GA. 776a4]; ff tamam halqihi-teleioo: Ft kawn, p. 164 [GA 775al0,12]; tamamteleothenai: FI kawn, p. 106 [G A 753al3] and p. 118 [757bl6];

47q>. gayr tamm-atelesteros: FI kawn, p.117 [GA 757a31]; gayr tamm-atelestatos: FI kawn, p.120 [C.A. 758a33[; laysa bi-tammmateles: FI kawn, p.54 [G A . 733al9j; laysa bi- tamm^ateleia: FI kawn, p. 152 [G A 770b5]; laysa bi-tamm-atclesteros: FI kawn, p.65 [GA. 737b8]; laysa bi-tamm-atelestatos: FI kawn, p.175 [GA. 779a25]; la yaknn tammanmateles: FI kawn, p. 118 [GA. 757b20[; qabla an yatimmamateles: FI kawn, p.134 [G A 763b27]

48q>. tammamcpitelco: Tabi'a I, p.149 [Phys. 199al6]; tamma wa-kamalamepiteleO: FI kawn, p .ll [GA. 718b8]; tamma-gigncsthai telos: FI a'd&3, p. 129 [PA. 686b31]; tamma-gigncsthai telcios: FI kawn, p.110 [GA. 754bl9]; tammamteIeiousthai: FI kawn, p .16 [G A . 720a3]; tammamteleothen: FI kawn, p.105 [G.A. 752b8]; tamma-cktrepho eis telos: FI kawn, p.163 [GA. 774b25]; tammamlambanein telos: FI kawn, p.55 [GA 733b 16] and p. 7 7 [742a7]; tammamlambanein teleiosis: FI kawn, p. 170 [GA. 777bl 1]; hatta yatimmameis telos: FI kawn, p.92 [GA. 747b27] andp.95 [748b31]; tamma framl tanl-epikuiskesthai teleios: FI kawn, p. 161 [GA. 773b29].


12

6) tamm=teleios: "perfect"

Tabi'a I, p. 170 [Phys. 201a6]; I, p.259 [207a9]; U, p.566 [228bl2,13]; U, p.912

[264b28].

Fi sama.> p. 127 [D.C. 268a21]; p.224 [284a7]; p.239 [286b21,22].

Fi a'4a>, p.44 [P.A. 655b29].

iawn, p. 12 [G.A. 718bl6,34]; p.55 [733b5,7,8]; p.65 [737b9,10,ll]; p. 101

[751a26]; p.109 [754al7]; p . l l l [755a7]; p.114 [755b30]; p.115 [756a22]; p.118

757bl9j; p. 120 [758a35].

Ma ba'd al-fabi'a U, p.537 [Meta. 1016b23]; U, p.621 [1021bl2,13,16,18,19]; U,

p.622 [1021b21,22,24,25,31,1022a2]; H,p.655 [1023a34]; M , p.1301 [1055al 1,12];

m , p. 1304 [1055al6]; m , p.1305 [1055a23,24,29]; III, p. 1309 [1055a32]; III,

p.l624[1072b34,35]49

49cp. tammmtcleOtera: Fi kawn, p.53 [G.A. 732'b29] and p.54 [733bl]; atammmtclcotcra: Fi kawn, p.53 [GA. 732b32]; tamm [wa-] kamihteleotatos: Fi kawn, p.134 [GA. 763b22]; tamm-tetelesmena: Fi kawn, p.86 [GA. 745bl2]; tamm-tctcleiomcnos: Ft kawn, p. 162 [GA. 774b4,6]; tamm-telesiourgos: Fi kawn, p.53 [G.A. 733a7]; tammmteleothen: Fi kawn, p.153 [G.A. 771a6] tamman-teleios: Ma bacd al-fablca II, p.622 [Meta. 10211)26,27]; $ara tamman-teleo: Fi kawn, p.118 [G .A. 757b25]; walad tamm-teleiogonos: Fi kawn, p.152 [G.A. 770a34, bl]; awlad tammmteleiotokei: Ft kawn, p.163 [GA. 774bl8].


13

g y y

1) gaya=telos: "end"

Ft sama3, p.205 [D.C. 281all,19].

Tabi'a I, p. 95 [Phys. 194a27,28,29,32]; 7, p.96 [194a35]; 7, p. 102 [194b32]; 7,

p. 140 [198b3]; 7, p.147 [199a8]; J, p.150 [199a25]; 7, p.151 [199a31,32]; I, p.161

[200a22]; I p.163 [200a34].

Fi nafs, p. 16 [D.A. 407a27]; p.38 [415bl7]; p.41 [416b24]; 433al5/p.82;

434bl/p.85.50

Ma ba'd al-fabi'a I, p.30 [Meta. 994b9]; 7, p.33 [994bl6]; I p. 183 [996a24,26].51

2) gaya=peras: "purpose"

Fi sama3, p.224 [D.C. 284a6].

Fi a'4a3, p.24 [P.A. 646b9.

Fikawn, p.105 [GA. 752b9]; p. 171 [777b30].52

^ In Fi nafs, telos is also translated as muntaha; cf. Fi nafs, p.32 [DA. 413a30] and p.81 [432b21].

5*for gaya-telos, also cf. Oxford: Ms. Hatton (Or.) 99rl7 [Meteor. 381al].52cp. ahir, a'tsi gaya-peras: Fi kawn, p.12 [GA 718b27]; gaya-paula: Fi sama3, p.224 [D.C.

284a8,ll]; gaya-eskhaton: Ma ba'd al-fabi'a U, p.622 [Meta. 1021b25,29,30]; gayamtcleuten: Fi sama3, p.224 [D.C. 284a9]; gayamelatton: Fi sama3, p.206 [D.C 281a26]; kana 'ala 'l-gayamteleioustbai: Tabi'a n, p.761 [Pbys. 247al]; la gaya lahu-apeiron: Fi kawn, p.3 [GA. 715bl5,16].


14

k m 1

1) kamil=teleios: "perfect"

Tabfflat ola, p. 143 [A.Pr. 24b22]; pp. 148-49 [25b34]; p. 152 [26a20,b29].

Tabi'a II, p.530 [Phys. 226a31]; U, p.761 [246b28j; H, p.917 [265a23].

FI sama3, p.239 [D.C. 286b21].

FI nafs, p.37 [D.A. 415a27] 53

2) kamal=entelecheia: "perfection"

Tabi'a I, p. 168 [Phys. 200a25,26]; I, p.171 [201al0,l 1,17,18]; I, p.177 [201a20]; I,

p . 1 8 4 [202al 1 ]; I p .3 3 3 [ 2 1 3 a 7 ,8 ] .5 4

3) istikmal=entelecheia: "perfection"

Tabi'a I, p. 16 [Phys. 186a3]; J, p.86 [193b7]; II, p.856 [257fc7,8]; II, 862

[258b2].55

53cp. kamil-teleiousthai: Tabi'a II, p.883 [Pbys. 261al7].54 cp. kamah-telciosis: Tabi'a JT, pp.760 [Phys. 246a26-7] and 761 [246b28];

kamahteleiotes: Tabi'a 17, p.887 [Phys. 261a36],55Cp. mustakmal-teleiousthai: Tabi'a II, p.881 [Phys. 260b33]; istakmala wa-

tammamlambaaeia telos: Tabi'a II, p. 760 [Phys. 246a26]. kamala is used only rarely to translate Greek technical terms about finality; cf. kamah^telesiourgsd: Fi kawo, p.51 [ GA. 732a26] and kamala-teleiothen: Fi kawn, p.105 [G~A. 752bll].


15

1) min ajli=heneka:56 "for the sake of'

Tablilat taniya, pp.408-9 [A.Po. 85b29,36]; p. 454 [95a9].57

Tabi'a I, p.95 [Phys. 194a27]; I, p.96 [194a36]; I, p.102 [194b33]; I, p.118

[196b21]; I, p.136 [198a20]; I, p.137 [198a24]; I, p.140 [198b4]; I p.144 [198bl7]; I,

p. 145 [198b28]; I, p.147 [199all,12]; I, p.150 [199a25]; I, p.151 [199a32]; I, p.155

[199bl9]; J, p. 158 [200a8]; I, p.160 [200al4]; I, p.161 [200a22]; I, p.163

[200a33,34]; U, p.746 [243a32].

FI nafs, p.37 [D A. 415b2]; p.38 [415bl 1,16,20,21]; p.51 [420b20]; p.82 [433al4,15];

p.8858 [435b21].

F ia 'fr3, p.6 [P.A. 639bl2,14,19]; p .ll [641b24]; p.46 [656al8]; p.89 [672b22].

Fi kawn, p.l [G.A. 715a5,8]; p.78 [742a21,29]; p.79 [742b5]; p.144 [767bl3]; p.174

[778bl2,13].59

Ma ba'd al-fabi'a U, p.474 [Meta. 1013a21]; H, p.482 [1013a33]; n, p.488 [1013b26]; H, p.1074 [1044a36]; H, p.1079 [1044bl2]; m , p.1599 [1072b2].60

^ 1 have not distinguished between the various forms that beneka can take, e.g. to bou beneka, beneka ton, and beneka tinos.

3?In Tablilat taniya, beneka tinos is also translated as najfw mada; cf. Tablilat taniya, pp.451- 53 [APo. 94a23,b8,b27].

^reading min ajli for min a$li, contra Badawi.Fi a 'da3 and Fi kawn, beneka is also translated as li-bal; cf. Fi a'da3, p.21 [P.A. 645b 14,15]; p.24 [646b6]; p.65 [663b23]; p.102 [677al4]; and Fi kawn, p.173 [GA 778a32,33]; p.174 [778b7,llJ.

Ma ba'd al-fabi'a, beneka is also translated as bi-sabab; cf. Ma ba'd al-fabi'a I, p.30 [Meta. 994b9,12]; I, p.33 [994bl5]; I, p.183 [996a25,26]; I, p.185 [996bl2]; 27, p.622 [1021b30]; U, p.l 186 [1050a8].


16

Logic a n d epistem o lo g y 1

In this chapter we shall focus on the role the final cause plays in logic and epistemology.

Our main sources will be Avicenna's Kitab al-burhan (Book o f Demonstration), Kitab al-

jadal (Book o f Dialectic), and the sections on logic of his Kitab al-iSarat wa'1-tanbihat

(Book o f Hints and Reminders)& 1 and DaniS-nama-yi Ala*i (Philosophy for Ala*

al-Dawla).^

This chapter is divided into five sections. In section 1.1, "The definition of final cause:

middle terms," we introduce our subject by surveying Avicenna's works on logic and

comparing the explicit statements he makes about the final cause and about how end

differed from form, agent, and matter. Section 1.2, "Causation and demonstrative

questions," identifies which types of question Avicenna thought were best answered using

a final cause, and how relevant these answers were to scientific explanation. Section 1.3,

"Causal reciprocity and complementarity," explains how Avicenna saw different elements

within a demonstrative syllogism as efficient, final and formal causes whose interaction,

both in causing each other and in helping each other function as causes, reflected the reality

they described. Section 1.4, "Perfection and necessity," introduces Avicenna's notion of

perfection, and describes how it helps us better understand the thorny issue of the

61j. Forget, ed., al-Uarat wa'1-tanb'aat (Leiden: 1892) [henceforth: iSarat]62m. Mucin, ed., Risala-yi manfiq-i daniS-nama-yi Ala*! (Tehran: 1952). [henceforth: DaniS-

nama [Mantiq]]


17

necessary relations between final cause and effect Finally, in Section 1.5, "The final cause

of definition," we shall discuss the notion of quiddity and the role it plays in the final

causation inherent in the act of defining.

Modem scholars continue to puzzle over Aristotle s description of the logical role of final

causes in Posterior Analytics 11,11. How exactly does a final cause operate in a syllogism?

Can the middle term of a syllogism really be seen as functioning like a final cause? Does

the conclusion serve as the purpose of the terms of a syllogism and thus "cause" them?

Many take the position that this passage simply shows Aristotle in sloppy form; often this

criticism veils a more general reductionist attack on Aristotle's t e l e o l o g y . 63 Others take the

passage as one element of a description of causes that is explicable on its own, but

ultimately irreconcilable with Aristotle's other descriptions and uses of causes; this criticism

tends toward a thesis in which the apparently different world-views presented in the

Posterior Analytics and in the Physics and Metaphysics are taken to indicate a profound

incompatibility between Aristotle's logical and non-logical w o r k s . 64

Concerns such as these are likewise evident in the expansions and elaborations found in the

Arabic Aristotelian tradition. That many of the most important themes of Avicenna's notion

of final causality originated from just such extensions and elaborations of Aristotle will, we

hope, become clear as we proceed in the chapter and throughout the dissertation. For now,

let us list three of them: 1) Avicenna's attempt to distinguish final from formal causes by

63c.g. Ross, Prior and Posterior Analytics, pp.642-7; Ross calls A.Po. 11,11 one of the most difficult [chapters] in A.; its doctrine is unsatisfactory, and its form betrays clearly that it has not been carefully worked over...: p.638. cp. J. Barnes, trans. and comm., Aristotles Posterior Analytics (Oxford: 1975); Barnes calls the passage on final causes miserably obscure: p.218. Discussing the corresponding description of the four causes in the Physics, another recent commentator exclaims I can think of no plausible way to regard principles as 'that on account of which the conclusions hold true; R.D. McKirahan, Jr., Principles and Proofs: Aristotle's Theory o f Demonstrative Science (Princeton: 19 92); p.226. cf. A.W. Burks, "Teleology and logical mechanism," Synthese 76/3 (1988), pp.335-9 and 365-8, for a broader discussion of the history of the logical aspects of this common reduction.

64cf. D. Graham, Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford: 1987), pp.49-51,78-9,110,160-6.


18

dividing the former into ends and perfections; 2) Avicenna's attempt to understand

Aristotle's somewhat opaque examples of the final cause serving as the middle term of a

syllogism by stressing the causal reciprocity of necessity and finality; and 3) Avicenna's

attempt to fix the epistemological status of the demonstrative syllogism by emphasizing (he

final cause's role in formulating a thing's quiddity and hence in defining it scientifically.

But the importance of studying Avicenna's logic of final causation lies not merely in his

reworking of problematic Aristotelian passages. Avicennas teleology relies heavily upon

the notion that definition, an apparently subjective logical concept, can serve objectively and

ontologically as the perfection of a things existence. That any real connection existed

between Aristotelian metaphysics and logic (which Avicenna considered as both separate

science and methodological tool^S) is not immediately obvious, as the agitation

surrounding the Posterior Analytics passage mentioned above makes clear; therefore we

must bear in mind throughout this chapter what Avicenna the teleologist wants from logic:

to provide a framework of meanings which supports his notion that ends and perfections

exist and serve causally in all entities, be they logical, intellectual, physical, biological, or

metaphysical. Put another way, we hope to use the example of final causes to prove the

correctness of Gutass insight that:

[according to Avicenna] not only do the contents of this [philosophical] knowledge correspond, one to one, to ontological reality, but the progression of this knowledge also corresponds to the structure of reality. The structure o f reality is therefore syllogistic.66

c f. G. Qanawatl, M. al-Hu

19

Th e d e f in it io n o f FINAL CAUSE: m id d l e t e r m s 1 .1

Given this chapter's difficult subject-matter it seems simplest to begin by examining those

passages in Avicenna's logical works where die final cause is defined explicidy, particularly

those passages where it is contrasted with the three other Aristotelian causes: agent, matter,

and (most importantly) form.

Avicenna defines the final cause, or end (al-gaya), as "the perfection on account of which

everything that is, is, and toward which the principle of motion propels." 67 This is

contrasted with the efficient cause, or agent, which is the principle of motion; the material

cause, which is the subject or ground; and the formal cause, which is the form. All of these

causes may be combined in a single thing, or, as is the case with separate substances such

as the celestial intellects, only the efficient and final may apply.

Even in this preliminary discussion we can discern traces of our first theme, namely

Avicenna's attempt to distinguish the final from the formal cause; we shall examine the

interaction of these two types of cause in Section 1.3. For the moment, we should simply

note that according to Avicenna, in those things to which neither matter nor motion apply

(for example, the subjects of abstract sciences such as mathematics^), form and end

6?reading a1-tamam alladl li-ajlihi yakon ma yakon wa-ilayhi yasOq mabda3 al-baraka: Burban, p. 181; for this reading cp. ya3ummuba '1-Say3: Ilahlyat, p.295; cp. A Badawl, ed., Ibn Slna: al-Taehqat (Cairo:1973), pp. 138,169. [henceforth: TacUqat]

culom intizaclya: Burban, p. 181. cp. Bahlyat, pp.299-300.


20

possess analogous relations to the a g e n t . 6 9 By contrast, the subjects of the natural sciences,

in which all these causes function together, require that form, unlike end, be tied necessarily

to a corresponding matter, "it not being possible for this [type of] form to exist separately

from it, or in another matter." 70 Rather, the form's nature is specific to the matter that i.s

appropriate to it, and thus matter is intrinsic to the definition of form.

Avicenna returns to this definition and differentiation elsewhere in the Burhan, where he

elaborates upon what he means by the final cause being a thing's "perfection." He describes

the four causes this way: the final cause is "the thing for the sake of which the entity's

matter and form unite, namely the p e r f e c t i o n ." 7 1 Form, on the other hand, is described as

being intrinsic to the reality of the existence of the thing itself; matter must first exist in

order to receive the form during the actual occurrence of the entity; and agent is, again,

simply the principle of motion. Avicenna once more appears eager to stress the difference

between form and end, and because of this distinguishes two types of finality, end and

perfection, a topic which will be explored in detail in Section 1.4.

The examples Avicenna gives, as opposed to the definitions, are taken straight from

Aristotle, ^ 2 with the major exception that in the Posterior Analytics the necessitating

ground (which we assume Aristotle intended to presentproblematicallyas a kind of

logical matter) and the essence (which Aristotle identified with the formal cause) are both

described using the same geometrical e x a m p l e .7 3 Avicenna, on the other hand, takes only

^Burban, p.181. Also note Avicenna's implicit distinction between mechanical causes (i.e. agent and matter) and what might be termed "ideal" causes (end and form) through the different ways he says etc.:" wa-ma fi jumlatibi ("and the lot of things like it") with agent and matter, and wa-ma yajra majrabu ("and what is analogous to it") for end and form.

7madda mulaima laba: Burban, p.181; cp. Sama3 wa-ealam, p.33.Burban, p.294; "perfection" is again al-tamam.

H a .Po. HI I:94a28-94b26; cf. Burban, p.294, n.7.73A.Po. II,ll:94a34-5. In Pbys. 11,3:195al6-20 Aristotle equates the logical ground with the

material cause, and says that both matter and form are enhuperchontos, i.e. that out of which (ex bou) something comes into being (cp. Meta. XII,4:1070bl6-26); this is probably why Aristotle felt he could use the same example to illustrate the material and formal causes in the A.Po. passage (elsewhere matter and form are separated more fastidiously; cf. Ross, Physics,


21

the form as applicable to Aristotle's geometrical example; for the material cause a medical

example is given. This is probably due to die fact that Aristotle's method in this passage is

obscure; indeed, in another context, Avicenna admitted that he failed to understand exactly

what Aristode meant by "ground here. 7 4 But another explanation might take into account

the fact that according to his autobiography, Avicenna wrote the Manfiq, or Logic, of the

Sifa3 after he wrote the Uahlyat, or Metaphysics,75 the opposite of what has traditionally

been taken to be Aristotle's order of composition. Thus, in an attempt to merge the two

apparently inconsistent conceptions of causation presented in the Aristotelian corpus,

Avicenna stressed the more physical and metaphysical roles of the formal and material

causes. Applying this developmental approach to Aristotle, 76 we can say that he needed, in

the logical part of his work, to present a cause that operated as a middle term in a syllogism

but which could later be made analogous to the matter operating in the natural world; for

this reason Aristode called it a "necessitating ground."

As Avicenna allowed in the first set of definitions, an example of form perse (i.e., taken as

existing separately from matter) may be gleaned from the abstract science of geometry and

said to function in Aristotle's proof concerning the place of a right angle in a semicircle. The

efficient cause is contained in the answer to the question "why do the Athenians make war

against such-and-such a city?" The principle of motion in this case (the fact that the non-

Athenians first attacked the Athenians) is given as the efficient cause.77 Avicenna draws

his example of the material cause from medical theory: in answering the question "why

p.512). cf. Rosss attack (.Prior and Posterior Analytics, pp.638-644), supported in H. Treddenick, ed. and trans., Aristotle H: Posterior Analytics (Cambridge, Mass.: 1960) p.210, n."e," and Barness defense (Posterior Analytics, pp.216-7). cp. Graham, Two Systems, pp. 158-160.

74cf. Samaf fab1% p.52.7^W. Gohlman, ed. and trans., The Life oflbn Sina (Albany: 1974), pp.54-60.76fts most famous proponent is W. Jaeger, in his Aristotle: Fundamentals o f the History o f bis

Development (Oxford: 1934), pp.3-7, and passim. This approach is also called organic, genetic, and evolutionary.

77Burban, p.295. In Aristotle's example, it is the Persian expedition of Cyrus which returned Athens' attack; as Aflfi points out dryly, for some reason Avicenna did not want to mention Persia in his example; Burban, p.295, n.4.


22

does man die?," the material cause is given, namely the fact that man is a composite of

opposing elements .78

Both examples of the "perfecting" cause are taken straight from Aristotle: in answering the

question "why does so-and-so take a walk?," the final cause may be given, namely the fact

that so-and-so strives to be healthy, and he who strives to be healthy walks in order to

exercise. Also, in answering the question "why does this house exist?," the final cause may

be given, namely in order to protect the c o n t e n t s . 79 Problems arise, though, when the point

is driven home that these causes are all taken to function as middle terms in syllogisms; as

this equivalence is crucial to Aristotle's notion of scientific explanation, his whole theory of

logical causation may appear to be built upon shaky ground. But for the moment, it is

enough to note that like Aristotle, Avicenna maintains that each of the four causes may be

posited as middle terms. How exactly they function as middle terms will be examined in

Section 1.3.

Avicenna does go further than Aristotle when he explicitly lists the various causal modes:

proximate and distant, essential and accidental, potential and actual, specific and general,

and particular and u n i v e r s a l . 80 Examples of these are mainly taken from medicine, to which

Avicenna turns when Aristotle fails him; the exception here is form, which Avicenna again

illustrates with an extension of Aristotle's geometrical e x a m p le . 81

Distant and proximate final causes are contained in the answers to the question "why does

so-and-so walk?:" preventing indigestion (distant) and breathing fresh air to prevent the

78cp. L al-QaSS, ed., al-Qanan fi 1-Tibb (1-2) (Beirut 1987), pp.196-7. [henceforth: QanOn] l^al-'illa al-tamam1ya...al-3atat: Burhan, p.295. Barnes finds the latter example more

convincing than the former (Posterior Analytics, p.220); cp. Graham, Two Systems, p.161, a 10.

8cp. Phys. II,3:195a26-bl5.8 iThis could be because he did not want in this context to be drawn into the problem of whether to

identify the body's soul as form or perfection.


23

congestion of a humor (proximate). Examples of the other causes in their ultimate mode are

a high temperature,82 for so-and-so's being feverish (distant efficient); die opposition of the

elements, for the animal dying (distant material); and the perpendicularity of one line on

another, for such-and-such an angle being a right angle (distant formal).83

The proximate versions of these causes are given as d e c a y ,84 which is the efficient

principle of fever; dryness overwhelming moisture in the humors, which is the material

principle of death; and the perpendicularity of a line in between two equal angles, which is

the formal principle of such-and-such an angle being a right angle.

Examples of essential causes are health, for making sure one walks before eating (essential

f i n a l ) ; 8 5 heaviness, for the wall's collapse (essential efficient); a mirror's shininess, for the

reflection of an image (essential m a t e r i a l ) ; 8 6 and two adjacent lines, for fixing a

perpendicular line (essential formal). Examples of the accidental versions of these causes

are the fatigue arising from the pre-(or post-!)prandial walk, which is an accidental

perfecting principle of health; the removal of a buttress, which is an accidental efficient

principle for the wall's collapse; the piece of burnished iron, which is an elemental principle

of the image's reflection; and the fact that the right angle is accidentally perpendicular to a

line parallel to the one upon which it is set

82al-Sidda; alternately, it could be al-Sadda, meaning simply "affliction;" Burban, p.29683Making an implicit distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic causes, Avicenna says that the

effects of final and efficient causes come "from" ( wa-dalika min al-ttavamin al-mabda3 al-faHl) the agent principle and end, while the effects of material and formal causes exist "through" (.wa-dalika ki'l-mabda3 al-'unsurliii'l-mabda3 al-$orf) the elemental principle and the formal principle; Burban, p.296.

Z^al-'ufana could also be translated as decomposition or putrefaction.85this is the essential "perfecting principle" (al-mabda3 al-tamaml); Aristotle (A.Po. II, 11:94b 12-

13) talks of walking after dinner (peripatos apo deipnos), and Abu BiSr translates the phrase faithfully as al-maSy baeda l-'aSa3: Badawi, Tablilat taniya, p.452. Avicenna (perhaps because clinical experience told him otherwise) says aabla'l-taeam here; Burban, p.296.

86ka'1-saqqala li-aks al-Sibb; cf. Burban, pp.296-7, nn.9,11.


24

In his discussion of accidental causes Avicenna touches upon the important question of

chance, a problem which has served to cast doubt on the philosophical coherence of final

causation. Avicenna appears to introduce the concept of accidental cause here partly in

order to escape this dilemma: chance events are not without final causes, but rather are

caused accidentally, not essentially. The example which Avicenna gives in the Burhan is

stumbling across buried t r e a s u r e ; 8 7 in the Uahiyat, it is a chance meeting with a friend. 8 8

We shall return to this topic in our discussion of necessity in Section 1.4, and examine it

fully in Section 2.5.

Finally, causes may be potential or actual, specific or general, particular or u n i v e r s a l . 8 9

Avicenna evidently felt these divisions sufficiently self-explanatory or well-known to

require a list of examples for them in the Burhan indeed, just such a list is given in Chapter

12 of his al-Samaf al-fabM (Physics).** But Avicenna does go on to make the

following distinction, one that will prove important to his metaphysics: the cause's being

actual is a cause of the effect's being actual, but when the cause is potential its being

potential is nsl a cause of die effect's being potential; rather, this is the proper possession of

the effect in and of itself. 91 We shall return to this subject in Section 4.2.

Fisewhere Avicenna seems to be splitting final causes along further, different lines. In the

K. al-Jadal, that part of the M anfiq of the S i fa3 which is devoted to dialectical

argumentation and which corresponds to Aristotle's Topics, Avicenna mentions motivating

causes; these describe how the means in an argument motivate towards the assent, although

87aj.'utar calal-kanz: Burhan, p.297.88cp. his discussion of accidental and essential ends in Jlahlyat, pp.284-289.89Burhan, p.297.9Samac fabl% pp.55-9. We will discuss these further divisions in Section 2.1.9 Icp. his discussion of the fact of coming into existence after non-existence and its causedness in

Uahiyat, pp.260-3.


25

the assent is not perfected by t h e m . 92 He also mentions "inclining c a u s e s , 93 and

"preserving" c a u s e s , 94 which also turn up in the TabWyat and the Uahiyat, and which

accordingly will be discussed in those contexts.

92cffla min al-rilal al-mustadlya; al-eilla ai-dac1ya: Jadal, p. 147; cp. Top. 111,1:116b23-27. 9^al-asbab al-murajjiba: Jadal, p. 148.94asbab bafT^a: Jadal, p.267.


26

CAUSATION AND DEMONSTRATIVE QUESTIONS 1.2

Having seen that Avicenna, like Aristotle, attempted to create definitions of causation in

general, and final causation in particular, in which the causes could plausibly be said to

function as, or at least like, middle terms in a demonstrative syllogism, we must determine

exactly which type of question calls for the middle term to fulfill such a causal function.

Avicenna states that there are three fundamental questions; "what?," "is?," and " w h y ? " 9 5

Avicenna further splits "why ?" questions, with which we shall be mainly concerned in this

section, into two further subdivisions: one which seeks the middle term as a purely logical

cause of belief in a statement, and hence as the cause of assent in a syllogism which

concludes a given question; and another which seeks the middle term as an ontological

cause of something in itself, and hence as the cause of the thing's existence, whether

absolute or m o d a l . 96 The precise nature of the link between these two causal functions

one logical, the other ontological-will play a crucial role in Avicenna's world-view, in

which the middle term, often gleaned immediately through intuition (bads), can be seen to

serve as the nexus between language and reality.^?

95Burban, p.68; cp. Burhan, p.263. In a comparable passage these are called "the mothers of (all) questions" (ummahat al-mafalib): Barat, pp.85-6.

96Burhan, p.68.9?cf. Burhan, p. 177; cp. Ta'ttqat, p. 141, and M. Mu'ln, ed., Tablelyat-i daniS-nama-yi 'Alad

(Tehran: 1952), pp.142-45. [henceforth: DaniS-nama [Tabl'lyat]] For important discussions of the role of intuition (bads) in Avicennas epistemology, cf. Gutas, Tradition, pp.159-76,316-7, and M. Marmura's review of Gutas, "Plotting the course of Avicenna's thought," Journal o f the American Oriental Society 111/2(1991), pp.333-42.


27

For the moment, however, we must concentrate on the more prosaic task of comparing

Avicenna's scheme with Aristotle's. Avicenna understood Aristotle as also splitting

questions into "what?," "is?," and "why?," and, like Avicenna (who split all three questions

into subdivisions), reducing "is?" questions into two further subdivisions, simple and

compound. Looked at through Avicenna's eyes Aristotle's system of questions meshes with

the former's conception of causation in scientific explanation: Does the thing possess this or

that characteristic? (compound "is?" question, the answer to which presupposes the material

cause^); Why does the thing possess the characteristic? ("why?" question, the answer to

which presupposes the final cause); Does the thing exist? (simple "is?" question, the

answer to which presupposes the efficient caused); and What is the thing? (i.e. "what is its

definition?:" "what?" question, the answer to which presupposes the formal cause). 100

Again, Aristotle's intention here is to present these questions in such a way that the middle

terms in each of their corresponding syllogisms can function as causes, since discovering a

phenomenons cause is the object of scientific knowledge. 101

In other words, Avicenna understood Aristotle as implying the following: given that there is no sensible unformed matter, in answer to the question "Does X possess the attribute P?," we must distinguish X as P (as opposed to Q) by giving X as the material cause of the form/matter compound PX (as opposed to the form/matter compound QX).

99flere Avicenna appears to be imposing his own notions on Aristotle a bit more: the efficient cause, in its broadest Avicennian sense, is what necessarily brings P into existence from nonexistence; in the answer to the question "Does P exist," the existence or non-existence of efficient cause X is given in the answer.

100 to boti, to dioti, ei esti, ti estia: A.Po. II,l-2:89b24-90a5; cf. Afifi's comments in Burban, p. 19, n.1. For a discussion of Avicenna's predecessor al-Farabt's division of demonstrative questions into "why?" (lima) and "how?" (kayfa) questions, and thence into "what?" (mada), "for what?" (li-mada), "through what?" (bi-mada), and "from what?" (ean mada), taken from his Ifurof, Burban, and Qiyas faglr, cf. S.B. Abed, Aristotelian Logic and the Arabic Language ofAlfarabl (Albany: 1991), pp.87-104; for a discussion in particular of li- mada questions and the final cause, cf. p.89. For Avicenna's contemporary al-Hiwarizmls division of questions (in the '' fl afadiqflcjl" section of his Mafatib al-culam) into bal f"is?"/material cause], ma ["what?"/formal cause], kayfa ["how?"/efficient cause] and lima ["why?"/final cause (literally the "whyness" cause-al-cilla al-limalya)], cf. L al-Abyari, ed., Mafatib al-culam li'1-Hiwarizml (Beirut: 1984), p.174; translated by N. Rescher in his "The Logic-Chapter of Muhammad ibn Ahmad al-Khwariznti's Encyclopedia, Keys to tbe Sciences (c.980 AD.)," Arcbiv fdr Cescbicbte der Philosophic 44/1 (1962), p.73.

11 A.Po. n,2:90a6ff.


28

But I believe that Avicennas division of "why?" questions into logical and ontological roles

is evidence that he read Aristotle as making a subtler point than the one usually ascribed to

him, a point that nevertheless leaves a wide wake across our understanding of Aristotle's

epistemology. Taking the lead from Philoponus rather than Themistius (the two Greek

commentators on the Posterior Analytics available to A v i c e n n a ) , 102 Avicenna could read

the hoti in Aristotle's discussion of lunar eclipse in Posterior Analytics I,31:88al instead

as another, first dioti, thus splitting "why?" rather than "is?" questions into two

c a t e g o r i e s ; 103 this despite the fact that the Arabic text we have implies the hoti rather than

the < 2 r o t i . l 0 4 The result is that we can translate 88al-2 Qgl as "For we perceive that it is

eclipsed, and not why at all," 105 or ^ "for what we would be sensing is the fact that there

is an eclipse at that moment but not the reason for that fact," 106 but rather as "for while we

perceive why there is an eclipse at this particular moment, we do not perceive why it is an

eclipse in general." 107

102 Alexander's commentary was not extant, according to Ibn Nadim and Ibn al-Qifti (although theformer reports that Yafcya b. Adi said he saw Alexander's commentary on A.Po. but that a man from Hurasan bought it before he could). For Ibn Nadlm's list of commentaries on A.Po., cf. G. FlUgel, ed., Kitab al-Fihrist (Beirut: 1966), p.249; for Ibn al-Qiril's identical list, cf. J. Lippert, ed., Ta}iib al-Hukama} (Leipzig: 1903), p.36.

103 For Philoponus's interpretation, cf. esthanometha gar an, phesi, dioti nun ekleipei, kai oudioti holos: CACXHI/3, p.310. For Themistius's, cf. ou men dia touto apodeixis estin be aistbesis, oudepote gar to dioti deiknusin, all' aei monon to hoti: CAC V/l, p.38, or the same passage in L. Spengel, ed., Tbemistii paraphrases Aristotelis, I (Lipsiae:1866), pp.61-2. For the fact that Avicenna did not advertise his use of Philoponus's commentaries, and his uncommon belief in their close adherence to Aristotelian doctrine, cf. F. Zimmermann, "Philoponus' impetus theory in the Arabic tradition," in R. Sorabji, ed., Philoponus and the Rejection o f Aristotelian Science (London:1987), pp.126-7; for Avicenna's familiarity with Themistius's commentaries, cf. M.C. Lyons, ed., The Arabic Translation ofThemistius Commentary on Aristoteles De Anima (Norfolk: 1973), pp.xiv- xv.

104For Abu BiSr's rendering of 88al-2, cf. wa li-hada '1-sabab fa-inna wa-law kunna ba$illn fawq al-qamr wa-kunm nueayinu anna'1-ard tasturahu, la-ma kunna naelamu cilla al- kusaf; wa dalika anna innama kunna nahussu blnaidin naclumu bil-kulllya lima: Badawi, Manfiq Arisfn II, p.418.

105 Barnes, omitting the nun: p.47.10&H. Apostle, trans. and comm., Aristotles Posterior Analytics (Grinnell, Iowa: 1981), p.43.107 And thus following Philoponus in taking the holos as untied syntactically to the ou (i.e. not as

in "not at all"), but as functioning separately; for similar uses of holos, cf. Phys. II,3:202bl9 - 20, and Meta. V,26:1023b29-32.


29

This reading not only makes more sense of the previous chapter (Posterior Analytics

1,30), in which Aristotle states that chance cannot be used in a demonstrative syllogism, but

also flows better from the sentences immediately preceding, which describe an observer on

the moon. Why, we ask ourselves, would one need to stand on the moon to observe just the

fact of an eclipse? One could just as easily observe the fact of an eclipse standing on earth.

Rather, Aristotle's point is that if we stood on the moon and saw the earth passing in front

of the sun, we will simultaneously perceive the fact and know whv a particular darkness

fell over the moon at that particular moment; but we would not understand what an eclipse

is in any formal, universal w a y . 108 This is because we understand something only after

observing repeated instances of it, for at that point we are Anally able to separate essential

from coincidental causes, and, as Aristotle states in the previous chapter, only the causally

essential belongs in a demonstrative syllogism. 109 Jo take the eclipse example further, let

us imagine a situation where we stood on the moon and observed an eclipse at a particular

moment. Let us suppose that at the moment of eclipse (or just before it) some other celestial

event took place, such as the passing of a meteor. Until we had stood on the moon a second

time and witnessed another eclipse, we could not be sure whether the meteor's passing was

causally relevant, or perhaps even essential, to the phenomenon "eclipse" one wished to

define and understand. Hence the second dioti requires a series of answers to the first dioti

in order to distinguish the causally essential from the causally accidental. 110

108cf. Meta. IQ,2:996bl8-19. As Bumyeat puts it, Again, the reason why according to Aristotle there is no cpisteme of particular things or events is that one does not in perception discover why something is as it is: M. Bumyeat, "Aristotle on understanding knowledge," in E. Berti, ed., Aristotle on Science: The Posterior Analytics (Padua: 1981), p.l 14.

109Bumyeat: [Aristotles]...contention is that the accidental falls outside the reach of systematic explanation and understanding; of things which are or come about accidentally the cause is also [the cause] accidentally; (Meta. VI,2:1027a6-7) Bumyeat, "Understanding," p. 113. But Avicennas insight is that a coincidence's having no systematic explanation (and thus, in the strictest terms, being scientifically un-understandable) is not the same as saying that it is causeless, or specifically, without a final cause.

UOfiumyeat, attacking J. Hintikkas Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotles Theory o f Modality (Oxford: 1973), says: But since the causes of the accidental are in this sense indeterminate or irregular (Phys. II,5:196b23ff/Meta. V,30:1025a24-5, X,8:1065a32-5), knowing them is not cpisteme. It is not understanding a recurring type of phenomenon from first principles. It is not even the accidental or qualified cpisteme which we have when we


30

A passage from Metaphysics 1,1, supports my interpretation. Aristotle says that:

"We assume that artists are wiser than men of mere experience (which implies that in all cases wisdom (sophia) depends rather upon knowledge (eidenai)). This is because the former know die cause (ten aitian), whereas the latter do not For the experienced know the fact (to hoti), but not the wherefore (to dioti); but the artists know the wherefore and the cause."HI

What Aristotle is referring to in the Posterior Analytics passage, therefore, is the second

rather than the first epistemic transition, from the dioti to the aitian, not from the hoti to

the dioti.112

Where Avicenna appears to depart most drastically from Aristotle 1 I3 js when he contrasts

"is?" questions with "why?" questions by stating that whereas an "is?" demonstration will

give the middle term only qua cause of logical assent, a "why?" demonstration will give the

middle term both qua cause of logical assent and qua cause of e x i s t e n c e . H 4 J q other

words, in the world of existence, the middle term in a syllogism given in response to an

"is?" question need be neither die cause nor the effect of the major terms existence in the

m i n o r . H 5 Elsewhere Avicenna says that in an "is?" demonstration the causality of the

middle term is presented as evidence only in terms of the logical assent, but not presented

as evidence in terms of the thing's existence; H 6 answers to "is?" questions presuppose

apply the explanation of a recurring type of phenomenon to a particular instance of it, e.g. a particular eclipse: Bumyeat, "Understanding," p. 113. cp. Uahiyat, p.289.

HI Meta. I,l:981a26-30/H. Treddenick, ed. and trans., Aristotle: The Metaphysics Books 1-DC (Cambridge, Mass.:1947), p.7; cp. Meta. I,2:982a4-5.

H^This first transition, from the hoti to the dioti, is described in Meta. I,l:981bl0-14.113in APo. U3:78a22 and 78b32-4, andI,27:87a31-3; cp. I,14:79a21-24.114 This difference is perhaps a little more obvious in the Persian, where these two demonstrations

are called chertPl (why; i.e. causal) and hastt (is; Le. existential): DaniS-nama [Mantiq], pp. 149-50; cp. Avicenna's al-Tacliqat eala hawaSI K. al-nafs li-ArisfU (Notes on the Margins o f Aristotle's De Anima) in CA. Badawl, Arisfa cindal-eArab (Cairo: 1947), p.102. [henceforth: Notes on the De Anima]

1HBurban, p.79; cp. DaniS-nama [Mantiq], pp. 152-53. For the translation of burban in as "conditional" demonstration, cf. A.-M. Goichon, trans., Livre des Directives et Remarques (Paris:1951), p.231, n.2; for a comparable list of lima demonstration examples, cf. iSarat,pp.80-1,

11 ISarat, p.84.1 have translated al-limaHya here as "causality," given the common translation of burhan lima as "causal demonstration." The literal translation would be "whyness." cp. Goichon's translation in Directives, pp.231-2.


31

only logical entailment, while answers to "why?" questions presuppose both logical and

ontological entailment What Avicenna is doing here, I believe, is preparing the ground for

giving ultimate epistemic priority to essential causes (the formal and final) rather than

existential causes (the material and efficient); we shall examine this topic fully in Section

4.1.

In some respects, however, Avicenna follows Aristotle rather closely here. In Metaphysics

VI, 1, Aristotle says that:

"It falls to the same thinking to indicate both what a thing is and whether it is. m

In other words, Aristotle also gives epistemic priority to essential causes rather than

existential causes because the former presuppose and therefore encompass the latter: asking

"what is that wooden thing? presupposes that a wooden thing X already exists. As we shall

see later in this section, Avicenna could use the reading we have proposed to understand

Aristotle as maintaining that induction alone (in this context, answering repeated "is?"

questions) cannot give a complete account of substance; substance is known both through

"what it is" (to Avicenna, the quiddity qua perfecting cause; to Aristotle, the essence qua

formal cause) and through "whether it is" (to Avicenna, the efficient existentiating cause).

We shall discuss these causal roles later in this chapter and throughout the dissertation.

Avicenna hesitates to assign outright priority to die essential causes contained in the

answers to "why?" questions when he says that the knowledge deriving from the

demonstrative answers to "is?" questions (along with some exceptive syllogisms 1 ^ ) is in

some senses more certain than that deriving from the demonstrative answers to "why?"

questions. This is because in "is?" demonstrations the major term exists in the minor due to

ll7 Mcta. VI,l:1025bl7-18/C. Kirwan, trans. and comm., Aristotle's Metaphysics: Books Gamma, Delta, and Epsilon (Oxford: 1971), p.66. [cp. A.Po. I,l:71al 1-17 and II,7:92b4-ll]

H&al-istitnal; Burhan, p.90; for more on exceptive syllogisms, cf. N. Shehaby, The Propositional Logic o f Avicenna: A Translation from al-Shifa3: al-Qiyas with Introduction, Commentary and Glossary (Dordrecht: 1973), pp.283-4.


32

its essence, not due to an extrinsic cause; thus they use as premises the thing's formal

definition, a formal definition which presupposes a series of "why?" demonstrations.

"Why?" demonstrations, on the other hand, utilize possibly accidental causes as middle

terms in their inductive sifting of the essential from the accidental. H 9 \ "why?"

demonstration is existentially posterior but logically prior to an "is?" demonstration; 120 the

"why?" demonstration gives the interposition of earth between sun and moon as the cause

of the eclipse, while the "is?" demonstration gives the eclipse as cause of the

i n t e r p o s i t i o n . 121 The former is logically more certain, though in terms of the world of

existence, it tells us less. As Aristotle puts it in Metaphysics VII, 17:

"Now to ask why a thing is itself is no question; because when we ask the reason of a thing the fact must first be evident; e.g. that the moon suffers eclipse: 'because it is itself' is the one explanation and reason which applies to all questions such as 'why is man man?"' 122

However these two types of explanation-one providing knowledge through "why?"

demonstration and the other providing understanding through "is?" demonstration-do

come together, according to Avicenna's reading of Aristotle, in their shared use of the

middle term, the nexus between logic and existence.123

Avicenna's distinction points, I believe, to his awareness of a profound tension between

more and less restricted notions of die scope of Aristotle's episteme: 124 should it be

119 Burhan, p.86-7. For Avicennas notion that induction is itself a kind of syllogistic process, cf.Burhan, p.79.

120 Barat, p.86121 Burhan, p.321; Barat, p.85. cp. A.Po. H,2:90a6-33 and H,8:93a29-93b8. But it is important to

note how Avicenna once again emphasizes here the concept of formal perfection, in this case the perfection of the earth's interposition (al-tawassuf al-tamm...tamam al-tawassuf: Burhan, p.321; in the Barat passage, it is simply the "manifestation" (bayan) of the earth: Barat, p.85. cp. *ilia kamila; Burban, p.82), the earth whose roundness is perfected only by being brought into relation with the sun at a given position (fa-la yatimmu dalika ilia: Burhan, p.322). cp. R. Sorabji, Necessity, Cause, and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory (London: 1980), 211-17.

I22Meta. VII,17:1041all-18/Treddenick, Metaphysics I-IX, p.395.123Moreover, they provide a common approach to each science: DaniS-nama [Manfiq],

pp. 136,144.124More specifically, the difference between epistasthai, eidenai, and gignoskein. For an

analysis of the different senses, cf. Bumyeat, Understanding, pp.97,103-4,106-8.


33

understood as a foundationalist's body of knowledge, a collection of universal intelligibles?

Or does epistdme refer to the state of secure understanding which a wise man attains when

he has formalized (through deduction) the knowledge he has already garnered (through

i n d u c t i o n ) ? 125 Avicenna appears to favor the latter interpretation in the last chapter of the

Manfiq of the DaniS-nama, where he gives ten pieces of advice to "secure" oneself againstfallacies. 126

The problem, as Avicenna implies, is that from the point of view of scientific discovery

about the natural world, giving a "why? demonstration in which the second, universal type

of dioti is used provides us with no new knowledge; rather, it simply marshals our

definitions in a kind of syllogistic drill. As stated above, whereas standing on the moon and

watching the earth cross the sun's path will enable us to know why darkness fell over the

moon at that moment, understanding why an eclipse is what it is necessarily presupposes

repeated observations of similar events, so that the mechanical ground may be prepared, as

it were, for the definition. Thus our wise man's knowledge, conceived of as a body of

generalized particulars, is acquired inductively, i.e. through repeated observation that given

certain material and efficient causes, an identical phenomenon will necessarily result; his

understanding, on the other hand, is secured deductively, through arraying those universals

*25cf. Meta. I,l:982a2-3 and I,2:982a6ff. cp. R.G. Bury, ed. and trans., Sextus Empiricus I: Outlines o f Pyrrhonism (Cambridge, Mass.:1955), pp.236-43 (Bk.II, 134-43); cited in Bumyeat, Understanding, p. 135. In Pyrrhonean Outlines 280-81 (pp.511-13), Sextus describes the Sceptic wise man employing appropriate strength arguments (which have been made impregnable through syllogistic deduction) against the Dogmatists, depending on the severity of their incorrectness. Following this lead, Bumyeat maintains that epistasthai consists of securing understanding [Bumyeat, pp. 115-120, 130-91; Barnes that it has pedagogical connotations, i.e. that it consists of presenting and imparting knowledge [J. Barnes, Aristotles theory of Demonstration, in J. Barnes, M. Schofield, and R. Sorabji, eds., Articles on Aristotle I: Science (London: 1975), pp.77-82]; Irwin (in a souped-up version of the traditional reading) that it describes the method of scientific discovery [T. Irwin, Aristotle's First Principles (Oxford: 1988), pp. 130-1,530-1].

*26 DaniS-nama [Manfiq], pp. 156-65. Farabi also appears to favor the secure understanding interpretation; cf. wa-ka-ma sahib al-cilm al-na^ari la yakon faylasofan bil-na^ar wal- fafy, dona an tab$ula lahu al-gaya allad li-ajliha al-nazar wal-fahf, wa-hiya iqama a1- barahln: R. al-*Ajam, ed., al-Manfiq eindal-Farabl III: Kitab al-Jadal (Beirut: 1986), p. 70; cited and translated in M. Galston, Politics and Excellence (Princeton: 1990), p.90.


34

by definition, in other words by formal and final causes. 127 We shall return to this topic

throughout the dissertation, where we shall show that Avicenna saw cilm in both ways,

both in terms of an intrinsic perfection a rational man may attain through contact with the

Agent Intellect, and in terms of an extrinsic end, the Agent Intellect qua thesauros of

universals, toward which this process of intellectual conjunction is directed 128

127 For more on Avicenna on induction and experimentation, cf. S. Pines, La Conception de laconscience de soi chez Avicenne et chez Abul-Barakat al-Baghdadi, in Archives dHistoire Doctrinale et Littdraire du Moyen Age 29/1955, pp.95-7, and A.C. Crombie, Avicennas influence on the medieval scientific tradition, in G. Wickens, ed., Avicenna: Scientist and Philosopher (London: 1952), pp.88-84.

128 For Avicenna on the different ends of speculative and practical philosophy, cf. wal-falsafa al-nazariya innamal-gaya flha takmll al-nafs bi-an tacluma faqaf, wal-falsafa al- eamallya innamal-gaya flha takmll al-nafs la bi-an taeluma faqaf, bal bi-an taeluma ma yuemalu bihi fa-taemalu: Madhal, p. 12; translated in M. Marmura, Avicenna on die division of the sciences in the Isagoge of his Shi f a in Journal for the History o f Arabic Science IV/2 (1980), p.241. cp. al-nazaiiya hiya allati naflubu flha istikmal al-qawa al- nazarlya min al-nafs bi-bu$al al-eaql bil-fi'l: Uahiyat, p.3; cited in Marmura, Division, p.242. cp. wa-saeasatuhu bi-takmll jawbarihi.,.wa-amma tazklyatuhu bi-eilm Allah fa- taJ}$ll malaka lahu, bi-ha yatahayyau li-il}

35

CAUSAL RECIPROCITY AND COMPLEMENTARITY 1 .3

Now that we have discussed the various types of questions addressed in demonstrative

syllogisms, we must turn our attention to die causal behavior of the terms and premises

used in those syllogisms. The subject of the present section is Avicenna's conviction that

this causal behavior is best described as a tension (and, ultimately, a logical symbiosis)

between efficient, final, and formal causes.

As stated above, Aristode's main concern in presenting his list of questions and the causes

relating to them was to introduce the notion of the middle term as cause. Avicenna states

flatly that he also views the middle term this w a y ; 129 however, as was also stated above,

what really seems to interest Avicenna is the notion that die middle term both behaves as a

cause within the syllogism but also causes the thing in the real world, so that the middle

term thereby serves as a link between language and reality. 120

Although in reality die middle term can sometimes be the effect of the major term, it is not

the effect of the majors existence in the minor. For in spite of the middle term's being an

effect of the major in reality, it is a cause of the existence of the cause in the effect 121 This

somewhat confusing formula becomes clearer if we take a hint from the JlaMyat, where

129Burhan, pp.71,263; Barat, p.84.^katlran ma yattafiqu an yakon al-ljadd al-awsaf fl'l-qiyas-wa-buwa eilla al-qiyaseilla

aydan li'l-amr tt nafsihi fa-yakon qad ijtama'a al-majtlaban fl bayan waljid: Burban, p.71.

131 Burban, p. 82; for Aflfl's summary, cf. Burban, p. 22. For a medical example whose terms are "feverish" (mabndman), "the chills" (al-quacr1ra~i.c. shivering and trembling), and "tertian fever" (bumma al-gibb), cf. Barat, p.85,

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