File in the Hole!

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File Uploaders Vulnerabilities

HackPraNovember 2012

Soroush DaliliSecProject.com



Web Application Security Researcher since2006

Finding vulnerabilities in my spare time: IIS Semi-Colon Problem, IIS ShortFile Scanner, ...

My blog: http://soroush.secproject.com/blog/ Twitter: @IRSDL Email: IRSDL at Yahoo dot com

http://soroush.secproject.com/blog/

http://soroush.secproject.com/blog/



Introduction to Form-based File Upload File Upload Vulnerabilities

Protections and Bypass Methods

Bonus zero days in examples!



Based on: http://osvdb.org , Keyword: File UploadMore info: http://goo.gl/NmxpM

http://osvdb.org/

http://goo.gl/NmxpM

http://goo.gl/NmxpM

http://goo.gl/NmxpM

http://osvdb.org/

http://osvdb.org/





Easy way to put the files on the server Increase business efficiency

Uses a simple web browser Sharing photos, videos, files, and so on Being used in most of the modern websites:

Social Networks, Mail Systems, Shops,Content Management Systems, Forums,…



The most common:

Form-based File Upload in HTML (RFC 1867)

Post Method Content-Type (enctype) = multipart/form-data

Others:

PUT HTTP Method ActiveX Java Applets …



<form method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data"action="upload.aspx">

File Name: <input type="file" name="myfile" />

<input type="submit" value="Upload" /></form>



POST /samples/upload.aspx HTTP/1.1Host: www.example.com

Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=AB12Content-Length: 1337

--AB12Content-Disposition: form-data; name="myfile"; filename="test.txt"

Content-Type: text/plain

File Contents ...--AB12--

RFC 1867



Specific Issues: Improper or no access control

Arbitrary (Unrestricted) File Upload Overwriting critical files Path disclosure Directory Traversal Insecure Temporary File+ Other web application vulnerabilities



Group A: Admin level access needed (Specific users which

have been authorised by admin)

Authentication bypass vulnerabilities…

Client Side Attacks… CSRF , XSS

Group B:

No authentication needed Normal user can have access

“ All the options are on the table!”



External module/library, it is safe: Wrong! It is just an editor: Wrong!

Bunch of images are harmless: Wrong! In-house applications are more vulnerable. Published vulns. in public apps:

Year OSVDB.org Records

2012 194

2011 123

2010 123

2009 107

2008 145



Restricted File Upload:

Validation or other protections

▪ Can be bypassed? Unrestricted/Unprotected file upload:

You can upload whatever you want!

▪ And NO access control?

▪Piece of cake!



Based on: http://exploit-db.com – total: 74 itemsMore info: http://goo.gl/NmxpM

http://exploit-db.com/

http://goo.gl/NmxpM

http://goo.gl/NmxpM

http://goo.gl/NmxpM







Changing the functionality Bypassing the protections

Make the website vulnerable Denial of Service! Lame but possible

Famous sensitive files:.htaccess, web.config, crossdomain.xml,clientaccesspolicy.xml, global.asa, golbal.asax



Exploit-DB ID: 17644FCKeditor (Old Version) Protection bypass by

uploading a .htaccess fileEven x_test.gif could run as a php file! Better Exploitation:Running a shell inside the .htaccess fileBy “Eldar Marcussen” -http://www.justanotherhacker.com



Included libraries are not always safe File system and webserver are important Different method for path disclosure:

File/Directory/Symlink already exists Filename is too long

▪ NTFS: 255 characters

Forbidden characters or reserved words▪ WinOS: “<>?|:*"” + Control Characters

▪ WinOS: CON, NUL, COM1, …

Sensitive file system patterns▪ NTFS ADS: “:$I30:$INDEX_ALLOCATION” or “::$BITMAP”

Permission Denied



GleamTech FileVista v4.6:Uploading “test” as a file when we have a

directory with the same name:



NTFS ADS:

FolderName::$Index_Allocation

Or FolderName:$I30:$Index_Allocation

Short Demo: File - YouTube

http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_3/FolderCreation.mp4

http://www.youtube.com/v/Ws2JrZG679Q?version=3&hl=en_US&rel=0&vq=hd720



http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_3/FolderCreation.mp4



Modern browsers hide the local path:

Note: Anything before the last “/”

or “ \” in filename is usually ignored

by the web application

but it needs to be tested!



Usually File Uploaders have destinationparameter(s)! Can accept an absolute path? Try these:

▪ “C: \”, “ \\127.0.0.1\c$\”, “file:///c: \\”,“ \\.\GLOBALROOT\Device\HarddiskVolume1\”,“ \\?\localhost\c$\”

Is it a relative path?▪

“../”, “.. \”, with URL encoding, double URL encoding, orUnicode encoding

▪ Other tricks (Code/FS dependent)▪ Dot or Space after filename in windows

▪ Incorrect protections: Example: replacing “../” with nothing



GleamTech FileVista v4.6:

Bypassing protections for “../” & “.. \” by using:

▪

“.. /” (“..%20/”) & “.. \” (“..%20 \”)


http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_3/FileVista_DirTraversal.mp4

http://www.youtube.com/v/HjS6Pob5t34?version=3&hl=en_US&rel=0&vq=hd720



http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_3/FileVista_DirTraversal.mp4



Accessible via web directly? Examples:

Mail attachments: Upload, Download Data Processing : e.g. resizing an image

PHP temp files on File Upload



Old but still effective for some systems… SmarterMail File Upload Vulnerability:

Temp Uploaded ASP fileLink: http://securitytracker.com/id/1013021

MailSite Express File Upload Vulnerability:

Temp Uploaded and then viewed file

Link: http://securitytracker.com/id?1015063

http://securitytracker.com/id/1013021

http://securitytracker.com/id?1015063








Similar to other Web Apps Vulns… Impacts can be highly critical though! e.g.:

Cross Site Request Forgery▪ Upload a file on behalf of authorities

Cross Site Scripting▪ Can make a website vulnerable OR can be vulnerable itself!

SQL Injection▪ When the website uses a database system

Denial of Service▪ Consuming server’s hard drive? Processing a large image?

And so on…



Client Side Protections: Name and Extension

It only makes the website more user friendly.

It is not for security! Data can be manipulated by a web proxy as usual

Server Side Protections – Proper ones!

Inside the code (Internal) Outside the code (External)



Internal ExternalContent-Type (mime-type) Firewall: Request Header Detection

File Name and Extension Firewall: Request Body Detection

File Header (File Type Detector) Web Server Configurations

Content Format Permissions on File system

Compression (Image) Antivirus Application

Name Randomization Storing data in another domain

Storing files out of accessible webdirectory

Storing files in the database



Good to have it. But, no matter how good itis, it can be bypassed:

▪

Different implementations of RFCs in web servers. e.g.:▪ Using white space characters and CrLf in HTTP Header

▪ Using Multiple fake “Boundary” items

▪ Using “Transfer-Encoding: chunked” and obfuscating the body

▪ Different File Systems/Operating Systems features. e.g.:

▪ “test.aspx” = “test~1.asp” in Windows which supports 8.3

▪ Different web technologies features. e.g.:

▪ PHP converts “.” to “_” in the parameter name

▪ ASP converts certain UTF-8 characters to ASCII



.htaccess, web.config, and so on:

Overwrite their contents

Create a new one in a new folder Use Windows 8.3 file names

Other webserver configurations

Use extensions that are not being blocked▪ asa, cer, php3, php4, ashx, pl, cgi, shtml, phtml, …

Try path traversal to move the uploaded file



We don’t need bypass for file upload Write access in Upload directory is needed

Webserver needs to be configured not FS

Not having execute permission does not help!

Write permission can be prohibited outside

What about Temp/Real Time files/folders?

Still bad if you can upload arbitrary files

It is good to have this to reduce the risk



AV only blocks malwares/viruses Web-shell can be obfuscated

AV vulnerabilities can be exploited: e.g.: Sophos Vulnerabilities by Tavis Ormandy:

▪ 7th Nov 2012: http://secunia.com/advisories/51156/

▪ Just upload a file to execute your code

▪ In PHP, you just need to send your file to any PHP file!

http://secunia.com/advisories/51156/






Good solution, hard implementation

File Server must be isolated

File Server must be hardened Subdomain can still be dangerous

Reading/Setting cross subdomain cookies

▪ e.g.: “domain=.example.com”

Phishing attacks



Location in the request:

File extension will change the “Content-Type” Can be easily manipulated by a web-proxy Mostly image uploaders are the victims

“Do Not Trust/Use Content-type!”



ManageEngine Support Center Plus:

Exploit-DB ID: 22040

Bypass = “Content-Type: image/gif ” MobileCartly 1.0:


Bypass = “Content-Type: image/gif ”…



First Step: What is File Extension in“test.php.jpg”? “.php.jpg”?

“.jpg” Next Step: Which part has validation? Filename or Extension or Both?

What does it do with existing files? Logical flaws

Denial of Service …



White-list or Black-list? Check executable extensions

“.php” is blocked, what about “.php3”,“.php4”, “.phtml”, etc? “.asp” is blocked, what about “.asa” or “.cer”? What about client side extensions?

.htm, .html, .swf , .jar, …?



The most common bypass method in 2012! Webserver related (can be fixed in Apache) Apache common configuration: “file.php.jpg” served as PHP

“AddHandler application/x-httpd-php .php” ▪ Better solution:

IIS 6 useless feature: “file.asp;.jpg” run as an ASP file

“/folder.asp/file.txt” run as an ASP file



Normally when we have Regular Expressions Always try it!

Code Example: Blacklist RegEx: “ ̂\.php$”

▪ “file.php” != “file.PhP”

“file.php3.jpg” != “file.PHP3.JpG”

Example: eFront




Overwriting sensitive files is easy:

“web.config” == “WEB~1.con”

“default.aspx” == “DEFAUL~1.asp” Files without extensions are allowed?

“.htaccess” == “HTACCE~1”



End of filename - ignored characters: Trailing dot and space characters

▪ “test.asp … . .. .” == “test.asp”

Sometimes when it saves a file:▪ “test.php<>” == “test.php”

NTFS Alternate Data Streams:

“file.asp::$data” == “file.asp” “/folder:$i30:$Index_allocation” == “/folder”

“.htaccess:.jpg” make empty “.htaccess” ==“HTACCE~1” …



“file.php%00.jpg”

It needs to be decoded

▪Web server (name is in URL or code hasURLDecode)

▪ From client in “filename” section

▪ Depends on server side parser



Height/Width of image files? Simple Example: Comments in a jpeg file:



Detecting malicious code by using a pattern?

Too many vectors and obfuscation techniques

False/Positives

Binary files

Different encodings

Performance issue

“This protection method is vulnerable!”



Does it remove the meta-data? Always scrambles the input?

What about small data?

Malicious code can be produced by thecompression out of dust!

Source: http://www.idontplaydarts.com

A compressed .png file can contain PHP code!

PNG Image CompressionPNG with PHP

code!

http://www.idontplaydarts.com/





Harmless Text…

Gzip Compression:

Now, we have a PHP backdoor:

<?=$_GET[0]($_POST[1]);?>





Directory Traversal to make it accessible? Remember FileVista Issue?

Still can be used in LFI How will users see them? You need to proxy them

▪ Performance issue

▪

Local File Disclosure by a Directory Traversal▪ Loading unauthorized contents/files

▪ Local/Remote file inclusion issue

▪ And so on



SQL Injection Still can create temporary files

Performance In upload and download

Files in the database need more space

Can lead to DoS

What if you want to migrate to another app?



File duplication issues Delay problems Good for LFI and DoS!

Special file formats Compressed files XML files

Bad programming

Using “include” function to show an image Replacing bad characters/extensions with nothing:▪ “file.p.phphp” “file.php”

And so on



In Apache (if we are in “/www/uploads/” dir):

Tested in Windows:

▪ filename = “.” or “…” make “/www/uploads” file

In NTFS, “…:.jpg” makes “…” file

Removable only via command line: “del *.*”

By misconfiguration, “file.jpg” can run as

PHP:

“/file.jpg/index.php”, check this too!



Many developers use it as a base! O_0 The issues are:

It uses “Content-Type” as well as the extension! No protection for double extensions

Possible Cross Site Scripting

Cross Site Request Forgery

Lack of authentication

Other online examples have similar issues





“.asptxt” is a valid extension Dangerous characters are converted to “_” However, file duplication is an exception! Thanks to Mostafa Azizi (@0daynet) for this bug

“file.asp;txt” will be saved as “file.asp_txt”

Again “file.asp;txt”will be saved as

“file(1).asp;txt”

IIS6 useless feature shines! But, we can even use Null Character here to have

“file(1).asp” on the server!


http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_3/FCKEditor_2_6_8_FileUpload.mp4

http://www.youtube.com/v/1VpxlJ5jLO8?version=3&hl=en_US&rel=0&vq=hd720



http://localhost/var/www/apps/conversion/tmp/scratch_3/FCKEditor_2_6_8_FileUpload.mp4



There is a logical flaw in CKFinder ASP version. Uploading “Con.pdf.txt” kills the server:

CKFinder renames an existing file to “file(1).ext”

▪ If “file(1).ext” was taken, it will try “file(2).ext”, and so on

CkFinder is OK with multiple valid extensions

“CON” is a forbidden name in Windows

CKFinder thinks “Con.pdf.txt” is taken, ▪ It tries “Con.pdf(1).txt” which is forbidden too!

▪ “Con.pdf(2).txt” … “Con.pdf(MaxInt).txt”

This can kill the server!



Do you have enough internal and externalprotections? Are they bypassable? Try it yourself!

Can you host malwares, adult or illegalcontent for free?!

Do you have a monitoring system to report

newly uploaded/modified files? Are all the libraries and modules up to date? Upload a safe webshell and try to see how

much access it has!



File Managers include different modules: Upload File Create File/Directory Edit File Rename File/Directory Delete File/Directory Move File/Directory Compress/Decompress Modules Image converting/resizing modules Download/View File Browse Files/Directories Change PermissionsMore functionality Possibility of more vulnerability



Attack vectors cheat sheets Protection methods cheat sheets More OWASP ESAPI for file managers Payloads to make the testing automatic Better checklists for Web Developers &

Webmasters.



Any Question?



A BIG thank you to everyone

And, to the people who helped me to prepare this

talk.

Here are my contact details:

Twitter: @IRSDL

Email: IRSDL at Yahoo dot com

Documents

File in the Hole!