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The impact of employeerepresentation upon workplaceindustrial relations outcomes

SIAN MOORE, ALI TASIRAN ANDSTEVE JEFFERYS, WORKING LIVES RESEARCH

INSTITUTE, LONDON METROPOLITANUNIVERSITY

SEPTEMBER 2008

WERS 2004 GRANTS FUND

EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS RESEARCH

SERIES NO. 87

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EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS RESEARCH SERIES NO. 87

The impact of employee representationupon workplace industrial relationsoutcomes

BYSIAN MOORE, ALI TASIRAN AND STEVE JEFFERYS,WORKING LIVESRESEARCH INSTITUTE, LONDON METROPOLITAN UNIVERSITY

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About EMAREmployment Market Analysis and Research (EMAR) is a multi-disciplinaryteam of economists, social researchers and statisticians based in the

Employment Relations Directorate of the Department for Business, Enterpriseand Regulatory Reform.

Our role is to provide the evidence base for good policy making inemployment relations, labour market and equality and discrimination at work.We do this through:

Conducting periodic socio-economic benchmark surveys

Commissioning external research reports

Conducting in-house research and analysis

Assessing the regulatory impact of new employment laws Monitoring and evaluating the impact of government policies

We publicly disseminate the results of this research through BERRsEmployment Relations Research Series and other publications. For furtherdetails of EMAR's work please see our web pages at:

http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation

About this publication

The project manager for this report was Carmen Alpin, Principal ResearchOfficer in the Employment Market Analysis and Research branch.

Published in September 2008 by the by the Department for Business,Enterprise and Regulatory Reform.

URN 08/1037 ISBN 978-0-85605-718-2 Crown Copyright 2008

This publication can be ordered at: www.berr.gov.uk/publications Click theBrowse by subject button,then select Employment Relations Research.Alternatively, callBERRs Publications Orderline on 0845 015 0010 (+44 845015 0010) and ask for URN 08/1037, or email them at:publications@berr.gsi.gov.uk

Postal enquiries should be addressed to:

Employment Market Analysis and ResearchDepartment for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory ReformBay 41071 Victoria StreetLondon SW1H 0ETUNITED KINGDOM

Email enquiries should be addressed to: emar@berr.gsi.gov.uk

The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect those of theDepartment or the Government.

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ForewordThe Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR)

leads work to create the conditions for business success through competitiveand flexible markets that create value for businesses, consumers andemployees. It drives regulatory reform, and works across Government andwith the regions to raise levels of UK productivity. It is also be responsible forpromoting choice and quality for consumers through competition policy and forensuring an improved quality of life for employees.

As part of that work the Employment Market Analysis and Research branch(EMAR) of the Department manages a research programme to inform policymaking and promote better regulation on employment relations, labourmarket, and equality and discrimination at work issues.

This is one of 14 reports commissioned by BERR under the WorkplaceEmployment Relations Survey (WERS) 2004 Grants Fund. The Fund is aDepartment for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform initiative todevelop the evidence base in areas of policy interest, raise awareness of thissurvey and encourage advanced data analysis based on the WERS 2004datasets.

A call for proposals was made in November 2005. Proposals were selectedfor their contribution to the evidence base and relevance to governmentpolicy. More details on the WERS 2004 Grants Fund can be found here:

http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/grants/wers/index.html

More details on the Workplace Employment Relations Survey are here:

http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/wers-2004/index.html

We hope you find it of interest. Electronic copies of this can be downloadedfrom the BERR website, and printed copies ordered online, by phone or byemail from BERR. A complete list of BERRs research series can be found atthe back of this report.

Please contact us at emar@berr.gsi.gov.uk if you wish to be added to ourpublication mailing list, or would like to receive regular email updates onEMARs research, new publications and forthcoming events.

Bill Wells

Director of Employment Market Analysis and Research

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AcknowledgementsThis report is based upon secondary analysis of the 2004 Workplace

Employment Relations Survey (WERS). WERS is sponsored by theDepartment for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform (BERR), theEconomic and Social Research Council (ESRC), the Advisory, Conciliationand Arbitration Service (Acas), and the Policy Studies Institute (PSI) and thedata is supplied to us by the ESRC Data Archive at the University of Essex.We are grateful to these organisations for allowing us access to the data.They are not responsible for any of the findings or claims made in this paper.

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ContentsList of tables.................................................................................................. vi

Executive summary ....................................................................................... 1

Introduction .................................................................................................... 4

The impact of employee representation ....................................................... 4

The characteristics of representation ........................................................... 5

Structure of the report .................................................................................. 7

Characteristics of representation and industrial relations outcomes.......8

Measures of representation.......................................................................... 8

The characteristics of union and non-union representatives ...................... 11Measures of industrial relations outcomes ................................................. 13

Variations in industrial relations outcomes by type of representative .........15

Bargaining over pay, hours and holidays.................................................. 16

Pay............................................................................................................. 17

Hours.......................................................................................................... 18

Holidays ..................................................................................................... 19

Summary.................................................................................................... 28

Disciplinary action ....................................................................................... 29

Summary.................................................................................................... 35

Conclusion ................................................................................................... 36

References.................................................................................................... 38

Technical appendix...................................................................................... 41

The Data .................................................................................................... 41

Statistical Tests and Models....................................................................... 42

Appendix 1.................................................................................................... 50Employment Relations Research Series ................................................... 55

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List of tables1 Characteristics of union and non-union representatives 12

2 Industrial relations outcomes by type of representative 15

3 Factors affecting negotiation over pay, hours and holidays 21-24

4 Factors affecting disciplinary sanctions 31-34

5 Chi-two test results for homogeneity of union and non-unionrepresentatives populations with respect to categories ofrepresentative characteristics

43

6 Chi-two test results for homogeneity of union and non-unionrepresentative populations with respect to industrial relations

outcomes

44

7 Significant t-test results of Correlation Coefficients in BivariateProbit models bargaining

46

8 Significant t-test results of Correlation Coefficients in BivariateProbit models disciplinary sanctions

47

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Executive summaryThis report explores the impact of workplace representation onindustrial relations outcomes. It finds that the characteristics ofunion and non-union representatives, and the industrial relationsoutcomes in workplaces with union and non-union representatives,are significantly different. The report suggests that active unionrepresentatives, supported by both their union and management,were significantly more likely to perceive that they negotiated withmanagement over terms and conditions, particularly pay. However,individual and organisational characteristics, and indicators ofunion activity and activism are highly inter-related and difficult to

disentangle. For example the incidence of disciplinary sanctions isrelated to union density, which may reflect organisational factorsas well as representative activity.

Aims and objectives

The first objective of the report is to use the 2004 Workplace EmploymentRelations Survey (WERS) to compare the characteristics of union and non-union employee representatives. The second objective, confined to unionrepresentatives only, is to explore whether these characteristics influence

industrial relations outcomes. The research focuses upon two outcomes: one,the extent of bargaining over pay, hours and holidays, reflects collectiverepresentation; the other, the incidence of disciplinary sanctions, reflectsindividual representation. The analysis aims to ascertain whether it is possibleto disentangle organisational and structural support for representation fromthe characteristics of individual activity and orientation, external support andtraining. It explores how far it is possible to construct typologies of active andpassive representation. The proposition is that an active representative witha participative style and collectivist outlook, who has received training, hasexternal support and is integrated into a representative infrastructure will havea more positive influence on workplace industrial relations outcomes.

Background

The Governments review of the facilities and facility time provided toworkplace representatives (launched in June 2006) focused attention uponthe effectiveness of workplace representation and the attributes necessary forrepresentatives to fulfill their roles. Recent literature on workplace industrialrelations presents a picture of declining trade union effectiveness with anarrowing of union influence and a move away from workplace bargaining to amore consultative role (Brown, 2000 etc). The role of structural change andthe reassertion of managerial prerogative in shaping workplace activity have

been documented (Cully et al 1999, Terry, 1995), yet the role of workplaceunion behaviour has been less well explored. At the same time as union

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decline, the increased diversity in employee representation and structures,facilitated by the introduction of legal rights for employees to consultation andinformation, has widened the potential for non-union representation in theworkplace.

Union and non-union representatives

There are significant differences between union and non-unionrepresentatives in terms of their individual, organisational, membership-facingand management-facing characteristics. Union representatives were morelikely to be elected and to hold meetings with those they represented; theywere more likely to have received recent training for their role and to seekexternal information or advice. Non-union representatives were more likely tohave informal contact with managers and to express trust in management.

Bargaining over terms and conditions

Where bargaining is at workplace level, the activity of union representatives

and the support they receive from their union and from their management areimportant. Thus recruitment activity and union density were significantlyrelated to whether representatives reported that management negotiated(rather than consulted or informed) on pay and hours. Negotiations over paywere significantly more likely where a representative had had recent trainingor held an official position in the union. Negotiations over hours and holidayswere related to regular contact with a full-time union officer. Whererepresentatives spent over half their working hours on union duties they weremore likely to report negotiations over pay and hours.

Disciplinary action

In terms of the incidence of six disciplinary sanctions, workforce composition(proportion of female employees) was a key factor, but union density wassignificantly related to reductions in more serious disciplinary sanctions suchas suspensions and dismissals. There also appeared to be a relationshipbetween sanctions and the institutionalisation of union-managementrelationships, including support for union representation. This may mean thereare more likely to be procedures in the workplace, which increase sanctionsshort of dismissal.

About th is project

This research was carried out as part of the Department for Business,

Enterprise and Regulatory Reforms employment relations researchprogramme and was funded under the WERS 2004 Grants Fund. Furtherdetails on the Fund can be found here:

http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/grants/wers/index.html

This report is based on secondary analysis of the 2004 WorkplaceEmployment Relations Survey (WERS). The research focuses uponresponses to one element of the survey, the worker representativequestionnaire, which is based upon interviews with the most senior employeerepresentative in the establishment. It matches the 984 responses from the

survey of employee representatives to the 2,295 responses from the survey ofmanagers to create a new merged database linking the perceptions of

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industrial relations outcomes reported in the management questionnaire to theactivity of the representative. The analysis excludes workplaces with less thanten employees, leaving 964 responses of which 724 were unionrepresentatives and 240 non-union representatives.

About the authors

Sian Moore and Ali Tasiran are Principal Research Fellows at the WorkingLives Research Institute at London Metropolitan University; Steve Jefferys isDirector of the Working Lives Research Institute.

About WERS 2004

The Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 2004) is a nationallyrepresentative survey of British workplaces employing five or more employeesand covering all sectors of the economy except agriculture, fishing, miningand quarrying. More information on the survey can be found here:

http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/wers-2004/index.html

The survey is jointly sponsored by the Department for Business, Enterpriseand Regulatory Reform, the Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service(Acas), the Economic and Social Research Council and the Policy StudiesInstitute. It follows in the acclaimed footsteps of earlier surveys conducted in1980, 1984, 1990 and 1998.

For further information please refer to the main published outputs from WERS2004: the first findings booklet (Kersley et al, 2005), a report on small andmedium-sized enterprises (Forth et al, 2006), and the 400-page sourcebook ofdetailed findings (Kersley et al, 2006). The sourcebook is published byRoutledge, while the first two reports are available free from BERR:www.berr.gov.uk/publications Please quote the URN when ordering.

The data from WERS 2004 is now available to users through the UK DataArchive (study number: 5294): http://www.data-archive.ac.uk

http://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/wers-2004/index.htmlhttp://../publicationshttp://www.data-archive.ac.uk/http://www.data-archive.ac.uk/http://../publicationshttp://www.berr.gov.uk/employment/research-evaluation/wers-2004/index.html

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IntroductionThe recent literature on workplace industrial relations presents a picture ofdeclining trade union effectiveness with a narrowing of union influence and amove away from workplace bargaining to a more consultative role (Brown etal, 2000). The roles of structural change and the reassertion of managerialprerogative in shaping workplace activity have been documented (Cully et al1999; Terry, 1995), yet workplace union activism has been less well explored.The increased diversity in employee representative structures is also raisingnew questions about the nature of non-union representation in the workplace.

This paper uses the 2004 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS2004) to firstly examine the characteristics of employee representatives both union and non-union and secondly to explore whether thecharacteristics of union representatives influence industrial relationsoutcomes.

The impact of employee representation

The issue of how far strong union representation creates better workingconditions and more reflective and better management has long beendebated in the industrial relations literature. Batstone et als (1977) detailedobservational study of shop steward activity argued that the dynamics of

behaviour in domestic organizations was key to understanding workplaceindustrial relations and that the leadership provided by shop stewards wasone factor conventionally ignored. For Batstone a leader is defined as arepresentative in relation to union members, taking a proactive role andhaving a commitment to trade union principles. In contrast a delegate is morepassive and merely reflects members wishes. Leadership is associated withstrong bargaining relationships with management and with outcomes in termsof bargaining, pay, overtime, work organisation and industrial action.Subsequent work by Fosh (1993) highlighted the role of local leadership stylein securing union membership participation. She has characterized the role ofrepresentatives in terms of participatory leadership style, emphasising

communication and consultation with members at the formal and informallevel. She identified the importance of a collectivist outlook, where issues areseen by representatives as relating to a shared situation of employment ratherthan taken up as individual grievances (1993: 581). In her study, differences inlocal leadership style were particularly evident during periods of change.Greene et als (2000) case study evidence also suggested thatcommunication within the union and the participation of members wereindicators of the processes of union organization, which influenced the waythe union interacted with management. Fairbrother (1989) and Darlington(1994) have also stressed that the key characteristic of employeerepresentation is a collectivist perspective a focus on shared rather thanindividual grievance. Darlington criticises Batstones emphasis on leaders; he

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suggests that Batstones formulation is predicated upon stewards andmanagers having shared values and that from this perspective by moderatingtheir goals shop stewards can achieve more for their members than theypossibly could through a more adversarial or militant perspective. Darlingtonargues that this leads to a process of marginal incremental adjustment, which

does not obstruct managerial objectives (1994:16).

Brysons (2003) study suggests there are strong links between unionsorganizational effectiveness and employee perceptions of whether they areeffective in delivering better terms and conditions for members. Brysondifferentiates between organizational effectiveness and union effectiveness inachieving fair pay, promoting equal opportunities, protecting workers, makingwork interesting and enjoyable and working with management to increasequality and productivity. For Bryson union effectiveness reflects the capacityof the union to represent its members and relates to the internal working of theunion. Organizational effectiveness includes: unions ability to communicate

and share information; the usefulness of unions as a source of informationand advice; unions openness and accountability to members; unionsresponsiveness to members problems and complaints; how seriouslymanagement takes the union; unions understanding of the employersbusiness and the power of the union. Bryson concludes that employeesperception of employer support for unionisation raises union effectiveness andunions therefore need the active support of management. This latter findingreflects Willmans (1980) earlier emphasis upon the impact that managementmay have in promoting the stewards role as part of the formalisation ofworkplace industrial relations.

Whilst Brysons study acknowledges the importance of workplace

representation, WERS data have recorded a decline in union workplacerepresentation. Analysis of WERS 2004 data (Kersley et al, 2006) shows thatin less than half (45 per cent) of recognized workplaces did members haveaccess to a lay representative at their own workplace, compared with just overhalf (55 per cent) in 1998. Upchurch et al (2002) recognise the increasingpressure on the time of stewards due to employers intensification of work aswell as the greater range of substantive and other issues needing to be dealtwith.

The characteristics of representation

The literature characterising representative activity focuses upon union ratherthan non-union representatives. Our analysis draws upon, but adapts andwidens Darlingtons (1994) definition of steward activity to characterise theactivity of both union and non-union representatives, or its absence.Darlingtons distinguishes between management-facing, member-facing andunion-facing activities. Management-facing activity includes dealing withmanagement on collective issues related to pay and non-pay matters throughbargaining or consultation, but can also include interacting with managementon individual issues linked to grievances and discipline; member-facingactivity covers activity that requires stewards to deal directly with theirconstituents, primarily providing advice and information on employment rights,

work and occupational issues; while union-facing activity embracesrecruitment by stewards as well as the dissemination of union information and

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material. Member-facing activity may coincide with Foshs conception ofparticipatory style (1993), which prioritises communication with members, orin the case of non-union representatives, those workers whom they represent.In this analysis a distinction is made between individual characteristics,organisational characteristics, management-facing characteristics,

member/employee-facing characteristics (defining interaction between therepresentative and their constituents and including union-facing activity suchas recruitment) and external-facing characteristics.

The analysis tentatively explores how far it is possible to construct typologiesof active and passive representation that may reflect participative styles.One proposition tested in the research is whether more activerepresentatives, those with a participative style and who have externalsupport, will have a more positive involvement with workplace industrialrelations outcomes. In this context it could be assumed that trade unionrepresentatives should be in a better position to influence outcomes than non-

union representatives. Gollans study of employee voice at the Eurotunnel callcentre (2003) suggests that non-union voice structures are used as devicesfor information and consultation rather than true consultation or bargainingmechanisms. Non-union representatives may be handpicked by managementand even if elected may not be fully independent of the company. They mayhave limited access to resources, such as external independent advice, whichreduces their ability to evaluate effectively the issues discussed withmanagement and represent the views of employees. Korczynski (1999)indicates that non-union employee representative structures have littleinfluence on management-decision making, since managementpredetermines the decision-making process and generally controls the

structure and agenda of meetings. He also finds that few non-unioncommittees have negotiation and bargaining rights over pay and conditions orfulfil a role of conflict resolution.

Freeman and Medoff (1984) argue that the efficacy of employee voicedepends upon the ways in which labour and management interact rather thanthe existence of unions. It has been suggested that the decline of union-basedsystems raises the possibility that the differences between union and non-union representation may have disappeared (Terry 1995: 263). Terry statesthat it is easy to overlook the argument that trade union and collectivebargaining are not necessary conditions for employee representation

(1999:16). He points out that a number of the problems that arise with non-unionised systems in terms of inadequate information and being marginalizedby management have also been true for unionized systems in the 1980s and1990s. The assumption that union representatives are better trained andequipped with information, arguments and negotiating skills may not hold(Terry 1999: 28).

With the introduction of legal rights for employees to consultation andinformation and the phasing in of regulations on Information and Consultationbetween 2005 and 2008, there is renewed interest in the role of non-unionrepresentatives in promoting employee representation and voice. Analysis ofWERS 2004 (Kersley et al, 2006) shows that 14 per cent of workplaces with

10 or more employees had a Joint Consultative Committee. Kersley et al(2006) also report that stand-alone representatives, representatives who do

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not sit on a Joint Consultative Committee or represent union members, werepresent in five per cent of workplaces. Key questions here concern the extentto which the absence of external support and legal rights will neutralise therole of such representatives and whether distinctions between union and non-union representation will narrow or disappear.

Structure of the report

This report focuses on whether and how far variations in employeerepresentation influence employment relations outcomes. Variations in therepresentative role may not mirror a union/non-union divide. They may beattributed to the activity of the individual representative or to the externalsupport that the representative receives. Equally, the structural andorganisational context may reinforce or even explain outcomes, making itdifficult or impossible to distinguish the contribution of individualcharacteristics.

Chapter Two outlines the differences between union and non-unionrepresentatives evident from the descriptive data. It defines the explanatorymeasures and the industrial relations outcomes selected to test thepropositions presented in this and subsequent chapters. Chapter Threeexplores whether the characteristics of union representatives affect bargainingover pay, hours and holidays. Chapter Four looks at their impact ondisciplinary sanctions and at how far the outcomes may also reflect theorganisational context within which representatives operate.

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Characteristics ofrepresentation andindustrial relationsoutcomesThe research examines the interaction of two groups of industrial relationsoutcomes (bargaining over terms and conditions and disciplinary sanctions)and 21 explanatory factors reflecting the characteristics of unionrepresentatives. The analysis showed that some of these factors werestrongly inter-related, pointing to the difficulties in drawing clear conclusionsfrom the analysis. Further details about the data source, variable definitionsand statistical tests used can be found in the technical appendix.

Measures of representation

Twenty-one explanatory variables drawn from the Worker Representative

Questionnaire were used to define the characteristics of employeerepresentatives and representation. These were divided into five broadgroups: the characteristics of individual representatives; their organisationalcharacteristics; representatives member or employee-facing characteristics;their external-facing characteristics; and their management-facingcharacteristics.1

Individual characteristics of representatives

A first group includes the personal characteristics of the employeerepresentatives interviewed: their age, gender and representative experience.The latter is defined as the total number of years the respondent has been a

representative whilst working in their current establishment. This makes itpossible to test how far it is the experience, rather than the age, of arepresentative that affects industrial relations outcomes, or how far the twoare mutually reinforcing.

1Certain variables could be included in more than one of these broad groupings. Thus having

participated in training for their representative role in the last year could be viewed either asbeing external-facing if initiated by the representatives themselves or by the union, or asmanagement-facing, if initiated by management. Equally, trying to recruit members could beviewed as both external-facing and membership-facing; whilst being a full-time union

representative can be an indicator of managements positive approach to the union, it couldalso be viewed as resulting from the individual strength or abilities of the person concerned orthe strength of membership support in the workplace.

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External-facing characteristics

The analysis uses four indicators of external-facing characteristics. First, forunion representatives only, the variable is whether they hold any officialposition in the union at district, regional or national level. This allows us tomodel the degree of integration of the representative within the wider union.

The perception that non-union representatives have only limited access toexternal support and advice has been seen to constrain their effectiveness(Gollan, 2003). This may also apply to union representatives although forBatstone et al (1977), studying the heartlands of shop steward autonomousorganisation in the 1970s, full-time officer support was not necessarilyassociated with effective workplace representatives. In a unionised contextDarlington (1994) highlights the tensions between independence anddependence inherent within shop stewards relationships to full-time unionofficers. On the one hand there may be an autonomous basis to shop stewardorganisation with representatives ideally possessing the resources and

experience to handle grievances and negotiation; on the other hand stewardsrely upon external representatives of the union for a range of support andservices. In the changed context of new union recognition in a later period,Moore et al (2004) noted the dependence of new workplace unionrepresentatives upon full-time officer support. This group of external-facingvariables thus includes two measuring the extent to which employeerepresentatives are influenced by external organisations (vertical linkages).One applies to union representatives only, and indicates whether they haveregular contact (at least once every three months) with full-time union officials.The other applies to both union and non-union representatives: whether theyhave sought any external advice during the last year, including from unions,

government, Citizens Advice Bureau or another independent agency.

Kessler and Herons (2001: 377) study of the role of stewards in the RoyalCollege of Nursing identifies the importance of the training they had receivedfor the role, as influential in their ability to act in an independent and proactiveway. As previously mentioned commentators have raised questions aboutthe access of non-union representatives to training and consequently theirability to act effectively. The last external-facing variable used, therefore,indicates whether or not the individual has taken part in training for their roleas an employee representative in the last year, although this variable may notreflect any previous training.

Management-facing characteristics

Goodman and Whittington, writing in 1973 when workplace unionrepresentatives were a focal point in the study of industrial relations, statedthat management enhance the scope, power and authority of shop stewards.Willman (1980) suggested that paid time-off for stewards can formalisebargaining arrangements, but can also be seen as encouraging more co-operative relations with management. In their recent study of workplacerepresentatives in the health service, Kessler and Heron confirmed thatmanagement support for local union organisation is essential to meaningfulsteward involvement in the handling of management-facing issues. They also

acknowledge that management support can also lead to the incorporation ofworkplace representatives, who become dependent upon their toleration and

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implicated in management-led agendas. The variable used in this analysis tomeasure one element of the extent of managerial support for therepresentative, is whether or not the representative is permitted to and spendsmore than half his or her total working hours on union duties.

Batstone et al (1977) show how shop steward interaction with managementinfluences the strength of the bargaining relationship. In particular they stressthe role of informal relationships between managers and the most effectivestewards or leaders. For Batstone, steward leadership is confirmed bymanagerial actions. Oxenbridge and Brown (2002) in their examination ofpartnership arrangements also found that unions have greater rights in theworkplace where they had informal relationships backed up with high levels ofworkforce unionisation. The second explanatory variable concerning themanagement-facing characteristics of representatives thus reports thefrequency of unplanned meetings between employee representatives andmanagers.

The third management-facing variable used reports the representativesdegree of trust in management carrying out its commitments. The issue oftrust in employment systems may capture both the representativesexperience of workplace relations, but also a wider ideological frame of

reference. A fourth variable also reflects management orientation to tradeunions; the extent to which representatives believe that management is infavour of trade union membership.

Interaction effects

The analysis also includes three interaction effects, each reflecting thecombined effect of two variables. These are, firstly, a variable combining male

representatives with those who spend over half their time on union duties;secondly a variable reflecting cases where representatives are based in theprivate sector and where management is considered by them to be in favourof union membership; and finally, a similar variable, but reflecting wheremanagers in the private sector are considered not to be in favour of unionmembership.

The characteristics of union and non-union representatives

Chapter 1 suggested that union decline may lead to a convergence betweenunion and non-union representation (Terry 1995: 263). This researchsuggests, however, that this has not yet occurred. Table 1 reports the

characteristics of the 964 representatives interviewed as part of the WERS2004 survey and highlights certain differences between union and non-unionrepresentatives.

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union3) and non-union representatives (combining those non-unionrepresentatives who sat on Joint Consultative Committees and those who didnot4), to provide sufficient numbers for the analyses.

The data shows that in terms of individual characteristics unionrepresentatives were slightly older and more likely to be male than non-unionemployee representatives. They also had more experience asrepresentatives. Non-union representatives were much more likely to be foundin the private sector and in workplaces where pay setting took place atworkplace or organisational level. Union representatives are slightly morelikely to represent workplaces with higher proportions of female workers.

Union representatives participated more frequently than non-unionrepresentatives in membership-facing activity. Thus they were more likely tobe elected by their constituency and to call meetings of these constituents ona more regular basis. Union representatives were also more external-facing they sought external information or advice more frequently than non-union

representatives and were more likely to have received training for their role asa representative in the previous 12 months. Non-union representatives, incontrast, were more likely to engage in management-facing activity. This wasdespite the fact that they were much less likely to spend over half of their timeon representative duties. Interestingly in the light of Batstones conclusionsabout the importance of informal interaction between shop stewards andmanagers, it was non-union representatives who reported more contact withmanagers outside of formal negotiating or consultative meetings. Similarly, ahigher proportion of non-union than union representatives said that managerscould be relied upon to live up to the commitments they have made.Unsurprisingly non-union representatives were far less likely to believe that

management was in favour of trade union membership.

There were significant differences between union and non-unionrepresentatives in terms of individual, organisational, membership-facing andmanagement-facing characteristics (refer to Table 5 in Technical Appendix).The only group where there were not significant differences is that reflectingexternal-facing characteristics (which may be due to the limited number ofvariables that could be used across both groups).

Measures of industrial relations outcomes

Do variations in the characteristics of workplace representatives explain

different industrial relations outcomes? Recent literature suggests thattraditional collective measures of industrial relations such as strike rates areinsufficient indicators of workplace industrial relations. Kelly (1998) arguesthat there has been a move towards the greater individualisation of theemployment relation at the expense of collectivism. Industrial action hasfallen to historically low levels and there has been a substitution of individualgrievances for strikes, reflected in the rapid increase in the volume ofindividual cases by workers against employers (Drinkwater and Ingram,

3Those representing the largest non-recognised union could be excluded from the analysis

on the grounds that the structure of institutional support will be very different, but the numbers

are relatively small and at this preliminary stage we have included them.4In Kersley et al (2006), the 169 non-union JCC rep respondents are distinguished from the

60 non-union stand-alone reps.

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2005). Cully et al (1998) suggest that Employment Tribunals are a moreprevalent indicator of workplace conflict than collective industrial action. At thesame time Brown et al (2000) found that vital links exist between theenforcement of individual rights and the structure of collective representation;they argue that the extent to which employers are complying with their legal

obligations depends significantly on the presence of active trade unions atworkplace and organisation level. In this research two sets of industrialrelations outcomes are utilised, one reflecting collective representation andthe other individual representation.

Negotiation

Moore et als (2005) study of workplace bargaining following new trade unionrecognition, suggested that, within the context of structural and organisationalconstraints, the characteristics of union representatives influenced the scopeand depth of bargaining and managements perceptions of the bargainingrelationship. That work explored how far managers perceived their interaction

with union representatives as negotiation, consultation or information and,where there was negotiation, how far the scope of bargaining was restricted topay, hours and holidays (the statutory model as set out in the statutoryrecognition procedure) or was more expansive. In common with Oxenbridgeand Brown (2004) the research detected a re-labelling of the process asconsultation by management, but suggested that this perception reflected notjust employer intent, but also the aspirations and expectations of unionrepresentatives following recognition. Terry (1999) has also highlighted thedifficulty in distinguishing between negotiation and consultation in the contextof non-union representative structures, suggesting that it is no clearer than insimilar unionized contexts.

The first industrial relations outcome measure is the incidence of negotiationsover pay, hours and holidays. These three topics are used since they reflectthe minimum topics that the employer is legally obliged to bargain over underthe statutory recognition procedure.

Discipline

Knight and Latreille (2000) used WERS 98 data to show that union densityhas a significant effect on the disciplinary sanction rate. They found that inworkplaces where union membership is high there is a significantly lower rateof dismissals and concluded that unions protect their members from punitive

action in both discipline and dismissal.5

Much earlier, Freeman showed thatlower quit and dismissal rates and longer tenures are evident in unionisedworkplaces (Freeman 1980: 41). These findings were based upon theproposition that unions contribute to the resolution of discipline issues withoutrecourse to formal sanctions and protect members when threatened withdismissal.

This research tests how far the presence and characteristics of an employeerepresentative impact upon the incidence of formal disciplinary sanctions.Dependent variables are taken from the management questionnaire andreflect whether or not verbal warnings, written warnings, suspensions, pay

5The authors do not appear to have controlled for the fact that union density was an

endogenous variable.

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deductions, dismissals or transfers have been applied to employees within theestablishment in the previous 12 months.

Variations in industrial relations outcomes by type of representative

The outcome data concerning the two main industrial relations issues,

bargaining and disciplinary sanctions, are shown in Table 2, highlighting thevariation between workplaces with union and non-union representativesaccording to information on outcomes from the management questionnaire.

Table 2. Industrial relations outcomes by type of representative

Management Questionnaire responsesWorkerRepresentativesQuestionnaire -responses for unionrepresentatives

All reps Union reps Non-Unionreps

Management negotiates on:Pay 37 48 65 5

Hours 35 45 57 13Holidays 30 42 56 5

Management has used the followingdisciplinary sanction during last 12months:

Written warning - 45 41 55Verbal warning - 45 42 56

Dismissal - 32 23 53Suspension - 29 25 40

Internal transfer - 9 10 8Pay deduction - 5 4 7

Source: 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey. Base: All workplaces with 10 or more employees. Figures are weighted and based onresponses from worker representatives and managers.

The descriptive data in Table 2 suggests differences in industrial relationsoutcomes between workplaces where union representatives are present andwhere non-union representatives are present. In terms of bargaining,managers were far more likely to report negotiating with union representativesthan with non-union representatives and the variation was particularly stark forpay bargaining. Non-union representatives were more likely to negotiate overhours than pay or holidays, but even here there were substantial differences

compared with union-representatives. In terms of work discipline,management respondents reported that, with one exception, disciplinarysanctions were higher in workplaces with non-union representatives than inthose with union representatives, and much higher for the more serioussanctions of dismissals and suspensions.

Additional analyses showed that the differences between workplaces withunion and non-union representatives in terms of bargaining over terms andconditions and disciplinary sanctions were statistically significant (refer toTable 6 in Technical Appendix).

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questionnaire) and secondly the perceptions of the union representative as towhether management normally negotiates with them, consults them or informsthem over pay, hours and holidays (from the worker representativequestionnaire).

Pay

Management responses

The results in Table 3 show the factors influencing whether managementrespondents reported negotiating on pay. They suggest that the individualcharacteristics of union representatives are important. Thus the probability ofmanagers negotiating with both older and more experienced unionrepresentatives was higher7 than with younger and less experiencedrepresentatives. The model also shows that gender was a significant factor,with management respondents significantly more likely to report that theynegotiated on pay with male union representatives. The findings on individualcharacteristics are likely to reflect the age and gender profile of senior unionrepresentatives (with the gender gap amongst representatives closing slowly),as well as the distribution of representatives by industrial grouping; unionrepresentatives were more likely to be found in the utilities, transport andcommunication and the public sector. Kersley et al (2006) show thedominance of white, male union representatives working full-time and aged 40and over in manufacturing.

In terms of organisational characteristics, none appeared significant in thedetermination of pay. This may be surprising since it was hypothesised thatthe level at which pay increases are set, whether the workplace is in the publicor private sector and the proportion of women in the workplace might affect

the scope for representative influence. However, it is possible that differentstructural factors cancel each other out to give this result: on the one handthose union representatives most likely to have some negotiating power aremore likely to be based in the larger, more feminised public sector where paynegotiations only rarely occur at workplace level; on the other, unionrepresentatives in the smaller, less feminised private sector where pay ismore commonly decided at local level, may be less likely to have thebargaining power to initiate real negotiations.

In terms of membership-facing variables, the model suggests that unionactivity does have an impact on pay bargaining. The probability of

management reporting that they negotiated with elected representatives onpay was higher than where they were not elected. Equally, recentmembership recruitment and union density appeared significantly associated

7The significantly estimated age parameter is 0.14. The marginal effect of age on the

probability of management reporting that it negotiates with union representative over pay

2)( ix is 0.05. This suggests that a unit change in age (a year) would increase theprobability of management responding that it negotiates with union representative on payquestions by 13 units. The total marginal effect of age must be computed by taking intoaccount the contributions both from the coefficients of age and age-square. It is non-linear

andequal to)2)(( 32

Agei

x . For example, it is equal to total 0.02 at age 25.

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with the probability of managers reporting that they negotiated over pay. Thisprobably reflects a continuing association between trade union adhesion andthe core issue of pay. In contrast, the models show no associations betweenmanagement reporting that they negotiated over pay with either external-facing (having a wider position in the union or contact with a full-time officer or

training) or management-facing characteristics (spending over half of workingtime on union duties; trust in management, informal meetings withmanagement and management support for unions).

Worker representative responses

Table 5 also draws upon the worker representative questionnaire to showfactors affecting whether union representatives reported negotiating withmanagement on pay. There were some differences from those based uponmanagement views. Here individual characteristics were less significant,although the probability of male representatives negotiating over pay washigher. Organisational characteristics again did not appear to be associated

with bargaining, but once again membership-facing activity did. Here densitywas positively associated with bargaining on pay, but surprisinglyrepresentatives who had not called a general meeting in the past 12 monthswere more likely to report that they had negotiated over pay. This may reflectthe possibility that union representatives were reporting negotiations atworkplace level, and were more likely to be in the private sector where it maybe harder to hold meetings with members than in the public sector.

In contrast to the management questionnaire results, external-facingcharacteristics did affect the probability that union representatives claimedthey negotiated over pay. This increased where they had received training in

the past 12 months and where they held an official position in the union. Interms of management-facing characteristics, representatives spending morethan half their working time on union duties were also more likely to reportengaging in pay bargaining. The probability of bargaining, however,decreased where union representatives had regular informal meetings withmanagement this is in line with the results of Table 1, where non-unionrepresentatives (who were less likely to see their role as negotiating) weremore likely than union representatives to meet with management outsideformal meetings.

Hours

Management responsesTurning to negotiations over hours, Table 3 shows that once again wheremanagers reported negotiating with the union individual characteristics weresignificant. Unlike discussions over pay, organisational characteristics are alsoimportant: managers were significantly less likely to report negotiations overhours in the private sector and in larger workplaces.

A number of membership-facing characteristics also affected the probabilitiesof management reporting negotiations on hours. Where union representativeshad not held a meeting with their members in the previous 12 monthsmanagers were significantly less likely to report that they negotiated on hours

and - as with pay negotiations - the probability increased where

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representatives reported that they had recruited new members in theworkplace. In this case, however, union density was not significant.

Variations in external-facing characteristics, such as training or contact withfull-time officers or holding a wider position in the union, made no difference tothe probabilities of managers reporting that they negotiated over hours. Onemanagement-facing characteristic was important the probability ofnegotiating on hours decreased if representatives perceived that managementwas in favour of union membership. However, the interaction of managementbeing in favour of union membership and the private sector, significantlyincreased negotiation over hours, suggesting that it is in the private, ratherthan the public sector where management orientation to unions is important.

Worker representative responses

Table 3 also shows factors affecting whether union representatives reportednegotiating with management on hours. In terms of individual characteristicsthe probability of such negotiations increased if the union representative wasmale and with age. Organisational characteristics, such as size and sectorwere not significant. Membership-facing activity was influential; there was apositive relationship between negotiating on hours and union density, but alsothe representatives recruitment activity. In terms of external-facing activity, inthe case of hours, it was regular contact with a full-time union officer that wassignificant. Two management-facing characteristics were important, firstlywhether management was believed to support union membership andsecondly the probability of union representatives reporting that theynegotiated over hours increased if they were male and spent more than halftheir working hours on union duties, this latter effect probably reflecting the

industrial sectors in which union representatives tend to be based.Holidays

Management responses

Table 3 shows that the individual characteristics of representatives were alsoimportant where management reported that they negotiated over holidays,with the probability of negotiation increasing with age and experience and formale representatives. As with pay, no organisational characteristics wereimportant. In terms of membership-facing activity union density is positivelyrelated to negotiations over holidays, but as with hours, union representativeswho had not held a meeting with their members in the previous 12 months

appeared to be significantly less likely to negotiate with management onholidays. External-facing characteristics appeared to make no difference tomanagement reporting that they negotiated over holidays. In terms ofmanagement-facing factors, the probability of negotiating was reduced whenrepresentatives spent more than half of their working hours on union duties,perhaps reflecting the fact that where holiday entitlements are set at a higherlevel they are only consulted upon at workplace level. A greater frequency ofinformal meetings with management also had a negative impact onnegotiating over holidays. This suggests that informal arrangements could beused to substitute for formal negotiations on issues where broad guidelinesare generally laid down at national or local labour market level.

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Worker representative responses

When union representatives were asked whether they negotiated withmanagement on holidays the outcomes were different (Table 3). Theprobability of negotiation increased with age, but other individualcharacteristics were not significant. One organisational characteristic wasimportant; the higher the proportion of women in the workforce the less likelyunion representatives were to negotiate on holidays again this may reflectthe fact that women were more likely to work in the public sector whereholidays are largely covered by national agreements. Only one membership-facing characteristic showed significance where representatives were lesslikely to hold meetings they were less likely to negotiate holidays. Theprobability of representatives negotiating increased where they had regularcontact with a full-time officer. The predicted variable reflecting whererepresentatives spent over half their time on union duties was negativelyassociated with bargaining on holidays, but regular, informal meetings with

management increased the probability. These rather contradictory findings onholidays may reflect the fact that for the public sector holidays are set bynational agreement and in the private sector often reflect statutory minimums the scope for negotiation with workplace representatives may be somewhatlimited.

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Table 3. Factors affecting negotiation over pay, hours and hol

With Union Representatives

(based on Management Questionnaire)

With Union

(based on Worker Re

Variables

Pay Hours Holidays Pay ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameEstimate

Constant -5.940

(1.28)-2.14 -2.820

(1.00)-1.11

Individual ch aracteristicsAge 0.140

(0.05)0.05 0.088

(0.04)0.03 0.121

(0.04)0.05 -0.131

(0.05)Age Square -0.180

(0.05)-0.06 -0.112

(0.05)-0.04 -0.150

(0.05)-0.06 0.123

(0.06)Male 0.910

(0.15)0.33 0.670

(0.12)0.26 0.520

(0.14)0.20

Experience 0.031(0.01)

0.01 0.040(0.01)

0.02 0.010(0.002)

0.02

Organisational characteristicsPrivate sector -0.900

(0.22)-0.34 S S

Proportion ofwomen

S S S

Pay increasesset atorganisationallevel

S S S S S

Logarithm ofsize

-0.123

(0.05)-0.05 S

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Table 3. Factors affecting negotiation over pay, hours and holidays (

With Union Representatives(based on Management Questionnaire)

With U(based on Worke

Variables

Pay Hours Holidays Pay ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParaEstim

Membership-facing characteristicsRep is elected 0.567

(0.31)0.21 S S S

No meeting inlast 12 months

-0.302

(0.13)-0.11 -0.264

(0.12)-0.10 0.227

(0.12)0.09

Meeting oncein last 12months

0 0 0 0

Meeting in last6 months

0 0 0 0

Tried to recruit 0.451

(0.16)0.17 0.421

(0.14)0.16 S S 0

(0Trade uniondensity

4.090

(0.13)1.47 0.641

(0.23)0.25 0.720

(0.23)0.29 0

(0Outward-facing characteristicsPosition inunion

S 0.283

(0.13)0.11

Contact withunion officer

S S S S 0.(0

Training S S 0.321

(0.12)0.13

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Summary

The results on bargaining outcomes vary according to the issue involved, butthere are also differences according to whether management or unionrepresentatives report on bargaining. According to management the individualcharacteristics of the representatives the age, gender and experience -increase the probability of bargaining over pay, hours and holidays. Accordingto union representatives, gender remains important, but age is significant onlywith respect to hours and holidays. The influence of organisationalcharacteristics is surprisingly limited; based upon management reports theseare only influential on hours; based upon the union representative reports,only one organisational characteristic is significant on holidays. It is possiblethat since the sample of workplaces upon which the models are based isconfined to those workplaces where there are union representatives,individual and organisational characteristics are closely related and individualcharacteristics may reflect organisational characteristics such as sector

(particularly with regard to gender).The variation in the results for the management and worker RepresentativeQuestionnaires may reflect differences in the question asked. Managers areasked whether they normally negotiate, consult, inform or not inform unions(not the union representative) over pay, hours and holidays their responsesmay reflect negotiation with unions at a higher organisational level or sector ornational level. On the other hand union representatives are asked ifmanagement normally negotiates, consults or informs union representatives responses are much more likely to reflect practice at the workplace. Thereports of bargaining by the union representative are thus more reflective ofbargaining in the workplace and the models showed that it was here that

union activity and activism become important, particularly on pay and hours,where recruitment activity and union density were significant. For bargainingover pay, external-facing characteristics such as training and holding anofficial position in the union were positively related to negotiations; over hoursand holidays, contact with a full-time officer was significant. Managementsupport also affected bargaining over pay and hours, particularly whererepresentatives spent over half their working hours on union duties. Wherebargaining was at workplace level, the activity of representatives, the supportthat they received from their union and management support for suchrepresentation appeared to play a role.

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4

Disciplinary actionIt has been suggested that industrial relations is increasingly defined in termsof individual rather than collective outcomes and thus this research has usedmeasures of individual as well as collective workplace representation. EarlierChapters noted the impact of union representation upon the incidence ofserious disciplinary sanctions; this Chapter further explores which specificcharacteristics of union representation are significant. Table 4 presents thefactors affecting the six measures of disciplinary action used in WERS 2004as reported by managers.8

In terms of the individual characteristics of union representatives, age wasassociated with the two most serious sanctions, suspension and dismissal.Thus the probability of these two sanctions having been applied to employeeswithin the previous 12 months was significantly reduced the older a unionrepresentative was. This association between older representatives andreduced penalties may be interpreted as a reflection on their negotiating skillsor the relationships they have with managers. In terms of organisationalcharacteristics, with two exceptions (internal transfer, and surprisinglysuspensions), sanctions were significantly less likely in workplaces with higherproportions of women. Workplace size was negatively associated with the

probability of dismissals and positively associated with the probability ofsuspensions. Verbal and written warnings appeared to be more likely in theprivate sector. These relationships between organisational characteristics andthe incidence of sanctions might be stronger if the sample had included allworkplaces and not just those with union representatives.

In terms of membership-facing activity, as with other studies (Knight andLatreille, 2000), the models demonstrate the significance of union density forserious disciplinary sanctions there was a significant negative relationshipbetween the incidence of suspensions and dismissals and union density, butunion density was less important for lesser sanctions. This suggests thatstrong union presence has a restraining effect on management. There were

significant relationships between dismissals and suspensions and a secondindicator of representative activity, union recruitment. Here where a unionrepresentative had attempted to recruit members in the previous 12 monthsthere were more likely to have been dismissals, but less likely to have beensuspensions. Where union representatives were elected, there aresignificantly more likely to have been suspensions, but this did not hold forany other sanctions.

8The WERS 2004 results are extraordinarily rich but also highly complex to analyse on this

issue of disciplinary sanctions. After considerable experimentation it was decided to reportwhether or not a particular sanction was used in the last year (Table 6).

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In relation to external-facing activity, there was a significant and positiveassociation between union representatives holding an official position in theunion and three sanctions (dismissal, internal transfers and deductions frompay). Internal transfers were negatively associated with representatives whohad been in regular contact with a full-time official (at least once every three

months), but positively for the more serious sanction of dismissal. Thissuggests the involvement of full-time union officers when sanctions becomemore serious. The receipt of training over the previous 12 months had asignificant positive relationship with verbal warnings and a negative impact ondismissals.

In terms of management-facing characteristics, whether a representativespent more than half of their working hours on union duties had a positive andsignificant association with two sanctions, internal transfer and verbalwarnings. Whether or not a representative met informally on a regular basiswith management was associated with the incidence of four sanctions; it was

positively related to internal transfers, written warnings and suspensions, butnegatively with dismissals. It may be that problem-resolution and informalrepresentative-management meetings are mutually sustaining, until sanctionsbecome serious, and then formal meetings become appropriate. Whethermanagement is believed to be in favour of union membership was positivelyassociated with the incidence of verbal and written warnings and suspensions.This suggests that relationships between management and unions play a rolein disciplinary sanctions and may reflect the existence of procedures in theworkplace.

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Table 4. Factors affecting disciplinary sanctions

Variables

Verbal Warning Written Warning Internal Transfer Deduction from pay SuParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameEstimate

Constant -9.673

(4.41)-0.38 -4.052

(1.77)Individual ch aracteristicsAge 0.180

(0.06)-0.01 -0.131

(0.05)Age Square 0.191

(0.07)0.01 0.123

(0.06)Male -0.511

(0.20)-0.04

Seniority

Organisational characteristicsPrivate sector 5.045

(2.52)0.98 1.660

(0.26)0.59

Proportion ofwomen

-1.310

(0.21)-0.51 -1.370

(0.24)-0.52 -1.230

(0.39)-0.05

Logarithm ofsize

0.450

(0.09)0.03 10.150

(0.99)

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Table 4. Factors affecting disciplinary sanctions (continued

Variables

Verbal Warning Written Warning Internal Transfer Deduction from pay SuParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameEstimate

Membership-facing characteristicsRep iselected

0.421

(0.15)No meeting inlast 12 months

0.258

(0.15)0.96

Meeting oncein last 12months

0

Meeting in last6 months

0

Tried to recruit -2.310(0.34)

Trade uniondensity

0.824

(0.40)0.05 -68.28

(6.97)Outward-facing characteristicsPosition inunion

0.650

(0.20)0.06 0.474

(0.22)0.02

Contact withunion officer

-0.552

(0.23)-0.03

Training 0.314

(0.15)0.12

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Table 4. Factors affecting disciplinary sanctions (continued

Variables

Verbal Warning Written Warning Internal Transfer Deduction from pay SuParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameEstimate

Management-facing characteristicsRep is full-time

0.841

(0.31)0.32 1.150

(0.36)0.16

Informalmeetings withmanagement

0.990

(0.14)0.36 0.910

(0.24)0.06 0.570

(0.14)

Trust inmanagement

-0.501

(0.19)-0.04

Management is in

favour totrade union

1.120

(0.20)0.39 0.860

(0.20)0.30 6.910

(0.74)

Managementis not in favourto trade union

0 0

Managementis neutral totrade union

0 0

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Table 4. Factors affecting disciplinary sanctions (continued

Variables

Verbal Warning Written Warning Internal Transfer Deduction from pay SuParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameterEstimates

MarginalEffects

ParameEstimate

Interaction effectsMale * Fulltimerepresentative

-1.650

(0.49)-0.04

Private sector* Managementis in favour ofunions

-1.600

(0.27)-0.49 -1.350

(0.29)-0.41

Private sector* Management

is not in favourof unions

0 0

Private sector* Managementis neutral tounions

0 0

Number ofobservations

587 578 596 668 671

Number ofones

420 417 133 68 373

Log Likelihood -316.22 -284.51 -126.28 -86.61 -251.18Chi-square 168.85 210.60 120.48 31.68 232.77

Source: 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey. Base: All workplaces with 10 or more employees. Figures are weighted and based on responses from worker representa

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Summary

The results suggest that the most important factor influencing disciplinaryaction is workforce composition (proportion of female employees), but alsoreinforce previous findings about the important association between uniondensity and fewer serious sanctions. Here, it is not just the presence of aunion representative that is important, but also the strength of membership inthe establishment. There also appears to be a relationship betweendisciplinary sanctions and the institutionalisation of union-managementrelationships, including support for union representation. This may reflect anincreased likelihood of procedural mechanisms for dealing with discipline inworkplaces with positive management-union relationships, which could havethe effect of increasing sanctions short of dismissal.

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union representatives describe their engagement over certain issues asnegotiation varies according to the issue involved. Union representativesperceptions of bargaining provided a better reflection of workplace practicethan those of management, because management perceptions may havereflected bargaining at national or sector levels. Where union representatives

described their engagement with management as negotiation, the analysissuggests that, particularly over pay setting, indicators of union representativeactivity and activism, namely holding a position in the union, training and thetime spent on union duties, become significant.

In terms of individual representation, the analysis explored the relationshipbetween the incidence of disciplinary sanctions and the characteristics ofunion representatives. Here, one organisational characteristic, the proportionof women in the workforce, was consistently associated with the application offewer disciplinary sanctions. However, the findings also pointed to thesignificance of union density in restraining management prerogative and

reducing the incidence of more serious sanctions such as dismissals andsuspensions. This variable was also positively associated with a number ofbargaining outcomes. Union density has been defined in the models as amembership-facing characteristic, since it reflects the activity of the unionrepresentative in the workplace, particularly around recruitment. However, inaddition it reflects organisational factors, such as size and sector, but alsomanagement characteristics, including the attitude of management towardsunion membership and the support that management provides for unions inthe workplace. The importance of union density underlines that it may not bepossible to mechanically isolate the individual characteristics of unionrepresentatives and to measure their influence. This analysis, using the

WERS 2004 dataset, has illuminated the complexity of relationships betweenunion representatives and management. It underlines that industrial relationsoutcomes reflect dynamic relationships within the workplace, themselvesunderpinned by wider social and economic forces; it is the interaction of unionrepresentatives with managers within this context that is important.

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Rivers, D. and Vuong, Q. (1988): "Limited Information Estimators andExogeneity Tests for Simultaneous Probit Models, Journal of Econometrics39: 347-366.

Terry, M. (1995): Employee Representation: Shop Stewards and the New

Legal Framework in Edwards, P (ed) Industrial Relations Theory & Practice,2nd edn, Oxford: Blackwell.

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Terry, M. (1999): 'Systems of collective employee representation in non-unionfirms in the UK', Industrial Relations Journal, 30 (1) 16-30.

Upchurch, M., Danford, A. and Richardson, M. (2002): 'Research Note:Profiles of union workplace representatives: evidence from three unions insouth-west England', Industrial Relations Journal, 33 (2) 127-140.

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Technical appendixThe Data

The research is based upon the 2004 Workplace Employment RelationsSurvey (WERS); a nationally representative sample of GB workplacessponsored by Acas, the Economic and Social Research Council, theDepartment for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform and the PolicyStudies Institute. The analysis is derived from a merged database created bymatching responses from the management questionnaire to those from theworker representative questionnaire. The WERS Technical Report states thatin total, 1,203 eligible employee representatives were identified from theinterviews with management representatives. They were based at 1,072establishments and in the end interviews were achieved with 984 of the

eligible employee representatives, giving a response rate of 82 per cent. Ofthe 984 productive employee representative interviews, 735 were conductedwith union representatives, and the remaining 249 with non-union employeerepresentatives. The response rate among union employee representativeswas 83 percent, and among non-union representatives 77 per cent. In 89cases there were two employee representative interviews (for both union andnon-union representatives) for one workplace. The employee representativedatabase thus comprises 984 cases with 525 separate variables.

The management data set originally comprised 2,295 observations fromdifferent workplaces. Those with some form of employee representation

comprised 1,433 observations (62 per cent of the sample) with 1,452variables9. In just over one in five (22 per cent) of these workplaces there wasno employee representative in place; in over half (52 per cent) there wasunion representation only; in 14 per cent there was non-union representationonly, and in 12 per cent there was both union and non-union representation.

Merging these databases leaves 984 cases and 1,976 variables from the twoquestionnaires administered in the survey. Twenty of these cases involvedworkplaces with fewer than 10 workers that were outside the scope of WERS2004. By excluding them the merged dataset was left with 964 cases. Theanalysis here uses these 964 observations and 15 dependent and 21independent variables. The full list of these, their definitions, mean values and

standard deviations, are shown in Appendix 1.

9These were workplaces where there are unions with members at the workplace

(eunionum>0); or workplaces where there are no union members, but at least one recognisedunion (eothnum>0); or where, apart from union representatives, there are employees who actas representatives of other employees in dealing with management (eothreps=1).

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Table 5. Chi-two test results for homogeneity of union and non-union representatives populations with respect to categories of

representative characteristics

Union reps

(numbers)

Non-Unionreps(numbers)

Test Results

Individual and OrganisationalcharacteristicsMale 405 98Private sector 268 202Proportion of women 407 126Pay increases set at organisational level 398 214

Chi-two(3):81.27Prob:

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Table 6. Chi-two test results for homogeneity of union and non-union representative populations with respect to industrial

relations outcomesUnion reps

(numbers)

Non-Union

reps(numbers)

Test Results

Management negotiates onPay 468 12Hours 411 31Holidays 403 12

Chi-two(2):14.16Prob:

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122111 uyy ++= z

where y1 is the dependent variable, y2 is the potentially continuous

endogenous explanatory variable, and 1z is a 11xL (including a constant),

1 is 11xL and 1u is the unobserved disturbance. The set of all exogenous

variables is denoted by the xL1 vector z , where 1z is the strict subset of .z

The maintained exogeneity assumption is

.0)( 1 =uE z

It is also assumed that the main equation is identified when ,0)( 12 uyE which

requires that z have at least one element not in 1z (the order condition); the

rank condition is that at least one element of z not in 1z is partially

correlated with 2y (after netting out 1z ). Under these assumptions, the null

hypothesis that 2y is actually exogenous is tested.

The Hausman test for endogeneity is based on comparison the OLS and

2SLS estimators of beta parameters, ify2 is uncorrelated with u1 , the OLSand 2SLS estimators should differ only by sampling error. To derive theregression based-test it is stated that:

222 vy +=z

where ,0)( 2 =vE z 2 is 1Lx . Since u1 is uncorrelated with 1z , it follows

that y2 is endogenous if only if .0),( 21 vuE

errorvyy +++= 2122111 z

The null hypothesis is .0:0 =H

The usual t statistic for is a valid test of endogeneity. Thus y2 is

exogenous only if .0=

The tests suggest that workplace size is endogenous for some dependentvariables. Training is an endogenous variable at least in terms of negotiationon pay and cannot therefore be used in the model of whether managementreported negotiating. Training may be both a function of management support

for representatives and a reflection of the initiative or commitment of individualrepresentatives and/or (for union representatives) union support. Equally,both union density and whether a representative is elected may reflect theirindividual preferences, but can also reflect the structure and history ofrepresentation within the workplace, the democratic legitimacy of therepresentative body, or membership strength or weakness. Contacts with full-time officers can suggest union availability as well as the initiative and activityof the representative. Similarly, whether or not a representative spends morethan half his or her working hours on union duties will be an outcome ofmanagement support, as well as (in the case of a union) the extent of unionmembership and strength. Finally, informal meetings with management and

perceptions of trust in management may also reflect a range of factors, bothindividual and institutional.

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Table 7. Significant t-test results of Correlation

Coefficients in Bivariate Probit models bargainingModels for Negotiation

With Union Representatives Management RepresentativeQuestionnaire

With Union Representatives Worker RepresentativeQuestionnaire

Variables

Pay Hours Holidays Pay Hours HolidaysLogarithm ofestablishmentsize *

-0.800

(0.20)0.1310

(0. 80)-0.720

(0.21)

Representativeis elected

-0.980

(0.02)-0.980

(0.02)-0.990

(0.01)-0.990

(0.06)0.830

(0.01)Union density 0. 955

(0.14)0. 359(0.21)

Contact withunion officer

-0.840

(0.11)-0.850

(0.11)Training -0.443

(0.21)-0.950

(0.06)-0.482

(0.20)Representativespends at leasthalf of workinghours onrepresentativeduties

-0.810

(0.14)-0.850

(0.12)-0.435

(0.22)-0.980

(0.03)

Informalmeeting withmanagement

0.690

(0.23)0.641

(0.26)-0.790

(0.17)-0.970

(0.04)-0.553

(0.26)

Representativebelieves that

managementcan be reliedupon to live upto itscommitments

0.840

(0.12)-0.830

(0.12)-0.800

(0.14)-0.750

(0.19)-0.960

(0.06)0.651

(0.24)

Source: 2004 Workplace Employment Relations Survey. Base: All workplaces with 10 or more employees.Figures are weighted and based on responses from worker representatives and managers.

* The endogeneity test is different here since log(size) is not a categorical variable.

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