Figure One. Small Wars and the Theory of GamesOpen, Living Conflict EcoSystem

Dove Hawk Retailator

Dove 35,35 0, 100 35,35

Hawk 100, 0 -25,-25 -25,-25

Retailator 35,35 -25,-25 35,35

100

100

-25

-25 State

Counter-State

(0, 100)

(100, 0)

(-25,-25)

Figure Two. Evolutionary Stable System- Small WarsAdapted Version of Maynard Smith’s ESS

100

100

-25

-25 State

Counter-State

(0, 100)

(100, 0)

(-25,-25)

Dove Hawk Retailator

Dove 35,35 0, 100 35,35

Hawk 100, 0 -25,-25 -25,-25

Retailator 35,35 -25,-25 35,35

100

100

-25

-25

Figure Three. External Nash Intervention Towards Negotiated Fair Settlement

State

Counter-State

(0, 100)

(100, 0)

(-25,-25)

(50, 50)

100

100

-25

-25

Figure Four. Evolutionary Stable System- Small Wars:When Intervention and Reconciliation cannot be reached,

The violence descends into a lose-lose

State

Counter-State

(0, 100)

(100, 0)

(-25,-25)

100

100

-25

-25

Figure Five. Changing The Rules of the GameWarden’s Third Ring: Structure Change (Construction, Reconstruction, or Deconstruction of State)

Host Nation

Insurgency

(0, 100)

(100, 0)

(-25,-25)