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Fighting Juvenile Transfers: From Legal Challenges to Mitigation Presentation Additional Materials Slide Presentation 2 JDA Law Primer for ACLU 28 Motion to Dismiss and Suppress Evidence 33

Fighting Juvenile Transfers: From Legal Challenges to ...federaldefendersny.org/pdfs/2017.09.27 CLE Additional Materials.pdfNeed for Acceptance Need of belonging –good, bad, or ugly

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Fighting Juvenile Transfers:

From Legal Challenges to Mitigation Presentation

Additional Materials

Slide Presentation 2

JDA Law Primer for ACLU 28

Motion to Dismiss and Suppress Evidence 33

Fighting Juvenile Transfers:

From Legal Challenges to Mitigation

Wednesday, September 27, 2017

U.S. Courthouse

Brooklyn, New York

Betsy A. Biben, ACSW, LICSW

Chief, Office of Rehabilitation & Development

Public Defender Service for D.C.

[email protected]

(202) 824-2328

Gangs Yesterday and Today

Gangs of the 1920’s

1920 Gang Violence

NEVER disclose gang membership

or even association

The Legal Team should advise their clients to NEVER

disclose gang membership or even association (not

a gang member, but on the periphery, or a

“prospect”) to anyone, not even people at school,

non-profits, etc.

How deeply involved in a gang is your client

Where does client live? If client doesn’t live at home with family (at all) then most likely they are living somewhere facilitated by the gang. What does client do with his time? If client isn’t at school or at work, or both, chances are he is spending time with the gang. Who does client perceive as the authority in his life? When bad things happen - to client and their loved ones – if he do not trust law enforcement or other adult authority figures - chances are he is go to the gang to get help with retribution -- that’s how kids think.

Identity Development and Social

DevelopmentNeed for Acceptance

Egocentricity

Relationships with Authority figures

Need for Acceptance

Need of belonging – good, bad, or ugly

MS 13 often did not grow up with their parents

Doesn’t mean you can reject their family, even if they

do

Trying on new roles to figure out who they are &their

next steps will determine years of their lives

The way you ask questions – patiently, without

intensity, open-ended will determine your relationship

Egocentricity

Adults don’t understand me so,

I’m not listening

Until they can trust you, they aren’t hearing a word

you’re saying

But, they are watching you like a hawk to see what

you are really saying with our body language

Relationships with Authority Figures

Adults are overwhelming to young – we talk too

much & listen too infrequently

We boss them around

We don’t trust them so they don’t trust us

Direct eye contact culturally uncomfortable – best

not to use it until he’s ready and don’t push him

Best to visit solo, at least at first & tell youth

when/why you are coming in pairs

Cognitive Development

Cognitive Development

Keep questions simple with one thought per sentence

LISTEN, STOP TALKING and LISTEN – it will save you time

Use names & places to keep your sentences clear and simple

Using negatives statements makes kids think you are trying to get them to answer your way --- a successful police tactic

Only way to go home is say what they want

They believe they can always take back what they say

They can’t see magnitude of situation

Remember, they really do get confused easily and are easily lead

Adolescents are Fairness Fanatics

As part of their identify development they are intolerant of anything that seems unfair or arbitrary

Don’t be fooled or misinterpret their need for fairness as uncooperative or defiant

You will close them down if you try to rush though your agenda let alone talk about their personal information in front of others – think cell block

“It shouldn’t be like that” - court process is unfair, lack of faith and trust in defender

Procedural Justice - people care more about how they are treated than about actual legal outcomes. By explaining statutes and court

Suggestibility

They want to please adults and will leave parts of events out

if they think you will be disappointed

And the police say they can go home

Believe they can always take back what I said

Can’t see magnitude of situation

They are likely to leave out feelings of what lead up to the

event

You need to reassure him that you will not be disappointed in

him, you are his ADVOCATE

Graham & Lowry, 2004; Spencer et

al., 2006

Violence poses a complex series of threats to

resilience for Black males, including aggression

as an adaptive response to deal with the

victimization, which may lead to arrest and

reinforces negative stereotypes.

Lieber man & Van Horn, 2004

While other children are growing emotionally, the

child coping with trauma is distracted from

normal developmental tasks and is occupied with

sadness and feeling powerless. Trauma causes

disturbances of emotional regulation, social

relationships, and attachment.

Affects of Trauma

Halts development

Stops the ability to think and hear others

Floods the young person with anger & fear

Depression fills waking and sleeping

Depressed children and youth become dependant on others

Aggression is a major sign of trauma – losing ones ability to

use words, express feelings = action. The more

aggressive the deeper the trauma

Don’t make the mistake of only seeing their behaviors

problems

Strategies for Successful

InterviewingInterviewing

Explain who you are and why you're there in a couple different ways

with clear, short sentences then turn to your client and LISTEN

Motivational, strength - based approach to your client. He's the

expert about his life, not you, though expressing himself isn't easy at his

age and w his experience, too much of which could be deep in trauma.

Let him tell his story without interruption. Follow your client's lead.

Keep calm with open body language. Infrequently you can ask for a

rewind if too confused

Be supportive, ask open ended ?s and stay positive comments.

”Why” is judging your client. Take that word out of your vocabulary.

Clarify points you may have missed or misinterpreted.

Client Connections

Finding and Reaching Out to Client

Connections

Family – here & outside country

Gang Liaison/Outreach

Counselor

Community/Agency Social

Workers

School staff

Correctional Officers

Articles from home land, risks of

migration, his/her stories

Decree 717 was created in response to

Trump's statements about deporting alleged gang members en masse – mass incarceration upon return creates a deportation-to-prison pipeline.

Last week - House passes Comstock bill targeting immigrant members of MS-13 gang

Devastating Immigration Bills in US

and Abroad

Our Careers Demand More of Us

Judges expect more from us now –

complex cases

Fortunately, they are allowing you to

hire mitigation experts: Wiggins, ABA

Capital Cases Miller, Graham, ABA local

laws

Mitigation Experts are an integral part of

your Team. They been training on

working with gangs, the poorest of the

poor, the most disenfranchised, the

persons with mental illnesses

It’s Our Life’s Work – contact LAS,

NLADA, or me – others here this

evening?

Books/articles & leading expert:

Leading Expert of Latin Kings - David Brotherton, Professor John Jay

[email protected] 212-237-8694 (12 books, volumes of articles)

Reymundo Sanchez – My Bloody Life: The Making of a Latin King

- Once a King, Always a King

Luis Rodriguez - Always Running : La Vida Loca: Gang Days in L.A

Piri Thomas – Down These Mean Streets (old book, good for history)

Latin Kings the NY Times has a series of articles

https://www.nytimes.com/topic/organization/latin-kings

A radical approach to the problem of gang violence. ... a professor in the

anthropology department at John Jay College of Criminal Justice .... and

criminal-justice experts

https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/06/22/dont-shoot-2

http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/magazine/what-does-it-take-to-stop-

crips-and-bloods-from-killing-each-other.html

https://global.oup.com/ushe/product/gangsters-without-borders-

9780199859061?cc=us&lang=en& An Ethnography of a Salvadoran Street

Gang (chart inside that depicts a typical day in the life of a gang member)

General Standards

The Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), 18. U.S.C. § 5033, provides that

“[w]henever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of juvenile

delinquency, the arresting officer shall immediately advise such juvenile of his

legal rights, in language comprehensive to a juvenile[.]” The statute further

requires the arresting officer to “immediately notify the Attorney General and the

juvenile’s parents, guardian, or custodian of such custody.” Id. Further, “[t]he

arresting officer shall also notify the parents, guardian, or custodian of the rights of

the juvenile and of the nature of the alleged offense.” Id. When a juvenile asserts

that his rights under the JDA were violated, the court must determine: 1) whether

the JDA was violated; 2) whether the juvenile’s Due Process rights were violated;

and 3) if the violation did not run afoul of Due Process, whether the violation was

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Doe, 862 F.2d 776, 779 (9th

Cir. 1988). The Government has the burden of showing that it complied with the

JDA. Id. The determination of voluntariness of a confession and legal issues under

the JDA are reviewed de novo. Micky v. Ayer, 606 F.3d 1223, 1233 (9th Cir. 2010)

(voluntariness reviewed de novo); United States v. Jose D.L., 453 F.3d 1115, 1120

(9th Cir. 2006). Purely factual determinations are reviewed for clear error. Id.

These protections apply to a juvenile even if he or she misrepresents that he or she

is an adult. United States v. Juvenile Male, 595 F.3d 885 (9th Cir. 2010).

Notification of Rights - Juvenile

Claims regarding whether the juvenile has been advised of his rights

immediately turn on the legal interpretation of “immediate,” and therefore de novo

review is appropriate. United States v. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 802 n.6 (9th Cir.

1999).The Ninth Circuit held in D.L.that immediate means “as soon as

practicable.” 453F.3d at 1120. In D.L., the agent violated his duty to immediately

notify the juvenile of his rights when he waited over an hour to read a Miranda

warning to the juvenile. Id. at 1121. In United States v. Juvenile (RRA-A), 229 F.3d

737, 744 (9th Cir. 2000), the Ninth Circuit found a delay of four hours not to be

immediate. Similarly, in United States v. Doe III, 219 F.3d 1009, 1014 (9th Cir.

2000) (Doe 2000), the Court found a delay of over three hours not to be immediate.

Notification of Rights - Parental/Consular

“Whether a juvenile’s parents have been properly notified pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 5033 is a predominately factual question that is reviewed for clear error.”

D.L., 453 F.3d at 1120 (citing United States v. Juvenile (RRA-A), 229 F.3d 737,

742 (9th Cir. 2000)). Whether the notification was “immediate” is a legal question

subject to de novo review. Frega, 179 F.3d 793, 802 n.6. In addition to

administering Miranda warnings, the arresting officer must attempt to contact the

juvenile’s parents before questioning begins and must promptly notify the parents

of the child’s rights. 18 U.S.C. § 5033; D.L., 453 F.3d at 1121-22, (citing United

States v. Doe, 170 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1997) (Doe 1999)). “Congress

enacted the JDA to protect the rights of juveniles: to ensure that juveniles can

consult with their parents before being interrogated so that they do not “ ‘become

the victim[s] of fear, then of panic.’ ” D.L., 453 F.3d at 1125 (citing Doe 1999, 170

F.3d at 1167) (citations omitted in D.L.). This Court has “noted that, particularly in

the case of foreign juveniles, ‘the potential discombobulation may be even more

resonant due to language differences and an exacerbated sense of isolation and

helplessness.’” Id.

The requirement of parental notification is so stringent that it may not be

delegated to a “subsequent official who might handle the judicial phases of the

matter[.]” Doe 1999, 170 F.3d at 1167; accord RRA-A, 229 F.3d at 745 (JDA

violated when arresting officer “double delegat[ed]” his duty to notify the

juvenile’s parents); compare Doe 1988, 862 F.2d 776, 779-80 (allowing the

juvenile to attempt to call his own parents did not relieve the Government of its

responsibility to make notification under the statute). “Juveniles cannot . . . waive

their right to parental notification even if they hinder notification.” RRA-A, 229

F.3d 737, 745-46 (citing United States v. L.M.K., 149 F.3d 1033, 1035

(9th Cir. 1998)).

In the event that the juvenile’s parents cannot be reached, the arresting

officer must promptly contact the consulate for the juvenile’s country of origin. Id.

(Consular notification “provid[es] an in-country mechanism for locating the

parents of alien juveniles” and “permit[s] diplomatic officials to become involved

as surrogates for parents who are not in the country.”). However, this substitution

is only permitted after the arresting officer has made reasonable efforts to contact

the juvenile’s parents. D.L., 453 F.3d at 1123. If the Government fails to observe

all of the aforementioned steps and relies on the juvenile’s statements for so much

as probable cause, the court may dismiss the information filed against the juvenile.

Id. The Government bears the burden of showing that parental or consular

notification was made. Doe 1988,862 F.2d at 780 (Government’s failure to show

that it had made consular notification justified finding that the JDA’s notice

requirement had been violated).

Remedies

In D.L., the Government had violated the JDA in obtaining the juvenile’s

confession, and the trial court suppressed the statements. 453 F.3d at 1126.

However, it did not matter whether the statements had been used in trial, because

the relevant question was whether the Government had relied on the statements to

prosecute the juvenile. Id. This Court, relying on Doe (1988),862 F.2d 776, 779-

80, has “held that a violation of the JDA may not be harmless (a) where the

isolation stemming from a violation of the JDA led a juvenile to confess, and (b)

where criminal proceedings were initiated on the basis of the juvenile’s

confession.” D.L., 453 F.3d at 1126. “If a violation of the JDA was prejudicial

because it led the Government to initiate prosecution of the juvenile, the remedy is

for the charges against the juvenile to be dismissed.” Id. United States v. C.M., 485

F.3d. 492 (9th Cir. 2007), a later case, goes further by requiring dismissal if any

constitutional right was violated.

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JON M. SANDS Federal Public Defender TAMARA MULEMBO Assistant Federal Public Defender State Bar No. 024490 407 W. Congress, Suite 501 Tucson, AZ 85701-1355 Telephone: (520)879-7500, Fax: (520)879-7600 Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

United States of America,

Plaintiff,

vs.

,

Defendant.

MOTION TO DISMISS AND SUPPRESS EVIDENCE

Defendant, , through undersigned counsel, respectfully submits the

following Motion to Dismiss and Suppress Evidence for the reasons set forth in the

accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

The juvenile contends that excludable delay will not occur as a result of the filing

of this motion. Section 5036 does not incorporate 18 U.S.C. § 3161 and specifically requires

that juveniles be tried within thirty days of the date of detention. Compare United States v.

Tinklenberg, 131 S.Ct. 2007, 2017 (2011) (absent provision expressly incorporating rules for

time calculation under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court only looks to the

plain language of the statute to calculate excluded time for purpose of Speed Trial Act).

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: June 17, 2016.

JON M. SANDS Federal Public Defender

s/ Tamara Mulembo TAMARA MULEMBO Assistant Federal Public Defender

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Armando Lopez and Brian Smisek to arrive and interrogate him. Neither agent was part of the

group that initially detained and arrested . Officers Perez, Villati, Tran, and Lipke did not

read his Miranda rights. Nor did they call his parents. was not read his Miranda

rights until 1:50 p.m. when HSI agents interrogated him. During the interrogation, was

confronted with photographs from his cell phone. No one had consent to search ’s phone,

and no report disclosed to the defense indicates that any officer so much as sought consent or

obtained a warrant for the search.

had no opportunity to privately confer with his parents before submitting to an

interrogation. His parents were not contacted until after his interrogation. When his parents

were contacted, no one explained ’s Miranda rights to them. ’s statements from the

interrogation were used in the affidavit supporting probable cause. He was charged with

Exportation of Munitions in violation of 22 U.S.C. § 2778(b)(2) and (c), Title 22 CFR §§

121.1, 123.1 and 127.1

Law and Argument:

I. ’S STATEMENT WAS OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE FEDERAL JUVENILE DELINQUENCY ACT.

The Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), 18. U.S.C. § 5033, provides that “[w]henever a

juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency, the arresting officer

shall immediately advise such juvenile of his legal rights, in language comprehensive to a

juvenile[.]” The statute further requires the arresting officer to “immediately notify the

Attorney General and the juvenile’s parents, guardian, or custodian of such custody.” Id.

Further, “[t]he arresting officer shall also notify the parents, guardian, or custodian of the

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rights of the juvenile and of the nature of the alleged offense.” Id. When a juvenile asserts

that his rights under the JDA were violated, the court must determine: 1) whether the JDA

was violated; 2) whether the juvenile’s Due Process rights were violated; and 3) if the

violation did not run afoul of Due Process, whether the violation was harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt. United States v. Doe, 862 F.2d 776, 779 (9th Cir. 1988) (Doe 1988). The

Government has the burden of showing that it complied with the JDA. Id.

In addition to administering Miranda warnings, the arresting officer must attempt to

contact the juvenile’s parents before questioning begins and must promptly notify the parents

of the child’s rights. 18 U.S.C. § 5033; D.L., 453 F.3d at 1121-22, (citing United States v.

Doe, 170 F.3d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1999) (Doe 1999)). “Congress enacted the JDA to

protect the rights of juveniles: to ensure that juveniles can consult with their parents before

being interrogated so that they do not “ ‘become the victim[s] of fear, then of panic.’ ” D.L.,

453 F.3d at 1125 (citing Doe 1999, 170 F.3d at 1167) (citations omitted in D.L.). This Court

has “noted that, particularly in the case of foreign juveniles, ‘the potential discombobulation

may be even more resonant due to language differences and an exacerbated sense of isolation

and helplessness.’” Id.

The requirement of parental notification is so stringent that it may not be delegated to

a “subsequent official who might handle the judicial phases of the matter[.]” Doe 1999, 170

F.3d at 1167; accord RRA-A, 229 F.3d at 745 (JDA violated when arresting officer “double

delegat[ed]” his duty to notify the juvenile’s parents); compare Doe 1988, 862 F.2d 776, 779-

80 (allowing the juvenile to attempt to call his own parents did not relieve the Government of

its responsibility to make notification under the statute). “Juveniles cannot . . . waive their

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right to parental notification even if they hinder notification.” RRA-A, 229 F.3d 737, 745-46

(citing United States v. L.M.K., 149 F.3d 1033, 1035

(9th Cir. 1998)).

The arresting officers in this case committed numerous JDA violations warranting

dismissal of the Information . First the officers violated the JDA by failing to notify of

his Miranda rights and by delegating the responsibility of informing of his rights.

Second, was to be read his rights immediately pursuant to §5033. Nearly three and a

half hours elapsed before anyone Mirandized him. Third, the arresting officers failed to notify

’s parents of his arrest. Fourth, the arresting officers failed to explain ’s rights to his

parents so that they could assist him in determining whether he should agree to speak with

law enforcement. Fifth, ’s parents were denied the opportunity to privately consult with

to assist him in determining whether to waive his right to remain silent.

II. THE REMEDY FOR VIOLATION ’S RIGHTS UNDER THE JDA IS DISMISSAL OF THE INFORMATION.

In D.L., the Government had violated the JDA in obtaining the juvenile’s confession,

and the trial court suppressed the statements. 453 F.3d at 1126. However, it did not matter

whether the statements had been used in trial, because the relevant question was whether the

Government had relied on the statements to prosecute the juvenile. Id. This Court, relying on

Doe (1988),862 F.2d 776, 779-80, has “held that a violation of the JDA may not be harmless

(a) where the isolation stemming from a violation of the JDA led a juvenile to confess, and

(b) where criminal proceedings were initiated on the basis of the juvenile’s confession.” D.L.,

453 F.3d at 1126. “If a violation of the JDA was prejudicial because it led the Government to

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initiate prosecution of the juvenile, the remedy is for the charges against the juvenile to be

dismissed.” Id., see also United States v. RRA-A, 229 F.3d at 747 (requiring reversal if the

confession resulted in part from isolation from family, friends, an attorney, or representatives

from his or her country). United States v. C.M., 485 F.3d. 492, 503 (9th Cir. 2007), a later

case, goes further by requiring dismissal if any constitutional right was violated.

A. The JDA violations contributed to ’s confession which was used to support filing charges against him. Thus, the Information must be dismissed.

The agents chose not to record the minor’s interrogation in this case. On information and

belief, HSI Agents used the Reid technique on the juvenile in this case. The Reid Technique

presumes the guilt of the suspect. Part of the Reid Technique calls for the isolation of a

detainee to heighten anxiety and distress and wear down their resistance to the interrogation

process. In the instant case, was isolated for nearly three and half hours before his

interrogation began and without the benefit of Miranda warnings or parental intervention or

consultation.

The authors of the Reid technique have cautioned against using this technique with

children as they may lack the capacity to stand up to interrogators. John E. Reid and

Associates warn investigators to:

Exercise extreme caution when interrogating juveniles, suspects with a lower intelligence or suspects with mental impairments. This class of suspect is more susceptible to false confessions and, therefore, the investigator should be cautious in utilizing active persuasion such as discouraging weak denials, overcoming objections or engaging in deceptive practices. Proper corroboration of a confession will be critical with this class of suspect.

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John E. Reid and Associates, Inc., A Quick Guide to Best Practices for the Reid Nine

Steps of Interrogation, (June 17, 2016, 3:05 p.m.), http://www.reid.com/

educational_info/ r_tips.html?serial=20130701

The JDA aims to protect children from becoming the “victim[s] of fear, then panic,”

D.L., 453 F.3d at 1125 (citing Doe 1999, 170 F.3d at 1167). the emotions the Reid Technique

seek to induce. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has recognized that children with language

differences are more susceptible to “ an exacerbated sense of isolation and helplessness.” Id.

was particularly vulnerable as a juvenile who spoke a foreign language and who had

been raised in a foreign country. He confessed after being detained for hours and after an

interrogation of unknown duration as the agents failed to audio or video record the

interrogation or note when it ended in their written notes. Accordingly, the Government’s

violations of the JDA were not harmless.

B. The agents’ violation of ’s Fourth Amendment rights through their warrantless search of his cell phone supports dismissal of the Information.

“Warrantless searches of cell phones are no longer justified by the “search incident to

arrest” exception. Riley v. California, 134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Camou, 773

F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2014). Although the Government may attempt to justify the search under

the “border search” exception, which generally allows for “exhaustive forensic searches” of

electronic devices at the border upon reasonable suspicion, United States v. Cotterman, 709

F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013), after Riley, the “border search” exception may not be extended to

the search of an arrestee’s cell phone seized incident to arrest at the border for the reasons set

forth below.

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The ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness. Riley, 134 S.Ct.

at 2482. “Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of

criminal wrongdoing … reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial

warrant.” Id. In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a

specific exception to the warrant requirement. Id. Because warrantless searches and seizures

are per se unreasonable, the government bears the burden of showing that a warrantless

search or seizure falls within an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.

United States v. Cervantes, 703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012).

In Riley, the Supreme Court held that “the search incident to arrest exception does not

apply to cell phones,” and thus, that “a warrant is generally required … even when a cell

phone is seized incident to arrest.” 134 S.Ct. at 2493-94. Generally, the “search incident”

doctrine allows police to “discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime” for reasons of

evidence preservation or officer safety. Id. at 2482-84. However, in balancing the competing

interests of privacy and law enforcement needs in the context of cell phone searches incident

to arrest, the Court concluded that “[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy

concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse,”

id. at 2488-89, and that “a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far

more than the most exhaustive search of a house.” Id. at 2491 (emphasis in original). Riley

noted that “other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular

phone,” and it discussed the exigency exception, but it made no mention of the “border

search” exception. Id. at 2494.

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The Ninth Circuit has “rejected an ‘anything goes’ approach at the border” and has

held that border searches are a “narrow exception” to the warrant requirement. Cotterman,

709 F.3d at 957 (citing United States v. Seljan, 547 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)).

Under the “border search” exception, the government may conduct “routine” searches of

persons and effects at the border or its functional equivalent upon no suspicion, United States

v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004), and “nonroutine” searches – i.e., highly

intrusive searches, including “exhaustive forensic searches” of electronic devices – upon

reasonable suspicion. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985);

Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 957.

The scope and reach of the “border search” exception is determined by reference to its

historical scope and rationale. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620, 622 (1977)

(examining “the rationale behind the border-search exception” and “historically recognized

scope of the border-search doctrine” to uphold a suspicionless searches of mail at the border).

The rationale is the plenary customs power and the right of the sovereign to protect itself, and

the historical scope is “to identify citizenship, collect payment on dutiable goods, and prevent

the importation of contraband” and disease. 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE §

10.5(a) (5th ed. 2014) (citing Ittig, 40 TENN.L.REV. 329, 331 (1973)); see also Flores-

Montano, 541 U.S. at 152 (plenary authority to protect territorial integrity to prevent “the

entry of unwanted persons and effects”); Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 537 (plenary

authority to police entrants “to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction

of contraband into this country”).

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However, the “border search” exception is a “narrow” one and may not be extended

beyond its historical purposes to a post-arrest, investigatory search of a cell phone seized

incident to an arrest for contraband at the border. The Supreme Court has justified warrantless

border searches precisely because they are based on purposes other than furnishing evidence

against a person. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 616 (differentiating the “long-standing right of the

sovereign to protect itself” and the “plenary customs power” from “the more limited power to

enter and search” places or objects, which generally requires a warrant). The “narrow”

exception thus remains rooted in governmental interests that are entirely distinct from

uncovering additional evidence of guilt to support a prosecution.

In Cotterman, the suspected contraband was the digital data itself. 709 F.3d at 956-57

(child pornography on a laptop). Here, in contrast, at the time of the forensic search, the

contraband had already been seized, had already been arrested, and his cell phone had

already been held as potential evidence. The phone was not contraband or a dutiable article.

The agents simply were not entitled to search his phone. See Camou, 773 F.3d at 937-45

(rejecting the government’s attempt to justify a cell phone search at an interior border patrol

checkpoint under the exigency, vehicle, good faith, search incident, and inevitable discovery

exceptions).

In the modern era, telephonic search warrants are easy to apply for remotely. Missouri

v. McNeely, 133 S.Ct. 1552, 1561-62 (2013). Also, other officers within Homeland Security

are now asking arrestees to sign forms giving consent to phone searches in nearly identical

cases in Nogales. Neither occurred here.

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Here, when the viewed objectively, the search of the arrestee’s phone was a “search

incident to arrest” – prohibited for cell phones – rather than a “border search,” as that

“narrow” exception has been defined and justified. Therefore, because the cell phone data

was obtained with a warrant or consent, and because no exception to warrant requirement

applies, it must be suppressed.

However, suppression alone is an insufficient remedy in this case. Here, the

Government violated a child’s Fourth Amendment rights and used the fruits of that violation

used to obtain a confession. The agents further sought to turn the minor into a confidential

source, all without the benefit of his parents’ intervention. ’s statement was used to file

charges against him and actually did cause him to lose his liberty for a time while this case

was pending. As the Ninth Circuit has stated in C.M., “[w]here the Government's violations

deprive the juvenile of his or her constitutional rights, reversal is required.” 485 F.3d at 499.

Dismissal is more than justified here.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED: June 17, 2016.

JON M. SANDS Federal Public Defender

s/ Tamara Mulembo TAMARA MULEMBO Assistant Federal Public Defender

I hereby certify that on June 17, 2016, I electronically transmitted the attached document to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF System for filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic filing to the following CM/ECF registrants: Jesse Figueroa, Assistant U.S. Attorney