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May 25, 2010
Introduction to Public Private Partnerships
2
Table of Contents
SECTION 1 Introduction to UBS 2
SECTION 2 Addressing the Infrastructure Problem 5
SECTION 3 Overview of Public-Private Partnerships 10
SECTION 4 PFI/PPP in the UK 28
SECTION 5 Implementing PPP in Florida 32
SECTION 6 Case Studies 37
APPENDIX A Pending US PPP 43
APPENDIX B Biographies 45
SECTION 1
Introduction to UBS
4
UBS Infrastructure Advisory Group— Broad-based Global Experience
Advisory
Advisory
2006-2008
Financial advisor to the State of New Jersey with regard to potential PPP initiatives
2007-2009
Financial advisor to the State of Illinois for its proposed long-term lease of the Illinois lottery
2007-2009
Financial advisor to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico with regard to concession of the parking facility at LMM Airport
2008
Financial advisor to Abertis, Citi Infrastructure Investors and Criteria CaixaCorp on its $12.8bn winning bid for the long-term lease of the Pennsylvania Turnpike
2006
Sole financial advisor to Orient Overseas (International) Limited on its US$2.4 billion divestiture of four North American container terminals to Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan
2006
Exclusive financial advisor to RREEF on its acquisition of a 49.9% stake in Peel Ports valuing Peel Ports at approximately £1.6 billion
2006Joint financial advisor and corporate broker to BAA on the recommended
£15.9 billion cash offer from a consortium led by Ferrovial
2006Joint financial advisor and corporate broker to BAA on the recommended
£15.9 billion cash offer from a consortium led by Ferrovial
2006Joint financial advisor and corporate broker to BAA on the recommended
£15.9 billion cash offer from a consortium led by Ferrovial
2009
Sole financial advisor to LCR in relation to its £5.2 billion debt restructuring
Joint adviser to MTR Corporation
merger with the Kowloon-Canton RailwayCorporation
2007Joint adviser to MTR Corporation
merger with the Kowloon-Canton RailwayCorporation
on its US$8.8 billion proposed
Pending
Joint financial advisor to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in relation to the Saudi Landbridge Rail Link BOT project
Debt
Equity
DebtDebt
2004Arranger, joint lead manager and joint
book runner of the €5 billion issuance for the financing of the new Italian high-speed rail network. The bond comprised
three tranches: a 10y fixed rate, a 20y fixed rate and a 15y inflation-linked
2004Arranger, joint lead manager and joint
book runner of the €5 billion issuance for the financing of the new Italian high-speed rail network. The bond comprised
three tranches: a 10y fixed rate, a 20y fixed rate and a 15y inflation-linked
2004Arranger, joint lead manager and joint
book runner of the €5 billion issuance for the financing of the new Italian high-speed rail network. The bond comprised
three tranches: a 10y fixed rate, a 20y fixed rate and a 15y inflation-linked
2004Arranger, joint lead manager and joint
book runner of the €5 billion issuance for the financing of the new Italian high-speed rail network. The bond comprised
three tranches: a 10y fixed rate, a 20y fixed rate and a 15y inflation-linked
2004Arranger, joint lead manager and joint
book runner of the €5 billion issuance for the financing of the new Italian high-speed rail network. The bond comprised
three tranches: a 10y fixed rate, a 20y fixed rate and a 15y inflation-linked
2004Arranger, joint lead manager and joint
book runner of the €5 billion issuance for the financing of the new Italian high-speed rail network. The bond comprised
three tranches: a 10y fixed rate, a 20y fixed rate and a 15y inflation-linked
2004–2006Global coordinator and financial advisor
of Network Rail’s.£20 billion multicurrency debt
issuanceprogramme
2004–2006Global coordinator and financial advisor
of Network Rail’s.£20 billion multicurrency debt
issuanceprogramme
2004–2008Global coordinator and financial advisor
of Network Rail’s.£20 billion multicurrency debt
issuanceprogramme
2003Underwriter and joint lead manager of
a £1.03 monolinewrapped bond issue for Metronet
its bid for the concession to provide
of the London Underground
2003Underwriter and joint lead manager of
a £1.03 monolinewrapped bond issue for Metronetin relation to
of the BCV and SSL networks of the London Underground
infrastructure services in respect
2003Underwriter and joint lead manager of
a £1.03 monolinewrapped bond issue for Metronet
its bid for the concession to provide
of the London Underground
2003Underwriter and joint lead manager of
a £1.03 monolinewrapped bond issue for Metronetin relation to
of the BCV and SSL networks of the London Underground
infrastructure services in respect
2003Underwriter and joint lead manager of
a £1.03 monolinewrapped bond issue for Metronet
its bid for the concession to provide
of the London Underground
2003Underwriter and joint lead manager of
a £1.03 monolinewrapped bond issue for Metronetin relation to
of the BCV and SSL networks of the London Underground
infrastructure services in respect
2005Sole bookrunner on SNCF’s
CHF600 million bond issue, maturing in 2012. UBS also arranged the CHR to EUR, fixed to floating swap
2005Sole bookrunner on SNCF’s
2012. UBS also arranged the CHR to EUR, fixed to floating swap
2009Joint bookrunner on a €1 billion 10-year fixed-rate bond forDeutsche Bahn Finance B.V.(guarantor: Deutsche Bahn AG)
The Ministry of Railway(MOR) of the People’sRepublic of China
2008 Joint lead manager for the Ministry of Railway of the People’s Republic of China’s RMB 20 billion (US$2.9 billion)Enterprise Bond Offering
2005Joint global coordinator and joint bookrunner of the US$4.3 billion secondaryoffering
2005Joint global coordinator and joint bookrunner of the US$4.3 billion secondaryoffering
Joint bookrunner for Vinci’s €2.5 billion 2 for 11 rights offering
2006Joint bookrunner for Vinci’s €2.5 billion 2 for 11 rights offering
2006Joint bookrunner for Vinci’s €2.5 billion 2 for 11 rights offering
20062005
Financial advisor to Sanef(and joint bookrunner) in relation to its
€900 million IPO
2005Financial advisor to Sanef(and joint bookrunner) in relation to its
€900 million IPO
2005Financial advisor to Sanef(and joint bookrunner) in relation to its
€900 million IPO
2005Financial advisor to Sanef(and joint bookrunner) in relation to its
€900 million IPO
Sole financial advisor to Beijing Capital Airport on the acquisition of Beijing Airport Terminal 3 Assets for RMB26.9 billion (US$3.7 billion) including A share issue on Shanghai Stock Exchange raising RMB4 billion
2008Joint lead manager and joint underwriter for an entitlement offer and multiple placements for Asciano to raise A$2.35 billion
2009Joint bookrunner on a R$1,099 million (US$630mm) follow-on equity offering
2009
5
UBS: A Leading Infrastructure / PPP Advisory Group Globally
Infrastructure M&A – Worldwide1 Bookrunner of Infrastructure Funds2
Infrastructure Equity Issuance – Worldwide1 Infrastructure Debt Issuance – Worldwide1
Adviser
Amount
(US$mm) No. (%)
1 Goldman Sachs 131,415 41 28.5
2 UBS 99,947 44 21.7
3 Citi 94,972 45 20.6
4 Lazard 74,586 38 16.2
5 Rothschild 72,011 46 15.6
Underwriter
Amount
(US$mm) No. (%)
1 UBS 10,999 33 12.0
2 Nomura 9,147 10 10.0
3 Morgan Stanley 6,537 25 7.2
4 Citi 6,117 21 6.7
5 HSBC 4,606 11 5.0
6 Bank of America Merrill Lynch 4,065 15 4.5
Underwriter
Amount
(US$mm) No. (%)
1 Mizuho 61,475 334 12.4
2 Nomura 27,389 172 5.5
3 Group 21,907 173 4.4
4 Daiwa Capital Markets 21,681 174 4.4
5 Credit Suisse 19,866 107 4.0
6 UBS 19,835 109 4.0
Bookrunner
Deal value
(US$m) No. (%)
1 UBS 4,653 35 21.0
2 Deutsche Bank 1,548 14 7.0
3 Bank of America—Merrill Lynch 1,411 8 6.4
4 ABN AMRO 1,393 12 6.3
5 Citi 1,205 11 5.4
UBS advised 4 out of the 6 biggest transportation infrastructure M&A transactions of all times
2006Joint financial adviser and corporate broker to BAA on the recommended £15.9 billion cash offer from a consortium led by Ferrovial
2005Financial adviser to Vinci on its €19 billion acquisition of Autoroutes du Sud de la France (ASF)
2008Financial adviser and manager on North American infrastructure fund raising with total commitments of US$1.913 billion
2009Joint lead manager and joint underwriter for an entitlement offer and placement for Hastings Diversified Utilities Fund to raise A$250 million
2009Joint lead manager and joint underwriter for an entitlement offer and multiple placements for Asciano Group to raise A$2.35 billion
2009Joint bookrunner on a R$1,099 million (US$630 million) follow-on equity offering
2009Joint Head Manager for JPY40 billion two tranche (10 & 20 year) straight bond issuance for JR central
2009Joint bookrunner on a €1 billion 10-year fixed-rate bond for Deutsche Bahn Finance B.V. (guarantor: Deutsche Bahn AG)
Source: DealogicNoteS:1 January 1999–March 20102 Includes all deals since 1996, excluding self managed funds
SECTION 2
Addressing the Infrastructure Problem
7
0
200
400
600
800
1,000
Roads andBridges
Transit Drinking Waterand Wastewater
Schools Aviation Public Parks Hazardous andSolid Waste
Energy Rail InlandWaterways
Levees Dams
$ Bi
llion
5-Year Need Estimated Actual Spending
The US Infrastructure Problem
The American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) assigned a “D” rating for the current state of US infrastructure – ASCE estimates that $2.2 trillion needs to be
invested over 5 years to bring the condition of the nation’s infrastructure to “good”
– Current size of the entire municipal bond market is approximately $2.8 trillion
The federal budget deficit tripled to a record $1.4 trillion for FY 2009– in FY 2010 it is projected 48 states will face budget
short falls– state and local governments account for about 75%
of public infrastructure spending– new methods of financing infrastructure projects
without increasing debt or raising taxes are essential
The poor state of US national infrastructure continues to merit
significant concern
Unprecedented state and federal budget constraints are limiting investment into infrastructure
Estimated US Infrastructure 5-yr Capital Requirement 2009–20141
Note:1 American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009
8
PPPs Address the Infrastructure Problem
Private capital in infrastructure has the potential to provide a number of benefits
Financial innovation from the private sector can be utilized to address critical infrastructure issues
Municipal bond issuance, the traditional mainstay of infrastructure funding, cannot on its own fund the investment gap
2 Key factors are limiting municipal issuers’ flexibility to fund infrastructure projects
I. Weakening credit profile of muni-bond issuers
II. Challenging and uncertain market conditions
PPPs can be a key driver in relieving capital budget constraints and generating operational and economic growth
Private investment in infrastructure will free government dollars and create much needed jobs
Private investment has been proven to generate positive economic growth and can act as a stimulus by providing investment-grade projects in which to invest
As of 2009, the total equity private capital committed to infrastructure is in excess of $150 billion – this translates to a leveraged purchasing power of more than $300 billion
1
2
3
9
Challenges Facing the Traditional Municipal Financing Market
Traditional bond issuance alone will be insufficient to fund future infrastructure investment needs
Municipal bond issuers are facing weaker credit profiles
Budget deficits are ballooning, with 46 states currently facing budget shortfalls1
– Most states have addressed or still face gaps in their budgets totaling $196 billion for fiscal year 2010
– Although improved from Q1 2009, $35bn (approx 34% of entire municipal issuance) of municipal issues have been downgraded in Q1 2010
States face a limited ability to raise taxes in a weak economy with rising unemployment
There have been recent meaningful changes in traditional municipal issuance A flight to quality resulting from a lower risk appetite led to weakened
investor demand– The disappearance of monoline insurance to enhance the credit quality
of new issues fueled declining investor perception
There has been Federal intervention to support municipal access to bond market funding through implementation of such programs as Build America Bonds (BABs)– Of the $104bn municipal issuance in Q1 2010, 26% has been BABs
issues– President Obama’s fiscal 2011 budget proposes to permanently extend
the BABs program at a reduced subsidy rate of 28% compared to the current 35% rate
1 Source: Wall Street Journal, May 2010Source: Moodys
Q1 Municipal Issuer Upgrades and
Downgrades 2007-10
28 27
621
3 8
7535
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
07Q1 08Q1 09Q1 10Q1
$ (b
n)
Upgrade Volume Downgrade Volume
10
Denver RTD (proposed)
Chicago Downtown Parking ($563mm, 2006)
Illinois Lottery (proposed)
Midway Airport ($2.5bn, 2008, abandoned)
O’Hare Cargo Project (proposed)
Roads Airports Parking Multiple OtherPorts
Capital Beltway HOT Lanes ($1.5bn, 2008)
TTC-69 (proposed)
Port of Oakland ($700mm, 2009)
Chicago Skyway ($1.8bn, 2004)
SH-130 ($1.4bn, 2008)
Pennsylvania Turnpike ($12.8bn, on hold)
Harrisburg Parking ($215mm, 2008)
Indiana Toll Road ($3.8bn, 2005)
PPP is Increasingly Viewed as a Viable Alternative
Port of Portland
New Jersey PPP Program (proposed)
Philadelphia Ports (proposed)
Chicago Metered Parking ($1.2bn 2008)
Pocahontas Parkway ($611mmm, 2006)
Northwest Parkway ($603mm, 2007)
Transit / RailEnacted State PPP Legislation
LBJ Expressway ($2.7bn, 2009)
North Tarrant Expressway ($2bn, 2009)
Alligator Alley (proposed)
I-595 ($1.8bn, 2008)
Miami Tunnel ($889mm, 2007)
First Coast Outer Beltway (proposed)
Jacksonville Parkway (proposed)
Bold indicates projects completed in 2009
Port of Baltimore ($750mm, 2009)
Port of Virginia (unsolicited offer)
South Bay Expressway ($635mm, 2007)
Doyle Drive (proposed)
Grand Texas Parkway (proposed)
Pittsburgh Parking System (proposed)
Georgia PPP Program (proposed)
New Orleans Airport (proposed)
LA Parking (proposed)
Indianapolis Airport Parking (proposed)
Goethals Bridge (proposed)
SECTION 3
Overview of Public-Private Partnerships
12
What is a Public-Private Partnership?
Description of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP)
An arrangement in which essential, public infrastructure assets are designed, built, financed and/or operated through a partnership of a public sector entity and one or more private sector companies
The private sector provides a public service and assumes substantial financial, technical, construction and operational risk in the project
Typical PPP structure
A typical PPP is structured as a long-term agreement (Long-Term Concession), in which the public sector assigns to a private sector company the right to design, build, finance and/or operate the infrastructure asset for a defined period of time and per a financial arrangement
Typical PPP Structure – Contractual Diagram
Notes:1 May be part of the consortium awarded the concession2 Organized by the sponsors3 If/as necessary
Construction Company(ies)1
Operating Company(ies)1
Sub Contractor3
Sub Contractor3
Sub Contractor3
Sub Contractor3
Public Sector Authority
Bank/Bond Financing2
Concession Company/SPV
Equity Sponsors
Availability Payment3
ConcessionContract
ConstructionContract
Operating and Maintenance Contract
Project Revenue
Upfront Payment3
13
Why Pursue PPPs?To satisfy demand for new infrastructure and maintain existing facilities, many state and local governments are evaluating PPPs
Advantages of PPPs Bring new sources of capital for investment in the public sector
infrastructure
Bring operating / maintenance cost benefits from private sector operation
Transfer risks from the public sector to the private sector
Increase accountability for the delivery and operation of an asset
New Source of Capital
Cost Benefits
Risk Transfer
Accountability
14
What Types of Assets may be Suitable for PPPs?
Roads and Bridges Airports Ports Transit / Rail Parking
Transportation Infrastructure
Healthcare
Education
Correctional Facilities
Judicial Court Buildings
Social Infrastructure
Power Water
Utilities
Lotteries
Others
Data Centers Communication Towers
Communication
15
Alternative PPP Structures
Service / Management Contracts Long-Term Concession Not-For-Dividend Company
Structure Description State enters contract with private sector to manage the entire business
State assigns (for a fee) the right to operate for a defined period of time
to a private sector concessionaire
State assigns (for a fee) the right to operate to a stakeholder-controlled entity for the benefit of the State
Main Objective of PPP Improve efficiency Mobilize private sector capital and efficiency
Mobilize private sector capital and efficiency
Source of Payment to State Revenue generated by asset
Upfront / ongoing payments paid by private
sector
Upfront and potential ongoing payments based on revenue
generated by asset
Duration (Years) 1–5 20-99 20-99 or Indefinite
Enforcing Public Policy Contract / Public sector control Contract / State Regulatory System Contract / State Regulatory System
Source of Revenue to Private Sector
Work done / Cost-plus and productivity bonus
Revenue generated by asset / Availability payments /
Shadow Tolls NA
Ownership Public sector Public sector Public sector
Source of Financing NA Private sector taxable debt and
equity Private sector taxable and potentially
tax-exempt debt
Management Private sector Private sector Private sector
Commercial Risk Public sector Private sector Public sector
16
Myths vs Reality: Overcoming Common Misconceptions About P3s
Cost of Capital for P3 is Substantially Higher than for Traditional Municipal Financing
MYTH
Concession Length is Unreasonably Long
Public will Lose Control of Asset
Focusing on cost of capital alone fails to consider the many other risks and costs
P3s with availability payments drive down the private sector investors’ required returns by providing a more certain revenue stream
Value-for-Money analysis based on whole-life project costs is a better measure
Length of a concession can be structured to fit the needs of the asset and government
Government will set the operations and maintenance standards and continue to monitor the asset
Regulations governing toll increases are set out in the concession agreement
There are several common misconceptions about P3s that can be addressed through a well-structured concession
MYTH
MYTH
REALITY
REALITY
REALITY
17
Myths vs Reality: Overcoming Common Misconceptions About P3s
Large Upfront Proceeds from P3 will be Squandered
Excessive Profits will be Enjoyed by Private Sector Operator
Jobs will be Lost
Concessions can be structured to include revenue- or profit-sharing mechanisms and caps on windfall profits to the private sector
Proceeds can be reinvested in new capital projects
The use of shorter concessions, revenue sharing mechanisms and greenfield projects substantially reduces the risk of the misappropriation of upfront proceeds
Concessions can be structured to ensure the retention of jobs for current employees
Transactions can also include relevant procurement and employment standards such as Buy America and living wage provisions
There are several common misconceptions about P3s that can be addressed through a well-structured concession
MYTH
MYTH
MYTH
REALITY
REALITY
REALITY
18
Common Concession Agreement Provisions
The public sector authority will enter into a concession contract with a concession company under which the company is typically granted a long-term concession to design, build, finance, operate, maintain and transfer an asset
Terms of the concession are negotiated between the public and private sector and vary depending on the objectives of the government and the assets/services to be provided
For services which are not self-sustainable, the concession company receives financial support from the government (i.e. “an availability payment”); the terms of such support are negotiated in the agreement– the payment is often conditioned on the performance of the concession
company
In Greenfield projects, shareholders of the concession company are usually composed of construction, facility management, and supplier companies
The concession agreement outlines unique risks of the project and documents ways in which those risks are to be allocated amongst the various project participants
– The concession company is responsible for the construction of the asset and may subcontract some construction work
– The concession company is responsible for operating and maintaining the asset and may outsource such activities through fixed-price contracts to 3rd party operators– Tariff regimes as well as performance metrics / requirements are
outlined in the agreement– The concession company is responsible for arranging the financing of the
project– sources of funding will usually include equity sponsors and bank/bond
financing– external financing may be lent via a financing vehicle
Construction
Operation
Financing
19
Common Concession Agreement Provisions
Performance Metric/ Penalty
Clear, achievable performance metric including life and condition of asset on expiry
Conditionality of subsidy to be within the concessionaire’s control
Asset Hand-back The Hand-back arrangements will be designed to preserve the condition of the asset(s)
Condition of the asset on expiry needs to be clear and achievable
Tariff Regime Regulated toll-setting mechanism that enables the concessionaire to set tariffs within a clear framework
A private sector operator will prefer a degree of flexibility to manage tariffs
Termination Events Termination events, if applicable, should include appropriate cure periods and materiality thresholds
Compensation on Termination
Market standard compensation on termination
Force Majeure Force majeure events are those that are likely to have a catastrophic effect on either party’s ability to fulfill its obligations
The purpose of the force majeure provisions is to give the party affected relief from liability and to give the parties an opportunity to terminate the concession
Non-Competition The concessionaire may require a non-competition undertaking to ensure that its forecast revenues are not impacted by competing assets or government policy changes
Policy Changes and Certain Changes in Law
The concessionaire may be protected from policy changes or certain changes of law by being in a “no better or no worse” position post the change
Lender Step-in Rights
If project cash flows are unable to meet debt obligations, the project lenders may step in and take control of the asset from the concession company
20
Assessing P3 Projects: Value-for-Money
Value for Money analysis is used by government agencies to determine if a PPP project provides an optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality compared to the traditional public sector procurement
Background
Value for Money (VfM) analysis is a tool used by governments as a basis for the implementation of PPPs– It provides a comprehensive set of procedures to evaluate a range of project
delivery options and identifies the best outcome for the government and community
– It represents the optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness for purpose) of the project
VfM Process Overview
While agencies differ on their specific approaches to carrying out VfM analysis, a number of fundamental principles guide the procedure
Program Level Assessment– Ensures that a PPP is only considered for use in those projects where it is
appropriate and is likely to represent good VfM– This assessment will determine whether the private sector is better equipped
to handle the risks associated with the project
Project Level Assessment– Requires an upfront procurement appraisal based on a public sector
comparator– Determines whether the PPP provides a better ratio of value to net life cycle
cost than the best feasible public sector strategy– This assessment determines whether the amount of capital and resources is
sufficient to attract private sector interest
Procurement Level Assessment– Ongoing assessment during the procurement phase of a project to ensure
that the desired project can be delivered in view of, for example, the competitive interest and market capacity
Source: UK Treasury
21
Financial Justification for P3s – Value for Money
Source: Infra-Americas, ARUP, California PIAC
Presidio Parkway Value for Money Illustration Presidio Parkway is a 1.9-mile road that serves as an access route to the Golden Gate Bridge
along Route 101 and was built 73 years ago
January 21, 2010, the California Public Infrastructure Advisory Committee (PIAC) recommended a P3 procurement for a portion of the Presidio Parkway replacement project in San Francisco
Project is valued at over $1.0 billion; funding will come from both private and public sources including:
The PIAC performed a value-for-money analysis and determined that a P3 procurement would result in a 15% cost reduction for the project
Value-for-Money Findings
631 (55)
(22) 1623 16 (77)
532
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
700
Traditional
Procurement
DBFOM
Efficiencies
Design
Contingencies
Private
Transaction
Costs
Construction Risk
Priced by
Contractor
Public Costs Public Retained
Risk Reserve
DBFOM
Const
ruct
ion C
ost
($
mm
)
22
Why are Investors Attracted to Infrastructure/PPP Assets?
Essential, stable assets
Assets provide “essential services” and therefore, very stable, predictable returns
Low demand elasticity
Low correlation to stocks and bonds
0.25 - 0.30 correlation with equities
0.00 - 0.20 correlation with bonds
Inflation hedge
Price/revenue formulas allow for inflation adjustments
Limited competition often enable business to pass on inflation to user
High cash yields
Long physical asset life
High margin businesses
23
Who Invests Equity in Infrastructure Assets through P3s?
CompanyMain Infrastructure Sectors
Roads, Airports, Car Parks, Telecom Infrastructure
Roads, Social Infrastructure, Water
Roads, Rail, Social Infrastructure
Roads
Roads, Social Infrastructure
Roads, Social Infrastructure
Roads, Social Infrastructure
Roads
Airports, Roads, Car Parks
CompanyMain Infrastructure Sectors
Roads, Ports, Social Infrastructure, Rail
Roads, Social Infrastructure
Roads, Power
Roads
Roads, Social Infrastructure
Roads, Social Infrastructure
Roads
Roads, Car Parks, Airports, Social Infrastructure
HQ
Spain
Spain
Spain
Italy
UK
Germany
France
Portugal
Spain
Roads, Social Infrastructure
HQ
Spain
Germany
Spain
Spain
Sweden
Canada
Australia
France
Spain
Equity Value (US$m)13,294
7,080
14,016
13,217
2,879
2,909
16,341
4,819
6,477
Equity Value (US$m)Private
4,939
Private
2,213
7,088
7,036
6,085
27,437
2,485
Note: Equity values from FactSet as of March 1, 2010
Airports, Roads, PowerIndia 4,359
Transportation, Oil & Gas
US 7,653 Transport, Energy, Water, Aviation, Ports
US Private
Greenfield or Brownfield P3
Diverse Infrastructure Sectors
Global Operational and Construction Expertise
Long-term Investor
US Power, Transportation, Water
3,323
Selected Infrastructure Construction / Concession Companies
Roads, Rail, Ports, Oil & Gas, Power
US Private
24
Who Invests Equity in Infrastructure Assets through P3s?
Infrastructure funds
Pension funds
Generally Prefer Brownfield Assets
Diverse Infrastructure Sectors
Partner with Construction/Concession Companies
Long-term Investor
Often Target Low- to Mid-teen Equity Returns
Selected Infrastructure and Pension Funds
25
Several potential debt sources should be considered for greenfield P3s
Traditional funding methods can be combined with alternative funding sources – administrators should be open to new methods of financing
Private Activity Bonds (PABs)
Bond market is becoming more favorable for project financing– North Tarrant Express project awarded to Cintra/Meridiam for $2bn included the first
major P3 bond issue in several months, with $400mm of tax-exempt PABs with a BBB-/Baa2 rating (Dec 2009)
– The IH-635 (Lyndon B Johnson Freeway) Managed Lanes P3 project in Texas will be the largest P3 financing in US history at nearly US$3 billion. PABs are expected to make up to US$500-800 million of the private financing, potentially alongside commercial bank debt in the mix
A number of deals have sold with A or triple-B ratings in the past several months, and project financings in the triple-B category in the $500mm range are becoming possible
Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act (TIFIA) TIFIA loans have been a portion of all the major greenfield road projects
undertaken since 2008– I-595: $678mm TIFIA loan– Port of Miami Tunnel: $587mm TIFIA loan– North Tarrant Express: $650mm TIFIA loan
TIFIA loans have been issued for several highway concessions totaling over $5.2bn
Recent indications from the TIFIA directors imply that going forward the focus of the program will be towards projects that improve livability and sustainability
The bank loan market is available for properly structured transactions, though all major greenfield road transactions financed in the bank market since 2008 have been availability-payment based– I-595 transaction priced at L+300bps with step ups to L+400 using a club of 12
banks– Port of Miami Tunnel transaction priced at L+325 using a club of 10 banks
Bank Loan Market
Infrastructure Debt Financing Considerations
Source: USDOT FHWA website, The Bond Buyer, Dec 2009
26
Infrastructure Debt Financing Considerations
Lenders will require robust project economics and security package to fund any infrastructure project
Lender’s Requirements for Financing Infrastructure Projects
Lenders’ requirements will depend on the credit quality of the project cashflows– Lenders will include ratio tests in loan documentation to either:
– restrict distributions in period of actual or forecast underperformance– trigger a default
– In evaluating project credit, funders will require base case ratios comfortably to exceed specified levels and to maintain a margin above default levels under a number of extreme stress scenarios
Lenders require a security package which may include some of the following:– 1st ranking pledge over all shares in the concession company– 1st ranking pledge over project accounts / reserves held by the concession company– assignments of all insurance and re-insurance policies and proceeds
Lenders may also seek certain project reserve accounts:– maintenance reserve account, usually funded on a look forward basis – debt service reserve account, usually covers next six months’ debt service
Lenders may request indirect credit support:– parent company guarantee from contractor’s parent– liquidated damages for delayed construction– 3rd party performance bond during construction
27
§4(2) Private Placement
The §4(2) market offers a more discreet funding source on a negotiated basis with selected, sophisticated institutional investors (insurance, pension funds, etc.)
Precedent exists for structured parking and infrastructure transactions
The market offers a high degree of flexibility to tailor terms of a transactions
The §4(2) market can serve as an attractive source of investment-grade debt capital when public funding alternatives are not available
Funding Alternatives – §4(2) Private Placement
The §4(2) private placement market can offer unique structuring advantages
The §4(2) market has been successfully accessed for parking and infrastructure projects in the past Brandywine Equity Trust – 30th Street Post Office Philadelphia, PA
Ambassador Bridge – Detroit, MI
Examples:
28
Key to Successful Implementation of a PPP ProgramPPPs require the following key ingredients to ensure they garner the political and public support needed to be successful
Strong Senior Political Sponsorship Benefits of PPP must be persuasively
communicated to various stakeholders
Uncertainty surrounding political support for PPP transaction can be costly
1 Communications Strategy Essential to maintain a transparent,
open process
Educate the public and key stakeholders as to the risks, rewards and benefits to the State of a PPP transaction
4
Understand Government’s Economic and Policy Objectives for a PPP Key to determining correct choices in
trade-offs among value, speed and risk transfer
2
Protection of Public Interests Appropriate oversight to ensure safety,
environmental and social standards
Input from stakeholders
3
Asset has to be Suitable for PPP Risk / Return
Size
Ability to finance PPP transaction
5
Certainty, Clarity of Process, Terms of the Deal and Timetable Well organized and structured process will
give confidence to private sector PPP investors and ensure strongest execution
6
SECTION 4
PFI/PPP in the UK
30
The UK experience shows that PPP delivers price certainty for the public sector and timely delivery of good quality assets
Since the introduction of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in 1992, the UK has used PPP to procure projects involving the construction of assets needed to deliver public services
PFI contracts have been used across a wide range of sectors: transport, hospitals, schools, defense, leisure, culture, housing and waste
In 2003, a study by the UK National Audit Office found that PFI have consistently demonstrated good value for money
Following its success in the UK, the PFI model and guidance has been used as a reference globally
Construction projects where cost to the public sector exceeds the price agreed at contract
Construction projects delivered late to the public sector
73%
22%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Traditionalprocurement
PFI projects
70%
24%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
Traditionalprocurement
PFI projects
Source: National Audit Office (“PFI: Construction Performance”, February 2003)
Notes:1 In only 8% of PFI projects surveyed was the delay more
than two months
1
PFI/PPP in the UK
31
Up to the end of 2008, the UK had signed a total of 935 PFI / PPP projects, with a capital value of £66bn– over 500 of these projects are now in operation– four sectors - transport, health, defense and education – have contributed three quarters of total projects
by value
The UK closed 59 infrastructure deals for US$13.1 billion in 2009; around 71 projects are currently seeking funding
At present, 43 projects are past the shortlist stage and 57 can be expected to name a preferred bidder in 2010 or 2011
The current UK government has laid out ambitious renewable energy plans that will see billions of pounds invested in offshore wind farms– Other sectors are also targeted such as healthcare, education, telecoms and waste management.
Overall, PFI / PPP has accounted for about 10-15% of infrastructure investment since 1996
Source: International Financial Services, PFI in the UK & PPP in Europe, Partnerships UK, IJOnline
The principal vehicle for delivering Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) in the UK is the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which has been widely developed in the UK over the past decade
PFI/PPP in the UK
Source: “2007 Pre-Budget Report and Comprehensive Spending Review”, HMTNote:1 Signed PFI deals, according to HMT’s database of infrastructure projects. Excludes London PPP underground projects
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
1992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007
Cap
ital v
alue
(£bn
)
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
No. of deals
Capital value No. of deals¹
Number and value of UK PPP / PFI projects
32
Lessons learned from UK PPP/PFI experience
Government needs to take a leading role to attract investors and allow PPP/PFIs to develop effectively
Favorable PPP/PFI project characteristics
Source: Confederation of British Industry (“CBI”) Policy Brief
Lessons learned from PFI/PPP in the UK Value for money is maximized by
allocating risks to whoever is best able to handle it
Risk and control must go together; whoever is allocated risk must have freedom to choose how to handle it
Risk allocation must reflect what the market can bear. There is no point in aiming for tomorrow’s risk allocation in today’s market
Sharing rewards and risks provides a common focus on success, gives value for money and can help get more deals signed faster
Construction and operational risks, rightly allocated to the private sector under PPP/PFI concessions, are a sizeable slice of a project’s total risks
Taking account of and pricing all genuine risks at the outset is essential to allow flexibility through the life of the contract
Output/service-delivery driven
Substantial operating content within the project
Significant scope for additional/alternative uses of the asset
Scope for innovation in design
Long contract term available
Committed public sector management
Political sensitivities manageable
Risks primarily commercial in nature
Substantial deals (though mega-projects have their own difficulties)
Complete or stand-alone operations to allow maximum synergies
SECTION 5
Implementing PPP in Florida
34
Implementation of PPPs in Florida Florida has had statutory authority to enter into PPPs at the state and local level since 2002. Under Florida’s Home Rule1, cities and counties have jurisdiction over implementing their own PPP projects
Alligator Alley
Alligator Alley was constructed as a two-lane, controlled access, 78-mile toll facility
The Florida Department of Transportation (“FDOT”) sought a private sector party that would lease, maintain, operate, and collect tolls for the project in early 2009. However FDOT was unable to secure a private sector partner largely due to the global recession
FDOT may re-tender the project as a PPP, and an RFQ is expected to be issued in early 2010
Florida High Speed Rail
The construction of Florida's High Speed Rail will start in the Tampa-Orlando-Miami corridor, with eventual state-wide service
Part of the project may be procured via the PPP process
An RFQ for the process is expected to be issued in early 2010
Port of Miami Tunnel
I-595
The I-595 PPP project consists of the reconstruction and widening of I-595 mainline and adjacent roads
The private sector partner will finance, design and build additional lanes to the I-595 corridor by 2014, and operate and maintain the facility for an additional 30 years
FDOT will set and retain tolls for the facility and in exchange shall provide the private operator with a milestone payment upon construction completion and an annual fixed payments for its services throughout the operation period (“Availability Payment”)
The Port of Miami Tunnel PPP project consists of developing the tunnel itself as well as road improvements between the Seaport, I-395 and I-95
The private sector partner will finance, design and build the Port of Miami Tunnel project by 2014, and operate and maintain the facility for an additional 30 years
FDOT will set and retain tolls for the facility and in exchange shall provide the private operator with a milestone payment upon construction completion and an Availability Payment for its services throughout the operation period
1 Florida Constitution Article VIII, Section 2(b)
35
Considerations Regarding PPP Candidates in Florida
Florida has viable PPP candidates that could deliver meaningful value to the State and its constituents
Roads
Toll-road assets attract considerable investor interest
PPP projects have been undertaken by Florida Dept. of Transportation (FDOT) recently– $1.8bn I-595 Corridor Improvement Project – $889mm Port of Miami Tunnel Project – on-going long-term concession lease process for the Alligator Alley
Forthcoming PPP projects announced include the following:– upcoming PPP projects being contemplated by the Miami-Dade county– upcoming PPP projects being contemplated by the FDOT– Jacksonville Outer Beltway concession lease
PPP Feasibilit
y
Asset
Ports
Florida is an important maritime destination in the US– approximately 1,190 miles of coastline, representing ~10% of total US
coastline
Florida needs to invest around $3.5bn in ports assets through 2012– State has budgeted for only $2.2bn to be spent on these assets for the
period
Two major port authorities have already announced PPP plans for future expansion strategies– In 2008, Jacksonville Port Authority (JAXPORT) – Port Manatee – Other assets that might be viable PPP projects include Jacksonville Port,
future expansions at Port of Miami, Port of Tampa, and Port Everglades
36
Airports
Airport PPPs have started to gain momentum in the US
In September 1997, Congress established the Airport Privatization Pilot Program (Program)– Program allows for four regional airports and one major hub airport to be
privatized – all airport PPP procurements require consent of 65% of the carriers at the
airport
Investment opportunities outside of the current Program could also be potentially viable– airport assets at Miami, Fort Lauderdale, Tampa, Jacksonville and Orlando
would generate tremendous interest among potential investors– assets include long-term leases for cargo facilities, parking, car rentals,
and other non-aviation related businesses
Orlando Sanford International already has a long-term concession in place with a private operator - Abertis - for managing some terminals and car-park facilities
PPP Feasibilit
y
Asset
Considerations Regarding PPP Candidates in Florida
Water Management
?
Population growth is straining Florida’s vital water resources
State’s water infrastructure investment needs are estimated to be $15bn by 20221
Florida’s water systems industry is highly fragmented1
Public-sector water assets could qualify for potential PPP programs – private sector partnership can be secured in areas such as water
treatment, water distribution, water conservation
In addition, the State can also consider private sector partnership in the following fields:– exploring alternative sources of clean water– waste-water recycling and treatment
Notes:1. Source: American Society of Civil Engineers 2008 report card on infrastructure in
Florida2. Serving 5,000 people or more
37
Parking
Many municipalities across the US are currently exploring PPPs for their parking assets
Florida’s cities already have experience with PPPs– the Miami Parking Authority is working with private companies to
meet projected parking needs throughout the City of Miami
New parking technology has made equipment upgrades more desirable as it helps to relieve congestion, provides aesthetic improvements and offers users more efficient parking options– by mobilizing private capital, Florida’s cities can bring implement new
technology faster and more effectively– new parking options will need to be made available to accommodate
the growing population
PPP Feasibilit
y
Asset
Considerations Regarding PPP Candidates in Florida
Other Assets
Other State-owned assets that are emerging as viable targets for PPPs include:– urban infrastructure
– waste management and recycling facilities– social infrastructure assets
– hospitals and healthcare facilities– educational institutes and student accommodations (e.g. Florida
A&M University)– military housing– prisons and courthouses
?
SECTION 6
Case Studies
39
Port of Miami TunnelTransaction Overview
The PPP Project for the development of Port of Miami Tunnel was awarded to the Miami Access Tunnel (“MAT”) consortium in March 2007
The $903mm project is being financed through term loans, credit facilities and TIFIA loans with a debt to equity ratio of 81:19
The concession will last for 35 years
Asset Overview
35-year DBFOM project includes the development of the Port of Miami Tunnel as well as road improvements between the Seaport, I-395 and I-95 in Miami
The project will widen the MacArthur Causeway Bridge and construct a tunnel to provide a direct highway connection to the Port of Miami on Dodge Island from Watson Island
The payment structure comprises of:– Milestone payments during and at the end of
construction – Availability payments that start at completion of
construction and escalate annually for 30 years
The project is expected to commence operations in 2014
Currently, no tolling is anticipated for the use of the tunnels
About the Consortium
The Miami Access Tunnel consortium consists of Meridiam Infrastructure and Bouygues – Meridiam Infrastructure is financing 90% of the
equity contribution while the balance is provided by Bouygues
– Bouygues’ construction arm has been subcontracted by the consortium to construct the tunnel for $659mm
– Transfield has been subcontracted to provide operation and maintenance (“O&M”) services to the Port of Miami Tunnel project for $260mm
Project Map
Source: P3Americas, Factiva, Infrastructure Journal
40
Florida I-595
Florida I-595 is the first availability payment-based PPP project in the US
In October 2007, the Florida Department of Transport (“FDOT”) released a Request for Qualifications (“RFQ”) for the I-595 Corridor Roadway Improvements DBFOM project
By December 2007, FDOT short-listed four consortia:– Babcock and Brown-led group– ACS Dragados-Macquarie
Partnership– OHL and Goldman Sachs-led group– Skanska and Fluor-led group
In February 2008, Skanska and Fluor-led group withdrew due to uncertainties about the risk profile of the proposed concession agreement
In June 2008, FDOT allegedly reduced milestone payments for the project by a few hundred million dollars– however, interest from remaining
bidders continued to remain strong
FDOT received final proposals in September 2008 from two of the three consortia– OHL and Goldman Sachs-led group
declined to bid on concerns over the performance security bonds
In October 2008, the ACS Dragados-Macquarie Partnership was named the “Preferred Bidder” to undertake the project
Timeline
Project consists of the reconstruction and widening of I-595 mainline and adjacent roads– corridor has been divided and
prioritized into 18 independent project segments
Preferred Bidder will:– finance, design and build additions to
I-595 corridor by 2014– operate and maintain it for an
additional 30 years
Preferred bidder will receive:– lump-sum payment of $685 million
once construction is completed– availability payments of $64 million /
year for the life of the concession
Concession Details
Project is the first availability payment-based PPP in the US
FDOT will set and retain tolls, effectively taking on the toll risk
Transaction reached financial close in extremely turbulent market conditions
Strong interest in the deal reinforces Florida's status as an active PPP market, with many sponsors and developers touting the State as their focus for PPPs
Key Highlights
Source: P3 Americas
41
Chicago Downtown Parking Garages
Project Description
Morgan Stanley Investment Management and LAZ Parking won the concession in 2006– Entered into a 99-year lease with the City to
operate the Parking System and collect parking, advertising and retail concession revenue
– The concessionaire must carry out certain improvements, particularly the rehabilitation of the East Monroe Street garage within five years. The City’s estimate of the cost is US$65m
The parking system, located under the Grant and Millennium Parks in downtown Chicago, is the largest downtown underground public parking system in the US and believed to be the largest underground parking system in the world
Grant Park North Garage: three-level facility with two underground levels providing parking for 1,850 cars with 830,000 sq ft of garage space
The garages had an income of US$16m in 2005, which equates to an earnings multiple of 35x based on the bid price of US$563mm– Equates to an earnings multiple 39x based on
the bid price plus US$65mm needed to rehabilitate the East Monroe Street garage
The lease enabled the City to defease the bonds associated with the garages
Timeline
Source: Infra-News, P3Americas, Factiva, Analysis of long term leasing of Chicago Parking Meters System by the City of Chicago and University of Illinois
Financing Overview The syndication for the deal was carried on during
April ’07 and the following debt facilities were arranged:– US$402mm facility, with Société Générale as
the facility agent– DEPFA Bank and MCC each underwrote
US$100mm of the credit facility, which comprises a US$350mm term loan and US$52m capex tranche
The debt was arranged as a 10-year facility which is fully expected to be refinanced in years three or four
The deal marks the first privatization of a municipal parking system in the US
In May 2006, the City of Chicago kicked off the tender process for the concession and lease of the Chicago Downtown Public Parking System
In May 2006 RFQs were released by the City
In October 2006, the City received bids from four groups and named Morgan Stanley / LAZ Parking as the preferred bidder
In November 2006, the Chicago City Council approved the concession and lease
In December 2006, the deal reached financial close and made the upfront payment of US$563m to the City
42
Chicago Parking Meters
Project Description
Chicago Parking Meters LLC, led by Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners, won the concession in 2008
The project comprises the operation, maintenance and right to collect revenues on 34,760 on-street metered parking spaces– concession period is 75 years– City of Chicago received a one-time payment of
US$1.15bn
Chicago's metered parking system comprises:– 106 pay and display machines– 31,200 electronic and mechanized single-bay
parking meters– 1,420 electronic double-bay parking meters
These are capable of metering approximately 36,000 parking spaces on arterial streets and 1,215 spaces in 17 metered lots throughout the City
The system generated total operating revenue of US$22.9mm in 2007, with net income of US$18.9mm
The Concession Agreement allows for increases in meter rates over the next five years
Due to the nature of the current credit environment, market sources were expecting the deal to be 100% equity financed
Timeline
Source: Infra-News, P3Amerias, Factiva, Chicago Reader article (Apr-09)
Key provisions in Concession Agreement Limits parking operation by other parties in
downtown Chicago
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners has the rights to set all parking rates without restrictions from the Government
Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners has opened many ancillary businesses such as car detailing, dry cleaning, and other services
This one of a kind deal follows as a continuation of the City’s strategy to balance its budget
In February 2008, the City of Chicago issued a request for qualifications (RFQ)
In March 2008, ten groups submitted RFQs including Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan, Lehman Brothers, the Carlyle Group, and partnerships led by Macquarie Capital Group and Cintra
In November 2008, the City received bids for the concession and lease
In December 2008, the procuring authority awarded the lease to Chicago Parking Meters LLC (Morgan Stanley led consortium)
The deal reached financial close in February 2009 and LAZ has assumed operation of the meters
43
New York Coordinated Street Furniture Franchise
Project Description
About Cemusa
In 2006, Cemusa (a subsidiary of FCC Group) was chosen as the concessionaire for New York City's Coordinated Street Furniture Franchise
Under the terms of the 20-year contract, Cemusa will build and maintain 3,300 bus shelters, 330 newsstands, 20 automated public toilets 37 Sheltered Bike Parking Structures and provide $1.4 billion in new revenue to New York City– Cemusa offered $924 million in guaranteed cash
and nearly $400 million in free advertising
In exchange for providing these facilities to the City, Cemusa is able to sell advertising space on these facilities and share in that revenue with the City
Founded in 1984, Cemusa represents 111 cities and municipalities throughout Europe and the Americas, and is quickly gaining a presence within the U.S. with secured contracts in New York, Miami-Dade County, San Antonio and Boston
Cemusa has designed, built, installed and maintained more than 100,000 urban furniture elements, which include bus shelters, clocks, public information panels, newsstands, automatic toilets, special trash containers and electronic panels
APPENDIX A
Pending US PPP
45
Selected Pending US PPPs
Project Name StateGreenfield/ Brownfield
Estiamted Value (US$ mil) Project Name State
Greenfield/ Brownfield
Estiamted Value (US$ mil)
Roads / Bridges Airports
First Coast Outer Beltway FL Greenfield 1,300-1,800 Louis Armstrong - New Orleans LA Brownfield TBD
Goethals Bridge NY Greenfield 1,500 Louis Munoz Marin - San Juan PR Brownfield TBD
I-75/ I-575 Northwest Corridor
Upgrade
GA Brownfield 1,500
Presidio Parkway CA Greenfield 1,000 Rail
Puerto Rican Toll Roads PR Brownfield 1,500 ARTIC CA Brownfield TBD
Tappan Zee Bridge NY Greenfield TBD Denver FasTracks Eagle P3 CO Greenfield 2,500
Florida HSR FL Greenfield 5,100
Parking Los Angeles Metro Transit
Authority (LAMTA)
CA Greenfield TBD
Hartford Downtown Parking CT Brownfield TBD
Indianapolis Airport Parking IN Brownfield TBD Ports
Indianapolis Downtown Parking IN Brownfield TBD Philadelphia Southport PA Greenfield TBD
Las Vegas Parking NV Brownfield TBD Port of Galveston TX Brownfield TBD
Los Angeles Parking Garages CA Brownfield 200-300 Port of New Orleans LA Brownfield TBD
New Jersey Transit Parking NJ Brownfield TBD
Pittsburgh Parking PA Brownfield 300-500 Water
Big Chino Water Delivery AZ Greenfield TBD
Social/Other Carlsbad Desalination Plant CA Greenfield 300
Long Beach Courthouse CA Greenfield 300
APPENDIX B
Biographies
47
Team Biographies
THOMAS R. OSBORNEManaging DirectorHead of Americas Infrastructure Group
Mr. Osborne has 23 years’ experience as an infrastructure investment banker. He is Head of the Americas Infrastructure/ Privatization Group and has worked on transactions with a total value exceeding $50 billion. Mr. Osborne has extensive experience in U.S. equity and fixed income capital markets and in structuring and advising on major M&A and strategic advisory transactions in the infrastructure (roads and ports) and utility & power sectors. His career experience includes 9 years in the Utilities Group at PaineWebber Incorporated, where he ultimately held the title of First Vice President, and 5 years as a Director in the Power and Energy Group at Credit Suisse First Boston. He joined UBS Investment Bank in 2001 as a Managing Director in the Power and Utilities Group, and was named Co-Head of the Infrastructure Group in July 2006, abd Americas Head of that group in 2008. He holds Series 7, 63 and 24 registrations, and a BA with honors from University of Virginia, Phi Beta Kappa.
(212)-821-2343299 Park Avenue
New York, NY [email protected]
STEPHEN PAINEManaging DirectorGlobal Head of Infrastructure Group
Mr. Paine joined UBS in 1994 to work in the Project Finance team and moved to the Infrastructure Group in 1999. He serves as Global Head of the Infrastructure Group. In the road sector, Mr. Paine advised Road Management Group on its financing in the capital markets of two shadow toll road projects, which was the first bond financing of a PFI project in the UK. He also led the team advising Scutvias on its successful bid for and the financing of the €800 million Beira Interior road project in Portugal. In the rail sector he was project director of Network Rail’s successful £9 billion bid for Railtrack in 2002 and has subsequently advised them in relation to their £20 billion debt issuance program. He also advised London & Continental Railways on the raising of finance for Section 2 of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link. In 2004, he advised Tube Lines on its £2.1 billion refinancing. In air transport, he advised Serco on its bid for the stake in National Air Traffic Control in 2001 and led the teams advising on the Istanbul airport terminal financing and the New Scottish Air Traffic Control Centre. Mr. Paine has worked on more than 40 PPI transactions. Mr. Paine has an M.A. in Law from Cambridge University and an M.B.A. from Insead. He is a qualified solicitor.
+44(20)7568-57632 Finsbury Avenue
London, UK [email protected]
48
Team Biographies
ALEX GREENBAUMAssociate DirectorAmericas Infrastructure Group
Alex Greenbaum joined UBS in 2005 and has covered municipal infrastructure and public-private partnerships since that time. He advises both public and private sector clients on a variety of infrastructure assignments, including the structuring and financing of public-private partnerships, and the acquisition, sale and financing of public and private infrastructure related companies. Mr. Greenbaum has worked with clients such as the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, State of Illinois, and was a member of the State of New Jersey's Infrastructure Finance Study team. Previous to his tenure at UBS, Mr. Greenbaum worked in the US Supreme Court and US Congress. He holds a BA with honors from Harvard University.
(212)-821-6395299 Park Avenue
New York, NY [email protected]
49
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