PAUL T1BBETTS University of Dayton

FEYERAI3END ON I D E O L O G Y , H U M A N HAPPINESS, AND THE G O O D LIFE

Of the various arguments proposed in defense of freedom of thought and action, Feyerabend had developed a position which is as controversial as his claims regarding science and objectivity. What makes his argument relatively unique and provocative is the way he employs his conceptual insights from the history and philosophy of science to defend a view of human freedom and self-determination which is directly at odds with any form of dogmatism or closed society. Though Feyerabend's position is to some extent fore- shadowed in MiE's 0~ Liberty, it draws ~po.n developments in the phitoso~ phy of science which Mill could at best only dimly have foreseen, though with which he would have been sympathetic. Feyerabend's particular argument should therefore be located within a tradition dating back at least to mid- nineteenth century British philosophy, where the convergence of ethical issues with analyses of the nature of scientific knowledge came into focus. After first stating Feyerabend's position as developed in "Science, Freedom, and the Good Life, ''1 as well as in "Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, ''2 I will then examine the cogency of Feyerabend's arguments, especially the particular conception of science and the philosophy of science which he extensively draws upon in defense of his position, a Feyerabend is justifiably considered to be one of the most radical philosophers o.f science alive today, partly due to his manner of ex- pression and frequent references to Marx and Lenin, and partly to the extreme and unconventional position he has taken on a number of issues regarding the nature of science and the ideological character of all human inqni;y. As I wii[ later suggest, Feyerab~nd's phiIoso.phy o,f science actually reflects a basic commitment on his part regarding the relation between political and scientific ideologies on the one hand and individual human values and self-determination on the other.

One gateway into Feyerabend's philosophy is his characterization of a closed society. This is a society or even sub<ulture governed by myths and dogmas (whether these be religious, political, or scientific dogmas) which are infallible and immune to criticism. "[Such~ myths have within them the logical machinery to explain, or rather explain away, a W difficulty which

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may arise, and even to convert in a convincing manner any difficulty into confirming evidence. ''~ In a closed society the ideal of the "preservation of society" afforded coherence and direction to science and the arts. in the modern world a new ideal is today required to provide this necessary unity. For Feyerabend such an ideal should be "to make people more pleasant and more interesting, to make life happier, to make the world better, to make the beer better, and so on. These are all reasonable." Regarding the matter of beer, Feyerabend is quite serious : "I think it quite important to cut down to size those who say we must concern ourselves with nothing less than the search for Truth. For what Truth is nobody really knows. Such an ideal, therefore, does not give us the direction we need. ''a

One of the more serious obstacles to implementing this ideal and thereby attaining reunification of science with the arts and the humanities, is the widely accepted stipulation or rule that no hypothesis should be introduced which conflicts with highly confirmed theories, laws, or observational data. In the present case, the hypothesis or postulate is the ideal suggested above ("to make people more pleasant, to make the world better"). The theory this postulated ideal conflicts with is the present ideology of society, which is less concerned with the promotion of human happiness than with the stock market, law and order, and the preservation of the status quo. Obviously the ideals proposed by Feyerabend are not easily reconcilable with our existing ideology. Feyerabend contends that one of the roots of this con- servative resistance to change and alternative proposals can be found in science, which generally resists hypotheses which compete with well- established theories, a resistance clearly documented by Kuhn.

In opposition to this conservative posture by science, Feyerabend proposes his proliferation principle : "Invent and elaborate theories which are in- consistent with the accepted point of view, even if the latter happen to be highly confirmed and generally accepted... Such a principle would seem to be an essential part of any critical empiricism. ''~ It should be mentioned that Feyerabend employs his proliferation principle as an argument for artistic creativity, given that the latter is indispensable for discovering new insights regarding the qualities and structure of our world. "This coin- cidence.., of the purely subjective and arbitrary with the objective and lawful, is one of the most important arguments in favor of a pluralistic methodology. ' 'r Pluralism in turn is the remedy for both conservatism in science ("Never introduce hypotheses which conflict with the dominant

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paradigm") and the conservatism of the closed society discussed above. Feyerabend concludes by reiterating his call for a new ideal around which

to integrate science and the humanistic disciplines: not the ideal of the closed society but the promotion of human happiness and of what human beings are capable of becoming. Dogmatism, whether expressed in the myths of the closed society or in the dogmas generating scientific conservatism, is therefore incompatible with the alternative ideal of promoting happiness and individual freedom. Feyerabend concludes with the remark that "the progress we can expect in the growth of human knowledge will amply serve these purposes. ''8

In "Against Method" Feyerabend argues that the ideal of science as a purely rational activity proceeding according to "certain and infallible rules" is unrealistic and another example of a dogma. Accordingly, Feyerabend is driven toward an anarchistic epistemology which rejects any appeal by philosophers or scientists to objective truths, rationality, or even "voice of reason." As with all dogmas, the ideal of science as a purely rational pursuit of truth, without regard to ideology and value judgments, is for Feyerabend a belief unworthy of a free man? For Feyerabend, "freedom" is freedom from dogma and spurious ideals: the free man recognizes the tentative and finite character of human reasoning and the extent to which value commitments and ideology influence inference and explanation in both science and non-science. Besides, the myth of total objectivity and rationality tends to promote a scientific elitism, according to which scientists--proceeding according to rules guaranteed to ultimately reveal the truth--are supposedly in a better position than non-scientists con- cerning empirical knowledge in general and the causes of human behavior and policy decisions in particular. However, the interests of men in general are not necessarily synonymous with the interests of scientists. Feyerabend even suggests in places that the pursuit of happiness and the exercise of freedom may simply be incompatible with the mystical pursuit of "Truth". Feyerabend mentions a further danger associated with the myth of objectivity. In a passage reminiscent of Nietzsche, Feyerabend remarks that

is it not possible that science as we know it today (the science of critical rationalism that has been freed from all inductive elements) or a "search for truth" in the style of traditional philosophy will create a monster ? Is it not possible that it will harm man, turn him into a miserable, unfriendly, self- righteous mechanism without charm and without humor ? 1.o

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At best, a science which proceeds according to the dogma of objectivity and

the impartial quest for truth would be thoroughly out of contact with the

everyday affairs of life and the dreams of men; at worst, such a science sees itself as the final arbitrator of not only what constitutes the good life but also of the best (most efficient) means to attain the good life. Such a night- marish situation is vividly described in Walden Two :

At this very moment we have the necessary techniques, both material and psychological, to create a full and satisfying life for eve ryone . . . You can't make progress toward the Good Life by political action ! You must operate upon another level en t i re ly . . . We want a government based upon a science of human behavior. Nothing short of that will produce a permanent social structure. We have faith in our power to change human behavior. We can make men adequate for group l iv ing-- to the satisfaction of everybody. That was our faith, but it's now a fact. 11

To head off such a possibility, Feyerabend totally rejects the classical con- ception of science as a method of inquiry which is independent of questions of value and of what is humanly desirable. This particular account of science for Feyerabend is due to the myth of total objectivity and the supposedly sharp demarcation between the realm of facts and the realm of values, with the former exercising cognitive control and direction over the latter. Science conceived in this sense poses the greatest threat to in- dividual determination of what constitutes the good life. Following Mill,

Feyerabend proposes that instead of defining science and scientific method independently of human values we reverse our approach and locate science within a general theory of man, where science "receives its rules from this general theory and is built up in accordance with our ideas of a worth- while human existence." 12 Again, "the idea of a fixed method, or of a fixed (theory of) rationality, arises from too naive a view of man and of his social surroundings." la

There are three critical points I wish to make regarding Feyerabend's position.

1. Given that Feyerabend's position regarding human happiness and the good life is tied up with his fairly negative conception of science, I will begin with some remarks concerning the latter. It may very well be the case that generations of scientists from Galileo and Newton on have adopted a conservative point of view and turned a deaf ear to counter evidence and

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assaults on well-established theories and the dominant paradigm of the period. Without wanting to defend the overly conservative approach of some scientists regarding existing theories, it should be noted in all fairness that probably the majority of counter hypotheses are either false or crazy, or at least not sufficiently crazy. Max Plan& frequently received manuscripts from cranks as well as from reputable scientists which sketched a "new theory of matter" or a "new theory of time." Planck's usual response was, "Your theory is crazy but not crazy enough to be true." In other words, in science as in politics and love, not all contenders are of equal merit.

Certainly, counter theories and hypotheses deemed crazy should be given a fair run and their day in court. But science as democracy would break down if every crazy hypothesis were countenanced as true and feasible until proven otherwise. Whatever may be the policy in a court of law regarding innocence and guilt, I personally feel that in science it is the unproven hypothesis, the hypothesis mustering little or minimal empirical support, which is suspect, not the well-established theory. The counter hypothesis might be correct, just as might be the radical spokesman, but in both cases the burden of proof is on the contending party, not on the dominant theory (whether scientific or political). Feyerabend appears to argue in places that the dominant paradigm is for that reason probabiy erroneous. Certainly it is more exciting and romantic to take such a tack; after all, who wants to be thought of as a conservative or--worse still--as a reactionary.

The upshot of these remarks thus far is that an overly conservative defense of highly confirmed theories does exert an overall retarding influence on the growth of scientific inquiry. Still, such a retarding is not in my opinion symptomatic of an unhealthy condition. I am fully aware of Feyerabend's contention that new data may only be unearthed by means of alternative hypotheses. For this reason alone the formulation of alternative hypotheses should not simply be tolerated but encouraged. But such a thesis is entirely compatible with my other remarks.

The most viable alternative to Feyerabend's maxim, "everything goes," is "put up or shut up." That is to say, "here is the equipment, the research facilities, the scientific periodicals : document the anomalies, develop your alternative hypotheses, and gather your supporting data."

2. I now turn to Feyerabend's proposal to reorientate the goals and methodology of science within a general theory of man and the good life.

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Certainly there are many positive things to say in defense of such a pro-

posal : the present threat to our environment and our health by a rampant and unchecked technology intent on profits and dividends, vividly points out the need for social legislation. Of course, punitive legislation is only e. temporary step; what is required is a searching reexamination of our in- dividual and collective priorities. In other words, we need some sort of manifesto or blueprint stating what we as a people take to constitute the good life and what we are willing to compromise and not compromise on. Certainly we can not let technology or industry dictate our priorities. I fully

concur with Feyerabend that technology and science should be largely preoccupied with attaining and preserving the good life, whenever we decide

as a people what this consists of. On the other hand, there are the obvious dangers in making science a

slave to man. For Peirce, the maxim underlying scientific inquiry is "Do not

block the road to inquiry." In other words, science should be autonomous from philosophy, religion, and especially politics and social demands. In a state where science is defined within the context of a "general theory of man and receives its rules from this theory and our ideas of a worthwhile human existence," 14 it is indeed questionable whether the road to inquiry could remain free and open. In a recent paper, Feyerabend has written that

The role of science in contemporary society is determined by the belief that scientific results are achieved with the help of a special, non-democratic process. It is this belief that is used in all arguments against state interference (the Lysenko affair !) and for the autonomy of science. The belief is shown to be false : the state must be prepared to interfere with science just as it must be prepared to interfere with other institutions that get out of h a n d . . .

How often is science improved, and turned into a new direction by non- scientific influences ! It is up to us, it is up to the citizens of a free society either to accept the chauvinism of science without contradiction, or to overcome it by the counterfo.rce of public action. This was done by the communists in China during the 'fifties and by some opponents of evolution in California during the 'seventies.' Let us follow their example, and let us free society from the strangling hold of an ideologically petrified science, just as our ancestors freed us from the stranglehood of religion !15

I would argue that unrestricted research may very well generate findings which would require us to reassess our social priorities. This is the case for example in genetics and education, in the mental health field, in social- ecology, and so on. I f one assumes as does Feyerabend that it is social

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priorities which should determine and direct scientific inquiry rather than the ocher way around then a hands off policy regarding research in science would not be encouraged by those responsible for coordinating science with the goal of promoting human happiness. There is the further problem, as Plato clearly foresaw, that the noble lie would at times be more politically

convenient than the uncensored distribution of scientific truth. In either situation, what we would have is simply another form of dictatorship, even

if a benevolent one.

3. Then there is the perennial problem of who decides what the good life is and which scientific findings should be repressed and which acted on. At this point Feyerabend is notoriously fuzzy. He understandably shies away from a detailed account of what constitutes the good life and what social../ political structure would most guarantee and promote human happiness. Feyerabend is too much of a libertarian to venture into the dark waters of creeds and manifestos binding on other men. Nor would he favor a utilitarian formula for determining the good life and happiness, for such a principle invariably creates unhappy minorities. The only other alternatives

are a laissez faire individualism or a dictatorship (whether benevolent or otherwise). The former has been the source of too many social problems, as Dewey for example has clearly noted in Individualism : Old and New. For Feyerabend as for Dewey, by placing excessive economic power in the hands of a few morally irresponsible individuals, a policy of laissez fadre individualism undermines a free society. Conversely, dictatorship is clearly unacceptable in any form to Feyerabend. Where does Feyerabend's position

�9 really leave us : with some overly general remarks about the good life and the promotion of human happiness, and some even more inconclusive proposals regarding the relation between science and a general theory of man. Perhaps there is no such thing after all as a "general theory of man"; perhaps this and the related notions of the "good life" and "making life happier" are in the final analysis nothing more than rhetorical expressions. Perhaps their attraction is more emotive than cognitive. Regarding these and related expressions, Skinner remarks toward the end of Walden Two that

As usual, I was not sure what any of these utterances meant, thought I ex- perienced a nebulous sense of agreement. Insofar as they had any meaning at all, they seemed to refer to worth-while goals. But on one point my reaction was definite : it was obvious that no one, least of all the speaker, had any notion of how to set to work to attain them. xG

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In any case, though Feyerabend speaks to our liberal and humanistic sym- pathies, in the final analysis his remarks on happiness and the good life are unfortunately couched more in the form of ideological slogans and catch- words than in the form of relatively concrete proposals for a social philoso- phy or, in turn, for mapping out the prospective contributions of scientific inquiry to a general theory of man.

In "Against Method" Feyerabend does suggest in one place a possible retort to some of my comments : given that science and the good life may, even in the best of circumstarlces be incompatible, then perhaps we should seriously consider the alternative of a society without science. For example, Feyerabend remarks that "science as we know it today is not inescapable, and that we can construct a world in which it plays no role whatever. (Such a world, I venture to suggest, would be more pleasant to behold than the world we live in today, both materially and intellectually.)" ,7 As one other commentator has also noted, Feyerabend unfortunately does not suggest what such a post-scientific society would be like. is

Perhaps Feyerabend has in mind something like Erewhon, where all machinery and even watches were banned. But of course it is not mere machinery and technology which Feyerabend rails at but a certain type r mentality : positivism, or the view that judgments concerning values and the good life are contingent on and ideally derivable from our knowledge of physical and social laws. This claim is of course central to the Comtean vision of the ideal society; it also finds systematic expression in Walden Two. Furthest removed from positivism and a sdentifically-structured society stands Feyerabend's humanism. For Feyerabend, if we are faced with choosing between a society governed by an intdlectual-scientific elite who insure social stability at the price of conformity, as against a state of anarchy, then Feyerabend unhesitatingly options for the latter. Better chaos and freedom than regimentation arm slavery.

The extent to which these are mutually exclusive alternatives is far from clear to this writer. Certainly one can envision societies which place a pre- mium on humanitarian values as well as on the development o,f critical in- telligence and considered judgment. Dewey for one thought that these were compatible and mutually reinforcing, as did Whitehead, Russell, and Popper. Personally I am most sympathetic with the open society envisioned by Popper. For Popper all living is essentially a process of problem solving. Consequently, that social structure should be preferred which is most con-

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ducive to the conjecture and refutation of tentative hypotheses, searching criticism, and error elimination. An ideal society would thus be one which consistently utilizes this self-correcting process of conjecture, criticism, and refutation in shaping its policies and priorities. A society organized along such lines will for Popper be infinitely more effective than closed societies in resolving its problems and in realizing the aspirations of its citizens. Obviously such a society is not possible without intelligent politically re- sponsible agents functioning within a noncoerdve political environment. For Popper, Feyerabend's proposals of epistemological and political anarchism would ultimately issue in scepticism and apathy. What humanism has most to fear is not science and rational criticism so much as scientism, or the claim that the conflict between competing values and questions concerning the good life can in principle be resolved only by a scientific elite. As with so many other issues, Feyerabend has in my judgment taken an extreme position to make an otherwise valuable p9int regarding the potential dangers of scientism to a free society. But after all, whether Feyerabend's critique of scientism and his own alternative proposals appear obvious or wildly implausible depends to a large extent on how we construe the relation--if any--between scientific ideology on the one hand, and values and the good life on the other.

REFERENCES

1 P. Feyerabend, "Science, Freedom, and the Good Life." Philosophical Forum, vol. i (~968),

pp. 127-I35. 2 ........................ , "Against Me thod : Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge," in M. Radner and S. vvVinokur (eds.) M i n n e s e ~ Studies in the PhiIosophy of Science, Vol. IV

(Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press, x97o), pp. ~7-x3o. a p. Feyerabend, "Science, Freedom, and the Good Life;" op. eit.; p. 229. In a paper entitled "'Feyerabend and a Scienc~ Without Experience" (forthcoming) t have concentrated on a few

of these issues, 4 Ibld., p. xag.

Ibid., p. ~ o . P. Feyerabend, "Against Method," op. eit., p. 26.

7 Ibid., p. 27. s p. Feyerabend, "Science, Freedom and the Good Life" op. cir, 0 p. Feyerabend, "Against Method," op. cir., p. ax. t0 Ibid. , p. 76. xx B.F. Skinner, Walden Two (New York : Macmillan, 1948), pp. I93-196. ~,2 p. Feyerabend, "Agains t Method," op. cir., p. 29. 18 Ibld., p. 25. In a footnote Feyerabend makes an interesting though debatable contrast between Mill and Popper regarding the relation between science and a general theory of man :

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For Mill the (mater ia l and spiri tual) welfare of the individual , the full development of his capacit ies , is the p r ima ry aim. The fact that the methods used for ach iev ing this a im also yield a scientif ic phi losophy, a book of rules concerning the ' search for t ru th , ' is a side effect , though a p leasan t one. For Popper the search for the t ru th seems to be much more impor tan t and it seems occasionally to even ou t r ank the in teres ts of the individual . In this my sympath ies are f i rmly wi th Mill. (p. :[xo)

14 Ibid., p. 29. 15 p. Feyerabend, " 'Science ' . The M y t h & its Role in Socie ty ," Inquiry, Vol. :L8 (x975) ,

pp. ~67 and ~74-I75. 1G B.F. Skinner , W~Iden Two, op. cir., p. 3~2. 17 p. Feyerabend, " A g a i n s t M e t h o d , " op. cit., p. 90. 18 N. Koertge, " F o r and Aga in s t M e t h o d , " in The British ]ournal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 23 , no. 3 (I972), P. 285.

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