Fertilitatea În Japonia Și Franța

H. KojimaJean-Louis Rallu

Fertility in Japan and France (Population, 5, 1997)In: Population, 10e anne, n2, 1998 pp. 319-347.

Citer ce document / Cite this document :

Kojima H., Rallu Jean-Louis. Fertility in Japan and France (Population, 5, 1997). In: Population, 10e anne, n2, 1998 pp. 319-347.

http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/pop_0032-4663_1998_hos_10_2_6832

AbstractKojima (Hiroshi), Rallu (Jean-Louis). - Fertility in Japan and France Fertility in Japan and France wasvery similar between 1975 and 1985, but the subsequent decline has been greater in Japan, wherelevels have stood at below 1.5 births per woman since 1993. A study of fertility using civil registrationand survey data, and from indices based on the parity-specific birth probabilities, reveals that thedecline in fertility in Japan was due to the fall in nuptiality until the mid-1980s but that since then therehas also been a fall in fertility within marriage. Unlike in France, extra-marital fertility has not increasedin Japan, and the compensation due to postponed births remained at a low level until the start of the1990s. There are various cultural and economic obstacles in Japan to an increase in fertility outsidemarriage and among older women. It is through these new forms of fertility behaviour that France hasbeen able to maintain a relatively high fertility based on an overall rate of childlessness that is still quitelow.

RsumKojima (Hiroshi), Rallu (Jean-Louis). - La fcondit au Japon et en France La fcondit tait peudiffrente au Japon et en France entre 1975 et 1985, mais la baisse a t ensuite plus importante auJapon avec des niveaux infrieurs 1,5 naissance par femme depuis 1993. L'tude de la fcondit partir de donnes d'tat civil et d'enqutes, et d'indices bass sur les probabilits de naissance parrang, montre que la baisse de la fcondit au Japon a rsult de la baisse de la nuptialit jusqu'aumilieu des annes 1980 mais consiste aussi depuis lors en une baisse de la fcondit dans le mariage. la diffrence de la France, on n'observe pas au Japon d'augmentation de la fcondit hors mariage etla rcupration des naissances retardes est reste peu importante jusqu'au dbut des annes 1990.Le dveloppement de la fcondit hors mariage et des ges avancs se heurte diverses contraintesculturelles et conomiques. C'est, au contraire, grce ces nouveaux comportements que la Franceconserve une fcondit assez leve sur la base d'une infcondit des gnrations encore assez faible.

ResumenKojima (Hiroshi), Rallu (Jean-Louis). - La fecundidad en Japon y en Francia Entre 1975 y 1985, losnivels de fecundidad de Francia y Japon eran similares, pero la disminucin posterior fue ms fuerteen Japon, donde se alcanzan nivels inferiores a 1,5 nacimientos por mujer despus de 1993. Elestudio de la fecundidad a partir de datos del registro civil, encuestas e indices ba- sados en lasprobabilidades de nacimiento por rango, muestra que la disminucin de la fecundidad observada enJapon fue debida a la disminucin de la nupcialidad hasta la mitad de los aos ochenta, pero que, msrecientemente, se explica tambin por la disminucin de la fecundidad dentro del matrimonio. Adiferencia de Francia, en Japon no se observa un aumento de la fecundidad fuera del matrimonio y lafecundidad en edades avanzadas sigue siendo poco significativa hasta el incio de la dcada de losnoventa. Ambos fenmenos (fecundidad fuera del matrimonio y en edades avanzadas) se enfrentan amultiples restricciones culturales y econmicas. En Francia, sin embargo, estos nuevoscomportamientos mantienen el nivel de fecundidad rela- tivamente elevado, teniendo en cuenta queexiste un nivel todavia reducido de infecundidad.

FERTILITY IN JAPAN

AND FRANCE

A considerable cultural distance separates Japan from France. In the field of demography, the long-term fertility trends were different right up to the 1960s, and their determinants certainly had little in common. During the last twenty years, however, many similarities between the two countries have emerged. Hiroshi KOJIMA* and Jean-Louis Rallu** present here an in-depth comparative analysis of fertility trends in Japan and France. They systematically review the different indicators and investigate the reasons for converging or diverging beha

viours: for instance, Japan has, like France, experienced a marriage crisis beginning in the 1970s, but this has been expressed by a rise in age at marriage and an increasing dissociation of marriage and parenthood, which has brought the Japanese fertility level below the French one. In France, cohabitation has caused a sharp rise in births outside marriage, but fertility values have been more resistant than in Japan to this social revolution.

Fertility in Japan has fallen below 1.5 live births per woman since 1993. Japan now has, after Russia and the European Union, the lowest fertility in the category of populations exceeding 100 million. From 1975 to 1985, Japan and France displayed very similar TFRs, around 1.8, except during France's short-lived gain in 1980-82. But since 1985, the decline has been more rapid in Japan than in France, where fertility was only down to 1.7 in 1995.

Such convergences and divergences between the Japanese and French fertility trends call for a detailed comparative analysis. We shall explore here the differences in fertility behaviour (birth orders), family formation (nuptiality, cohabitation and extra-marital fertility) and, more generally, in societal organization (women's labour force participation, gender roles).

Japan and France use different source materials for the study of fertility: the former depends more heavily on surveys, the latter on civil registration. Although the reason is convention rather than any real grounds of data availability, this difference has consequences for fertility studies. Survey data may be biased in several ways, particularly when the sample was small, which is the case of the Mainichi Shimbun National Survey on

* National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Tokyo. ** INED.

Population: An English Selection, 10(2), 1998, 319-348

320 ., J.-L. RALLU

1. Fertility data in Japan

The Japanese Ministry of Health has published since 1965 a series of annual birth statistics by mother's age and parity (live births). This now permits a retrospective study of fertility going back thirty years and yields longitudinal fertility findings. The census data provide women's parity structure at time of census. We interpolated and updated this information year by year, using the fertility rates calculated from registration data(1). An earlier study by the IPP (1990) estimated the parity structure by cumulating fertility rates cohortwise; the results were similar to our own. The civil registration data also provide information on births by marriage duration and parity; it would be preferable, however, to know birth order in current marriage to calculate parity progression ratios by marriage duration.

The Japanese civil registration data do not provide information on birth intervals, which must come from surveys. We used the birth intervals from the 10th National Fertility Survey taken by the IPP in 1992 to distribute the birth registration data by interval since previous birth. The parity progression ratios calculated in this way, by combining registration and survey data, differ quite notably from those derived from survey data alone, which consider only first-married women married to first-married men and thus overestimate fertility.

Births by mother's age and duration since previous birth - required to estimate PADTFR (see below) - were calculated as follows. Fertility rates by duration since previous birth for mothers of all ages were applied to births of order n classed by mother's age to construct a table of births of order n+\ by mother's age and duration. This table was then fitted to the actual data: births by mother's age (registration data) and births by interval since previous birth (derived from survey data as described above). Since fertility in Japan is strongly concentrated round the modal age at each birth order, the birth intervals should not vary much with age; moreover, some of this dispersion was taken into account in the adjustment.

C> The female populations of each age were interpolated between censuses. Since some cohorts showed unexplained changes between successive censuses, we first made some corrections by rtroprojection. The populations at time of census (1 Oct.) were adjusted to mid-year (25:75). Up to 1972, the data concern Japan without Okinawa.

Family Planning (5,000 women in 1996) or the Institute of Population Problems (IPP)('> National Fertility Survey (9,000 women in 1992). However, surveys based on very large samples - such as the French Family Survey (330,000 women in 1990) - may also be biased by mis-statements, omissions or dating errors, made on purpose or not (see boxed text no. 2). Such problems may authorize some doubt as to whether the quasi-stability - at a rather high level - of the first-birth probabilities in Japan is compatible with a TFR of 1.5, or whether this stability reflects, to a large extent, survey bias and the fact that the probabilities are by convention

(1) Attached to the Ministry of Health and Welfare. Since its merger with another institute in December 1996, it has become the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.

FERTILITY IN JAPAN AND FRANCE 321

calculated on first marriages alone. In France, fertility by birth order can be studied only through the Family Surveys (taken with each general population census since 1975), because this information is either unavailable or unreliable in the registration data.

The Japanese yearbooks publish data on Japanese nationals only and on the whole population. The most detailed tables, which we have used here, concern Japanese nationals. However, since the scale of immigration is relatively small in Japan, the results can be taken to apply to the whole population.

I. - Fertility

Cross-national comparisons of fertility are generally based on total fertility rates (TFRs). But this period index is sensitive to structures that reflect the past, in particular women's parity structure or distribution by duration since last birth, as a study of French fertility has demonstrated (Rallu

2. Fertility data in France

Civil registration data on births by mother's age and parity are available in France from 1946 to 1966 (apart from 1953-54). Information on birth order in current marriage is available since 1946. The information on parity was abandoned from 1967 to 1987 because of inaccuracies, while birth order in current marriage, based on births registered in the livret de famille - the 'family book' handed to newly-weds and updated for each vital event - was more reliable. Parity has been reintroduced since 1988 in birth registration forms but it is not correctly recorded and the data are not published by INSEE. Information on parity is collected by the Family Survey associated with the census. Matrixes of births by woman's parity and birth order in current marriage were derived from these surveys and used to calculate births by parity from the registration data. But some births outside of marriage may be stated as having occurred after marriage (by misreporting of date of birth or marriage* !) ), thus biasing the survey data and making some adjustment necessary. That is why we have preferred not to extrapolate the results of the Family Survey taken in 1990, and why the French data presented here go no further than 1989.

Births by order in current marriage and duration since previous event (birth or marriage) are provided by the registration data since 1959. Parity progression ratios can thus be calculated as from 1975. Births by parity were distributed by duration since previous birth in the same way as births by order in current marriage. Births by age and duration were calculated like the Japanese data, by constructing a table cross-classifying mother's age and duration since last birth, which was then fitted to the actual data.

(1) In addition, a date of marriage preceding the date of first birth is automatically attributed to married mothers who did not state date of marriage.

322 H.KOJIMA, J.-L. RALLU

and Toulemon, 1994). Civil registration and survey data can be combined to calculate period fertility indices that are independent of these structures.

The period indices We shall use the fertility indices previously tailed and applied to France (Rallu and Toule

mon, 1994): TFR (the conventional synthetic measure of period fertility), PATFR (the synthetic measure taking parity and age into account), PDTFR (the synthetic measure taking parity and duration since previous event into account) and PADTFR (the synthetic measure taking parity, age and duration since previous event into account). Whereas with TFR age-specific fertility rates are cumulated and all women are in the denominator, the other indices are birth probabilities and only women who have not already experienced the event and are susceptible of experiencing it are in the denominator: for instance, only women who have already borne one child are at risk of having a second birth. For first births, PATFR, PDTFR and PADTFR are based on the same data: the age-specific probabilities that childless women will have a first birth, summarized by a fertility schedule - analogous to the survivor function - which gives the proportion of women having had a first birth at each age in the fertile lifespan. For births of second and higher orders, the data control for parity and age, or parity and duration, or all three simultaneously and they are entered successively into the calculation. The equations relative to these different indices are presented in detail in the paper referenced above.

Time trends in TFR Following a brief post-war recovery, fertility in Japan fell from 4.3 in 1949 to just below replace

ment level in 1957, a reduction of more than 2.2 in the space of eight years: certainly one of the most rapid transitions ever. TFR then rose slightly and was above replacement level from 1965 to 1973 - with the exception of 1966, the horse-fire year in the Japanese calendar, when popular belief s(2) brought it plummeting to a level of 1.58 (Figure la). Starting in 1974, there was a new and rapid downturn, to 1.8 in 1977 and 1.73 in 1980-81. After a short-lived rise to 1.8 in 1983-84, the decline resumed, and TFR was down to 1.46 in 1993, 1.50 in 1994, 1.42 in 1995 and 1.43 in 1996.

The baby boom kept fertility in France well above replacement level during the 1960s. After peaking in 1964, as in many Western countries, TFR started to fall and was below replacement from 1975. A short recovery in 1980-82 brought the level to 1.95, then after a new reduction TFR stabilized around 1.8 until 1988, when it declined anew: it was down to 1.65 in 1993-94 and 1.70 in 1995.

Thus, fertility in Japan was far behind the French level during the 1960s, and although its increase in 1965-73 has been termed the 'Japanese

(2) A superstition, relayed by the media, that girls born that year would be particularly difficult to marry. The result was that women avoided having a baby that year.


Children per woman 3.0

1.2

1.0

TFR France

TFR Japan

i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993

Year

Figure 1a. - Total fertility rates (TFR), Japan and France

baby boom', Figure la shows how relative this was. The two TFR trends are remarkably similar during the mid-1970s low period which has often been, perhaps precipitately, attributed to the oil shock; we shall come back to this later. The subsequent recovery occurred later and was slighter and briefer in Japan than in France, and it was followed by a more substantial decline. Between 1975 and 1985, both countries were among those industrialized countries that were closest to replacement level. Since then, the two have diverged, and Japan is now heading towards a markedly low fertility. In reality, the earlier resemblances conceal profound differences that come to light when we examine the other indices - PATFR, PDTFR and PADTFR - and in particular their birth-order components.

The other indices The different indices based on birth probabilities - PATFR (parity-age-TFR), PDTFR (parity-

duration-TFR) and PADTFR (parity-age-duration-TFR) - follow the same order in Japan and France. They were all lower than TFR up to 1974 (Japan) or 1975 (France), then higher than TFR (Figures lb and lc). We note, however, that the gap between TFR and PATFR is wider in Japan than in France after 1975, which expresses a more favourable parity structure in Japan, while the gap between TFR and PDTFR is wider in France, expressing a greater birth interval effect. PADTFR, which takes both parity and duration since previous birth into account, has a similar position relative to TFR

324 H.K0J1MA, J.-L. RALLU


2.8

2.6

2.4

2.2

2.0

PDiTFR

PADTFR PDTFR

1.8 -

1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 Year

Figure 1b. - Period fertility indices, Japan

in both countries (7% higher around 1990). The different positions and time trends of PATFR, PDTFR and PADTFR in relation to TFR are explained by birth order factors.

In the case of first births, TFR exceeds PATFR when women's parity structure is favourable, that is, when the proportion childless - at risk of first birth - is higher, in a given year, in the actual population than in the synthetic population (female population by age and parity constructed from the fertility rates observed that year). This is the case when lower, or later, fertility in preceding years has left more women still childless. For second and higher order births (n = 2+), TFR is lower than PATFR when the proportion of women of a given age having n-\ children is lower in the actual population than in the stable population associated with the fertility of that year. This was the case during the baby boom and up to the early 1970s, in a context of earlier childbearing owing to earlier marriage or union formation and to shorter birth intervals. Japan, as well as France and Western Europe, although to a lesser extent, experienced this situation in the 1960s and early 1970s (see below).

After 1975 (1974 in Japan), the parity structure does not work in favour of TFR. For first births:

Owing to the fertility decline among younger women, the proportion of women who have already borne one child is higher, from 1976 on, than that derived from the 'current conditions'. Young women have fewer first



1.6

1.4

PDiTFR

.^.~. PDTFR

i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993

Year

Figure 1c. - Period fertility indices, France

births, but also older women, simply because they have already had their first child in previous years, when the rates were higher among young women. (3)

For second and, even more, third and higher order births, the parity structure is favourable to TFR when higher fertility in the past means that many women already have one, two or more children and are at risk of having another one. However, fertility also depends on birth intervals: delay in second and further births is due not only to a rise in mean age of mothers at first birth, but also to the fact they wait longer before having another child. As a result, at each age, the duration since last birth is longer in the actual population than in the fictitious population constructed from current fertility conditions, and for the same reasons, at each duration since previous birth, the women are younger in the observed population than in the stable population associated with the current conditions. It is, therefore, necessary to calculate an index, PADTFR, that takes into account parity, age and birth intervals.

Since 1975, the first-birth component of TFR (TFR1) is lower than the corresponding PATFR component and the second-birth component of TFR is also lower than the corresponding PADTFR component, but for third and higher birth orders, TFR is higher than PADTFR (Figure 2). Variations in TFR, and especially in its second and third-birth components,

(3) Rallu and Toulemon, loc. cit, pp. 80-81.


Children 950 900 850 800 750 700 650 600 550 500 450 400 350 300 250 200 150 100 50

per 1 ,000 women

PATFRl France PATFR1 Japan

PADTFR2 France

TFR3 France

TFR2 France PADTFR2 Japan

TFR2 Japan PADTFR3 France

TFR3 Japan PADTFR3 Japan

TFR4 France / PADTFR4 France TFR4 Japan

/ / PADTFR4 Japan

Figure 2. - Birth order components of period fertility indices, Japan

appear to be strongly dependent on TFR of orders n-l. For instance, the drop in TFR2 in the early 1980s in Japan is clearly the result of the drop in TFR1 in the late 1970s, given that the second-birth component of PADTFR indicates no change in the probability of having a second child from 1977 to 1984. This does not continue afterwards: a reduction of PADTFR, at first parallel with TFR then less acute, shows the probability of having a second child has fallen, affecting family formation; we shall discuss this point later. In France, on the contrary, the slight drop in TFR2 in the late 1980s is merely the result of the earlier drop in TFR1, since PADTFR remains stable or even rises somewhat.

Concerning third births, the structural effects (of parity and birth interval) are increasingly favourable to TFR in both countries during the period 1975-80, and then from 1985 on. In Japan, however, these favourable effects fade out in 1992-94. The structures are also favourable to fourth-birth TFR, but this component is very small in Japan.

Thus, the relative positions of TFR, PATFR and PADTFR vary with birth order, and the greatest differences in absolute values are observed for first births. Although not negligible for third and higher orders, the impact of the first-birth component is the strongest - and the second-birth


component reinforces this effect, especially for PADTFR. For all birth orders combined, PATFR and PADTFR are higher than TFR since 1975. This would suggest that the postponement of first births is the primary cause of the low fertility currently observed in both Japan and France. The fact that the position of the different indices is inversed at practically the same moment in both countries shows the changes in fertility behaviour occurred almost simultaneously and in the same direction.

In summary, the Japanese fertility level in 1994 amounts to 1.60 according to PADTFR, 7% more than TFR but less than PDTFR (1.65), which is often used to derive fertility values from the fertility and family planning surveys in Japan. The French fertility level in 1989 was 1.94 according to PADTFR (vs 1.68 in Japan that year), which was also 7% higher than TFR and much lower than PDTFR, which is not used in France.

Period fertility levels We leave aside the birth-order components of by birth order TFR, which are too sensitive to the influence

of the past - written into the structure of the female population by parity and duration since last event - to give a satisfactory measure of period fertility. Although different from cohort measures of infertility, the cross-sectional measures of fertility by birth order based on PATFR reflect the contrast in levels and trends between Japan and France. According to the PATFR value in 1994, for instance, 23% of Japanese women remain childless, a sharp contrast with the situation in 1967-73 when the level was only 9%. According to the French PATFR for 1989, 14% of women remain childless (vs 21% in Japan that year), compared to 9% in 1976 - a similar level to Japan. Thus, Japan has experienced a much more drastic fall in first-birth fertility during the 1980s than France (Figure 2). The decline also began later than in France - 1983 as against 1980 - and so has been all the more rapid.

Second-birth fertility was very high in Japan before 1975, with 0.83 second births per woman in 1968-73 (Feeney, 1986). The level began to fall, however, in 1974 and was down to 0.75 by 1976 according to PADTFR, and only 0.60 in 1994. In France, there were 0.68 second births per woman in 1989 (a similar level to Japan: 0.65, see Appendix Table 2), but the trend since 1976 (0.64) has been very stable or even risen slightly, unlike the sharp fall in Japan (Figure 2). It is true that France's second-birth fertility was particularly low in the mid-1970s, for contextual reasons; we note, however, that the Japanese level has recently fallen below that of France in 1976.

Third-birth fertility is much higher in France than in Japan from the outset of the study period. It declined in France from 1964 to 1976, down to 0.22 third births per woman according to PADTFR, then climbed unevenly back up to a level of 0.28 in 1989. There was also a slight upturn in third-birth fertility in Japan during the early 1980s. Thus, the 1980s have been marked by an increase in third births in both countries, but at


different moments, and less significantly in Japan, where the level has since dropped at the end of the 1980s before stabilizing at around 0.20 third births per woman. As for births of fourth and higher orders, they are much more rare in Japan than in France.

Period parity progression ratios The period parity progression ratio (PPPR) flo (progression from marriage

to first birth) will not be shown for France because the high proportion of extra-marital births (36% of all births in 1994 and probably 50% of first births) makes this index meaningless. In Japan, where the proportion of births outside marriage has remained low (1.2% in 1994), marriage and family formation are closely linked and first-birth fertility depends to a large extent on first marriage rates.

We calculate PPPR a0for Japan from all first births and first marriages recorded in the registers. Some first births occur in a second marriage, which will slightly bias the results, since the intervals used are between marriage and first birth within a first marriage; however, this should have little effect. We note also that the use of marriage registration data is complicated by the fact that marriages may be reported with some delay in Japan, which meant we had to estimate the numbers for recent years (see boxed text no. 3).

PPPR a0 was very high in Japan until the early 1970s, with more than 0.97 first births per marriage from 1965 to 1971, with the exception of 1966. It fell in the first half of the 1970s and was then stable at around 0.92 until 1983 (Figure 3), when a new reduction occurred in two stages, around 1985 and 1990, which brought the value down to 0.84 in 1993 (0.86 in 1994). This level is distinctly lower than that calculated from women in first marriages in the Fertility Surveys: the 1992 survey put it at 0.9

3. Nuptiality data for Japan

In Japan, marriages are not registered immediately, but only when the spouses decide to do so. Delayed registration also applies to divorces, in which Japan is in line with France and many other countries. Thus, the number of marriages in a given year has to be reconstructed by summing the marriages recorded in year of marriage and in following years, the registration data noting year of marriage. Very few marriages are recorded more than ten years after the event, and so reconstructing annual numbers of marriages was straightforward up to 1984. Thereafter, we used constant registration rates by marriage duration. The proportion of marriages recorded in year of event grew from 73% in 1955 to 92% in 1976 and has been relatively stable since. Marriages with delayed registration were redistributed by age according to a slightly older age pattern than those registered in year of marriage (Cohort Marriage Tables for Females in Japan, 1950-87, IPP, 1989). The proportions of women of each age remaining single were derived from census data and interpolated for intercensal years on the basis of first marriage rates.


400

300

200

100

600 a2 France

500 h ..--"*---. I y---- a2Japan

I \"

fl3 France

\ a3 Japan J I I I I I I I I I I I I I I L

oooooooooonoon On On On On On On On On

Figure 3. - Period parity progression ratios in Japan and France (per 1,000)

in 1991. The above-mentioned bias in our calculation cannot explain all this difference, which may be due to survey bias through over-representation of longer-lasting and more fertile first marriages.

PPPR a0 measured in first marriages is less and less representative of the corresponding ratio in all marriages: the proportion of marriages ending in divorce rose from 7.5% in the mid-1960s to 18% in 1983, when there was a slight about-turn followed by a new increase starting in 1989; the final percentage in 1994 is 22.5%. Divorce was more frequent in France: 11% in 1965, 27% in 1983 and 35% in 1994 (Sardon, 1996). According to the Japanese Fertility Survey, 48.6% of these dissolved marriages are infertile, since divorce often occurs in the early years of marriage and infertility is sometimes a cause of divorce. Remarriages represent more than 10% of all marriages since 1983, as against 6% in 1970. They peaked at 12% in 1989 but have barely moved since (11.4% in 1994). Now, according to the 1992 Fertility Survey, a0 in remarriages ranges from 60% to 67% in the period 1981-90. All these facts contribute to reducing a0, and the values derived from the survey data on women in first marriages overstate the probabilities of having a first child. The decline of first-birth fertility was for a long time caused essentially by marriage decline or postponement, but marital fertility rates have apparently also started to fall since the mid-1980s.

PPPR a, (the probability of having a second child when a first has been borne) was very high in Japan - 0.9 - until the early 1970s. It fell

330

Probabilities per 1,000

H.KOJIMA, J.-L. RALLU

400

Japan 1975 Order 2

3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Duration (years)

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

-

-

/ /

/ . - / /

' 1

Japan 1989

///Japan 1975 \

1/ France 1975

i i i

France

1

1989

l i

Order 3

| | T^: ~ " - -|- 0 1 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

Duration (years)

Figure 4. - Birth probabilities of orders 2 and 3 by duration since previous birth, Japan and France


in the mid-1970s then rose again, and remained just under the 0.9 level between 1978 and 1984. A further decrease brought it down to 0.8 in 1992- 94. This value is again lower than that calculated from first marriages in the Fertility Survey.

PPPR a2 (the probability of having a third child when a second has been borne) was around 0.4 before 1973 and fell to 0.3 in 1975. It then rose, particularly in the early 1980s, and has stabilized at around 0.37 since 1984. Parity progression ratio a3 (the probability of having a fourth child when a third has been borne) is very low and the time trend is more or less parallel to a2.

In France, ax was 0.83 in 1965 and fell below 0.70 in the mid-1970s - a level much lower than in Japan - before climbing back up to 0.8 during the 1980s (Figure 3). The fluctuations in a, are much more marked in France than in Japan. It is also noteworthy that until recently (owing to the decline in Japan), \ was much lower in France than in Japan, while a2 and, even more, a3- despite having experienced, like au substantial variations around 1980 - have been much higher in France. Leaving aside France's rapid about-turn in a2, the two countries show some similarity in the pattern observed from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s in a2 and a3, namely an upward trend.

The birth probabilities by duration since previous birth, which express the probability that women at parity n-1 will have an nth birth, are better than fertility rates by birth interval - particularly at long durations - for showing the extent of the fertility variations in France between 1975 and the end of the 1980s. The second-birth probabilities were very low in France in 1975, but they picked up rapidly thereafter (Figure 4a). In Japan, the changes are barely discernible at durations below 4 years: the Japanese family model - a second birth following close on the heels of the first - was scarcely affected by the fertility decline in the mid-1970s. At durations 4 years and more, however, the second-birth probabilities are observed to have fallen somewhat between 1975 and 1989, showing that a change in family formation has, in fact, occurred. The annual PADTFR values (Appendix Table 2) confirm that the birth of a second child has become less frequent since the mid-1980s, and only just about stabilized in the early 1990s. Thus, at a time when French women responded to the context by spacing their births and increased fertility at long durations, the behaviour of Japanese women was relatively unyielding. Similar patterns of change are observed in the third-birth probabilities in the two countries, with an increase this time also in Japan (Figure 4b); nonetheless, they remain much higher in France in 1989 at durations of 4 years and more since the second birth.

Mean age of mothers After a slight drop in age at first birth between the late 1960s and the early 1970s, the mean

age of mothers at the birth of children of each order (calculated from age- specific fertility rates) began to rise in the mid-1970s in both Japan and


Years of age 34

32

30

22

Japan order 3

_ . Japan order 2 France order 2

France order 1

20 i i i i i i i i i i i i i l I l l l l l l l l l l l i i l 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993

Year Figure 5. - Mean age of mothers at birth of children of orders 1

to 3, Japan and France

France (Figure 5). Age at first birth then grew more rapidly in France than in Japan, because of the greater recovery of delayed first births at late childbearing ages (see above). Mean age at second birth runs parallel with mean age at first birth in Japan, where most first births are followed by a second birth with stable interval patterns; mean age at third birth follows a similar trend. In France, while a slight dip is observed in age at first birth during the early 1970s, the mean ages at second and third births rise, mostly owing to a lengthening of birth intervals. Thereafter, the three time trends move in the same direction, but they are less parallel than in Japan and the ages increase more rapidly. Thus, fertility has remained younger overall in France, but the gap with Japan has shrunk from 1 year in 1965 to less than 0.5 year in 1989.

II. - Nuptiality and fertility

Given that extra-marital fertility is very low in Japan, the level of nuptiality has a strong influence on childlessness, and the recent developments in first-birth fertility must be considered from this perspective.


First marriages First marriage rates for females were very high in Japan up to 1970, with about 97% of women marrying,

according to the calendar-year tables(4). The censuses prior to 1960 even give proportions of women ever-married at age 50 higher than 98% (Feeney and Saito, 1985). In the latter half of the 1960s, the period total first marriage rate (TFMR) exceeded 0.95 (Figure 6) and women's mean age at marriage was 24.6, a relatively high age because of long studies for most girls. Such high indices explain that the substantial rise observed in Europe in the late 1960s could not occur in Japan. There was simply a slight upturn in TFMR, to 0.975 in 1971, while women's mean age at marriage fell to 24.4 in 1972-73. Starting in 1973, Japan experienced a marriage decline similar to the West, although more irregular: an increase in TFMR in 1979- 82 was followed by a decrease until 1987, when it amounted to 0.77. Then the first marriage rates stabilized and even rose slightly, bringing TFMR to a level of 0.80 in 1991-94. The measure derived from the calendar-year

Calendar-year tables, Japan

TFMR, France

Calendar-year tables, France

0.8

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.4

0.3 l i l i i i i l l i l i i i i i l i i i i i i i i i i i

u-i t^ oo o\ o 'oin^ifihooaO" cNo^vivor-ooavO N m Tf NOvO4OvONOt^t^I^t~-t^r^r^r^t^(^00000000000000000000ONONONONON On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On On

Year Figure 6. - First marriage indicators for women, Japan and France

(4) By calendar-year table, we refer to the period index obtained by combining the age-specific probabilities of first marriage in a given year, that is, taking into account the fact that only never-married persons can marry for the first time. The total first marriage rate (TFMR) is a period sum of incidence rates, that is, relating first marriages at a given age to the total population of that age, whether at risk or not. Cf. Rallu and Toulemon loc. cit., p. 85 and Table 4 in the Demographic Situation annual report in Population: An English Selection.


tables shows higher values and a smoother trend. We note in particular that the decline emerges in 1970 with this index - therefore prior to the oil shock in 1973 - and that there is a levelling-off from 1978 to 1983, which contrasts with the rise in TFMR. Thus, the rise was merely due to the structure of the female population by marital status, which also applies to the recent upturn since the end of the 1980s (Figure 6). The proportion of women remaining single at age 50 is 15% according to the table for 1994, as against 21% according to TFMR.

Nuptiality trends were fairly similar in Japan and France from 1965 to 1977, when the decline was accelerating in France while Japan held stable. In 1994, however, there is a vast difference in nuptiality level between the two, with 35% of French women remaining single at age 50 according to the tables (50% according to TFMR), compared to 15% in Japan. However, the proportion of young women living in a union is higher in France, owing to the frequency of unmarried cohabitation: 70% of women aged 25-29 were living with a partner in 1994 (Toulemon, 1997), whereas only 53% of Japanese women in this age group were married in 1995 (census data) and cohabitation has spread very slowly and only in the cities; in

Probabilities per 1,000

250

200 -

150 -

100 -

50 -

First marriages

il

- If

^isa&f"\ 1 1 1

1977

/ \

/ / / / / /

;

/ \ / First births

i i i i i i

First births 1977

\ First marriages

\

1994 \

i i i i i i i i

1994

1 1 1 1 ""i^-t-i^-_4-J--.t-i,.J.--

Age Figure 7. - Women's first marriage and first birth probabilities by

age, Japan, 1977 and 1994

(5) The proportion was lower in the 1992 IPP survey (3.1% at ages 20-24 and 4.5% at 25-29), but there may have been some under-reporting due to the fact that it was conducted by a government organisation.

FERTILITY IN JAP AN AND FRANCE 335

the Mainichi Shimbun survey, barely 5%(5) of single women under 30 reported having cohabited (Wagatsuma, 1996(6)). The situation is inversed in age group 30-34: 83% of Japanese women are married, while 79% of French women are in a married or unmarried union.

First marriages and In traditional Japanese society, couples started a first births family shortly after marrying. This was still the

case in 1977, after the fertility decline had started. In Figure 7, we see the age-specific first marriage and first-birth probability curves are almost parallel in 1977, with a one-year gap.

By 1994, the first marriage probabilities have fallen sharply before age 29, and there is no rise after this age. The first birth probabilities display a similar pattern, but the decline is more marked and the two curves no longer run parallel before age 29; after this age, there is a slight upturn in first births(7). In Figure 8, we observe that this upturn after age 30 was irregular and hesitant between 1980 and 1990, then more regular but still

Probabilities per 1 ,000 200

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

Age Figure 8. - First birth probabilities by age, Japan and France

since 1980

-

France

-

Japan

1980/ V /

/y

1980

-'

1 1

Japan 1990 Japan 1994

i i i i i i i

\ France \/

i i i

1989

i i

' * The same author reports that when women who are cohabiting or are not in a stable union become pregnant, they generally either marry or abort.


modest between 1990 and 1994. In contrast, the first birth probabilities have grown much more substantially in France between 1980 and 1989, and as from age 28. We shall come back later to this relatively slight upturn in Japan.

Thus, the Japanese fertility decline in the mid-1970s appears to have been solely caused by the nuptiality decline which emerged around 1970, according to the first marriage tables. This is not the case in 1980, when marital fertility shows distinct signs of a real decrease: the Japanese model of virtually universal marriage and of family formation implying a first birth very early in marriage followed closely by a second, is thus challenged. The compensation mechanism whereby the first births that do not occur at young ages are 'recovered' at later childbearing ages is not really observed yet in Japan, and this explains much of the fertility decline, given that there is no increase in extra-marital births to slow it down.

III. - Cohort replacement

Let us first take a look at the components of Japanese and French fertility in recent years. The levels of first marriage and of fertility of each birth order are very different (Table 1), and the TFR value in 1989 is 1.81 in France vs 1.57 in Japan, and 1.65 vs 1.50 in 1994 (for reasons of data availability, we compare the situations in 1989). TFMR is 22 percentage points lower in France than in Japan, but this goes together with a far higher proportion of extra-marital births. Although the parity progression ratio fl0 (from marriage to first birth) remains high in Japan, the first-birth component of TFR is lower than in France. Because of higher a, ratios and higher first-birth fertility during the mid-1980s, Japan maintains a second-birth TFR close to that of France, but its lower fertility at higher birth orders brings the total TFR gap to a level of 0.24 in 1989.

Table 1 . - Nuptiality and fertility in Japan and France, 1989

Total fertility rate Total first marriage rate Extra-marital births (%) TFR1* PATFR1 TFR2 PADTFR2 TFR3 PADTFR3 TFR4 TFR5+

Japan 1.57 0.77 1 % 0.67 0.79 0.61 0.65 0.25 0.22 0.04 0.01

* TFR1...5+: Birth order components of TFR. PATFR and PADTFR: indices explained in section I.

France 1.81 0.55 28% 0.72 0.86 0.62 0.68 0.33 0.28 0.08 0.06


Cohort analysis confirms the in-depth transformation of Japan's nuptiality and fertility models since the early 1970s. Before 1970, women's first marriage rates were at their maximum, and marriage was soon followed by a birth; in 1951, the combined probabilities of marriage and of a first birth for married women gave 93.5% of women in this situation (Feeney and Saito, 1986; Ogawa and Retherford, 1993). The cohorts born after the Second World War, however, gradually move away from this model. In cohort (denoted c.) 1950, already affected by the fertility decline, we find only 0.90 first births per woman, and this reduction then becomes more marked: 0.88 in 1955 and 0.85 in 1959. The first-birth fertility value was slightly lower in France than in Japan in 1950 - 0.88 - and then the two countries meet in 1954, with 12% of women remaining childless. The downward trend thereafter accelerates in Japan, and in 1959 the proportions childless are 15% and 14% in Japan and France re

spectively. The gap will widen rapidly unless more Japanese women catch up on first births at the later childbearing ages.

Second births remain more frequent in Japan than in France in 1960 (0.69 vs 0.65), although the difference is less marked than in 1950 (0.78 vs 0.68), but third and higher order births are more widespread in France. As a result, French women born before 1960 practically reach replacement level, while in Japan those born in 1955 fall below 2 children per woman and 1959 is down to 1.9. Given the limited compensation through later childbearing (although it has increased since 1990), completed fertility in cohorts born in the mid-1960s will likely be no more than 1.65 (estimated by projecting the age-specific fertility trends; when the rates are held constant from 1994, the estimate is 1.6). This is much lower than France's 1.97 (or 1.91 when the rates are frozen from 1995) (Prioux, 1997).

The fertility levels at each birth order determine women's distribution by completed family size. In 1950, this distribution shows considerable divergences between the two countries (Table 2). There are fewer childless women and mothers-of-one in Japan, and also fewer mothers with three children or more. The result is a greater concentration on the two-child family: more than half of women in Japan compared to 40% in France. In 1960, although the Japanese distribution continues to focus on the

Table 2. - Percentage distribution of women by completed family size

0 children 1 child 2 children 3 children or more Total

Birth cohort 1950 Japan

10 12 52 26

100

France* 12 20 39 29

100

Birth cohort 1960 Japan

17 14 43 26

100

France* 14 21 35 30

100

Year 1989** Japan

21 14 43 22

100

France 14 18 40 28

100 * Leridon, Toulemon, 1996.

** Based on PATFR and PADTFR.


two-child family, the latter's relative weight has fallen rapidly. We note that though one-child families remain less frequent in Japan than in France, childlessness has become more widespread.

IV. - Contraceptive use

Contraceptive use differs considerably in Japan and France. According to the IPP National Fertility Survey of 1987, 63.3% of married women aged under 49 were contraceptive users(8), but this figure is thought to be underestimated and unmarried women were not asked whether they used a method of contraception. In France, 65% of women aged 20-49, all marital statuses combined, were contraceptive users in 1994 (Leridon and Toule- mon, 1995), and a further 4% were sterilized; only 3% of women at risk of pregnancy and not wanting a child were unprotected.

The two countries differ most in the methods employed. The 1996 Mainichi Shimbun survey (Hayashi, 1996) found that, among users, 77% were protected by the condom, 3.8% by the IUD, 5.3% by sterilization through tubal ligation, 1.2% by male sterilization (vasectomy) and only 1.3% by the pill, the remainder using periodic abstinence (Ogino and temperature methods) or coitus interruptus. The government has taken a stand against the pill - it is authorized only on medical (not contraceptive) grounds, and at high doses; as a result, there are important side-effects and many women are wary of taking chemical contraceptives. A low-dose oral contraceptive was to have been authorized in 1997, but the decision was postponed. According to the Mainichi Shimbun survey, however, only 16% of unmarried and 13% of married women would be willing to adopt a low- dose pill (Wagatsuma, 1996; Hayashi, 1996). In France, the pill is far ahead of any other method, with 57% of users aged 20-49, followed by the IUD (25%). The condom concerns only 7% of contracepting women, but 45% of first sexual relations.

The current abortion rate in Japan was derived from survey data for the first time in 1996 (responses to the question "Did you undergo an abortion during the last twelve months?"): it amounted to 14.8 per 1,000 women aged 15-49, that is, 25% higher than the official abortion statistics. Almost 70% of married women stated they had never had an abortion, compared to 50% in the surveys conducted in the early 1970s to mid-1980s and 60% thereafter (Hayashi, 1996); although the figures are somewhat shaky, it is likely that induced abortion has in fact declined. In France, the abortion rate in 1994 was 15.1 per 1,000 women aged 15-49, or 0.52 abortions per woman.

(8) According to the Mainichi Shimbun survey of 1996, 56%.


V. - Attitudes towards low fertility in Japan

The present fertility level, which is far below replacement level, is a serious problem for Japan, whose population will already be ageing faster than in any other industrialized country by the beginning of the next millenium.

We have seen that the recent fertility decline is related to marriage postponement and, to a lesser extent, to a decrease in marital births. This factor will gain more weight if, as is the case now, relatively few women catch up on their childbearing at later ages. These trends would seem to challenge the Japanese family model which has stood firm so far, in particular against unmarried cohabitation. The very low level of fertility in recent years has caused concern among population specialists and government officials. This has been echoed by the media, who headlined "the 1989 shock" when TFR reached 1.57 - a level even lower than in the horse-fire year, which had been considered a one-off low resulting from popular superstition, and not anything that could last (Kuroda, 1996).

The Mainichi Shimbun National Surveys on Family Planning provide some elements for interpreting the persistence of such low fertility levels. Since the most detailed fertility analyses in Japan are based on survey data which, as we have seen, overstate marital fertility, the fertility decline is principally attributed to marriage postponement and demographers and sociologists tend to focus their attention on the intentions of singles. The 1996 Mainichi Shimbun survey showed that less than 4% of single women aged under 35 were resolutely against marriage (Ogawa, 1996). Yet almost 40% of age group 25-29 and 45% of age group 30-34 did not intend to marry in the next two years. And after the age of 35 and, even more, 40, women more frequently turn their backs on marriage, and fertility is likely to be low or refused altogether (see further).

Like other industrialized countries, Japan is paying special attention to women's labour force participation, all the more so since in traditional Japanese society a married woman stays at home to rear her children. According to the survey, Japanese women now want to continue working for economic reasons and to be independent and fulfil themselves. Fewer and fewer women accept to give up their job when they marry (23% in 1996 as against 28% in 1990), and more and more want to work without interruption until they retire (26% as against 21%) (Tsuya, 1996; Pennec, Blan- chet and Kojima, 1996). Almost 80% of single women aged 20-24, and more than 90% of those aged 25-39, work - in almost 90% of cases, in full-time jobs. But motherhood often implies giving up their full-time job for part-time work: this is the case for 30% of working mothers in age group 30-34 and 40% in age group 35-44. The Child Care Leave Law of 1992 was intended to make working life compatible with motherhood; but


only 16% of married under-30s and 19% at ages 30-34 used this right between 1992 and 1996. This was principally either because women preferred to give up their job completely to look after their children (46%) or because the "atmosphere in their work place made it difficult to take the leave" (15%). The child care leave is mainly aimed at full-time workers who can fulfil the 12 months worked in the last two years condition, and it can only have a positive impact on fertility if it stops women from leaving their job; otherwise the loss of income related to having a child becomes prohibitive. This prospect could explain why marriages tend to be deferred, since they are still expected to be followed post-haste by starting a family.

In the context of an imminent decline of the working-age population, the solution of increasing women's participation in the labour force is often proposed. Indeed, the female activity ratio is still M-shaped in Japan and women's work is largely part-time. This solution contains, however, two risks: a reduction of fertility and a reduction of the amount of care provided by women for elderly family members (Ogawa and Matsukura, 1995).

Young Japanese women have studied for years, and they have other horizons than the traditional family lifestyle (marriage and looking after their children, with a sometimes painfully close link to the husband's family when there is cohabitation). Low starting salaries and the high cost of urban housing are further reasons why a young couple may postpone a formal, and very expensive, wedding. The cost of education is another reason for limiting family size, particularly when a first or second child has already been born.

What is the family policy position in Japan? Those implemented by a number of Western countries in the 1970s and 1980s have not succeeded in raising fertility to replacement level. Japan has not launched any policies of the kind, that would have recalled pre-war nationalism and would have been perceived as an intrusion into private life. Although 18% of married women reported in the 1996 Mainichi Shimbun that they were "very anxious" about the low fertility level (and 63% "a little anxious") - because of their fears concerning the future of pension systems, care of the elderly and the nation's loss of economic and social vitality - a majority continue to think that fertility is a private matter (65% in 1994 and 1996 vs 79% in 1990). But 32% (as against 17% in 1990) think the government should do something to boost fertility to replacement level (Okazaki, 1996); this opinion is less frequent among the younger women, however. A family policy could help compensate the low wages at the beginning of working life, and more generally help conciliate pursuing a career with having a family; however, crches and kindergarten are presently much less available in Japan than in France.

As well as marriage postponement, the decline of first birth probabilities is noteworthy. It is true that divorce - which is not a new phenomenon in Japan and has never been seen as threatening the family model

FERTILITY IN JAPAN AND FRANCE 34 1

- has increased since the 1970s and often occurs in the first years of marriage, but the fact that the shortfall of first births at younger ages is not made up at later ages is also a problem. In the IPP surveys, the women who say they expect to have fewer than their ideal number of children are asked why. In 1992, 22% in age group 30-34 and 36% in 35-39 stated they wanted no more children because of their age, and 30% said they could no longer stand the physical and mental strain of childrearing. But the costs entailed by children - education, keep - were the most common reasons, with 38% and 46% respectively in age group 30-34 and 30% in age group 35-39; compared to 1982, that was an 8 to 10 percentage point increase (Kojima, 1993). We note here that, though the present economic situation does not favour an upturn in fertility, the rates began to fall in 1983, long before the financial 'bubble' burst and the recession of the early 1990s. Among the other reasons stated in the survey, we find lack of space for (more) children (30% at ages 25-29 and 20% at ages 30-34) and the necessity that all children be independent when the husband retires (6%). Incompatibility with work is mentioned only by 11-12% of women aged 25-39 (and more frequently by working women).

It therefore seems unlikely that fertility will increase in the near future in Japan. The trend towards later marriage will continue, since for women it is a means to ensure their place in the workforce, and it is not sure that the babies not borne now by younger women will be borne when they are older. Moreover, the reduction of the working-age population which is expected at the turn of the century will encourage women's labour force participation (Ogawa, 1996).

Conclusion

Registration data give a quite different picture of fertility in Japan to the one provided by fertility surveys. Childlessness appears to be higher, in connection with the marriage decline and that of first marital births. From 1965 to the latter 1980s, nuptiality trends dictated fertility trends and the parity progression ratio a0 and birth intervals were very stable. Since then, however, a decrease in marital fertility has emerged. The Japanese model of virtually universal marriage followed by the birth of one or two children - unchanged until the 1970s for marriage and until the mid-1980s for marital fertility - is thus challenged. The reasons are not a devaluation of the family image - family formation still begins with marriage and divorce is not perceived negatively as in France - but a mechanical consequence of delayed marriage, linked to economic conditions (housing costs, salaries increasing with seniority) and women's desire to work. There is also a loosening of the tie between marriage and childbearing, the impact of which is all the more marked as Japanese society refuses births outside marriage and does not favour having children later in life. Were the re-


luctance to have children after age 30 to diminish, fertility might rise once marriage postponement has settled down. But fertility might just as well fall if childlessness, linked to celibacy or not, were to continue to spread and if the family model were to deviate further from the traditional two- child family. The fertility decline should consequently be read in the framework of a double set of constraints: those related to the traditional family model and those concerning the modern way of life, both of which impose restrictions on women and men. The outlook does not, therefore, seem promising and points to low fertility being here to stay. Unless... the possibility of a collective realization of the demographic implications is not to be ruled out. The implementation of a global family policy, encompassing child education benefits, inter-generational solidarity, gender equity and the continuance of Japanese society, could have a positive effect on fertility.

In France, the growth of unmarried cohabitation and divorce has challenged the traditional family model more seriously. But this has resulted in a rise in extra-marital fertility which, together with a shift towards later childbearing, has kept childlessness at a rather low level. Family formation patterns have also proved very sensitive to contextual factors, with large variations in birth intervals, so that the rapid fertility decline in the mid- 1970s was in part made up around 1980. France is characterized also by a relative stability of the two-child family model, while the proportion of families with three children or more remains substantial. It is this combination that has kept fertility close to replacement level.

Hiroshi Kojima, Jean-Louis R.ALLU


Appendix Table 1. - Fertility indices for Japan and France, 1965-94

1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

Japan TFR 2.145 1.579 2.224 2.129 2.123 2.135 2.157 2.141 2.148 2.049 1.905 1.844 1.788 1.775 .751 .731

1.726 1.755 1.787 1.799 1.756 1.718 .689

1.656 1.575 1.542 1.535 1.504 1.461 1.503 1.425

PATFR 2.115 1.723 2.133 2.091 2.098 2.115 2.130 2.126 2.133 2.061 1.953 1.899 1.852 1.836 1.817 1.802 1.800 1.813 1.835 1.837 1.797 1.765 1.736 1.704 1.635 1.602 1.599 1.569 1.527 1.559 1.480

PDiTFR 2.111 1.499 2.175 2.132 2.110 2.089 2.119 2.098 2.113 2.010 1.882 1.855 1.847 1.874 .876

1.861 .860

1.894 1.922 1.930 1.873 1.826 1.803 1.782 1.695 1.669 1.672 1.650 1.597 1.651 1.550

PDTFR

1.867 1.875 1.877 1.867 1.867 1.879 1.908 1.920 .894

1.860 1.841 1.809 1.736 1.700 1.690 1.664 1.621 1.653 1.574

PADTFR

1.852 1.842 1.835 1.828 1.834 1.846 1.878 1.890 1.857 1.825 1.798 1.761 1.688 1.650 1.643 1.615 1.572 1.605 1.524

France TFR 2.840 2.791 2.665 2.581 2.526 2.472 2.490 2.412 2.302 2.101 1.929 1.830 1.864 1.823 1.855 1.945 1.945 1.913 1.787 1.808 1.823 1.844 1.817 1.824 1.790 1.780 1.770 1.730 1.650 1.650 1.700

PATFR 2.845 2.756 2.609 2.529 2.482 2.435 2.453 2.374 2.267 2.085 1.937 1.858 1.880 1.848 1.872 1.951 1.953 1.926 1.817 1.837 1.852 1.874 1.855 1.870 1.865

PDiTFR 2.723 2.672 2.512 2.444 2.419 2.372 2.422 2.304 2.180 1.977 1.841 1.811 1.915 1.928 2.038 2.209 2.255 2.196 1.993 2.033 2.097 2.155 2.128 2.133 2.100

PDTFR

1.969 1.904 1.948 1.952 2.021 2.138 2.192 2.166 2.026 2.049 2.096 2.141 2.132 2.144 2.131

PADTFR

1.922 1.834 1.858 1.841 1.887 1.987 2.013 1.991 1.876 1.889 1.916 1.945 1.932 1.946 1.937

The indices are explained in section I.


Appendix Table 2. - Birth order components of fertility indices for Japan and France, 1976-94

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Japan TFR1 821 786 776 773 778 785 792 805 795 759 742 722 701 673 664 681 677 669 695 662

TFR2 747 732 728 707 685 673 684 692 700 691 672 661 647 606 587 572 557 538 551 522

TFR3 227 225 229 231 228 228 237 247 258 260 259 261 263 251 246 237 225 211 211 197

PATFR1 889 879 873 868 865 864 863 863 857 842 832 821 807 788 111 775 768 758 766 743

FATFR2 753 732 723 712 704 702 703 709 705 688 674 660 645 617 601 600 587 569 580 546

PATFR3 216 204 204 202 199 200 211 224 232 227 220 218 214 197 191 191 182 170 179 160

PADTFR2 778 737 729 726 722 725 723 731 734 723 708 696 678 647 628 624 612 593 603 568

PADTFR3 214 200 203 206 207 209 221 239 251 248 242 240 236 217 209 208 201 190 199 180

PDTFR2 763 738 741 741 736 734 734 742 745 736 720 714 697 663 646 641 630 611 621 586

PDTFR3 219 209 219 225 225 227 238 254 266 266 260 261 259 242 236 233 226 215 224 205

France TFR1 815 822 808 795 816 797 792 758 746 744 741 733 728 720

TFR2 614 647 632 654 679 668 666 634 641 638 645 631 630 623

TFR3 229 238 238 268 311 329 305 259 278 295 311 315 323 327

PATFR1 899 897 895 892 897 893 891 880 875 870 869 865 863 861

PATFR2 657 665 653 651 667 656 653 628 627 629 633 626 632 630

FATFR3 228 238 226 245 280 284 269 227 235 244 254 253 256 255

PADTFR2 642 651 644 656 682 683 685 664 666 671 680 676 681 677

PADTFR3 220 230 224 248 289 300 286 242 249 261 273 274 278 276

PDTFR2 662 681 680 695 720 722 727 707 711 716 725 721 721 716

PDTFR3 243 261 263 297 344 360 342 290 302 320 338 342 345 341

The indices are explained in section I.


REFERENCES

Atoh M., (1996), The direction of changes in Japanese families in terms of parent-child relationship , in Toward a New Century of Equality and Symbiosis, The Population Problems Research Council, The Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo.

Feeney G., (1986), Period Parity Progression Measures of Fertility in Japan, Nihon University Population Research Institute, Research Paper n 35, Tokyo.

Feeney G., Saito Y., (1985), Progression to First Marriage in Japan: 1870-1980, Nihon University Population Research Institute, Research Paper n 24, Tokyo.

Hayashi K., (1996), The transition of contraception and abortion , in Toward a New Century of Equality and Symbiosis, The Population Problems Research Council, The Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo.

Institute of Population Problems, (1989), Cohort Marriage Tables for Females in Japan : 1950-1987, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Tokyo.

Institute of Population Problems, (1990), Fertility Tables for Japanese Women : 1950-1988, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Tokyo.

Institute of Population Problems, (1993-1994), The Tenth Japanese National Fertility Survey in 1992, vol. 1, Marriage and Fertility in Present-Day Japan; vol. 2, Attitudes toward Marriage and the Family among the Unmarried Japanese Youth, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Tokyo.

Kojima H., (1993), A policy-oriented analysis of fertility behaviors and attitudes in Japan Jinko Mondai Kenkyu,(The Journal of Population Problems), vol. 49, n 3, Institute of Population Problems, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Tokyo.

Kojima H., (1996), Determinants of attitudes toward population aging in Japan , Jinko Mondai Kenkyu,(The Journal of Population Problems), vol. 52, n 2, Institute of Population Problems, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Tokyo.

Kuroda T, (1996), Fertility transition in Japan , in Toward a New Century of Equality and Symbiosis, The Population Problems Research Council, The Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo.

Leridon H., Toulemon L., (1995), Les pratiques contraceptives en France , La revue du praticien, n 45, Paris.

Leridon H., Toulemon L., (1996), Deux enfants, le modle de rfrence , in Populations, l'tat des connaissances, la France, l'Europe, le monde, Leridon et al. (eds)., La Dcouverte, Paris.

Ogawa N., (1996), Single Japanese women's attitudes toward marriage and their career plans , in Toward a New Century of Equality and Symbiosis, The Population Problems Research Council, The Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo.

Ogawa N., Matsukura R., (1995), Population change, development and women's role and status in Japan , Population and Development, Asian Population Studies Series, n 133, ESCAP, Bangkok.

Ogawa N., Retherford R. D., (1993), The resumption of fertility decline in Japan : 1973- 1992 , Population and Development Review, vol. 19, n 4.

Okazaki Y., (1996), Declining fertility and countermeasures , in Toward a New Century of Equality and Symbiosis, The Population Problems Research Council, The Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo.

Pennec S., Blanchet D., Kojima H., (1996), Women's labor force participation and family size, the case of France and Japan , The SY 1995 Report of the Boshi-aiiku Foundation, re-print series n 26, IPP, Tokyo.

Prioux F., (1997), L'volution dmographique rcente in La Conjoncture dmographique en France, Population, n 3, INED, Paris.

Rallu J.-L., Toulemon L., (1993), Les mesures de la fcondit transversale. I - Construction des diffrents indices , Population, n 1, INED, Paris.

Rallu J.-L., Toulemon L., (1993), Les mesures de la fcondit transversale. II - Application la France de 1946 1989 , Population, n 2, INED, Paris.

Rallu J.-L., Toulemon L. (1994), Period fertility measures. The construction of different indices and their application to France, 1946-89 , Population: An English Selection, 6, 59-94. (This is a condensed version, in English, of the above two papers in the original French.)

Rallu J.-L., (1986), Descendance des gnrations franaises et probabilits d'agrandissement , Population, n 4-5, INED, Paris.

Sardon J.-P., (1996), L'volution du divorce en France , Population, n 3, INED, Paris. Toulemon L., (1997), Cohabitation is here to stay , Population: An English Selection, 9, 11-46.


Tsuya N. ., (1996), Women's employment and attitudes toward employment policies , in Toward a New Century of Equality and Symbiosis, The Population Problems Research Council, The Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo.

Wagatsuma T., (1996), Sexual behavior of unmarried women , in Toward a New Century of Equality and Symbiosis, The Population Problems Research Council, The Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo.


Kojima (Hiroshi), Rallu (Jean-Louis). - Fertility in Japan and France Fertility in Japan and France was very similar between 1975 and 1985, but the sub

sequent decline has been greater in Japan, where levels have stood at below 1.5 births per woman since 1993.

A study of fertility using civil registration and survey data, and from indices based on the parity-specific birth probabilities, reveals that the decline in fertility in Japan was due to the fall in nuptiality until the mid-1980s but that since then there has also been a fall in fertility within marriage.

Unlike in France, extra-marital fertility has not increased in Japan, and the compensation due to postponed births remained at a low level until the start of the 1990s. There are various cultural and economic obstacles in Japan to an increase in fertility outside marriage and among older women. It is through these new forms of fertility behaviour that France has been able to maintain a relatively high fertility based on an overall rate of childlessness that is still quite low.

Kojima (Hiroshi), Rallu (Jean-Louis). - La fcondit au Japon et en France La fcondit tait peu diffrente au Japon et en France entre 1975 et 1985, mais la

baisse a t ensuite plus importante au Japon avec des niveaux infrieurs 1,5 naissance par femme depuis 1993.

L'tude de la fcondit partir de donnes d'tat civil et d'enqutes, et d'indices bass sur les probabilits de naissance par rang, montre que la baisse de la fcondit au Japon a rsult de la baisse de la nuptialit jusqu'au milieu des annes 1980 mais consiste aussi depuis lors en une baisse de la fcondit dans le mariage.

la diffrence de la France, on n'observe pas au Japon d'augmentation de la fcondit hors mariage et la rcupration des naissances retardes est reste peu importante jusqu'au dbut des annes 1990. Le dveloppement de la fcondit hors mariage et des ges avancs se heurte diverses contraintes culturelles et conomiques. C'est, au contraire, grce ces nouveaux comportements que la France conserve une fcondit assez leve sur la base d'une infcondit des gnrations encore assez faible.

Kojima (Hiroshi), Rallu (Jean-Louis). - La fecundidad en Japon y en Francia Entre 1975 y 1985, los nivels de fecundidad de Francia y Japon eran similares, pero

la disminucin posterior fue ms fuerte en Japon, donde se alcanzan nivels inferiores a 1,5 nacimientos por mujer despus de 1993.

El estudio de la fecundidad a partir de datos del registro civil, encuestas e indices ba- sados en las probabilidades de nacimiento por rango, muestra que la disminucin de la fecundidad observada en Japon fue debida a la disminucin de la nupcialidad hasta la mitad de los aos ochenta, pero que, ms recientemente, se explica tambin por la disminucin de la fecundidad dentro del matrimonio.

A diferencia de Francia, en Japon no se observa un aumento de la fecundidad fuera del matrimonio y la fecundidad en edades avanzadas sigue siendo poco significativa hasta el incio de la dcada de los noventa. Ambos fenmenos (fecundidad fuera del matrimonio y en edades avanzadas) se enfrentan a multiples restricciones culturales y econmicas. En Francia, sin embargo, estos nuevos comportamientos mantienen el nivel de fecundidad rela- tivamente elevado, teniendo en cuenta que existe un nivel todavia reducido de infecundidad.

Hiroshi Kojima, National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, Ministry of Health and Welfare, Kasumigaseki 1-2-3, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 100, Japon

InformationsAutres contributions des auteursH. KojimaJ.-L. Rallu

Cet article cite :Rallu Jean-Louis. Descendance des gnrations franaises et probabilits d'agrandissement. In: Population, 41e anne, n4-5, 1986 pp. 763-802.Rallu Jean-Louis, Toulemon Laurent. Les mesures de la fcondit transversale. I. Construction des diffrents indices. In: Population, 48e anne, n1, 1993 pp. 7-26.Jean-Louis Rallu, Laurent Toulemon. Les mesures de la fcondit transversale. II. Application la France de 1946 1989, Population, 1993, vol. 48, n 2, pp. 369-403.

Pagination319320321322323324325326327328329330331332333334335336337338339340341342343344345346347

PlanI. - Fertility The period indicesTime trends in TFR The other indicesPeriod fertility levels by birth orderPeriod parity progression ratios Mean age of mothers

2. Fertility data in France 3. Nuptiality data for JapanII. - Nuptiality and fertility First marriages First marriages and first births

III. - Cohort replacement IV. - Contraceptive use V. - Attitudes towards low fertility in Japan Conclusion AppendixReferences

Documents

Fertilitatea În Japonia Și Franța