Feminist Methodologies and Epistemologies

36

5FEMINIST METHODOLOGIESAND EPISTEMOLOGY

ANDREA DOUCETCarleton University, Canada

NATASHA S. MAUTHNERUniversity of Aberdeen, Scotland

Over the past 10 years of teaching courses onresearch methods and feminist approaches tomethodologies and epistemologies, a recurringquestion from our students concerns the distinctiveness offeminist approaches to methods, methodologies, and epis-temologies. This key question is posed in different ways: Isthere a specifically feminist method? Are there feministmethodologies and epistemologies, or simply feministapproaches to these? Given diversity and debates in femi-nist theory, how can there be a consensus on what consti-tutes feminist methodologies and epistemologies?

Answers to these questions are far from straightforwardgiven the continually evolving nature of feminist reflec-tions on the methodological and epistemological dimen-sions and dilemmas of research. This chapter on feministmethodologies and epistemologies attempts to addressthese questions by tracing historical developments in thisarea, by considering what may be unique about feministepistemologies and feminist methodologies, by reviewingsome of sociologys key contributions to this area of schol-arship and by highlighting some key emergent trends.

The chapter begins with a brief overview of thetheoretical and historical development of feminist episte-mologies, followed by a similar overview of feministmethodologies. The final section discusses how feminist

epistemologies and feminist methodologies have begun tomerge into an area called feminist research and details somekey pillars of contemporary and emergent work in this area.

FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGIES

Twenty-five years ago, Lorraine Code, a Canadian feministphilosopher, posed what she called an outrageous ques-tion. In asking is the sex of the knower epistemologicallysignificant (Code 1981), she then went on to chart thecontours of a feminist epistemological approach as distinctfrom traditional or Anglo-American mainstream episte-mology (see Code 1991). Code was just one of many fem-inists who, in the 1970s, began grappling with issues ofmasculinity, power, and authority in knowledge creation(see Gilligan 1977; Miller 1976; Smith 1974). From theoutset, these challenges were being made across many dis-ciplines. In the natural, physical, and behavioral sciences,the emphasis was on exposing masculine bias in science asperhaps best revealed in the valuing of traditional mascu-line characteristics (e.g., reason, rationality, autonomy, dis-connection) (see Gilligan 1982; Keller 1985; Lloyd 1983).Indeed, feminist epistemological discussions owe a greatdebt to feminist scientists who relentlessly critiqued the

Bryant-45099 Part I.qxd 10/18/2006 7:42 PM Page 36

effects of gender bias in the collection, interpretation, andorganization of data on sex differences in behavioral, bio-logical, and biobehavioral scientific research. Docu-menting the exclusive use of male subjects in bothexperimental and clinical biomedical research, as well asthe selection of male activity and concomitant male-dominant animal populations, feminists pointed to the bla-tant invisibility of females in research protocols (Haraway1988, 1991; Keller 1983, 1985; Keller and Longino 1998;Longino and Doell 1983; Rose 1994).

While feminist scientists and scholars were scrutinizingresearch in the natural and physical sciences, feministphilosophers were actively engaged with defining the rela-tionship between feminism and epistemology. Definingepistemology as a philosophical inquiry into the nature ofknowledge, what justifies a belief, and what we meanwhen we say that a claim is true (Alcoff 1998:vii), it is notsurprising that feminist philosophers would find this fertileground for investigation. Whether the question of howfeminisms intersect epistemology (Alcoff and Potter1993) was shared by philosophers has been another matter.As Helen Longino (1997) has pointed out, The idea offeminist epistemology throws some philosophers into nearapoplexy (p. 19). Feminist philosophers have, neverthe-less, struggled with many of the problems that have vexedtraditional epistemology, among them the nature of knowl-edge itself, epistemic agency, justification, objectivity andwhether and how epistemology should be naturalized(Alcoff and Potter 1993:1). While addressing these tradi-tional epistemological questions, feminist epistemologistshave done so with a focus on the role of gender. Lennonand Whitford (1994), for instance, argued that feministepistemology consists . . . in attention to epistemologicalconcerns arising out of feminist projects, which promptreflection of the nature of knowledge and our methods forattaining it (p. 13). Yet while there seems to have beensome consensus on how specific issues required feministanalysis, the question still persisted as to whether suchanalysis needed to also generate specifically feminist epis-temologies or could simply work with existing philosoph-ical approaches.

This question remained at the backdrop of feminist dis-cussions of epistemology throughout the 1980s and 1990s.However, what marked feminist epistemologies as uniquefor at least a decade is a threefold characterization initiallyproposed by Sandra Harding (1987b): feminist empiri-cism, feminist standpoint epistemologies, and transitional(postmodern)1 epistemologies. As discussed later in thischapter, these epistemological categories have since givenway to greater complexity. Nevertheless, it is useful to pro-vide a brief overview of their central contrasting and over-lapping tenets.

Feminist empiricism was a response that emergedlargely from feminist scientists and feminist critiques ofscience. Rooted in diverse philosophical traditions (e.g.,Giere and Richardson 1996; Quine 1966, 1969), feministempiricists have considered how feminist values can

inform empirical inquiry, and how scientific methods canbe improved in light of feminist demonstrations of sex biasin traditional positivistic practices of science. At the risk ofsimplifying a very complex set of arguments, feministempiricism has three key elements. The first is the viewthat all observation, facts, and findings are valuetinged and that value judgments play a critical role in rig-orous empirical inquiry: There is a world that shapes andconstrains what is reasonable to believe, and . . . it does soby impinging on our sensory receptors (Nelson 1990:20;see also Campbell 1998; Longino 1990).2 The second keyelement is the notion of empiricism as a theory of evi-dence and, further that all evidence for science is, in theend, sensory evidence (Longino 1990:21). Third, know-ers are not individuals but are rather communities andmore specifically science communities and epistemologi-cal communities. Communities, not individuals acquireand possess knowledge (Longino 1990:14; see alsoCampbell 1998; Longino 1993, 2002; Nelson 1990, 1993;Walby 2001).3

While feminist empiricists are linked to postpositivistassumptions around different communities of knowers bat-tling for truths and legitimacy in knowledge making, fem-inist standpoint epistemologists have challenged thedifferential power that groups have to define knowledge,and they argued that marginalized groups hold a particularclaim to knowing. At the core of standpoint epistemologyis their assertion that they represent the world from a par-ticular socially situated perspective, which represents epis-temic privilege or authority. This epistemic privileging islocated in the standpoint of the marginalized or disadvan-taged, and all women, regardless of social location, occupythis position. Womens experiences, informed by feministtheory, provide a potential grounding for more completeand less distorted knowledge claims than do mens(Harding 1987b:184; see also Hartsock 1983, 1985).4Standpoint epistemology has continually emphasized howknowledge must begin in womens everyday/everynightworld (Smith 1999:5; see also Smith 1987) and howwomens lives are the places from which to start offknowledge projects (Harding 1991:61). Standpoint femi-nists have also been at pains to point out that these experi-ences, everyday/everynight worlds, or standpoints mustalso be located, and analyzed, within broader relations ofruling or social structures (Smith 1987, 1999). As NancyHartsock (1998) has made clear, a standpoint is achievedrather than obvious, a mediated rather than an immediateunderstanding (p. 110). Similarly, Patricia Hill Collins(1997) has highlighted that standpoint is about histori-cally shared, group-based experiences.

While very diverse as a theoretical strand, postmod-ernisms impact on feminist epistemologies has been pro-found for a number of reasons. First, it has critiqued the notion of woman as a unified object of theorizingand as a unified subject of knowing (Lugones and Spelman1983). Second, the strong claim for socially situatedknowledges translates into a greater attention to the

Feminist Methodologies and Epistemology37


concept of reflexivity and to the role of the researcher inconstructing knowledge. Third, drawing on Jane Flaxs(1990) characterization of postmodernism as the death ofhistory, the death of meta-narratives, and the death ofman (p. 204), the intersections between feminism andpostmodernism have led to the articulation of a plurality ofperspectives, none of which can claim objectivity or tran-scend into a view from nowhere (Haraway 1991). On thenegative side, postmodernism can also be associated witha lack of feminist analysis, judgment, politics, or theoriza-tion. As described by Seyla Benhabib (1995), A certainversion of postmodernism is not only incompatible withbut would undermine the very possibility of feminism asthe theoretical articulation of the emancipatory aspirationsof women (p. 29; Brodribb 1992; but see Elam 1992).

While initially cast as three fundamentally contrastingframeworks, Hardings tripartite distinction between femi-nist empiricism, feminist standpoint epistemologies, andtransitional (postmodern) epistemologies has faded in thelast 20 years. Indeed, Harding herself predicted this blur-ring (Harding 1987b, 1991, 1998). More recent debateshave focused on how to characterize each strand of femi-nist epistemology, and indeed whether these are bestnamed as theories, methodologies, or epistemologies(Collins 1997; Hartsock 1998; Smith 1999). Moreover,these oft-cited three categories of feminist epistemologiesare clearly inadequate to reflect the wide variety of femi-nist research since much of it falls between and joins ele-ments of two or three frameworks (see Fraser 1995; Fraserand Nicholson 1990; Haraway 1988, 1991). For example,since postmodern and postcolonial critiques have high-lighted the importance of multiple or fragmented perspec-tives, feminist standpoint has moved in a pluralisticdirection, acknowledging many situated standpoints(Collins 1997, 2000; Harding 1993b, 1998; Harding andNorberg 2005; Reynolds 2002; Smith 1999, 2005). At thesame time, the focus on empirical evidence and experi-ence and an emphasis on communities, rather than indi-viduated knowers, has always signaled at least someconvergence between feminist empiricism and feministstandpoint.

Throughout the 1990s, the emphasis on three episte-mologies became partially replaced by reflections on theprocesses of knowing, knowers and known(Hawkesworth 1989). Particular questions framing subjec-tivity and issues of representation and legitimation havecome to take center stage in feminist epistemological dis-cussions. Such questions include the following: Who canbe a knower (Code 1991), What can be known (Alcoff1998), and How do we know what we know? (Alcoff1998). As far back as 1993, Alcoff and Potter recognizedthat while feminist epistemology had named recognition,its referent was becoming increasingly obscure (see alsoLongino 1997).

Any clear referent to feminist epistemology was alsoeroded by the growing influence of postmodern, poststruc-tural, and postcolonial thinking that quashed the idea that

there could be a feminist or even several feminist ways ofknowing. In this vein, feminists working on epistemolog-ical questions have found themselves facing the samecrises as nonfeminists charting similar terrain. As NormanDenzin and Yvonna Lincoln (2000) suggest, researchershave begun to face a profound triple crisis of representa-tion, legitimation and praxis (see also Atkinson 1992;Clifford 1986; Denzin 1997; Lather 1991; Marcus andFisher 1986). Often referred to as the reflexive turn orthe narrative turn, as found mainly in postmodern andpoststructuralist critiques, these crises have created a senseof uncertainty as increasingly complex questions havebeen raised concerning the status, validity, basis, andauthority of knowledge claims (Geertz 1988; Hollway1989; Richardson 1997).

In light of this backdrop, the question of whether femi-nists need their own epistemologies began to be reviewedmore critically. There were many variations on this ques-tion: Would a feminist epistemology simply reverse andro-centric epistemology to a gynocentric epistemology?(Duran 1991:1415). Is feminist knowledge or feministscience a contradiction in terms? (Harding 1987b:182).What does feminism require of an epistemology (Fricker1994:95). Louise Antony addressed this issue succinctlywhen she asked, Do we need in order to accommodatethese questions, insights, and projects, a specifically femi-nist alternative to currently available epistemologicalframeworks (Antony 1993:187). Her answer was aresounding no. Meanwhile, parallel discussions wereoccurring for feminist researchers, particularly thoseworking with qualitative research projects.

FEMINIST METHODOLOGIES AND METHODS

Just a few years after Codes outrageous question,Sandra Harding queried in a well-cited piece: Is there afeminist method? While Harding was careful to distin-guish between method as techniques for gathering evi-dence and methodology as a theory and analysis of howresearch does or should proceed (Harding 1987a:23), thequestion of feminist versions of each of these has beenasked. That is, are there methods that are specifically fem-inist? Furthermore, what is it that makes feministapproaches to methodology unique?

Feminist sociologists have made important contribu-tions to this debate as they began to criticize positivism asa philosophical framework and, more specifically, its mostacute methodological instrumentthat of quantitativemethods for its practice of detached and objective scien-tific research and the objectification of research subjects(Graham 1983b; Reinharz 1979). These methodologicalcritiques were well placed against a backdrop of feministscholarship struggling to find a place for alternative valueswithin the academy. Such concerns emerged out of a senseof despair and anger that knowledge, both academic and

38NONTRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES, THEORY, AND METHODOLOGY


popular, was based on mens lives, male ways of thinking,and directed toward the problems articulated by men.Dorothy Smith (1974) argued that sociology . . . has beenbased on and built up within the male social universe(p. 7) while further lamenting in her seminal work, TheEveryday World as Problematic (1987), that the lives ofwomen were largely left to novelists or poets. This ren-dered invisible, within the knowledge academies, womenslives and female-dominated domains such as domesticwork and the care of children, the ill, and the elderly (seeFinch and Groves 1983; Graham 1983a, 1991).Subsequently, and not surprisingly, where womens liveswere studied and theorized, this occurred within malestream lenses. In this vein, British sociologist HilaryGraham (1983b) eloquently asked, Do her answers fit hisquestions? when she observed that womens experienceswere being measured within surveys designed on the basisof mens lives. A decade later, and again in Britain,Rosalind Edwards observed that attempts were still beingmade to fit womens lives into male theories, like trying tofit a round peg into a square hole (Edwards 1990:479).

A noteworthy piece by British sociologist Ann Oakley(1981) still stands as one of the most cited articles withinthis discussion. Challenging the masculine assumptions ofproper interviews that dominated the sociological text-books of the time, Oakley argued that some methods werebetter suited to feminist aims and that these could beviewed as feminist methods. Oakley suggested that, con-trary to an objective, standardized, and detached approachto interviewing, the goal of finding out about peoplethrough interviewing was best achieved when the rela-tionship of interviewer and interviewee is non-hierarchicaland when the interviewer is prepared to invest his or herown personal identity in the relationship (p. 41).5Drawing on her interviews with mothers, she maintainedthat her own identity as a mother came to act as a leveleragainst a power hierarchy in the interviewee-interviewerrelationship:

Where both share the same gender socialization and criticallife-experiences, social distance can be minimal. Where bothinterviewer and interviewee share membership of the sameminority group, the basis for equality may impress itself evenmore urgently on the interviewers consciousness. (Oakley1981:55; see also Finch 1984; Stanley and Wise [1983] 1993;Rheinharz 1992)

These perspectives have since been criticized anddeconstructed. To name a particular method, methodology,or theory as feminist calls for standards of judgment,which may exclude work that does not fit such criteria.Moreover, feminists have contested notions of mutualityand equality in interviews, highlighting how differing, aswell as shared, structural characteristics can impede mutu-ality and reciprocity (Coterill 1992; Edwards 1990;Glucksmann 1994; Ramazanoglu 1989; Ribbens 1989;Song and Parker 1995). Catherine Reissman (1987) high-lighted that gender and personal involvement may not be

enough for full knowing (p. 189; see also Ribbens 1998)while Rosalind Edwards (1993) cautioned that

if . . . we accept that there are structurally based divisionsbetween women on the basis of race and/or class that maylead them to have some different interests and priorities, thenwhat has been said about woman-to-woman interviewing maynot apply in all situations. (P. 184)

Reflections on the inevitability of power differentialswithin research have extended into discussions of thedangers of the illusion of equality in research relation-ships, the ethical dilemmas involved in conductingresearch with disadvantaged or marginalized women, aswell as larger epistemological issues involved in attempt-ing to know others. Sociologists have been particularlyvocal on the first issue of the potential dangers associatedwith trying to be friendly in interviews. Pamela Cotterill(1992), for example, has drawn attention to the potentiallydamaging effects of a research technique which encouragesfriendship in order to focus on very private and personalaspects of peoples lives (p. 597; see also Stacey 1991).While Western-based social scientists have worried oversuch issues (Fine and Wiess 1996:251; see also DeVault1999), such dangers have perhaps been best articulated byfeminists working in contexts where inequalities are acute,such as in low-income communities and in Third Worldcountries. For example, in her preface to her edited collec-tion on Feminist Dilemmas in Field Work, Diane Wolf(1996) discusses how her research inadvertently exacer-bated the inequalities between herself and her researchsubjects in Java, Indonesia:

My research was an attempt to analyze and depict their lives,their situation, and the grueling work of factory jobs. . . . Iwould go on to finish my dissertation, get a Ph.D., get a jobbased on a talk about this research, make enough money inone month to sustain an entire village for several, publish,and, I hoped, make a career. The money I gave to people ofthe organizations I contribute to will not be able to changemuch in the lives of those I worked with. Despite my goodintentions, I was making a situation for myself based on struc-tures of poverty and gender inequality. (P. x; see also Hale1991; Patai 1991; Zavella 1993)

Ironically, criticisms of male stream theories thatexcluded women began to haunt feminists trying to comeup with alternative methodologies that could also margin-alize women, albeit inadvertently. Gesa Kirsch (2005)eloquently articulates this point when she writes,

It is perhaps ironic, then, that scholars are discovering thatmethodological changes intended to achieve feministendsincreased collaboration, greater interaction, andmore open communication with research participantsmayhave inadvertently reintroduced some of the ethical dilem-mas feminist researchers had hoped to eliminate: partici-pants sense of disappointment, alienation, and potentialexploitation. (P. 2163)



By the late 1980s, many feminists opposed the idea ofthere being distinctive feminist methods or methodologies.Instead, they suggested that many feminists were simplydoing good research. For example, in 1990, feministcriminologist Lorraine Gelsthorpe acknowledged the dif-ficulty of distinguishing between feminist research andsimply good research and asked, Is feminist researchmerely old wine in new bottles? (Gelsthorpe 1990:105).

While others have concurred that feminist researchshould be good research that provides alternatives tomainstream research, it is also the case that, over the pastdecade, a large body of scholarship has laid out some keyunderlying principles that are central to much feministresearch.

FEMINIST RESEARCH

While it is difficult to argue that there is a specifically fem-inist method, methodology, or epistemology, it is the casethat feminist scholars have embraced particular character-istics in their work. First, feminist researchers have longadvocated that feminist research should be not just onwomen, but for women and, where possible, with women(DeVault 1990, 1996; Edwards 1990; Fonow and Cook1991, 2005; Neilsen 1990; Ramazanoglu and Holland2002; Reinharz 1992; Smith 1987, 1989, 1999; Stanleyand Wise [1983] 1993). Second, feminist researchers haveactively engaged with methodological innovation throughchallenging conventional or mainstream ways of collect-ing, analyzing, and presenting data (Code 1995;Gelsthorpe 1990; Lather 2001; Lather and Smithies 1997;Mol 2002; Naples 2003; Richardson 1988, 1997). Initially,this involved challenging positivist frameworks and thedominance of quantitative methods and experimentingwith novel ways of documenting and representingwomens experiences or everyday worlds. More recently,however, quantitative methods have been accepted andadopted (McCall 2005; Oakley 1998). Indeed, feministmethodological challenges include a diversity of method-ological and epistemological approaches (Ramazanogluand Holland 2002:2). Third, feminist research is concernedwith issues of broader social change and social justice(Fonow and Cook 1991, 2005). According to BeverlySkeggs (1994), feminist research is distinct from nonfemi-nist research because it begins from the premise that thenature of reality in western society is unequal and hierar-chical (p. 77). In a similar way, Ramazanoglu andHolland (2002) note that feminist research is imbued withparticular theoretical, political and ethical concerns that make these varied approaches to social researchdistinctive (pp. 23).

To these well-established key features of feministresearch, we add two further issuespower andreflexivitywhich we suggest have become critical within feminist discussions of methods, methodologies, and epistemologies.

Power: Knowing and Representing Others

Feminisms most compelling epistemological insight lies inthe connections it has made between knowledge and power.(Lennon and Whitford 1994)

As discussed above, early feminist discussions took anoptimistic view on power relations between the researcherand the researched. Feminist researchers argued that powerdifferentials in research could be minimized by developingnonhierarchical and friendly relationships with respon-dents (e.g., Oakley 1981). Later feminists critiqued thisposition, pointing to the inevitability of power imbalancesin research. Feminist sociologists now recognize thatresearchers and respondents have a different and unequalrelation to knowledge (Glucksmann 1994:150) and thatwithin most research projects, The final shift of powerbetween the researcher and the respondent is balanced infavor of the researcher, for it is she who eventually walksaway (Cotterill 1992:604; see also Reinharz 1992; Stacey1991; Wolf 1996). The focus of much current feministscholarship has moved on from the question of whetherthere are power inequalities between researchers andrespondents, to consider how power influences knowledgeproduction and construction processes.

Questions about who produces knowledge, Who canbe a knower? (Code 1991), Whose knowledge?(Harding 1991), and Who speaks for whom? (Code 1995;Mohanty, Russo, and Torres 1991) have become critical incontemporary feminist, postmodern, and postcolonial cli-mates. Women of color working within Western contextsand feminists working in Third World settings have high-lighted otherness, exclusion, racism, and ethnocentrism.Key issues have included the interrelatedness of race andselective entitlement to theory production (Hunter 2004;Sandoval 2000a, 2000b); intersections of global capitalismand feminist transnational identities (Ferguson 2004;Schutte 1993, 1998, 2000; Shohat 2001), the question ofwhether feminists in dominant cultures can ever know sub-altern cultures (Alexander and Mohanty 1997; Ladson-Billings 2000; Mohanty et al. 1991; Oyewumi 2000;Spivak 1993), the challenges of knowing transnational les-bian and gay identities (Bunch 1987; Gopinath 2005), andthe role and representation of subordinate others in theproduction of knowledge (Bernal 2002; Christian 1996).

Issues of power are also present in our attempts to cometo know and represent the intimate details of others wholive in close proximity to us. Even where researchers andrespondents share structural and cultural similarities of, forexample, gender, ethnicity, class, and age, this does notguarantee knowing, or better knowing. Being aninsiderwhatever this actually meansis not a straight-forward route to knowing (Narayan 1993; Olesen 1998;Stanley 1994; Zavella 1993). Feminists have emphasized,and reflected on, the tensions and dilemmas (e.g.,Ribbens and Edwards 1998; Wolf 1996) involved in com-ing to know and represent the narratives, experiences, or



lives of others. They have questioned how voices of par-ticipants are to be heard, with what authority, and in whatform? (Olesen 1998:315). They have asked whether andhow the experience (Scott 1992, 1994) or voice(Beiser 1993; Charmaz 1993; Wilkinson 1994) of anothercan be accessed. They have noted the dangers of presum-ing to know, speak for, or advocate for others. LorraineCode (1995) echoes the views of many feministresearchers grappling with power dilemmas around know-ing, representing, and advocating for others. She writes,

Only rarely can we presume to understand exactly how it isfor someone else even of our own class, race, sexual orienta-tion and social group. These issues become exacerbated whenfeminists claim to speak for others across the complexities ofdifference, with the consequences that the politics of speakingfor, about, and on behalf of other women is one of the mostcontested areas in present day feminist activism and research[italics added]. (P. 30)

As the site where research participants voices,accounts, or narratives become transformed into theory,we have argued that the interpretation stages and processesof empirical research are critical to feminist concerns withpower, exploitation, knowing, and representation (Doucetand Mauthner 2002; Mauthner and Doucet 1998, 2003; seealso Glucksmann 1994). With the exception of participa-tory research or collaborative research processes (e.g.,Code and Burt 1995; Davies et al. 2004; Ristock andPennell 1996; Siltanen, Willis, and Scobie, forthcoming),the analysis and interpretation of others narratives usuallytake place back in the office, in isolation from ourrespondents, research users, and colleagues. Both the ana-lytic processes and the raw narrative transcripts tend toremain hidden and invisible. This, we suggest, compelsresearchers to be reflexive about these processes of inter-pretation and power and how methodology and epistemol-ogy intertwine during this phase of research. We argue foraccountable and responsible knowing and emphasize thecritical importance of being reflexive and transparentabout our knowledge construction processes (see Doucetand Mauthner 2002; Mauthner and Doucet 1998, 2003).

While feminists have long debated issues of power vis--vis research respondents in the field, only recentlyhave they turned this critical reflexive gaze onto their prac-tices and relationships with collaborators in the office,and the influence of institutional power dynamics on whatbecomes known and how (Gillies, Jessop, and Lucey,forthcoming; Mauthner and Edwards, forthcoming). Oneof the challenges feminists face is how to create egalitarianand collaborative research practices and relationships,within the context of new managerialist hierarchicalhigher education institutions (Mauthner and Edwards,forthcoming). The personal, political, and ethical dilem-mas that arise in negotiating the dynamic relations ofpower that structure and sustain the institutions and prac-tices through which research knowledge is produced isbecoming a key issue within feminist research debates.

Reflexivity

The issue of reflexivity and the ways in which oursubjectivity becomes entangled in the lives of others(Denzin 1997:27) has concerned sociologists, anthropolo-gists, and cross-disciplinary feminist scholars for decadesand philosophers for even longer (Kuhn 1962; Quine 1969;Rorty 1969). Feminist sociologists have been particularlyvocal on this point, and reflexivity has come to be regardedas one of the pivotal themes in discussions of feministresearch (DeVault 1996; Fonow and Cook 1991, 2005;Gelsthorpe 1990; Naples 2003; Ramazanoglu and Holland2002). Most feminist researchers openly reflect on,acknowledge, and document their social location and theroles they play in co-creating data and in constructingknowledges (Harding 1993a; Hertz 1997; Wolf 1996). Inthis expanding area of scholarship, four key areas haveattracted the attention and commitment of feministresearchers.

First, while reflexivity is largely a point of consensusfor feminist researchers, recent attention has underlinedtheoretical diversity within the concept itself. NancyNaples (2003:214), for example, argues for the use of theterm reflective practice since it indicates a morethoughtful process and does not invoke the often-unconscious responses to stimuli associated with reflex.Others have pointed to strong and weak reflexivity asways of accounting for its varied degrees of reflexivenessas well as its links to strong objectivity6 (Harding 1993a,1998; Wasserfall 1994). Reflexivity has also been linked toaccountability, as a way of accounting for the knowledgeproduced (Code 1995; Doucet and Mauthner 2002;Hurtado 1996; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002). Recentdiscussions have drawn attention to the constraints onreflexivity, owing to our partial awareness of the range ofinfluences impacting on our research, and the unpre-dictable ways in which our work will be read (Bordo 1997;Grosz 1995; Mauthner and Doucet 2003; Mauthner, Parry,and Backett-Milburn 1998). We have suggested the notionof reflexivity in retrospect as a way of viewing researchand the knowledge produced as a continuous and open-ended process that changes as researchers revisit their dataand as new researchers reanalyze old data sets (Mauthnerand Doucet 2003).

A second theme within feminist debates on reflexivityconcerns the partial, provisional, and perspectival nature ofknowledge claims. The production of theory is viewed as asocial activity, which is culturally, socially, and historicallyembedded, thus resulting in situated knowledges(Haraway 1988). The reflexive turn, combined with theextensive turn to culture in feminism (Barrett1992:204), has, however, created a sense of uncertaintyand crisis as increasingly complex questions are raisedconcerning the status, validity, basis, and authority of theauthor and their knowledge claims (Bordo 1997; Grosz1995; Richardson 1988, 1997). This has particular impli-cations for feminist emancipatory goals in that feminists



have been left to grapple with how to make real politicalclaims from their work (e.g., Benhabib 1995; Lazreg 1994;Seller 1988; Smith 1999).

A third area where feminist sociologists have givensignificant attention concerns issues of reflexive position-ing in research projects (see, e.g., Hertz 1997; Letherby2002; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002). This reflexivepositioning tends to take the form of positioning in termsof subject positions such as gender, class, ethnicity, sexu-ality, and geographical location. This predominantapproach to reflexivity has, however, been criticized. Byfocusing on the researchers own subject positions, thediscussion of reflexivity tends to remain fixed at the levelof the researcher and how their subjectivityespeciallyin fieldwork and in writing upinfluences research. Anillustration of this weakness is Shulamit Reinharzs(1997) piece, Who Am I, in which she reflects on her20 different selves (p. 5) and their influence on theresearch process, particularly fieldwork. These reflectionsmay be useful in underlining the complexity of self inpractical terms during research, but their inadvertent con-sequence is that the researcherthe privileged, oftenwhite, often middle class, and First World researchertakes center stage. While engaged in dialogues aboutdecentering the West, feminist researchers from Westernindustrialized countries simultaneously put themselves atthe center while marginalizing the Third World narrator(Hale 1991). A further critique is that naming subject posi-tionings does not address the question of how these subjectpositionings affect knowledge construction. As Daphne Patai(1991) argues, these gestures at self-positioning are oftendeployed as badges; they are meant to represent onesrespect to difference but do not affect any aspect of theresearch or the interpretive text (p. 149). While social loca-tions are important, reflexivity also means actively reflect-ing on personal, interpersonal, institutional, pragmatic,emotional, theoretical, epistemological, and ontologicalinfluences on our research and interpretive processes.That is, how do these reflexive positionings actuallyshape research practices and the knowledges that are ulti-mately produced?

While feminist researchers have recognized that reflex-ivity is important in data analysis, and in knowledge con-struction more generally (Mason 2002; Olesen et al. 1994;Pidgeon and Henwood 1997), the question remains as tohow researchers can do reflexivity within the context ofempirical research practice, and particularly the analysisand interpretation of narratives. As well stated byRamazanoglu and Holland (2002): Feminism has beenstronger on honourable intentions for accessing powerrelations than on effective skills and strategies to enable

researchers to overcome limits of understanding, and thedifficulty of seeing ourselves as others see us (p. 119).

CONCLUSIONS

Over the past three decades, there have been multiple inter-sections between feminism and the fields of methodologyand epistemology. While initially claiming a particularprivileged place around the names of feminist methods,feminist methodologies, and feminist epistemologies,greater attention to diversity and complexity in feministefforts to research and know the lives of others, whetheracross the globe or within ones local community, hasmeant that feminists have come to see themselves, and beseen by others, as key contributors to these burgeoningbodies of scholarship. Feminist research has become awell-used term for the work that feminists do when theytake on either qualitative or quantitative research that isdriven by, and aimed toward, a desire to challenge multiplehierarchies of inequalities within social life. Feministscholars have made significant contributions to both main-stream and alternative thinking around issues of power,knowing, representation, reflexivity, and legitimation inmethodological and epistemological discussions. Feministsociologists have been particularly prominent in their par-ticipation in advancing such knowledge.

While the rich multidisciplinary feminist scholarship onmethodologies and epistemologies and the development ofa specific field of scholarship under the name of feministresearch, has been nothing short of overwhelming in thepast few decades, several areas of work still require atten-tion. Such areas include the challenges for feminists inmaking sense of, and theorizing, mens experiences(Doucet 2004; Grenz 2005; Presser 2005; Taylor and Rupp2005); grappling with power in the internal workings ofthe research process, especially hierarchies of inequalitieswithin feminist research teams and collaborations (seeMauthner and Edwards, forthcoming); greater attention tolinking knowing and doing (Letherby 2002) andmethodologies and epistemologies (e.g., Code 1995;Holland and Ramazanoglu 1994; Maynard 1994; Naples2003; Ramazanoglu and Holland 2002); and actualizingwhat it means to do reflexivity, or to enact what Hardinghas called strong reflexivity (1993a) and robust reflex-ivity (1998). In the words of Lorraine Code, feministresearchers must continue in their efforts to reflect on andwrite about what it means to know responsibly, to knowwell (see Code 1984, 1988, 1993, 1995) and to createexemplary kinds of knowing (Code 1993:39). Feministsociologists are well positioned to lead such efforts.



feature that the subsequent repair marks as the trouble source,such as I had wanted to. Through a repair the speaker mayachieve an alternation of a conveyed meaning even if the originalitem was not false in any independent sense. Sometimes a distinc-tion is drawn between repairs and corrections that handle errorshaving an independent existence (see Schegloff et al. 1977).

Chapter 4. Humanist Sociology

1. Although Max Weber and Georg Simmel offered alterna-tives to positivism, they did not, except as private citizens,embrace a moral imperative.

2. An irony here is that although Sumner was an ordainedminister and a practicing Christian, his sociology was devoid ofany religious or moral underpinnings.

3. Jane Addams was baptized at the age of 27 and saw thisas more of a joining of a community than as a religious commit-ment (Linn [1937] 2000).

4. Deegan (1988:161) offers the interesting interpretationthat although Park and Burgesss quarrel was with the religiosityof the early male Chicago sociologists, they did not openly con-front them on this point and instead attacked Jane Addams andthe women of Hull-House as unscientific social workers.

5. Although Small and Giddings were at odds regarding thedirection that sociological research should take, and there is evi-dence of personal animosity between them (see Bannister 1987),neither wavered in his commitment to a Christian-based sociol-ogy and its use in spreading the social gospel.

6. Space limitations preclude the inclusion of such others asLuther Barnard (18811951), Robert Lynd (18921970), PitirimSorokin (18891968), and Willard Waller (18991945), who alsokept the humanistic tradition alive.

7. Millss B.A. and M.A. from the University of Texas werein philosophy. He chose to do doctoral work in sociology at theUniversity of Wisconsin because the sociology departmentoffered him a larger fellowship than he was offered in philosophy(Scimecca 1977).

8. Lee also was a cofounder of another sociologicalassociation, the Society for the Study of Social Problems (SSSP),in 1953. In addition, he was elected to the presidency of the American Sociological Association in 1976 as a write-incandidate.

Chapter 5. Feminist Methodologies and Epistemology

1. Although Harding refers to the third stream as transi-tional epistemologies in her earlier work (Harding 1987b), shelater refers to this category as postmodern epistemologies (seeHarding 1991).

2. Empiricism is the view that experience provides the sole,or at least the primary, justification for all knowledge. From theclassical empiricists to some early twentieth-century theorists,empiricists held that the content of experience could be describedin fixed, basic, theory-neutral termsfor example, in terms ofsense data. Philosophy was regarded as a discipline that couldprovide a transcendent or external justification for empirical orscientific methods. Quine (1969) revolutionized empiricism byrejecting both these ideas. Quine argued that observation is

thoroughly theory laden. It is cast in terms of complex conceptsthat cannot be immediately given in experience, all of which arepotentially subject to revision in light of further experience.

3. Part of the problem with understanding feminist empiri-cism is that Harding initially provided such a slim and distortedpicture of what this was. Indeed as argued by sociologist GregorMcLennan (1995), Given her initial characterization of whatempiricism involves, it comes as no surprise that Harding canfind no real life advocates of feminist empiricism (p. 394). Inher later work, Harding (1991, 1993a) distinguished between theoriginal spontaneous feminist empiricism and a recent philo-sophical version as found, she notes, in her fellow authors(Longino 1993; Nelson 1993) in the collection titled FeministEpistemologies. Here, she acknowledges that Longino andNelson have developed sophisticated and valuable feministempiricist philosophies of science (Harding 1993a:51).

4. The difficulty with describing feminist standpoint is thatthere are many versions of it (Harding 1987b, 1991, 1993a;Hartsock 1983, 1985; Jaggar 1983; Rose 1983; Smith 1974,1987, 1999) and it has been widely critiqued (e.g., Flax 1990;Hekman 1997; Walby 2001). Feminist standpoint epistemologyhas been criticized for implying there is an essential woman(Collins 2000), for giving epistemic privilege to gender oppres-sion over other kinds of oppressions (Bar On 1993), for prioritiz-ing the unique abilities of the oppressed to produce knowledge(Harding 1991:57), and for assuming that the standpoints of theoppressed have not been tainted by dominant ideologies (Flax1990; Hawkesworth 1989; Holmwood 1995).

5. Ann Oakley (1998, 2000) has since qualified her views on this.

6. Harding (1991, 1993a) writes about the links betweenstrong reflexivity and strong objectivity in the constructionof feminist epistemologies. Specifically, she argues,

A notion of strong objectivity [italics added] would requirethat the objects of inquiry be conceptualized as gazing back inall their cultural particularity and that the researcher, throughtheory and methods, stand behind them, gazing back at hisown socially situated research project in all its cultural partic-ularity and its relationship to other projects of his culturemany of which . . . can be seen only from locations far awayfrom the scientists actual daily work. (Harding 1991:163)

Chapter 6. Feminist Theories

1. As Eldridge et al. (2000) point out, feminism is not theonly social movement to have challenged sociologys partialstandpoint: for example, as sociology became the chosen disci-pline for members of disenfranchised groups entering the acad-emy, its own partisanship was unmasked (p. 4).

2. Stories of their appearances, their experiences, theirdemands, and the resistance to those demands are legion, thoughfor the most part unwritten (Laslett and Thorne 1997; Hamilton1984, 2003).

3. This is, of course, similar to all theoretical traditions,though not always as acknowledged as in Alan Sicas (1995)recent comment: Theoretical action . . . its in that part of theMagical Theory bibliotheque where history, philosophy, aesthet-ics, nonexperimental psychology, aesthetics, nonexperimentalpsychology, ethics, economics, and politics share some commonturf (p. 6).

43821ST CENTURY SOCIOLOGY

Bryant-45099 EM.qxd 10/18/2006 7:42 PM Page 438

Du Bois, W. E. B. [1899] 1970. The Philadelphia Negro. NewYork: Oxford University Press.

Elshtain, Jean Bethke. 2002. Jane Addams and the Dream ofAmerican Democracy. New York: Basic Books.

Gerth, Hans H. and C. Wright Mills. 1953. Character and SocialStructure. New York: Harbinger.

Giddings, Franklin H. [1896] 1970. The Principles of Sociology.New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation.

Giddings, Franklin, H. 1901. Inductive Sociology. New York:Macmillan.

Glass, John. 1971. The Humanistic Challenge to Sociology.Journal of Humanistic Psychology 11:17083.

Goodwin, Glenn A. 1983. Toward a Paradigm for HumanisticSociology. Humanity and Society 7(3):21937.

Goodwin, Glenn A. and Joseph A. Scimecca. 2006. ClassicalSociological Theory: Rediscovering the Promise ofSociology. Belmont, CA: Thomson/Wadsworth.

Hoult, Thomas Ford. 1979. Sociology for a New Day. 2d ed. NewYork: Random House.

Hull-House Maps and Papers, by Residents of Hull-House, aSocial Settlement. 1895. New York: Crowell.

Laslett, Barbara. 1991. Biography as Historical Sociology: TheCase of William Fielding Ogburn. Theory and Society20(4):51138.

Lee, Alfred McClung. 1973. Toward Humanist Sociology.Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Lee, Alfred McClung. 1978. Sociology for Whom? New York:Oxford University Press.

Lee, Alfred McClung. 1988. Sociology for People: Toward a CaringProfession. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.

Leggett, John. 1998. Mining the Fields: Farm Workers FightBack. Dix Hills, NJ: General Hall.

Lindenfeld, Frank, ed. 2004. Cooperative Alternatives toCapitalism. Humanity and Society (special issue) 28(3).

Linn, James Weber. [1937] 2000. Jane Addams: A Biography.Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Locke, John. [1690] 1894. Essay Concerning HumanUnderstanding. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Martindale, Don. 1981. The Nature and Types of SociologicalTheory. 2d ed. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.

Mead, George Herbert. [1934] 1974. Mind, Self and Society.Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Meltzer, Bernard N., John W. Petras, and Larry T. Reynolds.1977. Symbolic Interactionism: Genesis, Varieties, andCriticisms. Boston, MA: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Mills, C. Wright. 1951. White Collar. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Mills, C. Wright. 1956. The Power Elite. New York: OxfordUniversity Press.

Mills, C. Wright. 1959. The Sociological Imagination. New York:Oxford University Press.

Ogburn, William F. [1922] 1966. Social Change with Respect toCultural and Original Nature. New York: Dell.

Park, Robert E. and Ernest W. Burgess. 1921. Introduction to theScience of Sociology. Chicago, IL: University of ChicagoPress.

Pepinski, Harold. 1991. Geometry of Violence and Democracy.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Randall, John Herman, Jr. 1976. The Making of the ModernMind. New York: Columbia University Press.

Rauschenbush, Winifred. 1979. Robert E. Park: Biography of aSociologist. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Rossides, Daniel W. 1998. Social Theory: Its Origins, History,and Contemporary Relevance. Dix Hills, NJ: General Hall.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques [1755] 1985. Discourse on HumanInequality. New York: Penguin Books.

Scimecca, Joseph A. 1977. The Sociological Theory of C. WrightMills. Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press.

Scimecca, Joseph A. 1980. Education and Society. New York:Holt, Rinehart and Winston.

Scimecca, Joseph A. 1987. Humanist Sociological Theory: TheState of an Art. Humanity and Society 11(3):33552.

Scimecca, Joseph A. 1989. The Philosophical Foundations ofHumanist Sociology. Pp. 22338 in Current Perspectives inSocial Theory, edited by J. Wilson. Greenwich, CT: JAIPress.

Scimecca, Joseph A. 1995. Society and Freedom. 2d ed. Chicago,IL: Nelson-Hall.

Scimecca, Joseph A. and Glenn A. Goodwin. 2003. JaneAddams: The First Humanist Sociologist. Humanity andSociety 27(2):14357.

Small, Albion W. [1905] 1974. General Sociology: An Expositionof the Main Developments in Sociology from Spencer toRatzenhofer. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Small, Albion W. 1920. Christianity and Industry. AmericanJournal of Sociology 25(6):67394.

Small, Albion W. and George Vincent. 1894. An Introduction tothe Study of Society. New York: American Book.

Spencer, Herbert. [1873] 1961. The Study of Sociology, edited byT. Parsons. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Starr. Jerold. 2001. Airwars: The Fight to Reclaim PublicBroadcasting. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Sumner, William Graham. 1911. War and Other Essays, editedby A. G. Keller. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Sumner, William Graham. 1940. Folkways. New York: NewAmerican Library.

Taylor, Carol M. 1981. W. E. B. Du Boiss Challenge toScientific Racism. Journal of Black Studies 11(4):44960.

Vidich, Arthur J. and Stanford M. Lyman. 1985. AmericanSociology: Worldly Rejections of Religion and TheirDirections. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Ward, Lester Frank. 1883. Dynamic Sociology. New York:Putnam.

Ward, Lester Frank. 1898. Outline of Sociology. New York:Putnam.

Ward, Lester Frank. 1906. Applied Sociology. Boston, MA: Ginn.Wolfe, James. 2004. Institution vs. Movement in Peace

Organizing. Humanity and Society 28(4):42232.

Chapter 5. Feminist Methodologies and Epistemology

Alcoff, Linda and Elizabeth Potter. 1993. Introduction: WhenFeminisms Intersect Epistemology. Pp. 114 in FeministEpistemologies, edited by L. Alcoff and E. Potter. London,England: Routledge.

Alcoff, Linda Martin. 1998. Preface. Pp. xxvixxviii inEpistemology: The Big Questions, edited by L. M. Alcoff.London, England: Blackwell.

Alexander, Jackie and Chandra Talpede Mohanty. 1997. FeministGenealogies, Colonial Legacies, Democratic Futures.New York: Routledge.



Antony, Louise M. 1993. Quine as Feminist: The Radical Import ofNaturalized Epistemology. Pp. 185226 in A Mind of OnesOwn Feminist Essays on Reason and Objectivity, edited by L.M. Antony and C. E. Witt. Cambridge, MA: Westview Press.

Atkinson, P. 1992. Understanding Ethnographic Texts. London,England: Sage.

Bar On, Bat-Ami. 1993. Marginality and Epistemic Privilege.Pp. 83100 in Feminist Epistemologies, edited by L. Alcoffand E. Potter. New York: Routledge.

Barrett, Michele. 1992. Words and Things: Materialism andMethod in Contemporary Feminist Analysis. Pp. 20117 inDestabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates,edited by M. Barrett and A. Phillips. Cambridge, England:Polity Press.

Beiser, H. R. 1993. Meeting at the Crossroads: WomensPsychology and Girls Development. Journal of theAmerican Medical Association 11:144647.

Benhabib, Seyla. 1995. Feminism and Postmodernism.Pp. 1734 in Feminist Contentions: A PhilosophicalExchange, edited by S. Benhabib, J. Butler, D. Cornell, andN. Fraser. New York: Routledge.

Bernal, Dolores Delgado. 2002. Critical Race Theory, LatinoCritical Theory, and Critical Raced-GenderedEpistemologies: Recognizing Students of Color as Holdersand Creators of Knowledge. Qualitative Inquiry 8:10526.

Bordo, Susan. 1997. Twilight Zones: The Hidden Life of CulturalImages from Plato to O. J. Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press.

Brodribb, Somer. 1992. Nothing Mat(t)ers: A Feminist Critiqueof Postmodernism. New York: Routledge.

Bunch, Charlotte. 1987. Passionate Politics: Feminist Theory inAction. New York: St. Martins Press.

Campbell, Richard. 1998. Illusions of Paradox. Lanham, MD:Rowman & Littlefield.

Charmaz, K. 1993. Meeting at the Crossroads: WomensPsychology and Girls Development. Gender and Society6:61416.

Christian, Barbara. 1996. The Race for Theory. Pp. 14857 inContemporary Postcolonial Theory: A Reader, edited by M. Padmini. New York: Arnold.

Clifford, J. 1986. Introduction: Partial Truths. Pp. 16379 inWriting Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography,edited by J. Clifford and G. E. Marcus. Berkeley: Universityof California Press.

Code, Lorraine. 1981. Is the Sex of the KnowerEpistemologically Significant? Metaphilosophy 12:26776.

Code, Lorraine. 1984. Toward a Responsibilist Epistemology.Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 45:2950.

Code, Lorraine. 1988. Experience, Knowledge andResponsibility. Pp. 187204 in Feminist Perspectives inPhilosophy, edited by M. Griffiths and M. Whitford.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Code, Lorraine. 1991. What Can She Know? Feminist Theoryand the Construction of Knowledge. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press.

Code, Lorraine. 1993. Taking Subjectivity into Account.Pp. 1548 in Feminist Epistemologies, edited by L. Alcoffand E. Potter. New York: Routledge.

Code, Lorraine. 1995. How Do We Know? Questions of Methodin Feminist Practice. Pp. 1444 in Changing Methods:Feminists Transforming Practice, edited by S. D. Burt andL. Code. Peterborough, Ontario, Canada: Broadview Press.

Code, Lorraine and Sandra D. Burt. 1995. Changing Methods:Feminists Transforming Practice. Peterborough, Ontario,Canada: Broadview Press.

Collins, Patricia Hill. 1997. Comment on Hekmans Truth andMethod: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited: Wheresthe Power? Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society22:37581.

Collins, Patricia Hill. 2000. Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge,Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment. London,England: Routledge.

Cotterill, Pamela. 1992. Interviewing Women: Issues ofFriendship, Vulnerability, and Power. Womens StudiesInternational Forum 15:593606.

Davies, Bronwyn, Jenny Browne, Susanne Gannon, EileenHonan, Cath Laws, Babette Mueller-Rockstroh, and EvaBendix Petersen. 2004. The Ambivalent Practices ofReflexivity. Qualitative Inquiry 10:36089.

Denzin, Noman K. 1997. Interpretive Ethnography:Ethnographic Practices for the 21st Century. ThousandOaks, CA: Sage.

Denzin, Noman K. and Yvonna S. Lincoln. 2000. Handbook ofQualitative Research. London, England: Sage.

DeVault, Marjorie L. 1990. Talking and Listening fromWomens Standpoint: Feminist Strategies for Interviewingand Analysis. Social Problems 37:96116.

DeVault, Marjorie L. 1996. Talking Back to Sociology:Distinctive Contributions of Feminist Methodology.Annual Review of Sociology 22:2950.

DeVault, Marjorie L. 1999. Liberating Method: Feminism andSocial Research. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.

Doucet, Andrea. 2004. Fathers and the Responsibility forChildren: A Puzzle and a Tension. Atlantis: A WomensStudies Journal 28:10314.

Doucet, Andrea and Natasha S. Mauthner. 2002. KnowingResponsibly: Ethics, Feminist Epistemologies andMethodologies. Pp. 12345 in Ethics in QualitativeResearch, edited by M. Mauthner, M. Birch, J. Jessop, andT. Miller. London, England: Sage.

Duran, Jane. 1991. Toward a Feminist Epistemology. New York:Rowman & Littlefield.

Edwards, Rosalind. 1990. Connecting Method andEpistemology: A White Woman Interviewing BlackWomen. Womens Studies International Forum 13:47790.

Edwards, Rosalind. 1993. An Education in Interviewing:Placing the Researcher and the Researched. Pp. 18196 inResearching Sensitive Topics, edited by C. M. Renzetti andR. M. Lee. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Elam, Diane. 1992. Romancing the Postmodern. New York:Routledge.

Ferguson, Ann. 2004. Symposium: Comments on OfeliaSchuttes Work on Feminist Philosophy. Hypatia19:16981.

Finch, Janet. 1984. Its Great to Have Someone to Talk To: TheEthics and Politics of Interviewing Women. Pp. 7088 inSocial Researching: Politics, Problems, Practice, edited byC. Bell and H. Roberts. London, England: Routledge &Kegan Paul.

Finch, Janet and Dulcie Groves. 1983. A Labour of Love: Women,Work and Caring. London, England: Routledge.

Fine, Michelle and Lois Wiess. 1996. Writing the Wrongs ofFieldwork: Confronting Our Own Research/WritingDilemmas. Qualitative Inquiry 2:25174.

Volume Two References449


Flax, Jane. 1990. Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis,Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West.Berkeley: University of California Press.

Fonow, Mary M. and Judith A. Cook. 1991. BeyondMethodology: Feminist Scholarship as Lived Research.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Fonow, Mary M. and Judith A. Cook. 2005. FeministMethodology: New Applications in the Academy and PublicPolicy. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society30(4):221136.

Fraser, Nancy. 1995. False Antitheses. Pp. 5974 in FeministContentions: A Philosophical Exchange, edited by S.Benhabib, J. Butler, D. Cornell, and N. Fraser. New York:Routledge.

Fraser, Nancy and Linda J. Nicholson. 1990. Social Criticismwithout Philosophy: An Encounter between Feminism andPostmodernism. Pp. 1938 in Feminism/Postmodernism,edited by L. J. Nicholson. London, England: Routledge.

Fricker, Miranda. 1994. Knowledge as Construct: Theorizingthe Role of Gender in Knowledge. Pp. 95109 in Knowingthe Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology,edited by K. Lennon and M. Whitford. London, England:Routledge.

Geertz, Clifford. 1988. Works and Lives: The Anthropologist asAuthor. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Gelsthorpe, Lorraine. 1990. Feminist Methodology inCriminology: A New Approach or Old Wine in NewBottles. Pp. 89106 in Feminist Perspectives inCriminology, edited by L. Gelsthorpe and A. Morris. MiltonKeynes, England: Open University Press.

Giere, Ronald N. and Alan W. Richardson. 1996. Origins ofLogical Empiricism. Minneapolis: University of MinnesotaPress.

Gillies, Valerie, Julie Jessop, and Helen Lucey, eds. Forthcoming.Power, Knowledge and the Academy. London, England: Sage.

Gilligan, Carol. 1977. In a Different Voice: PsychologicalTheory and Womens Development. Harvard EducationalReview 47:481517.

Gilligan, Carol. 1982. In a Different Voice: Psychological Theoryand Womens Development. Cambridge, MA: HarvardUniversity Press.

Glucksmann, Miriam. 1994. The Work of Knowledge and theKnowledge of Womens Work. Pp. 14965 in ResearchingWomens Lives from a Feminist Perspective, edited by M.Maynard and J. Purvis. London, England: Taylor & Francis.

Graham, Hilary. 1983a. Caring: A Labour of Love. Pp. 1330in A Labour of Love: Women, Work and Caring, edited by J. Finch and D. Groves. London, England: Routledge.

Graham, Hilary. 1983b. Do Her Answers Fit His Questions?Women and the Survey Method. Pp. 13247 in The Publicand the Private, edited by E. Gamarnikow, D. Morgan,J. Purvis, and D. Taylorson. London, England: Tavistock.

Graham, Hilary. 1991. The Concept of Caring in FeministResearch: The Case of Domestic Service. Sociology25:6178.

Gopinath, Gayatri. 2005. Impossible Desires: Queer Diasporasand South Asian Public Cultures (Perverse Modernities).Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Grenz, Sabine. 2005. Intersections of Sex and Power inResearch on Prostitution: A Female ResearcherInterviewing Male Heterosexual Clients. Signs: Journal ofWomen in Culture and Society 30:209114.

Grosz, Elizabeth. 1995. Space, Time and Perversion. London,England: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Hale, Sondra. 1991. Feminist Method, Process, and Self-Criticism: Interviewing Sudanese Women. Pp. 12136 inWomens Words: The Feminist Practice of Oral History,edited by S. B. Gluck and D. Patai. New York: Routledge.

Haraway, Donna. 1988. Situated Knowledges: The ScienceQuestion in Feminism and the Privilege of PartialPerspective. Feminist Studies 14:57599.

Haraway, Donna. 1991. Simians, Cyborgs and Women: TheReinvention of Nature. New York: Routledge.

Harding, Sandra. 1987a. Introduction: Is There a FeministMethod? Pp. 114 in Feminism and Methodology, editedby S. Harding. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Harding, Sandra. 1987b. Conclusion: EpistemologicalQuestions. Pp. 18190 in Feminism and Methodology,edited by S. Harding. Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress.

Harding, Sandra. 1991. Whose Science? Whose Knowledge?Thinking from Womens Lives. Ithaca, NY: CornellUniversity Press.

Harding, Sandra. 1993a. Rethinking Standpoint Epistemologies:What is Strong Objectivity. Pp. 4982 in FeministEpistemologies, edited by L. Alcoff and E. Potter. London,England: Routledge.

Harding, Sandra. 1993b. Reinventing Ourselves as Other: MoreNew Agents of History and Knowledge. Pp. 14064 inAmerican Feminist Thought at Centurys End: A Reader,edited by L. Kauffman. Oxford, England: Blackwell.

Harding, Sandra. 1998. Is Science Multicultural? Postcolonial-ism, Feminisms and Epistemologies. Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press.

Harding, Sandra and Kathryn Norberg. 2005. New FeministApproaches to Social Science Methodologies: AnIntroduction. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture andSociety 30:20092016.

Hartsock, Nancy C. M. 1983. The Feminist Standpoint:Developing the Ground for a Specifically Feminist HistoricalMaterialism. Pp. 283310 in Discovering Reality: FeministPerspectives on Epistemology, Metaphysics, Methodologyand Philosophy of Science, edited by S. Harding and M. Hintakka. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: D. Reidel.

Hartsock, Nancy C. M. 1985. Money, Sex and Power: Toward aFeminist Historical Materialism. Boston, MA: NortheasternUniversity Press.

Hartsock, Nancy C. M. 1998. The Feminist Standpoint Revisitedand Other Essays. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Hawkesworth, Mary. 1989. Knowers, Knowing, Known:Feminist Theory and Claims to Truth. Signs: Journal ofWomen in Culture and Society 14:53347.

Hekman, Susan. 1997. Truth and Method: Feminist StandpointTheory Revisited. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture andSociety 22:34165.

Hertz, Rosanna. 1997. Reflexivity and Voice. Thousand Oaks,CA: Sage.

Holland, Janet and Caroline Ramazanoglu. 1994. Coming toConclusions: Power and Interpretation in ResearchingYoung Womens Sexuality. Pp. 1248 in ResearchingWomens Lives from a Feminist Perspective, edited by M.Maynard and J. Purvis. London, England: Taylor & Francis.

Hollway, Wendy. 1989. Subjectivity and Method in Psychology:Gender, Meaning and Science. London, England: Sage.



Holmwood, John. 1995. Feminism and Epistemology: WhatKind of Successor Science? Sociology 29:41128.

Hunter, Margaret. 2004. Rethinking Epistemology,Methodology, and Racism: Or, Is White Sociology ReallyDead? Race & Society 5:11938.

Hurtado, Aida. 1996. The Color of Privilege: Three Blasphemieson Race and Feminism. Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress.

Jaggar, Alison. 1983. Feminist Politics and Human Nature.Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1983. A Feeling for the Organism: The Lifeand Work of Barbara McClintock. New York: W. H.Freeman.

Keller, Evelyn Fox. 1985. Reflections of Gender and Science.New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Keller, Evelyn Fox and Helen E. Longino. 1998. Feminism andScience. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Kirsch, Gesa E. 2005. Friendship, Friendliness, and FeministFieldwork. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society30:216372.

Kuhn, Thomas. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Ladson-Billings, G. 2000. Racialized Discourses and EthnicEpistemologies. Pp. 25777 in Handbook of QualitativeResearch, 2d ed., edited by N. K. Denzin and Y. S. Lincoln.Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Lather, Patti. 1991. Getting Smart. New York: Routledge.Lather, Patti. 2001. Postbook: Working the Ruins of Feminist

Ethnography. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture andSociety 27:199228.

Lather, Patti and Chris Smithies. 1997. Troubling the Angels:Women Living with HIV/AIDS. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Lazreg, Marnia. 1994. The Eloquence of Silence: AlgerianWomen in Question. New York: Routledge.

Lennon, Kathleen and Margaret Whitford. 1994. Introduction.Pp. 114 in Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectivesin Epistemology, edited by K. Lennon and M. Whitford.London, England: Routledge.

Letherby, Gayle. 2002. Feminist Research in Theory andPractice. Buckingham, England: Open University Press.

Lloyd, Genevieve. 1983. Man of Reason. London, England:Routledge.

Longino, Helen E. 1990. Science as Social Knowledge: Valuesand Objectivity in Scientific Inquiry. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.

Longino, Helen E. 1993. Subjects, Power and Knowledge:Description and Prescription in Feminist Philosophies ofScience. Pp. 10120 in Feminist Epistemologies, edited byL. Alcoff and E. Potter. London, England: Routledge.

Longino, Helen E. 1997. Feminist Epistemology as a LocalEpistemology: Helen E. Longino. Aristotelian Society71:1935.

Longino, Helen E. 2002. The Fate of Knowledge. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.

Longino, Helen E. and Ruth Doell. 1983. Body, Bias, andBehaviour: A Comparative Analysis of Reasoning in TwoAreas of Biological Science. Signs: Journal of Women inCulture and Society 9:20627.

Lugones, Maria and Elizabeth Spelman. 1983. Have We Got aTheory for You! Hypatia 1:57381.

Marcus, George E. and Michael M. J. Fischer. 1986.Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental

Moment in the Human Sciences. Chicago, IL: University ofChicago Press.

Mason, Jennifer. 2002. Qualitative Researching. 2d ed. London,England: Sage.

Mauthner, Natasha S. and Andrea Doucet. 1998. Reflections ona Voice Centred Relational Method of Data Analysis:Analysing Maternal and Domestic Voices. Pp. 11946 inFeminist Dilemmas in Qualitative Research: Private Livesand Public Texts, edited by J. Ribbens and R. Edwards.London, England: Sage.

Mauthner, Natasha S. and Andrea Doucet. 2003. ReflexiveAccounts and Accounts of Reflexivity in Qualitative DataAnalysis. Sociology 37:41331.

Mauthner, Natasha S. and Rosalind Edwards. Forthcoming.Feminism, the Relational Micro-Politics of Power andResearch Management in Higher Education in Britain. InPower, Knowledge and the Academy, edited by V. Gillies,J. Jessop, and H. Lucey. London, England: Sage.

Mauthner, Natasha S., Odette Parry, and Kathryn Backett-Milburn. 1998. The Data Are Out There, or Are They?Implications for Archiving and Revisiting Qualitative Data.Sociology 32:73345.

Maynard, Mary. 1994. Methods, Practice and Epistemology.Pp. 1026 in Researching Womens Lives from a FeministPerspective, edited by M. Maynard and J. Purvis. London,England: Taylor & Francis.

McCall, Leslie. 2005. The Complexity of Intersectionality.Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society30:17711800.

McLennan, Gregor. 1995. Feminism, Epistemology andPostmodernism: Reflections on Current Ambivalence.Sociology 29:391409.

Miller, Jean Baker. 1976. Toward a New Psychology of Women.Boston, MA: Beacon Books.

Mohanty, Chandra Talpede, Ann Russo, and Lourdes Torres.1991. Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism.Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Mol, Annemarie. 2002. The Body Multiple: Ontology in MedicalPractice. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Naples, Nancy A. 2003. Feminism and Method: Ethnography,Discourse Analysis, and Activist Research. New York:Routledge.

Narayan, Kiran. 1993. How Native Is a NativeAnthropologist?American Anthropologist 95:67186.

Neilsen, Joyce McCarl. 1990. Feminist Research Methods:Exemplary Readings in the Social Sciences. San Francisco,CA: Westview Press.

Nelson, Lynn Hankinson. 1990. Who Knows: From Quine to aFeminist Empiricism. Philadelphia, PA: Temple UniversityPress.

Nelson, Lynn Hankinson. 1993. Epistemological Communities.Pp. 12159 in Feminist Epistemologies, edited by L. Alcoffand E. Potter. New York: Routledge.

Oakley, Ann. 1981. Interviewing Women: A Contradiction inTerms. Pp. 3061 in Doing Feminist Research, edited by H. Roberts. London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Oakley, Ann. 1998. Gender, Methodology and Peoples Ways ofKnowing: Some Problems with Feminism and the ParadigmDebate in Social Science. Sociology 32:70731.

Oakley, Ann. 2000. Experiments in Knowing: Gender andMethod in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, England: PolityPress.



Olesen, Virgina. 1998. Feminism and Models of QualitativeResearch. Pp. 41110 in The Landscape of QualitativeResearch: Theories and Issues, edited by N. K. Denzin andY. S. Lincoln. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Olesen, Virginia, Nellie Droes, Diane Hatton, Nan Chico, andLeonard Schatzman. 1994. Analyzing Together: Recollec-tions of a Team Approach. Pp. 11128 in AnalysingQualitative Data, edited by A. Bryman and R. Burgess.London, England: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Oyewumi, Oyeronke. 2000. Family Bonds/Conceptual Binds:African Notes on Feminist Epistemologies. Signs: Journalof Women in Culture and Society 25:109398.

Patai, Daphne. 1991. U.S. Academics and Third World Women:Is Ethical Research Possible? Pp. 13753 in WomensWords: The Feminist Practice of Oral History, edited by S. B. Gluck and D. Patai. New York: Routledge.

Pidgeon, Nick and Katherine Henwood. 1997. Using GroundedTheory in Psychological Research. Pp. 24574 in DoingQualitative Analysis in Psychology, edited by N. Hayes.Hove, England: Psychology Press.

Presser, Lois. 2005. Negotiating Power and Narrative inResearch: Implications for Feminist Methodology. Signs:Journal of Women in Culture and Society 30:206790.

Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1966. The Ways of Paradox andOther Essays. New York: Random House.

Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1969. Ontological Relativity andOther Essays. New York: Columbia University Press.

Ramazanoglu, Caroline. 1989. Improving on Sociology: TheProblems of Taking a Feminist Standpoint. Sociology23:42742.

Ramazanoglu, Caroline and Janet Holland. 2002. Feministmethodology: Challenges and Choices. London, England:Sage.

Reinharz, Shulamit. 1979. On Becoming a Social Scientist. SanFrancisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

Reinharz, Shulamit. 1992. Feminist Methods in Social Research.Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.

Reinharz, Shulamit. 1997. Who Am I? The Need for a Variety ofSelves in the Field. Pp. 320 in Reflexivity and Voice, editedby R. Hertz. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Reissman, Catherine Kohler. 1987. When Gender Is NotEnough: Women Interviewing Women. Gender and Society1:172207.

Reynolds, Tracey. 2002. Re-Thinking a Black FeministStandpoint. Ethnic and Racial Studies 25:591606.

Ribbens, Jane. 1989. Interviewing: An Unnatural Situation?Womens Studies International Forum 12(6):57992.

Ribbens, Jane. 1998. Hearing My Feeling Voice? AnAutobiographical Discussion of Motherhood. Pp. 2438 inFeminist Dilemmas in Qualitative Research, edited by J. Ribbens and R. Edwards. London, England: Sage.

Richardson, Laurel. 1988. The Collective Story: Postmodernismand the Writing of Sociology. Sociological Focus21:199208.

Richardson, Laurel. 1997. Fields of Play: Constructing anAcademic Life. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers UniversityPress.

Ristock, Janice L. and Joan Pennell. 1996. Community Researchas Empowerment: Feminist Links, Postmodern Interruptions.Toronto, Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press.

Rorty, Richard. 1969. Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature.Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Rose, Hilary. 1983. Hand, Brain and Heart: A FeministEpistemology for the Natural Sciences. Signs: Journal ofWomen in Culture and Society 1:7396.

Rose, Hilary. 1994. Love, Power and Knowledge: Towards aFeminist Transformation of the Sciences. Cambridge,England: Polity Press.

Sandoval, Chela. 2000a. Methodology of the Oppressed.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Sandoval, Chela. 2000b. US Third World Feminism: The Theoryand Method of Oppositional Consciousness in the PostmodernWorld. Pp. 26180 in Feminism and Race, edited by K.-K.Bhavnani. New York: Oxford University Press.

Seller, Anne. 1988. Realism versus Relativism: Towards aPolitically Adequate Epistemology. Pp. 16986 in FeministPerspectives in Philosophy, edited by M. Griffiths and M. Whitford. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Scott, Joan W. 1992. Experience. Pp. 2240 in FeministsTheorize the Political, edited by J. Butler and J. W. Scott.London, England: Routledge.

Scott, Joan W. 1994. A Rejoinder to Thomas C. Holt.Pp. 397400 in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice andPersuasion across the Disciplines, edited by J. Chandler,A. I. Davidson, and H. Harootunian. Chicago, IL: Universityof Chicago Press.

Schutte, Ofelia. 1993. Cultural Identity and Social Liberation inLatin American Thought. Albany: State University of NewYork Press.

Schutte, Ofelia. 1998. Cultural Alterity: Cross-CulturalCommunication and Feminist Thought in North-SouthDialogue. Hypatia 13:5372.

Schutte, Ofelia. 2000. Negotiating Latina Identities. inHispanics/Latinos in the United States: Ethnicity, Race andRights, edited by J. E. Gracia and P. De Grief. London,England: Routledge.

Shohat, Ella. 2001. Area Studies, Transnationalism and theFeminist Production of Knowledge. Signs: Journal ofWomen in Culture and Society 26:126972.

Siltanen, J., A. Willis, and W. Scobie. Forthcoming. SeparatelyTogether: Working Reflexively as a Team. InternationalJournal of Social Research Methodology.

Skeggs, Beverley. 1994. Situating the Production of FeministEthnography. Pp. 7292 in Researching Womens Livesfrom a Feminist Perspective, edited by M. Maynard and J. Purvis. London, England: Taylor & Francis.

Smith, Dorothy. 1974. Womens Perspective as a RadicalCritique of Sociology. Sociological Inquiry 4:113.

Smith, Dorothy. 1987. The Everyday World as Problematic: AFeminist Sociology. Milton Keynes, England: OpenUniversity Press.

Smith, Dorothy. 1989. Sociological Theory: Methods of WritingPatriarchy. Pp. 3464 in Feminism and SociologicalTheory, edited by R. A. Wallace. London, England: Sage.

Smith, Dorothy. 1999. Writing the Social: Critique, Theory andInvestigations. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University ofToronto Press.

Smith, Dorothy. 2005. Institutional Ethnography: A Sociologyfor People. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press.

Song, Miri and David Parker. 1995. Commonality, Difference,and the Dynamics of Disclosure in In-Depth Interviewing.Sociology 29:24156.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1993. Outside in the TeachingMachine. New York: Routledge.



Stacey, Judith. 1991. Can There Be a Feminist Ethnography?Pp. 11119 in Womens Words, edited by S. B. Gluck and D. Patai. New York: Routledge.

Stanley, Liz. 1994. The Knowing Because ExperiencingSubject: Narratives, Lives, and Autobiography. Pp. 4562in Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives inEpistemology, edited by K. Lennon and M. Whitford.London, England: Routledge.

Stanley, Liz and Sue Wise. [1983] 1993. Breaking Out. London,England: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

Taylor, Verta and Leila J. Rupp. 2005. When the Girls Are Men:Negotiating Gender and Sexual Dynamics in a Study ofDrag Queens. Signs: Journal of Women in Culture andSociety 30:211540.

Walby, Sylvia. 2001. Against Epistemological Chasms: TheScience Question in Feminism Revisited. Signs: Journal ofWomen in Culture and Society 26:485509.

Wasserfall, Rahel R. 1994. Reflexivity, Feminism andDifference. Pp. 15068 in Reflexivity and Voice, edited byR. Hertz. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Wilkinson, S. 1994. Editors Introduction. Feminism andPsychology 4:34344.

Wolf, Diane. 1996. Feminist Dilemmas in Fieldwork. Boulder,CO: Westview Press.

Zavella, Patricia. 1993. Feminist Insider Dilemmas:Constructing Ethnic Identity with Chicana Informants.Pp. 4262 in Situated Lives: Gender and Culture inEveryday Life, edited by L. Lamphere, H. Ragone, and P. Zavella. London, England: Routledge.

Chapter 6. Feminist Theories

Abel, Elizabeth. 1990. Race, Class and Psychoanalysis:Opening Questions. Pp. 184204 in Conflicts inFeminism, edited by M. Hirsch and E. F. Keller. New York:Routledge.

Acker, Joan. 1997. My Life as a Feminist Sociologist; or,Getting the Man Out of My Head. Pp. 2847 in FeministSociology: Life Histories of a Movement, edited by B.Laslett and B. Thorne. New Brunswick, NJ: RutgersUniversity Press.

Adams, Bert N. and R. A. Sydie. 2002. Classical SociologicalTheory. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press.

Adams, Mary Louise. 1994. The Trouble with Normal: PostwarYouth and the Construction of Heterosexuality. Toronto,Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Adamson, Nancy, Linda Briskin, and Margaret McPhail. 1988.Feminist Organizing for Change. Toronto, Ontario, Canada:Oxford University Press.

Agnew, Vijay. 1996. Resisting Discrimination: Women from Asia,Africa, and the Caribbean and the Womens Movement inCanada. Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of TorontoPress.

Alway, Joan. 1995. The Trouble with Gender: Tales of the Still-Missing Feminist Revolution in Sociological Theory.Sociological Theory 13:20928.

Anderson, Karen. 1996. Sociology. Scarborough, Ontario,Canada: Nelson.

Anderson, M. and Patricia Hill Collins. 1995. Race, Class andGender: An Anthology. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Armstrong, Pat and Hugh Armstrong. 1994. The Double Ghetto:Canadian Women and Their Segregated Work. 3d ed.Toronto, Ontario, Canada: McClelland & Stewart.

Armstrong, Pat and Hugh Armstrong. 2002. Thinking ItThrough: Women and Work in the New Millennium.Canadian Woman Studies/les cahiers de la femme21/22(4/1):4450.

Baker, Carrie N. 2004. Race, Class, and Sexual Harassment inthe 1970s. Feminist Studies 30:727.

Barrett, Michle, ed. 1986. Introduction. Pp. 730 in TheOrigins of the Family, Private Property and the State by F. Engels. London, England: Penguin Books.

Barrett, Michle. 1988. Womens Oppression Today. 2d ed.London, England: Verso.

Barrett, Michle.1991. The Politics of Truth. Stanford, CA:Stanford University Press.

Barrett, Michle. 1992. Psychoanalysis and Feminism: A BritishSociologists View. Signs 17:45566.

Barrett, Michle. 1999. Imagination in Theory. Cambridge,England: Polity Press.

Beauvoir, Simone de. 1952. The Second Sex. New York: Knopf.Bell, Vikki. 1999. Feminist Imagination. London: Sage.Benjamin, Jessica. 1988. The Bonds of Love. New York: Pantheon

Books.Bernard, Jessie. 1973. My Four Revolutions: An

Autobiographical History of the ASA. American Journal ofSociology 78:77391.

Bernard, Jessie. 1998. The Feminist Enlightenment. Pp. 4558in The Global Feminist Enlightenment: Women and SocialKnowledge, edited by L. Chistiansen-Ruffman. Madrid,Spain: International Sociological Association.

Bhavani, Kum-Kum. 1996. Impact Is Not the Same asRevolution. Perspectives: ASA Theory Section Newsletter18(3):78.

Blumberg, Rae Lesser. 1991. Gender, Family and Economy: TheTriple Overlap. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.

Bradbury, Bettina. 1993. Working Families: Age, Gender, andDaily Survival in Industrializing Montreal. Toronto,Ontario, Canada: McClelland & Stewart.

Brand, Dionne. 1994. We Werent Allowed to Go into FactoryWork until Hitler Started the War. Pp. 17191 in WereRooted Here and They Cant Pull Us Up: Essays on AfricanCanadian Womens History, coordinated by P. Bristow.Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

Brodie, Janine. 1994. Shifting the Boundaries: Feminism andthe Politics of Restructuring. Pp. 4660 in The StrategicSilence: Gender and Economic Policy, edited by I. Bakker.London, England: Zed Books.

Brownmiller, Susan. 1999. In Our Time: Memoir of a Revolution.New York: Dial Press.

Burstyn, Varda. 1983. Economy, Sexuality, Politics: Engels andthe Sexual Division of Labour. Socialist Studies: ACanadian Annual 1:1939.

Butler, Judith. 1993. Bodies that Matter: On the DiscursiveLimits of Sex. New York: Routledge.

Chafetz, Janet Saltzman. 1997. Feminist Theory and Sociology:Underutilized Contributions for Mainstream Theory.Annual Review of Sociology 23:97121.

Chanana, Karuna. 2003. Foreword. Pp. xiiixv in Sociology ofGender: The Challenge of Feminist Sociological Thought,edited by R. Sharmilla. New Delhi, India, Thousand Oaks,CA: Sage.



Vol 2 Chapter 5.pdf1.pdf2.pdf

Documents

Feminist Methodologies and Epistemologies