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FEMA

Risk Management Series

Design Guidance forShelters and Safe RoomsFEMA 453 / May 2006

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Risk ManageMent seRies

Design Guidance orShelters and Sae RoomsProviding Protection to PeoPle and Buildings

against terrorist attacks

FEMA 453 / May 2006

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Any opinions, ndings, conclusions, or recommendations

expressed in this publication do not necessarily refect the views o

FEMA. Additionally, neither FEMA or any o its employees makes

any warrantee, expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability

or responsibility or the accuracy, completeness, or useulness o

any inormation, product, or process included in this publication.

Users o inormation rom this publication assume all liability

arising rom such use.

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foreword and acknowledgments

foreword and acknowledgments

oVerVIew

this manual is intended to provide guidance or engi-

neers, architects, building ofcials, and property owners

to design shelters and sae rooms in buildings. It presents

inormation about the design and construction o shelters in the

work place, home, or community building that will provide protec-

tion in response to manmade hazards. Because the security needs

and types o construction vary greatly, users may select the methods

and measures that best meet their individual situations. The use o

experts to apply the methodologies contained in this document is

encouraged.

The inormation contained herein will assist in the planning and

design o shelters that may be constructed outside or within dwell-

ings or public buildings. These sae rooms will protect occupants

rom a variety o hazards, including debris impact, accidental or

intentional explosive detonation, and the accidental or inten-

tional release o a toxic substance into the air. Sae rooms may also

be designed to protect individuals rom assaults and attempted

kidnapping, which requires design eatures to resist orced entryand ballistic impact. This covers a range o protective options,

rom low-cost expedient protection (what is commonly reerred

to as sheltering-in-place) to sae rooms ventilated and pressurized

with air purifed by ultra-high-efciency flters. These sae rooms

protect against toxic gases, vapors, and aerosols (fnely divided

solid or liquid particles). The contents o this manual supplement

the inormation provided in FEMA 361,Design and Construction

Guidance for Community Sheltersand FEMA 320, Taking Shelter From

the Storm: Building a Safe Room InsideYour House. In conjunction

with FEMA 361 and FEMA 320, this publication can be used orthe protection o shelters against natural disasters. Although this

publication specifcally does not address nuclear explosions and

shelters that protect against radiological allout, that inormation

may be ound in FEMA TR-87, Standards for Fallout Shelters.

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ii foreword and acknowledgments

This guidance ocuses on sae rooms as standby systems, ones

that do not provide protection on a continuous basis. To employ

a standby system requires warning based on knowledge that a

hazardous condition exists or is imminent. Protection is initi-

ated as a result o warnings rom civil authorities about a release

o hazardous materials, visible or audible indications o a release

(e.g., explosion or fre), the odor o a chemical agent, or observed

symptoms o exposure in people. Although there are automatic

detectors or chemical agents, such detectors are expensive and

limited in the number o agents that can be reliably detected. Fur-

thermore, at this point in time, these detectors take too long to

identiy the agent to be useul in making decisions in response to

an attack. Similarly, an explosive vehicle or suicide bomber attack

rarely provides advance warning; thereore, the shelter is most

likely to be used ater the act to protect occupants until it is sae

to evacuate the building.

Two dierent types o shelters may be considered or emergency

use, standalone shelters and internal shelters. A standalone shelter

is a separate building (i.e., not within or attached to any other

building) that is designed and constructed to withstand the range

o natural and manmade hazards. An internal shelter is a spe-

cially designed and constructed room or area within or attached

to a larger building that is structurally independent o the larger

building and is able to withstand the range o natural and man-

made hazards. Both standalone and internal shelters are intended

to provide emergency reuge or occupants o commercial ofce

buildings, school buildings, hospitals, apartment buildings, and

private homes rom the hazards resulting rom a wide variety o

extreme events.

The shelters may be used during natural disasters ollowing the

warning that an explosive device may be activated, the discovery o

an explosive device, or until sae evacuation is establishedollowing the detonation o an explosive device or the release o

a toxic substance via an intentional aerosol attack or an industrial

accident. Standalone community shelters may be constructed in

neighborhoods where existing homes lack shelters. Community

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iv foreword and acknowledgments

protect occupants until law enorcement agencies determine it is

sae to evacuate.

Protection against explosive threats depends to a great extent on

the size o the explosive, the distance o the detonation relative

to the shelter, and the type o construction housing the shelter.

Although there may be opportunities to design a new acility to

protect against a specifed attack scenario, this may be o limited

easibility or the retroft o an existing building. The appropriate

combination o charge weight and stando distance as well as

the intervening structure between the origin o threat and the

protected space is very site-specifc; thereore, it is impractical to

defne a design level threat in these terms. Rather than identiy

a shelter to resist a specifed explosive threat, this document will

provide guidance that will address dierent types o building

construction and the reasonable measures that may be taken to

provide a secure shelter and a debris mitigating enclosure or

a shelter. This approach does not attempt to address a specifc

threat because there are too many possible scenarios to generalize

a threat-specifc approach; however, it does allow the user to de-

termine the easible options that may be evaluated on a case by

case basis to determine a response to any postulated threat. For

protection against assault and attempted kidnapping, a level o

orced entry and ballistic resistance may be specifed. Several di-erent organizations (e.g., the American Society or Testing and

Materials (ASTM), H.P. White, Underwriters Laboratories (UL),

the Department o Justice (DOJ), etc.) defne perormance levels

associated with orced entry and ballistic resistance that relate to

the dierent sequence o tests that are required to demonstrate

eectiveness o a given construction product. This document will

not distinguish between the dierent types o testing regimes.

Protection against airborne hazardous materials may require ac-

tive measures. Buildings are designed to exchange air with theoutdoors in normal operation; thereore, airborne hazardous

materials can infltrate buildings readily when released outdoors,

driven by pressures generated by wind, buoyancy, and ans. Build-

ings also tend to retain contaminants; that is, it takes longer or

the toxic materials to be purged rom a building than to enter it.

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vforeword and acknowledgments

The sae room may also shelter occupants rom tornadoes and

hurricanes, which are the most destructive orces o nature. Since

1995, over 1,200 tornadoes have been reported nationwide each

year. Approximately fve hurricanes strike the United States main-

land every 3 years and two o these storms will cause extensive

damage. Protection rom the eects o these natural occurrences

may be provided by well designed and amply supplied sae rooms.

The well designed sae room protects occupants rom the ex-

tremely rare, but potentially catastrophic eects o a manmade

threat as well as the statistically more common, but potentially less

severe eects o a natural disaster.

scoPe and organIZatIon of tHe manUal

This document will discuss the design o shelters to protect against

CBRE attacks. Fallout shelters that are designed to protect against

the eects o a nuclear weapon attack are not addressed in this

publication. The risks o death or injury rom CBRE attacks are

not evenly distributed throughout the United States. This manual

will guide the reader through the process o designing a shelter to

protect against CBRE attacks. The intent o this manual is not to

mandate the construction o shelters or CBRE events, but rather

to provide design guidance or persons who wish to design and

build such shelters.

The design and planning necessary or extremely high-capacity

shelters that may be required or large, public use venues such as

stadiums or amphitheaters are beyond the scope o this design

manual. An owner or operator o such a venue may be guided

by concepts presented in this document, but detailed guidance

concerning extremely high-capacity shelters is not provided.

The design o such shelters requires attention to issues such as

egress and lie saety or a number o people that are orders o

magnitude greater than those proposed or a shelter designed inaccordance with the guidance provided herein.

The intent o this manual is not to override or replace current

codes and standards, but rather to provide important guidance

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vi foreword and acknowledgments

o best practices (based on current technologies and scientifc re-

search) where none has been available. No known building, fre,

lie saety code, or engineering standard has previously attempted

to provide detailed inormation, guidance, and recommendations

concerning the design o CBRE shelters or protection o the gen-

eral public. Thereore, the inormation provided herein is the best

available at the time this manual was published. Designing and

constructing a shelter according to the criteria in this manual does

not mean that the shelter will be capable o withstanding every

possible event. The design proessional who ultimately designs a

shelter should state the limiting assumptions and shelter design

parameters on the project documents.

This manual includes the ollowing chapters and appendices:

m Chapter 1 presents design considerations, potential threats,

the levels o protection, shelter types, siting, occupancy

duration, and human actors criteria or shelters (e.g.,

square ootage per shelter occupant, proper ventilation,

distance/travel time and accessibility, special needs, lighting,

emergency power, route marking and wayfnding, signage,

evacuation considerations, and key operations zones).

m

Chapter 2 discusses the structural design criteria or blast andimpact resistance, as well as shelters and model building types.

Structural systems and building envelope elements or shelters

are analyzed and protective design measures or the defned

building types are provided.

m Chapter 3 describes how to add chemical, biological, and

radiological (CBR) protection capability to a shelter or a sae

room. It also discusses air fltration, sae room criteria, design

requirements, operations and maintenance, commissioning,

and training required to operate a shelter.

m Chapter 4 discusses emergency management considerations,

Federal CBRE response teams, emergency response and

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viiforeword and acknowledgments

mass care, community shelter operations plans, descriptions

o the responsibilities o the shelter team members,

shelter equipment and supplies, maintenance plans, and

commercial building shelter operation plans. Key equipment

considerations and training are also discussed.

m Appendix A presents the reerences used in the preparation

o this document.

m Appendix B contains a list o acronyms and abbreviations that

appear in this document.

acknowledgments

Principal Authors:

Robert Smilowitz, Weidlinger Associates Inc.

William Blewett, Battelle Memorial Institute

Pax Williams, Battelle Memorial Institute

Michael Chipley, PBS&J

Contributors:

Milagros Kennett, FEMA, Project Ofcer, Risk Management

Series Publications

Eric Letvin, URS, Project Manager

Deb Daly, Greenhorne & OMara, Inc.

Julie Liptak, Greenhorne & OMara, Inc.

Wanda Rizer, Consultant

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viii foreword and acknowledgments

Project Advisory Panel:

Ronald Barker, DHS, Ofce o Inrastructure Protection

Wade Belcher, General Service Administration

Curt Betts, U.S. Army Corps o Engineers

Robert Chapman, NIST

Ken Christenson, U.S. Army Corps o Engineers

Roger Cundi, DOS

Michael Gressel, CDC, NIOSH

Marcelle Habibion, Department o Veterans Aairs

Richard Heiden, U.S. Army Corps o Engineers

Nancy McNabb, NFPA

Kenneth Mead, CDC, NIOSH

Arturo Mendez, NYPD/DHS Liaison

Rudy Perkey, NAVFAC

Joseph Ruocco, SOM

Robert Solomon, NFPA

John Sullivan, PCA

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table of contents

ixtable of contents

FOREWORD AND AckNOWlEDgmENts

Overview. i

Background. iii

Scope.and.Organization.o.the.Manual.v

Acknowledgments.vii

chAptER 1 DEsIgN cONsIDERAtIONs

11. Overview.1-1

12. Potential.Threats.1-4

121.. Explosive.Threats.1-5

122. CBR.Attacks. 1-11

1221. Chemical.Agents. 1-11

1222. Biological.Warare.Agents. 1-12

1223. Radiological.Attacks. 1-13

13. Levels.o.Protection.. 1-15

131. Blast.Levels.o.Protection. 1-15

132. CBR.Levels.o.Protection. 1-17

14. Shelter.Types. 1-19

141. Standalone.Shelters. 1-19

142. Internal.Shelters. 1-19

143. Shelter.Categories. 1-20

15. Siting. 1-23

16. Occupancy.Duration,.Toxic-ree.Area.(TFA)..Floor.Space,.and.Ventilation.Requirements. 1-31

17. Human.Factors.Criteria. 1-33

171. Square.Footage/Occupancy.Requirements.. 1-33

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x table of contents

1711. Tornado.or.Short-term.Shelter..

Square.Footage.Recommendations. 1-34

1712..Hurricane.or.Long-term.Shelter.

.Square.Footage.Recommendations. 1-35

172. Distance/Travel.Time.and.Accessibility.. 1-35

173. Americans.with.Disabilities.Act.(ADA). 1-37

174.. Special.Needs. 1-38

18.. Other.Design.Considerations. 1-39

181.. Lighting. 1-39

182.. Emergency.Power. 1-39

183. Route.Marking.and.Waynding.. 1-40

184. Signage. 1-42

1841..Community.and.Parking.Signage. 1-42

1842..Signage.at.Schools.and.Places..

o.Work. 1-42

19.. Evacuation.Considerations. 1-44

110. Key.Operations.Zones. 1-51

1101.. Containment.Zones. 1-51

1102. Staging.Areas.and.Designated.Entry.and..

Exit.Access.Control.Points. 1-55

chAptER 2 stRUctURAl DEsIgN cRItERIA

21. Overview.2-1

22. Explosive.Threat.Parameters.2-1

221. Blast.Eects.in.Low-rise.Buildings.2-5

222. Blast.Eects.in.High-rise.Buildings:..

The.Urban.Situation.2-8

23. Hardened.Construction.2-9

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xitable of contents

231. Structural.System.2-9

232. Loads.and.Connections. 2-12

233. Building.Envelope. 2-16

234. Forced.Entry.and.Ballistic.Resistance. 2-17

24. New.Construction. 2-19

241. Structure. 2-20

242. Faade.and.Internal.Partitions. 2-26

25. Existing.Construction:.Retrotting.Considerations. 2-29

251. Structure. 2-30

252. Faade.and.Internal.Partitions. 2-31

2521..Anti-shatter.Faade. 2-32

2522..Faade.Debris.Catch.Systems. 2-35

2523. Internal.Partitions. 2-39

2524. Structural.Upgrades. 2-44

253. Checklist.or.Retrotting.Issues. 2-45

26. Shelters.and.Model.Building.Types. 2-46

261. W1,.W1a,.and.W2.Wood.Light.Frames..

and.Wood.Commercial.Buildings. 2-46

262. S1,.S2,.and.S3.Steel.Moment.Frames,..

Steel.Braced.Frames,.and.Steel.Light.Frames. 2-50

263. S4.and.S5.Steel.Frames.with.Concrete..

Shearwalls.and.Inll.Masonry.Walls.. 2-54

264. C1,.C2,.and.C3.Concrete.Moment.Frames,..

Concrete.and.Inll.Masonry.Shearwalls...

Type.1.Bearing.Walls.and.Type.2.Gravity..

Frames. 2-57

265. PC1.and.PC2.Tilt-up.Concrete.Shearwalls.and..

Precast.Concrete.Frames.and.Shearwalls. 2-62

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xii table of contents

266. RM1.and.RM2.Reinorced.Masonry.Walls..

with.Flexible.Diaphragms.or.Sti.Diaphragms..

and.Unreinorced.Masonry.(URM)..

Load-bearing.Walls. 2-65

267. Conclusions. 2-69

27.. Case.Study:.Blast-Resistant.Sae.Room. 2-69

chAptER 3 cBR thREAt pROtEctION

31.. Overview..3-1

32.. How.Air.Filtration.Aects.Protection..3-5

33.. Sae.Room.Criteria..3-7

34.. Design.and.Installation.o.a.Toxic-agent.Sae.Room..3-9

341.. Class.3.Sae.Room.. 3-10

3411..Tightening.the.Room 3-10

3412..Preparing.or.Rapidly.Sealing..

the.Room. 3-11

3413..Preparing.or.Deactivation.o.Fans. 3-14

3414..Accommodating.Air.Conditioning..

and.Heating. 3-14

3415..Saety.Equipment. 3-16

342.. Class.2.Sae.Room. 3-16

3421..Filter.Unit.Requirements.or.the..

Unventilated.Class.2.Sae.Room. 3-16

3422..Installation.and.Operation. 3-17

343.. Class.1.Sae.Room.. 3-18

3431..Selecting.a.Filter.Unit.or.a.Class.1..

Sae.Room. 3-18

3432..Sizing.the.Filter.Unit.or..

Pressurization 3-20

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xiv table of contents

45. Community.Shelter.Operations.Plan. 4-19

451. Site.Coordinator.. 4-21

452.. Assistant.Site.Coordinator.. 4-22

453.. Equipment.Manager.. 4-22

454.. Signage.Manager.. 4-23

455.. Notication.Manager.. 4-24

456.. Field.Manager.. 4-24

457.. Assistant.Managers.. 4-25

458. Emergency.Provisions,.Equipment,..

and.Supplies.. 4-25

4581. Food.and.Water. 4-25

4582. Sanitation.Management. 4-25

4583. Emergency.Supplies. 4-28

4584. Communications.Equipment. 4-28

4585..Masks.and.Escape.Hoods. 4-29

4586..Portable.HVAC.Units. 4-29

4587..Emergency.Equipment.Credenza..and.Wall.Units.Storage 4-30

46.. Shelter.Maintenance.Plan. 4-30

47. Commercial.Building.Shelter.Operations.Plan. 4-30

471. Emergency.Assignments. 4-31

472. Emergency.Call.List. 4-33

473. Event.Saety.Procedures 4-34

48. General.Considerations. 4-34

49. Training.and.Inormation. 4-36

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xvtable of contents

AppENDIcEs

Appendix.A..Reerences

Appendix.B..Abbreviations.and.Acronyms

tABlEs

caer 1

Table.1-1. Sae.Evacuation.Distances.rom.Explosive..

Threats.1-7

Table.1-2. Sae.Evacuation.Distances.rom.LPG.Threats.1-8

Table.1-3. Correlation.o.ISC.Levels.o.Protection.and..

Incident.Pressure.to.Damage.and.Injury. 1-16

Table.1-4. ISC.CBR.Levels.o.Protection. 1-18

Table.1-5.. Commercial.Shelter.Categories. 1-21

Table.1-6. Evacuation.Versus.Shelter-in-place.Options..

Matrix.. 1-45

caer 2

Table.2-1... UL.752.Ratings.o.Bullet-resisting.Materials. 2-18

caer 3

Table.3-1.. Comparison.o.the.Three.General.Classes..

o.Toxic-agent.Sae.Rooms.3-3

Table.3-2.. Leakage.per.Square.Foot.or.01.iwg..

(estimated.makeup.airfow.rate.per.square..

oot.(foor.area).to.achieve.an.overpressure..

o.01.iwg). 3-21

caer 4

Table.4-1.. Shelter.Equipment.and.Supplies. 4-26

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xvi table of contents

FIgUREs

caer 1

Figure.1-1.. Terrorism.by.event.1980.through.2001.. 1-10

Figure.1-2.. Sample.anthrax.letter. 1-13

Figure.1-3. Radioactive.materials.smuggling. 1-14

Figure.1-4.. Example.o.shelter.marking.on.building,..

foor.plan,.and.exterior.exits.to.rally..

points. 1-25

Figure.1-5.. Examples.o.internal.shelter.locations.in..

a.residential.slab.on.grade.oundation 1-28


a.residential.basement. 1-28

Figure.1-7.. Examples.o.internal.shelter.locations.in.a..

commercial.building. 1-29


a.retail/commercial.multi-story.building..

using.parking.garage,.conerence.rooms,..

data.centers,.stairwells,.and.elevator.core..

areas. 1-29

Figure.1-9.. Examples.o.internal.shelter.locations.in..a.school/church.acility.. 1-30

Figure.1-10.. National.Weather.Service.orecast.and..

warnings. 1-36

Figure.1-11.. Photoluminescent.signs,.stair.treads,.and..

route.marking. 1-41

Figure.1-12.. Shelter.signage. 1-43

Figure.1-13.. Operations.Zones,.Casualty.Collection..

Point.(CCP),.and.Sae.Reuge.Area.(SRA).. 1-52

Figure.1-14.. NRP-CIS.Ladder.Pipe.Decontamination..

System.(LDS). 1-53

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xviitable of contents

Figure.1-15.. NRP-CIS.Emergency.Decontamination.Corridor.

System.(EDCS). 1-54

Figure.1-16.. Patient.staging.area.and.remains.recovery. 1-55

Figure.1-17.. Example.o.Pentagon.staging.and.recovery..

operations. 1-56

Figure.1-18.. Contamination.Control.Area.(CCA). 1-57

Figure.1-19.. Site.and.evidence.collection.on.the.site. 1-58

Figure.1-20.. Rescue.team.coordination.prior.to.entering..

a.site. 1-59

caer 2

Figure.2-1.. Airblast.pressure.time.history.2-3

Figure.2-2.. Range.to.eects.chart.2-4

Figure.2-3.. Blast.damage.2-5

Figure.2-4.. Alred.P.Murrah.Federal.Oce.Building.2-6

Figure.2-5.. Khobar.Towers.2-7

Figure.2-6.. Ductile.detailing.o.reinorced.concrete..

structures. 2-11

Figure.2-7.. Eects.o.uplit.and.load.reversals. 2-13

Figure.2-8.. Flat.slab.ailure.mechanisms. 2-14

Figure.2-9.. Blast.damaged.aade 2-16

Figure.2-10.. Layers.o.deense. 2-19

Figure.2-11.. Multi-span.slab.splice.locations. 2-21

Figure.2-12.. Typical.rame.detail.at.interior.column. 2-23

Figure.2-13.. Protective.aade.design. 2-27

Figure.2-14.. Mechanically.attached.anti-shatter.lm. 2-34

Figure.2-15.. Blast.curtain.system. 2-37

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xviii table of contents

Figure.2-16.. Spray-on.elastomer.coating. 2-40

Figure.2-17.. Geotextile.debris.catch.system. 2-40

Figure.2-18.. Stiened.wall.panels. 2-42

Figure.2-19.. Metal.stud.blast.wall. 2-43

Figure.2-20.. Steel.jacket.retrot.detail. 2-44

Figure.2-21.. W1.wood.light.rame..3,000.square.eet. 2-48

Figure.2-23.. W2.wood.commercial.buildings. 2-49

Figure.2-24.. S1.steel.moment.rames. 2-51

Figure.2-25.. S2.steel.braced.rames. 2-52

Figure.2-26.. S3.steel.light.rames. 2-53

Figure.2-27.. S4.steel.rames.with.concrete.shearwalls. 2-55

Figure.2-28.. S5.steel.rames.with.inll.masonry.walls. 2-56

Figure.2-29.. C1.concrete.moment.rames. 2-58

Figure.2-30.. C2.concrete.shearwalls..type.1.bearing.walls. 2-59

Figure.2.-31.. C2.concrete.shearwalls..type.2.gravity..

rames. 2-60

Figure.2-32.. C3.concrete.rames.with.inll.masonry..

shearwalls. 2-61

Figure.2-33.. PC1.tilt-up.concrete.shearwalls. 2-63

Figure.2-34.. PC2.precast.concrete.rames.and.shearwalls 2-64

Figure.2-35.. RM1.reinorced.masonry.walls.with.fexible..

diaphragms. 2-66

Figure.2-36.. RM2.reinorced.masonry.walls.with.sti..diaphragms. 2-67

Figure.2-37.. URM.load-bearing.walls. 2-68

Figure.2-38.. Schematic.o.tie.orces.in.a.rame.structure 2-72

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xixtable of contents

caer 3

Figure.3-1.. Hinged.covers.acilitate.the.rapid.sealing..

o.supply,.return,.or.exhaust.ducts.in.a.sae..

room. 3-13

Figure.3-2.. Automatic.dampers.are.used.to.isolate.the.

.sae.room.rom.the.ducts.or.vents.used.in..

normal.HVAC.system.operation. 3-22

Figure.3-3. A.tabletop.recirculation.lter.unit.with..

a.substantial.adsorber.is.a.simple.means..

o.providing.higher.levels.o.CBR.protection..

to.unventilated.sae.rooms. 3-28

Figure.3-4. A.canister-type.lter.unit.is.oten.used.or..

Class.1.Sae.Rooms.to.maximize.storage.lie..

o.the.lters. 3-31

Figure.3-5.. A.blower.door.test.on.the.selected.sae.room..

aids.in.estimating.the.size.o.air-ltration.unit.

required.and.in.identiying.air.leakage.paths. 3-37

Figure.3-6.. Blower-door.test.results.on.the.stairwell..

selected.or.a.sae.room.3-38.

Figure.3-7. A.military.radial-fow.CBR.lter.set.was..

selected.or.sae.room.ltration. 3-40

Figure.3-8. A.4,000-cm.lter.unit.using.radial.fow..

lters.was.selected.or.the.stairwell.sae..

room. 3-40

Figure.3-9.. The.Class.1.Sae.Room.control.panel..

has.a.system.start/stop.switch,.status..

indicators.or.dampers,.and.a.pressure.

gauge. 3-41

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xx table of contents

caer 4

Figure.4-1.. Preparedness.versus.scale.o.event.4-3

Figure.4-2.. Flowchart.o.initial.National-level.incident..

management.actions.4-6

Figure.4-3. NRP-CIS.Mass.Casualty.Incident.Response.4-7

Figure.4-4.. Emergency.Management.Group.and..

Emergency.Operations.Group..4-9

Figure.4-5... High-rise.buildings.and.emergency.response. 4-16

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design considerations 1

1-1design considerations

arc 4496, Standards for Hurricane Evacuation

Shelter Selection, FeMa 320, Taking Shelter From

the Storm: Building a Safe Room Inside Your House FeMa 361, Design and Construction Guidance

for Community Shelters

sources: arc and FeMa

1.1 oVerVieW

the attack against the Alred P. Murrah Federal Oce

Building in Oklahoma City and the anthrax attacks in

October 2001 made it clear that chemical, biological, ra-

diological, and explosive (CBRE) attacks are a credible threat to

our society. Such attacks can cause a

large number o atalities or injuries in

high-occupancy buildings (e.g., school

buildings, hospitals and other critical

care acilities, nursing homes, day-care

centers, sports venues, theaters, and

commercial buildings) and residential

neighborhoods.

This chapter discusses the potential

manmade threats to which a shelter may

be exposed and the level o protection

(LOP) that may be assumed by building

owners when deciding to build a shelter

to support the preparedness objectivesestablished in the National Preparedness

Goal. This guidance complements other

shelter publications such as the Amer-

ican Red Cross (ARC) 4496, Standards

for Hurricane Evacuation Shelter Selection;

FEMA 320, Taking Shelter From the Storm:

Building a Safe Room Inside Your House;

and FEMA 361,Design and Construction

Guidance for Community Shelters.

This manual presents inormation about

the design and construction o shelters

in the work place, home, or community

building that will provide protection

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1-2 design considerations

in response to the manmade CBRE threats as dened in the

National Response Plan (NRP) and the National Planning Sce-

narios. As published in the National Preparedness Guidance(April

2005), the Federal interagency community developed 15 plan-

ning scenarios (the National Planning Scenarios or Scenarios)

or use in national, Federal, state, and local homeland security

preparedness activities. The National Planning Scenarios are

planning tools and are representative o the range o potential

terrorist attacks and natural disasters and the related impacts that

ace our nation. The scenarios establish the range o response re-

quirements to acilitate preparedness planning.

The National Planning Scenarios describe the potential scope

and magnitude o plausible major events that require coordina-

tion among various jurisdictions and levels o government and

communities.

Scenario 1: Nuclear Detonation 10-Kiloton Improvised Nuclear

Device

Scenario 2: Biological Attack Aerosol Anthrax

Scenario 3: Biological Disease Outbreak Pandemic Infuenza

Scenario 4: Biological Attack Plague

Scenario 5: Chemical Attack Blister Agent

Scenario 6: Chemical Attack Toxic Industrial Chemicals

Scenario 7: Chemical Attack Nerve Agent

Scenario 8: Chemical Attack Chlorine Tank Explosion

Scenario 9: Natural Disaster Major Earthquake

Scenario 10: Natural Disaster Major Hurricane

Scenario 11: Radiological Attack Radiological Dispersal DevicesScenario 12: Explosives Attack Bombing Using Improvised

Explosive Device

Scenario 13: Biological Attack Food Contamination

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Scenario 14: Biological Attack Foreign Animal Disease (Foot and

Mouth Disease)

Scenario 15: Cyber Attack

Manmade threats include threats o terrorism, technological

accidents, assassinations, kidnappings, hijackings, and cyber at-

tacks (computer-based), and the use o CBRE weapons. High-risk

targets include military and civilian government acilities, interna-

tional airports, large cities, and high-prole landmarks. Terrorists

might also target large public gatherings, water and ood sup-

plies, utilities, and corporate centers. Further, they are capable o

spreading ear by sending explosives or chemical and biological

agents through the mail.

This chapter also considers shelter design concepts that relate to

the type o shelter being designed and where it may be located.

It discusses how shelter use (either single or multiple) may aect

the type o shelter selected and the location o that shelter on a

particular site. The chapter describes key operations zones in and

around a shelter that need to be taken into consideration as a

means to provide sae ingress and egress and medical assistance

to victims o a manmade event (terrorist attack or technological

accident). The decision to enter a shelter is made by the senior

management sta based on notication o a credible threat or asa result o an actual disaster. The National Incident Management

System (NIMS) and the Catastrophic Incident Supplement (CIS)

to the NRP established the procedures to respond to and recover

rom a CBRE event. Section 4.2 discusses the plans alerting and

notication, and response and recovery processes. The objective

o this chapter is to provide a broad vision on how a shelter should

be designed to protect against catastrophic events.

The decision to design and construct a shelter can be based on a

single actor or on a collection o actors. Single actors are otenrelated to the potential or loss o lie or injury (e.g., a hospital

that cannot move patients housed in an intensive care unit

decides to build a shelter, or shelters, within the hospital; a school

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decides not to chance ate and constructs a shelter). A collection

o actors could include the type o hazard event, probability o

event occurrence, severity o the event, probable single and ag-

gregate annual event deaths, shelter costs, and results o computer

models that evaluate the benets and costs o the shelter project.

1.2 PotentiaL tHreats

Rather than identiy a specic threat, this document provides

general guidance that will address dierent types o building

construction and the reasonable mitigative measures to provide

a secure shelter. However, it is important or building owners and

design proessionals to understand the potential threats to which

buildings may be exposed. This section provides an overview o

manmade threats.

The term threat is typically used to describe the design criteria

or manmade disasters (technological accident) or terrorism.

Identiying the threats or manmade threats can be a dicult

task. Because they are dierent rom other natural hazards such

as earthquakes, foods, and hurricanes, manmade threats are di-

cult to predict. Many years o historical and quantitative data, and

probabilities associated with the cycle, duration, and magnitude o

natural hazards exist. The act that data or manmade threats arescarce and that the magnitude and recurrence o terrorist attacks

are almost unpredictable makes the determination o a particular

threat or any specic site or building dicult and largely subjec-

tive. Such asymmetrical threats do not exclusively target buildings

and may employ diversionary tactics to actually direct occupants to

a primary attack instrument.

With any manmade threat, it is important to determine who has

the intent to cause harm. The aggressors seek publicity for their

cause, monetary gain (in some instances), or political gain throughtheir actions. These actions can include injuring or killing people;

destroying or damaging facilities, property, equipment, or re-

sources; or stealing equipment, material, or information.

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1-design considerations

Aggressor tactics run the gamut: moving vehicle bombs; sta-

tionary vehicle bombs; bombs delivered by persons (suicide

bombers); exterior attacks (thrown objects like rocks, Molotov

cocktails, hand grenades, or hand-placed bombs); stand-o

weapons attacks (rocket propelled grenades, light antitank

weapons, etc.); ballistic attacks (small arms and high power

rifes); covert entries (gaining entry by alse credentials or cir-

cumventing security with or without weapons); mail bombs

(delivered to individuals); supply bombs (larger bombs processed

through shipping departments); airborne contamination (CBR

agents used to contaminate the air supply o a building); and

waterborne contamination (CBR agents injected into the water

supply). This section ocuses on explosive threats, chemical

agents, biological warare agents, and radiological attacks.

1.2.1 eplv th

The explosive threat is particularly insidious, because all o the in-

gredients required to assemble an improvised explosive device are

readily available at a variety o arm and hardware stores. The in-

tensity o the explosive detonation is limited by the expertise o the

person assembling the device and the means o delivery. Although

the weight o the explosive depends on the means o transporta-

tion and delivery, the origin o the threat depends primarily on

the access available to the perpetrator. Operational security pro-cedures will dene the areas within or around a building at which

a device may be located, undetected by the building acilities sta.

These security procedures include screening o vehicles, inspection

o delivered parcels, and vetting hand carried bags. The extent to

which this inspection is carried out will determine the size o an ex-

plosive device that may evade detection. Despite the most vigilant

attempts, however, it is unrealistic to expect complete success in

preventing a small threat rom evading detection. Nevertheless, it

is unlikely that a large threat may be brought into a building. As a

result, a parcel sized device may be introduced into publicly acces-sible lobbies, garages, loading docks, caeterias, or retail spaces and

it must be assumed that a smaller explosive device may be brought

anywhere into the building.

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Although operational security measures can drastically limit

the size o the explosive device that could be introduced onto

a building site, there is no means o limiting the size o the ex-

plosive that could be contained within a vehicle traveling on the

surrounding streets or roadways.

Explosives weigh approximately 100 pounds per cubic oot and, as

a result, the maximum credible threat corresponds to the weight

o explosives that can be packaged in a variety o containers or

vehicles. The Department o Deense (DoD) developed a chart to

help indicate the weight o explosives and defagrating materials

that may reasonably t within a variety o containers and vehicles

(see Table 1-1). The table also indicates the sae evacuation dis-

tances or occupants o conventional unreinorced buildings,

based on their ability to withstand severe damage or resist col-

lapse. Similarly, Table 1-1 indicates the sae evacuation distance

or pedestrians exposed to explosive eects based on the greater

o ragment throw distance or glass breakage/alling glass hazard

distance. Because a pipe bomb, suicide belt/vest, backpack, and

briecase/suitcase bomb are specically designed to throw rag-

ments, protection rom these devices may require greater sae

evacuation distances than an equal weight o explosives trans-

ported in a vehicle. Table 1-2 shows sae evacuation distances or

liqueed petroleum gas (LPG) threats.

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1-design considerations

Table 1-1: Safe Evacuation Distances from Explosive Threats

Threat DescriptionExplosivesMass* (TNTequivalent)

BuildingEvacuationDistance**

OutdoorEvacuationDistance***

HighExp

los

ives

(TNTEqu

iva

lent

)

Pp Bmb lb

2.3 k0 21 m

80 29 m

s Bl10 lb4. k

90 2 m

1,080 330 m

s V20 lb9 k

110 34 m

1,360 41 m

B/

s Bmb

0 lb

23 k

10

46 m

1,80

64 m

cmps

00 lb22 k

320 98 m

1,00 4 m

s1,000 lb44 k

400 122 m

1,0 34 m

P/c V

4,000 lb1,814 k

640 19 m

2,0 838 m

smll MvV/ dlvtk

10,000 lb4,36 k

860 263 m

3,0 1,143 m

Mv V/W tk

30,000 lb13,608 k

1,240 3 m

6,00 1,982 m

sm-l60,000 lb2,216 k

1,0 4 m

,000 2,134 m

* B h mxmm m ml h l bl vhl. V pbl.

** gv b h bl bl wh v m llp.

*** gv b h m hw l bk/ll l hz . th b pl w bll p. n h h pp bmb, bl/v, b/ bmb m hv m h h q - h ql m xplv vhl.

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The Bureau o Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)

report on Incidents, Casualties and Property Damageor all states or2002 lists 553 actual bombing incidents, 32 o which were prema-

ture explosions, injuring 80 people, killing 13, and causing over $5

million in damages. Nearly hal o the events were against build-

ings and nearly a quarter were against vehicles.

Table 1-2: Safe Evacuation Distances from LPG Threats

Threat Description LPG Mass/Volume FireballDiameter*Safe

Distance**

Lique

fe

dPetro

leum

Gas

(LPG

-Butaneor

Propane

)

smll LPg

tk

20 lb/ l

9 k/19 l

40

12 m

160

48 m

L LPg

tk

100 lb/2 l

4 k/9 l

69

21 m

26

84 m

cmml/

rlLPg tk

2,000 lb/00 l

90 k/1,893 l

184

6 m

36

224 m

smll LPg

tk

8,000 lb/2,000 l

3,630 k/,0 l

292

89 m

1,168

36 m

sm-k

LPg

40,000 lb/10,000

l

18,144 k/3,80 l

499

12 m

1,996

608 m

* am mx h fmmbl wh mb .

** dm b u.s. h p wh ppxml m h fm hh. n h LPg k llwh hh xplv wl q l - h w ll wh LPg.

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Only two domestic terrorist bombings involved the use o large

quantities o High Energy explosive materials. (For more inorma-

tion on High Energy explosives, see FEMA 426, Reference Manual

to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 4.)

Although these events represent the largest explosions that have

occurred to date, they do not accurately represent the actual

domestic explosive threat. The 1995 explosion that collapsed

portions o the Murrah Federal Oce Building in Oklahoma

City contained 4,800 pounds o ammonium nitrate and uel oil

(ANFO) and the 1993 explosion within the parking garage be-

neath the World Trade Center complex contained 1,200 pounds

o urea nitrate.

Every year, approximately 1,000 intentional explosive detonations

are reported by the Federal Bureau o Investigation (FBI) Bomb

Data Center. As implied by the FBI statistics, the majority o the

domestic events contain signicantly smaller weights o Low En-

ergy explosives. (For more inormation on Low Energy explosives,

see FEMA 426, Chapter 4.) Figure 1-1 illustrates the breakdown o

domestic terrorist events rom 1980 to 2001. The vast majority o

the 294 terrorist incidents, 55 suspected terrorist incidents, or 133

prevented terrorist incidents, involved explosives and 75 percent

o these events occurred in the 1980s. The explosive that was used

in the 1996 pipe bomb attack at the Olympics in Atlanta, Georgia,

consisted o smokeless powder and was preceded by a warning

that was called in 23 minutes beore the detonation.

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Although the majority o these explosions targeted residential

properties and vehicles, 63 took place in educational acilities,

causing a total o $68,500 in property damage. By contrast, other

than the attack against the Murrah Federal Oce Building, no

explosive devices were detonated at a Federal government owned

acility, and only nine were detonated at local/state government

acilities. Nearly 80 percent o the people known to be involved in

bombing incidents were young oenders, and less than per-cent o the perpetrators were identied as members o terrorist

groups. Vandalism was the motivation in 53 percent o the known

intentional and accidental bombing incidents, and the timing o

the attacks was airly uniormly distributed throughout the day.

F 1-1 tm b v 1980 hh 2001

source: FBi terrorisM 2000/2001 PuBLication #308

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Nevertheless, the protective design o structures ocuses on the e-

ects o High Energy explosives and relates the dierent mixtures

to an equivalent weight o trinitrotoluene (TNT).

1.2.2 cBr ak

Like explosive threats, CBR threats may be delivered externally

or internally to the building. External ground-based threats may

be released at a stand-o distance rom the building or may be

delivered directly through an air intake or other opening. Inte-

rior threats may be delivered to accessible areas such as the lobby,

mailroom, or loading dock, or they may be released into a secure

area such as a primary egress route. There may not be an ocial

or obvious warning prior to a CBR event. Although ocial warn-

ings should always be heeded, the best deense may be to be alertto signs o a release.

There are three potential methods o attacks in terms o CBR:

m A large exterior release originating some distance away rom

the building (includes delivery by aircrat)

m A small localized exterior release at an air intake or other

opening in the exterior envelope o the building

m A small interior release in a publicly accessible area, a major

egress route, or other vulnerable area (e.g., elevator lobby,

mail room, delivery, receiving and shipping, etc.)

Chapter 4 provides additional guidance on emergency manage-

ment considerations that may have an impact on siting or design

o a shelter.

1.2.2.1ChemicalAgents.Toxic chemical agents can present air-

borne hazards when dispersed as gases, vapors, or solid or liquidaerosols. Generally, chemical agents produce immediate eects,

unlike biological or radiological agents. In most cases, toxic

chemical agents can be detected by the senses, although a ew are

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odorless. Their eects occur mainly through inhalation, although

they can also cause injury to the eyes and skin.

1.2.2.2 BiologicalWarareAgents.Biological warare agents are or-

ganisms or toxins that can kill or incapacitate people and livestock,

and destroy crops. The three basic groups o biological agents that

would likely be used as weapons are bacteria, viruses, and toxins.

m Bacteria. Bacteria are small ree-living organisms that

reproduce by simple division and are easy to grow. The diseases

they produce oten respond to treatment with antibiotics.

m Viruses. Viruses are organisms that require living cells in

which to reproduce and are intimately dependent upon the

body they inect. The diseases they produce generally do notrespond to antibiotics; however, antiviral drugs are sometimes

eective.

m Toxins. Toxins are poisonous substances ound in, and

extracted rom, living plants, animals, or microorganisms;

some toxins can be produced or altered by chemical means.

Some toxins can be treated with specic antitoxins and

selected drugs.

Most biological agents are dicult to grow and maintain. Manybreak down quickly when exposed to sunlight and other environ-

mental actors, while others such as anthrax spores are very long

lived. They can be dispersed by spraying them in the air or by

inected animals that carry the disease, as well through ood and

water contamination:

m Aerosols. Biological agents are dispersed into the air, orming

a ne mist that may drit or miles. Inhaling the agent may

cause disease in people or animals.

m Animals. Some diseases are spread by insects and animals,

such as feas, fies, mosquitoes, and mice. Deliberately

spreading diseases through livestock is also reerred to as

agroterrorism.

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m Foodandwatercontamination.Some pathogenic organisms

and toxins may persist in ood and water supplies. Most

microbes can be killed, and toxins deactivated, by cooking

ood and boiling water.

Person-to-person spread o a ew inectious agents is also possible.

Humans have been the source o inection or smallpox, plague,

and the Lassa viruses.

ahx p ml wh

pw w ml vl h

Fl gvm m h ll

2001. Pl mh h

p l p h p

l. svl h l. th

w p ml v

wp hl

lv ml m h pbl.

F 1-2 smpl hx l

source: FBi terrorisM 2000/2001 PuBLication #308

1.2.2.3RadiologicalAttacks.Shelters described in this manual donot address the severe and various eects generated by nuclear

events, including blinding light, intense heat (thermal radiation),

initial nuclear radiation, blast, res started by the heat pulse,

and secondary res caused by the destruction. Protection against

these severe eects o a nuclear explosion is not considered in

this manual.

Terrorist use o a radiological dispersion device (RDD), oten

called dirty nuke or dirty bomb, is considered ar more likely

than use o a nuclear device. These radiological weapons are a

combination o conventional explosives and radioactive material

designed to scatter dangerous and sublethal amounts o radio-

active material over a general area. Such radiological weapons

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appeal to terrorists because they require very little technical

knowledge to build and deploy compared to that o a nuclear

device. Also, these radioactive materials, used widely in medicine,

agriculture, industry, and research, are much more readily avail-

able and easy to obtain compared to weapons grade uranium or

plutonium. Figure 1-3 shows the number o incidents o radioac-

tive materials smuggling rom 1993 to 2003.

F 1-3 rv ml ml

source: internationaL atoMic energy agency

There is no way o knowing how much warning time there would

be beore an attack by a terrorist using a radiological weapon. A

surprise attack remains a possibility.

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1.3 LeVeLs o Protection

Currently, there are only two Federal standards that have been

promulgated or Federal acilities that dene LOPs or manmade

threats: the Interagency Security Committee (ISC)Design Criteriaand the DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards, UFC 4-010-01.

Both standards address blast primarily through the use o stand-

o distance and ensuring walls and glazing blast pressures are

strengthened to withstand the blast shock wave. Both standards

address CBR agents primarily through the use o ltration, emer-

gency shutdown o mechanical and electrical systems, and mass

notication to building occupants.

Until the building, mechanical, electrical, and lie saety codes are

promulgated or manmade events, the ISC building standards pro-vide a reasonable approach to selecting a level o protection or a

shelter or CBR agents.

1.3.1 Bl Lvl P

The level o protection in response to blast loading denes the

extent o damage and debris that may be sustained in response to

the resulting blast pressures and impulses. (For more inormation

on blast pressure impulses, see FEMA 426, Chapter 4.) The levels

o protection are generally dened in the terms o perormance.Fundamental to the discussion o levels o protection is the notion

o repairable damage. Repair is typically assumed to be within days

to weeks and the structure requires partial evacuation during re-

pairs. Table 1-3 provides a synopsis o the ISC blast standards.

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Table 1-3: Correlation of ISC Levels of Protection and Incident Pressure to Damage and Injury

Level ofProtection Potential Structural Damage Potential Glazing Hazards

Minimumand Low

th l p p wll hh lvl mwh pv llp.cl wll wll b m. Blmp, l lmmb, wll q plm, h l m b mpllpbl, q ml plm.

F Mmm P, h h p lz .

F Lw P, h qm ww p bl pl. Hwv, h lz ml h mmz h k .

glz k ww m l -phll. Fm p, mp vl w pl m h 3 m (10 ) m h ww hh h 0.6 m (2 ) bv h f.

Medium

M m, pbl.th l p pwll m, b h wllb bl. sm l m m b m.Bl lm h h mjl mmb m qplm.

F Mm Hh P, p h p l b hk m. Ww m (lz, m, h ppwll, .) h x hl bbl m h hz f lz llw xplv v.th wll, h, ww mhl ll vlp h p hlz ml l.

glz k. Fm p l h f mp vl wpl m h 3 m (10) m h ww hh h0.6 m (2 ) bv h f.

High

M m, pbl. thl p p mlbll m m whll m pbl.op m m j, v m m.

F Mm Hh P, p h p l b hk m. Ww m (lz, m, h ppwll, .) h x hl bbl m h hz f lz llw xplv v.th wll, h, ww mhl ll vlp h p hlz ml l.

glz k. Fm p l h f h h 3 m (10 )m h ww.

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1.3.2 cBr Lvl P

Protection against airborne chemical, biological, and radiological

(CBR) agents or contaminants is typically achieved by using par-

ticulate and adsorption lters, and personal protective equipment(PPE). Many dierent types o lters are available or CBR re-

leases. Filter eciency (e.g., how well the lter captures the toxic

material) varies based on the lter type (e.g., activated or impreg-

nated charcoal) and the specic toxic material. No single lter

can protect against all CBR materials; thereore, it is important to

veriy which CBR materials a lter protects against.

There are three levels o protection that range rom ltration with

pressurization (Class 1), ltration with little or no pressurization

(Class 2), and passive protection (Class 3). Class 1 protection is ora large-scale release over an extended period o time and would

apply to mission essential government and commercial buildings

that must remain operational 24 hours a day/7 days a week. Class

2 protection is or a terrorist attack or technological accident with

little or no warning and is characterized as a short duration small

scale release. Class 3 is typically applicable to an industrial acci-

dent that results in a short duration release. These three levels o

protection are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3. Table 1-4

provides a synopsis o the ISC CBR protection standards.

th cBr lvl p l h wh h dpm

Hml s (dHs) Wk gp rll dpl dv Pp

h Hlh Ph s (HPs) s Pbl i cmm p:

shl 10-80% v p p h xp,

bl vl. i h p plm v, hl m b

pbl v. Wh hl, vl hl b fx

. shl m b ppp pj b v hh l

.

shl lkl b m pv h v p ll v. th, h HPs mm h hl b h p pv .

th Pv a g (Pag) hl h m h x v Pag,

.., 10 msv (1 m), wh h mmm lvl b h m h x Pag,

.., 1 msv (100 mm).

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Table 1-4: ISC CBR Levels of Protection

Level ofProtection

For Biological/Radiological

Contaminants

ForChemical/

Radiological

Additional Considerations Class

Lowu mmm pvl (MerV) 13l lqvl.

n n 3

Medium

u hh-pl (HePa)l lqvl.

u bb .

d hl

sw pzm hl m

pv p w p , v, b h. th mk hz w m bmmz.

L l m l1 m (0 ) m lk, , pk .

2

High

u HePa l l qvl.

u bb .

d hl

sw pzm hl mpv p w p , v, b h. th mk hz w m bmmz.

L l m l1 m (0 ) m lk, , pk .

1, 2

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1.4 sHeLter tYPes

A CBRE shelter can be designed as a standalone or internal

shelter to be used solely as a shelter or to have multiple purposes,

uses, or occupancies. This section provides a series o denitionsthat can be useul when deciding to build a new shelter or up-

grade an existing shelter.

1.4.1 sl shl

A standalone shelter is considered a separate building (i.e., not

within or attached to any other building) that is designed and con-

structed to withstand the range o natural and manmade hazards.

This type o shelter has the ollowing characteristics:

m It may be sited away rom potential debris hazards.

m It will be structurally and mechanically separate rom any

building and thereore not vulnerable to being weakened

i part o an adjacent structure collapses or i a CBRE event

occurs in the adjacent building.

m It does not need to be integrated into an existing building

design.

A shelter or CBRE protection may be as simple as an interior

residential room to the traditional public shelter able to support

several hundred people. The number o persons taking reuge in

a shelter will typically be more than 12 and could be up to several

hundred or more.

1.4.2 il shl

An internal shelter is a specially designed and constructed room

or area within or attached to a larger building that is designed and

constructed to be structurally independent o the larger buildingand to withstand the range o natural and manmade hazards. It

shows the ollowing characteristics:

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m It is partially shielded by the surrounding building and may

not experience the ull orce o the blast. (Note that any

protection provided by the surrounding building should not

be considered in the shelter design.)

m It is designed to be within a new building and may be located

in an area o the building that the building occupants can

reach quickly, easily, and without having to go outside, such as

a data center, conerence room, gymnasium, or caeteria.

m It may reduce the shelter cost because it is typically part o a

planned renovation or building project.

1.4.3 shl c

A standalone or internal shelter may serve as a shelter only, or it

may have multiple uses (e.g., a multi-use shelter at a school could

also unction as a classroom, lunchroom, or laboratory; a multi-

use shelter intended to serve a manuactured housing community

or single-amily-home subdivision could also unction as a com-

munity center). The decision to design and construct a single-use

or a multi-use shelter will likely be made by the prospective client

or the owner o the shelter. To help the designer respond to non-

engineering and non-architectural needs o shelter owners, this

section discusses dierent shelter categories and usages. Table 1-5provides a summary o the commercial shelter categories.

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Table 1-5: Commercial Shelter Categories

ShelterConsiderations In-Ground Single-Use Multi-Use Community

Level of ProtectionBl Mm

cBr cl 3

Bl Lw

cBr cl 3

all all

Expected Capacity 1-100 1-10 1-100 100-1,000

Location

Bm b-bm whww m-hwll l

i pwhww m-hwll l

crm

d c

Bhm

swll

elv c

shl

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Special

Considerations

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m In-groundshelters.The in-ground shelters reerred to in

this manual are built below ground inside a building and

thereore can be entered directly rom within the building.

Other types o in-ground shelters are available that aredesigned to be installed outside a building and entering one

o these exterior in-ground shelters would require leaving the

building.

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m Single-useshelters. Single-use shelters are used only in

the event o a hazard event. One advantage o single-use

shelters is a potentially simplied design that may be readily

accepted by the authority having local jurisdiction. These

shelters typically have simplied electrical and mechanical

systems because they are not required to provide normal daily

accommodations or people. Single-use shelters are always

ready or occupants and will not be cluttered with urnishings

and storage items, which is a concern with multi-use shelters.

Simplied, single-use shelters may have a lower total cost o

construction than multi-use shelters.

The cost o building a single-use shelter is much higher than

the additional cost o including shelter protection in a multi-

use room. Existing maintenance plans will usually considermulti-use rooms, but single-use shelters can be expected to

require an additional annual maintenance cost.

m Multi-useshelters. The ability to use a shelter or more than

one purpose oten makes a multi-use standalone or internal

shelter appealing to a shelter owner or operator. Multi-use

shelters also allow immediate return on investment or owners/

operators; the shelter space is used or daily business when

the shelter is not being used during a hazard event. Hospitals,

assisted living acilities, and special needs centers would benetrom multi-use internal shelters, such as hardened intensive

care units or surgical suites. Internal multi-use shelters in these

types o acilities allow optimization o space while providing

near-absolute protection with easy access or non-ambulatory

persons. In new buildings being designed and constructed,

recent FEMA-sponsored projects have indicated that the

construction cost o hardening a small area or room in a

building is 10 to 25 percent higher than the construction cost

or a non-hardened version o the same area or room.

m Communitysheltersatneighborhoodsandorpublic

acilities. Community shelters are intended to provide

protection or the residents o neighborhoods and are

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typically located at schools and other similar institutions; they

are identied, categorized, and labeled by the American Red

Cross (see ARC 4496).

1.5 siting

One o the most important elements in designing a shelter is its

location or siting. In inspecting areas o existing buildings that are

used as shelter areas, research has ound that owners may over-

look the saest area o a building, while the saety o a hallway or

other shelter areas may be overestimated. Evaluating shelter areas

in an existing building or determining the best areas or new ones

is invaluable or saving lives when a disaster strikes.

The location o a shelter on a building site is an important part

o the design process or shelters. The shelter location on the site

and capacity should consider how many occupants work in the

building, as well as how many non-occupants may take reuge in

the nearest shelter available. At the site and building level, the

shelter location analysis should include evaluation o potential

CBRE eects.

When deciding to build a shelter, a preliminary evaluation may

be perormed by a design proessional or by a potential shelter

owner, property owner, emergency manager, building mainte-

nance person, or other interested party provided he or she has a

basic knowledge o building sciences and can understand building

design plans and specications.Althoughthethreatodamage

romCBREeventsmaybethepredominantocusotheevalua-

tion,additionalthreatsmayexistromtornado,hurricane,food,

andseismicevents;thereore,theevaluationshouldassessthe

threatatthesite. Prior to the design and construction o a shelter,

a design proessional should perorm a more thorough assessment

in order to conrm or, as necessary, modiy the ndings o a pre-liminary assessment.

An entire building or a section o a building may be designated as

a potential shelter area. To perorm an assessment o an existing

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structure or a new structure to be used as a shelter, the building

owner or designers may use theBuilding Vulnerability Assessment

Checklist included in FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Po-

tential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings;FEMA 452, A How-To Guide

to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildingsor the assess-

ment o CBRE events; and FEMA 433, Using HAZUS-MH for Risk

Assessmentor the assessment o major natural hazards.

I an existing building is selected or use as a shelter, the Building

Vulnerability Assessment Checklist will help the user identiy

major vulnerabilities and/or the best shelter areas within the

building to place the shelter. The checklist consists o questions

pertaining to structural, nonstructural, and mechanical character-

istics o the area being considered. The questions are designed to

identiy structural, nonstructural, and mechanical vulnerabilities

to CBRE hazards based on typical ailure mechanisms. Structural,

nonstructural, and mechanical deciencies may be remedied with

retrot designs; however, depending on the type and degree o de-

ciency, the evaluation may indicate that the existing structure is

unsuitable or use as a shelter area. A detailed analysis should con-

sider i a portion o a particular building can be used as shelter or

whether that portion is structurally independent o the rest o the

building. It should also determine i the location is easily acces-

sible, contains the required square ootage, and has good ingress

and egress elements.

The shelter should be located such that all persons designated to

take reuge may reach the shelter with minimal travel time. Shel-

ters located at one end o a building or one end o a community,

oce complex, or school may be dicult or some users at a site

to reach in a timely ashion. Routes to the shelter should be easily

accessible and well marked. Exit routes rom the shelter should

be in a direction away rom the threat. Hazard signs should be lo-

cated ollowing Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design(CPTED) principles o natural access control, natural surveillance,

and territoriality and illustrated in Figure 1-4.

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m Naturalaccesscontrol(controlsaccess).Guides people

entering and leaving a space through the placement o

entrances, exits, ences, landscaping, and lighting. Access

control can decrease opportunities or terrorist activity by

denying access to potential targets and creating a perception

o risk or would-be terrorists.

m Naturalsurveillance(increasesvisibility).The placement

o physical eatures, activities, and people in a way that

maximizes visibility. A potential criminal is less likely toattempt an act o terrorism i he or she is at risk o being

observed. At the same time, we are likely to eel saer when we

can see and be seen.

F 1-4

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bl, f pl,

x x ll

p

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m Territoriality(promotesasenseoownership). The use o

physical attributes that express ownership such as ences,

signage, landscaping, lighting, pavement designs, etc. Dened

property lines and clear distinctions between private and

public spaces are examples o the application o territoriality.

Territoriality can be seen in gateways into a community or

neighborhood.

Shelters should also be located outside areas known to be food-

prone, including areas within the 100-year foodplain. Shelters in

food-prone areas will be susceptible to damage rom hydrostatic

and hydrodynamic orces associated with rising food waters.

Damage may also be caused by debris foating in the water. Most

importantly, fooding o occupied shelters may well result in inju-

ries or deaths. Furthermore, shelters located in food-prone areas,

but properly elevated above the 100-year food elevation, could

become isolated i access routes were fooded. As a result, shelter

occupants could be injured and no emergency services would be

available.

Where possible, the shelter should be located away rom large

objects and multi-story buildings. Light towers, antennas, satel-

lite dishes, and roo-mounted mechanical equipment may be

toppled or become airborne during blast, hurricane, tornado, orearthquake events. Multi-story buildings adjacent to a shelter may

be damaged or may ail structurally due to natural or manmade

hazards. When these types o objects or structures ail, they may

damage the shelter by collapsing onto it or impacting it. The

impact orces associated with these objects are well outside the

design parameters o any building code.

There are several possible locations in a building or a house

or a shelter. Perhaps the most convenient and saest is below

ground level, in a basement. I the building or house does nothave a basement, an in-ground shelter can be installed beneath

a concrete slab-on-grade oundation or a concrete garage foor

(typically would be used as a single-use shelter). Basement

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shelters and in-ground shelters provide the greatest degree o

protection against missiles and alling debris.

Another alternative shelter location is an interior room on the

rst foor o a building or house. Closets, bathrooms, and small

storage rooms oer the advantage o having a unction other

than providing occasional storm protection. Typically, these

rooms have only one door and no windows, which make them

well-suited or conversion to a shelter. Bathrooms have the added

advantage o a water supply and toilet.

Regardless o where in a building or house a shelter is built, the

walls and ceiling o the shelter must be built so that they will

protect the occupants rom missiles and alling debris, and so

that they will remain standing i the building or house is severely

damaged by extreme winds. I sections o the building or house

walls are used as shelter walls, those sections must be separated

rom the structure o the building or house. This is true regard-

less o whether interior or exterior walls o the building or house

are used as shelter walls.

Typical foor plans o possible locations or shelters in a home are

highlighted in yellow in Figures 1-5 and 1-6. These are not foor

plans developed specically or houses with shelters, but they showhow shelters can be added without changes to the layout o rooms.

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F 1- exmpl l hl l l lb

source: FeMa 320

F 1-6 exmpl l hl l l bm

source: FeMa 320

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Figures 1-7 through 1-9 show examples o internal shelter loca-

tions in a commercial basement, concourse, and underground

parking garage; a retail/commercial multi-story building using a

parking garage, conerence rooms, data centers, stairwells, and el-

evator core areas; and a school/church acility, respectively.

F 1- exmpl l hl l mml bl

F 1-8 exmpl l hl l l/mml ml- bl

pk , m, , wll, lv

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Currently, standalone shelters are relatively rare and most

remaining shelters are remnants o the Cold War era that were de-

signed or nuclear weapons protection as allout shelters. These

shelters were called dedicated shelters to make a clear dieren-tiation rom dual use shelters (normal acilities in the community

that had enhanced radiation protection). Dedicated shelters were

built with very high levels o protection and did not have peace

time unctional compromises. Siting o standalone shelters or

nuclear protection has typically been underground, as tunnels,

caves, or buried structures. The mass o the geological materials

absorbed the blast energy and provided radiation shielding.

Many o the siting and design principles developed by the Oce

o Civil Deense in FEMA TR-29, Architect & Engineer Activities inShelter Development;FEMA RR-7, Civil Defense Shelters A State of the Art

Assessment 1986;and FEMA TR-87, Standards for Fallout Sheltersare

still applicable.

F 1-9

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l hl/hh

l

-

-

-

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For a standalone shelter, many sites will be constrained or site lim-

ited or underground, and an aboveground structure may be the

only easible alternative. For these sites, the siting considerations

include:

m Outside the foodplain

m Separation distance between buildings and structures to

prevent progressive collapse or impact rom collapsing

elements

m Separation rom major transportation eatures (road, rail)

m Access to redundant power and communications capabilities

1.6 occuPancY duration, toxic-ree area (ta) Loor sPace, andVentiLation requirements

Occupancy duration (also known as button-up

time) is the length o time that people will be

in the shelter with the doors closed and in the

protected environment. This period o time

is determined by the building owner or local

authorities and can range rom several hours

to several days. For o-site industrial accidents,the occupancy duration is usually less than 24 hours; occupancy

durations longer than 24 hours are generally restricted to war-

time. Occupancy duration stops when the doors to the shelter

are opened. It infuences the foor area requirements and the

amount o consumable and waste storage. Generally, occupancy

duration will not signicantly aect the perormance o the col-

lective protection system.

a. Less Than 24 Hours. An occupancy duration o less than 24 hours

does not require sleeping areas. The occupant load will generallybe a net 1.86 m2/person (20 square eet/person), depending upon

the classication o occupancy. The classication o occupancy,

as stated in NFPA 101, may require a higher or lower occupant

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loading depending upon the building classication. The occupant

loading will be coordinated with the authority having jurisdiction.

b. More Than 24 Hours. An occupancy duration greater than 24

hours requires sleeping areas. The minimum foor area, with the

use o single size beds, is approximately 5.6 m2/person (60 square

eet/person). With the use o bunked beds, the minimum foor

area is approximately 2.8 m2/person (30 square eet/person).

The total required TFA foor space is determined rom the oc-

cupancy duration, the number o people sheltered, and the

required foor area per person. Generally, large open areas such

as common areas, multi-purpose areas, gymnasiums, etc., provide

the most ecient foor area or protecting a large number o per-

sonnel. The TFA envelope should include bathroom acilities and,

i possible, kitchen acilities.

Although the planned response to CBR events may be to tem-

porarily deactivate the ventilation systems, both single- and

multi-use shelters must include ventilation systems capable o

providing the minimum number o air changes required by the

building code or the shelters occupancy classication. This will

provide a fushing capability once the CBR hazard has passed and

acilitate use o the shelter or non-CBR events. For single-use

shelters, 15 cubic eet per person per minute is the minimum air

exchange recommended; this recommendation is based on guid-

ance outlined in the International Mechanical Code (IMC). For

multi-use shelters, the design o mechanical ventilation systems is

recommended to accommodate the air exchange requirements

or the occupancy classication o the normal use o the shelter

area. Although the ventilation system may be overwhelmed in a

rare event when the area is used as a shelter, air exchange will

still take place. The designer should still conrm with the local

building ocial that the ventilation system may be designed orthe normal-use occupancy. In the event the community where the

shelter is to be located has not adopted a model building and/or

mechanical code, the requirements o the most recent edition o

the International Building Code (IBC) are recommended.

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1.7 Human actors criteria

Human actors criteria or the natural and manmade hazard shel-

ters build on existing guidance provided in this chapter and in

FEMA 320 and 361. Although existing documents do not addressall the human actors involved in the design o CBRE shelters,

they provide the basis or the criteria summarized in this chapter.

These criteria are detailed in the ollowing sections.

1.7.1 s /opy r

The duration o occupancy o a shelter will vary, depending on

the intended event or which the shelter has been designed. Oc-

cupancy duration is an important actor that infuences many

aspects o the design process.

The recommended minimums are 5 square eet per person or

tornado shelters and 10 square eet per person or hurricane

shelters. The shelter designer should be aware o the occupancy

requirements o the building code governing the construction o

the shelter. The occupancy loads in the building codes have histor-

ically been developed or lie saety considerations. Most building

codes will require the maximum occupancy o the shelter area

to be clearly posted. Multi-use occupancy classications are pro-

vided in the IBC; NFPA 101, Life Safety Code;NFPA 5000, BuildingConstruction and Safety Code;and state and local building codes.

Conficts may arise between the code-specied occupancy classi-

cations or normal use and the occupancy needed or sheltering.

For example, according to the IBC and NFPA 101 and 5000, the

occupancy classication or educational use is 20 square eet per

person; however, the recommendation or a tornado shelter is 5

square eet per person. Without proper signage and posted oc-

cupancy requirements, using an area in a school as a shelter can

create a potential confict regarding the allowed number o per-

sons in the shelter. I both the normal maximum occupancy andthe shelter maximum occupancy are posted, and the shelter oc-

cupancy is not based on a minimum less than the recommended

5 square eet per person, the shelter design should be acceptable

to the building ocial. The IBC, NFPA 101 and 5000, and the

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model building codes all have provisions that allow occupancies

as concentrated as 5 square eet per person. The American So-

ciety o Heating, Rerigeration, and Air-Conditioning Engineers

(ASHRAE) recommends that a minimum head room o 6.5 eet

and a minimum o 65 cubic eet o net volume be provided per

shelter occupant. Net volume shall be determined using the net

area calculated or the space.

ASHRAE Ventilation Standard 62-1981, Ventilation for Smoking-Per-

mitted Areasdenes minimum outdoor air supply rates or various

types o occupancy. These rates have been arrived at through a

consensus o experts working in the eld. A minimum rate o 5

cm per person or sedentary activity and normal diet holds the

carbon dioxide (CO2

) level in a space at 0.25 percent under steady

state conditions. Although normal healthy people tolerate 0.5

percent CO2

without undesirable symptoms and nuclear subma-

rines sometimes operate with 1 percent CO2

in the atmosphere,

a level o 0.25 percent provides a saety actor or increased

activity, unusual occupancy load, or reduced ventilation. The

ASHRAE Handbook 1982 Applications Environmental Control for

Survivalstates that carbon dioxide concentration should not ex-

ceed 3 percent by volume and preerably should be maintained

below 0.5 percent. For a sedentary man, 3 cm per person o

resh air would maintain a CO2 concentration o 0.5 percent.

1.7.1.1 TornadoorShort-termShelterSquareFootageRecom-

mendations. Historical data indicate that tornado shelters will

typically have a maximum occupancy time o 2 hours. Because the

occupancy time is so short, many items that are needed or the

comort o occupants or longer durations (in hurricane shelters)

are not recommended or a tornado shelter. FEMA 361, Section

8.2 recommends a minimum o 5 square eet per person or tor-

nado shelters. However, other circumstances and human actors

may require the shelter to accommodate persons who requiremore than 5 square eet. Square ootage recommendations or

persons with special needs are presented below; these recommen-

dations are the same as those provided in the FEMA1999National

Performance Criteria for Tornado Shelters:

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m 5 square eet per person adults standing

m 6 square eet per person adults seated

m 5 square eet per person children (under the age o 10)

m 10 square eet per person wheelchair users

m 30 square eet per person bedridden persons

1.7.1.2HurricaneorLong-termShelterSquareFootageRecom-

mendations.Historical data indicate that hurricane shelters will

typically have a maximum occupancy time o 36 hours. For this

reason, the occupants o a hurricane shelter need more space and

comorts than the occupants o a tornado shelter. FEMA 361, Sec-

tion 8.2 recommends a minimum o 10 square eet per person or

hurricane shelters (or a hurricane event only; an event expectedto last less than 36 hours). The American Red Cross 4496 publica-

tion recommends the ollowing minimum foor areas (Note: the

ARC square ootage criteria are based on long-term use o the

shelter [i.e., use o the shelter both as a reuge area during the

event and as a recovery center ater the event]):

m 20 square eet per person or a short-term stay (i.e., a ew days)

m 40 square eet per person or a long-term stay (i.e., days to

weeks)Again, the designer should be aware that there can be conficts

between the occupancy rating or the intended normal use o

the shelter and the occupancy required or sheltering. This oc-

cupancy confict can directly aect exit (egress) requirements or

the shelter.

1.7.2 d/tvl t ably

The shelter designer should consider the time required or all oc-

cupants o a building or acility to reach the shelter. The NationalWeather Service (NWS) has made great strides in predicting tor-

nadoes and hurricanes and providing warnings that allow time to

seek shelter; it has now expanded the service to include all hazards.

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As part o the NIMS, or tornadoes, the time span is oten short

between the NWS warning and the onset o the tornado. Figure

1-10 shows a sample NWS current watches, warnings, statements,

and advisories summary. This manual recommends that a tornado

shelter be designed and located in such a way that the ollowing ac-

cess criteria are met: all potential users o the shelter should be able

to reach it within 5 minutes, and the shelter doors should be secured

within 10 minutes. For hurricane shelters, these restrictions do not

apply, because warnings are issued much earlier, allowing more

time or preparation. A CBRE event may have warning such as the

Irish Republican Army gave to London police and residents, or no

warning as happened with the events o 9/11, and anthrax and sarin

releases in October 2001 and the Tokyo subway, respectively.

F 1-10

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source: nWs

Travel time may be especially important when shelter users havedisabilities that impair their mobility. Those with special needs

may require assistance rom others to reach the shelter; wheel-

chair users may require a particular route that accommodates the

wheelchair. The designer must consider these actors in order to

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provide the shortest possible access time and most accessible route

or all potential shelter occupants.

Access is an important element o shelter design. I obstructions

exist along the travel route, or i the shelter is cluttered with non-

essential equipment and storage items, access to the shelter will

be impeded. It is essential that the path remain unencumbered

to allow orderly access to the shelter. Hindering access in any way

can lead to chaos and panic. For example, at a community shelter

built to serve a residential neighborhood, parking at the shelter

site may complicate access to the shelter; at a non-residential

shelter, such as at a manuacturing plant, mechanical equipment

can impede access.

Unstable or poorly secured building elements could potentially

block access i a collapse occurs that creates debris piles along

the access route or at entrances. A likely scenario is an overhead

canopy or large overhang that lacks the capacity to withstand

blast eects collapses over the entranceway. The inclusion o

these elements should be seriously considered when designing ac-

cess points in shelters.

1.7.3 a wh dbl a (ada)

The needs o persons with disabilities requiring shelter spaceshould be considered. The appropriate access or persons with

disabilities must be provided in accordance with all Federal, state,

and local ADA requirements and ordinances. I the minimum

requirements dictate only one ADA-compliant access point or

the shelter, the design proessional should consider providing

a second ADA-compliant access point or use in the event that

the primary access point is blocked or inoperable. Additional

guidance or compliance with the ADA can be ound in many pri-

vately produced publications.

The design proessional can ensure that the operations plan

developed or the shelter adheres to requirements o the ADA

by assisting the owner/operator o the shelter in the devel-

opment o the plan. All shelters should be managed with an

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operations and maintenance plan. Developing a sound opera-

tions plan is extremely important i compliance with ADA at the

shelter site requires the use o lits, elevators, ramps, or other

considerations or shelters that are not directly accessible to

non-ambulatory persons.

1.7.4 spl n

The use o the shelter also needs to be c

Documents

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