Fed Suit against Sheriff Valdez, Oct. 2015

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

DALLAS DIVISON

ARTURO MERCADO, PABLO CARRANZA,SERGIO DIAZ, JOSE ARTURO GALVAN RESENDIZ, JOSE GUTIERREZ, HEYDY JARQUIN JIMENEZ, JOSE LOPEZ-ARANDA, MOISES MARTINEZ, JAVIER NAVARRETE, EFREN PEREZ VILLEGAS, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, ELEAZAR SAAVEDRA, ANDRES TORRES CABRERA, MOISES VEGA COSTILLA, MARIO GARIBALDI, and RODOLFO MARMOLEJO, Plaintiffs, v. DALLAS COUNTY, TEXAS, and LUPE VALDEZ, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO.

3:15-CV-3841

JURY TRIAL DEMANDED

COMPLAINT

Freedom from pretrial detention is a fundamental right protected by the United

States Constitution. “This traditional right to freedom before conviction permits the unham-

pered preparation of a defense, and serves to prevent the infliction of punishment prior to

conviction.” Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 3 (1951). “The consequences of prolonged detention

may be more serious than the interference occasioned by arrest. Pretrial confinement may

imperil the suspect’s job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships.”

Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114 (1975). Defendants held Plaintiffs in Dallas County jail

for months pending trial, even for purported misdemeanors, without allowing immediate

release on bond. Plaintiffs seek damages and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Case 3:15-cv-03481-D Document 1 Filed 10/26/15 Page 1 of 13 PageID 1

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PARTIES

1. Plaintiffs were held by Dallas County in detention. U.S. Immigration and Cus-

toms Enforcement (“ICE”) requested that Dallas County detain each Plaintiff for up to 48

hours after the time that each Plaintiff otherwise would have been released to facilitate ICE’s

arrest of that Plaintiff. As a result, an “immigration hold” appears in each Plaintiff’s file. No

Plaintiff is currently in Dallas County custody.

2. Dallas County is located in North Texas. Process for Dallas County may be ef-

fected on Clay Jenkins, County Judge, who is located at 411 Elm St., Dallas, Texas, 75202.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 17.024(a).

3. Lupe Valdez is the Sheriff of Dallas County and is the highest ranking law-

enforcement officer in Dallas County. She is responsible for the Dallas County Sheriff’s De-

partment, Dallas County jails, and Dallas County inmates. Sheriff Valdez lives and works in

Texas and in this District. Plaintiffs sue Sheriff Valdez in her personal and official capacity.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

4. This is a civil-rights case arising under the United States Code, title 42. The

Court thus has subject-matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

5. Defendants work and reside in Texas and in this District. Defendants regularly

conduct business in Texas and this district. Defendants’ acts in Texas form the basis of this

lawsuit. The Court thus has personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

6. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because many of the complained-of

acts in this case occurred in Dallas County, Texas, and because Defendants reside and work

in this District.


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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

7. Plaintiffs were arrested and placed in Dallas County custody within the last

two years. On information and belief, ICE requested that Dallas County detain each Plaintiff

for up to 48 hours after the time that each Plaintiff otherwise would have been released to

facilitate ICE’s arrest of that Plaintiff. As a result, each Plaintiff’s file includes an “immigra-

tion hold.” As an example, the following appears in the file for Plaintiff Moises Martinez:

“Illegal Alien” is often used by Dallas County as shorthand for an immigration hold. At times,

the hold indicates that no bond is allowed, as shown by the file for Plaintiff Efren Perez Vil-

legas:

Similarly, the file for Plaintiff Jose Lopez-Aranda states “H/F IMMIGRATION/NO BOND.”

8. ICE often provides a form to Dallas County entitled “Immigration Detainer.”

The Immigration Detainer for Plaintiff Andres Torres Cabrera is attached as Exhibit A. The

Torres Cabrera Immigration Detainer states that “there is reason to believe [Mr. Torres


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Cabrera] is subject to removal from the United States.” Under federal law, being “subject to

removal” is not a crime. The Immigration Detainer states that Mr. Torres Cabrera has a prior

felony, but does not state (in form or substance) facts showing probable cause that would

support arrest under the the Fourth Amendment, such as probable cause to believe that Mr.

Torres Cabrera has committed a different criminal offense or is committing a different crimi-

nal offense. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County maintain custody over

Mr. Torres Cabrera:

IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU: Maintain custody of the subject for a period NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS excluding Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, beyond the time when the subject would have otherwise been released from your custody to allow [the Department of Homeland Security] to take custody of the subject.

Ex. A. The Immigration Detainer requests that Dallas County provide a copy of the Detainer

to the subject, id., but Mr. Torres Cabrera did not receive a copy of the Detainer.

9. Dallas County generally honors ICE’s requests to detain. Dallas County detains

individuals after they would otherwise be released to allow ICE an opportunity to take cus-

tody of those individuals. ICE picks up detained individuals from Dallas County on a regular

schedule, approximately two times a week. As a result, at times, Dallas County detains indi-

viduals for ICE for more than 48 hours. ICE does not always take custody of the individuals

with immigration holds. For example, Dallas County detained Plaintiff Miguel Rodriguez af-

ter he otherwise would have been released for transfer to ICE. ICE did not take custody, and

Dallas County eventually released Mr. Rodriguez.

10. Dallas County imposes pretrial detention on individuals subject to immigration

holds (like Plaintiffs) in at least two ways. First, as shown in Mr. Perez Villegas’ file (which

states “IMMIGRATION DETAINER NO BOND ALLOWED”) and Mr. Lopez-Aranda’s file (“H/F


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IMMIGRATION/NO BOND”), Defendants do not allow bond for those with immigration

holds, resulting in pretrial detention. Second, even if individuals subject to immigration

holds are cleared for release (such as after a plea hearing), Dallas County detains those indi-

viduals pending transfer to ICE. Thus, even if Defendants accept bond, the bond does not

result in release. On payment, Dallas County instead maintains pretrial detention, pending

transfer to ICE. Under either method, Dallas County refuses immediate release on bond for

individuals with immigration holds.

11. The first method—refusing to allow bond—directly imposes pretrial detention.

If Dallas County will not allow bond, bail is illusory. Dallas County imposes pretrial deten-

tion by not allowing bonds for individuals with immigration holds.

12. The second method—detaining individuals for transfer to ICE based on an ICE

request to detain—indirectly imposes pretrial detention. If an individual with an immigration

hold attempts to post bond in Dallas County, and Dallas County allows the bond, Dallas

County will not immediately release the individual. Instead, Dallas County will maintain cus-

tody for transfer to ICE. Dallas County’s practices are widely known. As a result, attempting

to post bond is known as a futile exercise for those with immigration holds, because it will

not result in immediate release. The scheme has predictable effects. Because Dallas County

will not immediately release those on bond, individuals with immigration holds generally do

not attempt to post bond, and Dallas County maintains pretrial detention over almost all in-

dividuals with immigration holds.

13. The second method is independently wrongful. Under state law, Dallas County

must “at once set the accused at liberty” upon payment of bond. Tex. Crim. Code § 17.29(a).


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Defendants cannot rely solely on a request to detain from ICE to justify any further arrest or

detention, for at least the following reasons:

x Pursuant to Texas statute, all arrests generally require a warrant. An ICE re-quest to detain is not a warrant, and the ICE request to detain does not satisfy any statutory exception that would allow Dallas County to arrest Plaintiffs without a warrant.

x Dallas County cannot show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed, and Dallas County has no other au-thority to detain that satisfies Article I, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution.

x Dallas County cannot show probable cause to believe that a different criminal offense has been or is being committed, and Dallas County has no other au-thority to detain that satisfies the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.

14. Dallas County’s wrongful two-part scheme predictably results in pretrial deten-

tion over most individuals with immigration holds. Dallas County reported to the Texas

Commission on Jail Standards that, in June 2015, Dallas County held 557 prisoners that

were subject to an ICE request to detain. Due to its two-part practice of refusing immediate

release on bond to those with immigration holds, Dallas County unconstitutionally imposed

pretrial detention on most of those individuals.

15. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for Dallas County’s policy

and practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds by

(i) refusing to allow bond for those with immigration holds, and (ii) detaining individuals

subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals make bail or are otherwise

cleared for release. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas Coun-

ty’s decisions on (i) whether to allow bond posted for those with immigration holds, and (ii)

whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that make bail or are otherwise

cleared for release.


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16. Dallas County imposed pretrial detention on most Plaintiffs, as detailed below:

i. Bail was nominally set for Arturo Mercado in February 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Mercado. The immigration hold re-sulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing imme-diate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Mercado re-mained in Dallas County custody until around April 2015.

ii. Bail was nominally set for Pablo Carranza in May 2015 for $100,000. An im-migration hold was placed on Mr. Carranza. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate re-lease on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Carranza remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.

iii. Bail was nominally set for Sergio Diaz in January 2015 for $50,000. An im-migration hold was placed on Mr. Diaz, even though Mr. Diaz is a permanent resident of the United States. As a result, Dallas County initially would not al-low Mr. Diaz immediate release on bond, resulting in pretrial detention. Dallas County imposed pretrial detention until ICE withdrew its request to detain, in around August 2015.

iv. Bail was nominally set for Jose Arturo Galvan Resendiz in November 2014 for $2,500. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Galvan Resendiz. As a re-sult, Dallas County initially would not allow Mr. Diaz immediate release on bond, resulting in pretrial detention. Dallas County held Mr. Diaz until De-cember 2014.

v. Bail was nominally set for Jose Gutierrez in July 2015 for $100,000. An im-migration hold was placed on Mr. Gutierrez. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate re-lease on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Gutierrez remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.

vi. Bail was nominally set for Heydy Jarquin Jimenez in November 2014 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Ms. Jarquin Jimenez. The im-migration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Ms. Jarquin Jimenez remained in Dallas County custody until around February 2015.

vii. Bail was nominally set for Jose Lopez-Aranda in May 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Lopez-Aranda. The immigration hold re-sulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing imme-diate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Lopez-Aranada remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.


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viii. Bail was nominally set for Moises Martinez in April 2015 for $2,500. An im-migration hold was placed on Mr. Martinez. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate re-lease on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Martinez remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.

ix. Bail was nominally set for Javier Navarrete in December 2014 for $2,500. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Navarrete. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate re-lease on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Martinez remained in Dallas County custody until later that month or January 2015.

x. Bail was nominally set for Efren Perez Villegas in June 2015 for $10,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Perez Villegas. The immigration hold re-sulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing imme-diate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Perez Ville-gas remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.

xi. Bail was nominally set for Miguel Rodriguez in February 2015 for $2,500. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Rodriguez. The immigration hold result-ed in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Rodriguez re-mained in Dallas County custody until around March 2015.

xii. Bail was nominally set for Eleazar Saavedra in April 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Saavedra. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate re-lease on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Saavedra remained in Dallas County custody until around September 2015.

xiii. Bail was nominally set for Andres Torres Cabrera in May 2015 for $100,000. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Torres Cabrera. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing im-mediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Torres Cabrera remained in Dallas County custody until around August 2015.

xiv. The 363d District Court in Dallas County granted Moises Vega Costilla’s Mo-tion for New Trial in April 2015. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Vega Costilla. The immigration hold resulted in pretrial detention due to Dallas County’s practice of refusing immediate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds. Mr. Vega Costilla remained in Dallas County custody until around May 2015.

17. Dallas County detained each Plaintiff listed in the previous paragraph for vary-

ing periods of time after the Plaintiff should have been released, relying solely on an ICE re-


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quest to detain. For example, Plaintiff Miguel Rodriguez’s case was disposed of on March 20,

2015, but Dallas County detained him until March 22, 2015, based solely on ICE’s request to

detain. In addition to the Plaintiffs in the previous paragraph, Dallas County detained the

following Plaintiffs after they should have been released, based solely on an ICE request to

detain:

i. On August 20, 2015, the State of Texas filed a “Motion to Withdraw its Motion to Revoke or its Motion to Proceed with Adjudication” in the case against Mar-io Garibaldi. As a result of that filing, Mr. Garibaldi should have been re-leased immediately. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Garibaldi’s file. As a result, Dallas County detained Mr. Garibaldi, relying solely on the ICE re-quest to detain, after he should have been released. Mr. Garibaldi remained in Dallas County custody until around August 21, 2015.

ii. Plaintiff Rodolfo Marmolejo was arrested for failure to pay a fine. The fine was paid on October 19, 2015, which should have resulted in Mr. Marmolejo’s release. An immigration hold was placed on Mr. Marmolejo’s file. As a result, Dallas County detained Mr. Marmolejo, relying solely on the ICE request to detain, after he should have been released. Mr. Marmolejo remained in Dallas County custody until around October 19, 2015 (later in the same day) or Oc-tober 20, 2015.

18. Defendants abridged, in two ways, Plaintiffs’ freedom from pretrial detention

protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. First,

Dallas County’s practice of refusing to allow bond for individuals with immigration holds di-

rectly results in unconstitutional pretrial detention. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are re-

sponsible for the County’s policy of refusing to allow bond for individuals with immigration

holds, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation. Second, even if Dallas Coun-

ty accepts the bond, because Dallas County has a policy and practice of wrongfully detaining

individuals with immigration holds for ICE on request (e.g., in violation of Texas statutes,

the Texas Constitution, and the United States Constitution), Dallas County denies immediate

release on bond, indirectly resulting in unconstitutional pretrial detention. Dallas County


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and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for the County’s policy of detaining individuals subject to

an immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for release, and are

thus responsible for this constitutional violation.

19. Dallas County’s practice of honoring ICE requests to detain, even after those

individuals are otherwise cleared for release, denies Plaintiffs their rights under the Fourth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. After individuals are otherwise cleared for

release, Dallas County does not have probable cause to believe that a different criminal of-

fense has been or is being committed and has no other authority to detain that satisfies the

Fourth Amendment. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for the County’s policy

of detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals are oth-

erwise cleared for release, and are thus responsible for this constitutional violation.

COUNT 1: 42 U.S.C. § 1983—SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS (ALL PLAINTIFFS EXCEPT MARIO GARIBALDI AND RODOLFO MARMOLEJO)

20. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of all previous paragraphs.

21. The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect eve-

ry person against government interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty inter-

ests, unless the interference is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.

22. Freedom from pretrial detention is a fundamental and clearly established

right.

23. Defendants imposed pretrial detention on Plaintiffs, infringing the Plaintiffs’

strong interest in liberty. This intentional or reckless pretrial detention is not narrowly tai-

lored to serve a compelling state interest.

24. The moving force for this claim is Dallas County’s practice of refusing immedi-

ate release on bond to individuals with immigration holds by (i) refusing to allow bond for


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those with immigration holds, and (ii) honoring ICE requests to detain and detaining indi-

viduals subject to an immigration hold, even after those individuals are otherwise cleared for

release, in violation of Texas statutes, the Texas Constitution, and/or the United States Con-

stitution. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsible for these policies and practices. In

particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas County’s decisions on (i)

whether to refuse bond posted for those with immigration holds, and (ii) whether to detain

individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise cleared for release.

25. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to

be proven at trial.

COUNT 2: 42 U.S.C. § 1983—FOURTH AMENDMENT (ALL PLAINTIFFS)

26. Plaintiffs incorporate the allegations of all previous paragraphs.

27. The Fourth Amendment prevents arrests and seizures, absent probable cause.

28. When an individual pays bail or is otherwise eligible for release, Dallas County

must release that individual, absent a separate showing of probable cause that satisfies the

Fourth Amendment.

29. Plaintiffs’ rights under the Fourth Amendment are clearly established.

30. Dallas County has a policy and practice of detaining individuals who have oth-

erwise been cleared for release, without requiring probable cause to believe that a different

criminal offense has been or is being committed or other authority that would satisfy the

Fourth Amendment. Instead, Dallas County justifies its detentions with ICE-issued requests

to detain that neither satisfy the Fourth Amendment nor show probable cause to believe that

a different criminal offense has been or is being committed.


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31. Dallas County detained Plaintiffs after they were available for release, without

probable cause that satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Further, Dallas County detained certain

Plaintiffs for more than 48 hours.

32. The moving force for this claim is Dallas County’s policy of honoring ICE re-

quests to detain and detaining individuals subject to an immigration hold, even after those

individuals are otherwise cleared for release. Dallas County and Sheriff Valdez are responsi-

ble for this policy. In particular, Sheriff Valdez oversees and is responsible for Dallas Coun-

ty’s decision on whether to detain individuals with immigration holds that are otherwise

cleared for release.

33. As a result of Defendants’ actions, Plaintiffs suffered damages in an amount to

be proven at trial.

JURY DEMAND

34. Plaintiffs demand a jury on all issues so triable.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

Plaintiffs request the following relief:

i. That the Court award Plaintiffs actual, compensatory, and punitive damages in an amount to be proven at trial;

ii. That the Court award pre-judgment interest at the maximum rate allowed by law and post-judgment interest pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1961, continuing until such judgment is paid, at the maximum rate allowed by law;

iii. That Defendants pay Plaintiffs’ reasonable attorney fees and costs as permitted by law, including as permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1988;

iv. That the Court enjoin Defendants from detaining Plaintiffs solely based on an immigration hold, Immigration Detainer, or a request from ICE; and

v. That the Court award such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.


Dated: October 26, 2015 Respectfully submitted,

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THONYM. Gi

Texas State Bar No. [email protected] Callahan

Robson & Garza, PLLC3333 Lee Parkway, Suite 460Dallas, Texas 75219Telephone: (214) 521-6400Telecopier: (214) 764-8392

Eric Puente

Texas State Bar No. [email protected] M. Hindeah(Application for admission to be filed)Texas State Bar No. [email protected] & Hindieh PLLC3300 Oak Lawn Ave., Ste. 401Dallas, Texas 75219Telephone: (214) 730-0485Telecopier: (214) 730-0520

Counsel for Plaintiffs


Documents

Fed Suit against Sheriff Valdez, Oct. 2015