Fear, Surveillance, And Consumption

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David Lyon is Professor of Sociology and Director of the SurveillanceProject at Queens University, Canada. The author of many books, his mostrecent work has focused on computer-assisted surveillance, including the useof the internet for processing personal data: The Electronic Eye: The Riseof Surveillance Society (1994); Surveillance Society: MonitoringEveryday Life (2001); and Surveillance after September 11 (2003). Hisforthcoming book, Cyberspace (2004), focuses on the social and culturalcreation and consequences of the internet.

SURVEILLANCE IS A KEY THEME FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY,

particularly after the attacks on America now known as 9/11. Thisstrikes a somber note. Surveillance often smacks of the sinister, a worldwhere suspicions and secrecy rule. In the post-9/11 climate, surveil-lance also speaks of security, of airport checks and border controls, ofrisk reduction and the averting of danger. If surveillance was not alreadya recognized and taken for granted aspect of quotidian life before 9/11,it is now. Social control is one consequence of surveillance, within abroader frame of governance, and it spans social terrains from spying toshopping.

Surveillance is not new; it has a long history in the U.S., as elsewhere.From the early mutual surveillance of settler villages in New England,1

F E A R , S U RV E I L L A N C E , A N D C O N S U M P T I O N

David Lyon

1 See David H. Flaherty, Privacy in Colonial New England (Charlottesville: UniversityPress of Virginia, 1972).

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T H E H E D G E H O G R E V I E W / F A L L 0 3

where the church courts were the nearest thing to institutional surveil-lance, to todays high-tech infrastructural surveillance systems, peopleare used to being watched. But that experience has gone through a vari-ety of phases. The mid-twentieth centurys cumbersome system ofbureaucratic rule in government offices, police departments, andhuman resources units of large corporations had by the 1970s begun toundergo intensive computerization. This computerization in turnenabled new kinds of data-matching across organizations, which,though limited by law, began to spill over the banks of all previous con-ventions after 9/11. Computerization also permitted commercial sur-veillance to flourish in hitherto unknown ways, through insurancecompanies actuarial practices and database marketing. Surveillancenow has a curious connection with consumption. Today, after 9/11, theintricate networks linking consumer records with policing and intelli-gence gathering activities form a panoply of surveillance that is as yetlittle understood, but that clearly has some profound consequences.

Intertwined with surveillance is another feature of todays cultural ter-rain: fear. Without endorsing some general view that a culture of fearhas become a general condition of contemporary societies,2 it is worthremarking that fear, in a multiplicity of manifestations, has risen to aprominent position on the cultural radar. Pedestrians in downtowncores have imbibed the lurid lore of local newspapers and televisionsuch that they fear to walk those streets designated as dangerous. In theconsumer context, retailers fear the supposed loss of trade that occurswhen homeless people or teenagers hang around their stores, and sup-port street video surveillance as a means of discouraging them.

On a societal level, above all in the U.S., fear has become a dominantmotif since 9/11. The racialized characteristics of an elusive enemywithin have produced an unprecedented suspension of civil libertiesand flouting of the Constitution that includes the widespread use ofnew surveillance technologies to create categories of suspicion.3 Fears

2 See, for example, Barry Glassners The Culture of Fear: Why Americans Are Afraid ofthe Wrong Things (New York: Basic, 1999).

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have been fanned by the establishment of a Homeland SecurityDepartment and by the constant admonitions to ordinary citizens tobecome the eyes and ears of the agencies of policing and law enforce-ment. Such eyes and ears are intended to work in conjunction withthe fully-fledged systems of intelligence and surveillance whose budgetshave burgeoned since the fateful events of 9/11.

Fear and the Consumption of Surveillance

A host of surveillance devicesmore and less legal to operateis nowavailable on the open market. Anyone who uses the internet is aware ofthe spyware that can be purchased online so that parents can checkon their children, spouses on each other, employers on their workers,and so on. This is one means whereby the Big Brother figure has fadedto be replaced by a decentralized and depersonalized surveillance of allby all (or at least by all with the will and the resources to engage in sur-veillance). Even if it is not automated and networked, surveillance is nolonger the exclusive preserve of large organizations and departments ofstate. (It should be noted, however, that the lack of resources does pre-vent relatively unskilled ordinary users of electronic devices fromachieving anything like the surveillance power of large corporations.)

Underlying the quest for consumer surveillance equipment is the desireto be free from fear. Fear is a dominant factor in many domestic andneighborhood concerns in the twenty-first century. One can buy peaceof mind, apparently, by purchasing items such as nanny-cams withwhich children in daycare may be watched from a window in the cor-ner of the parental workplace computer screen (and this also functionsas a form of surveillance over daycare workers, of course). One mayeven pick up a handy device sold as a techno-bra to instantly detectsexual assault and raise an alarm. Much surveillance equipment is sold

3 See Christian Parenti, The Soft Cage: Surveillance in America from Slavery to the Waron Terror (New York: Basic, 2003); and David Lyon, Surveillance after September 11(Malden: Blackwell/Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003).

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as a means of allaying fears and quieting the anxieties of those whoignore statistical realities about assault and abuse and read only thelurid headlines.

Closed circuit television (CCTV) may also be considered a means ofbuying street-level security. CCTV systems are often funded by a com-bination of private and public bodies. As Stephen Graham argues, insome places they are well on the way to becoming a 5th utility.4 Likewater, electricity, or gas, CCTV systems are increasingly being builtinto the urban fabric in the UK. While the activities of the IrishRepublican Army (IRA), along with a notorious child murder by youngboys, may have catalyzed developments in urban, public-space CCTVduring the 1980s and 1990s, it seems that protecting spaces of con-sumption provides the key justification for the ongoing uses of suchsurveillance today. It is taken for granted and enjoys widespread publicsupport, in ways that parallel street lighting or the provision of lanemarkers on the roadway.

At the same time the case of CCTV is also interesting for the ways thatit is sold. There appears to be a neat amplification effect in which pub-lic opinion is claimed to be in favor of CCTV (though the method-ological questions surrounding this are manifold), public figures makepronouncements about how CCTV works (though the evidenceseems thin) that are supplemented by quoted figures from CCTV com-panies and then reinforced through television crime shows. As CliveNorris says, television and CCTV were made for each other.5

Television is frequently referred to by respondents as their source ofinformation about CCTV. And there is little public opposition to it. Ifthis is Big Brother, then he has certainly been domesticated as a con-sumer good.To examine CCTV, however, is merely to look on the surface of the

4 Stephen Graham, Technology, Place, and Planning: Looking Beyond the Hype,Planning Theory and Practice 3.2 (2002): 22144.

5 Clive Norris and Gary Armstrong, The Maximum Surveillance Society: The Rise ofCCTV (Oxford: Berg, 1999) 67.

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surveillance-and-commodification theme. Beneath the surface a hugeindustry of personal information processing has arisen that actuallylubricates the capitalist economy more significantly than any otheritem. It has visible manifestations, of course, in phenomena such asloyalty clubs in supermarkets, frequent flyer point systems, warrantyforms that ask about other interests and spending habits, telephonebills, and internet cookies. What all these have in common is that theyare means of gleaning, amassing, coding, and classifying personal infor-mation. The visible tokens of credit cards and bar-codes bespeak a hid-den world of personal data processing that places behaviors, preferences,and patterns into categories in order to target marketing efforts moreand more precisely and efficiently. The more people consume, the moreis known about their consumption, and the more this is used as a guideboth to what they will likely consume and to where incentives can beintroduced to further encourage that consumption.

These practices are known collectively as database marketing, a termthat sums up neatly what happens. Personal data are sought whereverthey may be found and entered into searchable databases to beprocessed into usable information. The idea is to produce algorithmsthat will facilitate the process of matching products to potential cus-tomers who in one way or another have revealed their preferences andpast choices. Indeed, one could argue that this is the process wherebyconsumers are produced for products. It is not so much that they aresomehow programmed to consume in particular ways, but rather thatthe range of choices is prescribed. Rather like the TV news, which doesnot so much tells us what to think as what to think about, a shoppingagenda rather than a shopping list is created for consumers, and thepath is smoothed to the (virtual) door of that particular outlet.

Since the mid-1990s these kinds of practices have been enhanced byinternet use, since massive amounts of personal data circulate online aspeople surf the web and use email. These are captured by numerousincreasingly sophisticated means, starting with cookies, the little soft-ware devices that attach themselves, barnacle-like, to our personal com-puters, as we navigate the electronic seas. But these cookies are alsounlike barnacles in the sense that they act as communication conduits.Think of them rather as bugs, concealed on window fixtures or in elec-


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trical outlets, that are transmitting information back to their headquar-ters. It is hard not to bring in the spy-movie scenario, because it cap-tures the situation so well. Some call these ET devices because, likeSpielbergs extraterrestrial, they phone home. Personal data aboutwhich sites have been visited or even which goods purchased is thusknown automatically by marketers, who frequently try to combinethese data with ones garnered in the off-line world in order to createfuller profiles of consumers.

Without lapsing into technological determinism, it is worth mention-ing that one other relevant technological innovation is likely to becomeincreasingly important over the next few years. If cookies are comput-er-bugs, then Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) makes body-bugs a real pervasive possibility. RFID is already making its presencefelt in a number of consumer contexts, and it speaks particularly to thematter of mobility. It is likely that RFID will begin to replace the ubiq-uitous bar code as a means of keeping track of consumer goods so that,at the most mundane level, razor blade or sweatshirt shelves can berestocked. The device, in this case, is a tiny tag that can be attached toalmost anything from shelved products in a store to livestock. It sendsradio messages that potentially increase efficiency. Such tags havealready proved their worth in airport luggage-routing systems and high-way toll collections. Major outlets such as Walmart are keen to reap thebenefits themselves.6 But, of course, clothing with tags is worn by con-sumers as they move around, and goods with tags are taken home,which is why privacy advocates are concerned. No policy currentlyexists to prevent stores, hackers, or even government departments fromutilizing data from these devices.

The rise of database marketing since the 1980s helped to foster thebelief that such techniques may be used to compensate for the lack ofpersonal contact in buying and selling. Under the banner ofRelationship Marketing, the practice has grown as a way of getting

6 Steve Ulfelder Raising an RFID Ruckus Technewsworld (8 October 2003)www.technewsworld.com/perl/story/31792.html/

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to know your customer. This, of course, has nothing to do with per-sonal knowledge typified by what we know of our friends or colleagues;it is also far from a mutual process. The marketer aims to know thecustomer with almost no reciprocal knowing except of the most care-fully edited and scripted kind. The knowledge acquired is merely thatof inferred preferences from patterns of consumer behavior, or fromself-reported declarations of spending habits. A flexible software toolknown as Customer Relationship Marketing or CRM is a spin-offfrom this marketing theory that has proliferated in its forms and usessince it was first used in the 1990s.

Whatever the mechanism for extracting and storing personal data, thepurpose is to create searchable databases capable of making up or creat-ing customers. By subjecting the data to sophisticated techniques, pro-files are produced for use by marketers. To older methods ofdata-matching have now been added data mining and other kinds ofanalysis that enable marketers to make increasingly fine-grained files onconsumers. The profiles can be sorted and ranked in terms of their rel-ative profitability for the corporation, and differential treatment metedout to consumers as a result. Such practices are becoming more wide-spread and systematic, leading at worst to the reinforcement of alreadyexisting forms of social division and inequality.

Though one might think that this sort of personal data collectionwould inspire in consumers fears about corporate control, this processof commodifying personal data is not generally seen as unwelcome bymany consumers. In a recent Canadian survey, 42% of respondentssaid they were happy to have their shopping habits monitored in returnfor a 10% discount on purchases. And 36% of internet users would beprepared to have their surfing monitored for a new computer and freeinternet access.7 Corporations often brush off complaints by privacyvigilantes with the remark that customers do not actually care aboutprivacy, the evidence being that only a tiny minority does anything toprotect their online transactions and interactions. But, of course, con-


7 Annual Report of the Privacy Commissioner (Ottawa, 2000) 30.

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sumers may not do so for many reasons, including the fact that they donot understand what is going on or do not have the technical ability toprotect themselves. Beyond this, there is simple economic gain or con-venience for which, it seems, some innocent data may cheerfully besacrificed.

Seamless Surveillance after 9/11

Well before September 11, 2001, surveillance was big business, wasconnected with consumption, and was itself consumed. Since that piv-otal date, however, the consumption-surveillance connection has had anew twist. In addition to personal information gleaned from police andimmigration records, intelligence sources and other government-relateddatabases, customer data is now viewed as fair game for law enforce-ment purposes. This is not entirely new, of course, but 9/11 gave thetrend a strong boost.

Immediately after the attacks on New York and Washington, grainyimages of Mohammed Atta and his associates started to appear on tele-vision screens. The images were from CCTV machines at conveniencestores, gas stations, fast food outlets, and the like. One also saw tele-phone and email logs, and traces gathered from online airline ticketingoutlets. In other words, those consumer footprints were used in theprocess of piecing together the story of what happened prior to theattacks. Together they amounted to vital bits of data through whichactivities could be mapped and timed, re-creating the actual sequencesof events and contacts that led up to the fatal consummation of theconspiracy.

This was not an anomalous moment or a quirky blip in the history ofsurveillance. There is a long-term trend towards system integration,which is the dream of some computer scientists and has the supportand encouragement of politicians and civil servants with a classic mod-ernist mindset. (It should also be observed that other computer scien-tists object more soberly that the dream is just that, and somepoliticians stake their reputations on resisting system integration in itsvarious guises.) What was visible just after 9/11 is the tip of an elec-

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tronic iceberg, which, beneath the surface, is a complex entity of per-sonal data collection, exchange, combination, manipulation, and pro-duction. System integration, thought of as a means of coordinationand efficiency-enhancement, invites the use of personal (and other)data, wherever they may be found, for purposes that appear as politicalpriorities.

After 9/11 the now-familiar War Against Terror was declared, andthis theme has become a political priority wherever American influenceis felt. Interestingly (and ironically) enough, several of the most impor-tant proposals and initiatives within this War involve both the use ofconsumer data and the deployment of consumer surveillance tech-niques in the apprehension of terrorists. For the latter, law enforce-ment agencies seized on CRM (Customer Relationship Marketing) as ahighly appropriate tool for redeployment as an anti-terror device. Ifcustomers could be clustered according to type in order to narrow downto and home in on likely targets, the same methods could be extendedto do the same for terror suspects. For the former, I have in mind thenow discontinued Total Information Awareness or TIA scheme, theComputer-Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening or CAPPS II program,8

and the plan to integrate federally the drivers license registration sys-tem that to date has always been state-administered.

The use of consumer data in the War Against Terror was manifest inthree proposals. The first was a Pentagon plan to link a number of data-bases, including some consumer records, to create a mega-network ofpersonal data useful in the apprehension of suspects. The second, nowwell under way, was seen as a means of increasing security at the vul-nerable borderless-borders of airports. It combines data required by lawwith other marketing sources, adding to the already existing level of airtraveler surveillance through ticketing and frequent flyer records. Thethird, if indeed it is implemented as planned, will enable law enforce-ment agencies to create a de facto national electronic identification for

8 Whether TIA is truly discontinued in the sense that it disappears, not to reappearin another similar form, remains to be seen.


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American citizens, even those who do not drive motor vehicles. Onceagain, however, the personal information available within the systemwill include customer records.

In these obvious ways, then, 9/11 reinforced existing trends, connect-ing personal databases that previously had little or no connection,including those whose initial purpose (whether dubious or not in itself )was to process customer data. There is an obvious drive for system inte-gration as a means of taking advantage of every conceivable source ofpersonal data. And one may also discern at work here a playing on pub-lic fears that amplifies what was already present in the depiction ofdowntown cores as sites of danger.

Technological solutions are also proffered for social and political prob-lems. The use of some technologies in obtaining security may not initself be questionable, but the fact is that such solutions have a veryhigh profile and involve heavy spending on the part of the relevantauthorities. They also appear to overshadow other kinds of initiatives ofmore low-tech and labor intensive kinds. But low-tech and labor-inten-sive methods are already discounted in relationship marketing, so itshould hardly be surprising that these features are perpetuated in theWar Against Terror.

Surveillance as Social Defense: Consumption and Control

What may be concluded from this brief survey of some links betweenfear, surveillance, and consumption? Are there more theoretical ways ofgrasping what is happening? Two concepts may help: one is defenseand the other is governance. The word defense has increasingly ambigu-ous connotations. It may be used in the military and law-enforcementsense of defending persons or property from attacks. But it may alsobespeak a situation in which political orders or social privilege may bedefended from perceived attack. As for governance, this concept is veryuseful in this context for discussing the ways in which social order ismaintained not merely by some legitimately constituted powers, but byforms of power that seep throughout the social system, many of whichhave no obvious connection with power in the conventional sense.

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Consumer surveillance may be thought of in this context.

As Nikolas Rose argues, today our citizenship is not realized primarilyin relation to the state or a uniform public sphere but through activeengagement with diverse and dispersed private and corporate practices,in which shopping and working loom large.9 We have constantly torepeat credentials and identifiers in order to link ourselves into the cir-cuits of civility. These touch each life decision with all manner ofinducements and sanctions that ensure control over conduct. They arefluid and networked but at certain points highly exclusionary. CustomerRelationship Marketing fits this description nicely, and elucidates theworking of one of the key strands of contemporary governance.

The governance theme may also be pursued by considering the formsof individualization that are visibly present in todays consumer-orient-ed societies. Commodification fits as neatly with individualism as itdoes with governance. In contemporary societies risk is increasinglyindividualized (rather than shared), and this encourages a situation ofdispersed governance, working through so-called market mechanisms.Pleasures may be individualized in societies that genuflect towards con-sumer choice, but so are perceived risks. Hence the nanny-cam and thetechno-bra. But, of course, such devices can only be afforded by certainsocial groups. They will also be managed by the private sector and bycorporations. Those who fall through the cracks will be caught insystems still run (though possibly contracted-out) by the state. Thenew divisions are between high-risk and low-risk travelers, workers,and consumers.

If new surveillance techniques developed in any of these spheres arethought to have some residual negative consequences, then individual-ized solutions are also available, on the shelf labeled privacy. This ideais commonly thought of as the protection of personal space fromviolations and intrusions, and is perversely perpetuated in a worldwhose surveillance practices go far beyond mere personal violations and


9 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 246.

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intrusions!10 Moreover in many cases privacy offers little more thanself-protection for those who can afford to follow-up suspectedinstances of the abuse or misuse of personal information, and whoknow how to use the law. Whatever the merits of the discourse of pri-vacyand there are someit is woefully and chronically inadequatefor dealing with the challenges of contemporary surveillance.

In a world of rampant commodification, none of this is surprising. Thecoin of so-called self-making through consumer choices has an obverseside, that of consumer categorization and sorting. The much-lovedpostmodern theme that shows how people construct their selvesthrough a conscious process of selecting personae in their spendinghabits may have some merit. But taken on its own, it paints only a verypartial picture of the social realities of contemporary consumer culturein which classification from outside is as significant if not more so thanthe process of self-definition from within.11 The power to classify andcategorize has always carried huge power.12 How much more so whenthe process is automated, generalized, and systematic, and when thecategories are available across a range of social and political agenciesand organizations?

The 9/11 theme is important here merely as a reminder of the moreegregious aspects of categorizing, known popularly as racial profiling,and because of the connections between the War Against Terror andconsumer society. Like the War on Drugs that preceded it, the WarAgainst Terror also acts as a handy decoy to distract public attentionfrom the social realities of a rapidly accelerating gap between rich andpoor in the U.S. (and other countries such as the U.K.).13 It is not only

10 This is not an argument against privacy either as a limited social good or as an effec-tive mobilizing slogan against the proliferation of surveillance. I have defended it onboth counts in several places including in my book The Electronic Eye: The Rise ofSurveillance Society (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994).

11 Richard Jenkins, Categorization: Identity, Social Process, and Epistemology,Current Sociology 48.3 (2000): 725.

12 Pierre Bourdieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste (Cambridge,MA: Harvard University Press, 1987).

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victims of slipshod justice after 9/11 who should be considered, butthe poorest and the most vulnerable at both local and global levels. Inthe U.S. one might think of welfare mothers in Appalachia, whosecourageous activities under the surveillance of those who are appointedas overseers of the poor have been so well documented by JohnGilliom.14

The kinds of governance emerging today rely on a combination of tech-nical and social fixes, but it should also be observed that these methodshave strict limitations. Not only do some new surveillance technolo-giesparticularly those established to deal with security threatsnotwork effectively, but their underlying logic is also defective. Theydepend on an amoral instrumentalism that is surely bound to fail inthe long run. Social defense technologies merely try to limit opportu-nities for criminal behavior or to maximize opportunities for targetedconsumer spending. The individualizing tendencies of societies charac-terized by consumerism-out-of-control are blindingly visible here, butthey may also tend to obscure the fact that the solidarities of civil soci-ety are simultaneously being eroded by the same means. Exploring suchabsences is another crucial task for the social sciences.

Surveillance today is offered as a commodity that will provide protec-tion and security. It is something to be bought; it has a price. It is alsoto be consumed; we desire more and more (not necessarily because itworks but because it fits the currently reigning ideology). Yet as it worksright now, it produces more technology-reliance and dependence onindividual solutions for problems that might more properly be thoughtof as public ones. Although on the surface surveillance augmentationreduces freedom in a curious paradox of control, freedom is not theprimary casualty. Collateral damage is caused above all to love and totrust. The culture of control that is fostered by the commodification of

13 David Garland argues that these two are closely connected within what he calls theculture of control in his book The Culture of Control (Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 2001).

14 John Gilliom, Overseers of the Poor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).

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surveillance currently mitigates against an ethics of care. Its automationin algorithmic systems tends to shift it further and further from thepersonal and the moral. Surveillance is articulated with systems ofexclusion that may act as dominationas in the case of racial profil-ingor as abandonment, in which the capacity to walk by on theother side is computer-assisted.15

All this also takes place, as I have argued, within cultural contexts wherefears are significant factors. Fear is many-faceted; it ebbs and flows ashistories and biographies intersect, here fomented by media amplifica-tion, there mitigated by communal involvement, commitments, andclear-sightedness. Our societies are, as Frank Furedi says, fearful becausethe evaluation of everything from the perspective of safety is a defin-ing characteristic.16 We perceive the world as dangerous, do not trustothers, and are skeptical about whether any intervention might work.Yet the kinds of fear discussed here are specific, to environments (suchas airports, streets) and particular classes of persons (prostitutes, drugaddicts, homeless people, terrorists, and so on). While there may besome general culture of fear (perhaps particularly in the U.S.), it isimportant to specify what sorts of fear are significant in what places forwhich persons and at what times.17 How these are connected with sur-veillance and with commodification could then be examined in a case-by-case fashion.

Are there some practical ways of confronting this? Yes. Though thiswould be the topic of another article, it should be noted that alterna-tives exist, including ones that do not simply eschew all technologies,mobilities, or forms of consumption. At a local level, accountabilityamong system operators, participation in systems design, the will tomaintain vigilance in protecting personal details through legal means

15 See Miroslav Volf, Exclusion and Embrace (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996).16 Frank Furedi, Culture of Fear: Risk-Taking and the Morality of Low Expectation

(London: Cassel, 1997) 4.17 See Andrew Tudors helpful article, A (Macro) Sociology of Fear? The Sociological

Review 51.2 (2002): 23856.

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(such as privacy law), the courage and willingness to ask not which isthe best system but whether we need a system at allall these andmore are ways of addressing contemporary surveillance outside thepresent box. These are appeals to the powerful to care and protectrather than invitations to victims to protect themselves (with law, cash,and so on).18

At a global level, growing awareness is apparent of the dangers of thepresent surveillance-commodification spiral, along with its fateful con-nections with fear. It comes, on the one hand, from a curious coalitionof loosely networked persons concerned with civil liberties and humanrights, especially after 9/11, and, on the other hand, from consumergroups who have come to realize the massive power of customer infor-mation for good or ill. In the twenty-first century we may well see thefurther rise of cross-national movements concerned with both surveil-lance and (over-)consumption, which in turn will help shift the agendaaway from individualized notions of privacy and towards more socialanalyses and solutions. But given the deep-seated nature of commodi-fied surveillance in contemporary cultures of control, such alternativesmay still have a hard time getting a hearing at either level.

18 At the very broadest level, it should always be remembered, too, that fear and loveare mutually repelling poles.

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Fear, Surveillance, And Consumption