FBI Drug Testing Affirmative

1AC

1AC — Cybersecurity AdvantageContention One is Cybersecurity

FBI drug testing policy creates a private brain drain that undermines cybersecurity.

Tracy 14 — Sam Tracy, Activism Director for Tech Freedom, Former Board Member of the ACLU, M.A. in Sociology and Political Science from the University of Connecticut, 2014 (“The FBI Isn't Updating Its Drug-Related Hiring Policies, But It Should Be,” Huffington Post, May 27th, accessible online at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/the-fbi-isnt-updating-its_b_5394775.html, accessed on 7-6-15)

Last week, the Internet erupted in praise, skepticism, and played-out puns following reports that the FBI

was reconsidering its hiring restrictions on marijuana use. FBI Director James B. Comey said

Monday that the agency was "grappling with the question right now" as the country changed its approach to marijuana, but backpedaled two days later, declaring at a Senate hearing, "I am absolutely dead set against using marijuana... I did

not say I'm going to change that ban." It's a shame -- to stay as effective as possible, the FBI would do well to become more flexible on prospective employees' marijuana use. The supposed potential change was a reaction to the agency's troubles recruiting hackers to fight cybercrime amid growing threats from China and elsewhere. Comey, playing up stereotypes while stating a valid concern, went so far to say, "I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the interview." Meanwhile, the FBI's policies state that job applicants can't have used marijuana within the past three years, any other illegal drug in the

past 10, or ever sold or transported any illegal drug. It is certainly true that many talented young hackers use marijuana. 14 percent of 18-29 year olds

told the latest Gallup poll they were current marijuana users, and 36 percent reported trying it at some point in their lives -- and hackers are one of many subcultures well-known for their

cannabis use. The cream of the crop is even more susceptible to disqualification: a number of studies have found smart people are more likely to experiment with drugs than their less-intelligent peers. But a policy change wouldn't just affect young hackers who use marijuana recreationally. The FBI employs over 35,000 people, from hackers to secretaries to

spies to janitors. When a young hacker who enjoys marijuana is turned away from an FBI job for her past-time, she can probably find a better-paying, drug-test-free job at Google, Microsoft, or one of the countless startups hoping to be listed along with those giants one day. But a medical marijuana patient in one of the 21 states (and the nation's capital) where it's legal may not have as many options, and current FBI employees who could benefit from its use may turn to more risky

treatment alternatives in order to keep their jobs. A majority of Americans live in states where it's legal to use marijuana for medical purposes, and millions

of adults who live in (or vacation to) Colorado can already use it like they do alcohol or tobacco. Yet

the federal government's unwillingness to update its approach to marijuana precludes countless otherwise law-abiding citizens from serving our country in agencies like the FBI or CIA. This already-nonsensical policy is all the more ridiculous when you consider our last three presidents -- each the ultimate head of the FBI -- has admitted to past illegal drug use. If having used cocaine doesn't disqualify one from being Commander in Chief, why should it take you out of the running to be an entry-level security analyst?

The FBI could greatly expand its applicant pool, thus increasing the quality of its hires, if it simply threw out the rules barring past drug use and focused instead on preventing on-the-job impairment. They've already eased up on their restrictions before: no one who used marijuana more than 15 times could be hired before the FBI changed to its current policies in 2007. What drugs someone chooses to use has nothing to do with their trustworthiness or love of country, and we'd all do well to stop pretending it does.

Current employees are forced to turn to riskier methods of medical treatment in order to avoid testing positive, jeopardizing their health

Huffington Post 14 (written by Sam Tracy, civil rights activist focused on drug policy reform, technological law, and criminal justice, “The FBI Isn't Updating Its Drug-Related Hiring Policies, But It Should Be” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/the-fbi-isnt-updating-its_b_5394775.html) aj

But a policy change wouldn't just affect young hackers who use marijuana recreationally. The FBI employs over 35,000 people, from hackers to secretaries to spies to janitors. When a young hacker who enjoys marijuana is turned away from an FBI job for her past-time, she can probably find a better-paying, drug-test-free job at Google, Microsoft, or one of the countless startups hoping to be listed along with those giants one day. But a medical marijuana patient in one of the 21 states (and the nation's capital) where

it's legal may not have as many options, and current FBI employees who could benefit from its use may turn to more risky treatment alternatives in order to keep their jobs. The FBI could greatly expand its applicant pool, thus increasing the quality of its hires, if it simply threw out the rules barring past drug use and focused instead on preventing on-the-job

impairment. They've already eased up on their restrictions before: no one who used marijuana more than 15 times could be hired before the FBI changed to its current policies in 2007. What drugs someone chooses to use has nothing to do with their trustworthiness or love of country, and we'd all do well to stop pretending it does.

Lack of qualified hackers drastically increases the risk of cyber-terror — current levels are not sufficient.

Wait 14 — Patience Wait, freelance tech editor for Information Week — internally citing Gregory Wilshusen, Director of Information Security Issues at the Governemnt Accountability Office, M.S. in Information Management from George Washington University, and Robert Childs, Former Chancellor of the National Defense University, Deputy to the President for Cyber and Information, ED in Education Management and Law from Duke University, 2014 (“Government Hiring Practices Hamper Cybersecurity Efforts,” Information Week, May 20th, accessible online at http://www.informationweek.com/government/cybersecurity/government-hiring-practices-hamper-cybersecurity-efforts/d/d-id/1252939?page_number=2, accessed on 7-6-15)

Bucci added that just getting employees to follow the cybersecurity policies already on the books would help -- and that has to include the bosses. "If the boss isn't doing it, no one else will," he said. Wilshusen

said many federal agency leaders are starting to understand the importance of recruiting better talent. "The incidents reported to US-CERT have more than doubled in the past four years." But it's going to take more than just agency leaders recognizing the problem. Childs pointed to previous cyberattacks, including when attackers shut down much of Estonia's electronic infrastructure in 2007 and another on the Saudi national oil company Aramco in 2012, as acts of cyber warfare. The war between Russia and Georgia in 2008 was the first demonstration of "cyber (attacks) combined with kinetic attacks," he said. Bucci said the US

military comes closest to understanding and preparing for these kinds of orchestrated attacks. "But in a [military] exercise, add the cyber component and the exercise comes crashing to a halt within a couple of hours," he said. The leaders of the exercise will usually insist on shutting down the cyber component so they can continue, even though they won't be able to do that on a real battlefield, he said.

Drug testing prevents the FBI from hiring vital cybersecurity experts

Mottl 14 (Judy, Tech Times, FBI: Finding cybersecurity gurus is tough as many are pot heads, May 21, 2014, http://www.techtimes.com/articles/7352/20140521/feds-finding-cyber-security-gurus-tough-pot-heads.htm, JZG)

The FBI is mulling revamping its hiring rules regarding drug use, specifically marijuana, as it's getting tough to hire on cybersecurity gurus given the pot-smoking habit many seem to have these days. FBI Director James B.

Comey said the federal enforcement agency may have to change up its regulations regarding employee drug rules to hire on needed IT talent in its quest to fight cybersecurity threats. The FBI has the approval of Congress to add 2,000 staffers and most will be focused on

cybersecurity. But finding that many gurus who don't have a pot habit may be tough, said Comey, during a conference Monday in New York. "I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the interview," Comey said.

Right now the FBI can't hire anyone who may be users of marijuana but Comey said publicly that those who do have a habit and are cybersecurity experts should apply for a job if interested.

Scenario One is Cyber Attacks

Cyber attacks are frequent and devastating. Every attack increases the risk of existential catastrophe.

Nolan 15 — Andrew Nolan, Legislative Attorney at the Congressional Research Service, former Trial Attorney at the United States Department of Justice, holds a J.D. from George Washington University, 2015 (“Cybersecurity and Information Sharing: Legal Challenges and Solutions,” CRS Report to Congress, March 16th, Available Online at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/R43941.pdf, Accessed 07-05-2015, p. 1-3)

Introduction

Over the course of the last year, a host of cyberattacks 1 have been perpetrated on a number of high profile American companies . In January 2014, Target announced that hackers, using malware,2 had digitally impersonated one of the retail giant’s contractors,3 stealing vast amounts of data—including the names, mailing addresses, phone numbers or email addresses for up to 70 million individuals and the credit card information of 40 million shoppers.4 Cyberattacks in February and March of 2014 potentially exposed contact and log-in information of eBay’s customers, prompting the online retailer to ask its more than 200 million users to change their passwords.5 In September, it was revealed that over the course of five months cyber-criminals tried to steal the credit card information of more than fifty million shoppers of the world’s largest home improvement retailer, Home Depot.6 One month later, J.P. Morgan Chase, the largest U.S. bank by assets, disclosed that contact information for about 76 million households was captured in a cyberattack earlier in the year.7 In perhaps the most infamous cyberattack of 2014, in late November, Sony Pictures Entertainment suffered a “significant system disruption” as a result of a “brazen cyber attack”8 that resulted in the leaking of the personal details of thousands of Sony employees.9 And in February of 2015, the health care provider Anthem Blue Cross Blue Shield [end page 1] disclosed that a “very sophisticated attack” obtained personal information relating to the company’s customers and employees.10

The high profile cyberattacks of 2014 and early 2015 appear to be indicative of a broader trend : the frequency and ferocity of cyberattacks are increasing , 11 posing grave threats to the national interests of the U nited States. Indeed, the attacks on Target, eBay, Home Depot, J.P. Morgan-Chase, Sony Pictures, and Anthem were only a few of the many publicly disclosed cyberattacks perpetrated in 2014 and 2105.12 Experts suggest that hundreds of thousands of other entities may have suffered similar incidents during the same period, 13 with one survey indicating that 43% of firms in the U nited States had experienced a data breach in the past year.14 Moreover, just as the cyberattacks of 2013—which included incidents involving companies like the New York Times, Facebook, Twitter, Apple, and Microsoft15—were eclipsed by those that occurred in 2014,16 the consensus view is that 2015 and beyond will witness more frequent and more sophisticated cyber incidents .17 To the extent that its expected rise outpaces any corresponding rise in the ability to defend against such attacks, the result could be troubling news for countless businesses that rely more and more on computers in all aspects of their operations, as the economic losses resulting from a single cyberattack can be extremely costly .18 And the resulting effects of a cyberattack can have effects beyond a single company’s bottom line. As “nations are becoming ever more dependent on information and information technology,”19 the threat posed by any one cyberattack [end page 2] can have “ devastating collateral and cascading effects across a wide range of physical, economic and social systems .” 20 With reports that foreign nations — such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea —may be using cyberspace as a new front to wage war , 21 fears abound that a cyberattack could be used to shut down the nation’s electrical grid , 22 hijack a commercial airliner , 23 or even launch a nuclear weapon with a single keystroke.24 In short, the potential exists that the U nited States could suffer a “ cyber Pearl Harbor ,” an attack that would “ cause physical destruction and loss of life ” 25 and expose—in the words of one prominent cybersecurity expert—“ vulnerabilities of staggering proportions .” 26

This escalates to nuclear war

Fritz 09 Jason Fritz, Bond University IR Masters, July 2009, “Hacking Nuclear Command and Control”, http://www.icnnd.org/latest/research/Jason_Fritz_Hacking_NC2.pdf

This paper will analyse the threat of cyber terrorism in regard to nuclear weapons. Specifically, this research will use open source knowledge to identify the structure of nuclear command and control centres, how those structures might be compromised through computer network operations, and how doing so would fit within established cyber terrorists’ capabilities, strategies, and tactics. If access to command and control centres is obtained, terrorists could fake or actually cause one nuclear-armed state to attack another , thus provoking a nuclear response from another nuclear power . This may be an easier alternative for terrorist groups than building or acquiring a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb themselves. This would also act as a force equaliser, and provide terrorists with the asymmetric benefits of high speed, removal of geographical distance, and a relatively low cost. Continuing difficulties in developing computer tracking technologies which could trace the identity of intruders, and difficulties in establishing an internationally agreed upon legal framework to guide responses to computer network operations, point towards an inherent weakness in using computer networks to manage nuclear weaponry. This is particularly relevant to reducing the hair trigger posture of existing nuclear arsenals. All computers which are connected to

the internet are susceptible to infiltration and remote control. Computers which operate on a closed network may also be compromised by various hacker methods , such as privilege escalation, roaming notebooks, wireless access points, embedded exploits in software and hardware, and maintenance entry points. For example, e-mail spoofing targeted at individuals who have access to a closed network, could lead to the installation of a virus on an open network. This virus could then be carelessly transported on removable data storage between the open and closed network. Information found on the internet may also reveal how to access these closed networks directly. Efforts by militaries to place increasing reliance on computer networks, including experimental tech nology such as autonomous systems, and their desire to have multiple launch options , such as nuclear triad capability, enables multiple entry points for terrorists. For example, if a terrestrial command centre is impenetrable,

perhaps isolating one nuclear armed submarine would prove an easier task. There is evidence to suggest multiple attempts have been made by hackers to compromise the extremely low radio frequency once used by the US Navy to send nuclear launch approval to submerged submarines. Additionally, the alleged Soviet system known as Perimetr was designed to automatically launch nuclear weapons if it was unable to establish communications with Soviet leadership. This was intended as a retaliatory response in the event that nuclear weapons had decapitated Soviet leadership; however it did not account for the possibility of cyber terrorists blocking communications through computer network operations in an attempt to engage the system. Should a warhead be launched, damage could be further enhanced through additional computer network operations. By using proxies, multi-layered attacks could be engineered. Terrorists could remotely commandeer computers in China and use them to launch a US nuclear attack against Russia. Thus Russia would believe it was under attack from the US and the US would believe China was responsible. Further, emergency response communications could be disrupted, transportation could be shut down, and disinformation, such as misdirection, could be planted, thereby hindering the disaster relief effort and maximizing destruction.

Disruptions in communication and the use of disinformation could also be used to provoke uninformed responses . For example, a nuclear strike between India and Pakistan could be coordinated with Distributed Denial of Service attacks against key networks, so they would have further difficulty in identifying what happened and be forced to respond quickly. Terrorists could also knock out communications between these states so they cannot discuss the situation. Alternatively, amidst the confusion of a traditional large-scale terrorist attack, claims of responsibility and declarations of war could be falsified in an attempt to instigate a hasty military response . These false claims could be posted

directly on Presidential, military, and government websites. E-mails could also be sent to the media and foreign governments using the IP addresses and e-mail accounts of government officials. A sophisticated and all encompassing combination of traditional terrorism and cyber terrorism could be enough to launch nuclear weapons on its own, without the need for compromising c ommand and c ontrol centres directly .

Scenario Two is Money Laundering

Countering cybercrime at the FBI is necessary to prevent financial crime

FBI 11 (“The NCFTA: Combining Forces to Fight Cyber Crime,” The Federal Bureau of Investigation, 9/16/11, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2011/september/cyber_091611)//kjz

Long before it was acknowledged to be a significant criminal and national security threat, the FBI established a forward-looking organization to proactively address the issue of cyber crime. Since its creation in 1997, the National Cyber-Forensics & Training Alliance (NCFTA), based in Pittsburgh, has become an international model for bringing together law enforcement, private industry, and academia to share information to stop emerging cyber threats and mitigate existing ones. “The exchange of strategic and threat intelligence is really the bread and butter of the NCFTA,” said Special Agent Eric Strom, who heads the FBI unit—the Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion Unit

(CIRFU)—assigned to the NCFTA. “The success of this effort at every level comes down to the free flow of information among our partners.” When the nonprofit NCFTA was established, the biggest threat to industry was from spam—those annoying

unsolicited e-mails that fill up inboxes. Today, the organization deals with malicious computer viruses, stock manipulation schemes, telecommunication scams, and other financial frauds perpetrated by organized crime groups who cause billions of dollars in losses to companies and consumers. CIRFU logo Cyber Takedowns The FBI has conducted a number of major cyber takedowns with the help of the Cyber Initiative and Resource Fusion

Unit (CIRFU)—the cyber unit attached to the NCFTA. Here is a brief look at a three of those cases:

Dark Market: Fifty-six individuals were arrested worldwide and $70 million in potential loss was prevented. A CIRFU undercover agent posing as a cyber crook infiltrated a criminal Internet forum at its highest level. More Coreflood: Investigators disrupted an international cyber fraud operation by seizing the servers that had infected as many as two million computers with malicious software. More Trident Breach: This major bust targeted a theft ring that used a Trojan horse virus to steal millions of dollars from victims’ bank accounts. More The NCFTA essentially works as an early-warning system. If investigators for a

major banking institution, for example, notice a new kind of malware attacking their network, they immediately pass that information to other NCFTA members. Alliance members—many have staff permanently located at

the NCFTA—then develop strategies to mitigate the threat. FBI agents and analysts from CIRFU, also located at NCFTA headquarters, use that information to open or further existing FBI investigations, often in concert with law enforcement partners around the world. “Cyber crime has changed so much since those early days of spamming,” Strom said. “And the threat continues to evolve globally, which is why the NCFTA’s work is so critical to both business and law enforcement.” The organization draws its intelligence from hundreds of private-sector members, Carnegie Mellon University’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), and the FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3). That extensive knowledge base has helped CIRFU play a key role in some of the FBI’s most significant cyber cases in the past several years. (See sidebar.) Training is another important role of the NCFTA. Last year, an international internship program was held in which cyber investigators from Germany, Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands, Lithuania, and the Ukraine came to the alliance headquarters for 90 days to share knowledge, build relationships, and help with each others’ investigations. “Working with CIRFU and the NCFTA makes our cooperation very direct,” said Mirko Manske, a cyber investigator for the German Federal Criminal Police. “We can work in real time, sharing information and moving our cases forward. That is one of the biggest gains for us.” Manske added, “If I need a contact in the U.S., I reach out to CIRFU, and they help me immediately. And we do the same for them. Basically we are opening doors for each other.” When it comes to the global reach of cyber crime, Manske said, “The FBI gets it. They realize that no one organization can succeed by itself. CIRFU started all of this,” he added. “The unit is one of the reasons the FBI is recognized as one of the worldwide leaders in the fight against cyber crime.”

FBI policy is key to prevent financial crimes like money laundering

Find Law 15 (Find Law – a database for information on criminal law, last updated in 2015, “Fraud and Financial Crimes” http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-charges/fraud-financial-crimes.html) CW

Fraud and financial crimes are a form of theft/larceny that occur when a person or entity takes money or property, or uses them in an illicit manner, with the intent to gain a benefit from it. These crimes typically involve some form of deceit, subterfuge or the abuse of a position of trust, which distinguishes them from common theft or robbery. In today's complex economy, fraud and financial crimes can take many forms. The resources below will introduce you to the more common forms of financial crimes, such as forgery, credit card

fraud, embezzlement and money laundering. Bribery Brief explanation of bribery, which is the act of accepting or offering something of value in exchange for influence or power in connection to an elected position or public employment. Fraud In-depth information about fraud in general and definitions of the various

types of fraud – such as wire fraud; tax evasion; insurance fraud; and identity theft – plus tips for identifying fraudulent activity. Embezzlement Overview of embezzlement, a crime that occurs when an individual steals money or property that he or she has been entrusted to manage, with links to FindLaw's theft and larceny

subsection. Identity Theft Brief definition of identity theft, which occurs when someone unlawfully uses another's personally identifying information

(such as a Social Security Number) to commit other crimes, such as credit card fraud.

Money Laundering Definition of money laundering, a crime involving the movement of illicit money and other gains into legitimate channels in order to disguise the money's illegal source and thwart tax officials . Mortgage Fraud Explanation of the various different illegal

schemes related to the misrepresentation or misstatement of mortgage documents for the purpose of defrauding another party, such as a lender or a homeowner. Racketeering / RICO Overview of federal and state racketeering and RICO (Racketeer-Influenced and Corrupt Organization) laws, which make it a crime for a criminal organization to profit from otherwise legitimate business operations. Securities Fraud Definition of securities fraud, a crime in which a corporate officer, for example, makes misleading statements about the company’s stock performance or discloses confidential information related to its stock. Tax Evasion / Fraud Brief

overview of tax evasion, the crime of not paying one’s legally required share of either federal or state taxes, which is punished severely and can lead to asset forfeiture or prison. White Collar Crimes So-called “white-collar crimes” encompass many separate individual crimes, most commonly related to the use of deceit for financial gains, such as Ponzi schemes; securities fraud; tax evasion; and embezzlement.

US action key on curbing IFFs

Targeted News Service 12 (“Mexico Hemorrhages US$872 Billion to Crime, Corruption, Tax Evasion from 1970-2010,” Targeted News Service, January 29, 2012, pageLexis)//JW

The large spike in illicit outflows following the implementation of NAFTA would imply that much of those outflows were indeed headed for the United States. This suggests that U.S. policymakers have a significant role to play in curtailing the flow of illicit money out of their southern neighbor.¶ In addition to the U.S., tax havens in the Caribbean and Europe were the second and third largest recipients of Mexican capital outflows.¶ Drug Cartels and National

Security Risk¶ A large portion of drug cartel activity is conducted in cash, and none of those cash transactions are detected in GFI's data, which is one of the reasons why the organization believes its figures to be extremely conservative. That said, drug cartels like many criminal enterprises also utilize legitimate commercial transactions to launder their profits. In fact, the Los Angeles Times reported last month that Mexican drug cartels were utilizing trade-based money laundering techniques to move their money across the U.S.-Mexico border. Those kinds of business transactions would show up in the organizations data, however it cannot be determined exactly how

much of the trade mispricing in GFI's report is attributable to the activities of drug cartels.¶ As such,

the organization believes that this has serious implications for national security. ¶ "The ease with which money can be laundered across the U.S.-Mexico border via trade mispricing poses a major national security risk to both the United States and Mexico," said Mr.

Baker. "Drug traffickers, like kleptocrats, terrorists and tax dodgers, all gain from anonymous shell companies, tax haven secrecy, and nefarious trade mispricing tactics. Taking steps to address these issues would curtail a number of societal ills."

IFFs structurally undermine government legitimacy and development while increasing dependence and the risk of economic crises

Le Billon 11 – Associate Professor of Geography and Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British Columbia (Philippe, CMI (Chr. Michelsin Institute, “Extractive Sectors and Illicit Financial Flows: What Role for Revenue Governance Issues?” U4 Issue, October 2011, No. 11, http://www.cmi.no/publications/file/4248-extractive-sectors-and-illicit-financial-flows.pdf)

The Norway-sponsored Task Force on the Development Impact of Illicit Financial Flows (2008) has stressed the negative development impacts of IFF and particularly those coming from natural resource sectors in developing countries. The Task Force observes that IFF undermine health, development, and government legitimacy, while increasing debt, aid

dependence, and the risk of economic crises. Quantitative studies specifically testing for these impacts are lacking, largely because of the relative novelty and persistent uncertainty of IFF data. However, it is estimated that developing countries experienced approximately US$1.2 trillion in illicit flows during 2008, 10 times the amount of overseas development assistance provided by members of the

OECD Development Assistance Committee that year (Kar and Curcio 2011). A major concern of extractive sector governance is the collection and allocation of revenue flows to maximise government revenue share, eradicate corruption,

and ensure fair and efficient use of the revenues. Illicit financial flows constitute a serious threat to several objectives: • IFF coming from corruption encourage such illegal activities by establishing transfer networks that facilitate the outflow of proceeds. Corruption undermines the sound governance of resources, notably by facilitating illegal exploitation and poor environmental and social practices, as well as by eroding the tax base. •

IFF undermine the maximisation of government revenues through tax evasion practices, including transfer mispricing and misinvoicing. African governments have been particularly vulnerable to this, in part because of “inadequate institutional capacity to ensure tax

compliance” (ATAF 2010, 1). In turn, this significantly reduces the contribution of mineral resource revenues to national development. IFF exacerbate inequalities (by increasing private gains for a few at the expense of public gains for the many) and inefficiencies (by resulting in suboptimal policies). Because national companies are

less able to lower their effective tax rates, trade mispricing advantages multinationals. This, in turn, negatively affects the domestic private sector. The developmental impact of domestic companies, moreover, is

frequently undermined by predatory practices. There is a fine balance between granting sufficient autonomy to a national resource company to allow it to thrive, and controlling it so it does not become self-serving. • IFF discourage accountability and encourage discretionary decision making, short-term thinking, and favouritism by bureaucrats and officials. These practices, in turn, drastically reduce total earnings that a country derives from extractive assets.

And, broad statistical models prove – growth solves war

Royal 10 [Jedediah, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction – U.S. Department of Defense, “Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises”, Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, Ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p. 213-215]

Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson's

(1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the often bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next . As such,

exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin. 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances,

increasing the risk of miscalculation (Feaver, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner.

1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) also shows that global economic cycles combined

with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major,

medium and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copeland's

(1996, 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific

benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as

energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could

potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because

it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write: The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour.

Moreover, the presence of a recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg &

Hess, 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004), which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of

a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect . Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995). and Blomberg, Hess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least

indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999), and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence

showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force. In summary, recent economic scholarship positively correlates

economic integration with an increase in the frequency of economic crises, whereas political science scholarship links economic decline with external conflict at systemic, dyadic and national levels.5 This implied connection between integration, crises and armed conflict has not featured prominently in the economic-security debate and deserves more attention.

1AC — PlanThe Federal Bureau of Investigation should cease drug testing its job applicants for marijuana.

1AC — SolvencyThe plan solves — now is key to amend the policy

Levinson 14 (Charles, reporter for the Wall Street Journal, “Comey: FBI ‘Grappling’ With Hiring Policy Concerning Marijuana,” Wall Street Journal, 5/20/14, http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2014/05/20/director-comey-fbi-grappling-with-hiring-policy-concerning-marijuana/)//kjz

Monday was a big day for the nation’s cyber police. The Justice Department charged five Chinese military officials with hacking, and brought charges against the creators of powerful hacking software. But FBI Director James B. Comey said Monday that if the FBI hopes to continue to keep pace with cyber criminals, the organization may have to loosen up its no-tolerance policy for hiring those who like to smoke marijuana. Congress has authorized the FBI to add 2,000 personnel to its rolls this year, and many of those new recruits will be assigned to tackle cyber crimes, a growing priority for the agency. And that’s a problem, Mr. Comey told the White Collar Crime Institute, an annual conference held at the New York City Bar Association in Manhattan. A lot of the nation’s top computer programmers and hacking gurus are also fond of marijuana. “I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the interview,” Mr. Comey said. Mr. Comey said that the agency was “grappling with the question right now” of how to amend the agency’s marijuana policies, which excludes from consideration anyone who has smoked marijuana in the previous three years, according to the FBI’s Web site. One conference goer asked Mr. Comey about a friend who had shied away from applying because of the policy. “He should go ahead and apply,” despite the marijuana use, Mr. Comey said.

The aff is unique – Comey’s dead set against hiring those who use marijuana

Huffington Post 14 (written by Sam Tracy, civil rights activist focused on drug policy reform, technological law, and criminal justice, “The FBI Isn't Updating Its Drug-Related Hiring Policies, But It Should Be” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/sam-tracy/the-fbi-isnt-updating-its_b_5394775.html) aj

Last week, the Internet erupted in praise, skepticism, and played-out puns following reports that the FBI

was reconsidering its hiring restrictions on marijuana use. FBI Director James B. Comey said Monday that the agency was "grappling with the question right now" as the country changed its approach to marijuana, but backpedaled two

days later, declaring at a Senate hearing, "I am absolutely dead set against using marijuana... I did not say I'm going to change that ban." It's a shame -- to stay as effective as possible, the FBI would do well to become more

flexible on prospective employees' marijuana use. The supposed potential change was a reaction to the agency's troubles recruiting hackers to fight cybercrime amid growing threats from China and elsewhere. Comey, playing up stereotypes while stating a valid concern, went so far to say, "I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the

interview." Meanwhile, the FBI's policies state that job applicants can't have used marijuana within the past three years, any other illegal drug in the past 10, or ever sold or transported any illegal drug.

Drug policy uniquely hurts people with high IQs

Szalavitz 11 (Maia, a neuroscience journalist and author of the forthcoming book "Unbroken Brain: Why Addiction Is a Learning Disorder and Why It Matters,” “Why Kids With High IQs Are More Likely to Take Drugs,” Time, 11/15/11, http://healthland.time.com/2011/11/15/why-kids-with-high-iq-are-more-likely-to-take-drugs/)//kjz

People with high IQs are more likely to smoke marijuana and take other illegal drugs, compared with those who score lower on intelligence tests, according to a new study from the U.K. “It’s counterintuitive,” says lead author James White of the Center for the Development and Evaluation of Complex Interventions for Public Health Improvement at Cardiff University in Wales. “It’s not what we thought we would find.” The research was based on interviews with some 7,900 British people born in early April 1970. Researchers measured the participants IQs at ages 5 and 10, then followed up with them at ages 16 and 30, asking about symptoms of psychological distress and drug use as part of a larger survey. MORE: Are Stoners

Really Dumb, or Do They Just Think They Are? At age 30, about 35% of men and 16% of women said they had smoked marijuana at least once in the previous year; over the same time period, 9% of men and 4% of women said they had taken

cocaine. Previous-year drug users tended to have scored higher on IQ tests than non-users. The IQ effect was larger in women: women in the top third of the IQ range at age 5 were more than twice as likely to have taken marijuana or cocaine by age 30, compared with those scoring in the bottom third. The men with the highest IQs were nearly 50% more likely to have taken amphetamines and 65% more likely to have taken ecstasy, compared to those with lower scores.

And these results held even when researchers controlled for factors like socioeconomic status and psychological distress, which are also correlated with rates of drug use. So why might smarter kids be more likely to try

drugs? “People with high IQs are more likely to score high on personality scales of openness to experience,” says White. “They may be more willing to experiment and seek out novel experiences.” MORE: Popping Smart Pills: The Case for Cognitive Enhancement

Another factor could be that the messages used to attempt to deter teens from drug use — particularly during the 1980s in the U.K. when the study group was in

adolescence — weren’t exactly known for the subtlety of their reasoning, so they may not have targeted the smarter group well. “What you typically find is that people with high IQs are less likely to smoke [cigarettes], more likely to be active and to have a good diet,” says White, noting that they are also likely to have high socioeconomic status. People in this group

tend to make healthy choices, based both on health information and their own experience. This group isn’t likely to see occasional drug use as particularly harmful, White says, both because there is little data to suggest great risk of harm from such use and because evidence of harm is rare among their peers. “With smoking, the evidence [about its dangers] is overwhelming,” says White, “whereas when you look at things like cannabis use, since they are more likely to associate with people who are similar to them, they are likely to see that smoking cannabis

relatively infrequently doesn’t have huge impact.” In contrast, drug users with less

education and wealth are more likely to be exposed to negative consequences of drug use. This is due in part to the fact that money itself can buy protection against the types of criminal involvement and disease that can affect poor drug users. MORE: Portugal’s Drug Experience: New Study Confirms Decriminalization Was a Success “The likely mechanism is openness to experience,” White concludes, “and, I think, it’s also this idea of having an educated view of risk as well.” (Of course, American views about what consists of an “educated” perspective on drug risks have often clashed with those of the more relaxed position typically taken in Europe.) The study didn’t look at the risk of addiction among those with high IQs because it wasn’t able to measure the frequency of drug use in participants. However, earlier research has found a connection between high IQ and greater risk of alcohol abuse and dependence. That could potentially be linked to the boredom and social isolation experienced by many gifted children, the authors note. But since a link between IQ and drug use remains independent of psychological distress, that can’t be all that’s going on. “It rules out the argument that the only reason people take illegal drugs is to self medicate,” says White. The research was published in the Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health.

General Case

InherencyThe government still enforces drug testing laws on federal employees even in states where it is legal – OPM statements

Veksler 15(Marie, LEGAL CANNABIS OFF LIMITS TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES, June 8, 2015, https://www.whaxy.com/news/can-federal-employees-use-marijuana, JZG)

The government issued a warning to federal employees that the use of legal cannabis is not sanctioned activity under any circumstance. Regardless of whether employees live in states where cannabis use has been legalized or not, in the eyes of a federal employer, marijuana is still an illegal substance.

The federal government issued a formal, written guidance to all 4.1 million federal workers all across the globe to make its warning loud and clear. The warning came straight from Katherine Archuleta, director of the

United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM). In the guidance, the fact that cannabis remains

illegal under federal law was clearly communicated. The plant is still classified as a Schedule I controlled substance under the Controlled Substances Act. Any employee that knowingly or intentionally engages in the possession of cannabis, regardless of intent is breaking the law and the rules regarding their employment. Any employee caught in possession of the plant is subject to be prosecuted, even in states where it has been legalized. All federal employees are subject to a higher standard that supersedes recent legislative

changes regarding marijuana, according to the issued statement. Federal law regarding the use of marijuana or any illegal substance or drug remains in effect. Many federal workers have sensitive jobs in law enforcement, security and other areas of safety, and therefore they are prohibited from using cannabis even when off the clock. This is an interesting development considering that several states, including Colorado, Oregon, Washington and Alaska have all recently legalized the recreational use and retail sale of cannabis. Voters in Washington D.C. also legalized possession and cultivation of cannabis, but retail sales are not permitted. Nearly half of the United States have legalized marijuana for medicinal purposes, and several others have enacted very limited and restrictive cannabinoid specific legislation. In terms of federal employees, the message

cannot be any clearer or more disheartening. Even a single use or exposure to the substance can linger in the body in traceable amounts for several weeks. This could be problematic for many federal workers who are required to undergo routine drug testing.

Current drug policies are an impediment to hiring skilled hackers

Cherney 14 (MAX CHERNEY - San Francisco-based author who contributes to news items and feature stories to Bay Area, national, and international publications in VICE, San Francisco Magazine, and The Economist, San Francisco Examiner, SF Weekly, The Bold Italic, and San Francisco Appeal, IndieWire, Ghost write speeches and opinion pieces for CEOs in the technology industry, Vice, “The FBI

Says It Can't Find Hackers to Hire Because They All Smoke Pot” http://motherboard.vice.com/read/the-fbi-cant-find-hackers-that-dont-smoke-pot) CW

It’s no secret that the federal government is having a hard time hiring cybersecurity experts, largely because many hackers can find more lucrative deals that don't

involve working for the feds. But there's another wrinkle: the FBI now says that its drug-testing policies are keeping experts off the payroll. According to the Wall Street

Journal, FBI Director James Comey said that in order to pursue so-called cyber criminals, the government would pretty much have to let government hackers get stoned—because who's going to quit the habit just to work for the FBI? “I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way to the interview,” Comey said, clearly not pandering to stereotypes. The reason for the FBI’s unorthodox approach is that Congress has told the agency it needs to hire 2,000 more people this year, and many of those new recruits are going to fight computer-related crime. And as it turns out, those that know computer crime best aren't often the Men's Wearhouse set. The agency's current regs say that the lawmen won’t hire someone who has “smoked” marijuana in the last three

years. (No word on dabs, edibles and other forms of marijuana consumption.) In theory, relaxing hiring restrictions for marijuana does make sense. Earlier this year, the feds admitted that the government isn’t very good at internet security—despite the fact that the NSA is basically a Philip K. Dick character’s worst nightmare—

and that various agencies need to take a long, hard look at hiring practices across the board. "[We have] the government hiring practices of the 1940s and 50s in the 21st century," Gregory Wilshusen, director of information at the General Accountability Office, told InformationWeek. Also, despite the federal government’s mixed approach to marijuana enforcement, the majority of Americans believe that it’s about time to legalize the drug, which remains classified as a Schedule I drug in the US, which is reserved for the most “dangerous” and “addictive” intoxicants known to humanity. Regardless of the federal government’s stance, the FBI will apparently consider the issue, and is encouraging anyone who has recently got stoned to apply for a job.

China hack makes cyber-security workers uniquely key

Kravets 15 (David Kravets - The senior editor for Ars Technica, 5/20/15 “FBI chief says anti-marijuana policy hinders the hiring of cyber experts” http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/fbi-chief-says-anti-marijuana-policy-hinders-the-hiring-of-cyber-experts/)

James Comey, the FBI director, says the bureau's no-tolerance marijuana policy is hindering the hiring of cyber-security experts. Comey added that he is "grappling" with possibly changing the practice. Just

yesterday, Comey was "grappling" with lifting marijuana-use ban on hiring. The director's comments come one day after five members of the Chinese military were indicted in the US on allegations of hacking into major US corporations and stealing trade secrets "I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on the way

to the interview," Comey told a New York City Bar Association meeting Tuesday. The bureau, which is seeking to employ as many as 2,000 new recruits this year, is

prohibited from hiring those who have used marijuana the previous years.

Government drug policy causes a skill shortage – FBI key

Muncaster 15 (Phil, reporter for Infosecurity Magazine- Infosecurity Magazine has over ten years of experience providing knowledge and insight into the information security industry. Its multiple award winning editorial content provides compelling features both online and in print that focus on hot topics and trends, in-depth news analysis and opinion columns from industry experts. “FBI on the Hunt for Cyber Special Agents” 1/2/15 http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/fbi-on-the-hunt-for-cyber-special/)lg

The FBI has asked cyber security experts to consider a career as a special agent, in a recruitment drive designed to ensure the agency stays on top of evolving online threats. In a lengthy release on Monday, the Feds stated that potential candidates must be between 23 ad 37-years-old, and will be required to pass a rigorous background check and fitness test. Some of the preferred backgrounds noted include computer programming and security, database administration, malware analysis, digital forensics, and ethical hacking, according to a job posting issued recently which remains open until 20 January. That reveals the

salary cyber special agents can expect is anywhere from $59,340 to $76,568. “The FBI seeks highly talented, technically trained individuals who are motivated by the FBI’s mission to protect our nation and the American people from the rapidly evolving cyber threat,” said Robert Anderson Jr, executive assistant director for the Bureau’s Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch. “What we want are people who are going to come and be part of a team that is working different very complex types of investigations and to utilize their skillsets in that team environment.” He added that successful applicants would be integrated into the FBI’s team of special agents,

leading their own cases. “Cyber permeates every aspect of what we do, whether it’s counterterrorism, criminal investigations, or traditional cyber attacks, as we’ve seen in the recent past,” Anderson said in the statement. “That’s why these types of people are so important to get into the pipeline and come into our organization.” He signed off by claiming the FBI can offer interested applicants an unrivalled “mission” and “scale of investigations.” “It doesn’t matter where you go, it doesn’t matter who you work for, you can’t get that anywhere else but the FBI,” said Anderson. Although the US government and its law enforcement agencies are increasingly reaching out to the

broader cyber community to recruit experts to their ranks, it’s not been easy given chronic skills shortages. Director James Comey even admitted in a speech last year that the agency may have to reconsider its zero tolerance policy on operatives who smoke marijuana after claiming many potential cyber recruits enjoy the occasional toke. Some 56% of (ISC)² members believe there is a global cyber security skills shortage as opposed to just 2% who said they think there’s a surplus, according to 2013’s Global Information Security Workforce Study.

Cyber-security has reached a pre 9/11 moment – experts are key

Aleaziz 12 (Hamed; October 30, 2012; Think Progress; “Federal Government Lacks Experts To Address Cyber Security Threats”; http://thinkprogress.org/security/2012/10/30/1111081/experts-cyber-security/)//CC

The federal government faces a shortage of cyber security experts.

That’s according to an article published in FCW, a technology-focused publication. FCW interviewed federal officials regarding the government’s ability to effectively beef up its cyber security program and found a unsettling trend: the government needs more tech experts. In some cases, according to a

Department of Defense official, the government hasn’t even figured out what to hire for: “We don’t have all the capacity and the right sets of skills that we need to do all that’s required. In the department we are still struggling to fully define and empower the cyber workforce. It’s a big challenge, just to define the

techniques.” In July, a State Department official gave an estimate of the shortage to Reuters: “The numbers I’ve seen look like shortages in the 20,000s to 40,000s for years to come.” Why is there a shortage? According to Cynthia Dion-Schwarz from the National Science Foundation, it’s a “pipeline” problem. In short, the government can’t find the “people with the right skills sets to just have the entry-level skills needed in order to make progress in cybersecurity,”

Schwarz told FCW. Others, like John Arguila, a U.S. Naval Postgraduate School professor and cyber security expert, say it’s time to think outside the box when it comes to recruiting, telling the Guardian that “most of these sorts of guys can’t be vetted in the traditional way. We need a new institutional culture that allows us to reach out to them.” The shortage is especially relevant now that the president is likely to sign an executive order on cyber security, putting, according to a copy of the report, “the Department of Homeland Security in charge of organizing an information-sharing network that rapidly distributes sanitized summaries of top-secret intelligence reports about known cyberthreats that identify a specific target.” For months, federal officials and cyber security experts have been warning about this.

In April, Janet Napolitano, the head of Homeland Security, said: “There is a lack of expertise and there are a lot of people clamoring for people who know the internet

well…We need analysts. We need people who are engineers. We need people who are experienced in intelligence as it relates to the cyber-universe.” It’s not just federal officials who have connected the shortage to national security; Enrique Salem, an executive at Symantec, a cyber security organization and software maker, told Reuters in June: “What I would tell you is it’s going to be a bigger issue from a national security perspective than people realize.” Earlier this

month, Leon Panetta, the secretary of defense, said cyber security was at a “pre-9/11 moment.”

Cybersecurity is vulnerable now – skilled government workers are key

Booz Allen Hamilton 15 (Booz Allen Hamilton is a leading provider of management consulting, technology, and engineering services to the US government in defense, intelligence, and civil markets, and to major corporations and not-for-profit organizations; April, 2015; “Cyber Insecurity II Closing the Federal Talent Gap; 27; http://ourpublicservice.org/publications/download.php?id=504)//CC

As society continues to enjoy new innovations from technology, it must be prepared for new threats. Because government is the means through which we address common societal needs, government has a critical leadership role to play in protecting the nation against cyber threats. Taking a page from the nation’s approach to counterterrorism, we believe it will take a network to defeat—or at least defend against—all the cyber threats against our network. And that network cannot just be one of terminals and fiber optic cables, it must be about the people. This process needs

to begin with a comprehensive understanding of our existing federal workforce and the resources that we have available. We also need to anticipate the types of skills

that we will need in the future. There is no time to lose. The government is dependent on communication and information systems in all aspects of its operations and mission, from business transactions and national security, defense and law enforcement matters to processing, maintaining and transmitting sensitive and proprietary information.

Without the skilled workforce in place to protect the integrity of these systems, the nation will be highly vulnerable. Currently, federal agencies are scrambling to attract and retain elite professionals to strengthen their defenses, but as outlined in this report, they often are impeded in getting some of the highly skilled employees by the absence of a government-wide strategy, and

because of factors such as weak talent pipelines, insufficient applicant assessments, a cumbersome and inflexible hiring process, a lack of consistent and targeted training, non-competitive pay, and ill-defined job classifications and career paths.

Internal LinksWeed-smoking hackers key to FBI cyber missions

The Wire 14 (Atlantic News reporting service, written by Connor Simpson, journalist for The Wire and Business Insider, “FBI Director: Don't Let Weed Stop You from Applying to the FBI,” http://www.thewire.com/national/2014/05/fbi-director-dont-let-weed-stop-you-from-applying-to-the-fbi/371279/) aj

Law enforcement agencies generally don't hire stoners and slackers. But as the cyber war heats up, groups like the FBI may be forced to turn to people who like to get a little heated to stay ahead of the curve. “He should go ahead and apply,” was the advice FBI Director James B. Comey had on Monday for a young man who theoretically balked at applying for an FBI job because he liked to get lit. Comey spoke about the difficulties facing the FBI when it comes to hiring promising young hackers at the White Collar Crime Institute, an annual conference held at Manhattan's New York City Bar Association, according to the Wall

Street Journal. The trouble is, a lot of hackers smoke weed, and that's something the FBI generally frowns upon. One attendee asked Comey about a friend who considered an FBI job but ultimately did not apply because of the marijuana policy. The theoretical FBI applicant knew he would

never pass a drug test. But director Comey's comments clearly signal the FBI at least wants to move on from the increasingly outdated anti-marijuana policy that is complicating its efforts to fight cyber crime. Bongs are everywhere in the fictionalized hacker hangout on HBO's Silicon Valley. Heck, two weeks ago police accidentally busted Erlich, one of the main characters, for his grow-op

hidden in their garage. Weed is baked into the tech culture at this point, and many people working in tech have zeroed in on the marijuana industry as one ripe for disruption, as Wired's Mat Honan explained recently. Plus, the USA is moving relaxing its marijuana attitudes, considering the drug is now legal in two states. As it stands, the FBI's hiring policy on its website says an applicant must be marijuana free for three years if they hope to apply for a job with the bureau. Unfortunately for Comey — who has to

fill 2000 new jobs this year, many of them dedicated to fighting cyber crime — finding a tech wizard who hasn't smoked in the last hour is hard enough. “I have to hire a great work force to compete with those cyber criminals and some of those kids want to smoke weed on

the way to the interview,” Comey told the conference attendees. The FBI could possibly amend those strict rules soon. Comey told the conference the bureau is “grappling with the question right now” of how to change the drug policy without scaring off the cream of the hacking crop

Pre-plan drug testing policies turn away the most skilled workers- key to prevent cyber attacks

Noble 15 (Danica, coordinator of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law (NORML) Women of Washington. She lives in the Pacific Northwest where she practices competition law.

You can find her TEDx on women’s role in ending prohibition here. “Let Federal Employees Toke Up. It’s Good for Everyone” 7/9/15 http://www.wired.com/2015/07/let-federal-employees-toke-good-everyone/)lg

**edited for ableist language

MARIJUANA MAY BE legal in your state, but if you partake, you can’t work for the government. Katherine Archuleta, the Executive Director of the Office of Personal Management, recently sent notice to the heads of every federal agency announcing a policy under which any federal employee who uses marijuana, or even possesses it for a sick child off duty, is not suited to work for the federal government. This policy remains in place even if the employee resides in a state where such use is legal under state law. The Office of Personnel Management, or OPM, is essentially the human resources department for the 4.1 million federal employees. Under the detailed guidance issued by Archuleta, even off-the-job, state-sanctioned doctor-supervised marijuana use by federal employees adversely impacts the efficiency, credibility, and productivity of the federal government. The letter relied heavily on an executive order from 1986, signed by President Reagan, calling for a Drug Free Federal Work Place. That executive order’s number one concern: funding cartels. Hard to see the direct relevance to the state taxed and regulated systems at issue. The guidance from Archuleta was unusually detailed. It explained disciplinary procedures and clearly declared that a federal employee is unfit for their job if they use marijuana for any reason, at any place, or at any time. The letter firmly plants the government on the wrong side of history. I myself am a federal

employee of almost 10 years. I’ve also been researching and advocating for reasonable marijuana policy since I was in law school. What I’ve learned in that time is that lots of wonderfully successful, productive, creative, responsible adults consume marijuana. Support nationwide for medical use of marijuana regularly polls above 80 percent. It turns out that the war on drugs, and its largest component, the prohibition of marijuana, is really terrible for American families, communities, and democracy. The U.S. spends $3.6 billion a year on marijuana prohibition and it has been a total failure; over 40 years neither demand nor supply has been reduced. Instead, success is measured by the number of people arrested, which is more than one per minute, and more than all violent crimes combined. We spend far more building prisons than schools and on prisoners than students. Our prisons are bursting: 1 in 28 kids has a parent in jail and the US holds 1 in 3 of the

world’s incarcerated women. And while prohibition hasn’t stopped anyone from using marijuana—nearly half of the country tries it—the untenable federal definition of marijuana as an exceptionally dangerous drug with no medical value, has virtually eliminated opportunities for scientific research. We are left without the information we need to make smart choices as citizens and government. In fact, scientists sometimes seem like the only ones who struggle to access pot.

Marijuana prohibition is unquestionably based in unscientific propaganda. So why, when the paradigm is clearly shifting, spend so much effort to double down on policies that cannot be justified in science, reason, or justice? I am all for improving the efficiency and reputation of the federal government. It would make my life easier! But shouldn’t we look at actual productivity, impairment, capabilities, and effort? OPM’s approach is the equivalent to firing anyone who ever broke the law by exceeding the speed limit. Meanwhile, if you are wondering why OPM and Katherine Archuleta sounds familiar, maybe it is because while she was busy digging up an outdated executive order from the failed drug war, hackers were steeling the social security, addresses, names, and 127 page security background checks for every single federal employee right under Katherine Archuleta’s watch. In fact, the news reports keep getting worse. OPM was under the worst hack in

history, it did not detect the breach and it affected every single federal employee and an additional 10 million people? Fail. There is a connection here. Last May, FBI Director James Comey said that the OPM policy against hiring anyone who has smoked marijuana in the last five years has hindered our ability to prepare for cyber-attacks. He said all the best candidates are disqualified by this policy. In April of this year, Representative Gerry Connolly of Virginia offered an amendment that would require a congressional report on how marijuana’s status as a Schedule 1 drug is affecting our nation’s security, specifically whether it disqualifies the most efficient, productive, and suitable candidates. As a Schedule 1 drug, marijuana is officially

defined as having no medical uses, a high potential for abuse and being too dangerous for use even in a hospital under a doctor’s supervision. In the face of these recurring

concerns and mainstream support for marijuana law reform across the country, Katherine Archuleta spent resources calling for good people, who are

good at their jobs, to be fired under the banner of the morally expired, criminal marijuana prohibition. Archuleta perpetuated the injustice of the drug war despite a conspicuous lack of any evidence to suggest that responsible, off-duty, marijuana use negatively affects job performance. At the same time, the country’s largest employer failed to notice it was the target of the largest data breach in history. Archuleta was too worried about what federal employees do in the privacy of their own homes to realize that her flat-Earth priorities actually contribute to our government’s vulnerability to defend against data breaches and deter cyber attacks . Is perpetuating marijuana prohibition worth sacrificing national security? Of course not. When will the government recover from reefer madness? Probably not while Archuleta is in charge.

FBI Marijuana tests prevent cyber security recruitments

Lam 3/4/15 (Bourree Lam is an associate editor at The Atlantic. She was previously the editor of Freakonomics.com, The Atlantic, “Are Companies With Drug Tests Weeding Out Great Candidates?” http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/03/are-companies-with-drug-tests-weeding-out-great-candidates/386447/) CW

The FBI's jobs page makes it pretty clear how the agency feels about marijuana: "You can easily determine whether you meet the FBI's illegal drug policy by answering the following questions." The list's first question: "Have you used marijuana at all within the last three years?" Government agencies are some of the strictest of employers when it comes to drug testing . The CIA's policy, for example, prohibits marijuana use in the previous 12 months, but any prior drug use is "carefully evaluated." Yet news that the FBI might be having a hard time recruiting cyber-security experts due to a strict "no marijuana" rule raises the question of how applicant pools will be affected by the growing popularity and

legalization of marijuana. Last year, FBI chief James B. Comey made comments that the bureau might loosen the rules to recruit hackers, though he later backtracked. And one police force in Idaho said that its recruitment efforts are set back by its own drug policy, which mandates that anyone who has used marijuana in the past three years can't be hired.

AT: Alt CausesOther methods to remedy the problem will only be effective in the long run – status quo drug policy is the key short-term lynchpin

Libicki et al 14 (Martin C. Libicki is an American scholar and Professor at the Frederick S. Pardee RAND Graduate School, David Senty is a retired Major General in the United States Air Force, Julia Pollak is a Ph.D. candidate at the Pardee RAND Graduate School and an assistant policy analyst at RAND, “Hackers Wanted: An Examination of the Cybersecurity Labor Market, published on RAND, a nonprofit global policy thinktank, http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR430.html) aj

There is a general perception that there is a shortage of cybersecurity professionals within the United States, and a particular shortage of these professionals within the federal government, working on national security as well as intelligence . Shortages of this nature complicate securing the nation's networks and may leave the United States ill-prepared to carry out conflict in cyberspace. RAND examined the current status of the labor market for cybersecurity professionals — with an emphasis on their being employed to defend the United States. This effort was in three parts: first, a review of the literature; second, interviews with managers and educators of cybersecurity professionals, supplemented by reportage; and third, an examination of the economic literature about labor markets. RAND also disaggregated the broad definition of "cybersecurity professionals" to unearth skills differentiation as

relevant to this study. In general, we support the use of market forces (and preexisting government programs) to address the strong demand for cybersecurity professionals in the longer run. Increases in educational opportunities and compensation packages will draw more workers in to the profession over time. Cybersecurity

professionals take time to reach their potential; drastic steps taken today to increase their quantity and quality would not bear fruit for another five to ten years . By then, the current concern over cybersecurity could easily

abate, driven by new technology and more secure architectures. Pushing too many people into the profession now could leave an overabundance of highly trained and narrowly skilled individuals who could better be serving national needs in other vocations.

Drug testing is the key lynchpin – no alt causes

Noble 15 (Danica, coordinator of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law (NORML) Women of Washington. She lives in the Pacific Northwest where she practices competition law. You can find her TEDx on women’s role in ending prohibition here. “Let Federal Employees Toke Up. It’s Good for Everyone” 7/9/15 http://www.wired.com/2015/07/let-federal-employees-toke-good-everyone/)lg

**edited for ableist language

MARIJUANA MAY BE legal in your state, but if you partake, you can’t work for the government. Katherine Archuleta, the Executive Director of the Office of Personal Management, recently sent notice to the heads of every federal agency announcing a policy under which any federal employee who uses marijuana, or even possesses it for a sick child off duty, is not suited to work for the federal government. This policy remains in place even if the employee resides in a state where such use is legal under state law. The Office of Personnel Management, or OPM, is essentially the human resources department for the 4.1 million federal employees. Under the detailed guidance issued by Archuleta, even off-the-job, state-sanctioned doctor-supervised marijuana use by federal employees adversely impacts the efficiency, credibility,

and productivity of the federal government. The letter relied heavily on an executive order from 1986, signed by President Reagan, calling for a Drug Free Federal Work Place. That executive order’s number one concern: funding cartels. Hard to see the direct relevance to the state taxed and regulated systems at issue. The guidance from Archuleta was unusually detailed. It explained disciplinary procedures and clearly declared that a federal employee is unfit for their job if they use marijuana for any reason, at any place, or at any time. The letter firmly plants the government on the wrong side of history. I myself am a federal

employee of almost 10 years. I’ve also been researching and advocating for reasonable marijuana policy since I was in law school. What I’ve learned in that time is that lots of wonderfully successful, productive, creative, responsible adults consume marijuana. Support nationwide for medical use of marijuana regularly polls above 80 percent. It turns out that the war on drugs, and its largest component, the prohibition of marijuana, is really terrible for American families, communities, and democracy. The U.S. spends $3.6 billion a year on marijuana prohibition and it has been a total failure; over 40 years neither demand nor supply has been reduced. Instead, success is measured by the number of people arrested, which is more than one per minute, and more than all violent crimes combined. We spend far more building prisons than schools and on prisoners than students. Our prisons are bursting: 1 in 28 kids has a parent in jail and the US holds 1 in 3 of the

world’s incarcerated women. And while prohibition hasn’t stopped anyone from using marijuana—nearly half of the country tries it—the untenable federal definition of marijuana as an exceptionally dangerous drug with no medical value, has virtually eliminated opportunities for scientific research. We are left without the information we need to make smart choices as citizens and government. In fact, scientists sometimes seem like the only ones who struggle to access pot.

Marijuana prohibition is unquestionably based in unscientific propaganda. So why, when the paradigm is clearly shifting, spend so much effort to double down on policies that cannot be justified in science, reason, or justice? I am all for improving the efficiency and reputation of the federal government. It would make my life easier! But shouldn’t we look at actual productivity, impairment, capabilities, and effort? OPM’s approach is the equivalent to firing anyone who ever broke the law by exceeding the speed limit. Meanwhile, if you are wondering why OPM and Katherine Archuleta sounds familiar, maybe it is because while she was busy digging up an outdated executive order from the failed drug war, hackers were steeling the social security, addresses, names, and 127 page security background checks for every single federal employee right under Katherine Archuleta’s watch. In fact, the news reports keep getting worse. OPM was under the worst hack in

history, it did not detect the breach and it affected every single federal employee and an additional 10 million people? Fail. There is a connection here. Last May, FBI Director James Comey said that the OPM policy against hiring anyone who has smoked marijuana in the last five years has hindered our ability to prepare for cyber-attacks. He said all the best candidates are disqualified by this policy. In April of this year, Representative Gerry Connolly of Virginia offered an amendment that would require a congressional report on how marijuana’s status as a Schedule 1 drug is affecting our nation’s security, specifically whether it disqualifies the most efficient, productive, and suitable candidates. As a Schedule 1 drug, marijuana is officially

defined as having no medical uses, a high potential for abuse and being too dangerous for use even in a hospital under a doctor’s supervision. In the face of these recurring

concerns and mainstream support for marijuana law reform across the country, Katherine Archuleta spent resources calling for good people, who are good at their jobs, to be fired under the banner of the morally expired, criminal marijuana prohibition. Archuleta perpetuated the injustice of the drug war despite a conspicuous lack of any evidence to suggest that responsible, off-duty, marijuana use negatively affects job performance. At the same time, the country’s largest employer failed to notice it was the target of the largest data breach in history. Archuleta was

too worried about what federal employees do in the privacy of their own homes to realize that her flat-Earth priorities actually contribute to our government’s vulnerability to defend against data breaches and deter cyber attacks . Is perpetuating marijuana prohibition worth sacrificing national security? Of course not. When will the government recover from reefer madness? Probably not while Archuleta is in charge.

Private companies don’t solve terror

Muncaster 15 (Phil, reporter for Infosecurity Magazine- Infosecurity Magazine has over ten years of experience providing knowledge and insight into the information security industry. Its multiple award winning editorial content provides compelling features both online and in print that focus on hot topics and trends, in-depth news analysis and opinion columns from industry experts. “FBI on the Hunt for Cyber Special Agents” 1/2/15 http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/fbi-on-the-hunt-for-cyber-special/)lg

The FBI has asked cyber security experts to consider a career as a special agent, in a recruitment drive designed to ensure the agency stays on top of evolving online threats. In a lengthy release on Monday, the Feds stated that potential candidates must be between 23 ad 37-years-old, and will be required to pass a rigorous background check and fitness test. Some of the preferred backgrounds noted include computer programming and security, database administration, malware analysis, digital forensics, and ethical hacking, according to a job posting issued recently which remains open until 20 January. That reveals the

salary cyber special agents can expect is anywhere from $59,340 to $76,568. “The FBI seeks highly talented, technically trained individuals who are motivated by the FBI’s mission to protect our nation and the American people from the rapidly evolving cyber threat,” said Robert Anderson Jr, executive assistant director for the Bureau’s Criminal, Cyber, Response, and Services Branch. “What we want are people who are going to come and be part of a team that is working different very complex types of investigations and to utilize their skillsets in that team environment.” He added that successful applicants would be integrated into the FBI’s team of special agents,

leading their own cases. “Cyber permeates every aspect of what we do, whether it’s counterterrorism, criminal investigations, or traditional cyber attacks, as we’ve seen in the recent past,” Anderson said in the statement. “That’s why these types of people are so important to get into the pipeline and come into our organization.” He signed off by claiming the FBI can offer interested applicants an unrivalled “mission” and “scale of investigations.” “It doesn’t matter where you go, it doesn’t matter who you work for, you can’t get that anywhere else but the FBI,” said Anderson. Although the US government and its law enforcement

agencies are increasingly reaching out to the broader cyber community to recruit experts to their ranks, it’s not been easy given chronic skills shortages. Director James Comey even admitted in a speech last year that the agency may have to reconsider its zero tolerance policy on operatives who smoke marijuana after claiming many potential cyber recruits enjoy the occasional toke. Some 56% of (ISC)² members believe there is a global cyber security skills shortage as opposed to just 2% who said they think there’s a surplus, according to 2013’s Global Information Security Workforce Study.

AT: No One Uses MarijuanaPot smoking at an all-time high

Wadley 14 (Jared Wadley – analyst for student health, 9/8/14, University of Michigan “College students' use of marijuana on the rise, some drugs declining” http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/22362-college-students-use-of-marijuana-on-the-rise-some-drugs-declining) //CW

ANN ARBOR—More college students nationwide have added illicit drugs, such as marijuana and

amphetamine, to their back-to-school supply lists. Illicit drug use has been rising gradually among American college students since 2006, when 34 percent indicated that they used some illicit drug in the prior year; that rate was up to 39 percent by 2013. Most of this increase is attributable to a rising proportion using marijuana, according to the University of Michigan scientists who conduct the nationwide

Monitoring the Future study. Daily marijuana use is now at the highest rate among college students in more than three decades. Half (51 percent) of all full-time college students today have used an illicit drug at some time in their lives; roughly four in 10 (39 percent) have used one or more such drugs in just the 12 months preceding the survey. The results are based on a nationally representative sample of some 1,100 students enrolled full time in a 2- or 4-year college in spring 2013. The survey is part of the long-term MTF study, which also tracks substance use among the nation's secondary students and older adults

under research grants from the National Institute on Drug Abuse. Marijuana has remained the most widely used illicit drug over the 34 years that MTF has tracked substance use by college students, but the level of use has varied considerably over time. In 2006, 30 percent of the nation's college students said they used marijuana in the prior 12 months, whereas in 2013 nearly 36 percent indicated doing so. Of perhaps greater importance, daily or near-daily use of marijuana—defined as 20 or more occasions of use in the prior 30 days—has been on the rise. The recent low was 3.5 percent in 2007, but the rate had risen to 5.1 percent by 2013. "This is the highest rate of daily use observed among college students since 1981—a third of a

century ago," said Lloyd Johnston, the principal investigator of the MTF study. "In other words, one in every 20 college students was smoking pot on a daily or near-daily basis in 2013, including one in every 11 males and one in every 34 females. To put this into a longer-term perspective, from 1990 to 1994, fewer than one in 50 college students used marijuana that frequently."

Statistics prove – everyone does pot

Baca 14 (Ricardo Baca is the editor of The Cannabist 12/26/14 “$573 million in pot sales: Here are 12 stats that define the year in marijuana” http://www.thecannabist.co/2014/12/26/pot-sales-taxes-statistics/26031/) CW

But since we’re journalists we also track down the hard numbers that show legal marijuana’s definitive impact on the state in this first year of recreational pot sales. And a glance at the numbers, statistics and

calculations below will give you a very clear picture of what legal, regulated, first-of-its-kind marijuana

looks like in the Rocky Mountains. 1. 130.3 metric tons That’s Colorado’s annual demand for marijuana — equal to 36.8 million “eighths” of cannabis flower. Makes you wonder

how many Coloradans use cannabis regularly … 2. 485,000 That’s the number of adults who are 21 and older using marijuana regularly (at least once a month), and it’s about 9

percent of the state’s population. And what about those using more often than that … 3. 23 percent

That’s the amount of Colorado’s user population that consumes cannabis near daily. But what about the out-of-state tourists visiting Colorado and purchasing legal weed … 4.

90 percent That’s the amount of recreational pot sales out-of-state tourists are responsible for at shops in mountain resort communities. But how

much of Colorado’s annual demand are these tourists actually buying … 5. 7 percent That’s the

amount of Colorado’s annual pot demand purchased by out-of-state tourists. But has Colorado pot gotten more or less expensive since the sales first began on Jan. 1 … 6. -9 percent That’s the price drop on a recreational eighth of marijuana flower at a dozen prominent Colorado pot shops from January 2014 ($53.88) to December 2014 ($48.95). But how much did Colorado sell in recreational cannabis … 7. $246,810,599.03 That’s the state’s total recreational marijuana sales, as counted from January to October (November and December data isn’t yet available from the Colorado Department of Revenue). And what about total medical sales … 8. $326,716,273.59 That’s Colorado’s total medical marijuana sales, also from January to October. (Yep, that’s $573,526,872.62 in 10 months for both recreational and medical pot sales in Colorado.) And what are the majority of the state’s medical

marijuana patients claiming as their need for medicinal pot … 9. 103,918 That’s the number of medical marijuana patients reporting “severe pain” as their condition for a license — or 94 percent of the state’s total patients. So what does all of this mean for the taxes raised by the sale of legal marijuana in Colorado … 10. $60.1 million That’s the amount Colorado has brought in via taxes, licenses and fees on recreational and medical marijuana, from January to October. And what about the cannabis-infused edibles, the cookies and gummies and brownies

that proved to be surprisingly popular in this first year of recreational sales … 11: 10 milligrams of THC That’s the state-standard single-serving size for marijuana edibles, with 100 milligrams maximum allowed in an individually packaged product being sold recreationally.

Marijuana use is increasing

NIH Abuse 15 (NIH -National Institute on Drug Abuse – government institute of science of drug abuse and addiction, Last updated: June 2015, “DrugFacts: Marijuana” http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/marijuana) CW

Marijuana refers to the dried leaves, flowers, stems, and seeds from the hemp plant, Cannabis sativa. The plant contains the mind-altering chemical delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and other related compounds. Extracts with high amounts of THC can also be made from the cannabis plant (see

"Marijuana Extracts"). Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug in the United States (SAMHSA, 2014). Its use is widespread among young people.

According to a yearly survey of middle and high school students, rates of marijuana use have steadied in the past few years after several years of increase. However, the number of young people who believe marijuana use is risky is decreasing (Johnston, 2014). Legalization of marijuana for

medical use or adult recreational use in a growing number of states may affect these views.

Cybersecurity Impacts

yes extinction

Extinction

Guterl 12 Guterl, executive editor – Scientific American, 11/28/’12 (Fred, “Armageddon 2.0,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

The world lived for half a century with the constant specter of nuclear war and its potentially devastating consequences. The end of the Cold War took the potency out of this Armageddon scenario, yet the existential dangers have only multiplied. Today the technologies that pose some of the biggest problems are not so much military as commercial. They come from

biology, energy production, and the information sciences -- and are the very technologies that

have fueled our prodigious growth as a species. They are far more seductive than nuclear weapons, and more difficult to extricate ourselves from. The

technologies we worry about today form the basis of our global

civilization and are essential to our survival. The mistake many of us make about the darker aspects of our high-tech civilization is in thinking that we have plenty of time to address

them. We may, if we're lucky. But it's more likely that we have less time than we think. There may be a limited window of opportunity for preventing catastrophes such as

pandemics, runaway climate change, and cyber attacks on national power grids. Emerging diseases. The influenza pandemic of 2009 is a case in point. Because of rising prosperity and travel, the world has grown more conducive to a destructive flu virus in recent years, many public health officials believe. Most people probably remember 2009 as a time when health officials overreacted. But in truth, the 2009 virus came from nowhere, and by the time it reached the radar screens of health officials, it was already well on its way to spreading far and wide. "H1N1 caught us all with our pants down," says flu expert Robert G. Webster of St. Jude Children's Research Hospital in Memphis, Tennessee. Before it became apparent that the virus was a mild one, health officials must have felt as if they were staring into the abyss. If the virus had been as deadly as, say, the 1918 flu virus or some more recent strains of bird flu, the result would have rivaled what the planners of the 1950s expected from a nuclear war. It would have been a "total disaster," Webster says. "You wouldn't get the gasoline for your car, you wouldn't get the electricity for your power, you wouldn't get the medicines you need. Society as we know it would fall apart." Climate change. Climate is another potentially urgent risk. It's easy to think about greenhouse gases as a long-term problem, but the current rate of change in the Arctic has alarmed more and more scientists in recent years. Tim Lenton, a climate scientist at the University of Exeter in England, has looked at climate from the standpoint of tipping points -- sudden changes that are not reflected in current climate models. We may already have reached a tipping point -- a transition to a new state in which the Arctic is ice-free during the summer months. Perhaps the most alarming of Lenton's tipping points is the Indian summer monsoon. Smoke from household fires, and soot from automobiles and buses in crowded cities, rises into the atmosphere and drifts out over the Indian Ocean, changing the atmospheric dynamics upon which the monsoon depends -- keeping much of the sun's energy from reaching the surface, and lessening the power of storms. At the same time, the buildup of greenhouse gases -- emitted mainly from developed countries in the northern hemisphere -- has a very different effect on the Indian summer monsoon: It makes it stronger. These two opposite influences make the fate of the monsoon difficult to predict and subject to instability. A small influence -- a bit more carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, and a bit more brown haze -- could have an outsize effect. The Indian monsoon, Lenton believes, could be teetering on a knife's edge, ready to change abruptly in ways that are hard to predict. What happens then? More than a billion people depend on the monsoon's rains. Other tipping points may be in play, says Lenton. The West African monsoon is potentially near a tipping point. So are Greenland's

glaciers, which hold enough water to raise sea levels by more than 20 feet; and the West Antarctic Ice Sheet, which has enough ice to raise sea levels by at least 10 feet. Regional tipping points could hasten the ill effects of climate change more quickly than currently projected by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Computer hacking. The computer industry has already made it possible for computers to

handle a variety of tasks without human intervention. Autonomous computers, using techniques

formerly known as artificial intelligence, have begun to exert control in virtually every sphere of our lives. Cars, for instance, can now take action to avoid collisions. To do this, a car has to make decisions: When does it take control? How much braking power should be applied, and to which wheels? And when should the car allow its reflex-challenged driver to regain control? Cars that drive themselves, currently being field tested, could hit dealer showrooms in a few years.

Autonomous computers can make our lives easier and safer, but they can also make

them more dangerous. A case in point is Stuxnet, the computer worm designed by the US

and Israel to attack Iran's nuclear fuel program. It is a watershed in the brief history of malware -- the Jason Bourne of computer code, designed for maximum autonomy and effectiveness. Stuxnet's creators gave their program the best training possible: they stocked it with detailed technical knowledge that would come in handy for whatever situation Stuxnet could conceivably encounter. Although the software included rendezvous procedures and communication codes for reporting back to headquarters,

Stuxnet was built to survive and carry out its mission even if it found itself cut off. The uranium centrifuges that Stuxnet attacked are very similar in principle to the generators that power the US electrical grid. Both are monitored and controlled by programmable-logic computer chips. Stuxnet cleverly caused the uranium centrifuges to throw themselves off-balance, inflicting enough damage to set the Iranian nuclear

industry back by 18 months or more. A similar piece of malware installed on the

computers that control the generators at the base of the Grand Coulee Dam would likewise cause them to shake, rattle, and roll -- and eventually explode. If Stuxnet-like malware were to insinuate itself into a few hundred power generators in the United States and attack

them all at once, the damage would be enough to cause blackouts on the East and West Coasts. With such widespread destruction, it could take many months to restore power to the grid. It seems incredible that this should be so, but the worldwide capacity to manufacture generator parts is limited. Generators generally last 30

years, sometimes 50, so normally there's little need for replacements. The main demand for generators is in China, India, and other parts of rapidly developing Asia. That's where the manufacturers are -- not in the United States. Even if the United States, in crisis mode, put full diplomatic pressure on supplier nations -- or launched a military invasion

to take over manufacturing facilities -- the capacity to ramp up production would be severely limited. Worldwide production currently amounts to only a few hundred generators

per year. The consequences of going without power for months, across a

large swath of the United States, would be devastating. Backup electrical generators in hospitals and other vulnerable facilities would have to rely on fuel that would be in high demand. Diabetics would go without their insulin; heart attack victims would not have their defibrillators; and sick people would have no place to go. Businesses would run out

of inventory and extra capacity. Grocery stores would run out of food, and deliveries of

all sorts would virtually cease (no gasoline for trucks and airplanes, trains would be down). As we saw with the blackouts caused by Hurricane Sandy, gas stations couldn't pump gas from their tanks, and fuel-carrying trucks wouldn't be able to fill up at refueling stations. Without power,

the economy would virtually cease, and if power failed over a large enough portion of the

country, simply trucking in supplies from elsewhere would not be adequate to cover the needs of hundreds of millions of people. People would start to die by the thousands, then by the tens of thousands, and eventually the millions. The loss of the

power grid would put nuclear plants on backup, but how many of those systems would fail, causing meltdowns, as we saw at Fukushima? The loss in human life would quickly reach, and perhaps exceed, After eight to 10 days, about 72 percent of all economic activity, as measured by GDP, would shut down, according to an analysis by Scott Borg, a cybersecurity expert.

Cyber war escalates

Tilford 12 (27 July 2012, Robert, Writer for The Examiner, http://www.examiner.com/article/cyber-attackers-could-easily-shut-down-the-electric-grid-for-the-entire-east-coa)

“Cyber attackers could all too easily shut down the electric grid for the entire east coast, the west coast, and the middle part of our country”, said Senator Grassley on July 26, 2012. “Any one attack could leave dozens of major cities and tens of millions of Americans without power. We know, because we were shown in a room here in the Capitol, how an attack could take place and what damage it would do, so we know this is not just make believe”, he said. So what would a

cyber attack look like anyway? The Senator explained: “Without ATMs or debit card readers, commerce would immediately grind to a halt. My daughter, who lives here in the DC area, lost power when the storm hit. They waited for a number of hours, and then they took all the food out of their freezer, they gave away what they could, and they threw the rest away. And that was the way it was all over. Their power was out for about a week, and it made it very difficult. They

are fortunate enough to have a basement, and the heat wasn’t oppressive down there. Without refrigeration, food would rot on the shelves, the freezers would have to be emptied, and people could actually go hungry. Without gas pumps, transportation arteries would clog with abandoned vehicles. Without cell phones or computers, whole regions of the country would be cut off from communication and families would be unable to reach each other. Without air conditioning and without lifesaving technology and the service of hospitals and nursing homes, the elderly and sick would become much sicker and die. Most major hospitals have backup power, but it is only for a limited amount of time. It depends on how much fuel they can store, and that is very limited”, Senator Grassley said. The devastation that the Senator describes is truly

unimaginable. To make matters worse a cyber attack that can take out a civilian power grid, for example could also cripple the U.S. military . The senator notes

that is that the same power grids that supply cities and towns, stores and gas stations, cell towers and heart monitors also power “ every military base in our country.” “Although bases would be prepared to weather a short power outage with backup diesel generators, within hours, not

days, fuel supplies would run out”, he said. Which means military command and control centers could go dark. Radar systems that detect air threats to our country would shut Down completely. “Communication between commanders and their troops would also go silent. And many weapons systems

would be left without either fuel or electric power”, said Senator Grassley. “So in a few short hours or days, the mightiest military in the world would be left scrambling to maintain base functions”, he said. We contacted the

Pentagon and officials confirmed the threat of a cyber attack is something very real . Top national security officials—including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the National Security Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the CIA Director— have said, “preventing a cyber attack and improving the nation’s electric grids is among the most urgent priorities of our country ” (source: Congressional Record). So how serious is the Pentagon taking all this? Enough to start , or end a war over it , for sure (see video: Pentagon declares war on cyber attacks http://www.youtube.com/watch?

v=_kVQrp_D0kY&feature=relmfu ). A cyber attack today against the US could very well be seen as an “Act of War” and could be met with a “ full scale” US military response . That could include the use of “ nuclear weapons ”, if authorized by the President.

Miscalc, draws in major powers, collapses nuclear deterrence

Cimbala 11, PhD, Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State University–Brandywine, served as a consultant for various US government agencies and private contractors, (Stephen J. "Nuclear Crisis Management and “Cyberwar”Phishing for Trouble?," Strategic Studies Quarterly, Spring, www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/cimbala.pdf)

Notwithstanding the preceding disclaimers, information warfare has the potential to attack or disrupt successful crisis management on each of four dimensions. First,

it can muddy the signals being sent from one side to the other in a crisis. This can be done deliberately or inadvertently. Suppose one side plants a virus or worm in the other’s communications networks.19 The virus or worm becomes activated during the crisis and destroys or alters information. The missing or altered information may make it more difficult for the cyber victim to arrange a military attack. But destroyed or altered information may mislead either side into thinking that its signal has been correctly interpreted when it has not. Thus, side A may intend to signal “resolve” instead of “yield” to its opponent on a particular issue. Side B, misperceiving a “yield” message, may decide to continue its aggression, meeting

unexpected resistance and causing a much more dangerous situation to develop. Infowar can also destroy or disrupt communication channels necessary for successful crisis management. One way it can do this is to disrupt communication links between policymakers and military commanders

during a period of high threat and severe time pressure. Two kinds of unanticipated problems, from the standpoint of civil-military relations, are possible under these

conditions. First, political leaders may have predelegated limited authority for nuclear release or launch under restrictive conditions; only when these few conditions obtain, according to the protocols of predelegation, would military commanders be

authorized to employ nuclear weapons distributed within their command. Clogged, destroyed, or disrupted communications could prevent top leaders from knowing that military commanders perceived a situation to be far more desperate, and thus permissive of nuclear initiative, than it really was.

During the Cold War, for example, disrupted communications between the US National Command Authority and ballistic missile submarines, once the latter came under attack, could have resulted in a joint decision by submarine officers to launch in the absence of contrary instructions. Second, information warfare during a crisis will almost certainly increase the time pressure under which political leaders operate. It may do this literally, or it may affect the perceived timelines

within which the policymaking process can make its decisions. Once either side sees parts of its command, control, and communications (C3) system being subverted by phony

information or extraneous cyber noise, its sense of panic at the possible loss of military options

will be enormous. In the case of US Cold War nuclear war plans, for

example, disruption of even portions of the strategic C3 system could have prevented competent execution of parts of the SIOP (the strategic nuclear war plan). The SIOP depended upon finely orchestrated time-on-target estimates and precise damage expectancies against

various classes of targets. Partially misinformed or disinformed networks and communications

centers would have led to redundant attacks against the same target sets and, quite possibly, unplanned attacks on friendly military or civilian installations. A third potentially disruptive effect of infowar on

nuclear crisis management is that it may reduce the search for available alternatives to the few and desperate. Policymakers searching for escapes from crisis denouements need flexible options and creative problem solving. Victims of information warfare may have a diminished ability to solve problems routinely, let alone creatively, once information networks are filled with flotsam and jetsam. Questions to operators will be poorly posed, and responses (if available at all) will be driven toward the least common denominator of previously

programmed standard operating procedures. Retaliatory systems that depend on launch-on-warning instead of survival after riding out an attack are especially vulnerable to reduced time cycles and restricted alternatives: A well-designed warning system cannot save commanders from misjudging the situation under the constraints of time and information imposed by a posture of launch on warning. Such a posture truncates the decision process too early for iterative estimates to converge on reality. Rapid reaction is inherently unstable because it cuts short the learning time needed to match perception with reality.20 The propensity to search for the first available alternative that meets minimum satisfactory conditions of goal

attainment is strong enough under normal conditions in nonmilitary bureaucratic organizations.21 In

civil-military command and control systems under the stress of nuclear crisis decision making, the first available alternative may quite literally be the last; or so policymakers and their military advisors may persuade

themselves. Accordingly, the bias toward prompt and adequate solutions is strong. During the Cuban missile crisis, a number of members of the presidential advisory group continued to propound an air strike and invasion of Cuba during the entire 13 days of crisis deliberation. Had less time been available for debate and had President Kennedy not deliberately

structured the discussion in a way that forced alternatives to the surface, the air strike and invasion might well have been the chosen alternative.22 Fourth and finally on the issue of crisis management, infowar can cause flawed images of each side’s intentions and capabilities to be conveyed to the other, with potentially disastrous results. Another example from the Cuban crisis demonstrates the possible side effects of simple misunderstanding and noncommunication on US crisis management.

At the most tense period of the crisis, a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft got off course and strayed into Soviet airspace. US and Soviet fighters scrambled, and a possible Arctic confrontation of air forces loomed. Khrushchev later told Kennedy that Soviet air defenses might have interpreted the U-2 flight as a prestrike reconnaissance mission or as a bomber, calling for a compensatory response by Moscow.23

Fortunately Moscow chose to give the United States the benefit of the doubt in this instance and to permit US fighters to escort the wayward U-2 back to Alaska. Why this scheduled U-2 mission was not scrubbed once the crisis began has never been fully revealed; the answer may be as simple as bureaucratic inertia compounded by noncommunication down the chain of command by policymakers who failed to appreciate the risk of “normal” reconnaissance under these extraordinary conditions. Further Issues and Implications The outcome of a nuclear crisis management scenario influenced by information operations may not be a

favorable one. Despite the best efforts of crisis participants, the dispute may degenerate into a nuclear first use or first strike by one side and retaliation by the other. In that situation, information operations by either, or both, sides might make it more difficult to limit the war and bring it to a conclusion before catastrophic destruction and loss of life had taken place. Although there are no such things as “small” nuclear wars, compared to conventional wars, there can be different kinds of “nuclear” wars in terms of their proximate causes and

consequences.24 Possibilities include a nuclear attack from an unknown source; an ambiguous case of possible, but not proved, nuclear first use; a nuclear “test” detonation intended to intimidate but with no immediate destruction; and a conventional strike mistaken, at least initially, for a nuclear one. As George Quester has noted: The United States and other powers have developed some very large and powerful conventional warheads, intended for destroying the hardened underground bunkers that may house an enemy command post or a hard-sheltered weapons

system. Such “bunker-buster” bombs radiate a sound signal when they are used and an underground seismic signal that could be mistaken from a distance for the signature of a small nuclear warhead.25 The

dominant scenario of a general nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union preoccupied Cold War policymakers, and under that assumption concerns about escalation control and war termination were swamped by apocalyptic visions of the end of days. The second nuclear age, roughly coinciding with the end of the Cold War and the demise of

the Soviet Union, offers a more complicated menu of nuclear possibilities and responses.26 Interest in the threat or use of nuclear weapons by rogue states, by aspiring regional hegemons, or by terrorists abetted by the possible spread of nuclear weapons among currently nonnuclear weapons states stretches the ingenuity of military planners and fiction writers. In addition to

the world’s worst characters engaged in nuclear threat of first use, there is also the possibility of backsliding in political conditions, as between the United States and Russia, or Russia and China, or China and India (among current

nuclear weapons states). Politically unthinkable conflicts of one decade have a way of evolving into the politically unavoidable wars of another—World War I is instructive in this regard. The war between Russia and Georgia in August 2008 was a reminder that local conflicts on regional fault lines between blocs or major powers have the potential to expand into worse.

2nc yes motive

Cyber-threat is high

Carney 14, Jordain, Staff @ National Journal, “Defense Leaders Say Cyber is Top Terror Threat,” 1-6-14, http://www.nationaljournal.com/defense/defense-leaders-say-cyber-is-top-terror-threat-20140106, DOA: 8-13-14, y2k

Defense officials see cyberattacks as the greatest threat to U.S. national security, according to a survey released Monday. Forty-five percent of respondents to the Defense News Leadership Poll named a cyberattack as the single greatest threat—nearly 20 percentage points above terrorism, which ranked second. The Defense News Leadership Poll, underwritten by United Technologies, surveyed 352 Defense News subscribers, based on job seniority, between Nov. 14 and Nov. 28, 2013. The poll targeted senior employees within the White House, Pentagon, Congress, and the defense industry. "The magnitude of the cyber problem, combined with declining budgets, will challenge the nation for years to come," said Vago Muradian, the editor of Defense News. It's not the first time cyber has ranked at or near the top of a list of security concerns. Seventy percent of Americans called a cyberattack from another country a major threat in a Pew Research Center survey released last month. Defense Department officials, for their part, have warned about the increasing threat. FBI Director James Comey, Rand Beers, the then-acting secretary for the Homeland Security Department, and Gen. Keith Alexander, director of the National Security Agency, each voiced their concerns before Congress last year. And House Intelligence Committee Chairman Mike Rogers, R-Mich., called it the "largest national security threat to the face the U.S. that we are not even close to being prepared to handle as a country."

2nc goes nuclear

Cyber attacks escalate nuclear war fast

Austin 13 (Greg Austin, PhD in IR, director of policy innovation at the EastWest Institute, “Costs of American Cyber Superiority” August 6, 2013, China-US Focus)

The NSA Prism program exists because it is technologically possible and there have been no effective restraints on its international targeting. This lack of restraint is especially important because the command and control of strategic nuclear weapons is a potential target both of cyber espionage and offensive cyber operations . The argument here is not to suggest a similarity between the weapons themselves, but to identify correctly the very close relationship between cyber operations and nuclear

weapons planning. Thus the lack of restraint in cyber weapons might arguably

affect (destabilize) pre-existing agreements that constrain nuclear weapons deployment and possible use. The cyber superiority of the United States, while legal and understandable, is now a cause of strategic instability between nuclear armed powers. This is similar to the situation that persisted with nuclear weapons themselves until 1969 when the USSR first proposed an end of the race for the technological frontier of potential planetary devastation. After achieving initial capability, the U.S. nuclear missile build up was not a rational military response to each step increase in Soviet military capability. It was a race for the technological frontier – by both sides – with insufficient recognition of the consequences. This conclusion was borne out by a remarkable Top Secret study commissioned in 1974 by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Dr James Schlesinger. By the time it was completed and submitted in 1981, it assessed that the nuclear arms build-up by both sides was driven – not by a supposed tit for tat escalation in capability of deployed military systems – but rather by an unconstrained race for the technological limits of each side’s military potential and by its own military doctrinal preferences. The decisions of each side were not for the most part, according to this now declassified study, a direct response to particular systems that the other side was building. In 1969, the USSR acted first to propose an end to the race for the technological frontier of nuclear weapons because it knew it was losing the contest and because it knew there was political sentiment in the United States and in its Allied countries that supported limitations on the unbridled nuclear fetish. As we ponder the American cyber industrial complex of today, we see a similar constellation of opposition to its power emerging. This constellation includes not just the political rivals who see they are losing in cyber space (China and Russia), but nervous allies who see themselves as the likely biggest victims of the American race for cyber superiority, and loyal American military commanders who can see the risks and dangers of that quest. It is time for the United States to take stock of the collateral damage that its quest for cyber military power, including its understandable quest for intelligence superiority over the terrorist enemy, has caused amongst its allies. The loss has not yet been seen at the high political level among allies, in spite of several pro forma requests for information from countries such as Germany. The loss of U.S. credibility has happened more at the popular level. Around the world, once loyal supporters of the United States in its war on terrorism had a reasonable expectation to be treated as faithful allies. They had the expectation, perhaps naïve, that privacy was a value the Americans shared with them. They did not expect to be subject to such a crude distinction (“you are all non-Americans now”). They did not want to know that their entire personal lives in cyber space are now recoverable – should someone so decide – by the running of a bit of software in the NSA. After the Prism revelations, so many of these foreign citizens with an internationalist persuasion and solidarity for the United States now feel a little betrayed. Yet, in the long run, the most influential voice to end the American quest for cyber military superiority may come from its own armed forces. There are military figures in the United States who have had responsibility for nuclear weapons command and control systems and who, in private, counsel caution. They advocate the

need to abandon the quest for cyber dominance and pursue a strategy of “mutual security ” in cyber space – though that has yet to be defined. They cite military exercises where the Blue team gets little or no warning of Red team disruptive cyber attack on systems that might affect critical nuclear command and control or wider war mobilization functions . Strategic nuclear

stability may be at risk because of uncertainty about innovations in cyber attack capability. This question is worth much more attention.

at: defenses

Defenses are insufficient

Pew 14 Pew Research Center, citing a slew of experts, October 29, 2014, “Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase”, http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-likely-to-increase/

‘Yes’ respondents theme 2) Security is generally not the first concern in the design of Internet

applications. It seems as if the world will only wake up to these vulnerabilities after catastrophe occurs. Patrick Tucker, futurist and author of The Naked Future: What Happens In a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? said, “Today, cities around the world use supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems to manage water,

sewage, electricity, and even traffic lights. Independent analysis has found that these

systems suffer from 25 different security vulnerabilities. That’s bad enough,

but then consider how human error and incompetence makes these common systems even less secure. Many of the IT managers that use these systems haven’t changed the manufacturer-installed security codes. As writers Indu B. Singh and Joseph N. Pelton have pointed out in The Futurist

magazine, that failure to take even the most basic security precautions leaves these systems open to remote hacking.” Stuart Umpleby, a systems theory expert and professor at George Washington University wrote, “In addition to cyber attacks there are threats from individuals who have access (e.g., Manning, Snowden, Bernie Madoff, Steven Cohen). Digital equipment is vulnerable to solar flares and EMP (electromagnetic pulse). There can be overlooked or underestimated design flaws (e.g., the Y2K bug, Long Term Capital Management, financial derivatives, or the change in the Glass-Steagall Act). Possible solutions: 1. Decentralization can stop cascade effects. However, decentralization plus connection can lead to vulnerabilities since no one is in charge. 2. Oversight and regulation. However, technical regulation requires highly skilled people and the private sector pays higher salaries. Firms also try to keep secrets. In finance the banks are now in a position to write the rules that regulate them. Big banks are getting bigger. So far losses in the billions have been due to financial and political design flaws more than technical design flaws.” Elena Kvochko, manager for

IT industry at an international organization based in New York, noted, “The possibility of a widespread cyber attack on national critical infrastructure is a major concern for many governments. The scope and the consequences of such

attacks may be different for different nations. However, a large portion of critical infrastructure facilities still rely on software and technology created decades ago and which has not been upgraded. The level of sophistication of adversaries generally progresses much faster, therefore, it is important to implement adequate measures to ensure a proper protection of critical assets

and capabilities.” An executive for a major national news organization in the US wrote, “The government and the private sector are responding too slowly to this threat. We’ve already seen the US Chamber of Commerce hacked, allegedly by the Chinese. We’ve seen numerous ‘botnet’ attacks on financial institutions that have rendered their sites unusable for

hours at a time. And, at the moment, there’s little political will to impose minimal cybersecurity standards even on ‘essential’ businesses, such

as electric utilities, telecommunications companies and financial institutions. Some Obama administration officials have warned of a coming ‘Cyber Pearl Harbor.’ Still, the public and many businesses seem sanguine about this

possibility.” Systems are highly vulnerable – the threat will only get worse Pew 14 Pew Research Center, citing a slew of experts, October 29, 2014, “Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase”, http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-likely-to-increase/ ‘Yes’ respondents theme 1)

Internet-connected systems are inviting targets. The Internet is a critical infrastructure for national defense activities, energy resources, banking/finance, transportation, and essential daily-life

pursuits for billions of people. The tools already exist to mount cyber attacks now and they will improve in coming years—but countermeasures will evolve, too. Joe Kochan, chief operating officer for US Ignite, a company developing

gigabit-ready digital experiences and applications, wrote, “Cyber attacks will become a pillar of warfare and terrorism between now and 2025. So much of a country’s infrastructure—commerce, finance, energy, education, health care—will be online, and gaining control of or disrupting a country’s online systems will become a critical goal in future conflicts.” Mark Nall, a program manager for NASA, responded, “Current threats include economic transactions, power grid, and air traffic control. This will expand to include others such as self-driving cars, unmanned aerial vehicles, and building infrastructure. In addition to current methods for thwarting opponents, growing use of strong artificial intelligence to monitor and diagnose itself, and other systems will help as well.” Geoff Livingston on the future of cyber attacks Geoff Livingston, author and president of Tenacity5 Media, responded,

“Cyberwar is the battlefield of now. Don’t kid yourself. Battlefields in Sudan, Afghanistan, and Syria are real, but there is a new battlefield and every day wars are won and lost between individuals, businesses, and countries. The Pentagon and China’s military are regularly engaged in digital spats. We really have no idea how deep this goes, but we are much closer to William Gibson’s vision in the seminal cyberpunk novel Neuromancer than any of us would like to admit.” Herb Lin, chief scientist for the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board at the National Research Council of the US National Academies of Science, replied, “More likely is cyber sabotage of individual enterprises.

On a large scale, cyber attacks may be combined with kinetic attacks and the combination may cause large-scale damage.” Christian Huitema, a distinguished engineer with Microsoft, observed, “We are already witnessing the theft of trade secrets, with impact well worth tens of billions of dollars. We are also seeing active development of cyber weapons by many world powers. Historically, such new weapons are always used at least once or twice before nations realize it is too dangerous and start relying on diplomacy.” Stewart Baker, a partner at

Steptoe & Johnson, a Washington law firm, wrote, “Cyberwar just plain makes sense. Attacking the power grid or other industrial control systems is asymmetrical and deniable and devilishly effective. Plus, it gets easier every year. We used to worry about Russia and China taking down our infrastructure.

Now we have to worry about Iran and Syria and North Korea. Next up: Hezbollah and Anonymous.”

Stuxnet was the tip of the iceberg

Pew 14 Pew Research Center, citing a slew of experts, October 29, 2014, “Cyber Attacks Likely to Increase”, http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/29/cyber-attacks-likely-to-increase/

‘Yes’ respondents theme 3) Major cyber attacks have already happened, for instance the Stuxnet worm and attacks in nations where mass opposition to a regime has taken to

the streets. Similar or worse attacks are a given. A notable number of

respondents cited Stuxnet and other acts against various populations as evidence that cyber attacks were now integrated into national military and intelligence strategies. The Stuxnet computer worm, according to a publication of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, infected the software of at least 14 industrial sites in Iran several years ago. A worm is not like a computer virus, which must be installed—unwittingly—by a user in order to work. Instead, a worm spreads on its own among computers once it has been introduced to a network. In the case of Stuxnet the worm targeted computer systems tied to production of Iran’s nuclear program and helped destroy as many as a fifth of the centrifuges. Jason Pontin, editor in chief and publisher of MIT Technology Review, wrote, “Oh, sure it is possible. Although not at your defined level, there has already been a ‘Pearl Harbor’ event: the Stuxnet computer worm that was used to attack Iran’s nuclear

capabilities. Do we really believe that the infrastructure of a major industrial power will not be so attacked in the next twelve years? The Internet is an insecure network; all industrialized nations depend on it. They’re wide open.” Stowe Boyd, lead researcher for GigaOM Research, said, “A bellicose China might ‘cyber invade’ the military capabilities of Japan and South Korea as part of the conflict around the China Sea, leading to the need to reconfigure their electronics, at huge cost. Israel and the United States have already created the Stuxnet computer worm to damage Iran’s nuclear refinement centrifuges, for example. Imagine a world dependent on robotic farm vehicles, delivery drones, and AI-managed transport, and how one country might opt to disrupt the spring harvest as a means to damage a neighboring opponent.” Judith Perrolle, a professor at Northeastern University in Boston, wrote, “The US government’s series of cyber attacks on citizens, economic entities, and governments around the world has already done this. People have died from faulty equipment producing gas pipeline explosions and from drone bombings of civilians. US companies have lost billions worth of business as foreign customers no longer trust their products and services. One way to counter such attacks is by diplomacy and respect for international law, especially by the United States. As one of my students once titled a paper on Stuxnet: ‘People who live in electronic houses shouldn’t throw worms.’ A second line of defense is to design computer and information systems to be more secure. Our current systems are incredibly vulnerable, by design. US cyber security efforts seem dedicated to breaking into computer systems, not securing them.” Maurice Vergeer, an assistant professor at Radboud University Nijmegen in the Netherlands, replied, “It probably will. Estonia was one of the first countries that

suffered a major cyber attack some years ago. If an agency can create something like Stuxnet to sabotage Iranian nuclear facilities, it’s a question of time for another agency to come up with another piece of malware to sabotage essential infrastructure. The problem is that because of the Internet of things, this is even more likely because most computers and machines will be connected to the Internet. Even when security is tight, the human factor is probably the weakest link.”

at: rid

Rid is wrong --- lack of bureaucratic friction increases the risk

Junio 13 (Tim, Cybersecurity predoctoral fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperationat Stanford University and PhD Candidate in Polisci @ UPenn and MA in IR from Johns Hopkins and develops new cyber capabilities at the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, “How Probable is Cyber War? Bringing IR Theory Back In to the Cyber Conflict Debate” 06 Feb 2013, Journal of Strategic Studies Volume 36, Issue 1, pages 125-133)

Two recent articles in the pages of this journal contribute to an important debate about how information technology (IT) influences international politics.1 Thomas Rid and Adam Liff argue that cyber ‘war’ has never happened and probably will not happen. A fundamental problem with these articles is that Rid and Liff do not commit to a theoretical framework regarding the causes of war. Doing so yields an opposite conclusion : international relations theory identifies many mechanisms that may cause violent escalation with cyber weapons. This brief response article explains why cyber war is sufficiently probable to merit serious attention from scholars and practitioners, and proposes a theoretical research agenda. First, domestic political factors – such as states' command and control over cyber operations – must be problematized. The principal-agent approach demonstrates how variation in incentives and preferences may make militaries more likely to favor cyber attack than other kinds of

bureaucracies. This matters in societies with poor civilian control over the military . Second, the unique material qualities of IT must be evaluated alongside traditional mechanisms that cause war. For instance, the attribution problem and computational complexity in modeling cyber operations may increase the odds of inadvertent cyber war by causing states to retaliate against the wrong targets or miscalculate the potential costs and gains of attacking. What is Cyber War? (Again…) Rid and Liff do not define cyber war the same way, and there is no disciplinary consensus. Rid, Liff, and this author at least agree on the following: cyber war is a coercive act involving computer network attack. Network attack means information is disrupted, degraded, or destroyed. ‘Coercive’ means using force to change or preserve a political status quo. A point of contention is lethality, which Rid believes is necessary for cyber ‘war’.2 This is an extreme and undesirable requirement, particularly because (as Rid himself points out) non-lethal cyber attacks may be more costly than conventional warfare.3 It is important to note that Rid focuses on network attack, whereas Liff considers a broader conflict process. This response addresses both. The central point of Rid's article is that it is difficult to cause lethal effects with cyber weapons, and that politically motivated, instrumental cyber attack has never killed anyone.4 While the empirics of his article are sound – he describes recent cyber attacks accurately – Rid never explains what causes war or makes war more or less likely. The arguments in his article are exclusively definitional, and do not directly support his title's assertion that ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place.’ Liff does better from a theoretical point of view; he links his article to the bargaining approach to war.5 He does an excellent job of offering counterpoints to four arguments about why cyber attack may increase the probability of war. However, Liff never establishes why his reasonable views are more plausible than their alternatives. This is because he is not explicit about assumptions that are necessary for his arguments to hold, nor about the circumstances under which those assumptions break down. For example, Liff argues that private information may make war less likely because states poorly estimate the gains from cyber attack.6 Although Liff is right to point out that ambiguity in cyber operations is important, he is wrong to assume the causal arrow points in one direction. Ambiguity can make war more or less likely, because it may lead states to overestimate their potential gains, overestimate their stealth, and/or underestimate their adversary's skill. Finally, it must be recognized that any future war is a low probability event. Crafting claims that particular conflict scenarios are improbable is rather unimpressive; what is important to understand is the potential cost and probability of cyber war relative to other kinds of conflict. Causes of Cyber War The noted problems in the Rid and Liff articles could have been avoided by drawing on structured theoretical approaches that are common to the study of the causes of all kinds of warfare. What would such an approach look like? This response lacks the space to fully develop one, but recommends a way forward. Literally dozens of arguments have been advanced in the political science discipline regarding the causes of war, and very many of these offer reasons to believe cyber war is plausible or even probable.7 An approach, advanced in James Fearon's modern

classic ‘Rationalist Explanations for War,’ is to list assumptions that create an ideal condition in which war should never happen.8 One way to structure scientific inquiry regarding the probability of cyber war is to examine how the unique material qualities of IT affect each of the assumptions. Table 1 offers a cursory version of such an analysis to identify priority areas for further study. Among a large number of revealed paths to cyber war, one – principal-agent problems involving the bureaucracies that conduct cyber operations – is detailed here to demonstrate the plausibility of specific mechanisms and what follow-on empirical work should look like. Principal-Agent Problems Rid and Liff appear to assume that states are unitary rational actors (URAs), and do not explain the domestic political processes whereby

states make foreign policy choices. Empirically and theoretically, it is important to relax the

URA assumption and problematize who has formal and actual release authority over cyber weapons. The principal-agent approach, for instance, works from the premise that individuals and organizations often vary in their incentives and preferences, which could make war beneficial for some at the cost of others.9 This and related thinking inform how scholars study other military technologies, such as nuclear weapons. Scott Sagan points out that although unauthorized nuclear war is improbable, it is sufficiently probable that people should worry a great deal about command and control (C2) issues.10 Many anecdotes echo Sagan's work. For example, a Russian general was asked during the Cold War about his backup plan in the event he could not open the safe containing his nuclear launch codes. His answer was that he would bash the safe open with a sledgehammer he kept nearby!11 Consideration of how bureaucracies do what they do – like keeping emergency nuclear war sledgehammers – is of critical importance to the cyber C2 question. Although controlling large organizations is a core function of militaries, the conduct of cyber operations is different from other kinds of activity in a way that greatly magnifies the ‘strategic corporal’ problem. This is because constant cyber operations other than war decrease the bureaucratic friction that normally alerts superiors to aberrant behavior. In the case of nuclear weapons, a long chain of events is required before unauthorized activities occur. Someone probably would notice a crazed general using his sledgehammer on the launch codes safe, turning keys, fueling missiles, and so on. In contrast, it is a core function of cyber bureaucrats to access adversary networks constantly, and to develop push-button solutions to minimize lags during war. Furthermore, if the perception that cyber weapons are non-lethal comes to be widely perceived (as Rid would prefer), it is reasonable to conclude that the threshold for their use will be lower than other kinds of weapons – even if the cost of cyber attacks is greater.

What do they do? What do federal cyber security employees do?

FBI 15 (Federal Bureau of Investigation – Cyber Unit, Last updated in 2015, “Computer Intrusions” https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investigate/cyber/computer-intrusions) // CW

Every day, criminals are invading countless homes and offices across the nation—not by breaking down windows and doors, but by breaking into laptops, personal computers, and wireless devices via hacks and bits of malicious code. The collective impact is staggering. Billions of dollars are lost every year repairing systems hit by such attacks. Some take down vital systems, disrupting and sometimes disabling the work of hospitals, banks, and 9-1-1 services around the country. Who is behind such

attacks? It runs the gamut—from computer geeks looking for bragging rights…to businesses trying to gain an upper hand in the marketplace by hacking competitor websites, from rings of criminals wanting to steal your personal information and sell it on black markets…to spies and terrorists looking to rob our nation of vital information or launch cyber strikes. Today, these computer intrusion cases—counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and criminal—are the paramount priorities of our cyber program because of their potential relationship to national security. Combating the threat. In recent years, we’ve built a whole new set of technological and investigative capabilities and partnerships—so we’re as comfortable chasing outlaws in cyberspace as we are down back alleys and across continents. That includes: A Cyber Division at FBI Headquarters

“to address cyber crime in a coordinated and cohesive manner”; Specially trained cyber squads at FBI headquarters and in each of our 56 field offices, staffed with “agents and analysts who protect against investigate computer intrusions, theft of intellectual property and personal information, child pornography and exploitation, and online fraud”; New Cyber Action Teams that “travel around the world on a moment’s notice to assist in computer intrusion cases” and that “gather vital intelligence that helps us identify the cyber crimes that are most dangerous to our national security and to our economy;” Our 93 Computer Crimes Task Forces nationwide that “combine state-of-the-art technology and the resources of our federal, state, and local counterparts”; A growing partnership with other federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, and others—which share similar concerns and resolve in combating cyber crime.

What does a cyber-security worker do anyway?

GWU 15 (George Washington University – Department of Computer Science, “Cybersecurity Roles and Job Titles” https://www.cs.gwu.edu/academics/graduate_programs/master/cybersecurity/cybersecurity-jobs) CW

Overview Graduates from this new MS degree in Cybersecurity will have a large, “hungry” and lucrative job market available to them, and will be qualified to occupy nearly all of the roles described in this page. The roles and job titles in the security sector often involve somewhat overlapping responsibilities, and

can be broad or specialized depending on the size and special needs of the organization. Typical job titles are security analyst, security engineer, security administrator, security architect, security specialist, and security consultant. To better describe the scope of those positions, employers often precede the above titles with qualifying terms like “Cyber”, “Information”, “Computer”, “Network”, “IT”, and “Applications”. This results in fuller job titles such as IT Security Engineer, Information Security Analyst, Network Security Administrator, IT Security Consultant, and so on. Special variations of some of the titles are sometimes preferred, such as Information Assurance Analyst, and Security Software Developer. Also, some security jobs are even more specialized, such as cryptographer, intrusion detection specialist, computer security incident responder, and so on. Additional terms are sometimes used to convey rank, such as Senior IT Security Consultant, and Chief Information Security Officer. Graduates of the new program will normally qualify for such high ranks after several years of on-the-job experience. As the Cybersecurity domain expands and develops further, new roles and titles are likely to emerge, and the roles attributed to the current titles will likely crystallize or evolve. For now, the following is a good description of the various security job titles and roles employed by the private and public sectors. Job Titles Description Summaries Security Analyst:

analyzes and assesses vulnerabilities in the infrastructure (software,

hardware, networks), investigates available tools and countermeasures to remedy the detected vulnerabilities, and recommends solutions and best practices. Analyzes and assesses damage to the data/infrastructure as a result of security

incidents, examines available recovery tools and processes, and recommends solutions. Tests for compliance with security policies and procedures. May assist in the creation, implementation, and/or management of security solutions.

Security Engineer: Performs security monitoring, security and data/logs analysis, and forensic analysis, to detect security incidents, and mounts incident response. Investigates and utilizes new technologies and processes to enhance security capabilities and implement improvements Security Architect: Designs a security system or major components of a security system, and may head a security design team building a new security system. Security Administrator: Installs and manages organization-wide security systems. May also take on some of the tasks of a security analyst in smaller organizations. Security Software

Developer: Develops security software, including tools for monitoring, traffic analysis, intrusion detection, virus/spyware/malware detection, anti-virus software, and so on. Also integrates/implements security into applications software. Cryptographer/Cryptologist: Uses encryption to secure information or to build security software. Also works as researcher to develop stronger encryption algorithms. Cryptanalyst:

Analyzes encrypted information to break the code/cipher or to determine the purpose of malicious software. Chief Information Security Officer: a high-level management position responsible for the entire information security division/staff. The position may include hands-on technical work. Security Consultant/Specialist: Broad titles that encompass any one or all of the other roles/titles, tasked with protecting computers, networks, software, data, and/or information systems against viruses, worms, spyware, malware, intrusion detection, unauthorized access, denial-of-service attacks, and an ever increasing list of attacks by hackers acting as individuals or as part of organized crime or foreign governments. Very Specialized Roles: Intrusion Detection Specialist: Monitors networks, computers, and applications in large organizations, looking for events and traffic indicators that signal intrusion. Determines the damage caused by detected intrusions, identifies how an intrusion occurred, and recommends safeguards against similar intrusions. Also does penetration testing to identify vulnerabilities and recommend safeguards as preemptive measures. Computer Security Incident Responder: A member of team that prepares for and mounts rapid response to security threats and attacks such as viruses and denial-of-service attacks. Source Code Auditor: Reviews software source code to identify potential security issues and vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hackers to gain unauthorized access to data and system resources. Virus Technician: analyzes newly discovered computer viruses, and designs and develops software to defend against them. Penetration Tester (also known as

Ethical Hacker or Assurance Validator): Not only scans for and identifies vulnerabilities, but exploits them to provide hard evidence that they are vulnerabilities. When penetration-testing large infrastructures such as power grids, utility systems, and nuclear facilities, large teams of penetration testers, called Red Teams, are employed. Vulnerability Assessor: Scans for, identifies and assesses vulnerabilities in IT systems including computers, networks, software systems, information systems, and applications software.

Money Laundering Impacts

AfricaIFFs cripple relief efforts in Africa breeding political and economic instability in the region

Kar et al 10 [DevKar; Lead Economist at Global Financial Integrity, Former Economist at IMF

(Dev, Global Financial Integrity, Illicit Financial Flows from Africa: Hidden Resource for Development, January 2010, http://www.gfintegrity.org/content/view/300/154/]

The enormity of such a huge outflow of illicit capital explains why donor-driven efforts to spur economic¶development and reduce poverty have been underachieving in Africa. Policy measures must be taken to address¶the factors underlying illicit outflows and also to impress upon

the G-20 the need for better transparency and¶tighter oversight of

international banks and offshore financial centers that absorb these flows.¶Research at Global Financial Integrity shows that the massive outflows of illicitcapital are not just dueto suboptimal policiesin individual developing countries butratherthatsuch policies find synergy in deep flawswithin¶the global financial system. Take for example a simple indicator of aid effectiveness. According to recent studies¶ by GFI and other researchers, developing countries lose at least $10 through illegal flight capital for every $1 they¶ receive in external assistance. The comparable ratios for African countries are misleadingly low not only because¶ of data deficiencies but also due to the fact that they receive a

disproportional share of development assistance¶ provided to developing countries.¶So long as illicit capital continues to hemorrhage out of poor African countries over the long term at a rapid¶pace, efforts to reduce poverty and boost economic growth will be thwarted as income distribution becomes ever¶moreskewed leading to economic and political instability.¶The current global financial crisis, which has generated a world-wide public backlash against the lack of¶transparency and excesses of financial institutions, offers both African and rich donor countries an historic¶opportunity to address the problem of illicit flows and absorption of such flows in the world’s shadow¶ financial system. The existing global financial system shaped by liberalization and deregulation of financial¶ markets have instead ended up generating ever-rising illicit

flows and loss in government revenues. As several¶ researchers have noted, economic growth without credible reform could lead to more, not less, capital¶flight, as the increase in incomes would simply finance the increased accumulation of foreign assets. Hence,¶ prudent macroeconomic policies such as lower fiscal deficits, reduced monetary expansion, positive real¶ rates of interest, and an appropriately valued exchange rate are crucial to improving the attractiveness of¶ domestic investments relative to the illicit

transfer of capital abroad in search of better risk-adjusted rates of¶ return. However, sound economic policies also need to be complemented by strengthened

institutions, the rule¶of law, and better governanceif policymakers areto curtail illicit financial flows on a lasting basis.

Africa instability coming now, escalates to war

MACP 12[Moroccan American Center for Policy, 12/30/12, http://allafrica.com/stories/201212310063.html]

Two new studies report that "the growing role of al-Qaeda across northern Africa," fueled by the Mali crisis and Libyan arms influx, iscreating an 'Arc of Instability' across Africa's

Sahel that poses an " acute threat " to countries in the region and to Europe andthe US. The studies — by NATO Allied Command's Civil-Military Fusion Centre, "Al Qaeda and the African Arc of Instability," and CNA Strategic Studies, "Security Challenges in Libya and the Sahel" — also cite or link to evidence of ties to al-Qaeda groups by members from the

Polisario-run refugee camps near Tindouf, Algeria. The CNA Strategic Studies report, by Sarah Vogler, says "the situation in Mali remains a veritable powder keg ." Regionally, the Mali crisis and flood of arms from Libya has fed the formation of "a network of jihadists from Africa to Asia," and relocation of Al-Qaeda's

"center of gravity" to North Africa, extending an "Arc of Instability" across the region.

Locally, the report warns "the infiltration by AQIM and the political destabilization of the country pose a n acute threat to Mali's neighbors." Of particular concern "is evidence that AQIM has infiltrated the Sahrawi refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, as well as indications that Sahrawi from the camps have joined terrorist groups based in Mali." This poses "immediate concerns for the security of Western Sahara, Mauritania, Morocco, and Algeria." The CNA Strategic Studies report

says the security threat extends beyond the Sahel/North Africa neighborhood. "As the Islamist militants have established their control of the north, fighters from other countries have poured into the area to join the conflict." The al-Qaeda-linked Islamist groups Ansar Dine and Movement for Tawhid and

Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) have likewise allowed the "transnational terrorist organization a base of operation in Mali's north from which to launch attacks against Western targets."

African conflicts escalate to great power warGlick 7 (Caroline, Senior Middle East Fellow – Center for Security Policy, “Condi’s African Holiday”, 12-12, http://www.centerforsecuritypolicy.org/home.aspx?sid=56&categoryid=56&subcategoryid=90&newsid=11568)

US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice introduced a new venue for her superficial and destructive stewardship of US foreign policy during

her lightning visit to the Horn of Africa last Wednesday.The Horn of Africa is a dangerous and strategically vital place . Small wars , which rage continuously, can easily escalate into big wars . Local conflicts have regional and global aspects . All of the conflicts in this tinderbox , which controls shipping lanes from the Indian Ocean into the Red Sea, can potentially

give rise to regional, and indeed global conflagrations between competing regional actors and global powers .Located in and around the Horn of Africa are the states of Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan and Kenya. Eritrea, which gained independence from Ethiopia in 1993 after a 30-year civil war, is a major source of regional conflict. Eritrea has a nagging border dispute with Ethiopia which could easily ignite. The two countries fought a bloody border war from 1998-2000 over control of the town of Badme. Although a UN mandated body determined in 2002 that the disputed town belonged to Eritrea, Ethiopia has rejected the finding and so the conflict festers.Eritrea also fights a proxy war against Ethiopia in Somalia and in Ethiopia's rebellious Ogaden region. In Somalia, Eritrea is the primary sponsor of the al-Qaida-linked Islamic Courts Union which took

control of Somalia in June, 2006. In November 2006, the ICU government declared jihad against Ethiopia and Kenya. Backed by the US, Ethiopia invaded Somalia last December to restore the recognized Transitional Federal Government to power which the ICU had deposed.Although the Ethiopian army successfully ousted the ICU from power in less than a week, backed by massive military and financial assistance from Eritrea, as well as Egypt and Libya, the ICU has waged a brutal insurgency against the TFG and the Ethiopian military for the past year.The senior ICU leadership, including Sheikh Hassan DahirAweys and Sheikh Sharif Ahmed have received safe haven in Eritrea. In September, the exiled ICU leadership held a nine-day conference in the Eritrean capital of Asmara where they formed the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia headed by Ahmed.Eritrean President-for-life IsaiasAfwerki declared his country's support for the insurgents stating, "The Eritrean people's support to the Somali people is consistent and historical, as well as a legal and moral obligation."Although touted in the West as a moderate, Ahmed has openly supported jihad and terrorism against Ethiopia, Kenya and the West. Aweys, for his part, is wanted by the FBI in connection with his role in the bombing of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.Then there is Eritrea's support for the Ogaden separatists in Ethiopia. The Ogaden rebels are Somali ethnics who live in the region bordering Somalia and Kenya. The rebellion is run by the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) which uses terror and sabotage as its preferred methods of warfare. It targets not only Ethiopian forces and military installations, but locals who wish to maintain their allegiance to Ethiopia or reach a negotiated resolution of the conflict. In their most sensationalist attack to date, in April ONLF terror forces attacked a Chinese-run oil installation in April killing nine Chinese and 65 Ethiopians.Ethiopia, for its part has fought a brutal counter-insurgency to restore its control over the region. Human rights organizations have accused Ethiopia of massive human rights abuses of civilians in Ogaden.Then there is Sudan. As Eric Reeves wrote in the Boston Globe on Saturday, "The brutal regime in Khartoum, the capital of Sudan, has orchestrated genocidal counter-insurgency war in Darfur for five years, and is now poised for victory in its ghastly assault on the region's African populations."The Islamist government of Omar Hasan Ahmad al-Bashir is refusing to accept non-African states as members of the hybrid UN-African Union peacekeeping mission to Darfur that is due to replace the undermanned and demoralized African Union peacekeeping force whose mandate ends on December 31. Without its UN component of non-African states, the UN Security Council mandated force will be unable to operate effectively. Khartoum's veto led Jean-Marie Guehenno, the UN undersecretary for peacekeeping to warn last month that the entire peacekeeping mission may have to be aborted.And the Darfur region is not the only one at risk. Due to Khartoum's refusal to carry out the terms of its 2005 peace treaty with the Southern Sudanese that ended Khartoum's 20-year war and genocide against the region's Christian and animist population, the unsteady peace may be undone. Given Khartoum's apparent sprint to victory over the international

community regarding Darfur, there is little reason to doubt that once victory is secured, it will renew its attacks in the south.The conflicts in the Horn of Africa have regional and global dimensions . Regionally, Egypt has played a central role in sponsoring and fomenting conflicts. Egypt's meddling advances its interest of preventing the African nations from mounting a unified challenge to Egypt's colonial legacy of extraordinary rights to the waters of the Nile River which flows through all countries of the region.

warmingSolving IFFs is key to raising domestic climate change financing – solves warming

Tax Justice Network 09 (Stop Illicit Capital Flows to Tackle the Climate Crisis,” December 11, http://taxjustice.blogspot.com/2009/12/stop-illicit-capital-fligh-to-solve.html)//SEP

What about mitigation, i.e. reversing the trend of increasing CO2 and other

greehouse gas (GHG) emissions in the atmosphere? Estimates vary even more here: the

UNFCCC estimates US$ 52.4 billion, while the World Bank says US $140-175 billion --

with cost of financing even higher if that money has to be borrowed and then repaid (financing cost is estimated anywhere between US$ 265-565 billion), hence the figure of US$ 400 billion to bring the level of CO2 in the climate down to a safer level of 450 parts per million (ppm) of CO2 in the climate. Meanwhile there is a petition on the 'safe' level actually being 350 ppm, requiring a lot more climate financing. Whatever the 'magic figure', the demand for climate change

finance is huge. One solution is this: tackle illicit financial flows from developing countries, estimated by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), our colleagues in

Washington D.C. annually between US$ 858.6-1060 billion annually for the years 2002-2006. This point was completely lost in the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen (COP15) -- the 15th climate conference since the first one in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. If we want to adapt to climate change, and further mitigate it, we need to look at the capacity of especially the developing countries in raising domestic climate change financing. Alongside tax evasion, illicit flows, and avoidance, there are questions such as low royalties and imbalanced mineral contracts, sources of large losses. Ghana, for instance, in a report titled 'Breaking the Curse' says the state could have raised further US$ 54.46-163.39 million due in mining royalties if a range of 6-12 per cent were applied instead of the current minimum rate of 3 per cent, that all mining companies pay due to low reported profits from gold, diamonds, manganese and bauxite mining. Meanwhile, in Sierra Leone, it is estimated in another report titled 'Sierra Leone at Cross-Roads' that US$ 110 million more could be raised annually by 2020 in the future from the mining sector. This potential for mobilising further domestic resources is there. Indeed, just as we argued at the Doha Financing for Development (UNFfD) conference in Doha in November-December 2008, involving pledges to reinforce international tax co-operation, to tackle illicit financial flows and to work towards a multilateral framework of automatic information exchange. These will be productive ways of tackling the financial costs of the climate crisis.

povertyWe solve poverty – IFFs are the root cause of poverty

Reuter 12 – Professor in the School of Public Policy and the Department of Criminology, University of Maryland, Senior Researcher at RAND, PhD in Economics from Yale University

(Peter, Draining Development: Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds From Developing Countries, World Bank, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/2242)

There is no doubt that illicit financial flows (IFFs) from developing coun- tries are substantial . Even if the correct figure is only a 10th of the often- cited Global Financial Integrity estimates (about US$1 trillion annually according to Kar and

Cartwright-Smith 2008), that is, around US$100 billion, it is large relative to either official development assistance (about US$70 billion) or total foreign direct investment in the developing world (around US$250 billion in 2004 according to

UNCTAD 2009). Eliminat- ing this outflow , all else being equal, would be an enormous gain to developing countries . This alone does not imply, however, that IFFs constitute a good focus for policy. IFFs are a specific consequence of more fundamental prob- lems that have long been of great concern. Most notably, corruption and the payment of bribes to major government officials have become a cen- tral issue for the World Bank and for the development community gen- erally, at least since World Bank President James Wolfensohn put it on the Bank’s agenda in the mid-1990s. Similarly, the failure of developing countries to collect taxes has also come more into focus in the last decade; the reliance on official development assistance is seen as, impor- tantly, a consequence of the inability of these countries to tax their own resources (Bräutigam, Fjeldstad,

and Moore 2008). The root cause argu- ment, then, is that one should focus on ways of reducing the underlying problems: corruption, tax evasion , and so forth. The international fl ows are only a manifestation of these problems. Cut down on corruption, tax evasion, and the rest, and the IFFs will take care of

themselves. The argument for focusing on causes rather than symptoms is a com- mon one in many domains of policy. For example, many analysts argue that crime is a manifestation less of individual failings or moral turpi- tude than of social failure (Sykes, Cullen, and Merton 1992). Thus, they say, the most effective way of responding to crime is not detection and punishment of offenders, which treat only the symptom, but elimina- tion of social inequality, improving the conditions in which the poor live, and better schools and social programs, which treat the true causes of crime. In fact, there is evidence that society can usefully do both. Police and prison do reduce crime, at least through incapacitation, and social programs such as early childhood interventions also reduce the propensity to crime (Spelman 2000; Greenwood et al. 1998). There are other domains in which policy focuses on root causes, but with little attention to amelioration of harms. For example, the cur- rent debate about financial regulation, in the wake of the global fi scal crisis, emphasizes rules to correct fundamentals rather than postfailure remedies. There is thus no general approach. For some

problems, ameliorative programs have a minimal role; focusing on the root causes is, indeed, the only path to reduction of the problem . For others, treating the

symptom is also useful. What may be said about illicit fl ows in this respect? A distinctive feature of the IFF issue is that the illicit flows may them- selves exacerbate the underlying harms, that is, even if the tax evasion,

corruption, and criminal markets continued unabated and all that one accomplished was to prevent the resulting funds leaving the home coun- try, the result would appear to be welfare enhancing . Assuming that the owners of the illicit funds want to do more than hide their assets under mattresses, there would be more money for domestic investment and, perhaps, also a stronger tax base. Mick Moore takes this up in

chapter 14. It is also possible that trapping funds in the source countries reduces the attractiveness of corruption, tax evasion, and so on. A focus on the consequences might then reduce the underlying activities. This reduc- tion could occur through at least two mechanisms. First, the returns associated with having to spend the money at home, with only the goods and services available, for example, in Congolese markets, may make the marginal dollar less valuable and, thus, lower the incentive to steal from the state. With increasing globalization, however, the consumption pos- sibilities in developing countries are approaching those available else- where, at least in terms of perishables. Substitutes for homes in the south of France may remain difficult to fi nd in poorer countries (indeed, in almost any

country). Second, the funds are less secure at home than abroad. This will also lower the marginal return of another dollar stolen in an ex ante calculation because a change in regime may lead to the seizure of some of these assets. The calculation of the probabilities of seizure is no doubt complicated, but the fear of such a loss surely weighs heavily in small countries with kleptocratic traditions. The fear may increase the current kleptocrats’ incentives for retaining power given that fl ight will separate them from their wealth.2 However, this seems a modest effect; few kleptocrats quit power easily, even with vast amounts of wealth overseas, as evidenced by Muammar Ghaddafi ’s refusal to leave Libya under extreme pressure, despite the availability of billions of dol- lars in overseas accounts.

AT: T-Substantial

2AC — T-SubstantialW/M: Substantially is modifying the curtailment; not the number of people. Resolution basis is best – it doesn’t say anything about domestic surveillance of the population. We are a substantial curtailment of domestic surveillance.

C/I: "Substantial" means of real worth or considerable value --- this is the USUAL and CUSTOMARY meaning of the term

Words and Phrases 2 (Volume 40A, p. 458)

D.S.C. 1966. The word “substantial” within Civil Rights Act providing that a place is a public accommodation if a “substantial” portion of food which is served has moved in commerce must be construed in light of its usual and customary meaning , that is, something of real worth and importance; of considerable value ; valuable, something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal

Not all forms of surveillance are the same. The negative takes a flawed approach to the topic – some methods of surveillance are more important. FBI drug testing is one of them.

Takash 7/8 (Budget and Tax Policy Intern at the Cato Institute, Applied Mathematics & Statistics and Political Science major at JHU, Winners of Provost's Undergraduate Research Award, Young Voices Advocates Advocate specializing in drug policy) aj

Drug testing also makes it harder for firms to maximize profit. The NSA and FBI are starting to reconsider testing applicants because it’s so difficult to find good hackers who don’t use marijuana or other drugs. If this means less qualified hackers are working for the government, the federal government’s drug testing policies are literally a threat to national security.

Drug testing is a means of social control. That’s the worst form of surveillance.

Gilliom 96 – (Established in 1972, the National Criminal Justice Reference Service (NCJRS) is a federally funded resource offering justice and drug-related information to support research, policy, and program development worldwide. “Surveillance, Privacy, and the Law: Employee Drug Testing and the Politics of Social Control” https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=169080)/lg

One view of employee drug testing is that it is an innovative means of policing as part of a broader move to move social control policy toward an ideal of total surveillance and total crime prevention. While privacy and autonomy are obvious casualties of such a system, social control policy holds out the possibility of securing almost total compliance with the law in such problematic areas as drug use, welfare administration, and taxation. Another view of employee drug testing is less about testing than about political and legal battles over implementation. Drug testing in the workplace is discussed in relation to surveillance, hegemony, and the law. The social construction of the drug crisis is examined; consent and resistance in a unionized work force are considered; and constitutional issues associated with privacy, due process, and the fourth amendment are explored. Supplemental information on employee drug testing is provided in two appendixes. References, tables, and figures

They overlimit to only metadata affs because that’s the only thing that affects all US persons. Other portions of surveillance are important for in-depth education and topic research on the topic. Otherwise that justifies the aff and neg to only research metadata for the entire year, disincentivizing argument innovation and critical thinking which are the best portable skills.

1AR — T-Substantial“Substantial” means considerable or to a large degree --- this common meaning is preferable because the word is not a term of artArkush 2 (David, JD Candidate – Harvard University, “Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources”, Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review, Winter, 37 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 131)

Plaintiffs should argue that the term "substantially prevail" is not a term of art because if considered a term of art, resort to Black's 7th produces a definition of "prevail" that could be interpreted adversely to plaintiffs. 99 It is commonly accepted that words that are not legal terms of art should be accorded their ordinary , not their legal, meaning , 100 and ordinary-usage dictionaries provide FOIA fee claimants with helpful arguments. The Supreme Court has already found favorable , temporally relevant definitions of the word "substantially" in ordinary dictionaries: "Substantially" suggests "considerable" or "specified to a large degree." See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1976) (defining "substantially" as "in a substantial manner" and "substantial" as "considerable in amount, value, or worth" and "being that specified to a large degree or in the main"); see also 17 Oxford English Dictionary 66-67 (2d ed. 1989) ("substantial": "relating to or proceeding from the essence of a thing; essential"; "of ample or considerable amount, quantity or dimensions"). 101

Substantial means “of considerable amount” – not some contrived percentage

Prost 4 (Judge – United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, “Committee For Fairly Traded Venezuelan Cement v. United States”, 6-18, http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/federal/judicial/fed/opinions/04opinions/04-1016.html)

The URAA and the SAA neither amend nor refine the language of § 1677(4)(C).  In fact, they merely suggest, without disqualifying other alternatives, a “clearly higher/substantial proportion” approach.  Indeed, the SAA specifically mentions that no “precise mathematical formula” or “‘benchmark’ proportion” is to be used for a dumping concentration analysis.  SAA at 860 (citations omitted); see also Venez. Cement, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 1329-30.  Furthermore, as the Court of International Trade noted, the SAA emphasizes that the Commission retains the discretion to determine concentration of imports on a “case-by-case basis.”  SAA at 860.  Finally, the definition of the word “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument.   The word “substantial ” generally means “considerable in amount , value or worth.”  Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2280 (1993).  It does not imply a specific number or cut-off .   What may be substantial in one situation may not be in another situation.  The very breadth of the term “substantial” undercuts the CFTVC’s argument that Congress spoke clearly in establishing a standard for the Commission’s regional antidumping and countervailing duty analyses.  It therefore supports the conclusion that the Commission is owed deference in its interpretation of “substantial proportion.”  The Commission clearly embarked on its analysis having been given considerable leeway to interpret a particularly broad term.

Defining “substantial curtailment” quantitatively is completely arbitrary

Albin 9 – J. Albin, Justice of the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 197 N.J. 339; 963 A.2d 289; 2009 N.J. LEXIS 6, 1-29, Lexis

Defining "stoppage of work" as a "substantial curtailment of work which is due to a labor dispute" is a sensible interpretation; because a "stoppage" is "the act of stopping or the state of being stopped[,]" Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 2251 (1966), that portion of the definition appears both rational and reasonable on its face. The difficulty, however, arises from the regulatory definition of a "substantial curtailment [***66] of work" as a twenty percent reduction in output . The hospital/employer argues that there is no factual basis on which to ground that regulatory definition, and I am compelled to agree.

No doubt, administrative regulations are entitled to a presumption of validity, N.J. State League of Municipalities v. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 158 N.J. 211, 222, 729 A.2d 21 (1999). That said,

[h]owever, the deference afforded regulations does not go so far as to permit an administrative agency under the guise of an administrative interpretation to give a statute any greater effect than is permitted by the statutory language. Nor can agency regulations alter the terms of a legislative enactment or frustrate the policy embodied in the statute. If a regulation is plainly at odds with the statute, the court must set it aside. As we have repeatedly stated, the judicial role is to ensure that an agency's action does not violate express and implied legislative intent. [*377] Thus, the meaning of enabling legislation is pivotal to any analysis of the legitimacy of a rule.

[T.H. v. Div. of Developmental Disabilities, 189 N.J. 478, 490-91, 916 A.2d 1025 (2007) (citations, internal quotation marks and editing marks omitted).]

And, in determining the [***67] validity of challenged administrative regulations, our point of departure is the statute's meaning and, "[o]rdinarily, we derive a statute's meaning from its language." Id. at 491, 916 A.2d 1025 (citing State v. Sutton, 132 N.J. 471, 625 A.2d 1132 (1993)).

N othing in this record provides any basis whatsoever for the Department of Labor's adoption of what clearly is a totally arbitrary "80% rule " to define a "stoppage of work." Indeed, in its own answers to the public comments on this regulation, the Department of Labor boldly asserted that "[t]he rules provide that only those individuals involved in the labor dispute will be disqualified for benefits." Comments of the Department of Labor, Division of Employment Security and Job Training to the proposed adoption of N.J.A.C. 12:17-12.2, 29 N.J.R. 5162 (Dec. 15, 1997) (emphasis supplied). Repeatedly, the Department of Labor claimed that it "recognizes unemployment insurance as an insurance program and not an entitlement program . . . [and, therefore, i]ndividuals must contribute to the unemployment system and must meet eligibility requirements in order to receive unemployment benefits." Ibid. Yet, despite those clear statements of intent, nothing--absolutely nothing [***68] --in the published history of the adoption of this regulation supports the arbitrary "80% rule" [**313] adopted by the Department of Labor and on which the majority relies.