Fatal Accident Shows Risk of Using Blind Rivets · Fatal Accident Shows Risk of Using Blind Rivets In-flight separation of the vertical fin from a Eurocopter BK 117 was accelerated

JULY–AUGUST 2000

F L I G H T S A F E T Y F O U N D A T I O N

Aviation Mechanics Bulletin

Fatal AccidentShows Risk of

Using Blind Rivets

F L I G H T S A F E T Y F O U N D A T I O N

Aviation Mechanics BulletinDedicated to the aviation mechanic whose knowledge,craftsmanship and integrity form the core of air safety.

Robert A. Feeler, editorial coordinator

Fatal Accident Shows Risk of Using Blind Rivets .......................................1

Maintenance Alerts ........................................................................................8

News & Tips ............................................................................................... 11

July–August 2000 Vol. 48 No. 4

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Aviation Mechanics BulletinCopyright © 2000 Flight Safety Foundation Inc. ISSN 0005-2140

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On the cover: Eurocopter BK 117

Fatal Accident ShowsRisk of Using Blind Rivets

In-flight separation of the vertical fin from a EurocopterBK 117 was accelerated by the use of blind rivets in place of

solid rivets during installation of a replacement part.

Bart J. Crotty

On April 15, 1997, the crew lostcontrol of a Eurocopter BK 117-B2while departing from the 60thStreet heliport, New York City, NewYork, U.S. The helicopter, ownedand operated by Colgate-PalmoliveCo. and being flown on a visualflight rules flight plan under U.S.Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)Part 91, descended into the EastRiver and sank. One passenger waskilled, the other passenger and thepilot-in-command received seriousinjuries, and the copilot receivedminor injuries.

The accident report by the U.S. Na-tional Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB) said that the probable causeof the accident was “the fatigue fail-ure of the vertical fin, accelerated bythe installation of blind rivetsin lieu of solid rivets in the replace-ment of the [mount support for theyaw stability-augmentation system(SAS)], which resulted in the loss ofhelicopter directional control andcollision with the terrain (water).”(The yaw-SAS-mount support wasa 0.04-inch [1-millimeter] thick, 11-inch by 14-inch [28-centimeter by 36-centimeter] sheet-metal plate on theleft side of the vertical fin.)

The report said that factors contrib-uting to the accident were a lack of

2 FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • AVIATION MECHANICS BULLETIN • JULY–AUGUST 2000

information in the manufacturer’smaintenance manuals about repairsto the yaw-SAS-mount support andthe design of the vertical fin, whichwas susceptible to fatigue cracking.1

The report said that the upper half ofthe helicopter’s vertical fin separatedfrom the aircraft because of fatiguecracking. A laboratory examinationof the wreckage revealed multiplefatigue cracks in the vertical-fin skin,frame assembly, stiffener rib and spar,and compression and deformation onthe right side of the vertical fin.

“Five distinct cracks with indepen-dent initiations near blind-rivet holeswere found,” the report said. “For twosegments, the origins were under theheads of blind rivets.”

A skin crack on the left side of thevertical fin was 5.5 inches (14 centi-meters) long; all but one inch (2.54centimeters) of the crack was beneaththe yaw-SAS-mount support, whichhad been replaced in 1992 because ofa crack.

The left-hand frame assembly wasfractured about 0.5 inch (12.7 milli-meters) below the plane of the skinfracture. The fracture face had “a pol-ished appearance,” the report said,“and further examination did not un-cover the original fracture features.”

The stiffener rib was fractured about0.5 inch above the level of the skin

break, “through a blind rivet hole inone leg and a lightening hole in theother leg. The fatigue initiated at mul-tiple origins on the outboard face ofthe rib, progressed through the thick-ness and away from the hole, in theforward and aft directions. About halfof the rib was fractured in fatigue, withthe remainder in tensile overstress.”

The report said that the fracture faceof the crack on the spar cap, whichintersected a blind-rivet hole, occurred“in an area of the spar where a smalltransverse flange on the aft edge of thespar cap had been machined away toprovide clearance for the lower-actu-ator-mount sheet metal. … Opticalexamination found extensive damageand polishing to the fracture faces con-sistent with fretting and recontact be-tween the faces. No recognizablefracture-mode features were visible.”

The report said that the spar webcrack was a fatigue crack that beganat a solid-rivet hole.

The accident helicopter had accumu-lated 4,186 flight hours and 15,561flight cycles at the time of the acci-dent. Colgate-Palmolive acquiredthe helicopter new in December 1989as a B1 model and later upgraded theB1 to a B2 model. The helicopterwas maintained in accordance withthe manufacturer’s inspection pro-gram, which included a progressivemaintenance program and phasedinspections at 50-hour intervals.

FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION • AVIATION MECHANICS BULLETIN • JULY–AUGUST 2000 3

When a Colgate-Palmolive mainte-nance technician replaced the yaw-SAS-mount support in 1992, thehelicopter had a total airframe timeof 1,694 hours. The original yaw-SAS-mount support had been in-stalled by the manufacturer usingsolid rivets; the replacement mountsupport, which was obtained newfrom the manufacturer, was installedon the upper part of the vertical fin,halfway between the intermediategearbox and the 90-degree gearbox,using CherryMax rivets (part numberCR3243, also designated as NationalAirspace Standard NAS9304B), man-ufactured by Textron AerospaceFasteners of Santa Ana, California,U.S. They were 4/32-inch (3.2-millimeter) blind rivets, oversized by1/64 inch (0.4 millimeter).

The Colgate-Palmolive maintenancetechnician who replaced the yaw-SAS-mount support said that he usedblind rivets because the presence in-side the vertical fin of hydraulic linesleading to the SAS-yaw-servo actua-tor limited work space. Thus, the useof solid rivets would have been diffi-cult unless the hydraulic lines hadbeen removed.

The report said, “The investigationrevealed that the majority of the riv-ets used with the [yaw-SAS-mount]support were easily accessible. … Toimprove accessibility to certain riv-ets, it was necessary to remove thehydraulic lines.”

The report said that the mainte-nance technician, who held a U.S.Federal Aviation Administration(FAA) airframe and powerplant (A&P)mechanic certificate and inspectionauthorization (IA), provided no specif-ic reference for use of the blind rivets.

The Eurocopter BK 117 maintenancemanual contained no specific instruc-tions for replacing the yaw-SAS-mount support or for substituting blindrivets for solid rivets, but Eurocopterreferred maintenance personnel toFAA Advisory Circular (AC) 43.13-1A, “Acceptable Methods, Techniquesand Practices – Aircraft Inspection andRepair” for guidance on repairs thatwere not discussed in the manual.

The maintenance technician saidthat the NAS numbers cited inAC 43.13-1A for blind rivets wereoutdated and that CherryMax rivetswere considered “the same as solidrivets and had been used in many ap-plications as a replacement for solidrivets.”

The Colgate-Palmolive director ofmaintenance, who held an FAA A&Pcertificate with IA and who approvedthe helicopter for return to service,said that the NAS numbers in the ACwere outdated and that he “believedthe rivets were OK for use but did notcross-reference them specifically.”

AC 43.13-1A stated, “Blind rivets inthe MS-20600 through MS-20603


series rivets and the mechanicallylocked stem NAS 1398, 1399, 1738and 1739 rivets [numbers that designateCherryLock rivets, which predatedCherryMax rivets] may be substitutedfor solid rivets in accordance withthe blind rivet or aircraft manufactur-er’s recommendations. They should notbe used where the looseness or failureof a few rivets will impair the airwor-thiness of the aircraft.”

[Other FAA publications, includingAC 65-9A, “Airframe and PowerplantMechanics General Handbook,”Chapter 6, and AC 65-15A, “Airframeand Powerplant Mechanics AirframeHandbook,” Chapter 5, both issued in1976, said, “Self-plugging (mechani-cal lock) rivets display all the strengthcharacteristics of solid-shank rivetsand in most cases can be substitutedrivet for rivet.”2,3 (Self-plugging me-chanical lock rivets are one of threetypes of blind rivets; CherryMax riv-ets and CherryLock rivets are self-plugging mechanical lock rivets.)]

Nevertheless, the accident report said,“although maintenance personnel fromColgate-Palmolive reported that Cher-ryMax rivets could be substituted forCherryLock rivets, a check with Tex-tron Aerospace Fasteners and the FAAfailed to produce any written documen-tation authorizing the substitution.”

The accident report said that thevertical-fin spar could be inspectedfor cracking only by removing the

tail-rotor drive shaft and the yaw-SASactuator. The BK 117 maintenancemanual originally required their re-moval every 1,200 flight hours. Euro-copter subsequently increased theinspection interval, first to 2,400 flighthours and later to 3,600 flight hours.

Nevertheless, Colgate-Palmolivemaintenance personnel said thatthey continued to conduct their in-spections every 1,200 flight hours andthat they had conducted two inspec-tions after the replacement of theyaw-SAS-mount support. The lastinspection was conducted in April1996, at 3,600 flight hours.

The report said that the “holder,left-hand assembly,” located on thevertical fin about six inches (15 cen-timeters) above the fatigue crack, hadbeen installed incorrectly after the tailboom was reskinned in December1990. Colgate-Palmolive mainte-nance personnel said that the repair,which was performed by a contract-ed FAA-certified repair station, wasnecessary because of cracking nearthe intermediate gearbox.

An FAA engineering office saidthat an incorrectly installed holder“would have negligible effect on theinitiation or propagation of the fatiguecracks found in the tail spar and skinof the accident helicopter.”

Nevertheless, the engineering officesaid, “If the holder was installed


incorrectly … the stress concentrationwould increase at the mounting sup-port cutout due to plate bending andclamp up-loads on the fasteners.”

The NTSB metallurgist participatingin the investigation said that a draw-ing (drawn after the accident) submit-ted by Colgate-Palmolive showed thatthe crack on the cutout of the yaw-SAS-mount support had been over theholder, left-hand assembly. Colgate-Palmolive said that the original yaw-SAS-mount support was not availablefor examination and that no photo-graphs existed of the unit. Therefore,the location of the crack could not beconfirmed.

After the accident, Eurocopter issuedAlert Service Bulletin (ASB) MBB-MK117-30-106, and FAA issued Air-worthiness Directive (AD) 97-09-16to require “immediate and repetitivevisual inspections” of the vertical-finspar on BK 117 helicopters to checkfor “cracks, loose rivets and otheranomalies.” The AD also instructedoperators to inspect visually theskin and the left-hand frame andright-hand frame. The inspections re-vealed cracks in 10 [of about 125] BK117s in the United States, includingone helicopter that had been operat-ed by Colgate-Palmolive but had beentraded before the accident. Eight ofthe 10 helicopters had cracks inthe vertical-fin spar. One helicopterhad a crack in the left-hand frameassembly. The location of the crack

in the tenth helicopter was notreported.

Revisions of the ASB instructedoperators to repair cracks in thevertical-fin spar and the left-handframe and right-hand frame and —later — to reinforce the vertical-finspar, frames and adjacent skin. AnASB revision in December 1997 de-leted a reference that had alloweduse of blind rivets in repairs or mod-ifications of the vertical-fin spar.

FAA AD 97-20-16 mandated thestructural repairs, modifications andrepetitive inspections recommendedby the revised ASBs, and AD 98-24-13 prohibited use of blind rivets dur-ing repairs or modifications of thevertical-fin spar.

“Inspections of BK 117s resultingfrom the FAA … ADs [and similardirectives from authorities in othercountries] revealed that at least fourother helicopters worldwide haddeveloped fatigue cracks in thevertical-fin spar,” NTSB said in thesafety recommendation issued to co-incide with the public release of thefinal accident report.

“In addition, Eurocopter reportsindicate that before the Colgate-Palmolive accident, seven helicoptershad developed fatigue cracking atvarious cross-sections of the vertical-fin spar. However, several of the fa-tigue cracks were found in areas not


specifically addressed by the in-spection requirements of AD 98-24-13. Therefore, the Safety Boardremains concerned that there may beadditional incidents of fatigue crack-ing of BK 117 vertical fins. Further,on the basis of its design review ofthe BK 117 vertical fin, the SafetyBoard is also concerned that normalvisual inspection techniques … maynot be adequate to detect crackingdamage in the underlying areas of thespar or leading-edge skin.”

Therefore, NTSB recommended thatFAA conduct a fatigue evaluation anddamage-tolerance analysis of the ver-tical fin to ensure that inspection re-quirements prescribed in the AD areadequate to detect the growth ofcracks in the underlying areas of themodified spar and the leading-edgeskin and to ensure that the vertical-fin spar is “not susceptible to fatiguefailure beyond those areas specifical-ly identified by AD 98-24-13. If thesusceptibility is not so limited or theinspection requirements are not ade-quate, the AD should be supersededto ensure that all fatigue cracks willbe detected.”

In the recommendation, NTSBsaid that, although the CherryMaxCR3243 blind rivet “is generally ac-cepted as a replacement for the NAS1738B blind rivet, no FAA guidanceconfirms the interchangeability ofthese rivets.”

FAA’s AC 43.13-1B, issued in Sep-tember 1998 to supersede AC 43.13-1A, provides no information aboutthe joint fatigue life of materials whenthey are joined with blind rivets.

“Postaccident testing conducted byTextron Aerospace Fasteners … andearlier testing conducted by Eurocop-ter consistently demonstrated that thejoint fatigue life of materials fastenedwith blind rivets is less than the jointfatigue life of the same materials fas-tened with solid rivets,” NTSB said.“The Safety Board is concerned thatother maintenance personnel may in-stall blind rivets in applications wheresolid rivets are required, thereby re-ducing the structural fatigue life ofan airframe.”

NTSB said that FAA should “issue amaintenance alert to all certificatedairframe mechanics and inspectors tonotify them of the circumstances ofthis accident and to inform them ofthe hazards associated with the instal-lation of blind rivets.”

NTSB also recommended that FAA:

• Revise AC 43.13-1B to requirethat operators substitute fastenertypes “only when the applicationhas been specifically authorizedby the airframe manufacturer or arepresentative of the [FAA]”; and,

• Revise FARs Part 43, AppendixA, to classify repairs that involve


the substitution of fastener typesas major repairs.♦

[Editorial note: This article, exceptwhere specifically noted, was basedon U.S. National TransportationSafety Board (NTSB) Factual ReportNYC97FA076, NTSB Brief of Ac-cident and NTSB Safety Recom-mendation A-00-46 through -50. The234-page factual report includesphotographs.]

References1. U.S. National Transportation

Safety Board (NTSB) accidentreport no. NYC07FA076 saidthat an additional factor was thelack of an adequate passengerbriefing. There were no eva-cuation cards in the cabin, andseveral regular passengers oncompany helicopters said thatthey were not aware of the pro-cedures for opening the maincabin door, the location and pro-cedures for opening emergencyexits and the location and proce-dures for use of personal flota-tion equipment. The passengersalso said that passenger briefingswere given only to new passen-gers before their first flight on thehelicopter. NTSB recommendedthat the U.S. Federal AviationAdministration (FAA) requirethat passengers in large andturbine-powered multi-engine

helicopters receive passengerbriefings similar to those re-quired for passengers in largeand turbine-powered multi-engine airplanes.

2. FAA. Advisory Circular (AC)65-9A. “Airframe and Power-plant Mechanics General Hand-book,” Chapter 6. 1976.

3. FAA. AC65-15A. “Airframe andPowerplant Mechanics AirframeHandbook,” Chapter 5. 1976.

About the Author

Bart J. Crotty is an airworthiness,maintenance and safety consultantand chairman of the maintenancehuman factors committee of theInternational Society of Air SafetyInvestigators. He is a former U.S. Fed-eral Aviation Administration (FAA)airworthiness inspector and trainerand a former International Civil Avi-ation Organization airworthiness spe-cialist. Crotty has worked for repairstations, airlines, a large aircraft man-ufacturer, law firms, consulting firms,a safety organization and several na-tional civil aviation authorities. Hiscareer spans 39 years, with about halfof that time in countries other than theUnited States. He has an FAA airframeand powerplant mechanic certificateand a bachelor of science degree inaeronautical engineering. Crotty re-sides in Springfield, Virginia, U.S.


MAINTENANCE ALERTS

NTSB RecommendsAlternative to

Nickel-CadmiumPlating

The U.S. National TransportationSafety Board (NTSB) has cited twoengine failures in recommending arequirement for an alternative tonickel-cadmium plating to protectsteel rotating engine parts againstcorrosion.

The recommendation to the U.S. Fed-eral Aviation Administration (FAA)followed an Oct. 7, 1998, accident inwhich a Continental Airlines Boeing727 had an uncontained failure ofits no. 2 (center) engine, a Pratt &Whitney JT8D-9A, during a takeoffroll at Miami International Airport,Florida, U.S.

“The captain reported that while hewas advancing the engine power le-vers, he heard a loud bang and im-mediately retarded the power levers,rejecting the takeoff,” the safetyrecommendation said.

The airplane was stopped, the flightcrew discharged one fire bottle, andall crewmembers and passengersdeplaned safety. No injuries werereported.

The NTSB investigation revealedthat fragments of the no. 2 engine’seighth-stage high-pressure compres-sor (HPC) hub had penetrated theengine, the cowlings and the air-plane’s vertical stabilizer.

“Investigators determined that the tra-jectory of the liberated hub fragmentshad come within inches of the ruddercontrol cables,” the safety recommen-dation said. “Pieces of the engine andcowling were recovered from the run-way and surrounding areas.”

Airline records showed that theeighth-stage hub had accumulated15,539 cycles, including 176 cyclessince its last overhaul. The hub’spublished life limit is 20,000 cycles.

During the last overhaul, nickel-cadmium plating was applied. TheJT8D engine manual and overhaulstandard practices manual requirethat the plating process be accom-plished by coating the base material(steel) with a layer of nickel 0.0004inch to 0.0007 inch (0.010 milli-meter to 0.018 millimeter) thick,applying a layer of cadmium 0.0001inch to 0.0002 inch (0.002 milli-meter to 0.005 millimeter) thick andthen baking the hub for one hour atabout 640 degrees Fahrenheit (338degrees Celsius).


A metallurgical examination revealedthat the primary fracture of the hubstemmed from a crack that extendedfrom the rim radius partially into thebore.

“The fracture-initiation site containeda significant amount of cadmium incontact with the base material and onthe fracture surface, indicating thatthe hub failed because of cadmiumembrittlement,” the safety recommen-dation said.

“The source of the cadmium was the[nickel-cadmium] plating on the ex-terior surface of the hub. Analysis ofthe plating on the multiple crosssections through the hub revealedprimarily a single layer of diffused[nickel-cadmium plating] rangingfrom 0.00008 inch to 0.00019 inch[0.002 millimeter to 0.005 milli-meter] thick and no pure nickel layeradjacent to the steel surface.”

The exact thickness of the initial lay-er of nickel could not be determined,but the thickness was less than re-quired by the JT8D manuals.

“This deficiency suggests that thenickel-thickness inspection specifiedin the maintenance manual was eitheromitted or performed incorrectly,” thesafety recommendation said.

During the investigation, NTSBlearned that a customer audit of the

facility that performed the nickel-cadmium plating procedure had re-vealed that the layer of nickel wasbeing inspected visually but wasnot being measured, as required. AnNTSB employee also witnessed anelectrical malfunction in a nickel-plating tank that prevented sufficientnickel from being applied, the safetyrecommendation said.

The recommendation said that aprevious uncontained engine failure ona United Airlines Boeing 737 duringtakeoff from O’Hare InternationalAirport, Chicago, Illinois, U.S., alsoinvolved an improperly plated part.That accident prompted NTSB to rec-ommend revision of the plating guide-lines. In response, FAA issued FlightStandards Information Bulletin forAirworthiness 98-11, directing main-tenance inspectors to perform repairstation audits to ensure that properplating procedures are followed.

The recommendation said that Unit-ed Airlines has discontinued volun-tarily the use of nickel-cadmiumplating and has begun usingSermetel, an aluminum-based paintapproved for use as an alternativeto nickle-cadmium in the platingprocess. The airline believes thatSermetel provides better protectionagainst corrosion and erosion.

“The board considers the use ofsuch alternative corrosion protection


methods important in the effort to pre-vent failures of steel rotating parts inturbine engines,” the safety recommen-dation said. “Therefore, the board be-lieves that the FAA should require theuse of alternative corrosion-protectionmethods instead of [nickel-cadmium]plating on steel rotating engine parts toeliminate the hazards introduced by im-proper [nickel-cadmium] plating.”

The earlier FAA action “does not ap-pear to be sufficient in preventing en-gine parts from being improperlyplated during routine operations whenan inspector is not present or if theprocess is momentarily left unattend-ed,” the safety recommendation said.

“Further, the events discussed in thisletter suggest that such improper[nickel-cadmium] plating techniquesmay continue to be performed in in-dustry and that maintenance person-nel may not be receiving adequateinitial and recurrent training in the …plating process.”

NTSB also recommended that FAA is-sue a flight standards information bul-letin to require principal maintenanceinspectors to ensure that facilities per-forming nickel-cadmium plating havea training program for the process.

Changes Ordered inLanding Gear on

Airbus A300-600 Models

The U.S. Federal Aviation Adminis-tration (FAA) has ordered modifica-tion of the electrical looms of thenose landing gear and the main land-ing gear on Airbus Model A300-600airplanes.

The FAA airworthiness directive(AD), which took effect June 16,2000, also requires changes in therotor-shaft attachment on tacho-meters for the nose landing gear andmain landing gear. The AD requiresthat operators of the aircraft com-plete the modifications within 180days.

FAA said that the modifications areneeded “to prevent erratic operationof the wheel tachometers, whichcould result in degradation of thebraking performance and possibleincreased landing roll.”

The modifications must be performedin accordance with Airbus ServiceBulletin A300-32-6069, Revision 1,or Airbus Service Bulletin A300-32-6077, Revision 1.♦


NEWS & TIPS

Urethane AdhesiveBonds Thermoplastics,

Metals

A new urethane adhesive has beendeveloped for bonding thermoplas-tics, fiberglass, glass and metals, themanufacturer said.

Ciba Specialty Chemicals, Perfor-mance Polymers’ Uralane 6100-A/Bclear urethane can be applied withoutsanding or other surface preparation.The urethane gels in two minutes tothree minutes, can be handled after onehour and is cured after two days at roomtemperature or two hours at 150 de-grees Fahrenheit (66 degrees Celsius).

The urethane is designed to producedurable, invisible bond lines in theassembly of aircraft parts and inother uses, the manufacturer said.

For more information: Maria Pate,Ciba Specialty Chemicals, 5121 SanFernando Road West, Los Angeles,CA 90039, U.S. Telephone: +1 (818)265-7210.

Space-saving SwitchDeveloped for Use

In Avionics

A compact switch has been devel-oped for the avionics industry to

give users a linear-activated switchfunction with either momentary(spring return) action or detented(push-pull) action, the manufacturersaid.

The linear function makes theswitch suitable for use for annuncia-tor panel tests, transponder push-to-identify applications and globalpositioning system function selec-tions. The switch is available withsingle shafts or concentric shafts.

For more information: Janco Corp.,3111 Winona Ave., Burbank, CA91504, U.S. Telephone: +1 (818)846-1800.

Shears Have SerratedEdge for Cutting

Kevlar Fibers

Shears have been developed with aserrated edge on one blade for cuttingKevlar fibers, the manufacturer said.

Kevlar Shear


The Xuron Model 9180 Kevlar Shearhas cushioned rubber grips and a re-turn spring that opens the cutting headafter every cut. The shears have a ser-rated edge to prevent fibers from slid-ing and a sharp edge for cutting. Theshears are designed for use on fiberoptic cables and other cable insulations.

For more information: Abby Robey,Marketing, Xuron Corp., 62 Industri-al Park Road, Saco, ME 04072, U.S.Telephone: +1 (207) 283-1401.

Charger/AnalyzerServices All Battery

Chemistries

The Universal 60 battery charger andbattery analyzer offers standard fea-tures and an ability to service all bat-tery chemistries and to provide on-siteself-calibration, the manufacturer said.

The Universal 60 has digital-currentsettings, and its design enables theUniversal 60 to charge batteries anddischarge batteries at specified cur-rent settings of up to 60 amperes.

For more information: Christie Elec-tric Corp., 18120 South Broadway,Gardena, CA 90428, U.S. Telephone:+1 (310) 715-1402.

Fast-curingChemical Adhesive

Seals Screw Threads

The Precote screw-locking and thread-sealing adhesive system uses a mi-croencapsulation process to preventpremature hardening because of chem-ical reactions to moisture or solventpenetration, the manufacturer said.

Universal 60 Battery Charger

Precote Screw-locking andThread-sealing Adhesive System

The chemical adhesive for fastenerscan be applied to internal threads orexternal threads of fasteners or nutsand to thread sizes M4 and larger.The adhesive is available in severalgrades for thread-sealing and screw-locking under varying conditions.

For more information: Nylok Fasten-er Corp., 15260 Hallmark Drive,Macomb, MI 28042-4007, U.S. Tele-phone: (800) 791-7101 (U.S.) or +1(810) 786-0100.♦

Join Flight Safety Foundation

For more information, contact Ann Hill, senior manager, membership and development,by e-mail: [email protected] or by telephone: +1 (703) 739-6700, ext. 105.

Visit our World Wide Web site at http://www.flightsafety.org

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Documents

Fatal Accident Shows Risk of Using Blind Rivets · Fatal Accident Shows Risk of Using Blind Rivets In-flight separation of the vertical fin from a Eurocopter BK 117 was accelerated