Molly FasslerProfessor WeinbergSenior SeminarThesis Chapter

Stoic Lekta[footnoteRef:2] [2: I have included this section as a quick summary to lekton so that any reference to them in the following chapter can be understood. However, in the final draft, this section will be in a preceding chapter that discusses what lekta are and their role in human rationality.]

Lekta, or sayables as they are often translated, are distinct from the actual (physical) words uttered in speech and are more accurately described as being the content or meaning of our thoughts and language. Brad Inwood describes them as more that just the entities which give meaning to uttered words; lekta are themselves the substance of our internal discourse...[footnoteRef:3] Further description of lektas various properties is helpful in elucidating their meaning. For this I turn to a description of lekta given by Diogenes: [3: Inwood, Brad. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism (Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 43]

Sayables...are divided into complete and incomplete, the latter being ones whose linguistic expression is unfinished, e.g.[Someone] writes, for we ask, Who? In complete sayables the linguistic expression is finished, e.g. Socrates writes. So incomplete sayables include predicates, whereas ones that are complete include propositions, syllogisms, questions, and enquiries.[footnoteRef:4] [4: Diogenes, Laertius. Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Trans. R. D. Hicks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980, Section 7.63 (Herein referenced by DL and section number)]

If an incomplete lekton, consisting of an unqualified predicate, is nevertheless still a lekton, then a completed lekton implies that something distinct from the lekton has been added that explains the qualitative change of the lekton. By Diogeness description, we can take this something to be the subject that qualifies the predicate. As the predicate seems to be the only thing present in both, and as both are described as lekta, one can say that lekton consists of a predicate.

Chapter 2: Stoic CausationLekta, as essential features of human reasoning seem to have some sense of causal power, for according to the Stoics, it seems that in some sense they cause humans to be rational. But if the Stoics truly believe that all that exists in the world is material, and only material things have causal power, than this picture of lekta and their place in human reasoning cannot be correct. It is clear that in order to reach a conclusion of whether or not Stoic lekton truly are contradictory to other tenets of Stoic metaphysics, we must first reach a detailed conclusion of what the Stoics actually characterize as a cause. As materialists, the Stoics restrict their description of causal entities to physical bodies, which they specify in multiple accounts. [footnoteRef:5] Furthermore, they only allow for the interaction of bodies with other bodies. If lekta are actually described as incorporeal, as they quite indisputably do seem to be, and the Stoics are truly materialists in the typical sense, in that they only allow material concrete entities to have causal power, then lekta must have no causal power. Even more obviously problematic is the apparent immaterial and material causal interaction between lekta and causal bodies generally. In Stoic aetiology, lekta are often described as the essential products of causes. In many accounts, Stoics are accredited with arguing that if a body is actually a cause, it has caused a lekton.[footnoteRef:6] But what is it to say that a body caused a lekton? Solving the puzzle of the apparent interaction of incorporeals (lekta) with bodies (causes) requires an understanding of what Stoics mean by cause. This leads to the project of this chapter: constructing an accurate and detailed account of Stoic cause. [5: Stobaeus 1.138.14-139.4 (LS 55A); Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, 9.211 (in Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers V.1 herein just referenced by LS, 55B); Aetius 1.11.5 (LS 55G); DL 7.55] [6: Frede, Michael. "The Original Notion of Cause." Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. By Malcolm Schofield, et. al. Oxford: Clarendon, 1980; pp. 233]

The General Notion of CauseIn general, when we speak of a cause or something having causal power we mean that it does something. We typically require that a cause is active in that it brings about some change or event. But determining the sort of metaphysical category that causes fit into is controversial. Colloquially, we often say that events, people, and objects are causes. If I wave hello to a friend while riding my bike and hit a pothole and fall, there could be many different causes named: me, my waving hello, the bike, the pothole, etc. It may also be some combination of any of these. If cause is an event, it is difficult to determine or describe exactly how an event, which is an abstract entity, not a concrete physical object, interacts with the physical world in a way that causes physical changes in physical objects. But it also seems incorrect to say that the pothole caused me to fall on my bike. For it was not simply the pothole, but the pothole being in the road and me riding over it. Causes require context because they inherently take place in a system with multiple entities, otherwise there would be no interaction and hence no causal relation. But we are still faced with the question of what exactly a cause is. Similarly, it is difficult to pinpoint exactly what a cause causes. Is it an event, a quality, or an object that was caused? The project of this chapter is to understand how exactly the Stoics would answer such questions.Background to Stoic CauseBoth Aristotle and Plato, each of whom set out their own notions of cause, preceded the Stoics. Plato is generally attributed as the source of the concept of an active cause, however he did not limit cause only to active causes.[footnoteRef:7] He defined cause (using the word aitia) very generally as that through which [diho] a thing comes to be.[footnoteRef:8] This general account allows for an inclusion of many things that we may not generally think of as active causes. And it is Aristotle who further specifies and categorizes types of causes (again using aitia) that may not fit in with our general notion of a cause as active. In Physics, Aristotle sets out four notions of cause: [7: Frede, pp. 218] [8: Plato, Cratylus, 413a in Plato, John M. Cooper, and D. S. Hutchinson. Complete Works. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1997. ]

In one way, then, that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called a cause, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species. In another way, the form or the archetype, i.e. the definition of the essence, and its genera are called causes (e.g. of the octave relation of 2:1 and generally number), and the parts in the definition.Again, the primary source of the change or rest; e.g. the man who deliberated is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what changes of what is changed.Again, in the sense of end or that for the sake of which a thing is done, e.g. health Is the cause of walking about. (Why is he walking about? We say: To be healthy, and, having said that, we think we have assigned the cause.) The same is true also of all the intermediate steps which are brought about through the action of something else as means towards the end, e.g. reduction of flesh, purging, drugs, or surgical instruments are means towards health. All these things are for the sake of the end, though they differ from one another in that some are activities, other instruments. This then perhaps exhausts the number of ways in which the term cause is used.[footnoteRef:9] [9: Aristotle, Physics, II.3.194b24-195a3, in Aristotle, and Jonathan Barnes; The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984. ]

Aristotle gives four sorts of cause: the material, the form, whatever it is which made it, and the purpose.[footnoteRef:10] Instead of pinpointing one specific sort of thing that is a cause, he allows for an all-inclusive sense of cause made up of four primary types. Furthermore, Aristotle allows that these causes can occur simultaneously, so that two or more may very well be bringing about the same thing. However, these four types are not all included if we require that a cause be active. [10: Hankinson, R. J. "Cause and Explanation." The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. By Keimpe Algra. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1999; pp. 479]

Following Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus, Hellenistic philosophers shift their notion of cause to be exclusively active cause. Sextus Empiricus (a Skeptic) even writes that despite all of the disagreement amongst the competing philosophical schools of the time, they all agreed that the cause is that because of which in virtue of its being active the effect comes about.[footnoteRef:11] Preceding this statement, he specifies that the following discussion will be one concerning active cause (energetikon aition). This specification clearly indicates awareness that there are other ideas of cause that could include non-active causes.[footnoteRef:12] In texts that follow, the majority of the written opinions seem to support Sextuss claim. Ancient philosophers such as Clement, Simplicius, Damascius, and Senecabelonging to the Stoic and Neoplatonic schools--all indicate that their notion of cause is excluded to active cause.[footnoteRef:13] Clearly, at this point in history, the Platonic and Aristotelian notion of cause has been abandoned. Stoic cause should therefore be interpreted as exclusively active cause. What remains to be determined though, is exactly what sort of active thing cause is. [11: Frede, pp. 218] [12: Frede pp. 219] [13: Frede, pp. 219]

The Stobaeus PassageIn a passage meant to elucidate the Stoic position, Stobaeus reports on Zeno and Chrysippuss (two of the essential and founding Stoic philosophers) definitions of cause. The passage though, has spawned a variety of interpretations of what it truly means, and what Stoic cause truly is. Stobaeus originally wrote:(1) Zeno says that a cause is that because of which (dio), while that of which it is the cause is an attribute; and that the cause is a body, while that of which it is a cause is a predicate. (2) He says that it is impossible that the cause be present yet that of which it is the cause not belong. (3) This thesis has the following force. A cause is that because of which something occurs, as, for example, it is because of prudence that being prudent occurs, because of soul that being alive occurs, and because of temperance that being temperate occurs(4) Chrysippus says that cause is that because of which; and that the cause is an existent and a body, ; and that the cause is because, while that of which it is the cause is why? (5) He says that an explanation [aitia] is the statement of a cause [aition], or statement [logos] concerning the cause [aition] qua cause [aition].[footnoteRef:14] [14: Stobaeus 1.138.14-139.4 (LS 55A)]

This passage gives what may initially seem to be a very clear outline of what a Stoic cause is. From the passage, we gain some general requirements of Stoic cause:1. Cause is a body; it is physical. (From 1)2. A cause is a cause to a predicate. (From 1)3. A cause is necessary and sufficient for bringing about its effect. (From 2)4. A cause is responsible for bringing about something; it is active. (From 3)5. Cause and explanation are related, but not the same. Explanation is the statement that expresses by what virtue the cause (a body) is a cause. (From 5)

The interaction between corporeals and incorporeals is referenced in Stobaeuss passage, and it is this interaction that poses difficulty for those attempting to understand and reconcile Stoic materialism with Stoic aetiology. If cause is a body, then, according to Stoic metaphysical accounts it must only interact with other bodies.[footnoteRef:15] And yet, Stobaeus quite directly states that a cause is a cause to a predicate an incorporeal. So here, it seems we have a body interacting with an incorporeal. [15: Cicero, Academica 1.39, (LS 45A); Sextus Empiricus, Against the professors 8.263 (LS 45B); Nemsius 78,7-79,2 (LS 45 C)]

Furthermore, Stobaeuss passage distinguishes between cause (aition) and explanation or reasons (aitia), two things that are often conflagrated or at the very least confused with each other. We commonly say things like The rain is the reason the ground is wet but also The rain made the ground wet. The rain can be understood both as the reason and the cause, and here those terms seem synonymous, but the Stoics want to distinguish these from each other. If aitia is not a cause, and aition is not a reason, then we must clarify exactly what these terms mean and what role they play in Stoic aetiology. In constructing an accurate description of the Stoic theory of cause, one must not only explain how aitia and aition are distinct, but also how the Stoics deal with an apparent interaction of bodies and incorporeals (material and immaterial). Michael Frede, Susanne Bobzien, and Marcelo D. Boeri all take up this task, with varying degrees of success. In what follows, I will assess each of their interpretations, however, I hold that only Boeris is an accurate and coherent account.Fredes InterpretationOne possible explanation that could resolve the apparent issue is to expand the notion of body so that it includes non-concrete or immaterial objects, and thus predicates can be described as bodies and the interaction of the cause and the predicate poses no problem. This is the strategy Michael Frede takes up in The Original Notion of Cause. Frede begins from the premise that Stoic causes must be active, on account of the previously described evidence that this was not only the Stoic view but also the predominant view of many Hellenistic philosophers.[footnoteRef:16] The problem with Fredes argument begins when he attempts to try to hold on to Stoic materialism, while simultaneously allowing that Stoics allow for non-physical objects to be categorized as bodies. Although he acknowledges that Stoic causes must be bodies when he states only bodies can do something and can be affected, only bodies can interact he weakens this statement by continuing with At this point it is important to remember, though, that for the Stoics not just physical objects, but also stuffs and qualities and mixtures thereof are bodies.[footnoteRef:17] It is unclear what is meant by Fredes use of stuffs and unfortunately he fails to expand on this, so I cannot make any judgments of the accuracy of this inclusion. Even so, Fredes concession that bodies include anything but physical objects is not loyal to the true Stoic position. Indeed, multiple sources quite blatantly refute just this. Diogenes Laertius clearly asserts that for the Stoics, body is what has threefold extension length, breadth and depth; this is also called solid body.[footnoteRef:18] Certainly, body here seems limited to those things that literally occupy physical space. This position is only further strengthened by Galens description: Whydo they [the Stoics] say that what has threefold extension together with resistance is a definition of body alone, and do not also apply this definition to colour, flavor, taste and every remaining attribute?. [footnoteRef:19] Galens complaint with the Stoics is that their definition of body is too limited because it does not include non-physical attributes. Perhaps Frede would be right to allow Galens definition to encompass things other than physical objects, but to attribute this to the Stoic position is clearly a mischaracterization. In Fredes attempt to strengthen the Stoic view by expanding the definition of body he crucially ignores that the Stoics did not actually hold this view, and so fails to present an accurate account of Stoic cause. [16: Frede pp. 219-221] [17: Frede pp. 229] [18: DL 7.135] [19: Galen, On incorporeal qualities 19.483, 13-16 (LS 45F)]

What Frede does seem to get right, however, is his interpretation of aitia and aition. Frede interprets aitia as a propositional item [lekta] of a certain kind and what the causing body the aitioncauses to be true of the body it is affecting. Indeed, the first known reference to lekta comes from Clement in his description of Stoic causal theory when he states that causes are causes of lekta.[footnoteRef:20] Aition, the cause, is a body, but it causes a certain lekta, an incorporeal, to be true of another body. [20: Frede, pp. 233]

Bobziens InterpretationSusanne Bobzien, in her paper, Chrysippus Theory of Causes, has a vastly opposing interpretation of the Stoic use of aitia/aition distinction. As opposed to Frede, who clearly acknowledges aitia as a predicate and thus lekton, Bobzien proposes that aitia is actually physical just like aition, stating it is mistaken to place the Stoic aitia among the incorporeals, making it a proposition, or translating it by explanation.[footnoteRef:21] As she explains, the only evidence for such a translation is a passage from Galen that references a similar usage from Diocles of Carystus, which she believes to be insufficient.[footnoteRef:22] Instead, she argues for an interpretation of aitia as meaning the specific portion of matter or body that makes the aition (the causing body) the cause.[footnoteRef:23] So, in the case of a knife cutting a piece of bread, the aitia is the portion of the knife that actually causes the bread to be cut, like the sharp edge. She thus understands the Stobaeus passage to read, aitia is the reason in the cause, or the reason in respect of the cause as cause.[footnoteRef:24] This eliminates any incorporeals from the Stoic picture of cause, and thus any problematic interaction, but Bobziens translation does not make sense in the context of many sources on Stoic cause. As discussed before, many sources refer to causation as a triadic relation: one that includes a body which becomes the cause to a body of something incorporeal.[footnoteRef:25] Bobziens account makes no reference to any such incorporeal. But almost all accounts of Stoic cause from ancient sources refer to such an incorporeal, be it as just incorporeal, predicate, proposition or lekton. Perhaps Bobzien is correct in stating that the only evidence that explicitly defines aitia as an account or explanation of the cause is the Diocles passage that Galen references, but Bobziens alternative theory loses explanatory power because it fails to account for the frequent referencing to incorporeals in the Stoic theory of causation. Any complete account of the Stoic theory will be able to explain this frequent inclusion, and so Bobziens fails to truly address the issue. [21: Bobzien, Susanne. "Chyrsippus' Theory of Causes." Topics in Stoic Philosophy. By Katerina Ierodiakonou. Oxford: Clarenden, 1999, pp. 199] [22: Bobzien, pp.199] [23: Bobzien, pp. 201] [24: Bobzien pp. 202] [25: Sextus empiricus, Against the professors 9.211 (LS 55B)]

Boeris InterpretationIn his paper, The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals, Marcelo D. Boeri is primarily concerned with arguing for the importance of the distinction between bodies, or material things, and incorporeals in Stoicism. Boeri argues against both ancient and modern critics of Stoicism who find the idea of incorporeals to be contradictory or at the very least unnecessary to the Stoic claims about bodies being the only things that exist.[footnoteRef:26] Boeri instead argues that incorporeals, rather than being contradictory or unnecessary, are in fact essential and entirely complementary to the materialist aspects of Stoic theory. As evidence for this complementary interaction, Boeri points to the way that Stoics deal with cause. The Stoics directly contradict the Platonic and Aristotelian view of cause as purely immaterial forms and ends and material bodies only serving as necessary conditions.[footnoteRef:27] As Boeri understands the Stoic description of cause, cause itself, or cause in the strict sense (aition)[footnoteRef:28] is always and can only be a body, but causal accounts (aitia), which are essential to our understanding of cause itself, are strictly incorporeal.[footnoteRef:29] This distinction between causes in the strict sense and causal accounts allows the Stoics to retain the materialist notion of causality that seems so pervasive in their texts, but also gives importance to the incorporeal aitia which might otherwise seem extraneous or indeed contradictory. [26: Seneca, Letters 58.13-15 (LS 27A)] [27: Boeri, Marcelo D. "The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals." The Review of Metaphysics (2001), pp. 726] [28: Boeri, pp. 738] [29: Boeri, pp.742]

Boeri argues that while the Stoics may use similar concepts or vocabulary to Plato and Aristotle, their theory of cause is actually a very different one than theirs. Boeri bluntly states, It seems to me that this [the Stoic] thesis contains an implicit and serious attack on the Platonic and Aristotelian view[footnoteRef:30] Indeed, the many Stoic texts[footnoteRef:31] that exclude anything but the material from having causal power present good evidence that Stoic causal theory is making no effort to make any allowance for an inclusion of Aristotelian or Platonic immaterial forms and ends as entities that might have causal power in the strict sense of cause. Stoic causal theory should not be viewed as an extension of Aristotelian or Platonic theories, but instead as a direct and opposing response to these theories. Distinguishing the Stoic theory from these previous theories can prevent ascribing views to the Stoics that are in fact not supported by any evidence, but only assumed out of an inaccurate association of Stoicism with these theories. [30: Boeri, pp.726] [31: For examples see: Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors 9.211 (LS 55B); DL 7.55; Seneca, Letters 106.4-5; Aetius I.II.5 (LS 55G)]

This sort of faulty assumption may lead to a mistaken interpretation of the Stoic use of the aitia and aition that might equate the two, as Plato did, rather than hold them as distinct terms. Boeri acknowledges and agrees that both Galen and Plutarch use aitia and aition synonymously in their descriptions of Stoic theory, and therefore formalizing or detailing any distinction between them may seem unnecessary or incorrect, however, the Stoics do not actually use these terms in the same way.[footnoteRef:32] Boeri argues that these sources are not reliable as both are attacking those Stoics and their causal theory. Furthermore, Galen acknowledges that he uses the terms interchangeably, not necessarily that the Stoics do.[footnoteRef:33] Looking at the Stobaeus passage alone seems evidence enough that the Stoics used the terms differently. For if it were not the case that they used them distinctly, the last sentence of the passage (He sayscause.) would be absolutely nonsensical. If it were the case that aitia and aition meant the same thing, this sentence would define aitia as being a statement of itself. Perhaps opponents of Stoicism would be happy to ascribe such an illogical statement to the Stoics, but there seems to be a better explanation of the statements meaning and of Stoic causal theory. [32: Boeri, pp.740. He cites the uses of aitia and aition in Platos Timaeus 28a4-5; Philebus 26e and Arisotles Physics 2.3] [33: Boeri, pp. 741]

Boeri recommends interpreting aitia and aition as distinct but related terms, and in doing so helps to clarify a possible interpretation of Stoic causal theory. He argues that the aitia should be understood as an incorporeal entity the propositional item describing the fact or event caused by the aition.[footnoteRef:34] The aition then, is understood as the actual causing body, or strict sense cause. An aition causes something to another body, and this something is expressed by the ascription of a certain predicate. For example, say I touch a piece of clay, creating an indent in its shape. My finger (a body) is the aition, for it caused something to the clay (another body), namely its being indented (a predicate). But being indented is both a physical embodiment of the clay as it is now and an incorporeal description of the clays such state. The aition causes a physical change to the clay but the aitia, as an incorporeal, is the expression of this assigned predicate that indicates that something has occurred. Furthermore, the clay is still clay, and the same piece of clay, but now has a different attribute or way that we describe it. The finger (aition) was a cause to the clay, and caused a physical change in the clay, and that physical change is described by the aitia. The aitia is an account of the causal relation and the method by which we come to understand the event as a causal relation. The aitia does not actually do anything at least nothing physical as Bobzien claims, but it is the meaning by which we come to understand the causal event that has actually occurred as a causal event. Aitia is the proposition associated with a causal event that expresses that a body has done something, and therefore is a cause. [34: Boeri, pp.742]

There is no real causal interaction between the bodies and the associated aitia because the aition does not an actively affect the aitia in any way. Interpreting aitia and aition as such helps to understand exactly what the Stoics determine to be the actual causal agent (aition) and what is the causal account (aitia) that allows for an understanding of a causal event as such an event. Boeris interpretation not only accounts for all parts of triadic Stoic causal relation, but also accounts for how, as rational thinkers, humans understand causal relations as such.

Works Cited Aristotle, and Jonathan Barnes. The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1984. Bobzien, Susanne. "Chyrsippus' Theory of Causes." Topics in Stoic Philosophy. By Katerina Ierodiakonou. Oxford: Clarenden, 1999. 196-242. Boeri, Marcelo D. "The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals." The Review of Metaphysics (2001): 723-52. Diogenes, Laertius. Diogenes Laertius: Lives of Eminent Philosophers. Trans. R. D. Hicks. Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1980. Frede, Michael. "The Original Notion of Cause." Doubt and Dogmatism: Studies in Hellenistic Epistemology. By Malcolm Schofield, Myles Burnyeat, and Jonathan Barnes. Oxford: Clarendon, 1980. 217-49. Hankinson, R. J. "Cause and Explanation." The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy. By Keimpe Algra. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge UP, 1999. Inwood, Brad. Ethics and Human Action in Early Stoicism. Oxford: Clarendon, 1985. Long, A. A., and D. N. Sedley. The Hellenistic Philosophers. Vol. 1. Cambridge [Cambridgeshire: Cambridge UP, 1987. Plato, John M. Cooper, and D. S. Hutchinson. Complete Works. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub., 1997.

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