A Faith-BasedScience Policy?By Henry Kelly

Volume 54, Number 1 January/February 2001

continued on p. 2

Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear WeaponsBy Robert W. Nelson

F.A.S. PUBLIC INTEREST REPORTJOURNAL OF THE FEDERATION OF AMERICAN SCIENTISTS (F.A.S.)

continued on p. 6

Despite the global sense of reliefand hope that the nuclear arms

race ended with the Cold War, anincreasingly vocal group of politi-cians, military officials and leaders ofAmerica’s nuclear weapon laborato-ries are urging the US to develop anew generation of precision low-yieldnuclear weapons. Rather than deter-ring warfare with another nuclearpower, however, they suggest theseweapons could be used in conven-tional conflicts with third-worldnations.

Critics argue that adding low-yieldwarheads to the world’s nuclearinventory simply makes their eventualuse more likely. In fact, a 1994 lawcurrently prohibits the nuclear labora-tories from undertaking research anddevelopment that could lead to aprecision nuclear weapon of less than5 kilotons (KT), because “low-yieldnuclear weapons blur the distinction

between nuclear and conventionalwar.”

Last year, Senate RepublicansJohn Warner (R-VA) and WayneAllard (R-CO) buried a small provi-sion in the 2001 Defense Authoriza-tion Bill that would have overturnedthese earlier restrictions. Although thelanguage in the final Act was watereddown, the Energy and Defense Depart-ments are still required to undertake astudy of low-yield nuclear weaponsthat could penetrate deep into the earthbefore detonating so as to “threatenhard and deeply buried targets.”Legislation for long-term research andactual development of low-yieldnuclear weapons will almost certainlybe proposed again in the currentsession of Congress.

Senators Warner and Allardimagine these nuclear weapons could

Figure 1. Diagrams like this one give the false impression that a low-yield earthpenetrating nuclear weapon would “limit collateral damage” and therefore be rela-tively safe to use. In fact, because of the large amount of radioactive dirt thrown out inthe explosion, the hypothetical 5-kiloton weapon discussed in the accompanying articlewould produce a large area of lethal fallout. (PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER/ CynthiaGreer, 16 October 2000.)

Americans have a right to expectthat the President will have the

best possible advice both about factsdefining his choices and the valuesthat should be brought to thedecision. And they have a right toexpect that he can tell the differ-ence. It’s a bad sign that the newPresident is pushing forward onmany complex issues – includingpreparing his first budget – withoutany apparent source of advice fromthe science community. No ScienceAdvisor to the President has beennamed (let alone confirmed) andfew, if any, of the Cabinet membersmanaging major federal researchportfolios come with any experienceor instincts in managing science andtechnology.

While Clinton named hisScience Advisor along with hiscabinet, the elder Bush waited a fullfive months before having a scienceadvisor in place – well after theinternal alliances that defined thenetwork of Presidential decision-making had been solidified. Thiscreated enormous problems;scientists in the White House findtheir work difficult even in the bestof circumstances. Science advisorseasily become the odd person out inpolitical circles – someone who canbe counted on to tell amusing storiesabout Mars rocks before everyone

low-yield nuclear weapons, we riskblurring the now sharp line separatingnuclear and conventional warfare, andprovide legitimacy for other nations tosimilarly consider using nuclearweapons in regional wars.

The FAS Public Interest Report (USPS 188-100) is published bi-monthly at 307 Massachusetts Av-enue NE, Washington, DC 20002. Annual subscription is $25/year. Copyright©2001 by the Federa-tion of American Scientists. ! Archived FAS Public Interest Reports are available online at www.fas.orgor phone (202) 546-3300, fax (202) 675-1010, or email fas@fas.org.

Editor: Henry Kelly, PresidentAssisant Editor: Karen Kelley, Organization Manager

FAS

Chairman: FRANK VON HIPPEL

President: HENRY C. KELLY

Members:

NATIONAL COUNCIL MEMBERS

RUTH S. ADAMS

DAVID ALBRIGHT

HAROLD A. FEIVESON

JEAN F. HERSKOVITS

MICHAEL T. KLARE

PRISCILLA J. MCMILLAN

The Federation of American Scientists (FAS), founded October 31, 1945 as theFederation of Atomic Scientists by Manhattan Project scientists, engages in re-search and advocacy on science-and-society public policy issues with an emphasis onglobal security policy. Current weapons nonproliferation issues range from nucleardisarmament to biological and chemical weapons control to monitoring small armssales; related issues include drug policy, space policy, and disease surveillance. FASalso works on learning technology and on reductions in government secrecy.

BOARD OF SPONSORS

2 """"" FAS Public Interest Report January/February 2001

*Sidney Altman BiologyBruce Ames Biochemistry*Philip W. Anderson Physics*Kenneth J. Arrow Economics*Julius Axelrod Biochemistry*David Baltimore BiochemistryPaul Beeson Medicine*Baruj Benacerraf Immunology*Hans A. Bethe Physics*J. Michael Bishop Biology*Konrad Bloch Chemistry*Nicolaas Bloembergen Physics*Norman Borlaug Agriculture*Paul Boyer ChemistryAnne Pitts Carter Economics*Owen Chamberlain PhysicsMorris Cohen Engineering*Stanley Cohen BiochemistryMildred Cohn Biochemistry*Leon N. Cooper Physics*E. .J. Corey ChemistryPaul B. Cornely Medicine*James Cronin Physics*Johann Deisenhofer BiologyCarl Djerassi ChemistryAnn Druyan Writer/Producer*Renato Dulbecco MicrobiologyJohn T. Edsall BiologyPaul R. Ehrlich BiologyGeorge Field Astrophysics*Val L. Fitch PhysicsJerome D. Frank Psychology*Jerome I. Friedman Physics*John Kenneth Galbraith Economics*Walter Gilbert Biochemistry*Donald Glaser Physics-Biology*Sheldon L. Glashow PhysicsMarvin L. Goldberger Physics*Joseph L. Goldstein Medicine*Roger C. L. Guillemin Physiology*Herbert A. Hauptman Chemistry*Dudley R. Herschbach Physics*Roald Hoffmann ChemistryJohn P. Holdren Political Science*David H. Hubel Medicine*Jerome Karle Physical ChemistryNathan Keyfitz Demography*H. Gobind Khorana Biochemistry*Arthur Kornberg Biochemistry*Edwin G. Krebs Pharmacology

*Willis E. Lamb Physics*Leon Lederman Physics*Edward Lewis Medicine*William N. Lipscomb ChemistryJessica T. Mathews Public PolicyRoy Menninger PsychiatryRobert Merton SociologyMatthew S. Meselson BiochemistryNeal E. Miller Psychology*Franco Modigliani Economics*Mario Molina ChemistryPhilip Morrison PhysicsStephen S. Morse Virology*Joseph E. Murray MedicineFranklin A. Neva Medicine*Marshall Nirenberg Biochemistry*Douglas D. Osheroff Physics*Arno A. Penzias Astronomy*Martin L. Perl PhysicsGerard Piel PublisherPaul Portney EconomicsMark Ptashne Molecular BiologyGeorge Rathjens Political Science*Burton Richter PhysicsDavid Riesman, Jr. Sociology*Richard J. Roberts BiologyVernon Ruttan AgricultureJeffrey Sachs Economics*J. Robert Schrieffer PhysicsAndrew M. Sessler Physics*Phillip A. Sharp BiologyStanley K. Sheinbaum EconomicsGeorge A. Silver Medicine*Richard E. Smalley ChemistryNeil Smelser Sociology*Robert M. Solow Economics*Jack Steinberger Physics*Henry Taube Chemistry*James Tobin Economics*Charles H. Townes PhysicsFrank von Hippel PhysicsMyron E. Wegman MedicineRobert A. Weinberg Biology*Steven Weinberg Physics*Torsten N. Wiesel MedicineAlfred Yankauer MedicineHerbert F. York Physics

*Nobel Laureate

BRUCE BLAIR

MARVIN L. GOLDBERGER

MARK A. R. KLEIMAN

KENNETH N. LUONGO

FASFUND

The Federation of American Scientists Fund, founded in 1971, is the 501(c)(3) tax-deductible research and education arm of FAS.

Chairman: STEVEN FETTER

Members:

MARVIN MILLER

DAVID Z. ROBINSON

BARBARA HATCH ROSENBERG

ARTHUR H. ROSENFELD

LYNN R. SYKES

GREGORY VAN DER VINK

Secretary: PRISCILLA J. MCMILLAN

Treasurer: MICHAEL MANN

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

President: HENRY C. KELLY

RICHARD MULLER

PETER REUTER

WILLIAM REVELLE

HERBERT F. YORK

FAS PublicInterestReport

In This

Issue ...Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating NuclearWeapons ................................................

A Faith-Based Science Policy? ..............

FAS Welcomes Sherman to Staff ..........

R&D A Priority For FAS NewestProject ....................................................

Defense Export “Reforms” Revisited ....

FAS Obtains First Bush PresidentialDirective ................................................

1

1

7

7

7

8

Figure 2. The Pentagon has a growingcollection of high precision conventionalweapons capable of defeating hardenedtargets. In this sled-driven test, the GBU-28 laser guided bomb with its improvedBLU-113 warhead penetrates severalmeters of reinforced concrete.

be used in small-scale conventionalconflicts against rogue dictators, whileleaving most of the civilian populationuntouched. As one anonymous formerPentagon official put it to the Wash-ington Post last spring,

“What’s needed now is some-thing that can threaten a bunker

tunneled under 300 meters of gran-ite without killing the surroundingcivilian population.”

Statements like these promote theillusion that nuclear weapons could beused in ways which minimize their“collateral damage,” making themacceptable tools to be used likeconventional weapons.

As described in detail below,however, the use of any nuclearweapon capable of destroying a buriedtarget that is otherwise immune toconventional attack will necessarilyproduce enormous numbers of civiliancasualties. No earth-burrowing missilecan penetrate deep enough into theearth to contain an explosion with anuclear yield even as small as 1percent of the 15 kiloton Hiroshimaweapon. The explosion simply blowsout a massive crater of radioactivedirt, which rains down on the localregion with an especially intense anddeadly fallout.

Moreover, as Congress understoodin 1994, by seeking to produce usable

Figure 3. A B2 bomber releases anunarmed B61-11 earth-penetrating bombduring tests in Alaska. Despite fallingfrom an altitude of 40,000 feet, this bombburrowed only approximately 20 feet intothe soil. Any nuclear blast at this shallowdepth would not be contained, and wouldproduce intense local fallout.

January/February 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 3

continued on p. 4

Conventional Earth-PenetratingWeapons

The Pentagon already has anumber of conventional weaponscapable of destroying hardened targetsburied within approximately 50 feet ofthe surface. The most well-known ofthese is the GBU-28 developed anddeployed in the final weeks of the aircampaign in the Gulf War. The AirForce was initially unable to destroy awell-protected bunker north ofBaghdad after repeated direct hits. The4000 lb GBU-28 was created from avery heavy surplus Army eight-inchgun tube filled with conventionalexplosive and a modified laser guid-ance kit. It destroyed the bunker,which was protected by more than 30feet of earth, concrete and hardenedsteel.

The precision, penetrating capabil-ity, and explosive power of theseconventional weapons has improveddramatically over the last decade, andthese trends will certainly continue.Indeed, the GBU-37 guided bomb, asuccessor to the GBU-28, is alreadythought to be capable of disabling asilo based ICBM — a target formerlythought vulnerable only to nuclearattack. In the near future, the UnitedStates will deploy new classes of hardtarget penetrators which can landwithin one to two meters of theirtargets.

The B61-11 Nuclear Bomb

However, mini-nuke advocates —mostly coming from the nuclearweapons labs — argue that low-yieldnuclear weapons should be designedto destroy even deeper targets.

The US introduced an earth-penetrating nuclear weapon in 1997,the B61-11, by putting the nuclearexplosive from an earlier bomb designinto a hardened steel casing with anew nose cone to provide groundpenetration capability. The deploy-ment was controversial because ofofficial US policy not to develop newnuclear weapons. The DOE and theweapons labs have consistentlyargued, however, that the B61-11 ismerely a “modification” of an olderdelivery system, because it used anexisting “physics package.”

The earth-penetrating capability ofthe B61-11 is fairly limited, however.Tests show it penetrates only 20 feet

or so into dry earth when droppedfrom an altitude of 40,000 feet. Evenso, by burying itself into the groundbefore detonation, a much higherproportion of the explosion energy istransferred to ground shock comparedto a surface bursts. Any attempt to useit in an urban environment, however,would result in massive civiliancasualties. Even at the low end of its0.3-300 kiloton yield range, thenuclear blast will simply blow out a

huge crater of radioactive material,creating a lethal gamma-radiation fieldover a large area.

Containment

Just how deep must an under-ground nuclear explosion be buried inorder for the blast and fallout to becontained?

The US conducted a series ofunderground nuclear explosions in the1960s — the Plowshare tests — toinvestigate the possible use of nuclearexplosives for excavation purposes.Those performed prior to the 1963Atmospheric Test Ban Treaty, such asthe Sedan test shown in Figure 4, wereburied at relatively shallow depths tomaximize the size of the craterproduced.

In addition to the immediateeffects of blast, air shock, and thermalradiation, shallow nuclear explosionsproduce especially intense local

radioactive fallout. The fireball breaksthrough the surface of the earth,carrying into the air large amounts ofdirt and debris. This material has beenexposed to the intense neutron fluxfrom the nuclear detonation, whichadds to the radioactivity from thefission products. The cloud typicallyconsists of a narrow column and abroad base surge of air filled withradioactive dust which expands to a

Figure 4. The 100 KT Sedan nuclear explosion, one of the Plowshares excavation tests,was buried at a depth of 635 feet. The main cloud and base surge are typical ofshallow-buried nuclear explosions. The cloud is highly contaminated with radioactivedust particles and produces an intense local fallout.

4 """"" FAS Public Interest Report January/February 2001

Figure 5. Underground nuclear tests must be buried at large depths and carefullysealed in order to fully contain the explosion. Shallower bursts produce large cratersand intense local fallout. The situation shown here is for an explosion with a 1 KT yieldand the depths shown are in feet. Even a 0.1 KT burst must be buried at a depth ofapproximately 230 feet to be fully contained. (Adapted from Terry Wallace, withpermission.)

radius of over a mile for a 5 kilotonexplosion.1 In the Plowshare tests,roughly 50 percent of the total radio-activity produced in the explosion wasdistributed as local fallout — the otherhalf being confined to the highly-radioactive crater.

In order to be fully contained,nuclear explosions at the Nevada TestSite must be buried at a depth of 650feet for a 5 kiloton explosive — 1300feet for a 100-kiloton explosive.2

Even then, there are many docu-mented cases where carefully sealedshafts ruptured and released radioac-tivity to the local environment.

Therefore, even if an earth pen-etrating missile were somehow able todrill hundreds of feet into the groundand then detonate, the explosionwould likely shower the surroundingregion with highly radioactive dustand gas.

Long-Rod Penetration

It is straightforward to show,however, that the maximum penetra-tion depth is severely limited if themissile casing is to remain intact. One

can make reasonably accurate esti-mates of the penetration depth basedon the well-developed theory of “long-rod penetration.” The fundamentalparameter R is the ratio of the projec-tile ram pressure to the yield strengthof the material.3 The target materialyields, and penetration occurs, when Ris greater than one. For a steel rod topenetrate concrete, the minimumvelocities for penetration is about onehalf a kilometer per second (1100miles per hour). For ductile materials,the kinetic energy lost from thepenetrator can deform the target anddig out a penetration crater.

Fundamentally, however, thedepth of penetration is limited by theyield strength of the penetrator — inthis case, the missile casing. Even forthe strongest materials, impact veloci-ties greater than a few kilometers persecond will substantially deform andeven melt the impactor.

An earth-penetrating nuclearweapon must protect the warhead andits associated electronics while itburrows into the ground. This severelylimits the missile to impact velocitiesof less than about three kilometers per

second for missile cases made fromthe very hardest steels. From thetheory of “long-rod penetration,” inthis limit the maximum possible depthD of penetration is proportional to thelength and density of the penetratorand inversely proportional to thedensity of the target. The maximumdepth of penetration depends onlyweakly on the yield strength of thepenetrator.4 For typical values forsteel and concrete, we expect an upperbound to the penetration depth to beroughly 10 times the missile length, orabout 100 feet for a 10 foot missile. Inactual practice the impact velocity andpenetration depth must be well belowthis to ensure the missile and itscontents are not severely damaged.

Given these constraints, it issimply not possible for a kineticenergy weapon to penetrate deeplyenough into the earth to contain anuclear explosion.

The Weapons Labs and the CTBT

The most vocal proponents of newsmall-yield weapons come from thenation’s nuclear weapons laboratories,at Los Alamos and Livermore.

In a 1991 Strategic Affairs articleentitled “Countering the Threat of theWell-armed Tyrant,” Los Alamosweapons analysts Thomas Dowler andJoseph Howard II, argued that the UShas no proportionate response to arogue dictator who uses chemical orbiological weapons against US troops.Our smallest nuclear weapons —those with Hiroshima-size yields—would be so devastating that no USpresident could use them. We wouldbe “self-deterred.” To counter thisdilemma, they argued the US shoulddevelop “mininukes,” with yieldsequivalent to 0.01-1 KT: “... nuclearweapons with very low yields couldprovide an effective response forcountering the enemy in such a crisis,while not violating the principle ofproportionality.”

More recently, in a speech to theNuclear Security DecisionmakersForum, Sandia Laboratory DirectorPaul Robinson stated

“The US will undoubtedly require

Conclusion

Proponents of building a newgeneration of small nuclear weaponshave seldom been specific aboutsituations where nuclear deviceswould be able to perform a uniquemission. The one clear scenario isusing these warheads as a substitutefor conventional weapons to attackdeeply buried facilities. Based on theanalysis here, however, this missiondoes not appear possible withoutcausing massive radioactive contami-nation. No American president wouldelect to use nuclear weapons in thissituation — unless another countryhad already used nuclear weaponsagainst us.

The end of the Cold War shouldallow us to place further limits on thedevelopment and use of nuclearweapons. The danger of moving froma conventional to a nuclear war is soenormous, that the US refrained fromusing nuclear weapons in Korea evenwhen US troops were in danger ofbeing overwhelmed. Attempts todevelop a new generation of low-yieldnuclear weapons would only makenuclear war more likely, and theyseem cynically designed to providelegitimacy to nuclear testing - stepsthat would return us to the dangers ofCold War nuclear competition, butwith a larger number of nationsparticipating.#Robert W. Nelson, a theoretical physicist whoworks on technical arms control issues, is onthe research staff of Princeton University anda consultant to FAS.

NOTES:1 The base surge radius scales roughly as 4000W1/3

kt feet, where Wkt is the yield in kilotons.2 In general, NTS tests are buried at depths ofD > 450 Wkt t1/3.4 feet to be fully contained.3 R = ρv2 / 2Y = (v/vc)

2 where ρ is theprojectile density, v is its velocity, Y is theyield strength of the material, and the criticalvelocity vc = (2Y /ρ)1/2

4 For a penetrator which is much stronger thanthe target, D/L ~ (ρp / ρt) ln(Yp / Yt), where L isthe length of the penetrator, ρ is the materialdensity, and Y is the material strength to plasticyielding; the subscripts p and t stand for thepenetrator and target.

January/February 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 5

a new nuclear weapon ... becauseit is realized that the yields of theweapons left over from the ColdWar are too high for addressing thedeterrence requirements of a multipolar, widely proliferated world.Without rectifying that situation,we would end up being self-de-terred.”

A more cynical interpretation ofthese statements is that the laboratorystaff and leadership simply feelthreatened by the current restrictionson their activities, and want to gener-ate a new mission (and the associatedfunding) to keep them in operationindefinitely. Indeed, beginning in1990 with the collapse of the SovietUnion and the end of the Cold War,there was serious discussion of closingone of the bomb labs.

Moreover, President Clintonended US nuclear testing in 1993, andsigned the Comprehensive Test BanTreaty (CTBT) — a permanentworldwide ban on nuclear testing —in 1996. Despite the Senate’s failure toratify the CTBT in 1999, its propo-nents believe the treaty will eventuallycome into force. The major nuclearpowers continue to abide by the worldmoratorium on nuclear testing, andeven India and Pakistan appear tohave joined the moratorium after theirMay 1998 nuclear tests.

The nuclear weapons labs areparticularly threatened by the CTBT,since it will probably limit them tomaintaining the stockpile of weaponsalready in our arsenal. Keeping youngscientists interested in the weaponsprogram is especially difficult whentheir main job is the relatively mun-dane task of assuring reliability. Thelabs desire the challenge of designingnew nuclear weapons, simply for thescientific and technical trainingexperience the effort would bring.Hence, there is tremendous pressure tocreate a new mission that justifies anew development program.

But could the US deploy a newlow-yield nuclear earth-penetratingweapon without testing it? Undercontinued political pressure to supportthe Test Ban and its related StockpileStewardship Program, Los Alamos

Associate Director Steve Younger hasstated, “one could design and deploy anew set of nuclear weapons that do notrequire nuclear testing to be certified.However, ... such simple deviceswould be based on a very limitednuclear test database.”

On the other hand, it seemsunlikely that a warhead capable ofperforming such an extraordinarymission as destroying a deeply buriedand hardened bunker could be de-ployed without full-scale testing.First, even if the missile casing wereable to withstand the high-velocityground impact, the warhead “physicspackage” and accompanying electron-ics must function under extremeconditions. The primary device mustdetonate and produce a reliable yieldshortly after suffering an intenseshock deceleration. Second, theremust be great confidence that theactual nuclear yield is not greater thanexpected. Since the natural energyscale for a fission nuclear weapon is oforder 10 KT, much lower yieldweapons must be sensitive to exactingdesign tolerances; the final yield isdetermined by an exponentiallygrowing number of fission-producedneutrons, so the total number ofneutron generations must be finely-tuned. Given that these weapons maybe used near population centers, it thusseems highly unlikely that designerscould certify a low-yield warheadwithout actually testing it.

What would be the consequence ifthe US decides to go ahead and test anew generation of nuclear weapons?As House Democrats expressed in aletter to Rep. Ike Skelton of Missouri,the ranking Democrat on the HouseArmed Services Committee,

“The resumption of nuclear testexplosions that will result fromsuch a program involving nuclearweapons would decrease ratherthan increase our national securityand undermine US and interna-tional non-proliferation efforts.”

If the US abandons the moratorium,Russia and China will almost certainlyrespond in kind — destroying pros-pects for eventual passage of theCTBT.

~

~

6 """"" FAS Public Interest Report January/February 2001

“A Faith-Based Science Policy?”continued from p. 1else gets down to dealing with theserious issues of the day.

The absence of sound scientificadvice is becoming increasingly danger-ous. There’s much at stake and lessroom for error in science policy. It’shard to find a major policy issue thatdoesn’t hinge in some important way onadvances in computers and communica-tion, biotechnology, nanotechnology,and a host of fields defined by othermouth-filling terms. Technical advancesplay a central role in economic growth,in national security, and finding afford-able ways to improve the naturalenvironment.

The price being paid is alreadyvisible. The administration’s budgetincreases spending for NIH by $2.8billion but dangerously shortchangesresearch in most other areas. A $50million increase is requested for NSF–not enough to cover inflation. TheDOE’s civilian research programs willcertainly be hurt – squeezed between anoverall cut in the DOE budget and arequested increase for stockpile stew-ardship. Defense research may behighly focused on a crash effort todevelop and deploy a ballistic missilesystem – at the expense of much neededlong-term research in DARPA and otheragencies. The irony, of course, is thatmedical research relies in essential wayson advances in physics, chemistry,information technology, and other areassupported outside of NIH – areasweakened in the current budget. Theadministration’s very public reversal onpolicy about climate change appears tohave been made without any seriouseffort to consult the scientific commu-nity – in or outside the administration.

The delay in picking a scienceadvisor may result from the admini-stration’s inability to find a respectablescientist willing to support positionswhere dogma collides with the positionsof the scientific community. I’d suggestthe following questions for anyonechosen:♦ Are you willing to defend tax cutseven if this clearly translates into deepreductions in federal R&D budgets? Thehypothetical budget surpluses theadministration proposes to give awaythrough tax cuts are based on an

assumption that domestic spending willbe tightly controlled. If tax cuts gothrough but the surpluses are notrealized, there will be a frantic searchfor savings. Things will be worse ifthere are sharp increases in defensespending. Research funding alwayslooks like something that can bepostponed.♦ Are you willing to tell the truthabout the feasibility of ballistic missiledefense systems? If there’s anythingclearly worse than being undefendedagainst missile attacks, it is believingthat you’re safe when you’re not. Willyou have the courage to speak the truthon this issue?♦ Will you prevent Americans withAlzheimer’s disease, spinal cordinjuries, diabetes, and other debilitatingillnesses and injuries from enjoying thebenefits of medical advances that can beachieved using stem cells? Anti-abortion extremists want to blockpromising research because of misin-formed fears that it would encourageabortions. Will you have the courage tostand up to this hysteria?♦ Will you recognize the critical rolefederal funding plays in ensuring thatfederal research helps ensure a cleanenvironment and a secure, affordableenergy supply? Drilling for oil in everyUS park will not come close to provid-ing the amount of energy that can besaved by advances in technologypossible in our automobiles, appliances,and industrial equipment. Will you beable to stand up to zealots who arguethat the federal government has no rolein applied research and explain thatprivate incentives to invest in majorinnovations are seldom strong enoughand federal funding is essential?

The new White House Office ofFaith-Based and Community Initiativesbegan work quickly but the WhiteHouse Office of Science and Technol-ogy Policy is still being manned byClinton holdovers who, for obviousreasons, are largely shut out of thedecision making process. An effectivescience and technology advisor canensure that America’s best scientificminds are brought to bear on criticalnational issues. Is the administrationuninterested – or is it afraid – of theadvice they might offer? #

FAS WelcomesSherman to Staff

Robert Sherman has joinedFAS as Director of the

Nuclear Security Program. Withdegrees in both chemistry andsocial psychology, Bob began hispublic life on the staff of Sen.George McGovern (D-SD),working in opposition to theVietnam war. He became anational security specialist toseveral prominent House membersof the Armed Services Committeeand the Defense AppropriationsSubcommittee, including RobertLeggett (D-CA), Bob Carr (D-SD), and Tom Downey (D-NY).

Bob’s first priority has beenprevention of the use of weaponsof mass destruction. He playedmajor parts in Congressionalsupport for the SALT II agreementand opposition to the MX missileand the B1 bomber. Working withRep. Les AuCoin, Bob was thekey staffer behind the 1985 flighttest ban on anti-satellite weapons.Most amazingly, in 1988 Bobpersuaded Rep. “B1 Bob” Dornan,one of the most determinedopponents of arms control, to bethe principal Republican sponsorof a flight test ban on depressedtrajectory ballistic missiles. (Theban passed the House by a 102-vote margin, was accepted inconference, vetoed by PresidentReagan, but became US policyunder the first President Bush.)

In 1993, Bob joined the ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency,which later merged with the StateDepartment. Bob served asExecutive Director of the ArmsControl and NonproliferationAdvisory Board, which providedtechnology-intensive confidentialadvice to Under Secretary JohnHolum. Bob also did intensivenegotiation on landmines, and isresponsible for the provision in theConvention on ConventionalWeapons that requires unmarkedanti-personnel mines to self-destruct and self-deactivate. #

Defense Export “Reforms” RevisitedBy Tamar Gabelnick

Arms Sales MonitoringArms Sales MonitoringArms Sales MonitoringArms Sales MonitoringArms Sales Monitoring

January/February 2001 FAS Public Interest Report """"" 7

As part of the US arms industry’snever-ending quest to reduce

barriers on overseas sales, they havecome up with the ultimate in speciousrationalizations. They claim that thecurrent US export system – originallydesigned to enhance US nationalsecurity and advance foreign policygoals – is now actually weakening USdefenses.

The Pentagon’s Defense Acquisi-tion and Technology last year en-dorsed this argument and pushedthrough a series of far-reaching“reforms” to the US export system,called the Defense Trade SecurityInitiative (see http://www.fas.org/asmp/campaigns/control.html formore information). But those changesare minor compared to the proposalsbeing put forth in a report by theCenter for Strategic and InternationalStudies (CSIS) due out at the end of

export and technology transfer licens-ing system is so long, burdensome,and over-restrictive that US allies arestarting to get fed up and shop else-where. In the CSIS’ view, inflexibleUS controls have instigated develop-ment of an industry consolidationprocess in Europe that threatens to cutthe US industry out of the market andleave the US hopelessly behind ontechnology development. This is badfor US security becauseinteroperability with the Allies re-quires Europeans to rely on the US forarms and technology, not the opposite.

The report rests on inaccuratefacts and less logic. Under the currentsystem, the US arms industry main-tains a large market share in Europe,making $9.5 billion worth of newgovernment to government sales deals

March. “Effective Export Controls forthe 21st Century” makes the counter-intuitive argument that US nationalsecurity would be enhanced byeliminating most of the currentcontrols on arms exports. Theypropose not only cutting all but themost sensitive items from the con-trolled US Munitions List, but alsoeliminating the need for most exportlicenses. Their solution would be toreplace the current transaction licens-ing system – where items for exportare approved individually by the Stateand Defense Departments – to a“process” system where companieswould be granted advance approvalfor most exports. The companieswould then be trusted to comply withwhatever export rules are left on thebooks.

The gist of the CSIS argumentgoes something like this. The US arms

Learning TechnologyLearning TechnologyLearning TechnologyLearning TechnologyLearning Technology R&D A Priority For FAS Newest ProjectBy Marianne Bakia

FAS’s new Learning TechnologyProject is off to a running start.

Our mission is to encourage theresearch and development needed toensure that advances in computers,communication, and other informationtechnologies make learning moreproductive, more accessible, and morefun for people of all ages. We areworking to strengthen the communityof scholars interested in R&D ofeducational technologies. Thisincludes gathering information onworldwide R&D efforts in learningtechnology and making it available onour website (www.fas.org/learn/index.html should be up and runningsoon). Project information willinclude descriptions, funding levels,and contact information. Both theinter-institutional relationships andknowledge developed through such aproject will be used to forge newalliances and improve sharing of

information in a nascent field whereresearchers often feel isolated. Thiswork is made possible by a grant fromthe Spencer Foundation.

We are also working to encouragegreater public funding in learningtechnology research. Researchinvestment in this critical field is tinycompared with the size and impor-tance of the education enterprise. Weare working in close collaborationwith other organizations to start theLearning Federation* (a government-industry partnership in learningresearch) and the Digital OpportunityInvestment Trust (a proposed resourcefor providing public support of thedevelopment of educational andcultural materials that could bedelivered over new communicationnetworks).

A key task has been to develop aprioritized research agenda, or “roadmap,” for research that would create

revolutionary new ways of usingtechnology to learn science, math,engineering, and technology educationat the post-secondary level. Thisresearch would define the challengesthat must be overcome to buildcompelling, effective and efficientlearning systems using advancedinformation technologies and intro-duce new ways to evaluate them.Under NSF sponsorship, we invitedthirty of the world’s most prominenteducational technology leaders to aworkshop focused on this project. Asummary of our conclusions is avail-able on the FAS website.

If you have any questions, com-ments, or would like to get involved inthese evolving activities, please don’thesitate to contact Marianne Bakia,Director, Learning TechnologiesProject at mbakia@fas.org.#* More information can be found atwww.learningfederation.org

continued on p. 8

PeriodicalsPaid at

Washington, D.C.

FAS PUBLIC INTEREST REPORT (202) 546-3300307 Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C. 20002; fas@fas.orgJANUARY/FEBRUARY 2001, VOLUME 54, NO. 1

ADDRESS CORRECTION REQUESTEDReturn Postage Guaranteed

FAS Obtains First Bush Presidential DirectiveBy Steven Aftergood

Government SecrecyGovernment SecrecyGovernment SecrecyGovernment SecrecyGovernment Secrecy

In a small victory over bureaucraticsecrecy, the FAS Project on Govern-

ment Secrecy obtained a copy of theBush Administration’s first presiden-tial directive, which the Administra-tion had refused to officially release.

Such Presidential directives areused to establish and implementnational security policy. Althoughthey frequently authorize the commit-ment of government resources, theytend to escape any kind of oversight oraccountability. They are often classi-fied and more often than not arewithheld from public disclosure. EvenCongress is not routinely notified oftheir existence or contents. According to a 1992 GeneralAccounting Office study, the previousBush Administration did not declas-

zation of the National Security Coun-cil System,” from a public-spiritedsource. The directive is hardly a statesecret. But it is an important policydocument, since it defines the struc-ture of the national securitydecisionmaking process, which cansometimes be a major factor inshaping policy outcomes. One hopes that the Bush Adminis-tration will still adopt a responsiblepolicy concerning public access toofficial information. Until then, thetext of National Security PresidentialDirective 1 is available on the FASweb site at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-1.htm. #

sify any of its presidential directives inits first three years. (Several have beendeclassified since then.) This habitual secrecy had beenpartially overcome in the ClintonAdministration. Although mostClinton directives, then known as“Presidential Decision Directives,”remain classified, President Clintondid authorize release of his first twodirectives in 1993 with no fuss at all. But in a reversion to past practice,“the White House did not publiclyrelease the directive, even though it isan unclassified document,” the NewYork Times reported on February 16. Nevertheless, FAS managed toobtain a copy of the document,designated National Security Presiden-tial Directive 1 and entitled “Organi-

The GAO already criticized DoD lastyear for putting forward reforms basedon “very little data or analysis” and onexamples filled with “factual errors.”The CSIS report shows the sameweaknesses, relying on the using thesmoke and mirrors of “a nationalsecurity risk” to throw everyone offthe real point: promoting the agendaof the weapons industry.

Although the CSIS report was notcommissioned by the government, theideas it puts forth are gaining a

to Europe and receiving $56.8 billionworth of licenses for commercial armsexports in fiscal years 1996-99. Theidea of European weapons technologysurging past US systems is ludicrousgiven the amount of relative spendingon research and development. Indeed,the US government blasted Europeansfor a technology gap in the otherdirection during the Kosovo conflict.

worrisome level of support amongpro-industry forces in the administra-tion and Congress. Fortunately keycongressional aides in the HouseInternational Relations and SenateForeign Relations Committees, whowould have to review any changes toarms export laws, have shown reluc-tance to further reduce controls forsecurity reasons. But developments,especially regulatory changes that cancircumvent Congress, bear closewatching. #

“Export Reforms Revisited”continued from p. 7